2. NEGROS ORIENTAL PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. HON.

PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC-NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH

52, BACOLOD CITY, and ANICETO MANOJO CAMPOS,

FACTS:
On 17 March 1999, Campos filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract with
Damages, , against NOPA before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros
Occidental, Bacolod City. According to the Complaint, Campos and NOPA entered
into two separate contracts denominated as Molasses Sales
Agreement.Campos allegedly paid the consideration of the Molasses Sales
Agreement in full, but was only able to receive a partial delivery of the molasses
because of a disagreement as to the quality of the products being delivered.
On 17 August 2005, more than six years after NOPA filed its Answer, NOPA
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of an alleged failure of Campos to file the
correct filing fee.
On 30 June 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to
Dismiss. NOPA received this Order on 17 July 2006.
On 1 August 2006, NOPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration. . On 5 January
2007, the RTC issued an Order denying NOPAs Motion for Reconsideration.
On 2 April 2007, NOPA filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals assailing the Orders of the RTC
On 23 May 2007, the Court of Appeals issued the first assailed Resolution
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari on the following grounds:
1. Failure of the Petitioner to state in its Verification that the allegations in
the petition are based on authentic records, in violation of Section 4, Rule
7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
2. Failure of the petitioner to append to the petition relevant pleadings and
documents, which would aid in the resolution of the instant petition, in
violation of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
3. Failure of petitioners counsel to indicate in the petition his current IBP
Official Receipt Number,

On 22 June 2007, NOPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above

Resolution, attaching thereto an Amended Petition for Certiorari in compliance with
the requirements of the Court of Appeals deemed to have been violated by
NOPA. The Court of Appeals denied the said Motion in the second assailed
Resolution dated 16 August 2007.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS NO
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROCEDURAL
REQUIREMENTS WHEN PETITIONER FAILED TO ALLEGE IN
ITS VERIFICATION THAT THE ALLEGATIONS THEREIN ARE
TRUE AND CORRECT OF HIS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OR
BASED ON AUTHENTIC RECORDS AND FAILURE TO ATTACH
THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTS ON ITS PLEADINGS AS
REQUIRED BY SECTION 1, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE

Held:
No. Clearly, the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 00-2-10 to Sec. 4, Rule
7 was in order to make the verification requirement stricter, such that the party
cannot now merely state under oath that he believes the statements made in the
pleading. He cannot even merely state under oath that he has knowledge that such
statements are true and correct. His knowledge must be specifically alleged under
oath to be either personal knowledge or at least based on authentic records.
A pleading, therefore, wherein the verification is merely based on the party’s
knowledge and belief produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court
to allow the deficiency to be remedied. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, in
the exercise of this discretion, refused to allow the deficiency in the Verification to
be remedied, by denying NOPA’s motion for reconsideration with attached amended
petition for certiorari.
As ruled in Lino Luna v. Arcenas, decisions of a trial court which "lie
in discretion" will not be reviewed on appeal, whether the case be civil or criminal
at law or in equity. Where such rulings have to do with minor matters, not affecting
the substantial rights of the parties, the prohibition of review in appellate
proceedings is made absolute by the express terms of the statute; but itwould be a
monstrous travesty on justice to declare that where the exercise of
discretionary power by an inferior court affects adversely the substantial legal rights
of a litigant, it is not subject to review on appeal in any case wherein a clear and
affirmative showing is made of an abuse of discretion, or of a total lack of its
exercise, or of conduct amounting to an abuse of discretion, such as its improper
exercise under a misapprehension of the law applicable to the facts upon which the
ruling is based. In its very nature, the discretionary control conferred upon the trial
judge over the proceedings had before him implies the absence of any hard-and-fast
rule by which it is to be exercised, and in accordance with which it may be reviewed.
But the discretion conferred upon the courts is not a willful, arbitrary, capricious and
uncontrolled discretion. It is a sound, judicial discretion which should always be
exercised with due regard tothe rights of the parties and the demands of equity and
justice.

The case at bar demonstrates a situation in which there is no effect on the substantial
rights of a litigant. NOPA’s petition for certiorari is seeking the reversal of the
orders of the RTC denying NOPA’s motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to
pay the proper docket fees. The alleged deficiency in the payment of docket fees by
Campos, if there is any, would not inure to the benefit of NOPA. There is therefore
no substantive right that will be prejudiced by the Court of Appeals’ exercise of
discretion in the case at bar. While the payment of docket fees is jurisdictional, it is
nevertheless unmistakably also a technicality. Ironically, in seeking theleniency of
this Court on the basis of substantial justice, NOPA is ultimately praying for a Writof
Certiorari enjoining the action for breach of contract from being decided on the
merits. What’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander . A party cannot expect
its opponent to comply with the technical rules of procedure while, at the same time,
hoping for the relaxation of the technicalities in its favor. There was therefore no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals warranting this Court’s
reversal of the exercise of discretion by the former. However, even if we decide to
brush aside the lapses in technicalities on the part of NOPA in its petition for
certiorari, we nevertheless find that such petition would still fail.
Furthermore, NOPA seeks for the application of this Court’s ruling in Manchester
case wherein we ruled that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar
pleading will not thereby vest jurisdictionin the court, much less the payment of the
docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended pleading. In denying NOPA’s
motion to dismiss, the RTC cited Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, wherein
we modified our ruling in Manchester and decreed that where the initiatory pleading
is not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment
ofthe fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive orreglementary period. The aforesaid ruling was made on the
justification that, unlike in Manchester, the private respondent in Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. (SIOL) demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees required. NOPA claims that Sun is not applicable to the case
at bar, since Campos deliberately concealedhis claim for damages in the prayer. In
the case at bar, the circumstances clearly show that therewas no deliberate intent to
defraud the Court in the payment of docket fees, the case of Sun should be applied,
and the Motion to Dismiss by NOPA should be denied

3. UNITED PARAGON MINING G.R. No. 150959

CORPORATION VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Prior to the instant controversy, private respondent Cesario F. Ermita was a
regular employee working as a foreman of petitioner United Paragon Mining
Corporation (UPMC, hereafter).

On January 18, 1996, Cesario received a termination letter,

informing Cesario that his employment as foreman is terminated effective thirty
days after his receipt of the letter. As stated in the letter, the termination was on
account of Cesarios violation of company rules against infliction of bodily injuries
on a co-employee, it being alleged therein that Cesario inflicted bodily injuries on a
co-employee, a certain Jerry Romero, as well as for unlawfully possessing a deadly
weapon, a bolo, again in violation of company rules.

The matter was brought to the grievance machinery under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement existing at that time between UPMC and the United Paragon
Supervisors Union. Having failed to reach a settlement thereat, the parties agreed to
submit the dispute to voluntary arbitration.
On February 28, 1997, Voluntary Arbitrator Mendez rendered a
decision[4] in Cesarios favor, stating that although the procedural requirements in the
termination of an employee had been complied with, the termination of Cesario was
unjustified because it was arrived at through gross misapprehension of facts. The
Voluntary Arbitrator, in his aforementioned decision of February 28, 1997, ordered
Cesarios reinstatement, to his former position prior to the termination without loss
of seniority nor interruption of service, and to pay said Ceasario F. Ermita his back
wages, including such other fringe benefits as he would have been entitled to, from
the date of his termination effective February 17, 1996 up to the time of actual
reinstatement.
UPMC moved for a reconsideration of the decision insofar as it ordered
Cesarios reinstatement which UPMC sought to avert by offering separation pay
instead. April 22, 1997, the Voluntary Arbitrator denied the desired reconsideration
 Unsatisfied, UPMC, thru its Personnel Superintendent Feliciano M. Daniel,
elevated the case to the CA on a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Injunction, asserting that the Voluntary Arbitrator committed
grave abuse of discretion, erroneous interpretation of the law and denial of
substantial justice.
July 24, 2001, the CA dismissed the same on the following grounds:

1) The petition for certiorari was not the proper remedy in order to seek review or
nullify decisions or final orders issued by the Labor Arbiter;

2) The verification in the petition is ineffective and insufficient because it was

merely signed by the company's Personnel Superintendent without alleging or
showing that he is authorized for the said purpose and that the verification was based
on knowledge and information;

3) The petitioner's ground of grave abuse of discretion, erroneous interpretation of

the law and denial of justice are actually dwelling on the appreciation of facts, which
cannot be entertained in a petition for certiorari.
With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION AFTER FINDING THAT THE
PETITION LACKS MERIT BECAUSE IT DWELLED ON THE APPRECIATION
OF FACTS WHICH IS NOT PROPER IN PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.

HELD:
No reversible error having been committed by the CA. It is petitioners posture
that there is no necessity for a board resolution authorizing its Personnel
Superintendent to file in its behalf the certiorari petition because said petition arose
out of the labor dispute filed against it and its Personnel Superintendent, Feliciano
M. Daniel. It is argued that in Cesarios complaint for illegal dismissal, Daniel was
made a co-respondent of the corporation. Upon this premise, UPMC argues that
Daniel has all the right to answer the complaint and to appeal an unfavorable
judgment therein, which he actually did, in his capacity as the corporations Personnel
Superintendent and as its representative. Plodding on, petitioner contends that were
the CA to insist that Daniel could not represent the corporation, it follows that the
proceedings before the Voluntary Arbitrator could only be binding as against Daniel
because the company then could not have been duly represented in said proceedings.
True, ample jurisprudence exists to the effect that subsequent and substantial
compliance of a petitioner may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure in the
interest of justice. But to merit the Court's liberal consideration, petitioner must
show reasonable cause justifying non-compliance with the rules and must convince
the Court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration
of justice. Here, petitioner has not adequately explained its failure to have the
certification against forum shopping signed by its duly authorized officer. Instead, it
merely persisted in its thesis that it was not necessary to show proof that its Personnel
Superintendent was duly authorized to file that petition and to sign the verification
thereof and the certification against forum shopping despite the absence of the
necessary board authorization, thereby repeating in the process its basic submission
that the petition by Daniel is merely a continuation of the proceedings before the
Voluntary Arbitrator and that its Personnel Superintendent was impleaded as one of
the respondents in Cesarios complaint for illegal dismissal.

4. COLITO T. PAJUYO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDDIE

GUEVARRA, respondents.
FACTS:
In June 1979, petitioner Colito T. Pajuyo (Pajuyo) paid P400 to a certain Pedro
Perez for the rights over a 250-square meter lot in Barrio Payatas, Quezon
City. Pajuyo then constructed a house made of light materials on the lot. Pajuyo and
his family lived in the house from 1979 to 7 December 1985.
On 8 December 1985, Pajuyo and private respondent Eddie Guevarra (Guevarra)
executed a Kasunduan or agreement. Pajuyo, as owner of the house, allowed
Guevarra to live in the house for free provided Guevarra would maintain the
cleanliness and orderliness of the house. Guevarra promised that he would
voluntarily vacate the premises on Pajuyos demand.
In September 1994, Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his need of the house and
demanded that Guevarra vacate the house. Guevarra refused.
 Pajuyo filed an ejectment case against Guevarra with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City. In his Answer, Guevarra claimed that Pajuyo had no valid
title or right of possession over the lot where the house stands because the lot is
within the 150 hectares for socialized housing. Guevarra pointed out that for eight
years Pajuyo did not show up or communicate with him. Guevarra insisted that
neither he nor Pajuyo has valid title to the lot.
The MTC rendered its decision in favor of Pajuyo. Guevarra appealed to the
RTC of Quezon City. On 11 November 1996, the RTC affirmed the MTC decision.
Guevarra received the RTC decision on 29 November 1996. Instead of filing his
appeal with the Court of Appeals, Guevarra filed with the Supreme Court a Motion
for Extension of Time to File Appeal by Certiorari Based on Rule 42 (motion for
extension). The Receiving Clerk of the Supreme Court received the motion for
extension one day before the right to appeal expired.
On 3 January 1997, Guevarra filed his petition for review with the Supreme
Court.
On 8 January 1997, the First Division of the Supreme Court issued a Resolution
referring the motion for extension to the Court of Appeals which has concurrent
jurisdiction over the case.
On 28 January 1997, the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution granting the motion for extension conditioned on the timeliness of the
filing of the motion.
On 27 February 1997, the Court of Appeals ordered Pajuyo to comment on
Guevaras petition for review. On 11 April 1997, Pajuyo filed his Comment.
On 21 June 2000, the Court of Appeals issued its decision reversing the RTC
decision.
Pajuyo filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. Pajuyo pointed out that
the Court of Appeals should have dismissed outright Guevarras petition for review
because it was filed out of time. Moreover, it was Guevarras counsel and not
Guevarra who signed the certification against forum-shopping.
On 14 December 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution denying Pajuyos
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR ABUSED ITS
AUTHORITY AND DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION:

1) in GRANTING, instead of denying, Private Respondents Motion

for an Extension of thirty days to file petition for review at the
time when there was no more period to extend as the decision of
the Regional Trial Court had already become final and executory.
2) in giving due course, instead of dismissing, private
respondents Petition for Review even though the certification
against forum-shopping was signed only by counsel instead of by
petitioner himself.

HELD:
Decisions of the regional trial courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction
are appealable to the Court of Appeals by petition for review in cases involving
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. [14] Decisions of the regional
trial courts involving pure questions of law are appealable directly to this Court by
petition for review.[15] These modes of appeal are now embodied in Section 2, Rule
41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Guevarra believed that his appeal of the RTC decision involved only questions
of law. Guevarra thus filed his motion for extension to file petition for review before
this Court on 14 December 1996. On 3 January 1997, Guevarra then filed his petition
for review with this Court. A perusal of Guevarras petition for review gives the
impression that the issues he raised were pure questions of law. There is a question
of law when the doubt or difference is on what the law is on a certain state of
facts.[16] There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference is on the truth or
falsity of the facts alleged.
The Court of Appeals has the power to grant an extension of time to file a
petition for review.
A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law. Finality of
judgment becomes a fact on the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no
appeal is perfected.[23] The RTC decision could not have gained finality because the
Court of Appeals granted the 30-day extension to Guevarra.
The Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
approved Guevarras motion for extension.
 The material dates to consider in determining the timeliness of the filing of the
motion for extension are (1) the date of receipt of the judgment or final order or
resolution subject of the petition, and (2) the date of filing of the motion for
extension.[24] It is the date of the filing of the motion or pleading, and not the date of
execution, that determines the timeliness of the filing of that motion or
pleading. Thus, even if the motion for extension bears no date, the date of filing
stamped on it is the reckoning point for determining the timeliness of its filing.
A partys failure to sign the certification against forum shopping is different from
the partys failure to sign personally the verification. The certificate of non-forum
shopping must be signed by the party, and not by counsel.[27] The certification of
counsel renders the petition defective.[28]
On the other hand, the requirement on verification of a pleading is a formal
and not a jurisdictional requisite. The party need not sign the verification. A partys
representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts
alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.
The court agree with the Court of Appeals that the issue on the certificate against
forum shopping was merely an afterthought. Pajuyo did not call the Court of Appeals
attention to this defect at the early stage of the proceedings. Pajuyo raised this
procedural issue too late in the proceedings.

5. VICAR INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION, INC., and CARMELITA

V. LIM, Petitioners,
vs.
FEB LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION (now BPI LEASING
CORPORATION), Respondents.

FACTS:

A complaint for unjust enrichment and damages, filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati by herein petitioner, Vicar International Construction, Inc. (Vicar), against
Respondent FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation (now BPI Leasing Corporation)
and the Far East Bank and Trust Company. In turn, FEB Leasing and Finance
Corporation filed a Complaint against Vicar, Carmelita Chaneco Lim and one John
Doe, for a sum of money, damages and replevin.

Deeds of Absolute Sale with a "lease-back" provision were executed by the parties.
In those Deeds, Vicar appears to have sold to FEB the equipment purchased with the
loan proceeds and, at the same time, leased them back. Vicar claims to have paid
FEB. FEB maintains that Vicar still had an outstanding balance despite the
extrajudicial foreclosure. . As a consequence, the auction sale produced ₱17,000,000
which, Vicar claims, should have been applied to its loans.

In the course of the second (replevin) case, the trial court issued several Orders. the
regional trial court (RTC) quashed the property counterbond filed by Vicar and
denied the latter’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, which was grounded on forum
shopping. the RTC denied the corporation’s Motion for Reconsideration and Motion
for Voluntary Inhibition of the trial judge.

On October 3, 2002, Vicar filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals, to stop the implementation of the Writ of Replevin issued against the
subject equipment.

The Petition was instantly dismissed by the CA because the Verification and the
Certification against forum shopping had been executed by Carmelita V. Lim
without any showing that she had the authority to sign for and on behalf of petitioner-
corporation.

On November 23, 2003, the day after receiving its copy of the Resolution, Vicar
filed an "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for Admission of the Attached
Secretary’s Certificate." Nevertheless, the CA denied the Omnibus Motion

ISSUE:

whether the Court of Appeals erred in summarily dismissing the Petition

for Certiorari.

HELD:

The present Petition for Review is meritorious.

the Court deems it proper and justifiable to grant the present Petition. Clearly,
petitioners did not deliberately ignore SC Circular 28-91. In fact, a
"Verification/Certification," stating the information required under the Circular, was
attached to the Petition for Certiorari filed before the CA.

Petitioners merely missed attaching to their Petition a concrete proof of Lim’s

authority from Vicar to execute the said Verification/Certification on its behalf. .
The latter, however, lost no time in submitting its corporate secretary’s Certificate
attesting to the fact that, indeed, Petitioner Vicar’s board of directors had
unanimously approved a Resolution on October 2, 2002, authorizing its president
and general manager, Carmelita V. Lim, to file the Petition and "to execute and sign
x x x the verification and certification against forum shopping."

6. EDEN BALLATAN and SPS. BETTY MARTINEZ and CHONG CHY

LING, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GONZALO GO,
WINSTON GO, LI CHING YAO, ARANETA INSTITUTE OF
AGRICULTURE and JOSE N. QUEDDING, respondents.

FACTS:

Lot No. 24 is registered in the name of petitioners Eden Ballatan and spouses Betty
Martinez and Chong Chy Ling. Lots Nos. 25 and 26 are registered in the name of
respondent Gonzalo Go, Sr. On Lot No. 25, respondent Winston Go, son of Gonzalo
Go, Sr., constructed his house. Adjacent to Lot No. 26 is Lot No. 27 is registered in
the name of respondent Li Ching Yao.

In 1985, petitioner Ballatan constructed her house on Lot No. 24. She noticed
that the concrete fence and side pathway of the adjoining house of respondent
Winston Go encroached on the entire length of the eastern side of her property.
Forthwith, Ballatan informed respondent Go of this discrepancy and his
encroachment on her property. Respondent Go, however, claimed that his house,
including its fence and pathway, were built within the parameters of his father's lot;
and that this lot was surveyed by Engineer Jose Quedding.
Engineer Quedding declared that he made a verification survey of Lots Nos. 25
and 26 of respondents Go in 1983 and allegedly found the boundaries to have been
in their proper position. He, however, could not explain the reduction in Ballatan's
area since he was not present at the time respondents Go constructed their boundary
walls.
petitioner Ballatan made a written demand on respondents Go to remove and
dismantle their improvements on Lot No. 24. Respondents Go refused. The parties,
including Li Ching Yao, however, met several times to reach an agreement on the
matter.
Failing to agree amicably, petitioner Ballatan brought the issue before the
barangay. Respondents Go did not appear. petitioner Ballatan instituted against
respondents Go for recovery of possession before the Regional Trial Court,
Malabon. The Go's filed their "Answer with Third-Party Complaint" impleading as
third-party defendants respondents Li Ching Yao, the AIA and Engineer Quedding.
The trial court decided in favor of petitioners. . It dismissed the third-party
complaint.
Respondents Go appealed. The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the
trial court. It affirmed the dismissal of the third-party complaint against the AIA but
reinstated the complaint against Li Ching Yao and Jose Quedding. Instead of
ordering respondents Go to demolish their improvements on the subject land, the
appellate court ordered them to pay petitioner Ballatan, and respondent Li Ching
Yao to pay respondents Go, a reasonable amount for that portion of the lot which
they encroached, the value to be fixed at the time of taking. It also ordered Jose
Quedding to pay respondents Go attorney's fees for his erroneous survey.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in admitting the third-party complaint
despite the failure of respondents GO’s to pay the docket and filing fees before the
trial court.
HELD:
The Court of Appeals did not err in awarding damages.If there are unspecified
claims, the determination of which may arise after the fling of the complaint or
similar pleading, the additional filing fee thereon shall constitute a lien on the
judgment award. The same rule also applies to third-party claims and other similar
pleadings. In the case at bar, the third-party complaint filed by respondents Go was
incorporated in their answer to the complaint.
Go's failure to specify the amount prayed for and pay the corresponding
additional filing fees thereon such claim for attorney's fees refers to damages
arising after the filing of the complaint against the Go's. The additional filing fee on
this claim is deemed to constitute a lien on the judgment award.
7. Spouses PATRICK JOSE and RAFAELA JOSE, petitioners, vs. Spouses
HELEN BOYON and ROMEO BOYON, respondents.
FACTS:

Patrick and Rafaela Jose lodged a complaint for specific performance against Helen
and Romeo Boyon to compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel
of land subject of a controverted sale. The action was lodged before the Regional
Trial Court of Muntinlupa. The respondent judge, through the acting Branch Clerk
of Court issued summons to the respondents. As per return of the summons,
substituted service was resorted to by the process server allegedly because efforts to
serve the summons personally to the respondents failed. Petitioners filed court an
Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication which is
likewise been granted byt the respondent judge. On July 30, 1999, the respondent
judge, sans a written motion, issued an Order declaring herein respondents in default
for failure to file their respective answers. As a consequence of the declaration of
default, petitioners were allowed to submit their evidence ex-parte. The RTC issued
a resolution in favor of petitioner.

Helen Boyon, who was then in United States, was surprised to learn from her sister
of the resolution issued by the court. Spouses Boyon filed an Ad Cautelam motion
questioning, among others, the validity of the service of summons effected by the
court a quo. The RTC denied the said motion on the basis of the defaulted respondent
supposed loss of standing in court. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied.

ISSUES: Whether the servive of summons on respondents is valid.

HELD:

In general, courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the
service of summons, such service may be done personal or substituted service, where
the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines. However,
extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies only when
the action is in rem or quasi in rem. That is, the action against the thing itself instead
of against the defendant’s person if the action is in rem or an individual is named as
defendant and the purpose is to subject the individual’s interest in a piece of property
to the obligation or loan burdening it if quasi in rem.
In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific
performance directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a
piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue. Moreover,
court has consistently declared that an action for specific performance is an action
in personam. Hence, summons by publication cannot be validly served.

8. TOYOTA CUBAO, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS and DANILO A. GUEVARRA, respondents.

FACTS:
Toyota Cubao, Inc., undertook repairs on the car owned by private respondent Danilo Guevarra and
paid by means of Check in favor of Toyota. When presented for payment, the check was dishonored.
Petitioner requested that Guevarra should make good the check. Guevarra failed to heed the demand,
petitioner filed a civil case for collection of the unpaid account.
The trial court issued the summons to Guevarra at his address thru his sister-in-law by leaving a copy
of the summons and complaint but refused to sign. Respondent failed to answer of the complaint and was
declared default and petitioner was allowed to present evidence ex-parte. the trial court rendered judgment
in favor of petitioner
a writ of execution was issued to implement the decision. The notice of levy was served on
Guevarra personally but he refused to sign the receipt. The vehicle was sold at public auction
Guevarra filed a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals, for the nullification of the ex-
parte judgment. Guevarra claimed that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because
of a defective service of summons on him.
The appellate court annulled and set aside the default judgment, the writ of execution, the levy
upon execution and the sale at public auction of the vehicle. It held that the substituted service of summons
effected on private respondent was not valid.
Petitioner, in its appeal, argues that the appellate court has gravely erred in ignoring the rule that
the absence in the sheriffs return of a statement about the impossibility of personal service cannot be
conclusive proof that the substituted service resorted to is invalid. Petitioner asserts that the requirements
of Section 8, Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of Court have been met and that the evidence for such
compliance is the affidavit of the process server on the substituted service annexed to its reply filed before
the appellate court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by failure to
serve summon in his person

HELD:
The Court sustains the Court of Appeals.
Section 7, Rule 14, of the Rules of Court requires that summons must be served personally by
"handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him." If,
however, this mode of service cannot be effected within a reasonable time, substituted service may be
resorted to under Section 8 of the same Rule. A law prescribing the manner in which the service of
summons should be effected is jurisdictional in character and its proper observance is what dictates the
court's ability to take cognizance of the litigation before it. Compliance therewith must appear affirmatively
in the return. It must so be as substitute service is a mode that departs or deviates from the standard
rule. Substitute service must be used only in the way prescribed, and under circumstances authorized, by
law.

It is not here disputed that substituted service of summons has been resorted to by the process server
but that, unfortunately, the server's return did not state the facts or the needed particulars that could justify
the substituted service. The constitutional requirement of due process, exacts that the service (of summons)
be such as may reasonably be expected to give the notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules
accomplishes that end, "the requirement of justice is answered; the traditional notions of fair play are
satisfied; due process is served. In the case at bar, private respondent appears to have been notified of the
case for the first time only at the time the levy on execution of judgment was effected by the sheriff.
The fact of the matter was that Guevarra evidently had been unaware of the proceedings. Upon
learning of the adverse decision, he filed, a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court neither abused its discretion nor was in error when it refused to consider the affidavit of the process
server (declaring the concomitant facts required to be incorporated in the return) which was presented to it
for the first time only as an annex to its Reply filed with the tribunal.
9. ELISEO BOTICANO, petitioner, vs MANUEL CHU, JR., respondent.