Building Competitive Regions

e _it E d it
STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE s io
w
In recent years, the main focus of territorial policy has been on sustaining
Building

n
o
growth, not only to address relative decline, but also to make regions more

D Br

y
competitive. Putting this in practice is complicated because different

nl
regions have different characteristics (urban, intermediate, industrial,
Competitive

O
rural, etc.), which imply specific policy and investment needs. This report

u le
assesses the strategies pursued by OECD member governments to address
Regions

d
the competitiveness of regional economies and the accompanying governance

EC
mechanisms on which the implementation of these strategies rests. The

ea
report is principally based on findings from the series of reviews

se
undertaken by the OECD Territorial Development Policy Committee at STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE

R
O
national and regional levels.

e
FURTHER READING
An r
c tu

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGION

OECD Regions at a Glance
Le
GIO
CE RE
G O V ERNAN E CON
NOMY REGIO
NA L
The full text of this book is available on line via these links:
IO N A L ECO E RNANCE E TR ANS
REG MY G OV
NAL
http://new.sourceoecd.org/regionaldevelopment/9264009469 ANCE CONO REGIO
http://new.sourceoecd.org/governance/9264009469 MY G OVERN CE REGIO
NAL E
V E R NANCE N O MY
O A N
MY G O O
ECON VERN L EC N
N A L O LY GO CO N O RE GIONA GOVER
N ITION
REGIO NAL E
EC O NC E
G IONAL G IO O VERNA L E TRANS G I
Those with access to all OECD books on line should use this link: NANCE
R E
CE R E ONOM
Y G
GION A ANCE
R E
GOVER ERNAN EGION
AL EC CE RE OVERN
http://new.sourceoecd.org/9264009469
N O M Y GOV R N ANCE R G O V ERNAN AL ECON
OMY G
N C E REG
IO
ECO NOMY
GOV E
C O NOMY CE RE
GIO N
O VERNA CON
C O L E N AN Y G L E
ONOM
NAL E NA ER NA
REGIO REGIO Y GOV EGIO
SourceOECD is the OECD's online library of books, periodicals and statistical databases.
NANCE
ONOM AL EC VERNA
NCE R
CON
For more information about this award-winning service and free trials ask your librarian, or OV ER R EGION
AL EC
CE R EGION N OMY GO G IO NAL E
G N AN CE
RN AN A L ECO
E R E GI
NANC
R
GOVE CE RE
OV E EGIO N
OMY G ERNAN
write to us at [email protected]. ECON
E C O NOMY G OVERNA
NCE R
O M Y GOVER O MY GOV O V E
NAL ONOM
Y
ECON EC ON
MY G
REGIO EGION
AL EC
E G IONAL C E REG
IONAL
A L E CONO
NAN C E R
NCE R OVER NA N
EGIO N
GOVER VERNA ECON
OMY G NCE R
O N OMY GO R EG IONAL Y G O VERNA
EC ANC E
ONOM
OVERN AL EC
OMY G EGION
ECON E R
NAN C NAL
GOVER REGIO

Strategies and Governance

ANCE
OVERN
OMY G
ECON

MY G
CONO
NAL E
C E REGIO E C ON
VERNA
N
NAL
CONO
MY GO
N C E REGIO ECON
E A A L
OVERN
A L N
REGIO
N REGIO
OMY G OVERN
ANCE
MY GO
VE
N A L ECON CO N OMY G C OO N
E G IO NA L E
A L E CON
CE R NCE R
EG IO
GION NAL E
G O VERNAN G O VERNA R N A N CE RE R N ANCE
REGIO
E G IO
OMY ONOM
Y
GOVE MY GO
V E
NCE R
ECON EGION
AL EC
C O NOMY NAL E
CONO
O VERNA OVE
E R L E G IO Y G Y G
NA ONOM
C E M
www.oecd.org GOVER
NAN
REGIO VERNA
NCE R
AL EC NAL E
CONO
N
NANCE MY GO EGION ANCE
REGIO L ECO
ISBN 92-64-00946- GO V ER
ION AL ECONO
RN A N CE R
Y GO VER N
E R EG NA
IO N

-:HSTCQE=UU^Y[W:
G O
NANCE
R E
GOVE CON O M
ANC AL E C
9 GOVER C O NOMY E REGIO
NAL E
M Y G OVERN A NCE R
EGION
V E
NAL E VERNA
NC
CON O V E R N
MY G O
04 2005 04 1 P MY GO
REGIO MY GO NAL E CONO CONO
A NCE E
CONO
N CE REGIO REGIO
NAL E
E G IO NAL E IONAL
ECON
GOVER N
VERN A NAN CE
NCE R E R EG
Y G O Y GOVER ER N A V E RNANC V E R NA
OM Y GOV
M
MY GO
CON O G O
ECON IONAL E O N OM L E CONO
MY
O N O
AL EC RE IO
G
AL EC
R E GION A G
NANCE CE RE NANCE
GOVER
C E R EGION VERNAN C E R EGION Y GOVER AL
EGION
O
RNAN
M
RNAN Y G NO
ONOM L ECO
 � ��� � � ��
� ��
�

�
�
� ��

�
��
��

� ��
�
��

��

��
�
�

�
�� �
�� � ��

About OECD Browse_it editions

In a traditional bookshop you can browse the display copies from cover-to-cover, free of charge. Wouldn’t
it be good to be able to do the same online? Now you can. OECD’s Browse_it editions allow you to browse
our books, online, from cover-to-cover. But, just as in a real bookshop where you can’t take or copy pages
from the books on display, we’ve disabled the print and copy functions in our Browse-it editions - they’re
read-only. And, just as in a real bookshop, you may choose to buy or borrow from a library some titles you’ve
browsed, so we hope you’ll buy or borrow our books when they meet your needs. Tell us what you think
about our Browse-it service, write to us at [email protected].

Buying OECD Publications

You can purchase OECD books and e-books from our Online Bookshop - www.oecd.org/bookshop where,
if you purchase printed editions you can download the e-book edition free of charge. Our books are also
available from a network of distributors, click the ‘Distributors’ button on this website: www.oecd.org/
publications/distributors to find your nearest OECD publications stockist.

OECD Publications in Libraries

You’ll find OECD publications in many institutional libraries around the world, especially at universities and
in government libraries. Many subscribe to the OECD’s own e-library, SourceOECD. SourceOECD provides
online acess to our books, periodicals and statistical databases. If your institutional library does not yet
subscribe to SourceOECD, tell your librarian about our free three-month trial offer. For more details about
SourceOECD visit http://new.SourceOECD.org or email [email protected]
itoryLibrariesineachMembercountrywhereallOECDprintedpublicationsareavailableforconsultation-www.oecd.
org/deposoitorylibraries for a list.
 e _it E d it
s io
w

n
o
D Br

y
nl
Building

u le
d
Competitive Regions
EC

ea

se
R
O
Strategies and Governance

e
An r
Le c tu

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

 e _it E d it
io
s CO-OPERATION
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC
w
AND DEVELOPMENT

n
o
D Br

y
The OECD is a unique forum where the governments of 30 democracies work

nl
together to address the economic, social and environmental challenges of globalisation.

O
The OECD is also at the forefront of efforts to understand and to help governments

u le
respond to new developments and concerns, such as corporate governance, the

d
information economy and the challenges of an ageing population. The Organisation

EC

ea
provides a setting where governments can compare policy experiences, seek answers to

se
common problems, identify good practice and work to co-ordinate domestic and

R
O
international policies.
The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the

e
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
An r
c tu
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Le
Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
the United Kingdom and the United States. The Commission of the European
Communities takes part in the work of the OECD.
OECD Publishing disseminates widely the results of the Organisation’s statistics
gathering and research on economic, social and environmental issues, as well as the
conventions, guidelines and standards agreed by its members.

This work is published on the responsibility of the Secretary-General of

the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not
necessarily reflect the official views of the Organisation or of the governments
of its member countries.

Publié en français sous le titre :

Promouvoir la compétitivité des régions
Stratégies et gouvernance

© OECD 2005

No reproduction, copy, transmission or translation of this publication may be made without written permission.
Applications should be sent to OECD Publishing: [email protected] or by fax (33 1) 45 24 13 91. Permission to photocopy a
portion of this work should be addressed to the Centre français d'exploitation du droit de copie, 20, rue des
Grands-Augustins, 75006 Paris, France ([email protected]).
 FOREWORD

e _it E d it
s io
w

n
o
D Br

y
nl
Foreword

u le
T

d
EC
his report analyses the strategies pursued by member governments to address the

ea
competitiveness of regional economies and the accompanying governance mechanisms

se
on which the implementation of these strategies rests. The report is principally based on

R
O
findings from the series of reviews undertaken by OECD at national and regional level.
Beginning with an overview of the concept of competitiveness, the first chapter

e
An
looks at how this term has been employed recently in a regional context and how it is
r
c tu
being translated into policy. Chapter 1 concludes that there are two broad categories of
Le
policy, those relating to firms and those relating to the wider business environment.
Chapter 2 assesses the main instruments that have been used to increase the
productivity of firms, focusing on three types of policy oriented mainly to increase the
level of innovation: science parks and other land-based initiatives, cluster policies and
policies to link local research institutions with enterprise. Chapter 3 turns to the
enabling environment in which firms operate, identifying the main factors that
increase the attractiveness of a region as a residential and business location. The
overall conclusion of Part I of this report is that regional competitiveness policies, by
their nature, are making new demands on both central and local governments in terms
of policy formulation and implementation. As such, the evolutions that are apparent in
the systems of governance in member countries are increasingly crucial.
Assessment of these evolutions in the second part of this report demonstrates that
these multi-level governance mechanisms are moving towards more co-operative
practices. First, the vertical relations between the centre and sub-national governments
are examined, with particular reference to the advantages and disadvantages of the use
of contractual arrangements between levels of government (Chapter 4). Among other
things, co-ordination between sectors/departments at the level of the central government
stands out as an important pre-requisite for more effective delivery of policy at lower
levels. The report then looks at horizontal co-ordination at local and regional level, in
particular co-ordination between municipalities and the different local institutional
structures that can promote such co-operation (Chapter 5). Extending the analysis of
cross-jurisdictional co-operation, the report then addresses the increasingly important
case of cross-border governance structures. Finally, the role of new actors, both private
firms and civil society organisations, in multi-level governance is examined, clarifying
the role that the centre can play in facilitating such public-private partnerships
(Chapter 6). Concluding our discussion of governance issues, the last chapter addresses
three main issues common to the various devices that have been reviewed (Chapter 7).

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

e _it E d it
s io
w

n
o
D Br

y
nl
O

u le
Acknowledgements. This report was prepared by Claire Charbit and

d
Andrew Davies, with the assistance of Adrienne Hervé. In addition to

EC
input from OECD territorial reviews, the report also draws on material

ea
prepared for the OECD by John Bachtler, Director of the European Policies

se
Research Centre (EPRC), and contributions to an OECD Symposium on

R
O
Multi-Level Governance held in June 2003 by Luigi Bobbio, Professor,
Università di Torino, Italy, Jean-Pierre Collin, Professor, Université du

e
An
Québec à Montréal (UQAM), Gerard Marcou, Professor, Université de r
Paris (Pantheon-Sorbonne), France and Paul Vermeylen, Expert
Consultant, Brussels, Belgium. Le c tu

4 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

e _it E d it
s io
w

n
o
D Br

y
nl
Table of Contents

u le
d
EC
Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

ea
Part I. Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

se
1. Competitiveness in a regional context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

R
O
2. Competitive firms: policies to generate innovation and knowledge . .
3. Competitive regions: policies for the wider business environment .
26
50

e
An r 63
tu
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Part II. Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L . . . .c

. . . .e ......... 67
4. Coordination between the different levels of government: transfers,
contracting practices and incentives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5. Horizontal co-ordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6. New actors in economic development strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
7. Common issues in co-operative governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

List of boxes
1.1. Targeted regulatory reform initiatives: Japan’s Special Zones. . . . . . 23
1.2. Region type and competitiveness strategy: some examples . . . . . . . 25
1.3. Sophia-Antipolis: slow evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.4. Cluster development: a national approach and a regional model
in Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.5. Cluster audit in Montreal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.6. Cluster policies: success involves intensive effort: the case of Scotland 37
1.7. Research-industry relationships: the example of Georgia Tech . . . . 43
1.8. Higher education and industrial clusters in the Öresund region. . . . 44
1.9. Deregulation of universities: the case of Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.10. Centres of Expertise, Finland. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.11. HES in Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1.12. Impacts of the Öresund bridge on attractiveness
and competitiveness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
1.13. Some examples of rural amenities assessed by OECD . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
1.14. Reorientation of industrial cities: the port city of Busan, Korea . . . . 61
1.15. The balance sheet of urban amenity promotion in Glasgow . . . . . . . 62

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
5
TABLE OF CONTENTS

e _it E d it
2.1. Metropolitan reform: the creation of the s Greater London Authorityio 94
2.2. Illustrations of reticence with regard w to inter-municipal mergers . . 9798

n
o
2.3. The US case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

D Br
2.4. An illustration of place-based policy in rural areas: the micro-regions. 100

y
2.5. Inter-municipal co-operation in intermediate regions . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

nl
2.6. Examples of intermediate levels for co-ordinating inter-municipality

O
agreements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

u le
2.7. Cross-border governance: the examples of TriRhena and Öresund . 111

d
EC
2.8. Obstacles to cross border institution building: the starting point

ea
for Vienna-Bratislava . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

se
2.9. The example of Cascadia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

R
O
2.10. PPPs for local innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
2.11. PPPs for the supply of local infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

e
2.12. Participatory PPPs for “territorial projects” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
An r118
2.13. Logistic Centre Wolfsburg GmbH – Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
u 121
2.14. Expertise advice and comprehension between public and private
Lect
sectors – The Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
2.15. Examples of learning initiatives for local public officials
in OECD countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

List of tables
1.1. Taxonomy of kinds of relationships between tertiary education
and business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.2. Source of innovative ideas for Busan firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1.3. Types of collective action for mise en valeur of amenities . . . . . . . . . 59
1.4. Port city transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

List of figures
1.1. Transport infrastructure investment and economic growth effects . 52
2.1. Indicators of fiscal decentralisation in OECD countries:
sub-national government share in general government revenues
and expenditures, percentages, 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.2. Changes in the share of sub-national governments in total public
revenues and spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.3. Shares of conditional transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.4. Organisational structure for regional contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

6 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 ISBN 92-64-00946-9
Building Competitive Regions
Strategies and Governance
e _it E d it
© OECD 2005
s io
w

n
o
D Br

y
nl
Executive Summary

u le
d
EC

ea

se
R
O

e
An r
Le c tu

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
7
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

e _it E d it
s io
w

n
o
D Br

y
nl
O
The challenge for territorial policymakers is to

u le
develop policies that are effective and relevant in

d
different regional contexts

EC

ea

se
In recent years, the main focus of territorial policy has been on sustaining

R
growth, not only on addressing relative decline but on making regions more

O
competitive. This has involved a shift away from redistribution and subsidies

e
for lagging regions in favour of measures to increase the productivity of
An r
c tu
enterprises and encourage private investment, including an emphasis on
endogenous assets.
Le
Putting this into practice is, however, complicated because different regions
have different characteristics (urban, intermediate, industrial, rural, etc.)
which in turn imply specific and different policy and investment needs. As a
first principle, therefore, policies to improve competitiveness need to be
capable of adapting to these different needs.

In all cases, competitiveness policies represent a

governance challenge

Regional competitiveness policies also pose significant governance

challenges. On the one hand, they depend on effective integration of sectoral
policies such as R&D and education. They also demand close co-operation
across levels of government and between neighbouring regions, not to
mention resource-sharing. They also involve a high degree of co-ordination in
planning and spatial development (zoning, network infrastructure
development, etc.). As important as the choice of strategy is the framework
within which the strategy is implemented.

Policies for firms focus increasingly on measures

that promote innovation
… But the instruments appear to favour more
advanced regions

Knowledge-based strategies stand out as key elements of new regional policy,

and they exemplify the move towards building on existing, endogenous

8 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

e _it E d it
assets. National and regional governments io to
sare re-orienting their policies
w
emphasise the role of public policy in creating or facilitating more systematic

n
o
exchange and interaction among key economic actors. This orientation is

D Br
driven by recognition that the system by which knowledge is created and then

y
circulates is an important determinant of productivity in a regional context.

nl
This report assesses three of the most common categories of policy measures

O
that endeavour to build such interlinkages:

u le
1. Real estate based projects: development of science parks, technopoles and

d
EC
other industrial spaces designed to facilitate networking and technology

ea
development and transfer through “co-location”.

se
2. Cluster-type policies: initiatives to support existing or nascent groupings of

R
O
firms by providing collective services and other measures to build co-
operation within the cluster and to enable joint initiatives to export,

e
market, etc.
An r
Le
3. Linking research and industry: linking knowledge producers with users in
order to promote “systems” of technology and innovation diffusion and
c tu
better commercialisation of innovation.
Among the three instruments discussed in this report, each has significant
advantages and some disadvantages, and there is some complementarity. It is
apparent that in the search for regional policies that emphasise knowledge
and innovation, these approaches are appealing, individually and in
combination.

For other regions, instruments need to be adapted,

but this risks diluting their impact…

However, the emphasis on innovation and knowledge has some limitations. In

particular, it appears to rest on an assumption that regions have at least
moderate levels of “knowledge infrastructure” and that local enterprises have
some innovative capacity. The three instruments discussed in the report all
appear to be best suited to more advanced regions. In order to be cost-effective
and have regional impact in other types of regions, these policies need to be
significantly adapted in less amenable contexts than are found in the “best
practice” high-tech, high wage regions. So far, adapting innovation-led
policies appears often to dilute their impact. For example, the development of
ambitious technology parks in less advanced regions has generally been seen
to produce very limited results – the term “cathedrals in the desert” has been
used to describe them. Cluster policies appear to depend on the presence of
factors that are by no means universal in intermediate and rural regions (e.g.,
sectoral specialisations, networking culture, etc.). A stronger participation by
technical colleges in regional development is an important avenue for

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
9
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

e _it E d it
policymakers; however, it is dependent on io
s the quality of the educational
w
institution concerned and the flexibility of its mission. Other measures to

n
o
embed FDI and to foster entrepreneurship have also had mixed results outside

D Br
the main economic centres.

y
nl
Policies should focus on the enabling environment

u le
as a factor that promotes business activity

d
EC
The common denominator in current thinking about territorial policy –

ea
including in relation to knowledge and innovation – is an emphasis on

se
exploiting place-specific externalities and unused potential. Policy

R
O
instruments now tend to focus on providing collective goods that improve
what has been termed the “enabling environment” or the “quality of place” –

e
An
the attractiveness and functioning of the region as a whole. These were often r
c tu
formerly part of social or environmental policies, but are now increasingly
framed in terms of building competitiveness. Le
Investment in the enabling environment emphasises physical infrastructure
investment, but the constraints on infrastructure investment are growing. In
particular, the costs of new infrastructure have increased dramatically, while
the proportion of total investment that will need to be allocated to
maintenance is becoming more significant. As a result, policymakers are
seeking more cost-effective strategies.
In theory, investment in the regional environment should aim to trigger
positive externalities that already exist in the region, which in turn should
produce growth effects via more intense and productive economic activity.
The issue for policymakers is to identify the possible sources of externalities
in regions where economic activity is, for one reason or another, constrained
(for example because of remoteness, because of location in a deprived urban
area, or because of the presence of political-administrative borders).

Rural policies should emphasise the potential of ICT

and of amenities in providing a base for enterprise
development…

Recent moves to diversify rural economies have shifted the emphasis towards
concepts of rural development that include both sectoral and non-sectoral
initiatives designed to maintain traditional sectors whilst supporting the
emergence of new activities. The concept of competitiveness applied to rural
regions is still relatively new, but it is having an important influence on
policymaking. Adoption of this more positive approach to rural policy has

10 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

e _it E d it
iorural
increased interest in more market-orientedssolutions to the problems of
w
regions. Two domains appear particularly important:

n
o
● Communications infrastructure produces generalisable time-savings and

D Br

y
productivity gains for most economic sectors. There is a close link between

nl
the increased use of ICT in rural locations and growing interest among
policymakers in rural enterprise creation, including how cluster policies

u le
can be adapted to be relevant for rural regions.
● Amenities can provide the basis for a wide range of economic activities in

d
EC
rural regions, particularly tourism-related activities but also other

ea
industries that support SMEs and provide a focus for entrepreneurship.

se
R
While urban regions are generally receptive to O

e
innovation-led policies, governments are still
An r
c tu
confronted with localised problems of adjustment…
Le
In general, policies to improve the competitiveness of cities emphasise their
comparative advantages in terms of knowledge infrastructure and the range
and variety of interactions among diverse economic actors. As noted above,
innovation-led policies of the type discussed in this report are generally
applicable in urban regions, and the main success stories related to these
approaches tend to be found in and around metropolitan areas (though not
exclusively so).

… In such cases, an urban “amenity” approach can

help improve the enabling environment

Nonetheless, governments continue to emphasise the challenges of

restructuring industrial economies and the problems of maintaining
economic and social vitality in particular areas of cities (whether inner city or
suburbs). In such cases, policymakers have recognised that they need to
address the quality of the wider urban environment in addition to direct
initiatives for the enterprise sector. In this respect, greater use of the
framework developed by OECD for rural amenities would be appropriate with
respect to creation of markets for collective public goods and the tools for
supporting collective action and public-private partnerships to transform
urban land use patterns and regenerate deprived neighbourhoods.

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
11
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

e _it E d it
s io
Cross-border regions exemplify the links between
competitiveness and governance w

n
o
D Br

y
Cross border regions represent another case in which the overall strategy to

nl
improve the competitiveness of the region generally needs to address issues
relating to the enabling environment as well as promoting objectives relating

u le
to firms directly. The cross-border integration issue exemplifies the
governance challenges that policymakers face in implementing development

d
EC
strategies that are specific enough to provide relevant solutions for a given

ea
region, but that are also coherent with national objectives.

se
R
The quality of the enabling environment is O

e
determined in large part by the quality of local
An r
c tu
collective competition goods…

Le
The emphasis on the quality of the local environment for business leads
directly to the question of the quality of locally provided services and public
goods. Firms, especially SMEs, are dependent on the environment in which
they are located to provide them with different types of “local collective
competition goods”. This involves the participation of various categories of
actors – public authorities at local, regional and central levels, private firms or
non profit organisations, etc. – to ensure that the provision is appropriate,
relevant, high quality, and so on. For example, regional innovation systems are
based on relations between industry and universities, between small and large
enterprises, and between sectors (training and employment, for example). At
central level, budgets, like the strategies themselves, relate to different
ministerial portfolios. And, in a context of decentralisation different sectors
are the competence of different levels of government. The co-ordination of the
various actors and sectors implied in such “systems” can be defined as
mechanisms of multi-level governance, and can be seen to directly influence
competitiveness.

… Of which the high quality provision is

increasingly dependent on processes of co-operation
among key government and non-government actors

New forms of governance targeting local and regional competitiveness, like

most development strategies themselves, are increasingly oriented towards
co-operation. This is true with respect to both vertical linkages (between lower
and higher levels of government) and horizontal linkages (which can be of two
types: between ministries at central level or between regions or communes). It

12 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

e _it E d it
s of stakeholders – essentially
is also true for linkages among various kinds io
public sector and private sector actors w
(profit or non-profit). In practice, these

n
o
different forms of co-ordination can be integrated in one and the same

D Br
system, as is the case for example with “micro-regions” in Mexico or the Czech

y
Republic.

nl
O

u le
The vertical relation between the centre and

d
regional government is crucial…

EC
… Contracts provide one important means by

ea
which to formalise this relation…

se
… But co-ordination at the central level between

R
ministries and departments is a pre-requisite to
vertical integration of policy O

e
An r
c tu
Given the complexity of multi-level governance mechanisms, the main policy
Le
question is: what organisational or institutional devices can promote the
active participation of central and regional levels of government in a co-
operative rather than hierarchical system? This report examines one of the
principal recent innovations that tries to respond to this question: the use of
contractual arrangements among levels of government. Contractual
arrangements across government levels represent a compromise, helping to
reconcile the tendency towards decentralization with the responsibility of the
central level to maintain overall coherence and consistency. Because they are
negotiated, contract systems tend to be well-adapted to joint projects of
regional development, more so than “automatic” fiscal equalisation mechanisms
that often characterised traditional vertical relations. They also have some
risks and drawbacks. These are mainly linked to the nature of the relationship
among the partners, and have led to the introduction of incentives for the
different parties to participate fully and to fulfil their contractual obligations.
While some open questions remain, in general contract-based regional
development should aim to:
1. ensure that local authorities are “empowered”;
2. preserve the negotiating power of the central government with respect to
other actors;
3. focus contractual arrangements on a limited number of key programmes,
while leaving some room for local targeting;
4. ensure the transparency of the process and open the contractual
negotiation to public participation, at least at some stages.
Only the central government can ensure co-ordinated action among the
different actors, as a pre-requisite for the implementation of territorial

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
13
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

e _it E d it
policies of this type. This co-ordination cans io
be achieved by means of dedicated
w
agencies or through more flexible institutional mechanisms.

n
o
D Br

y
At regional and local level, closer horizontal co-

nl
operation offers significant cost and outcome
advantages…

u le
Closer co-operation among municipalities can be relevant from two

d
EC
perspectives: contributing to an improvement in the cost efficiency of local

ea
public services and improving the coherence and impact of development

se
projects by emphasizing functional rather than administrative demarcations.

R
O
Overall, voluntary associations appear to stand a greater chance of success
than mergers ordered from the centre. Indeed, although they offer some clear

e
An
advantages, the economic arguments in favour of mergers have not been r
c tu
proven.
Le
… But this co-operation needs to be encouraged by
the central level (rather than forced) and to be
adapted to the specificity of the area

Co-operative solutions allow local authorities to preserve their identity and

autonomy from an institutional point of view. Nonetheless, it is still necessary
to find a workable compromise between the need for an intermediary
organisation that manages joint programmes and the need to avoid over-
complication of the local institutional structure. Moreover, the inter-
municipal institutions often lack transparency. One solution is to make
nomination of members of such inter municipal bodies more transparent.
Evaluations suggest that the elaboration of common, multi-sectoral
development projects is more efficient than co-operation based on
specialisation in the management and provision of one particular public
service. This allows decision-making on economic development (which is by
definition multi-sectoral) to be adapted to a more functional economic scale).
Fiscal incentives from the central level and the adaptation of the type of inter-
municipal coordination according to the characteristics of the area
(metropolitan, urban/rural and remote areas) seem to encourage participation
in such arrangements.

14 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

e _it E d it
s io
Better co-operation between border regions requires
more local flexibility and giving a stronger say to w

n
o
local private actors

D Br

y
nl
Interest in mechanisms for managing cross-border regions is the result of two
distinct international trends: first, supra-national integration is reducing trade

u le
barriers between countries, and second, decentralisation is putting more power
into the hands of subnational governments. Both trends increase the

d
EC
feasibility and potential benefits of collaboration across the border.

ea
The approaches taken in Europe and in North America differ markedly.

se
Despite their ambitious declarations, cross-border governments in Europe

R
O
have often failed to reach regional development objectives. The cost of co-
ordination and common decision making often appears to outweigh expected

e
An
benefits. The dense institutional and policy networks that support cross- r
border co-operation have not automatically resulted in the establishment of
Le
new public-private alliances to address regional and local development issues.
c tu
At its most successful, collaboration has worked mainly where public agencies
have been strongly involved and had a direct say in project definition and
implementation.
This differs somewhat from the pattern on the North American continent
where governance structures tend to be more flexible, more oriented towards
a few purposes, better able to react to specific problem situations and more
driven by the private sector and local governments. North America’s drive for
regional integration is motivated much more by direct economic concerns.
Given the problems of motivating integration efforts in many cases, according
greater weight to economic integration issues and allowing local private actors
a stronger say in the direction that integration should take appears to be
important.

The inclusion of private stakeholders, profit and

non-profit, in the decision making and policy
implementation processes contributes to improving
the competitiveness of regions

Beyond closer collaboration between central and local governments, or

between local or regional authorities, there is increasing recognition that
purely public intervention has its limits, and this has opened the way for
greater co-operation between the public and the private sector through public-
private partnerships (PPP). The main traditional advantage that PPPs present
is that they split the costs and risks of projects between the public and private
sectors, tapping into the expertise and economies of scale available in the

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
15
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

e _it E d it
iorisks
private sector that are rarely exploited forspublic policy. The principal
associated with PPPs are linked to w asymmetries of information and of

n
o
commitment between the different parties of the agreements. These

D Br
considerations have now to take into account more “inclusive” PPPs, of which

y
the various local stakeholders of the development projects, profit and non

nl
profit, may contribute. From the perspective of public policy, some

O
outstanding issues include:

u le
● Local public authorities need guidance and, as far as is practicable,

d
EC
standardised processes for selecting and operating PPPs. This help does not

ea
only concern respect of competition regulations but also the steps to be

se
followed to identify the best partner, evaluate the effectiveness of the PPP

R
O
option, and diffuse information to other local jurisdictions, among other
things.

e
●
An
Local firms should be involved in PPPs devoted to local development. As r
c tu
users of collective services, they have views on their needs in terms of
Le
infrastructure, training, etc. And as suppliers of services, they will often be
more attuned to improving outcomes than other actors that are less directly
involved. Without infringing rules of competition, it would be worthwhile to
provide them with the support and incentives necessary for them to
participate in this way. This is particularly important with respect to SMEs.
A similar logic should be applied with respect to citizen’s groups and other
non-profit organisations.

One of the most important challenges of the vertical

and horizontal co-operation mechanisms is to
enhance the competence of local actors

In order to obtain positive outcomes from these different innovations in the

overall governance system, some element of capacity building needs to be
emphasised. Examples include: change of civil servants, detachment of
officials to private organisations, targeted training for local NGOs, and so on.
The aim of these initiatives would be to increase the level of common practice
and information exchange among the different actors participating in multi-
level governance mechanisms.
At the same time, co-operative arrangements among levels of government
and between public and private actors present in themselves important
capacity building tools. An important recommendation is, therefore, that this
aspect (empowerment as capacity building) should be emphasized from the
outset, including clear definition of objectives and of the level of performance
expected from participants.

16 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

e _it E d it
s io
… Another is to improve evaluation, including that
of intangible outcomes w

n
o
D Br

y
The question of the value added of co-operative arrangements in the

nl
organisation and delivery of public goods should be addressed. Cost-benefit
assessment of the outcomes from physical investment can be taken into

u le
account, but this is insufficient. The intangible nature of many of the key
factors relating to competitiveness, such as networking and interlinkages

d
EC
among actors, makes many performance indicators, such as share of local

ea
beneficiaries in the decisional boards, share of local and regional revenues

se
from services offered to local firms, number of new companies advised by

R
O
public or semi-public regional development agencies, etc., very unsatisfactory.
These can supplement economic evaluation of the performance of

e
An
technopoles or other investments, but do not address adequately the added r
c tu
value of the governance approach itself. This is particularly true with respect
Le
to the capacity building aspect that is implied in multi-level governance
mechanisms.
In the case of multi-level partnerships, the evaluation problem needs to be
addressed from the outset and an appropriate reporting system has to be
established. Without such a framework, the financial incentives and sanctions
that partnership and contract mechanisms often include are difficult to
implement and to justify.

... And governments need to accept and encourage

institutional experiments

In the absence of optimal solutions to the questions raised by the new

objectives and instruments of regional policy, policymakers are obliged to
experiment with what is practicable in the given context. In order for these
experiments to be mainstreamed, where judged appropriate, it is important
that the central government support a policy of encouraging and evaluating
experimentation at regional level. Such a policy, based on, for example, grants
for selected projects in competition, allows relevant innovations at local level
to be diffused more widely.

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
17
 ISBN 92-64-00946-9
Building Competitive Regions
Strategies and Governance
e _it E d it
© OECD 2005
s io
w

n
o
D Br

y
nl
Part I

u le
d
EC

ea

se
Strategies

R
O

e
An r
Le c tu

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
19
I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
s io
w

n
o
D Br

y
nl
1. Competitiveness in a regional context

u le
The changing nature of regional policy in OECD countries

d
EC
The significance accorded to competitiveness by policymakers reflects

ea
the increasing emphasis on competitive advantage for national economies.

se
Policy makers across the OECD stress that their countries must become more

R
O
“competitive” if they are to maintain their economic position vis-à-vis other
industrial or developing nations and regions and respond to challenges such

e
as perceived productivity gaps, competition for mobile investment, rapid
An r
c tu
adoption of new technology and electronic commerce. While the wording and
Le
emphasis vary, the definitions originating from governmental and non-
governmental sources tend to share some fundamental elements and
assumptions. First, improving competitiveness at micro or firm level is a
means by which to improve macro-economic performance. Second, benefits
from improved firm competitiveness can be translated into better living
standards for all. Spillover effects transfer benefits from growth in one area to
another with which it is geographically linked or with which it has close
economic ties. Third, competition takes place in, and is “tested” by, open
(international) market conditions – it can be thought of as “relative
productivity in traded sectors”. And, finally, places compete with each other,
in the same way that firms do, for “market share”.1
Increasingly, the concept of competitiveness is extended to the regional
level. The argument is that (some) firms gain general and specific advantages
from geographical proximity to material inputs (raw materials, land, etc.), to
suppliers, to markets, to transport infrastructure, and so on. It follows that
places have different endowments and degrees of attractiveness. Michael
Storper formulates regional competitiveness as the capacity of a region to
attract and maintain successful firms while maintaining stable or rising
standards of living for the region’s inhabitants. Skilled labour and investment
gravitate away from “uncompetitive” regions towards more competitive ones.
The term “structural competitiveness” is often used to describe this capacity
of a region to support and attract economic activities. “Territorial capital” has
also been used to describe the bundle of attributes that a region possesses that
make it more or less competitive with respect to other regions.
The extension of the competitiveness concept to the regional level is
recent, but is having a major influence on the direction of policy. In particular,
it is supporting a revival of interest in a new form of regional policy. Regional

20 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
policy began in most OECD countries ins io of
the 1950s and 1960s, a period
w
relatively strong economic growth, fiscal expansion and low unemployment.

n
o
The principal objective of the measures that were introduced was greater

D Br
equity. The main instruments used were wealth redistribution through

y
financial transfers by the national government accompanied by large-scale

nl
public investments. During the 1970s and early 1980s, successive economic

O
shocks and changes in the global economy led to the emergence of

u le
geographical concentrations of unemployment in many countries, and

d
EC
regional policy evolved rapidly to address this new challenge. In the earlier

ea
period, the focus was on reducing disparities (in income, in infrastructure

se
stock, etc.). Now an additional focus on employment creation was added. The

R
O
guiding theoretical assumption in this case was that public policy could alter
supply conditions (essentially by changing production cost factors through

e
production subsidies and incentives) and thereby influence industrial
An r
c tu
(re)location decisions, both with respect to existing firms and new
investments.
Le
Overall, the results of these policies were disappointing: regional
disparities have not reduced significantly, appearing as entrenched as ever in
many countries. At a regional level, the success of these policies in
restructuring the economic base of the target areas has also been limited.
Attraction of inward investment illustrates the limitations that regional
policies came up against. Many governments have attempted to attract FDI
into target regions, with, as a premier objective, creation of employment, but
also an assumption that spillovers would benefit local enterprises, principally
increasing their technological and organisational capacity. However,
numerous studies have found that in most cases the facilities brought into the
region accrue little for the local economy in terms of productivity gains among
local enterprises. Often, these branch plants are weakly embedded in local
production systems, generating very low levels of local supplier linkages. Most
foreign-owned subsidiaries show weak innovation tendencies, and very few
conduct R&D or have linkages with the local innovation system, preferring to
retain their R&D in their main country of origin (Pavitt and Patel, 1991). The
experience of Scotland’s so-called “Silicon Glen” is a good example. Over the
course of the 1970s and 1980s a large number of high-technology companies
located in Scotland, among them IBM, Hewlett Packard, Motorola, NEC and
Compaq. These companies created large numbers of jobs and the inward
investment strategy was successful in moving Scotland away from reliance on
declining heavy industries. By 1990, electronics manufacturing accounted for
20% of all manufacturing and 42% of exports. This policy was supported
through large-scale incentives with electronics manufacturers in Scotland
receiving half of the available regional selective assistance grants over the
period 1995-1999. Nonetheless, the linkage between foreign-owned and local

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
21
I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
sexample, locally sourced iinputs
firms has not lived up to expectations; for
o
were only a very small proportion of w
total inputs. Moreover, the local input

n
o
tended to be mainly at the low-tech end – packaging, plastics, rubber and

D Br
metal components, for example.

y
nl
Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, regional policy moved down the
political ag en da. Large allocations for these programmes be came

u le
unsustainable in a period of successive economic recessions, generalised
higher levels of unemployment and increasing pressure on public

d
EC
expenditure. In response to poor outcomes, regional policy has evolved and is

ea
evolving from a top-down, subsidy based group of interventions designed to

se
reduce regional disparities into a much broader “family” of policies designed

R
O
to improve regional competitiveness and characterised by: 1) a strategic
concept or development strategy that covers a wide range of direct and

e
indirect factors that affect the performance of local firms; 2) a focus on
An r
c tu
endogenous assets, and less on exogenous investments and transfers; 3) an
Le
emphasis on opportunity rather than on disadvantage; and 4) a collective/
negotiated governance approach involving national, regional and local
government plus other stakeholders, with the central government taking a
less dominant role. Evidence of this so-called “paradigm shift” in regional
policy can be seen in recent reforms of regional policy in a number of OECD
countries. For example, signs that the local linkages were not likely to
increase, but if anything more prone to decrease, has led Scotland’s
development agency, Scottish Enterprise, to rethink its strategy and embark
on a development strategy (Smart Successful Scotland) that emphasises the
importance of innovation, human capital and the competitiveness of
indigenous business. A similar process has taken place in Ireland, another
region that was successful in attracting FDI but that is now reorienting its
strategy (Enterprise 2010 Ireland).

Diagnosing competitive advantage and identifying policy options

Developing strategies that will have an impact on the competitiveness of
a given region involves identifying the sources or potential sources of the
region’s competitive advantage. As such, an extremely wide range of factors
could be targets for policy. Some of these factors are national or international
in nature and lie beyond the scope of regional strategies, while others appear
more open to influence or replication at regional level.
Many factors that affect the functioning of enterprises or that encourage
investment are regulated through national policies that do not differentiate
among regions, i.e., that are based on legislative or regulatory frameworks that
are space-neutral. For example: the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) regime
affects incentives to undertake research and product development. Many of
the special development zones that have been introduced around the world

22 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
s io
w
Box 1.1. Targeted regulatory reform
Japan’s Special Zones
initiatives:

n
o
D Br
A major initiative that exemplifies the close links between territorial policy

y
and regulatory reform is the Programme of Special Zones for Regulatory

nl
Reform. The objective of this programme is to stimulate private sector

O
activity by exploiting targeted regulatory reforms that remove specific,

u le
localised development obstacles. The Zones are designated by local entities

d
(mainly governmental but also local consortia) on the basis of an assessment

EC

ea
of the geographical area that would benefit directly from revision of a

se
particular national regulation or law. The underlying assumption is that
many of the bottlenecks in the Japanese economy are localised and that

R
O
relaxing national regulatory frameworks in certain specific cases could give a
boost to both local and national economies. The philosophy of the

e
An
programme is based on the assertion that local actors are best placed to r
define their needs in terms of special exemptions or special treatment. The
Le
national government presents no model in advance and local groups must c tu
compete with other localities to prove that their proposal will have both local
and national impacts. Local actors must organise themselves before
submitting a proposal, and whatever strains or pressures might be caused by
the implementation of special measures in the zones (e.g., with respect to
adjacent areas where the measures are not applicable or balancing different
interest groups) must be mediated/negotiated locally. As such, the
programme is promoting the capacity building, local autonomy and
horizontal co-operation mechanisms that decentralisation processes are
trying to instil.

include measures to accord exemptions from specific regulations for firms

located within the target area. Region-specific regulatory frameworks have
also been tested in some countries as a means by which to overcome localised
market failures and/or test the feasibility of more general, nationwide reform
(see Box 1.1).
Factors relating to the geographical location, endowments and features of
every region are also undeniably important. Often, these can be harnessed by
policy – for example, development policies may seek to capitalise on a region’s
locational advantages as a transport hub or its position at a national border –
but these assets usually cannot be replicated and, as such, lie beyond the
scope of public policy. In addition to geographical location, these factors could
also include the presence of raw materials (such as oil or minerals) that
support extractive industries. It is fair to assume that many geographical and
physical endowments are becoming less significant as transportation times
and costs reduce. Nonetheless, there are many regions for which their

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
23
I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
s A 1998 isurvey
principal comparative advantage remains “endowment”-based.
of OECD rural regions confirmed that w
o
a large number of the most successful

n
o
rural regions possessed features of this type.

D Br

y
Leaving aside these categories of non-replicable input factors, OECD work

nl
suggests that there are two basic groups of factors that can be influenced by
policy: 1) those directly related to economic activities (principally related to

u le
economies of agglomeration) and 2) those that have an indirect influence on
economic activities (principally related to what have been termed economies

d
EC
of “urbanisation”).

ea
1) Direct: Individual firms derive comparative advantage from their

se
internal organisation, management style, internal processes of innovation,

R
O
product development, m arketing, and so on. In some reg ions, the
performance of the local economy is driven by a few dynamic firms. In many

e
An
other regions, collective characteristics pertaining to groups of firms or sectors r
c tu
provide a source of productivity gain. These collective advantages – often
found in clusters or productive systems – stem from the historicalLe
development of local sectors and links with the region, firm size and structure,
level of specialisation (agglomeration effects related to specialisation of
industrial production, and any spillovers such as high innovation capacity and
concentration of specialised workers), use of advanced technologies, and the
use of networking as a business practice.
2) Indirect: The wider business environment at regional level includes a
range of factors that either encourage or inhibit business activity. These
include the efficiency of the transport and communications infrastructure, the
level of local taxes and the quality of public services that they fund, provision
of affordable housing, the presence and quality of education institutions. This
is strongly linked to the strategic management of the economy and the level of
leadership that local authorities provide and, within that, the approach taken
to support local business, attract new industries and to provide an
environment that is attractive for investors and employees. In general,
attention focuses on the framework conditions for business, the tangible
factors that increase or decrease production costs – local tax regimes,
transport infrastructures, and so on. However, there is increasing recognition
that environmental quality, social stability and other attributes, often derived
from good local governance, can have an important influence on regional
competitiveness.
In order to define policy strategies that are relevant for the regional
context as well as fitting national policy objectives and constraints, it is
essential to move from the listing of potential contributory factors, to an
approach that sets priorities, assesses causal relationships in the regional
economy, etc. A series of reviews undertaken by OECD confirm the central

24 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
s io
Box 1.2. Region type and w
competitiveness strategy:
some examples

n
o
D Br
1) Knowledge activity oriented city regions. An innovation-oriented strategy has

y
been a key element in the success of the Helsinki, Öresund, Seoul and Montreal

nl
regions, and is the aspiration and main policy preoccupation for other regions

O
reviewed such as Glasgow and Melbourne. These large metropolitan or city-

u le
regions have similar combinations of large population, good infrastructure,

d
educational facilities, strong demand in international and national services,

EC

ea
etc. The competitiveness policy issue for such regions is how these assets are

se
managed in order to have an impact on relative competitiveness.

R
O
2) City regions in transition: There are a large number of smaller city regions,
often with a strong industrial tradition, high quality infrastructure and even

e
prestigious research capabilities but specialised in declining sectors. Such
An r
c tu
cities and regions are looking for their niche with respect to high growth/high

Le
rent “knowledge activity oriented” regions. Of the regions reviewed, this
category would include Newcastle, Belfast, Champagne-Ardenne and Bergamo.
In these regions, the endogenous assets of the region are strong, but are poorly
adapted to current economic conditions. Competitiveness policies emphasise
transformation of labour force skills and industrial specialisations, including
stronger roles for the region’s educational institutions.
3) Specialised manufacturing regions. Other regions, often with moderate
population densities but dense infrastructure networks achieve critical mass
in a limited number of economic sectors. This category includes the Central
Valencia Districts, Modena, Siena (as well as other regions identified in the
national reviews of Italy and France) and is the preferred trajectory for
Canberra. These regions depend on their ability to absorb and apply new
knowledge and adapt to international pressures through an enterprise
structure that emphasises positive feed-backs among economic actors
(research, government and local and foreign firms). The issue for such
regions is to maintain and enhance the relational assets that support their
high productivity.
4) Rural regions. Finally, there are regions where neither population and
infrastructure nor particular forms of firm organisation offer opportunities
for external economies or above average rents. The extreme examples of this
category are remote rural regions, such as the regions of Tzoumerka and
Teruel, but also applies to regions without strong geographical handicaps,
such as Moravska Trebova-Jericka, until such time as physical and knowledge
infrastructure are upgraded. The endogenous assets of these regions are less
clear. Nonetheless, evolutions in the demand for rural areas, and more
specifically the demand for rural amenities, promise to increase the value of
the environmental assets of rural areas.

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
25
I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
importance of competitiveness issues s for regions and the interest io of
w
policymakers at both national and regional level in identifying strategies. The

n
o
series of regional reviews suggest that a small number of generic success

D Br
factors appear repeatedly in dynamic regions, constitute the principal

y
aspirations of intermediate regions or appear as weaknesses in less dynamic

nl
regions. These reviews suggest a very broad typology of regions, implying

O
related but different policy needs (see Box 1.2).

u le
The next two sections will assess the initiatives that member

d
EC
governments have introduced in order to increase the competitiveness of

ea
reg i o n s , f oc u s i n g o n 1 ) p o l i c i e s a n d i n s t r um e n t s t o i n c re as e t h e

se
competitiveness/productivity of firms and 2) policies and instruments to

R
O
improve the quality of the region as a business location.

e
2. Competitive firms: policies to generate innovation and knowledge
An r
The competitive advantage of regions: exploiting proximity
and linkages to generate innovation Le c tu
The search for a new approach to regional industrial policy in mature
economies is now mainly focused on making domestic firms more
competitive, and this has, in turn, led to an emphasis on innovation and better
use of the knowledge and technology available within a region. On the one
hand, the reorientation of regional policy in many countries has led to a more
sophisticated awareness of reg ional innovation syste ms and their
components. On the other hand, science and technology policymakers are
taking increasing account of the importance of region-specific factors – in
particular the role of proximity – in the innovation process. This approach
emphasises the importance of agglomeration effects for knowledge creation
and diffusion and takes the view that the regional level is the most
appropriate to assure knowledge a favourable “diffusive” environment.
Physical proximity, and the shared ’regional culture’ that often comes with it –
i.e. shared practices, attitudes, expectations that facilitate the flow and
sharing of tacit and other forms of proprietary knowledge – have become the
cornerstones of an implicitly “regional” system of innovation.
The relation between innovation and region-level interaction is
supported by a large body of academic literature. A string of observations in
the 1980s, from clustering of hi-tech firms to the rising competitiveness of
more traditional industrial districts, triggered the idea of a new form of
spatial-industrial organisation. 2 The regional version of the innovation
system developed by Porter provides an illustrative and very influential
example. According to Porter, “regions compete in providing the most
productive environment. It is not the industry that matters but the way the
firm competes, its use of the advantages that the local environment brings.

26 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
Porter’s much-cited development “diamond” io
sstructure contains four principal
w
factors: 1) a supportive context for firm strategy and rivalry (i.e., policies/

n
o
regulations that encourage investment and technical upgrading); 2) robust

D Br
demand conditions (a core of advanced, competitive and demanding

y
customers); 3) related and supporting industries (capable local suppliers,

nl
preferably organised in clusters); and 4) good factor/input conditions (human

O
resources, physical infrastructure, etc.). The system should be animated by

u le
dynamic, open competition among locally based rivals (Porter, 1994 and 1990).

d
EC
While the model has been criticised for being inflexible, it provides an

ea
illustration of how innovative capacity can drive the competitiveness of a

se
place, based of the ability of that region to exploit its own resources. The work

R
O
of Storper has also been influential in promoting the view that it is a basket of
“untraded interdependencies” (labour markets, regional conventions, norms

e
and values, public or semi-public institutions, etc.) 3 that foster an
An r
c tu
environment conducive to trust, co-operation and innovation, often
Le
synonymous with social capital. The corollary of this argument is that lack of
such untraded interdependencies is typical of many vulnerable regions,
including, notably in the context of debate over exogenous vs. endogenous
development models, those characterised by loosely embedded branch plants
(Cooke et al, 2004). The same concept of locational advantage has been used by
other theorists to focus attention on the crucial role of “geographical
cumulative causation” and “positive feed-backs” (Kaldor and others, including
Krugman), “knowledge workers” (Moss Kanter, 1995; Reich, 1991) and
“systems of innovation” (Lundvall and Johnson, 1994), as well as the
embeddedness of investment in generating competitive advantages (Dunning,
1992). There is some evidence to support these theories. Recent work by Cooke
(2004a) on the biosciences industry, for example, reveals a close association
between proximity and knowledge transfer. Cooke finds that in regions where
bioscience firms are strongly embedded in regional networks, companies
perform better than in other regions.
In their search for operational instruments to increase the intensity of
interactions among innovation and knowledge generators and users, regional
policymakers have developed a wide range of instruments. Overall, three
broad (and not mutually exclusive) categories of policy measures stand out:
1. Real estate based projects: Development of science parks, technopoles and
other industrial spaces designed to facilitate networking and technology
development and transfer through “co-location”.
2. Relational asset/cluster policies. Initiatives to support existing or nascent
groupings of firms with collective services and other measures to build
co-operation within the cluster and to enable joint initiatives to export,
market, etc.

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
27
I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
3. Linking research and industry. Linkingsknowledge producers withiusers;
o
w
systems of technology and innovation diffusion; commercialisation of

n
o
innovation, including specific models such as science parks, technical

D Br
service centres and technical education institutions.

y
nl
Constructing proximity: science parks, technopoles and other real

O
estate instruments

u le
Among the longest established policy instruments for promoting regional

d
EC
research and innovation capacity is the creation of high-tech industrial

ea
spaces, which are intended to provide a supportive business location for

se
innovative firms. The development of technopoles and science parks goes

R
O
back to the success of market-driven technology agglomerations like Silicon
Valley and Route 128. The success of these regions made them best practice

e
examples that other regions tried to imitate. A wave of publicly supported
An r
c tu
technopoles emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, with ambitious targets and
Le
correspondingly big sites and budgets – Research Triangle in North Carolina
and Sophia Antipolis in France are two well-known examples. These triggered
a variety of more modest adaptations of the model, tailored to the means of
the regions adopting them. The fact that firms like Apple and Hewlett Packard
grew up in such environments has certainly added credence to the theory that
co-location is beneficial for innovative small firms.

Locating together benefits firms and can provide a focus for FDI and
entrepreneurship
The rationale underlying the creation of shared industrial space is that
physical proximity between specialised firms, and between enterprises and
other technological organisations, combined with appropriate organisational
arrangements to facilitate cross-fertilisation, will lead to better generation
and exploitation of technological creativity. The following general models
have emerged:
● large technopoles, established by national governments as part of a
combination spatial planning and innovation policy, to attract external
(often large) investors in high-tech centres and to locate (public) research
centres;
● science parks linked to a university, often developed at a regional or
metropolitan level, with university involvement in park management, with
a major objective to encourage spin-outs;
● stand-alone science parks, developed by regional or local authorities as a
local incubator area for SMEs and to attract high-tech investments;
● incubator centres, a building complex with space for independent SMEs.
(Longhi and Quéré, 1997; 236).

28 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
io
s of national policy initiatives
Initially, many of these were the result
w
designed to create poles of growth, either to consolidate advanced regions or

n
o
to diffuse high end economic activity to non-core regions. France and Japan,

D Br
for example, have been at the forefront of this type of growth pole policy. The

y
prime objectives were to attract high-tech investments and skilled workers to

nl
target areas. To provide some impetus, most technopoles involved the

O
relocation or creation of public research facilities or even universities, and

u le
were sometimes linked to policies focused on sectors in which state

d
EC
procurement played a dominant role: defence, aerospace, nuclear and

ea
electronic technologies, for example. Some technopoles were also built

se
around investments by major multinational enterprises. An example is ZIRST

R
O
in Grenoble, France, where three major electronic firms – Thompson, Merlin-
Gerin and Hewlett-Packard – were major early stage investors. Recently, the

e
role of regional and local governments has increased dramatically. The
An r
c tu
interest of regional and local authorities in projects that imitate the large-

Le
scale nationally-driven science parks has led to some spectacular flops, but
also to a refinement of the smaller-scale version of the technopole as a
workable and locally fundable concept.
Technology parks and similar initiatives are often seen as a vehicle for
attracting FDI to locations where links can be developed with local suppliers
and research institutions. Foreign investment is assumed to produce
significant spillovers to the local business sector.4 The spillovers are assumed
to be more intense and more rapid where firms are located in the same facility
and are involved in organised networking as is often the case in science parks
and similar. Technopoles and science parks also often emphasise incubation
functions and entrepreneurship, with many of the larger initiatives including
a business incubator. The aim is mainly to incite spin offs from larger firms,
with support services provided for the new business at below market rates.
The ability of the technology park to effectively fulfil this role depends to a
large extent on whether specialised services and support staff are available.5

Outcomes require long-term commitment and institutional co-operation

Assessing the overall impact of these initiatives, it appears that the most
effective technopoles share three main features:
● some basic “raw materials ” or framework conditions, notably a specialised
research domain, dynamic manufacturing and service companies, higher
education facilities, and finance and human resources;
● mechanisms for cross-fertilisation, comprising organisational and
communication initiatives that support a culture of collaboration within the
technopole; and

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
29
I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
● an added value element involving the s emergence and use ofionew
technological knowledge, the creationw new products and processes, the
of

n
o
creation of durable and stable jobs, or the arrival of new enterprises,

D Br

y
It is clear that many of the varieties of technopole or science park do not

nl
possess or emphasise all of these features. On this basis, we can distinguish
between two types of initiative:

u le
● real technopoles: which are more comprehensive and ambitious measures
that include all three features (examples include the market-led US cases,

d
EC
the French technopoles process and individual cases in Europe and Asia);

ea
and

se
● quasi-technopoles: to denote the less comprehensive initiatives that would

R
O
typically downplay the networking and cross-fertilisation aspect of the
technopole concept and that are essentially industrial parks, business

e
support or information centres. An r
u
L e lattert “quasi-
The fact that so many technopoles are found in the c
technopole” category is partly because, unlike some other regional innovation
approaches, they involve development of a physical site. In general, the
construction part of the intervention is easy to design and is a tangible
political achievement. The cross fertilisation and value added aspects are,
however, much more complicated to generate, slow to emerge, difficult to
measure and, as a result, difficult to fund. In many cases, the crucial cross-
fertilisation dynamic is relatively weak and other objectives, notably
attraction of FDI have a more central importance. As noted above, they appear
to work best when the “raw materials” of the system are already in place, such
as a highly regarded R&D centre or some co-location of linked industries. In
these cases, the public investment aims simply to enhance existing patterns
of activity. In the majority of situations, however, the baseline conditions need
to be up-graded, and this requires long-term investment and commitment.
The case of Sophia-Antipolis, a prominent French technopole, illustrates the
point (see Box 1.3).
Given the long-term nature of the investment, the key questions for
policymakers include:
● is the clustering imposed by the technology park an effective means of cross
fertilisation and innovation diffusion?
● is the technology park destined to be a high tech enclave or can it be the
mainspring for a broader regional development strategy as well?
With respect to these questions, the record of both fully-fledged and
quasi technology parks is mixed. Although, in theory, technology parks can
form an essential interface between inter-regional and international systems,
many have been criticised as expensive oases, “cathedrals in the desert”,

30 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
s io
w
Box 1.3. Sophia-Antipolis: slow evolution

n
o
Sophia-Antipolis, located close to Nice, is today counted as a major

D Br
European technopole. It covers 2 300 hectares, 800 of which are given over to

y
nl
economic activity. Sophia-Antipolis is unusual in the sense that it was set up
in a region without an industrial or university tradition; the region’s only

O
resources were linked to its main activity, tourism. These were an

u le
international airport, transport infrastructure, good climate, and a

d
cosmopolitan tradition. These initial conditions, important for an

EC

ea
understanding of how the place developed, turned out in the end to be

se
favourable.

R
O
Two phases can be identified in the development of Sophia-Antipolis. Up
until the beginning of the 1990s, Sophia-Antipolis grew by accumulating

e
external resources. The project benefited from the French policy of
An r
u
decentralisation, becoming the home for the technology centres of major

L e c t on in
French businesses, and also from the multinationalisation that went
the 1970s and 1980s, the time when American companies set their sights on
the European market. A number of public research laboratories were also set
up there, as well as higher education facilities, which contributed to the
emergence of a highly-qualified labour market. This exogenous development
proved to be perfectly suited to the needs of these businesses, which were
adapting their products to a new market. That model underwent a crisis in
the 1990s. Sophia-Antipolis was able to generate a new, endogenous,
development model based on its accumulated resources. By contrast with the
first phase in which public policy had played a major role, this time it was the
actors that generated the new model through different associations of
businesses (Telecom Valley for instance, which includes all the actors
involved in ICT and which has enabled numerous exchanges to take place).
Telecommunications, and more especially the technologies associated with
the mobile phone, developed into one of the fundamental local areas of
competence. Growth no longer comes from attracting exogenous resources
but from the development of local businesses and technologies.
Source: Longhi C. (1999); and Garnsey E. and C. Longhi (2004).

attracting the lion’s share of regional public investment without contributing

sufficiently to the local economy.
Overall, technology parks appear to have performed best in three types of
region:
● Old industrial regions, which within the framework of industrial reconversion
have sought to create technopoles as a way of changing their overall image,

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
31
I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
to attract new economic activities ands io
to modernise the local industrial
fabric; w

n
o
● Urban locations offering economies of scale, a strong concentration of high

D Br

y
technology based activities and the possible transition between traditional

nl
and new technologies;
● Some new industrial regions, where initiatives have capitalised on the

u le
emergence of dynamic companies, particularly in high-tech sectors, in
areas with little industrial tradition.

d
EC

ea
Reducing the size and ambitions of such initiatives in an effort to tailor

se
them to less suitable locations or to more restricted budgets seems an
inappropriate development model.

R
O
Implementation and management of technopoles also poses a number of

e
significant challenges that relate to governance:
An r
c tu
● The construction of a technology park goes beyond the designated site and
Le
involves the development of support infrastructures of different kinds, such
as highway extensions, public transportation links, etc. These require close
linkag e of reg ion al innovation strateg ies w ith other investmen t
programmes that may have different overall objectives, timeframes, etc.
● Many technology parks involve greenfield developments or anticipate the
extension of existing sites into greenfield sites. These new developments
will have environmental impacts, impacts on transport flows and even
impacts on residential location. As such, they can have region-wide
implications, and as such should be the object of close inter-municipal and
inter-regional co-ordination;
● In order to reap the benefits associated with “real” technopoles, a
substantial investment over a long period is required. This investment will
inevitably involve national, regional and sometimes supranational funding
sources from a variety of sectoral budgets. For example, technology parks
based on existing universities will often involve a transformation and
upgrading of the research capacity/focus of the regional university – this
will require support for R&D activities through national R&D budgets and
programmes.

Building relational assets: cluster policies

Research studies of advanced urban, intermediate and rural regions often
emphasise the importance of specialisation in productive activities where a
competitive advantage can be derived and maintained. Others argue, on the
contrary, that specialisation by a region in a limited range of sectors is a
dangerous strategy and that diversity is the real key to creativity and
innovation. Rather than specialising in specific sectors or even product types,

32 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
io
s specialisation in a complex
the advocates of clusters argue that they promote
array of related activities demandingw diverse and highly market-oriented

n
o
skills. Interest in clusters arises, therefore, because of the potential of

D Br
innovative clusters to offer the benefits associated with specialisation at

y
regional level with flexibility and resistance to adverse changes in market

nl
conditions.

u le
Another motivation for interest in clusters is the accumulation of
evidence from different countries that both productivity and wage levels can

d
EC
be higher in clustered activities than in non-clustered activities, and that

ea
clusters in “traded” (as opposed to local or resource dependent) industries

se
have a strong influence on the overall prosperity of the region and on its

R
O
average wage level. Porter finds that clusters increase the contribution of
traded sectors to regional output and wages. Similar research by METI in Japan

e
and the Bank of Italy has suggested a correlation between clusters and higher
An r
c tu
productivity. Research into the sources of this productivity advantage focuses
Le
principally on the positive impact of the circulation of people and knowledge
around a local economic system on the generation of innovative ideas and the
development of new products and technologies. Within dynamic high-
technology clusters, levels of personal exchanges between firms appear to be
higher than in non-clustered locations. This type of “cross-pollination” of
ideas and innovation is put forward as one of the main drivers of the success
of the Silicon Valley model (Saxenian, 1994). Some research seems to
empirically verify this thesis. For example, the successful Stockholm ICT
cluster exhibits higher rates of inter-firm labour mobility that the rest of the
labour market and higher rates of intra-firm mobility than other comparable
private-sector enterprises (Power and Lundmark, 2004).
At the same time, other studies have questioned the validity of the
cluster hypothesis, asserting that problems of definition and measurement
make empirical evaluation of the relative performance of clusters and, in
particular, the origins of any difference with non-clustered industries
statistically dubious (Martin and Sunley, 2003). What is certain is that much of
the evidence to support the view that clusters are more productive is case
specific and large scale empirical reviews are extremely rare, with the review
of the Bank of Italy standing out as the most extensive research effort (the
problem from an international perspective being that Italy already provides
the best evidence of external economies derived from clustering). Other
researchers have found that clusters tend to be strong in only certain parts of
the production process or in particular sectors or sub-sectors, further
questioning the assertion that clusters can be a generalisable model of
economic organisation or an appropriate target for public policy.

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
33
I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
io
selement of regional strategies
In practice: an approach that forms a key
The “classic” Italian example ofw
established industrial clusters and

n
o
supportive policy environments has been widely cited for some time. More

D Br

y
recently, cases such as Helsinki where clusters seem not to have been purely a

nl
historical development but a phenomenon influenced by public policy have
led national and regional policymakers to focus on the strategies that can

u le
encourage this type of agglomeration and network building. The reversal of
fortunes of Helsinki has provided a convincing example of how clusters can

d
EC
turn a regional economy around. Helsinki has developed, very rapidly, a strong

ea
specialisation in a high growth sector, and has been extremely successful as a

se
result. One of the appealing lessons of the Helsinki case is that while sectoral

R
O
mix owes much to chance and path dependency has an influence, insightful
public policy undoubtedly played a role. Box 1.4 describes how a recently

e
An
introduced national cluster development programme in Japan was inspired at
r
c tu
least in part by the success of a publicly supported but locally driven network
in a Tokyo suburb. Le
Cluster policie s h ave pro liferated over the past decade, with
manifestations ranging from policies to encourage low-resourced, small-
group business networks without a particular sectoral focus to complex, large-
scale programmes of co-ordinated measures that targ et a specific,
geographically-cohesive industry. As an approach to regional development,
they differ from traditional incentive-based regional development policies by
concentrating their support on networks of diverse agents rather than on
individual firms. Although there has been some questioning of the degree to
which cluster policies are more than a reformulation of traditional sectoral
policies (Raines 2002), they are widely regarded as innovative in bringing
together formerly separate policy elements (Benneworth et al., 2003):
“Cluster policies have taken the sectoral focus and industry-specific
measures from industrial policy; an awareness that regional economic
growth is dependent on the interaction of businesses, institutions (such
as universities) and wider environmental factors such as the labour
market and infrastructure from regional development policies; and
… have acknowledged the importance of developing the capacity of
individual (particularly smaller) businesses to overcome their growth
challenges from SME policy…”
Benneworth et al. (2003) consider that these policy measures can be
subdivided into three groups: 1) support for existing clusters; 2) support for
busin e sses th at already co ll aborate; and 3) establ ishment o f new
collaborations between non-cooperating businesses. The first-step, therefore,
for most regions is to understand precisely the economic and “relational”
geography of the region. Many large regions have undertaken audits of their

34 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
s io
w
Box 1.4. Cluster development: a national
and a regional model in Japan
approach

n
o
D Br
The TAMA network

y
nl
The area of TAMA is in a suburb of Tokyo and became industrialised as
enterprises moved out of inner city and costal areas, partly due to the Factory

u le
Restriction Laws, to find less congested areas for industrial location. The area
developed a strong accumulation of sub-contracting enterprises in the

d
EC
electronics, transportation, precision machinery and other technologically

ea
advanced branches. As large firms moved overseas or contracted their

se
operations during the 1990s, the smaller firms located in the TAMA region

R
lost a substantial part of their customer base. The association focuses on the

O
revitalisation and development of industries located in the western parts of

e
the Tokyo metropolis, creating new technologies, products and businesses.
An r
c tu
The association promotes industry interaction and seeks to strengthen

Le
traditionally poor industry-university linkages through exchange and joint
R&D projects, with the broader goal of creating synergies that will foster new
technological development and commercialisation. TAMA has established a
Technology Licensing Office to assist in patenting, licensing, and R&D
commercialisation. TAMA founders report that they have been successful in
raising the concerns of companies in these sectors to policy makers, in
catalysing academic-industry links (important because many of the region’s
universities are small and not experienced in technology transfer), and in
creating a unifying hub in an otherwise fragmented region.

Japan’s Industrial Cluster programme

A 1996 White Paper on SMEs noted that firms with the characteristics of those
in the TAMA region could maintain their competitiveness through networking
with other similar producers and with research generators such as universities
and labs. Partly inspired by the success of TAMA, the Japanese Ministry for
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) Industrial Clusters Programme, introduced
in 2001, endeavours to build on the specific structural assets of 19 regions.
Officials of the Regional Bureaus of Economy, Trade and Industry (approximately
500 persons) work with approximately 5,800 local small and medium
enterprises and with researchers of more than 220 universities to implement
measures in three main fields: 1) giving support to exchanges and co-operation
between industry, academia, and government; 2) giving support to the
development of technologies for practical use based on regional characteristics;
and 3) establishment of facilities to provide training to entrepreneurs. In
addition, a relatively large number of local governments participate in the METI
Industrial Cluster Programme. Given that much of the financing within these
clusters is local funding, the attitude and capacity of local government to take a
more pro-active role in enterprise policy will also be crucial.
Source: OECD Territorial Review of Japan (2005)

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
35
I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
s io
Box 1.5. Cluster w
audit in Montreal

n
o
The first task for policy makers is to identify the key characteristics of

D Br
clusters and understand their different dynamics and potentials. This work is

y
nl
being undertaken in Montreal through the Stratégie métropolitaine de
développement économique par créneaux d’excellence. Montreal’s economy is

O
based on strong specialisation in a number of sectors. The preliminary

u le
research phase identified 15 possible clusters to focus on in Greater Montreal:

d
agriculture/bio-food, professional and business services, tourism/leisure,

EC

ea
aerospace, information technology, life sciences, nanotechnology, metals and

se
metal products, fashion/textiles, transportation/distribution, plastics,

R
composite materials, printing/publishing, chemicals, and environmental

O
industries. These were divided into three categories: existing/traditional
clusters, emerging clusters and diffused clusters (those not geographically

e
An
concentrated). As this list suggests, there is no shortage of possible r
employment sectors in the Montreal economy on which to build. The
Le
problem is weaving the multiple strengths of the regional economy into a
c tu
cohesive whole.
The point of departure in the case of Montreal is that the strategy should
take a metropolitan-region perspective. Unless cluster initiatives are
specifically structured to engage actors throughout the Metropolitan region,
they run the risk of heightening the tensions that exist between smaller
municipalities in the region and the new mega-city of Montreal itself. A
second principle of the cluster strategy is that it should address problems of
duplication among institutions, streamlining interventions according to an
agreed set of priorities. Given the potential for conflict between proponents of
specific locations or specific institutions, it is important that the process of
identifying priority clusters and priority measures is both transparent and
focused. In this respect, the initiative to engage a working group to elaborate
a development strategy based on clusters “of excellence”, appears to be an
important step forward. While there is a great deal of activity around the
different clusters – various cluster-based associations and committees –
there has not been until now an overview of the range of clusters in the
metropolitan region that both diagnosed strengths and weaknesses and
proposed concerted policy action. The ultimate aim of the group is to follow
an open methodology by which the diagnostic is verified and leads to agreed
conclusions of the policy actions that the diagnosis implies in the context of
the level and type of public investment available.
Source: OECD Territorial Reviews of Montreal (2004).

36 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
economic structure in order to specifically sidentify groupings of firmsiothat
w example (Box 1.5) describes an
could be the target for collective support. The

n
o
ongoing process in Montreal, a city with strong industrial specialisations in

D Br
aeronautics and pharmaceuticals that is looking to establish a more

y
comprehensive cluster development strategy that takes into account not only

nl
different categories of existing clusters but also identifies new opportunities.

u le
Unlike the development of regional technology centres or science parks,
cluster policies require relatively low capital investment. Nonetheless, as both

d
EC
national and regional governments have discovered, they tend to be human

ea
resource intensive and demand a significant commitment of time on the part

se
of both the public policy officers and specialised brokers/facilitators, making

R
O
the overall funding requirement significant. The Scottish case provides a good
example (see Box 1.6).

e
An
Policy measures tend to focus on providing common resources for groups r
c tu
of inter-related firms – such as specialised infrastructure or specific skills
Le
training programmes – or to encourage linkages between and amongst firms

Box 1.6. Cluster policies: success involves intensive effort:

the case of Scotland
Scotland has several existing and emerging enterprise clusters,
characterised by strong linkages and networks between firms, the presence
of specialised supporting institutions and infrastructure and well-developed
sector labour markets. Scottish Enterprise was one of the first economic
development agencies to consider the potential of the cluster approach, with
research undertaken in 1993 to identify Scotland’s clusters and to assess
which could benefit from specifically targeted support. Critically,
Scottish Enterprise did not seek to create entirely new clusters of firms.
Instead it prioritised clusters that demonstrated strong existing capacity,
willingness from industry players to work together and with the public sector
and where there was the potential for policy to make a difference.
This is an example of a successful regional cluster-based policy managed
through a development agency. At the same time, it should be noted that this
approach was supported with significant funding and has been resource
intensive from the beginning. It was supported with EUR 360 million over six
years. The process of working out how public policy can help to generate
linkages among firms and between firms and other actors was long and
painstaking. The results obtained have justified the investment, but they also
suggest that the cluster audit represents a crucial first step before this
strategy is taken forward.
Source: OECD, Urban Renaissance: Glasgow (2002).

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
37
I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
and research providers. The target group ofs io of
these services should be groups
w
firms rather than a single firm. A survey of research on support for clusters

n
o
identified a series of actions that have proven to be successful in one or more

D Br
places (Rosenfeld, 2002):

y
nl
● Regional economic analysis and benchmarking to better understand how
the regional economy functions as a system and which policy levers are

u le
likely to have the greatest impact. Actions: identification of clusters;
modelling and mapping of systemic relationships; benchmarking of

d
EC
clusters against competitors.

ea
● Engagement with the collective needs of employers and institutions.

se
Actions: recognition, or where unmet need exists, creation of cluster

R
O
associations; formalisation of communication channels; fostering of inter-
firm collaboration.

e
● An
Organisation and delivery of services around the complexities and r
Le
interdependencies of business needs, rather than individual generic
functions. Actions: organisation and dissemination of cluster-oriented
c tu
information; establishment of one-stop cluster hubs; formation of cross-
agency cluster teams; creation of cluster branches of government;
facilitation of external connections.
● Building a specialised workforce, with the aim of producing workers who
are more productive, informed about labour markets and better connected
to employers. Actions: qualification of people for employment; use of
clusters as context for learning; establishment of cluster skill centres;
formation of partnerships between educational institutions and clusters;
support for regional skills alliances; working with NGOs to reach low-
income populations.
● Allocation and attraction of resources and investment to maximise impacts
on the economy. Actions: incentives or purpose-specific funds for multi-
firm projects only; investment in cluster R&D; support for applications for
national and EU funding in less-favoured regions; funding of critical
foundation factors (e.g. education, healthcare, housing).
● Stimulation of innovation and entrepreneurship to generate new ideas and
new enterprises. Actions: investment in innovations and business start-
ups; support for cluster-based incubators; facilitation of entrepreneurs’
support networks; promotion of innovation networks; building of
technology cluster hubs.
● Marketing and branding of the region. Actions: targeting of inward
investment; promotion of clusters; formation of export networks; exploiting
opportunities for regional branding.

38 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
These services can be provided by io
sa variety of different actors,
w
government, quasi-government or private, each having certain advantages.

n
o
Legitimacy in building consensus, for example, may favour governmental

D Br
agencies or associations. The same is true when services imply disclosure of

y
sensitive information or brokering between potentially conflicting interests:

nl
public or collective actors may be perceived as offering better guarantees of

O
neutrality and confidentiality. The need for specialised skills, on the other

u le
hand, could argue in favour of private sector provision. The risk, particularly in

d
EC
more advanced regions, is that many of the services that cluster policies

ea
promote could well be provided through the market by the same private

se
actors. In regions with a less dense “knowledge infrastructure” , however, this

R
O
kind of specialised private provider might be more difficult to find.

e
Diversity of contexts and policy approaches makes evaluation of
An r
outcomes difficult
u
c tof positive
L
Interest in cluster development has arisen mainly
e
because
outcomes in industrial districts in Italy and in high-tech clusters of more
recent origin in the US and a limited number of regions in other countries. In
general, the success stories appear difficult to replicate. Nonetheless, OECD
work on territorial policy and reviews of regions shows that cluster
development is an ambition in economic development policy in a large
proportion of OECD regions, including intermediate and rural regions, where
it is seen as a relatively low-cost reorientation for enterprise policy. The series
of territorial reviews illustrate the many different varieties of clusters that are
found across the OECD, and the difficulty that policy makers face in designing
effective policies in such diverse contexts. Nevertheless, while the enterprise
systems found in most OECD regions diverge sharply from the Northern Italy/
Silicon Valley models, many of the same competitive advantages accrue – a
similar potential for positive feedbacks and linkages exist. In Montreal and
Helsinki, for example, where the respective clusters on which each
metropolitan economy is strongly based (aerospace, biotechnology and ICT in
Montreal and ICT in Helsinki) have characteristics that do not fit neatly into
the industrial cluster model – for example, large multinationals tend to
dominate the clusters in each city. Nonetheless, a form of cluster development
policy is likely to be the cornerstone of the regional competitiveness policy in
each place: for example, the emphasis for Montreal is on building relational
assets among local actors in both existing and emerging clusters. A better
understanding of how classic “cluster” principles can be used to inform policy
for a wider set of regional economic contexts – the large majority of cases –
where cluster conditions are only partially present, is an important area for
further research.

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
39
I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
io
s within most enterprise systems
At the same time, the mechanisms at work
w
are poorly understood or are sufficiently intangible to be difficult for policy

n
o
interventions to reach. For example, two key “unknowns” are 1) the channels for

D Br
information exchange and co-operation that firms, particularly SMEs, actually

y
use and 2) the current gaps – communicative, cultural, management style –

nl
among firms and between firms and other participants in the regional economy,

O
particularly government and non-government producers/diffusers of knowledge

u le
and technology. Services for clusters depend on there being a clear sense of the

d
EC
added value of joint working, which is often lacking.

ea
More than most areas of regional policy, there is an obvious need for

se
evaluation of the outcomes from these policies. But, impact evaluation of

R
O
cluster policies poses numerous problems. In essence, the more rigorous the
conceptual definition, the more difficult it is to measure. In other words, if the

e
outcomes are measured simply in terms of co-location of enterprises, services
An r
c tu
received or meetings arranged, then the measurement can be relatively sound.
Le
However, when the definition of positive clustering outcomes is based on “levels
of informal collaboration” or on the presence of “informal knowledge spillovers”
then assessing the contribution of policy to changes in firm productivity
becomes qualitative (Martin and Sunley, 2003). Moreover, cluster policies have
been applied in very different regional contexts and with differing levels of
funding.6 As a result, despite the enormous interest, cluster policies still have
much to prove in terms of their effectiveness and general applicability.

Linking education, research and business

Until recently, universities were viewed in most member countries as
essentially providers of basic knowledge for the labour market, and most
remain relatively isolated from the rest of the economy. This situation is,
however, changing. Pressures to enhance the employability of university
graduates brought workplace skill issues onto the tertiary education agenda.
Moreover, innovation based competition has increased the demand for access
to university expertise and research findings. As a consequence, higher
education institutions are now called upon for tasks that go far beyond their
traditional teaching and research functions, such as regional engagement,
urban planning, and, perhaps most significantly, collaboration with firms.

In practice: an increasingly important focus for regional development

policies
Beyond their traditional functions in research and teaching, many higher
education institutions (HEI) have now taken steps to respond better to the
needs of their regions and to transform themselves into entrepreneurial
universities. The table outlines the main ways in which higher education
institutions interact with their local environments (Lawton Smith, 2005).

40 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
io
s between tertiary education
Table 1.1. Taxonomy of kinds of relationships
w
and business

n
o
Innovation

D Br

y
Knowledge production Formal research collaboration

nl
and transfer of Links to global technological and scientific networks
knowledge Take up of patents and licences

O
Published papers – e.g. joint academic industry articles

u le
Contract research
Specialisation in new technologies and leadership of new industries

d
EC
Technological Testing services e.g. carbon dating, equipment testing

ea
applications of research, prospects of application (e.g. X-rays, lasers).

se
expertise and in-house Engineering design tools and techniques – including modelling, simulation and theoretical
facilities prediction

R
O
Product and process development
Instrumentation

e
SME support Prototype development,
Consultancy services
An r
c tu
testing
Contract research
Entrepreneurial culture, entrepreneurship and cluster development
Le
Entrepreneurship Spin-offs
Buildings Science parks
Incubators
Cluster focused technical assistance
Networks Network facilitators, developing academic and non-academic networks
Mentoring services
Image Place marketing and development, promoting brand image, organisation of showcase
events
Human capital
Recruitment Recruitment of graduated undergraduate and post-grad students
Training Vocational courses – technical and teaching e.g. technicians training
Vocational Placement schemes
Public access to Continuing professional development and extension programmes
knowledge Public lectures and public access to libraries, museums, galleries, sporting facilities
Direct multiplier effects
Staff, student and visitor spending
Purchase of goods and services
Contribution to tourism
Support for inward investment
Governance
Engagement in Economic
decision-making Cultural
processes Sustainability
Transport
Contribution to Contribution to the quality of the built environment
sustainable development Contribution to property-led urban regeneration
Provision of student accommodation
Effects on parking and traffic problems
Other land use issues

Source: Patel 2002, Glasson 2003, survey by Helen Lawton Smith.

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
41
I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
although the degree varies i
With respect to links with enterprises,s
o
greatly
w
by region and by country, interactions with business have generally increased.

n
o
A recent OECD report described the different rationales and mechanisms

D Br
according to the types of firms involved and often on the technological fields

y
represented. Three main types of relationship are distinguished:

nl
● Relations between multinational enterprises and world-class universities.

u le
Multinational enterprises are externalising part of their research and
development activities and are looking for the best laboratories, scientists

d
EC
and students.

ea
● Relations between universities and small high-technology firms (spin-offs

se
and knowledge intensive business services).

R
●
O
Relations developing in a regional context between firms (often SMEs) and
the local university. Here firms are looking for short-term, problem-solving

e
capabilities. An r
These new roles for universities are particularly visiblec
u
t US. For
L e in the
example, many public research universities have long-established missions to
encourage business development. With respect to the key elements in
university-business links, a recent study of the most successful US universities
highlighted the importance of university leadership (in championing economic
development and innovation missions), faculty culture and rewards, active and
well-organized technology transfer and entrepreneurship incentives
throughout the university, and strong partnerships with private and other
public organisations (see Box 1.7) (Tornatzky et al., 2002).
One of the best known models of linkages between universities and
companies is the MIT Industrial Liaison Programme. After paying a
membership fee that varies according to their size, companies have unlimited
access to specialised information services and seminar series, a monthly
newsletter that includes details of ongoing research and outlines new
inventions, the directory of MIT research activity organised by area of
expertise to make it easier to track specific interests, faculty visits and expert
meetings for companies that often result in consultancy or research
sponsorship. The programme is particularly attractive to companies because
it is managed by a panel of Industrial Liaison Officers (ILO), each responsible
for a focused portfolio of companies with the responsibility to serve their
unique interests and needs.
In many other OECD countries, a similar pattern is now emerging. In
Sweden, for example, universities have been given the formal mission
(in 1996) of promoting regional innovation. In several locations in Sweden,
universities have been active in forming new academic-business linkages,
establishing regional technology partnerships, and offering new kinds of
entrepreneurial training (Cooke, 2004). The Öresund region provides a good

42 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
s io
Box 1.7. Research-industrywrelationships: the example
of Georgia Tech

n
o
D Br
The top-ranked “Innovation-U” in a recent study by the Southern Growth

y
Policies Board was Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech) in Atlanta.

nl
A prominent research university, Georgia Tech also works closely with

O
Georgia state government, local communities, and businesses in a variety of

u le
technology-focused initiatives. Economic development and technology

d
transfer activities are housed in Georgia Tech’s Economic Development

EC

ea
Institute, which operates a network of regional technology transfer offices in

se
18 communities in the state, and in its parent organisation, the Office of
Economic Development and Technology Ventures, which sponsors advanced

R
O
technology incubators and faculty commercialization programs. Many other
academic units, research centres, and the university’s continuing education

e
An
program support regional innovation missions. Long-term results from r
Georgia Tech’s regional innovation efforts include a massive expansion of
industry-research partnerships, the development o f cutting-edge Le c tu
technology-based economic development programs, scores of new high
technology start-ups, ongoing technology and business support for
thousands of existing firms, specialized industry training of thousands of
people each year, and the fostering of systems for entrepreneurial
development in the state.
Other “Innovation-U’s” highly ranked in the study were Carnegie-Mellon,
North Carolina State, Ohio State, Pennsylvania State, Purdue, Stanford, Texas
A&M, UC San Diego, Utah, Wisconsin, and Virginia Tech. The practices and
partnerships of these innovative universities emerge from the “grass roots” –
and not from the federal government or through a top-down standardized
formula. “There are common practices,” the study authors conclude, “but no
one model or approach is followed by all” (Tornatzky et al., 2002).*
* See also OECD, Benchmarking of Science Industry Relationships, 2002.
Source: Quoted in OECD Territorial Reviews of Japan (2005).

illustration of these collaborative initiatives, with the added twist of being a

cross-border network covering both Sweden and Denmark (see Box 1.8).
However, elsewhere in the OECD the role of universities in regional
development is at an early stage. The third CEC Community Innovation
Survey 7 (2004) shows that only 5% of innovating firms indicated that
universities were highly important for innovation (3% for government or
private non-profit research institutes) compared with 28% from clients or
customers (the highest external source) (Lawton Smith 2005). Cooke et al.
(2002) in their study of Tel Aviv, Belfast and Cardiff, like numerous other
studies of larger cities like London and Amsterdam, have found that

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
43
I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
s io
Box 1.8. w
Higher education and industrial
in the Öresund region
clusters

n
o
D Br
The Öresund is a cross-border region comprising the Danish island of

y
Zealand including Copenhagen the capital city and the Skåne region, with

nl
Malmö, Sweden’s second largest city. Since 2000, the two cities have been
linked by a rail and road bridge. This new transport infrastructure has

u le
resulted in a single functional region spanning two different countries. The
Öresund region has developed significant strength in knowledge – intensive

d
activities including the medical and pharmaceutical industries and certain

EC

ea
segments of information and communication technology industries. It is also
strong in food processing and has developed an environmental cluster with

se
companies that either produce environmental technologies or make

R
O
production, products and services more environment friendly.
The education sector seems to be in the forefront of promoting co-operation

e
among knowledge generators and users. With a total of 20 universities with
An
130 000 students, the Öresund Region has many strengths in the education and r
c tu
research sector. More important than simply the existence of these resources,
Le
however, is the co-operation between universities that has developed over time.*
Long-term informal co-operation was formalised in 1997 with the creation of the
Öresund University. This institution has been a leading actor not only around
formal scientific research and education (i.e. Öresund Science Region), but also
around the creation of institutions to promote more informal networking
activity and information sharing for economic activities. Working in
collaboration with researchers, business leaders and policy makers throughout
the region, the Öresund University has helped in identifying critical driving
growth clusters and facilitating the development of networking associations in
each of those clusters. These organisations – Medicon Valley Academy, Öresund
IT Academy, Öresund Food Network, and Öresund Environment – are already
playing an important role in promoting networking and integration across the
region, and show a great deal of promise for the future.
Medicon Valley Academy (MVA) started out as a publicly funded initiative, set up
in 1997 as a regional and bi-national network organisation. In 2000, it went
through a significant re-organisation to become a membership-based
organisation, funded primarily by membership fees (that accounted for 67% of
total funding for the year, with conference fees providing another 17%). The aim
is to support a regional biotech forum for debate and networking. The Academy
has also organised a series of ongoing sub-groups promoting networking around
topics, such as human resources in bio-tech, bio-molecular structures and
dynamics, cancer research and health economics. A PhD programme involving
12 students is part of the MVA and aim at strengthening co-operation between
public institutions and private companies about product development. While
catalysed by the Öresund University and significant public sector funding, the
organisation has now developed a dynamic of its own and plays an active role in
promoting information sharing and knowledge development in the region.
* One interesting evidence of this is the early efforts to develop a commonly administered
“Öresund Summer University” for international students, who take courses at different
institutions in the region. Currently, co-operation in education and research affect many
aspects of the activities of universities. Still, utilisation of resources could be intensified,
including such areas as courses offered, library collections, laboratories and other facilities,
which can be made readily accessible to students and researchers throughout the region.
Source: OECD Territorial Review of Öresund (2002).

44 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
universities often have much stronger sinnovation interactionsiowith
w (Lawton Smith 2005).
businesses at national and international levels

n
o
The influence of regulation

D Br

y
nl
Universities are traditionally managed and supervised by ministries of
education and ministries of research (when these competencies are

u le
separated) at national or, in federal and decentralised countries, at regional
level. Their strategic missions are influenced by the programmes, instructions

d
EC
(in the case of public universities) and regulations designed by the ministries.

ea
Moreover, regulatory frameworks can also reduce the freedom and incentives

se
for institutions and individual researchers to engage in projects with the

R
O
private sector. OECD countries have introduced reforms in the governance of
universities with the aim of increasing their flexibility and autonomy and,

e
thereby, promoting better interaction among universities, public research
An r
c tu
organisations and firms. Japan is a good example (see Box 1.9). The emphasis
Le
Box 1.9. Deregulation of universities: the case of Japan
In 2004, Japan’s national universities – positioned as part of the central
government for more than a century – were reformed as independent public
corporations. University faculty members are now non-governmental
employees, not civil servants as before. From 2004 onwards, it will also be
possible for other public universities to be incorporated according to the
judgement of the prefectural government concerned. Selective university
mergers to create economies of scale and other changes in academic
incentive and evaluation systems are also under way. Universities are also
rapidly establishing Technology Licensing Offices, incubators, collaborative
industry-research centres, and other programmes to promote research
commercialisation and regional development.* The aim is to stimulate a
more flexible, competitive and entrepreneurial university system in Japan
that can not only undertake world-class research but also have significant
impacts on regional innovation and development. Whether the latter goal is
achieved will depend not only on the extent to which universities themselves
embrace these reforms, but also on the ways in which regions and localities
can build new linkages between universities, economic sectors, and
territorial innovation strategies.
* The 1999 Industry Revitalization Law (also known as the “Japanese Bayh-Dole Act”) reduced
obstacles to collaboration between universities and private enterprises and also allowed
private firms to acquire intellectual property rights from publicly-funded research. This has
given stimulus to the growth of Technology Transfer Offices in Japan, of which there are
now 37. See also: J. Rissanen and J. Viitanen, Report on Japanese Technology Licensing Offices and
R&D Intellectual Property Right Issues, The Finnish Institute in Japan, 2001.
Source: OECD (2005), Territorial Review of Japan.

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
45
I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
of the government, apparent for a number s of years, is to ensure thatiothis
w into commercial success for
research and technical expertise are translated

n
o
Japanese firms. However, until recently there were strong disincentives for

D Br
employees of universities to work on joint projects with companies. This is

y
now changing.

nl
O
Mismatch between offer and demand

u le
In some cases, it is the local enterprises themselves that are reticent.

d
EC
Small firms are often reluctant to engage in joint activities with universities,

ea
either because they are unable to precisely formalise their research and

se
expertise needs, or because they lack information about the supply of

R
O
university research findings and services and consider them to be too basic or
abstract. Thus, the explanation for limited engagement between research

e
institutions and business can be a result of a simple mis-match between what
An r
c tu
the university can offer and what firms expect. For example, although regional
universities in Korea have already started to take useful steps in that Le
direction,8 they need to improve the quality of their R&D and re-balance their
teaching, research and regional economic engagement functions. According
to a survey by Busan University, only 7.3% of firms pick innovative ideas from
local universities. Even the few efforts from large firms such as Renault-
Samsung Motors to join in co-operative research initiatives with local
universities have been aborted because the level of research in the universities
was not attractive enough to firms. Both the national and regional
governments in Korea will be investing heavily to up-grade the capacity of
regional universities in order to reduce this gap (OECD 2005).

Table 1.2. Source of innovative ideas for Busan firms

% of 1 000 firms

Source of innovative ideas Yes No

Universities 7.3 92.7

Government-funded research institutes 4.2 95.8
Public laboratories 3.8 96.2
Societies and leagues 5.3 94.7
Research unions 2.8 97.2
Private research institutes 3.3 96.7

Source: Asian Institute for Regional Innovation, December 2003.

Small business expectations and technological needs clearly differ

significantly from those of large firms. Such firms are, nevertheless,
increasingly pressed to adopt cutting edge technologies both for their own
production and when they are part of a supply chain and linked with large
customers. Technology intermediaries or technology “clinics” (such as those

46 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
io
s institutions. These initiatives
in Finland) can help to link SMEs and knowledge
w
provide brokerage services and put firms in contact with university experts

n
o
who may be able to provide them with solutions to their problem.

D Br

y
Links with other innovation policies: a key factor in both technopole

nl
and cluster initiatives

u le
In practice, many initiatives combine links between research and
business with elements of the technology centre and clusters policies

d
EC
discussed above. If the technopole is well designed and funded, then there is

ea
a better chance that the linkages between the education/research side and the

se
enterprises located on site will develop. The comprehensive policy of Centres

R
O
of Expertise in Finland is a good example (see Box 1.10).

e
An r
c tu
Box 1.10. Centres of Expertise, Finland
Le
The Centre of Expertise (CoE) action programme began in 1994 and was
initially programmed to last five years until 1999. It was so successful that the
Finnish Government decided to embark on a new eight-year programme
spanning the period 1999 to 2006. Th e first program me sought to
complement national policy for innovation by pooling regional and national
resources to develop specific industry sectors (mainly traditional high-tech)
into selected, internationally competitive fields of expertise. More
specifically, it aimed to forge innovation and creativity among small and
medium-sized companies by encouraging them to co-operate with training
institutes, universities, and research centres in and around a region. The
long-term objective was to enhance regional competitiveness and to increase
the number of high-tech products, companies, and jobs.
The guiding principle of the programme is that it is open to competition,
which is why only the very best units receive a national CoE status. To
participate in the programme, the units must demonstrate an internationally
high-level concentration of expertise, effectiveness, innovation, and efficient
organisation. CoEs also compete annually for government funding. This basic
funding is matched by a contribution from the region’s local partners. So far,
relatively small amounts of state subsidies have helped generate significant
economic growth within the selected fields of expertise. For the first
programme, however, the most important source of funding was the private
sector (27%). Next came the National Technology Agency (TEKES), accounting
for 25 %, and cities, municipalities and regional councils, all together
accounting for 24 % of funding. Meanwhile, the EU contributed to 17 % of total
project costs.

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
47
I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
s io
Box 1.10. w
Centres of Expertise, Finland (cont.)

n
o
The first CoE programme exceeded all expectations and had a hugely

D Br
positive impact on job creation and entrepreneurial activity.1 To give an idea

y
nl
of the scale of its success, the number of regional CoEs has risen from 8 to
22 since the programme started. The CoE projects have not only generated a

O
new economic activity, but have also (by utilising research and the special

u le
expertise specific to the regions) furthered business development and new

d
c on ta cts and pro mo ted new industries. By 2004, there were over

EC

ea
1 750 regional projects underway at the centres, and the programme had

se
contributed to the creation of well over 10 000 new jobs and has safeguarded

R
18 000 existing ones. About 850 new enterprises in the fields concerned were

O
established during the first years of the programme. With better co-
ordination of the CoE operations nation-wide, there has been increasing

e
An
collaboration between centres, leading to more advanced innovations, often r
Le
of international significance. The Pro Electronica international development
project in Oulu is an example of this.2
c tu
The expanded programme, inspired by the results of the first, has been
reoriented and expanded. Its four main goals are to identify regional
strengths and create economic growth; increase the number of competitive
products, services, enterprises, and jobs based on the highest standard of
expertise; attract international investment and leading experts; and
continually reinforce and regenerate regional expertise. In particular, the
concept of the field of expertise has been broadened from the traditional
high-tech sectors to include new fields, such as new media, the cultural
business, the recreational experience industry, design, quality and
environmental expertise. This reorientation ensures that the Centres of
Expertise of the future will represent increasingly attractive targets for
international private and corporate investment.
1. Urban Exchange Initiative III: Urban development through expertise, research and
information (Informal Meeting of the Ministers responsible for Spatial Planning and Urban/
Regional Policy of the European Union at Tampere, October 1999). Participants included the
Ministry of the Interior, Finland, in co-operation with several experts in Finland and other
EU member states.
2. See: www.intermin.fi/suom/oske/en/osket/oulu.html.
Source: OECD Territorial Review of Finland (forthcoming).

The emerging role of technical colleges

As part of the policy effort to improve interaction within regional
innovation systems, particularly with respect to SMEs, technical colleges have
been increasingly recognised as having a key role to play, especially in
peripheral and less-favoured regions. These organisations are variously called
community colleges (Canada, USA), technical colleges (Denmark, USA, and

48 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
s
UK), further education colleges (UK), technical io
and further education
institutions (Australia), polytechnics w
or Fachhochschulen (Austria, Belgium,

n
o
Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand) and institutes of technology

D Br
(Finland, Ireland). However, they have in common a role as upper secondary or

y
tertiary education, targeting occupations such as technicians and engineers,

nl
and having a strong regional or local focus in their operations (OECD 1999).

u le
Technical colleg es are unusual and even unique among public
educational institutions in the explicitness and intensity with which their

d
EC
economic aims complement their educational goals. A large proportion of

ea
technical college systems were formulated or have been reformulated to serve

se
both the student bodies and regional economies. This economic value of

R
O
technical colleges is based on an inherent flexibility that allows them to
respond quickly to the demands of the workplace caused by growth,

e
r
t e ch n o lo gy, a n d/ o r e c o n o m i c r e a dj us tm e n t. O ve r t im e, t h e m o s t
An
c tu
entrepreneurial and innovative of the colleges have used their resources and
Le
expertise not only to react to technological change but to influence rates of
technology adoption.
Technical colleges are generally acknowledged as vital ingredients in
regional technology and innovation strategies – retraining in the wake of
technological change and ensuring a sufficient flow of technically proficient
workers into the region to meet needs and allow for growth. Most colleges now
include some dimensions of technology development within their core
missions. Just how far a college is willing to extend its reach beyond its
traditional student client base towards a newer and less conventional
business client base depends on a number of factors, i.e., college and business
leadership, national and state policies and regulations, budgets, alternative
sources of technology training and assistance, degree of flexibility and
autonomy, and entrepreneurial energy. The role of technical colleges, as
described above, seems appropriate for all types of regions, although their size
and specialisation will differ from case to case. Technical colleges have the
ability to specialise in all types of productive activities, even those based on
natural endowments like mineral exploitation or tourism. They already
respond to the mass need for human capital formation and thus their
contribution to regional developments comes as a result of broadening their
scope. In that sense additional investment is lower than in the two cases
discussed previously. In high-tech regions they are expected to specialise in
high-tech sectors, in industrial districts they would need to offer technology
services in the already existing clusters, whereas in underdeveloped regions
they would limit their activities to the organisational and technology transfer
needs of the local productive activities.

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
49
I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
s io
Box 1.11. HES w
in Switzerland

n
o
The Swiss HES (Colleges of Higher Education) programme is a major

D Br
initiative in the field of education, innovation and regional development. It

y
nl
should help in bridging the gap between the high level of research in the
country and the more modest level of innovation performance. HESs are

O
training highly qualified professionals by offering a combination of practical

u le
and theoretical education within the framework of a short-term degree

d
programme. Further, HESs are also promoting applied research and

EC

ea
technology transfer to SMEs. The specialisation of these could have many

se
potential economic applications; and if a certain level of quality of research

R
and private R&D is obtained, continuing experimentation can ensure that

O
specialised knowledge will evolve constantly and be applied in new ways.
Further, public investments in specialised HES may be extremely cost

e
An
efficient if local industrialists become involved and the HES succeed in r
Le
spurring private investments in training and R&D. Thus, a great political
effort should be devoted not just to the specialisation of the HES, but also to
c tu
ensuring that local industrialists participate in the process. Further, HES
could function as local technology service providers. In co-operation with
local authorities, some HES could even take on the role of industrial
development councils, arranging seminars and informal meetings about, for
example, best technological practices, or new international, federal, and
cantonal industry regulations. Such meetings also have a great potential for
developing local networking cultures.
Source: OECD Territorial Review of Switzerland.

3. Competitive regions: policies for the wider business environment

As discussed above, innovation and knowledge have emerged as the
principal targets for regional policies. In order to be cost-effective and have
regional impact in all types of region, these knowledge-based policies need to
be complemented with other measures. These other measures should aim to
improve the “enabling environment” of the specific region that supports
business activity. The common denominator in current thinking is an
emphasis on place-specific externalities based on better exploiting unused
potential and assets. Many of the targets of these policies were formerly more
closely associated with social or environmental policies, but are now
considered from the perspective of their impact on economic performance.
Policy instruments tend to focus on providing collective goods that improve
what has been termed the “quality of place” – the attractiveness and
functioning of the region as a whole, that improve its accessibility, and so on.
Without a supportive environment, cluster development, regional innovation

50 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
s impact on performance. iWorse,
strategies and so on will not have a significant
o
they could even lead policy back towardsw artificially supporting private sector

n
o
development without addressing key market failures first. In terms of specific

D Br
policies, OECD work has focused on two main groups of policies that

y
exemplify the issue of providing public, collective goods for economic

nl
development in the framework of regional competitiveness:

u le
● investing in the “enabling” environment; and
● focusing development on under-used natural, cultural and historical

d
EC
amenities.

ea

se
Investing in the “enabling” environment

R
O
As discussed earlier, the regional environment in which firms are located
plays an important role in influencing their productivity, both directly with

e
An
respect to the level of services and infrastructure that are available and r
Le
indirectly, for example through the ability of the region to offer quality of life
advantages for workers. The regional environment includes a range of factors
c tu
that either encourage or inhibit business activity – the quality of transport and
communications infrastructure, local tax rates and the return in terms of
efficient public service provision, the availability of land and housing,
including affordable housing, the standard of the education system at all
levels, and so on. This is strongly linked to the strategic management of the
territory and the level and allocation of investment that national and local
authorities jointly provide. Attention tends to focus on the framework
conditions for business, the tangible factors that increase or decrease
production costs – local tax regimes, transport and so on.
OECD work across a range of different region-types demonstrates that
the presence of efficient physical infrastructure and related services remains
a key to economic development. The expectation that improvements in
physical infrastructure will generate productivity gains for local businesses
and increase the attractiveness of an area for investment has been a recurring
theme in OECD reviews of specific regions. High quality infrastructure and
services are accepted as being vital to a strong economy – locally, regionally
and nationally. Taking the example of transport, upgrading infrastructure
changes access (travel times) which affects property prices and economic
rents, influences decisions of households (residential location, patterns of
consumption) and firms (production location, access to markets and
investment decisions) and these, in turn, should have a net positive impact on
the economy, increase tax revenues, create employment and generate
resources for further investment. For business, the benefits could include:
● access to a wider labour market pool, with more diverse competencies;
● faster access to suppliers and customers, which reduces transaction costs;

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
51
I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
● expanded market reach (including choice io
sof suppliers, as well as expanded
customer base); w

n
o
● reduction of land use constraints.

D Br

y
nl
Figure 1.1. Transport infrastructure investment and economic growth effects

u le
Transport infrastructure investment

d
EC
Improved transport service provision:

ea
lower costs, time saving, more reliability

se
R
O
Increased accessibility and market expansion

e
An r
Increasing
returns
Improved labour supply
Le
Expansion of trade
c tuInnovation
and
to scale technology
diffusion

Expanded Economic restructuring

production Exit/entry of firms

Total factor productivity and GDP growth

Source: OECD (2003) “Decoupling transport demand and economic growth”; adapted from
Larkshmanan, 2002.

Although there are issues of regional impact measurement and

diminishing returns from upgrading of infrastructure to consider, transport
improvement is generally seen as generating strong positive externalities and
more efficient allocation of resources throughout the local economy. From a
policy perspective, the assumption of a multiplier effect from investment is
appealing. In an attempt to link given levels of transport infrastructure
expenditure with productivity gain and employment growth, the European
Commission has produced estimates of potentially substantial output/
employment gains from the TransEuropeanNetwork (TEN) programme.
Increases of 0.25% in EU GDP and in employment of 0.11% are predicted as a
result of the priority TEN projects between 2005 and 2025, with the
employment creation potential of the full network estimated at 800 000 jobs.
An OECD review of regional policy in the Czech Republic (OECD, 2004) strongly
emphasises the importance of adequate domestic and international road and
rail connections. For example, it highlights the accessibility issues for Ostrava,
third city in the country, which is still not connected to the rest of the highway

52 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
network, thus stifling the development s efforts of an industrialioarea
w
undergoing deep restructuring and experiencing high unemployment. Poor

n
o
accessibility prevents Ostrava, and more generally the region of Moravia-

D Br
Silesia from attracting a more sizeable share of FDI in spite of its assets

y
(human capital, excellent university and research centres) and strong

nl
financial and other incentives for investors.

u le
Even if the costs and benefits of infrastructure investment are difficult to
measure precisely, from the perspective of most policymakers this type of

d
EC
forecast ensures that strategies for competitiveness include a strong focus on

ea
upgrading infrastructure and delivering better quality transport services.

se
Case studies suggest, however, that the construction or upgrading of

R
O
transportation infrastructure can undoubtedly have a fundamental influence
on a region’s economic development, but economic growth is not automatic.

e
An
Growth effects are likely to appear when positive externalities exist in the r
c tu
region. The discussion of innovation and specialisation suggests that both
Le
depend on an efficient, sufficient infrastructure network in order for the
different types of spatial agglomeration effects to operate. Faster transport
connections can potentially incite positive externalities that exist in various
markets – typically unexhausted economies of scale, scope, agglomeration,
density or network – and consequently improve (labour) productivity, enhance
output, reduce production costs and promote more efficient use of resources.
If latent economies do not exist, improvements in accessibility could lead to
changes in existing transport flows and spatial patterns without having long-
term effects on growth. The OECD review of the Öresund region is clear that
the bridge between Copenhagen and Malmö is only one element in a wider
strategy to build on the complementarities that have developed between the
two regional economies (see Box 1.12). The challenge for policymakers explicit
in the recommendations is to ensure that the potential in the now unified
labour market, research community, and enterprise systems is realised.
Vienna-Bratislava provides a similar example: it is expected that accession of
Slovakia to the EU will allow a larger and stronger functional economic area to
develop that generates scale and scope advantages for local firms that did not
exist before. Providing infrastructure to link the opened border is a first step,
but then policy challenges relating to economic specialisation, innovation and
governance come to the fore (see also Box 2.8).
At the same time, constraints on infrastructure development are
growing. In particular, the cost of developing new infrastructure has increased
dramatically, while maintenance represents a significant share of total
infrastructure spending in OECD countries. In Japan, for example, projections
regarding the proportion of total investment that will need to be spent on
maintenance suggest that in the relatively near term, expenditures on
renewal of infrastructure will equal expenditures on new facilities. Assuming

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
53
I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
s io
w
Box 1.12. Impacts of the Öresund bridge
and competitiveness
on attractiveness

n
o
D Br
Three territorial levels of impact should be considered: the regional level, the

y
national level and the international level. At each level, the effects are different

nl
and more importantly, the reactions of stakeholders are quite diverse.

u le
At the regional level (Öresund), the new infrastructural links – in addition to
the Bridge – have framed a new internal network of mobility and

d
communication which has increased interactions among people, firms and

EC

ea
institutions. The intensified interactions increase the “value” of internal

se
interdependence as a factor of robustness of the local economy and society in
terms of competitiveness and attractiveness. The main feature of this evaluation

R
O
is identifiable in the strengthening of the two main poles, Copenhagen and
Malmö, but that growth has also affected a multiplicity of areas within the

e
r
region. Thus, on both sides of the Strait, the spatial “continuity” between cores
An u
e citstrelative
and hinterlands causes fewer problems today than in the past.
The competitive role of the Öresund Region is alsoL modifying
position within the two countries. This is a relatively minor problem for
Denmark, where Copenhagen’s leading role increased as a national capital and
as a main attraction pole in the Öresund Region. On the contrary in Sweden, the
growth of the Öresund Region will inevitably create a more significant impact. In
particular, Stockholm and Gothenburg have perceived the importance of the
Öresund growth and are reacting to its increased competitiveness. On one side,
the reinforcement of Malmö and Skåne has caused a new development area in
Sweden, speeding up the overall country output. On the other side, the
acceleration of growth in Southern Sweden has upset the traditional political
agreement on regional policy in the country. In fact, due to its marginality, the
North had always been strongly privileged in the allocation of “regional”
subsidies, as the central part of Sweden (along the Stockholm-Gothenburg axis)
was self-sufficient and the South, despite the industrial decline in Malmö, had
always been considered already “developed” and was not considered worthy of
particular intervention. The opportunity represented by the growth of the
Öresund Region has modified this attitude. The political orientation towards
favouring equality rather than supporting dynamism is slowly reversing and a
greater attention is being paid to the Southern part of Sweden, also because it
has become a stronger link toward the rest of Europe.
The third territorial level of competitiveness, which is indirectly enhanced
by the new infrastructural investments in the Öresund Region, takes place on
an international scale. The fact that Copenhagen and Malmö are starting to
be considered a joint global hub and have climbed in the European hierarchy
of metropolitan areas is indeed playing a significant role in the competitive
growth of the region. The most meaningful factor of such increase in
competitiveness is the international integration process. Comparable
experiences are the Channel Tunnel between France and Great Britain, and
the new highway system planned between Vienna, Prague and Budapest.
Source: OECD Territorial Review of Öresund.

54 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
io to
smaintenance budget is likely
limited increases in total spending, Japan’s
w
overtake the budget for new construction in the next decade (OECD, 2005). In

n
o
consequence, infrastructure investment policies in the OECD tend to

D Br
emphasise three aspects: 1) better use of existing infrastructure, 2) better

y
targeting of new investment and 3) mechanisms to increase the level of

nl
private sector financing in public projects.

u le
In this context, communications infrastructure promises both
substantial returns on targeted investment and important leveraging

d
EC
possibilities. Communications infrastructure produces generalisable time-

ea
savings for most economic sectors that can translate into economic growth

se
and employment creation potential. Rural policy in particular is focusing on

R
O
how enterprises and entrepreneurs in peripheral regions can use advanced
communications networks to gain access to markets located in core regions. A

e
review of policies to promote ICT in rural areas identified three categories of
An r
c tu
economic activity: tele-business (call centres and business process out-
sourcing), tele-work, and start ups focusing on multimedia and softwareLe
design, often linked to providing services (marketing, etc.) for both local
customers (e.g. local businesses, local governments, etc.) and those further
afield. There is a close link between the increased use of ICT in rural locations
and growing interest among policymakers in rural enterprise creation,
including how cluster policies can be adapted from their general targets which
are urban or intermediate regions to be relevant for rural regions as well.

Focusing development on under-used natural, cultural and historical

amenities
Amenities as a core of rural development policy
There is increasing recognition that “quality of place” has an important
influence on regional competitiveness, particularly with respect to attracting
and retaining mobile resources such as investment and skilled labour. This
emphasis on environmental quality and attractiveness can be seen in ongoing
OECD work in fields such as the attractiveness of cities, sustainable use of
housing and building stock, among others. Regional development policies in
both rural and urban areas are increasingly looking to harness the potential of
their “amenities”, the varied natural and man-made attractions that
differentiate one region from another and that provide the “raw material” for
di f f e re n t k in d s o f e co n o m ic a ct ivit ie s ran g in g f ro m t ou r ism an d
entertainment industries to speciality products and foods.
These diverse amenities have some shared characteristics that mean that
they are often not effectively provided through conventional markets.
Amenities often exhibit what are termed public good characteristics,
specifically, they are to some extent non-rival and non-excludable:

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
55
I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
s io
w
Box 1.13. Some examples of
by OECD
rural amenities assessed

n
o
D Br
Australia: Native forests are one of Australia’s premier suppliers of rural

y
amenities. However, tensions have been increasing between the need to

nl
conserve these forests for environmental and recreational purposes, on one

O
hand, and support for traditional forest industries, on the other hand. The

u le
Regional Forest Agreement (RFA) process, on which the case study focuses, is

d
designed to reduce these conflicts and promote a multifunctional forest

EC

ea
system by setting a framework (in the form of a signed agreement) for forest

se
resource planning over twenty years.

R
O
Austria: Alpine pasture makes up 20 per cent of all land in Austria. How it
is managed has important implications for landscape, tourism and

e
prevention of natural disasters. In addition to its productive function,
An r
c tu
mountain farming maintains sensitive alpine eco-systems and cultural

Le
landscapes. In 1972, the Mountain Farmers Special Programme was set up to
maintain the multiple functions of mountain agriculture as well as economic
and social stability. Under the programme, mountain farmers receive
government payments based on their level of “difficulty” (as related to
transportation constraints and small size).
France: Established in 1967, France’s Regional Nature Parks (RNP) are
intended to implement development schemes based on conservation,
management, and valorisation of natural and man-made amenities. They are
located only in areas with natural and cultural heritage of outstanding
quality. The overall objective is to reconcile the preservation of these
amenities with the area’s economic development. There are now 32 such
regional nature parks in France, covering nearly 10 per cent of the country
and involving over 2 600 rural communes.
Japan: Tanadas are stair-shaped rice fields or terraces built on steep
mountain slopes. They were developed in ancient Japan and used in nearly
all regions of the country. Today, there are about 220 000 hectares of Tanadas
on slopes exceeding 1/20. They account for about eight per cent of all land
planted in rice. Tanadas are appreciated not only for their scenic appearance,
but also because they represent accumulated tradition, culture, and local
identity. However, the laborious work required for their maintenance is
causing them to disappear rapidly. Several measures to reverse the decline
are being taken, particularly by local governments. The Temporary Owner
System, for example, is intended to market amenity value by inviting city-
dwellers to work the terraced fields as if they were owners of Tanadas. They
typically assist farmers on several weekends during the busiest seasons.
Another example is the Tanada fund, which subsidises farmers to continue to
farm the traditional, terraced fields.

56 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
s io
w
Box 1.13. Some examples of rural
by OECD (cont.)
amenities assessed

n
o
D Br
Switzerland: The border trail Napfbergland follows one of the country’s

y
most distinctive economic, ethnic, and cultural dividing lines: a border

nl
between two cantons, one western and one central European culture, one

O
Protestant and one Catholic faith. The Napf border area has not only a unique

u le
cultural identity but also a scenic, pre-Alpine landscape comprised of

d
forested areas, historic sites, and traditionally cultivated small farms. The

EC

ea
area’s individual attractions are not considered as spectacular as those in the

se
more mountainous Alpine region. However, as a series of natural and cultural
sites connected by the border, they are a valuable asset. Hence, the trail

R
O
project was begun in 1997 with government support to diversity the economy
through tourism. By creating a critical mass of attractions, project leaders

e
An
hope to attract visitors and market labelled products from the border trail r
region.
Le c tu
● non-rival in that the availability of the good for consumption by one person
is not decreased by consumption by another (except where over-use has
negative impacts on the quality of the amenity). A typical example here
would be an attractive landscape. Public access to the countryside can be
enjoyed by substantial numbers of people without affecting each others’
enjoyment, but at some point congestion arises such that the quality of the
recreation experience is reduced;
● non-excludable in that once provided, it is often impractical to exclude
people from enjoying their consumption. Landscape can in principle be
rendered excludable by setting up and enforcing boundaries around an
area, but in practice the cost of so doing would exceed the revenue that
might be obtained from the undertaking.
These public good characteristics mean that there are few direct
incentives for private actors, or even public actors, to provide, maintain or
invest in the supply of amenities because it is difficult to convert this
investment into revenue accruing solely or in large part to the investors.
Nonetheless, these are clearly important assets for a region and can represent
an important, sometimes the only, source of competitive advantage in some
rural regions. Moreover, the valorisation of amenities is often the best
incentive for their conservation. The central question is: how can
policymakers “internalise” the externality benefits inherent in rural amenities
so that providers have financial incentives to maintain and/or provide access
to these amenities at a reasonable cost to the different “users” (both individual
visitors and, in many cases, society as a whole). Two key elements in this

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
57
I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
io
s for) amenities and thereby
process are 1) estimating the value of (demand
w
setting prices, and 2) encouraging the creation of market or market-type

n
o
mechanisms to transfer benefits.

D Br

y
Work on valuing amenities has its origins in efforts to quantify the

nl
multifunctional dimension of agriculture by separating amenity provision from
commodity production functions, as well as in attempts to estimate the value of

O
biodiversity and other ecological assets.9 Recreational (use) value of rural

u le
amenities can be estimated using revealed (observed, actual) preference models

d
EC
that are relatively robust. However, the non-use values of rural amenities

ea
expressed as, for example, willingness-to-pay to preserve biodiversity or

se
agricultural landscapes have to be based on stated preference techniques, and

R
O
are thus more problematic. As such, the ability of policymakers to estimate the
cost effectiveness of programmes that support amenities with significant non-

e
use values is limited, which partly explains why policies to develop markets or
An r
c tu
substitute markets for amenity goods are preferred.10
Le
Instruments to ensure optimal provision of amenities can take several
different forms: for example, creating direct amenity markets (paying for
access, user fees); creating amenity-related commodity markets (“green”
markets); buying of resources by interest groups; incentives, taxes and
subsidies to providers; etc. There are two principal types of policy that include
market-oriented economic instruments: 1) policies to stimulate co-ordination
between supply and demand, and 2) instruments that provide regulatory or
financial incentives or disincentives to act in a particular way.
1) Policies designed to stimulate direct co-ordination between amenity providers
and beneficiaries, either through the market or through co-operation among
agents acting collectively.
● Support for enhancement of the commercial value of amenities: The aim is to
encourage commercial transactions between providers and beneficiaries of
amenities with regard to either the amenities themselves or to related
products. Targeted amenities are those which are potentially private goods
so that the establishment of an amenity market is possible with certain
assistance, such as the introduction of a institutional framework for
amenity markets, supports for the valorisation by rural enterprises, official
certification on amenity value added products, etc.
● Support for collective action: The aim is to promote and support actions
initiated and pursued by groups of agents with a view to adjusting amenity
supply and demand. Targeted amenities are those which need collective
action for their maintenance and/or valorisation by providers and
beneficiaries.

58 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
smise en valeur of amenitiesio
Table 1.3. Types of collective action for

Type of action Action and aims w

n
o
Collective action by 1. Networking among complementary amenities: to make amenities more visible and so

D Br

y
amenity providers open up more possibilities for their valorisation.

nl
2. Networking for the certification of several amenity offerings: to enable commercial
valorisation by certifying collectively the link between product and amenity.

O
3. Self-regulation by voluntary agreement among providers: to supply an amenity jointly

u le
and so preserve possibilities for its valorisation.

d
Collective action by 4. Pooling and communication of private demand: to communicate a social demand to

EC
beneficiaries providers and the authorities.

ea
5. Direct action on provision of an amenity: to purchase lands of amenities or certain rights

se
to preserve them.
Concerted action by 6. Negotiation with a view to voluntary agreement between supply and demand sides: to

R
O
providers and communicate supply and demand and agree how to share the burden for optimum
beneficiaries provision.

e
r
7. Concerted territorial management of amenities: to provide an appropriate territorial scale
An
to achieve optimum valorisation of amenities.

Le
2) Policies designed to change the economic ground rules so as to guide individual
c tu
acts in a given direction. Under this heading come economic incentives or
regulations that make it worthwhile to adopt practices favourable to amenity
provision. In these cases the authorities try to “control” amenity supply
themselves. Targeted amenities are mainly those which are public goods and/
or externalities so that direct government intervention is necessary to
maintain amenity supply and to reveal demand for them. They are:
● Regulations: The aim is to determine and/or reassign rights relating to the
ownership and use of amenities, since these rights are often not clearly
defined or need to be reassigned to promote the valorisation of amenities or
to avoid further degradation. Although the clear definition or reassignment
of property rights may facilitate the establishment of markets in the case of
a private good amenity, regulations are often imposed to restrict the
individual ownership over an amenity: society is considered to hold the
property right. Thus the general function of regulations is to internalise
public goods and/or externalities at the expense of providers.
● Financial incentives: The aim is to pay for the supply of amenities and to tax
actions which have a negative impact on amenities in order to internalise
such actions. When an amenity is a public good and/or an externality,
governments are required to create substitute markets: to send demand
signals to providers on behalf of potential beneficiaries.

The emergence of urban amenity policies

In general, policies to improve the competitiveness of cities are
em phasising their com parative advantag es in terms of know ledg e
infrastructure and the range and variety of interactions among diverse

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
59
I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
io
s policies of the type discussed
economic actors. As noted above, innovation-led
w
earlier in this report are generally applicable in urban regions, and the main

n
o
successful models related to these approaches tend to be found in and around

D Br
metropolitan areas (though not exclusively so). Nonetheless, governments

y
continue to emphasise the challenges that many cities face in restructuring

nl
former industrial economies and the problems of maintaining economic and

O
social vitality in particular areas of cities (whether inner city or suburbs). In

u le
such cases, there is a need to address issues of the wider urban environment

d
EC
as well as addressing policies for the enterprise sector directly. In this regard,

ea
there is a close relation between the issues and responses of rural amenity

se
policies and those being developed in cities. The transition path of Busan,

R
O
Korea is a good example (see Box 1.14).
The urban amenity issue is exemplified by the common problem of how

e
to regenerate historic city centres. The motivation for regenerating historical
An r
c tu
districts is, on the one hand, a social question. Residents must appreciate the
Le
value of their cultural heritage in order to give a mandate for public authorities
to make the necessary investments to preserve and restore. This has not
always been apparent, with the extent of the loss of patrimony only becoming
a matter of wide public concern when it is almost too late to reverse the
process. In many cases, private national and international foundations have
been responsible for preserving specific buildings and lobbying for more active
intervention from governments. Once there is a more general recognition of
the need to safeguard the cultural heritage and once the pressures and threats
to the areas concerned have been accepted, then governments have acted
with a range of regulatory instruments and grants to redevelop individual
buildings and, more recently, whole neighbourhoods. The expense of such
programmes and the limited ability of public authorities to go beyond
addressing physical decline and address functional obsolescence have tended
to undermine the outcomes from these programmes. In many US and
European cities, large scale investments have been made to remodel
industrial, often river-front or canal-front sites in order to, on the one hand,
preserve decaying industrial heritage sites, and, on the other, to rejuvenate
depressed city centre areas. These have had very mixed success, with property
re-development in some cases triggering little spillover for the wider central
city area. The weakness of many of these earlier initiatives was the lack of
emphasis on the subsequent viability of retail and entertainment businesses,
the principal users of commercial space in such zones. As a result of these
experiences, there has been a shift to a stronger emphasis on the economic
motivation for regeneration. Here the issue of amenities and ways of
developing markets or quasi-markets for public goods becomes significant.
The common denominator in most urban regeneration projects in Europe
and the US is the recognition that physical renovation is not sufficient but that

60 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
s io
Box 1.14. Reorientation of industrialw
cities: the port city of Busan, Korea

n
o
Given the possibility for Busan’s port volumes to plateau or even decline, it would be

D Br
prudent to avoid the potential risks of overinvestment strategy over the long term. Port

y
cities increasingly follow a path of development that can be schematised in three main

nl
phases, from pre-industrial to industrial and on to knowledge-based economies. Most

O
large port cities in Pacific Asia are in the second phase, which is reflected in the primary

u le
importance given to port infrastructure investment geared for larger ships and wider
logistical networks that are shipping-intensive. In the future, however, there will be a clear

d
EC
push to make the port more relevant to needs not directly related to shipping. These needs

ea
include amenities and service industries. There is increasing international awareness of

se
this nearly inevitable shift.* And the rise of competing ports in China may in the long term

R
O
lead Busan and other similarly situated ports in advanced economies more decisively in
this direction. Most port cities are endeavouring to create more integrated city-port
linkages and have also shown renewed concern for the environment and urban liveability.

e
An
Busan should take due note of these trends in shaping its own planning decisions. r
Le c tu
* The 7th International Conference of Cities and Ports in 2000 concluded that “port cities must now create
investment and development programs that will enhance their quality of life as a desirable maritime or riverside
metropolis. Local environmental resources must be preserved and the social and cultural development of the local
community supported if sustainability is to be achieved. Each port city must define a policy for overall
development that takes on broad ecological and social issues”. The International Association of Cities and
Ports (IACP), which is dedicated to promoting “real partnerships between these two ‘worlds’ – the city and its port”,
has as its theme for the 2004 annual conference “Modernity and Identity”. It stated that “the modernity of a port
city is then expressed in its capacity to participate in these new worldwide networks, to integrate them in the
logics of their political, economic and social choices, to translate them in terms of infrastructure, of equipment
and installations and of professional training. Responding to this requirement of modernity is that of identity.
Keeping its cultural reference points, valorising its acquired advantages and affirming its ambitions in terms of
sustainable development and quality of life are the indispensable corollaries to any development project”.

Table 1.4. Port city transition

→ Port City Transition →

Port City Region 2) Labour-intensive 3) Amenity-rich,
1) Pre-industrial
export industry knowledge-intensive
Port Functions Simple sea-land interface Logistical distribution platforms Region wide intermodal nodes in
(e.g. among industrial estates international supply chain
and export processing zone networks
facilities)
City Region Economy Commercial centre, primary Branch plant light industry Knowledge-based, diversified high
product export and assembly operations; local technology “learning regions”
management functions of global with headquarter functions and
firms. amenities as attractions for
investment.
Urban Design Focus Port development and city Port development linked by trunk Port as “riverside” landscapes
development separated. Port as roads to new peri-urban industrial integrated into city design; city as
“dockland”; city as separate “growth poles” as globally-linked amenity-rich, historically-rich
commercial centre. Emphasis on enclaves. City hosts local TNC landscapes with multiple locations
trunk road linkages to resource management functions with focus for public engagement and life-
and agricultural hinterlands to on raising central city skylines and long learning; shift from
ports. providing for massive metropolis to post-metropolitan
suburbanization of residential urban regional networks
population.

Source: OECD Territorial Review of Busan (2005).

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
61
I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
economic and social dynamics have to be s“invented” for these areas. ioFor
example, the grouping of retail outlets w
in or around historical areas effectively

n
o
provides a “backdrop” for bars and restaurants, cultural and entertainment

D Br
facilities, etc. In many US cities, historical buildings have been renovated for

y
use by creative arts – as dance studios, artists’ studios, etc. In these cases,

nl
public authorities and private developers gamble on a strong link between

O
different forms of culture (architecture, arts, etc.) and evolutions in patterns of

u le
consumption.

d
EC
The idealised “chain” is: people increasingly value living in or visiting

ea
historic areas, the number of residents and visitors increases, the commercial

se
value of these locations increases, this draws in investment to create

R
O
commercial and residential spaces. In this scenario, civil society guides the
public sector with respect to the desires and aspirations of citizens, the public

e
authorities put in place a regulatory framework and provide incentives, and
An r
Le c tu
Box 1.15. The balance sheet of urban amenity promotion
in Glasgow
Heritage and culture as catalysts for urban regeneration and economic
growth are increasingly favoured options for European cities. The
regeneration and economic development trajectory for the city of Glasgow
was built on several important events beginning in 1988 with the UK National
Garden Festival, a river based regeneration initiative. The Festival was an
important event for the city. At a cost of £20 million to the public purse the
event drew in some four million visitors to the city and marked the beginning
of a new approach to urban regeneration in Glasgow. Cultural events became
an integral part of the regeneration process as was seen elsewhere in Europe
throughout the decade. In 1990, Glasgow was a European City of Culture, an
event which captured the imagination of politicians and regeneration
agencies alike. Nine million admissions were recorded, over half a million
from outside the city, adding £80 million to the local economy. New landmark
buildings such as the Glasgow Royal Concert Hall, a £28.5 million investment
by Glasgow City Council, had a considerable impact. In 1996, the Glasgow
Festival of Visual Arts generated £25 million of visitor expenditure with a net
economic benefit of £5.5 million for the city economy. In 1999 Glasgow was
City of Architecture and Design, which generated £20 million and resulted in
the creation of 500 jobs. Investment in culture has continued as the city has
developed a science museum, a strong cultural industries base and
significant urban design improvements throughout the city.
Source: OECD, Urban Renaissance Review of Glasgow.

62 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
the private sector reacts to changes in thes ioTwo
local market for investment.
w
recent OECD studies of urban regeneration policies in Belfast and Glasgow

n
o
showed how each city has identified its major river (the Lagan and the Clyde

D Br
respectively) as an underused amenity. In both cases, the riverfronts were the

y
traditional industrial heart of the city and now a new functional relevance was

nl
needed in the two areas in order to attract back both investment and

O
residents. The approach of the Laganside Corporation, which was responsible

u le
for implementing a development strategy was grounded in the premise that

d
EC
the scale of the area’s needs required substantial private sector investment,

ea
but that the initial investment in infrastructure, land remediation and

se
environmental improvements would have to come from the public sector.

R
O
Once the commitment of the public authorities had been demonstrated,
private sector investment and confidence was forthcoming.

e
Actions related to attractiveness of the region as an investment or
An r
c tu
residential location are of particular interest to policymakers insofar as they
provide a coherent and convenient framework for regional investment Le
strategies, particularly to the extent that they target upgrading endogenous
assets and underdeveloped potential in a region. In this respect, greater use of
the framework developed by OECD for rural amenities is relevant with respect
to creation of markets for collective public goods and the tools for supporting
collective action and public-private partnerships to transform urban land use
patterns and regenerate decaying neighbourhoods. While analysis at the
international level has tended to focus on amenities as a rural policy issue,
there is growing interest in the “amenities as local public goods” concept
applied to urban areas. Most of the same conceptual issues concerning the
relation between amenities and development are equally applicable (synergy,
antagonism and interdependence), as are many of the policy options (market
creation, support for collective action regulatory and financial incentives for
provision, etc.). More generally, they raise a number of important governance
issues about how investment is made in urban areas and by whom.

Notes
1. Despite their general use in policy discourse, these assumptions are not all shared
by opinion makers. Paul Krugman is perhaps the most prominent critic of the
assertion that places are “like big corporations competing in the global
marketplace”, arguing that an over-emphasis on international competition
ignores major differences between the characteristics and behaviour of a
company and those of a country, notably that a country cannot go out of business
and does not necessarily have to make an operating profit, and could provoke “un-
economic” policy responses (notably protectionist policies and rejection of free
trade principles). A related problem with the implication that places compete is
the assumption that firms and the regions or countries in which they are located
share similar objectives – wealth creation, employment creation, in some

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
63
I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
s io
definitions sustainable development, and so on. This may be true in some cases,

w
but is certainly not true in all. In a global economy, firms are not tied to specific
places and their profit motivation is not the same as the wealth and employment

n
o
creation motivation of a region in particular.Even if the interests of firms and

D Br
those of local and national authorities are not always synonymous, they are

y
nonetheless closely related.

nl
2. Michael Porter asserts that “firms gain competitive advantage where their home

O
base allows and supports the rapid accumulation of specialised assets and skills…

u le
Nations succeed in particular industries because their home environment is the
most dynamic…”.

d
EC
3. These interdependencies are similar to the concept of “social capital”. Social

ea
capital is a set of intangible factors such as trust, mores and networks which

se
contribute to the overall capital stock.

R
O
4. The two areas where this channel seems to be particularly strong is technology
transfer and human capital formation. Through their linkages with domestic

e
enterprises – on recent evidence, mainly their direct suppliers – foreign-owned
An
enterprises share know-how with the local business community. As for human r
c tu
capital, foreign-owned enterprises tend to “spin off” trained employees, and in
Le
many cases also managers, whose specialist skills then benefit unrelated
enterprises or serve as a source of entrepreneurship in the local economy.
5. Some research has suggested that US technology parks have more than double the
number of support staff as similar facilities in either Europe or Japan, with the
conclusion being that the US cases place more emphasis on active support for new
businesses.
6. The current Industrial Cluster initiative in Japan and the initiative in Scotland
cover relatively large urban regions and emphasise an array of well-funded
services. Other more regional initiatives, such as that in the Arve valley in France
and the city of Tempere in Finland, covered more restricted areas and provided
more limited ranges of services (Raines, 2003).
7. www.dti.gov.uk/iese/international_comparisons.pdf.
8. One example is Busan University, which has created a think tank called the Asian
Institute for Regional Innovation (AIRI). This think tank not only organises
research projects and seminars but also participates in the activities of regional
innovation councils in the Busan area, implements various education
programmes for regional innovation and networks with overseas universities and
research institutes (Japan, China, United States).
9. Valuation approaches have also come to the fore in efforts to quantify the
environmental damage caused by oil spills for the purpose of determining costs to
be borne by the polluter. Economic valuation is widely used in OECD countries as
a way of assessing values (usually monetary) to goods that have no markets.
Valuation methods are used to support or argue against projects and policy
choices. The political relevance of the debate stems from the technical and ethical
difficulties of assessing the value of non-market goods. This means that the
validity of much of the information presented to or by governments, in defense of
key arguments in domestic and international policy debates, is often contested.
Economists have developed a variety of techniques to value non-market
environmental and cultural amenities consistent with the valuation of marketed
goods; i.e. based on individual preferences.

64 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 I. STRATEGIES

e _it E d it
s io
10. Even when the methodology may be sound, the fact that many estimates

w
(particularly of non-use values) are based on hypothetical “contingent valuation”
surveys, means that the results cannot be taken too literally. There may be large

n
o
differences between what people say they are willing to pay and what people

D Br
actually disburse. To test this disparity, a willingness-to-pay mail survey that was

y
followed by an invoice requesting the sum that the respondent had claimed to be

nl
willing to pay. While many people paid, the discrepancy was nonetheless large.

u le
d
EC

ea

se
R
O

e
An r
Le c tu

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
65
 ISBN 92-64-00946-9
Building Competitive Regions
Strategies and Governance
e _it E d it
© OECD 2005
s io
w

n
o
D Br

y
nl
Part II

u le
d
EC

ea

se
Governance

R
O

e
An r
Le c tu

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
67
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s io
w

n
o
D Br

y
nl
Introduction

u le
Regional competitiveness rests on networked forms of production. The

d
corollary of this assessment is that firms are more dependent, especially

EC

ea
when it concerns SMEs, on the local environment in which they are located. In

se
order to develop and prosper, firms need to use all sorts of goods and services

R
that are provided in different ways. When these are made available within a

O
particular geographical context they can be considered as “local collective

e
competition goods” (Crouch et al., 2001). They may concern availability of
An r
c tu
relevant skills, access to information related to technical evolution or external

Le
markets, the sharing of a territorial label, etc. These collective goods and
services provide competitive capacity to the actors located in the place. Their
combination constitutes specific answers to the competitiveness challenges
faced by local areas: workforce, lifestyle, financial and above all informational
capacities.1 These collective goods do not appear at random. Their provision
must be ensured by social or political arrangements, strongly linked to the
central government regional policy (objectives and means), that is, by forms of
multi-level governance.
Governance across levels of government – or “multilevel governance” –
has become a major issue in territorial policy making and was recognised as
one of the central elements of territorial policy making at the OECD High Level
Meeting on Innovation and Effectiveness in Territorial Development Policy
in 2003.2 Multilevel governance, understood here as the exertion of authority
across levels of government, has changed over the last two decades.
Decentralisation has made local and regional governments more powerful and
increased their capacity to operate their own development and management
policies. The emergence of private actors that take part in policy making and
the increased number of public-private partnerships has made the
stakeholders’ pattern more colourful but also more complicated. Local and
regional governments – much more exposed to global competition than
t wen ty yea r s ag o – wa nt to h ave a b igg er s ay in t h e s e t ti n g and
implementation of national policy measures. People at the local and regional
level put pressure on the outcome of policy delivery and require that publicly
funded programmes have a real and positive impact on their lives. And finally,
the main objective of regional policy is moving away from redistribution and
towards growth enhancement. Taking such secular trends into account,
management and governance of public development and related programmes

68 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s
have become more complex and more demanding, io of
requiring a rethinking
w
how national and sub-national governments should collaborate.

n
o
New forms of governance targeting local and regional competitiveness

D Br

y
are oriented towards co-operation. It can be vertical, mirroring the linkages

nl
between lower and higher levels of government (Chapter 4) or horizontal, for
example between communes or between regions (Chapter 5). Co-operative

u le
linkages also concern various types of stakeholders at a given level of
governance – essentially public sector and private sector actors (profit or non-

d
EC
profit) (Chapter 6). In practice, these different forms of co-ordination can be

ea
integrated in one and the same system, as is the case for example with

se
“micro-regions” in Mexico or the Czech Republic. Chapter 7 will underline

R
O
three issues common to these governance matters.

e
4. Coordination between the different levels of government:
An r
c tu
transfers, contracting practices and incentives
Le
The first part of this report demonstrates that strategies to promote
competitiveness are multi-sectoral and involve many different actors. The
central government intervenes in these mechanisms by supporting public
service delivery according to standards set at the national level. Local public
services are, as we have seen, an essential feature of the attractiveness of the
territories. To let the supply of these services depend on decisions made by
local authorities and their financial resources would present important risks
of coherence. Indeed, local and regional authorities could choose to compete
among themselves, in order to attract private investment, by reducing local
taxes (or constraints on environmental norms), which would in turn force
them to reduce local public services (“race to the bottom” issues).
However, the central government’s role consists of more than simply
distributing grants and setting standards. All the more so when local collective
competition goods are created, which depend to a large extent on local input
such as setting up a network of actors or local contacts. Under these
conditions, policies directed at regions and local areas should be undertaken
in coordination with regional and local governments. The central government
should thus also intervene to facilitate co-operation among different actors,
using, for example, fiscal instruments to encourage co-operation among
municipalities, encouraging diversity in the partnerships that support local
projects, involving the private sector, etc. Introducing competition among
local projects to obtain grants from central government can also be an
effective way of encouraging partnerships at local level.
Nevertheless, the dependence upon central resources and expertise is
partial. In a context of regional specificities and research for knowledge-based
assets, local and regional authorities are often best placed to identify the

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
69
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
io to
sthe measures to take in order
possible unexploited factors of growth and
implement their promotion. Bottom-up w initiatives are required rather than

n
o
top down decisions to be implemented locally. What organisational devices

D Br
can enable both the participation of central and regional levels of government

y
and co-operative rather than hierarchical relations? In this report we examine

nl
the contractual types of relations among levels of government.

u le
Decentralisation and transfers

d
EC
Although in theory local authorities should make use of their own

ea
revenue to provide local public services, all countries – including the most

se
decentralised ones – have public finance relations between levels of

R
O
government that take the form of intergovernmental transfers. Through these
transfers, central governments try to ensure that all local authorities can fulfil

e
their responsibility for a certain number of public services whose standards
An r
c tu
are usually set at national level. The central government supplements the
local budgets by: Le
● grants earmarked to specific types of local public services,
● among these earmarked grants, some are proportional grants depending on
the amount that local authorities are committed to spend3 (via a matching
rate that is supposed to compensate local authorities for the extent of
benefit spillovers across jurisdictional boundaries),
● general purpose grants not earmarked for a specific purpose (by assessing
the amount of these grants according to different formulas tied to the
demographic or geographic features of the area).4
The different types of transfers have an impact on how public decision-
makers behave at local and regional level. If the transfers in question are
earmarked grants and if they are proportional (according to the terminology
used by the Council of Europe, 2004) the local authorities will have limited
room to manoeuvre in their spending. On the other hand, if the transfers are
non-proportional or general purpose grants, there is much more freedom left
for local decision-making.
Trends in intergovernmental transfers highlight a complex reshaping of
relations across level of governments.
First, there is an observable trend to increase the relative weight of
central government transfers in local and regional financing in the great
majority of countries (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2).
The two graphs can be summarised as follows:
1. The degree of decentralisation varies greatly across OECD countries. For
instance, the sub-national share of total government expenditures varies
from less than 6% up to more than 50%. The constitutional framework for

70 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s
Figure 2.1. Indicators of fiscal decentralisation io
in OECD countries:
sub-national government share w in general government revenues
1
and expenditures, percentages, 2002

n
o
D Br
Revenues

y
70

nl
60

u le
50 CAN

d
EC
40 USA

ea
SWE DNK
DEU
30

se
ESP
FIN JPN
AUT

R
O
20 ITA NOR2
FRA NLD
10 PRT GBR
MEX

e
GRC
An r
c tu
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 80
Le
Note: Revenues include direct and indirect taxes as well as non-tax revenues received by regional and
Expenditure

local governments and are expressed as a share of revenues received by the general government.
Expenditure corresponds to total expenditure by regional and local governments expressed as a share
of general government expenditure.
1. Or latest year available: 2000 for Japan, 2001 for France and Portugal.
2. Mainland only. Data exclude revenues from oil production.
Source: OECD, National Accounts database, Statistics Norway, Statistics Canada, US Bureau of
Economic Analysis.

Figure 2.2. Changes in the share of sub-national governments

in total public revenues and spending
Changes expressed in percentage points, 19851-20022
Revenues3
10

5
DEU DNK
BEL
0 PRT GRC CAN
AUT USA
FIN NOR SWE
-5 FRA ITA
LUX ESP

-10

-15

JPN
-20
GBR NLD
IRL
-25
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8
Spending4
1. Or earliest year available: 1986 for Ireland, 1987 for the United Kingdom, 1990 for Japan, Luxembourg
and Netherlands, 1991 for Germany, 1993 for Sweden, 1995 for Greece, Portugal and Spain.
2. Or latest year available: 1997 for Canada and the United States, 1996 for Ireland and 1998 for Portugal.
3. Excluding transfers received from other levels of government.
4. Excluding transfers paid to other levels of government.
Source: OECD National Accounts data. Statistics Norway.

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
71
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
io
s – has surprisingly little impact
government in a country – federal or unitary
on the extent of decentralisation.w Sub-national governments in some

n
o
unitary countries are responsible for a larger share of public spending than

D Br
in countries identified as federal.

y
nl
2. Sub-national tax and expenditure shares have diverged over the last
20 years. While in most countries the share of sub-national expenditures

u le
increased, local taxing power – with a few notable exceptions – declined or
remained stable. The decentralisation movement in the OECD mainly

d
EC
embraced Southern and Central-Eastern European countries, Korea, and

ea
Mexico. The rising expenditure share partly reflects new responsibilities

se
assigned to sub-national governments (health care and/or non-university

R
O
education in Italy, Mexico (OECD, 2003a and 2001a) and Spain, active labour
market policies in Canada in 1996 (OECD, 2002c), and primary education in

e
Hungary (OECD, 2001c), while local taxing power was reduced in many
An r
c tu
countries, such as in France, where local taxes were replaced by transfers
(OECD, 2002d). Le
3. Most countries exhibit sub-national expenditures that are larger than sub-
national tax receipts and this gap is widening over time. This points to the
existence of large inter governmental transfer schemes. The size and
structure of intergovernmental grants and their management are becoming
crucial issues of multilevel governance.
Second, non-earmarked transfers are well diffused (with the notable
exception of the United States) (see Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.3. Shares of conditional transfers

In percentage of total transfers

United States 100%

Switzerland 73%

Germany 65%

Australia 53%

India 38%

Spain 24%

Canada 17%

0 25 50 75 100
%
Source: Department of Finance, Canada, 1998.

72 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
Third, applied research has shown insmany cases that matching iorates
w
broadly exceeded any possible spillover measures (Oates, 1999; Inman, 1988).

n
o
According to the prevailing economic thought on local finance these

D Br

y
trends could have diverging results. Reducing the financial independence of

nl
local authorities has the advantage of allowing the central government to have
more control over the growth and distribution of resources. However, it

u le
operates as a kind of disincentive to local government from taking
responsibility vis-à-vis their electors and from providing local public services

d
EC
that are cost-effective. However, the fact that most of the transfers are non-

ea
specific carries the opposite risk, reducing the powers of control available to

se
central government. What is more, this type of financing places a heavy

R
O
burden of responsibility on local players who do not necessarily have the
capacity to handle it. At the same time, these trends have advantages, too,

e
especially in terms of reducing the transaction costs associated with transfers
An r
c tu
(administrative costs in particular).
While these trends in intergovernmental transfers could be quicklyLe
regarded as out of control, they deserve a more in depth and careful analysis.
Of course, fiscal decisions that are often outcomes of negotiations between
central and “local” authorities could be seen as the result of politically driven
criteria that could be different from the result of weighing benefits and costs
of prospective public programs. However, viewing public decision-making as
something that should result automatically from the application of normative
guiding principles, rather than being the subject of negotiation, could be
equally considered out of touch with reality. In many cases, the central
government contribution is no longer just used for revenue balancing but
rather for competences that are shared across levels of government and
cannot be assigned once for all as well as for inciting regions to valorise their
comparative advantages and enhance their competitiveness. In this context,
policy strategies are impacted by uncertainty about decisions. With
asymmetry of information between the “principal” (the central government)
and the “agents” (the sub-national ones),5 and with the necessity of dialogue
between different actors, appropriate strategies for development are more
likely to emerge from having plurality of participation in decision-making
(with different types of actors, central, regional and local) as well as in policy
implementation.

The regional development contracts

Fiscal relations across levels of government can include, among other
things, institutional mechanisms to support transfers of funds between the
upstream and downstream levels of government. In particular, there is
growing interest in contracts between levels of government as a practice that
could provide a response to central government involvement in local spending

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
73
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
and bring different partners together with s a common focus. Contracts i
o
set out
w
the goals, the nature of the transfers, the conditions attached to the transfers

n
o
and the obligations of the different parties. While they can provide support for

D Br
some redistribution initiatives (between regions and municipalities) on the

y
part of central gove rnm ent, they are not des ig ne d as ex post facto

nl
compensatory tools for adjustment, but rather they have to do with the

O
central government playing an upfront role in regional and local development

u le
strategies. At the same time, contracts can valorise the role of local decision-

d
EC
makers, their proximity to problems and resources of a region and therefore

ea
their capacity to better target the initiatives and utilise untapped development

se
potential. This involves opening up contractual negotiations to local third

R
O
parties, beyond just actors in the public sector: business representatives,
private citizens, interest groups, etc. Contracts can help to harness diversity

e
and develop the particular features of each region within the framework of the
An r
c tu
desired consistency at national level. The fact that they are negotiated means

Le
they have more in common with planning initiatives shared between the
different levels of government than with a kind of “homogenisation” of
regional and local situations.
Contractual arrangements can be found in all kinds of countries with a
democratic regime, they cannot be ascribed to a specific type of State
organisation,6 and include all or part of complex mechanisms such as:
● Vertical relations with several varying dimensions including financial
transfers (that for European countries also includes the supra-national level
of the Union).
● Local horizontal relations. Several contracts involve the participation of
different local authorities as well as the private sector.7
● Central horizontal relations,i.e. co-ordination between the different ministries
involved in regional policy in order to overcome the traditional isolation of
sectoral policies.8
● Conditions and incentives arrangement. In order to comply with the conditions
of contracts, regions have to propose projects which are very detailed in
terms of lead time, technology content, environmental impact, costs, etc.
Moreover, in various countries, contracts are financially underpinned by
transfers dependent on the success of regional policy and development
programmes. The conditions that go with these transfers vary9 but, as with
all types of contract, they shape the incentives influencing the behaviour of
local government.

The 3 types of contracts in existence with regard to regional development

There are three types of contract in the field of regional development.
Planning and programme contracts integrate a number of policies and

74 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s
programmes in the territory covered. Implementation io
contracts mainly
w
concern contractual arrangements devoted to the devolution of regional or

n
o
local planning to sub-national levels of governments. Co-operation contracts

D Br
organise co-operation between different parties to carry out a specific

y
programme or project, establishing their reciprocal commitments. In the

nl
latter case, contracts do not reflect a principal/agent type of relationship since

O
each partner has in principle an equal position in the co-operation.

u le
d
Planning and programme contracts

EC

ea
There are several programme contracts (especially in Switzerland with

se
the programme contracts in regional public transport and the programme

R
O
contracts in forest management (TR Switzerland, 2002). We will mainly be
looking at one of the most representative mechanisms in the field, especially

e
because of the increasingly multisectoral nature of the commitments: the
An r
c tu
French CPERs (TR France, forthcoming).
Le
The State-region plan contract (contrat de plan Etat-région, CPER) became a
key instrument of the regional development policy just a few years after its
creation. Contracts have been passed with all regions for the periods 1984-88,
1989-93, 1994-98 (postponed until the end of 1999) and 2000-06. The contract is
a detailed document, setting out a series of policies and programmes which
will be carried out for a certain period. The central government and the region
jointly finance the projects in the contract, and, recent contracts have
included contributions of infra-regional governments and European structural
funds. The contract includes a financial appendix stating the precise amount
of the financial commitment of each party for the period covered by the
contract. Contracts do not necessarily imply budgetary transfers between the
central government and local governments; instead they usually stress the
responsibilities and commitments of each party, while providing a detailed
description of the purpose of each measure.
The decentralisation laws have had a significant impact on the State-region
plan contracts. As regions have acquired more power over the decision-making
process, the contracts have expanded to include new fields, often with larger
budgets (increasingly financed by regional and local authorities) and new actors
such as representatives of civil society. As a result of this process, planning at the
national level has been entirely replaced by State-region plan contracts, which
provide the only framework for forward-looking and consultative policy-making.
Although the first contracts were mainly devoted to infrastructure projects
and the modernisation of industries, the second generation of contracts dealt
with a broader range of issues, including regional innovation and urban
planning. During the 90s, the budget for these contracts increased dramatically
by over 45%, partly as a result of contributions from new sources such as local

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
75
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s the central government isought
authorities and the European funds. In addition,
o
to enable poorer regions to compete on wa more equal footing by providing them

n
o
with a larger share of resources through the contracts (which was seen as a

D Br
supplementary instrument for equalisation), depending on their rate of

y
unemployment, employment perspectives and fiscal capacity indicators. The

nl
idea was to promote local development through the contract as a complement

O
to other more traditional programmes using compensation subsidies. The

u le
current contract (2000-2006) reinforces this trend. Today the budget is more

d
EC
important and the regional contribution slightly exceeds that of the central

ea
government. Public investment under the contracts accounts for 15 to 20% of

se
the central government budget and for 5 to 30% of the regional council budgets.

R
O
For instance, in the Ile de France (Paris and its neighbouring region) the regional
council contributes more than 60% and the central government 39%. Central

e
government participation ranges from 39% (Ile de France) to more than 63%
An r
c tu
(Limousin), reflecting the government’s attempts to enable less competitive
regions to catch up. The ministries that contribute the most to regional
programmes through the contracts are the ministry of infrastructure,
Le
transportation and housing (40%), followed by the ministry of education (17%)
and the ministry of agriculture (9%). However, the great majority of the different
ministries are now involved in State-region planning contracts.
The current planning contract is structured around four areas:
sustainable development (which has led policy-makers to favour investments
in collective transportation and railways rather than roads), employment in all
s e c t o rs , s o lid a r i t y (w h i ch h a s le d t o u rb an re newal p ro gram m es ,
improvements in the delivery of public services, etc.) and “immaterial
functions” (such as education, research and development, ICT diffusion, etc.).
The current contract contains a new system for classifying projects into the
following categories: “regional issues” (volet régional), “territorial matters”
(volet territorial for infra regional issues), and “inter-regional matters”. At least
25% of the contract’s budget must be devoted to territorial matters.
Organisational setting: The implementation of the planning contract
necessitates the participation of various actors; central, regional and local
authorities, their representatives and some bodies for intermediation:

Figure 2.4. Organisational structure for regional contracts

Central Government Local and Regional Authorities Financing Information

DATAR

Prefecture of the Region Regional Steering Regional council + other local

+ de-concentrated services Committee authorities
Ministries

76 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s of a long process of mutual
The planning contract is the result io
w
commitment between two different groups of actors: 1) the elected local and

n
o
regional authorities, and the “development actors” in the region (firms,

D Br
associations, etc.) under the co-ordination of the regional authority and 2) the

y
regional “prefect” who is not elected but designated by the State and an “actor

nl
of intermediation”. All the regional planned projects are co-ordinated by the

O
Delegation for Territorial Management and Regional Action (DATAR, délégation

u le
à l’aménagement du territoire et à l’action régionale). Different ministries form

d
EC
steering committees to coordinate the actions taken by the central and

ea
regional governments in different sectors at the regional level. It is important

se
to note that, under the current generation of contracts, when dealing with

R
O
territorial development, inter-municipal structures direct transversal projects
instead of the steering committees.

e
Challenges: Indeed, a number of important problems exist. Delays in the
An r
c tu
implementation of decisions contained in the contracts may necessitate their
Le
extension beyond 2006. However underperformance can rarely be put down to
a breach of contract in the sense of a desire to escape from one’s obligations.
It is more likely the consequence of delays in availability of funds, as a
consequence of budgetary regulation, or of changes in circumstances that
mean funds are reallocated, or of programmes the costs of which have been
underestimated or preliminary studies not completed. Aside from such
incidents, which may admittedly be serious, contracts are performed. When
there is failure to perform, there is hardly a single case where one of the
parties has made a claim in the administrative court; the claimant has always
been a third party. Indeed, neither central government nor the region has any
interest in leaving the solution of a conflict to the courts, not least because of
the length of the procedure. Basically, they are forced to cooperate because of
their legal competences. As a result, there is nothing to be gained from
obtaining the satisfaction of a judgment on one matter, at the expense of
ongoing relations. On the contrary, the preferred course is to seek
compensation by negotiation on another subject. In addition, various regional
authorities have complained that the central government is not honouring its
fin ancial com mitm ents. On the oth er hand, s ome critics see s uch
arrangements as being more an instrument of State devolution than as
imparting any real impetus in partnership terms. A negative aspect is that it
remains too much top-down due to a stronger negotiating power of the State
with the consequences that priority actions do not differ significantly from
one region to another.
French authorities are aware of these problems. An evaluation of the
CPER device, currently in process, has generated a number of debatable
recommendations. Among them, the proposition to re-centre the planning
contracts around a limited number of structural policies is a crucial one but a

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
77
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
io
sdevice in this way will threaten
lot of observers believe that reforming the
local initiative. Another importantw recommendation is related to the

n
o
insufficiency of the evaluating process which could perhaps be improved

D Br
thanks to a more transparent and independent council for evaluation. Other

y
financial considerations have also led them to recommend greater “fungibility”

nl
of the budgets. A last important recommendation is that in order to strategically

O
reinforce the long term coherence of the various CPER a “national scheme with

u le
a long term perspective” could be set up. The region will be in charge of a

d
EC
“strategic document of orientation” which would consolidate its role as leading

ea
intermediary structure (between national and local levels).

se
R
Implementation contracts
O
These contracts are provided by numerous laws in France, VINEX

e
r
c ove n an ts i n t h e N e th e r l an d s , c o n t ra ct u al a r ran g e m e n t s f o r t h e
An
c tu
implementation of regional planning in Germany, or the programme contract
Le
in Italy which is a contract made by the competent central administration,
large firms, associations of small and medium enterprises, representatives of
industrial districts, for the implementation of activities under a negotiated
programme. In what follows we will focus on the Netherlands and Germany.

The Netherlands. The Netherlands define themselves as a “decentralised

unitary state”, with three government levels: the central government,
provinces and municipalities. It is also characterised by “co-government”
practices (medebewind); this means that policy-making generally involves
central government and local government in most policy fields, partly because
of the relatively small size of the country. Decision-making processes usually
include consensus building, even when it takes a lot of time. There is no
fragmentation as in France. Due to its high density of population, the
Netherlands has developed country wide spatial planning. Contracts have
appeared as an instrument for the implementation of the national plan, and
may be considered as a form of “co-government”.
The national plan is adopted by a key planning decision of the central
government; concrete policy planning decisions for parts of the plan have to
be complied with by local plans. However, for the Supplement to the Fourth
Report on Country Planning (Vierde Nota over de Ruimtelijke Ordening Extra –
VINEX), adopted in 1991 and still in force, the government decided to pass
contracts with provinces and municipalities, including the regional bodies
(sub-provincial in the Netherlands). To simplify the negotiation, the central
government passed contracts directly with the four main cities, whereas it
passed a contract with the association of provinces to delegate to provinces
the contracts with 18 other urban areas. These contracts included housing,
urban extensions, green areas, public transports. As a counterpart for

78 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
financial support by the central government,s local governments had itoouse
w planning, in accordance with the
their prerogatives, in particular as regards

n
o
guidance of the national plan.

D Br

y
The multilateral contracts ROM (Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu – Planning

nl
and Environment) are another example devoted to fragile areas. There is a
consultation round on the basis of a planning project. A contract results from

u le
the agreement expressed by all parties. The procedure is open to private
bodies, by contrast with VINEX covenants. Their content includes a large

d
EC
variety of subjects, because the strategy was based on the achievement of a

ea
package deal: each party had to reach a satisfactory agreement on a subject in

se
order to commit to the whole.

R
O
At present, and since 1999, the Fifth Report is being prepared and should
be decided soon. As before, there is no say on covenants on the planning

e
An
documents. Covenants are not planning instruments but implementation r
c tu
instruments. It is too soon to anticipate whether and how again the
implementation of the Fifth Report would proceed through covenants. Le
Germany. In Germany contractual arrangements still have little place in the
planning system, or a very specific one. Regarding the relationships between
the Federation and the Länder, the institutional scene absorbs most of the
political agreements. The Bundesrat secures the co-decision right of Länder
governments in federal policies, and those which have an impact on economic
development and planning policies of the Länder (common tasks of the article 91a
of the Basic Law) are managed by joint committees in which the Länder
governments have collective control over decisions. Otherwise, there are
13 inter-ministerial committees linking the Federation and the Länder over
almost all policy fields; they have been set up by treaties which lay down their
working rules. However, deliberations of these committees may result in
collective agreements for the implementation of specific policies by all Länder.
An example is the “administrative agreement” on the financial support of the
Federation to urban planning measures of 19 December 2001 and 9 April 2002;
this support has to be transferred to municipalities on the basis of their
projects by the Land government.10 The procedural and deliberative mode of
exchange between government levels is usually described in Germany as the
expression of the Gegenstromprinzip, that is to say the principle of “reciprocal
flows”. In the institutional structure of Germany a significant development of
contractual arrangements for planning is probably not needed.

Co-operation contracts
Their purpose is to govern co-operation between different parties
carrying out a specific programme or project, laying down their reciprocal
commitments; most contractual arrangements under the laws in Italy and

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
79
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
io
Spain belong to this category. In Spain assin Italy, in contrast to Germany,
w
contractual arrangements have increased tremendously in the last decade,

n
o
probably as a result of the devolution of responsibilities to regions. In many

D Br
respects, the situation in Italy is similar to the situation of Spain, but the

y
differences need to be pointed out. The development of contractual

nl
arrangements below the regional level is important, whereas contractual

O
relations between central government and regions are less developed. Italian

u le
regions seem to be less involved in national policy-making than their Spanish

d
EC
counterparts. Furthermore, the Italian legal tradition is reluctant towards

ea
public law contracts, in contrast to Spain where the administrative law covers

se
a wide sphere of legal relations, including contracts.

R
O
Spain. In the absence of an institutionalised participation of regions in the

e
national policy-making process in Spain, there is a proliferation of councils in
An r
c tu
which regions are involved in key decisions affecting their interests (for
example: on fiscal and financial policy, on health, on research and
Le
technology…), of sectoral conferences, and other mixed bodies. As a whole
there are more than 400 mixed bodies in which policies, projects and
financing are discussed between regions and central government. These
relationships have also developed through various sorts of contracts. The law
has attempted to organise and clarify this process (national laws 12/1983 and
30/1992). The latter piece of legislation establishes three kinds of contractual
arrangements between the central government and regions:
● agreements passed within sectoral conferences, which are deemed to
involve all regions;
● co-operation agreements (convenios de colaboración): they are bilateral, can be
passed between public administrations, they have to provide for funding
and can establish a permanent corporate structure;
● joint plans and programmes (planes y programas conjuntos): they are
contracts between the administration of a region and the general
administration at the central level in order to achieve common objectives in
the field of shared competences; they are also bilateral and may be
combined with a co-operation agreement.

Italy. The contract system began with the transfer of central government
competences to ordinary regions in 1970. The presidential decree No. 616 of
24 July 1977 provides for contractual arrangements following this transfer:
between regions for activities overlapping their borders; between central
government, regions and other local governments for the use of school
infrastructure, and between central government and regions for public works
deviating from local planning rules. The Constitutional Court confirmed this
possibility as a response to the need for close co-operation between central

80 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
io
s provided for contracts between
government and regions. Later on, other laws
w
central government, regions and local governments for their implementation,

n
o
in particular the law No. 64 of 1986 for development programmes of the

D Br
Mezzogiorno.

y
nl
But, with the laws No. 142 and 241/1990, contracts or agreements became
a general means of administrative action. The first law gave legal effect to

u le
municipal autonomy, and the second one is the first general law on
administrative procedure. The development of contractual arrangements led

d
EC
to a new system of classification with the law No. 662 of 23 December 1996

ea
(Art. 2, par. 203), which is still in force:

se
● the negotiated programme, between public subjects, or public and private

R
O
subjects, but for a common purpose;
● the institutional programme agreement: includes a financial programme

e
and a multi-annual operational programme; An r
t u
●
L e cprogramme,
the framework programme agreement: is used for a complex
determines the commitments of each party, provides for the necessary
service conferences and the implementation agreements;
● the territorial covenant (patto territoriale): it is an intervention programme
agreed by local governments, social partners and other public or private
parties for a development programme similar to those covered by
framework programme agreements;
● the area programme: this is an operational instrument agreed between
public administrations (national, regional, local…), representatives of
workers and employers aimed at interventions to support job creation in
the area.
Additionally, the programme agreement (accordo di programma) of the law
No. 142 is still in force in article 34 of the new code of local government (Texto
unico delle leggi sull’ordinamento degli enti locali, D.Lgs No. 267, 18 August 2000).
Its purpose is to carry out public works, or programmes requiring the
integration of the activities of different public administrations; the initiative
belongs to the executive of the region, of the province or of the municipality,
and gives rise to a service conference which verifies that the agreement can be
achieved. The agreement needs the formal approval of the president of the
region or, as the case may be, of the province or of the municipality. In case of
conflict, the regional administrative court is competent. Programme
agreements have become the most common contractual arrangement
practised in Italy.

Canada. A similar approach has been adopted by Canada with the Labour
Market Development Agreements and the Infrastructure Canada Programme
which are Federal-Provincial-Partnerships.

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
81
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
Federal Provincial Partnerships in active s io
employment policy. After a request
from provinces to give them more control w over labour market programming,

n
o
the federal government in 1996 offered to turn over responsibility for active

D Br
labour market programmes to the provinces. The offer encompassed the

y
transfer of CAD 1.5 billion in 1997-1998 and 3 620 full time equivalent staff

nl
from federal to provincial administrations. In the two years that followed,

O
agreements were negotiated between the federal government and most of the

u le
provinces. As of June 2001, Labour Market Development Agreements (LMDAs)

d
EC
have been negotiated with all the provinces and territories except Ontario. The

ea
Agreements are of two types: the first provides for a “full transfer” of authority

se
to the province/territory, the second type is designated Co-management

R
O
where there is no transfer of staff or funds. Under the “transfer” LMDAs,
provinces and territories assume responsibility for delivery of active labour

e
market assistance programmes similar to those described as Employment
An r
c tu
Benefits and Support Measures (EBSM) in the Employment Insurance Act. The
Co-management LMDAs involve an innovative partnership between federal
Le
and provincial agencies administering the EBSMs. Preliminary findings from
eleven completed formative evaluations indicate that LMDAs contribute to
partnerships and the harmonisation of programmes and services and to local
flexibility. Factors that have contributed to partnerships include a strong
w i l l i n g n e s s t o wo r k t o g e t h e r a n d m ai n t ai n c l i e n t s e r v i c e d u r i n g
implementa ti o n. In so me situ atio n s, co -o peration h as un cove red
opportunities for efficiencies and e conomies. Evaluations in most
jurisdictions indicated duplication had decreased or remained the same as
prior to the LMDA. Moreover, over 75% of EBSMs participants rated service as
good or excellent. These results confirm that LMDAs are being used to assist
eligible clients for employment benefits. Issues for further investigation
include: the need to assess longer-term results, how to further improve co-
ordination, and potential gaps in programming for non-Employment
Insurance eligible clients.
We c ould als o m ention a more rec ent p rogram m e con ce rnin g
infrastructure: The Infrastructure Canada Programme which is designed so that
dedicated funding is provided over several fiscal years. The Infrastructure
Canada Programme was the successor to the Canada Infrastructure Works
Programme (CIWP), which ran from 1994-1999. Infrastructure Canada’s
principle focus is on “green” municipal infrastructure, such as municipal
water, wastewater, solid waste management including, recycling, and
improving energy efficiency in buildings. Secondary priorities include local
transportation, cultural and recreational facilities, infrastructure that
supports tourism, affordable housing, rural and remote telecommunications,
and the provision of high-speed Internet access for public institutions. The
programme is governed through federal-provincial/territorial agreements that

82 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
provide for administration by management s committees composed iofotwo
provincial and federal representatives.w
Each committee is headed by a federal

n
o
co-chair and a provincial co-chair. The management committees in two

D Br
provinces also include municipal representatives. In several other provinces

y
municipal representatives are consulted in project assessment and selection.

nl
The federal share of funding under the programme (approximately one-third

O
of eligible costs) was allocated to provinces and territories on the basis of the

u le
share of Canada’s population and the share of Canada’s unemployment. Each

d
EC
of these components is equally weighted. The remaining share of funds can

ea
come from provincial and local governments as well as non-governmental

se
sources including, for example, public private partnerships. Generally,

R
O
provincial governments contribute another third of costs, and local
governments the remainder. Funding priorities were determined through

e
negotiated agreements between the federal and provincial/territorial
An r
c tu
governments.

Advantages and disadvantages of contractual arrangements

Le
Advantages
F r o m t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f m u l t i - l eve l g ove r n a n c e , c o n t ra c t u a l
arrangements have the following advantages:
● Link regional and local policies to national priorities. As such, contractual
arrangements are measures accompanying further decentralisation while
maintaining consistency in public policy making and implementation;11
● Contribute to building local capacity. In contractual arrangements, the “sub”
level of government is not being looked upon as the mere recipient of a
mandate granted to it. On the contrary, it is made responsible by virtue of
its participation in decision-making and in the learning process.
Therefore, these arrangements require a high level of participation,
knowledge and competence on the part of local representatives. The
negotium is at least as important as the instrumentum which results from it.
This is particularly true for the cooperative type of contract and partly for
the planning ones.
● Although less explicitly, perform a legitimatisation function. Whereas
government by command is no longer practiced, contractual arrangements
offer an opportunity for governments to submit their policies to the
agreement of other authorities, which will have to comply with them, and
to re-legitimise their authority through negotiation. This legitimisation
effect is both relevant for the central and the regional level.
● Help handling institutional fragmentation. Contractual arrangements are
meant to constitute a useful tool for improving co-ordination between
different ministries acting at local level. As such, they are more developed

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
83
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s Spain), where they tend toioturn
in more fragmented systems (France, Italy,
into an all-purpose instrument, thanwin more integrated systems (Germany,

n
o
the Netherlands), where they tend to focus on specific purposes and have a
more limited scope.12 As for co-ordination between local jurisdictions,

D Br

y
contractual arrangements can be an incentive for horizontal co-operation

nl
between local authorities.

u le
● Stabilisation of relationships. Since the contract sets out long –term
commitments, it allows each party to anticipate the decisions of its

d
EC
counterparts with more certainty. Even if this is not a guarantee, it reduces

ea
opportunistic behaviour and political risk to a minimum. Since most

se
contractual arrangements involve financial commitments over several

R
O
years they help overcome the drawbacks of the annual budgetary principle.
The positive effect of the ability to anticipate is particularly manifest in

e
implementation contracts. The reduction of opportunistic behaviour is a
An r
c tu
direct result of the co-operation. Both of these effects could be obtained in
Le
the planning and programme contracts if there were no uncertainty about
the provision of resources by the central government (which is not
completely the case in the French CPER).
● Contracts allow the burden of big projects and complex programmes to be
shared, making possible the kind of operation which could not have been
undertaken by an isolated government level.
● The contract is one of the procedures possible to get partners involved.
Sharing the burden is also sharing the risks. This means, not only the
financial ones, but also the political risks in case of difficulties: political
criticism will not be possible from all those involved jointly. Therefore,
contractual arrangements work as a kind of reassurance. However this
impact is limited to the implementation contracts because decision making
still belongs to the central levels.

Drawbacks and implementation problems

Contracts nevertheless have many drawbacks:
● They involve a high cost in terms of negotiation and execution (transaction
costs, especially in the programming and co-operation types of contracts)
and they risk being based on imperfect information.13
● User countries say that they tend to proliferate (France, Italy).
● The ministries in charge in the different countries seem reluctant to give up
their prerogatives.
● While these negotiated mechanisms are supposed to allow a greater degree
of flexibility than a hierarchical distribution of obligations, they may prove
unresponsive to change where the parties are rigidly committed to fixed

84 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
io
long-term programmes (that is especiallystrue for planning and programme
contracts). w

n
o
● Another problem concerns the question of whether grants from the higher

D Br

y
level of government should supply capital formation and/or current

nl
expenditure. The support of capital formation without the support of
current expenditures linked to capital formation neglects the dynamic

u le
relationship between capital and current expenditures. Receiving regions
may not be in a position to pay the current expenditure after they have

d
EC
invested in fixed capital, or they may neglect maintenance in order to

ea
obtain more capital grants in the future. Moreover, many development

se
programmes aim at “soft” infrastructure but are technically or financially

R
O
not considered capital formation, and thus receive no grants. In such a case,
a bias towards capital grants neglects the formation of soft capital like

e
capacity building or construction of regional knowledge systems.
An r
c tu
● Furthermore, evaluation procedures are rarely provided for in advance,
Le
which means that it is not possible to measure the actual performance of
this instrument which, moreover, often suffers from a lack of transparency.
This limit especially concerns the co-operation contract (and partially the
programming ones) since the evaluation of the co-operation per se is a
complex task.
● It can also be said that the way infra-regional levels are positioned in
contractual mechanisms directed by the upstream level often bears the
signs of a power relationship. This underscores the risk of lack of
downstream representation when appointing a regional intermediary leader.
● Without a regional leader, however, it would be more difficult to bind the
local institutions in a contractual relationship with the central level, with
the risk that the whole set-up of vertical relationships, if they were possible,
would lack coherence. The leader should therefore be considered (and
consider itself) more as an intermediary than the first in line.

Issues of policy making

Our discussion of contractual arrangements has produced a number of
issues. While no perfect solution has emerged, one must note that countries
which use such contractual arrangements are debating the need for an
intermediary “leader” structure, the appropriate time period that contracts
should cover and, finally, the appropriate geographic areas which they should
cover.

The need for an intermediary “leader” structure

Appointing a local institution to act as “pilot” spokesman in contractual
relations has both pros and cons. Should sub-regional levels be incorporated

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
85
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
in an overall contractual framework in order io of
s to improve the consistency
action between the different levels, as w
is the case in Switzerland where there

n
o
is a “Tripartite Commission” encompassing communes, cantons and the

D Br
Federal level? Or is it preferable to increase the number of contracts between

y
central government and the different interlocutor levels? In the case of Italy,

nl
the answer is clear. In a given territory which is a partner in many

O
development assistance contracts, including supranational ones, setting up

u le
an intermediary local development body can prove beneficial with regard to

d
EC
the coherence of partnerships as a whole (the case of southern Italy).

ea
Including an ever growing number of stakeholders does of course help ensure

se
the participation of all possible sources of innovation, but makes it difficult to

R
O
respect efficiency criteria when determining common policy. As for France, it
takes the view that responsibility for coordinating economic development

e
rests with the regions, but without making them the leaders.
An r
The duration of contracts
Le c tu
A lot of time is spent on initial co-ordination when setting up such
mechanisms (contrats de plan Etat Région in France, territorial pacts and
programme contracts in Italy, tripartite contracts in Canada, etc.). In Italy this
is even seen as essential to guarantee the smooth execution of the contract,
obviously because of the lasting quality of decision-making networks that
share experience, references, objectives, etc. This is, however, very difficult to
measure and is undermined by having a succession of contractual formats.
Italy emphasises the need to set up clearer and more effective incentive
mechanisms such as bonus systems and performance-related sanctions
(inspired by the European performance reserve scheme).

Going beyond the administrative perimeters

Rather than merely viewing local economic development strategies as
the output of relations between levels of administration, one can see in
different member States that the competent regional perimeter, the partner in
the new contracts, is itself the product of cooperative processes (as it is the
case in Finland where regional councils are the result of inter-municipal
partnership). Horizontal co-operation is therefore a prerequisite for
intervention at the central level. This is the case with the “contrats de pays” for
rural zones in France. Some countries adopt this approach specifically to
urban development. By concluding multi-level urban partnerships, both
central and local governments have agreed on a list of common tasks and on
sharing the responsibility of fulfilling them (France and the agglomeration
contracts; Canada and the Urban development agreements…). There are also
a few recent types of metropolitan contracts (France, Switzerland…).

86 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
Recommendations s io
w
The comparative analysis brings us to six policy recommendations:

n
o
transfer real responsibility to local authorities, strengthen the capacity of

D Br

y
central government, focus on key programmes, ensure the transparency of the

nl
process, organise monitoring during the implementation of contracts,
organise evaluation.

u le
● Transfer responsibilities from the central government to local authorities: There is

d
no need to review again here the justification for decentralisation of

EC
government, but we have to be clear on the meaning of decentralisation. It

ea
requires elected bodies at the sub-national and local levels, vested with

se
autonomous rights. As regards contractual arrangements across levels of

R
O
government, decentralisation is a precondition for their use. This shows the
difference between management contracts, which are there to clarify the

e
An
responsibilities within an organisation, and contracts which operate in a r
●
multi-level system of government.
Le
Strengthen the capacity of central government: Any large-scale devolution of
c tu
responsibilities to sub-national levels that does not give central government
the resources to keep the whole government system working might
unde rm in e overall cohe re nce. C ontractual ar rang e m ents acros s
government levels may be a compromise, helping to reconcile the tendency
towards decentralisation and the consistency of the policy-making system
at central level. In this way, more responsibilities can be coupled with more
co-operation. However, a basic condition for such a compromise is that
there is a balanced distribution of resources of all kinds between central
government and regional/local governments. Furthermore, contracts are
not an alternative to classical instruments of government. On the contrary,
the capacity to revert to using instruments of prerogative must remain an
important resource in the central government’s negotiating capability.
● Focus contractual arrangements on key programmes: The proliferation of
contracts can dilute responsibilities and policies, and make coordination
much more difficult. In this regard, it can help to have framework contracts.
On the other hand, contracts whose content focuses on key issues will
support the debate on those issues by giving it concrete application.
Focusing contractual arrangements on key issues will also help to save
administrative costs, facilitate the involvement of political assemblies in
the policy-making process, and allow greater transparency.
● Ensure transparency of contractual arrangements: Transparency means both
publicity and procedural requirements. Publicity should be ensured at all
stages of the contractual process. It means documents must be made easily
available to the public. Procedural requirements are more difficult to define
and to fulfil. By contrast with planning documents, for which broad

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
87
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
consultation and inquiry procedures s io
are provided by law, as recently
w
reinforced by EC directives, the legal regulations are rather weak where

n
o
contractual arrang ements are concerned, and the level of public

D Br
participation is almost left to the discretion of local authorities. This is a

y
paradox, considering how contractual arrangements come about, and the

nl
fact that they generally determine the content of public procedures that will

O
be needed later to carry out a number of projects. Although it would be

u le
unjustified to introduce too many procedural obligations at the contractual

d
EC
negotiation stage, at least some part of the process should be open by law to

ea
public participation.

se
● Organise monitoring: This is a requirement especially for planning

R
O
arrangements. When a contract is to last for several years, it is clear from
the beginning that the implementation will not stop with the execution of

e
the written contract. Mechanisms must be put in place so that the parties
An r
c tu
can share the burden of implementation, as well as the difficulties that
Le
arise and answers to them. An appropriate reporting system has to be
established for this.
● Organise evaluation from the beginning: Everybody nowadays recognises the
need for evaluation. But the results of evaluations are often disappointing,
if not deceptive. Indeed, the quality of the evaluation is determined
practically at the time of contract signature. The technical requirements of
the evaluation have to be anticipated when formulating objectives and
determining measures, and in setting up the reporting system. Collection of
the information necessary for measurement has to be put in place from the
very beginning.
In conclusion, contracts are complicated mechanisms. They primarily
concern the vertical relationships between different levels of government.
However, they cannot properly cover multiple sectors unless different
ministries involved in regional and local development are able to coordinate
their policies.

Organisation/reorganisation of the higher levels of government for

regional development: a prerequisite
Several different models have emerged in OECD countries in order to
improve co-ordination of territorial policies at national level. The spectrum of
instruments ranges from bodies charged with co-ordinating the activities of
sectoral ministries to full-fledged ministries with broad responsibilities and
powers that encompass traditionally separate sectors.
The simplest and most common instrument is co-ordination through
inter-ministerial committees and commissions. OECD governments all have
numerous inter-ministerial committees to deal with cross-sectoral issues,

88 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s
among which there are generally co-ordinating iofor
bodies responsible
w
territorial policy domains such as regional policy, urban policy and rural

n
o
development policy. Three characteristics of these co-ordinating bodies stand

D Br
out: 1) formality/informality, 2) political level co-ordination, and 3) links with

y
budget allocation mechanisms.

nl
● Some co-ordinating structures are relatively informal, others are more

u le
structured. Austria, for example, has developed an informal approach
that emphasises consensus building among different ministries, while

d
EC
Switzerland uses a more formal approach to policy co-ordination where

ea
ministries dealing with territorial development issues have to convene

se
regularly in an inter-ministerial body.

R
O
● The task of managing co-ordination across ministries – i.e., chairing co-
ordination bodies – is often a responsibility of the head of state, prime

e
An
minister or cabinet. In the United States, the President’s Cabinet is r
c tu
responsible for cross-sectoral co-ordination, in Mexico, the Presidency, in
Le
Ireland, the Office of the Taoiseach, in the UK, the Office of the Deputy
Prime Minister, in Austria, the Federal Chancellery.
● The participation of finance/ treasury ministries and the link between the
outcomes of co-ordination processes and budget allocation procedures is
another important aspect.
Several countries augment cross-sectoral co-ordination mechanisms
with the use of special units or agencies that provide planning and advisory
support to help ensure policy coherence across sectors. In Norway, the
Regional Development Unit of the Ministry of Local Government and Regional
Development has been given responsibility to co-ordinate the regional
dimension of the policies of other government departments, principally
through inter-ministerial groups. In the UK, the Regional Co-ordination Unit –
currently placed within the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister – was set up
to implement cross-cutting initiatives and advise departments. In Japan, the
National and Regional Planning Bureau within the Ministry of Land
Infrastructure and Transport has developed a new perspective of territorial/
regional policy and provided a network for local authorities as well as other
local actors. In France, the DATAR (délégation à l’aménagement du territoire et à
l’action régionale) is an inter-ministerial body directly linked to the office of the
Prime Minister (which coordinates national territorial policy and handles the
planning contracts and the European Structural Funds) and receives the
different ministries’ information regarding their regional priorities and the
strategic objectives identified by the regional prefects. DATAR also plays an
important role in the allocation of funds: every year it collects budget requests
from the regional prefects and allocates the budget to related ministries, and
if necessary organises inter-ministerial meetings with the prefects and the

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
89
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
ministries. When the ministries decides iowill
the amount of money they
distribute, they inform DATAR which inw
turn informs the prefects.

n
o
While co-ordinating bodies represent an important tool, decision-making

D Br

y
power remains principally in the hands of the individual sectoral ministries

nl
that implement policies. As such, while the planning stage is more or less well
integrated, implementation is potentially compartmentalized.

u le
To overcome problems relating to sectoral implementation and in line
with the increasing importance accorded to regional development policies, in

d
EC
some cases inter-ministerial co-ordination bodies have been empowered and

ea
given some responsibilities for implementation. The DATAR in France is an

se
example of an inter-ministerial body that is charged with ensuring co-

R
O
ordination but that also has a formal role in territorial development planning,
decision-making and policy implementation. The Office of the Deputy Prime

e
An
Minister in the UK has also evolved towards a broader and more active role r
c tu
than its original policy co-ordination remit. In Italy the Department for
Le
Development and Cohesion Policies within the Treasury Ministry has broad
competence for programming and co-ordinating investments with particular
reference to the Mezzogiorno regions.
An important additional function that these co-ordination bodies have
adopted is as the interface with regional government in the field of economic
development – allocating funding; setting the guidelines for drawing up
regional strategies; advising on and authorising the strategies; and ensuring
value-for-money.
T h e oth e r appro ach to se cto ral co -o rdin at io n is to overco me
departmental boundaries by merging and combining departments. This is
generally only a partial consolidation. For example:
● In 2001, Japan reorganised cabinet level ministries and agencies in order to
establish more effective political leadership, improve transparency,
streamline the central government, and improve efficiency. The new
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT) was created by
amalgamating four ministries and agencies (the National Land Agency, the
Hokkaido Development Agency, and the Ministries of Transport and
Construction). Within the MLIT there has not been a radical reallocation of
responsibilities and although MLIT was given specific regional development
responsibilities, some important aspects of territorial policy are located in
other line ministries (notably Agriculture and Economy, Trade and
Industry).14
● The UK, similarly, created the Department of Environment, Transport and
the Regions (DETR) which brings together several departments involved
with spatial development. Responsibility for this large department rests
with the Deputy Prime Minister, whose Office is also responsible for co-

90 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
ordinating policy for the regions more s generally. Nonetheless, iothe
Department of Trade and Industryw retains important regional economic

n
o
development functions, and a range of departments and agencies combine

D Br
to manage rural development policies.

y
nl
Some countries have established regional development ministries, with
broad responsibilities for different aspects of regional policy design and

u le
implementation. Good examples are provided by the former EU accession
countries – Hungary and the Czech Republic, for example – in which regional

d
EC
development bodies were responsible for managing EU regional aids. As is

ea
discussed in the territorial review of the Czech Republic, the regional

se
development ministry played a strong role in the allocation of EU funding, but

R
O
its influence appears to be waning in the post-accession period. In the
evolving context of regional development, it appears that there is a slow but

e
progressive erosion of its initial competencies, although the MRD is the
An r
c tu
guarantor of the use of pre-accession and structural funds, jointly with the
Le
Ministry of Finance. Certain recent transfers of responsibilities and the
creation of numerous state agencies with regional offices illustrate this. The
management of SME support programmes in regions (most of which are
administered by the Czech Moravian Guarantee and Development Bank) is no
longer under the responsibility of the MRD15 but of the Ministry of Industry
and Trade (MIT), which finances these.
Finally, a completely different approach was taken in Canada where,
in 1986 the federal regional policy administration was decentralised and four
agencies located in the regions were created. The task of these agencies is to
translate national priorities at the territorial level and represent regional and
territorial interests in national programmes and policies. While at the broad
level many of the activities undertaken by the Regional Agencies are similar
(e.g. a focus on SMEs, reduced reliance on direct assistance to business,
increased focus on innovation and communities), the programming varies
from region to region in order to be responsive to local conditions and address
specific gaps. The agencies are also members of an industry portfolio umbrella
that includes other related departments and organisations thereby providing
a mechanism for policy co-ordination that ensures a consistent federal
approach to issues and national initiatives.

5. Horizontal co-ordination
Analysis will concern initially inter-municipal co-ordination before
focusing on inter-regional and more particularly trans-border co-ordination.

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
91
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
Inter-municipal co-ordination s io
w
Inter-municipal co-ordination is on the agenda of many countries and is

n
o
often a controversial issue. In some countries with a municipal structure that

D Br

y
is highly fragmented, inter-municipal co-operation has seen tremendous

nl
growth, as in France, for instance, where 75% of the population has now been
integrated under some kind of inter-municipal structure. The debate on inter-

u le
municipal co-operation is also intense in countries with a lower density of
municipalities (as is the case for Mexico or Canada). Broadly, opinion on the

d
EC
inter-communal approach is divided. Offsetting the advantages it brings in

ea
terms of increasing the supply size of public services (which would enable

se
improvements in both quality and quantity) are the extra costs of co-

R
O
ordination and initial investment that increased size generates.16
There are two basic types of organisational form of inter-municipal co-

e
An
ordination: municipal integration (by merger or by one municipality taking r
over another) and partnership-type arrangements, involving no more than a
Le
straightforward agreement on the joint supply of public services (covering onec tu
or more sectors) which can go as far as transferring powers to a joint body
created specifically for that purpose (creation of an additional layer of local
government or an institutional body such as an agency). This latter option
amounts in a way to “re-centralising” at the intermediate level functions that
previously used to be decentralised.

Why bring the municipalities together?

A number of theoretical arguments support the case for mergers
From the normative standpoint, putting municipalities together
essentially provides the answer to the quest for greater economic efficiency
(economies of scale, integration of spillovers) and fiscal performance.
Economic theory suggests that the per capita cost of providing a level of public
services follows an U-shaped curve, such that the cost of service provision
declines with the size of population up to an “optimal” level before increasing
beyond that point. Applying this theory to Japan, Hayashi determined that the
optimal municipality size to obtain the lowest unit costs of public services is
approximately 120 000 (based on 1990 figures). Using this figure as the
benchmark, 80% of Japan’s municipalities are under-populated and are not
providing public services efficiently (Hayashi, 2002). The existence and
magnitude of spillover effects from localised public policies clearly depend on
the geographical extent of the relevant jurisdiction. One way to deal with such
spillovers is to increase the size of the jurisdiction, thereby internalising all
the benefits and costs. Regarding fiscal aspects, a unitary tax system and
uniform tax rates allow greater fiscal equity within the amalgamated city, and
amalgamation allows better policy coordination across the territory. Indeed,

92 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
io
sable to play off one jurisdiction
with fewer jurisdictions, firms may be less
against the others. w

n
o
This search for economies of scale and for the integration of externalities

D Br

y
means that inter-municipal mergers seem to be the mechanism most likely to

nl
enable the communes to grow in size. In functional models, governance
structures are re-shaped to fit or to approximate to the functional economic

u le
area of the metropolitan region. Examples include the amalgamation of
municipalities (Montreal, Halifax, and Toronto) and the creation of a

d
EC
metropolitan government (London and Stuttgart) (see Box 2.1). The functional

ea
model of metropolitan governance has some basic characteristics. First, it is

se
based on governance at a functional economic area level. Second, it assumes

R
O
that some decision-making power at the regional level is distinct and
autonomous from either central, large regional or local government. Third, it

e
is built around cross-sectoral competencies (i.e., not restricted to a specific
An r
c tu
sector or service) and competence in areas that have a metropolitan logic,
Le
such as transport, investment promotion, water supply, etc. The metropolitan
model also holds out the promise of increasing the political power of the
metropolitan region, vis-à-vis the central government and internationally.

… But there are difficulties

Defining the optimum size: The search for an optimal functional territory is
futile because there is no one functional territory, but on the contrary, a
multiplicity of functional territories depending upon the local public good or
service under consideration. For instance, it is estimated in Denmark that
30 000 inhabitants is the optimal size as shown in an analysis of the costs of
providing an effective local health system, an indicator used as a proxy for
other local public services.
Problems of congestion linked to large size: Local public goods often show the
characteristic of being “club goods” in the sense that the right to use them is
limited to a finite group of people beyond which there is a risk of crowding.
Beyond a certain number of users of the asset, the advantage that comes from
others using it starts to diminish. A too-great supply of public goods can thus
generate this sort of inefficiency.
Internal transaction costs linked to large size, and the issue of control:
Economies of scale and of scope justify concentration. But the desire to better
control local public choices, on the part of the voters as much as at the
upstream government level, would seem to favour a smaller size while
preventing, amongst other things, abuses of bureaucracy.
Problems of local competences: While some believe that amalgamation
induces potential economies of scale, others, such as Kitchen (2002), argue
that whether cost savings are realised depends largely on the quality of the

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
93
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s io
w
Box 2.1. Metropolitan reform:
the creation of the Greater London Authority

n
o
D Br
London is an unusual and perhaps atypical example to use in an analysis

y
of metropolitan governance. Its metropolitan tier was abolished by central

nl
government decree and then re-created – in radically different form –

O
fourteen years later. In 1999, the Greater London Authority Act was passed,

u le
and the GLA was set up in 2000. London has thus had four forms of

d
governance in the past 40 years.

EC

ea
The GLA consists of a directly elected Mayor and a separately elected

se
Assembly, each elected for a term of four years. The GLA represents a new

R
O
form of governance in Britain, with clear separation of powers between the
directly elected Mayor and a small London Assembly of 25 members. The

e
London Assembly must be consulted by the Mayor during the preparation of
An r
each of the GLA’s strategies.
u
L e coftthe four
The Assembly considers the budget for the GLA and for each
functional bodies and can over-rule the Mayor with a two-thirds majority.
The Assembly scrutinises the exercise of the Mayor’s functions and conducts
investigations into London issues.
The GLA has limited fiscal powers. It has no general revenue-raising
powers: it cannot levy taxes nor issue bonds. It can raise income through an
identifiable precept on the local authorities within the London area, but this
is subject to the same powerful centralised control on taxing and spending
that apply to all other British local authorities. As well as the precept, the
other main sources of the GLA’s income are government grants and the
“congestion charge” on drivers in the central area, instituted in 2003. The GLA
and its functional bodies spend around £5 billion per annum out of a total
public sector budget of £45 billion. The 33 lower-tier authorities retain many
powers and are responsible for most service delivery. The Mayor devises
strategies, but he needs the boroughs, and other agencies, to implement
them.
Source: Dr. Mark Kleinman, Greater London Authority, quoted in OECD (2004) Territorial Reviews:
Mexico City.

local public administration. Larger size requires new local capacity which
takes time to be built.
Problems concerning local resources: Potential cost savings of amalgamation
are sometimes obscured by the fact that new responsibilities have accompanied
the creation of large merged cities without corresponding resources.
Problems arising from the abandonment of competition: For the Public Choice
School institutional fragmentation and smallness are essential elements in

94 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
maintaining competition and in permittingsindividual choice. In theoryioit is
assumed that the factors are mow bile and so competition betwee n

n
o
municipalities can have a positive impact on development inasmuch as it

D Br
encourages municipalities to provide cost-effective services as well as greater

y
diversity in the public services provided in a given area. The monopoly of

nl
merged governments in many services does not favour innovation or

O
reductions in production costs. In fact, as far as the impact of competition is

u le
concerned, there are two competing schools. One central concern is that such

d
EC
competition leads to too little in the way of public outputs. It is argued that

ea
competition for new firms and jobs may lead to public budgets that are too

se
small, and to overly lax environmental standards. Or, on the contrary, if those

R
O
budgets are financed through central government grants, the competition
across municipalities could lead to excessive spending. By contrast another

e
thrust aims at the beneficial effects of competition as a disciplining force that
An r
c tu
restrains tendencies in the public sector towards excessive spending
and other forms of fiscal m isbehaviour. “One’s view of the role of
intergovernmental competition clearly depends on how one views the
Le
operation of the public sector more generally!” (Oates, 1999).

What do we see in practice?

Diverse “management” strategies of the effects of municipal fragmentation
have developed over decades and in different countries. First of all municipal
consolidation was at the heart of the debate. The reduction in the number of
local municipalities has often been viewed as essential for the reform of
decentralised institutions. Thus, some countries have made severe cuts in the
number of local municipalities; operations which often went hand-in-hand
with the introduction (or strengthening) of a regional or supra-municipal tier
of government.
Municipal consolidation has been and remains an important element of
most national programmes. Relatively speaking, the Scandinavian countries
(Denmark, Norway, Sweden), along with the United Kingdom, are those in
which municipal consolidation was pursued to the furthest extent,
implemented with determination, steadfastness and authority. This was
typically combined with public sector decentralisation within the local
territorial bodies. Australia and New Zealand took over this policy in
the 1990s, but with more mixed results (Sancton, 2000). Other countries have
still not adopted this approach (or just to a very limited extent), for example
Switzerland, France, Spain and the United States. In some federal countries,
such as Canada and Germany, this policy is applied to very different degrees
depending on the individual states (provinces, Länder) or on whether the
context is urban or rural.

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
95
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s is the main reason given
One can observe that economic efficiency iofor
mergers in Denmark, Canada, Koreaw and Japan. Denmark considers that

n
o
merely setting up co-operative arrangements is insufficient and, as has

D Br
already happened in the past, wishes to increase pressure on communes to

y
merge. However, most countries are of the opinion that the theoretical

nl
indicator of optimum size faces the problem of the variety of possible

O
outcomes depending on the service in question, and in particular that trying

u le
to oblige municipalities to come together does not work. Some countries

d
EC
which adopted this type of policy in the past, such as the Netherlands, today

ea
consider that only one form is possible: that of voluntary agreements between

se
communes, since this alone can guarantee a real co-operative sharing of

R
O
objectives and communal costs (OECD, Symposium TDPC, 2004).
Regarding policy for inter-municipal co-ordination, the different degrees of

e
“rapprochement” between communes may result simply from a policy adopted
An r
c tu
by neighbouring municipalities, from encouragement by the central authority
Le
or from a hierarchical decision taken by central government. Most countries
support the second form of inter-communality (Czech Republic, France, Greece,
Hungary, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden…).
The main practical limits have to do with inertia in local identity
(see Box 2.2). Municipal consolidation has always been (very) “popular” with
senior civil servants and those working for the higher levels of government.
Reluctance was expressed, on the other hand, essentially by local elected
representatives. As for the inhabitants of these same municipalities, they
often declined the invitation to merge with others because they feared losing
a certain quality of life which they ascribed to “local identity”. In fact, when
the merger of municipalities is put to the popular vote (by referendum or
otherwise), it has to be said that the result is almost always a refusal, even in
the case of “watered-down” arrangements such as town-county consolidations
in the United States. What is more, merged municipal structures seem less
democratic than independent municipalities, because the distance increases
between local authorities and citizens, resulting in lack of control over elected
representatives. Finally, it is sometimes necessary to look to history for
explanations of the local identity’s strength. Institutional fragmentation thus
becomes very difficult to reduce, as is illustrated by the “municipal
demographic expl osi on ” in the Cze ch Republic i n reacti on to the
amalgamation imposed by the communist government.

Practicability and suitability of inter-municipal co-operation for

economic development policies
Faced with these obstacles cooperative agreements appear like a
workable second best. Inter-municipal co-operation has an advantage over
mergers as it allows a diversification of the pooling of resources and of

96 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s io
w
Box 2.2. Illustrations of reticence
to inter-municipal mergers
with regard

n
o
D Br
The case of Switzerland

y
nl
Switzerland is interesting on more than one count. It is different from most
European countries (except for France) in that the number of its communes

u le
remains stable. There are many local municipalities (over 2 300), generally
with few inhabitants. In this federal country, municipal bodies are

d
EC
answerable to the federated states (cantons) and form an integral part of the

ea
constitutional framework in a country characterised by a tradition of direct

se
democracy and consensus. Consolidating them is therefore a difficult, indeed

R
O
almost impossible task. That said, the local political context in Switzerland is
changing. In recent years, there has been a large increase in the tasks

e
devolved to communes. This means in practice that communal tasks have
An r
c tu
become more numerous and complicated and that there has been an

Le
increase in interdependence. At the same time, the financial situation of
communes is worsening whereas the demands and expectations of their
inhabitants are increasing. Since the merger of municipalities can only be a
last resort as a solution to this problem, there has been a sharp increase in
inter-communal co-operation in recent years: except for the smallest and
very rural communes (fewer than 250 people), nearly two-thirds have
increased their participation in associations of communes in recent years
(Steiner, 2003).

Other examples
Less than two years after its introduction, amalgamation in Montreal was
already being questioned. The citizens’ movement in favour of the
detachment of their former municipality had gained new strength following
t h e A p r i l 2 0 0 3 e l e c t i o n o f a n ew g o v e r n m e n t . T h e r e a s o n s f o r
disamalgamation were both political (increased distance from decision-
making centres), fiscal (lack of an economy inherent in the amalgamation
and unfair redistribution of fiscal resources) and social (to preserve
communities and identities). A referendum was held in June 2004 and
15 former municipalities decided to separate from the new city. Other
attempts to introduce metropolitan governments by merging municipalities
in Amsterdam and Rotterdam were rejected by referenda (more than 90% of
Rotterdam’s residents voted against).

partnerships, taking account of the multiplicity of the problems involved.

Thus, the areas that provide different local public services can be respected
and at the same time, the needs and preferences of local inhabitants can be
better taken into account. Taking account of spillovers onto other jurisdictions
can lead to the supply of local public goods being the product of a “bargaining

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
97
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s
process in which jurisdictions can swap externalities iolocal
and establish their
w
public goods cooperatively” (Jehiel, 1997). There is a kind of “neither/nor”

n
o
argument which sustains the use of co-operative modes: neither merger, nor

D Br
competition. It is possible to take advantage of existing structures without

y
recourse to heavy institutional forms through co-operation between local

nl
authorities as a substitute for amalgamation or metropolitan government,

O
while voluntary co-operation between public authorities can meet the

u le
legitimate needs of the population that one town alone may not be able to

d
EC
satisfy. A related argument is that a municipal merger is unnecessary from the

ea
perspective of public service provision because there are many other means by

se
which to achieve economies of scale (many of them involving joint production

R
O
and provision of public services by partner municipalities, but also by the
private sector, as described below).

e
Inter-municipal co-operation also covers very different situations
An r
c tu
depending on the context in which it is introduced and the goals pursued.
Le
Generally speaking, it takes the form of a pooling of resources (budgetary,
human, infrastructure) in order to improve local public services falling within
the jurisdiction of the member municipalities. All sectors of municipal activity
can be the subject of co-operation agreements. It should, however, be noted
that the list of municipal powers varies considerably across countries (see
Box 2.3 on the US case).
As administrative boundaries do not necessarily coincide with areas that
are relevant economically, municipalities can co-operate with the aim of

Box 2.3. The US case

In the United States since the mid 1950s, there has been a significant
increase in Councils of Governments (COGs) and other forms of co-operation
agreements for the planning, financing and production of local public
services. By way of example, in the mid 1990s, the State of Connecticut alone
counted more than 900 inter-municipal co-operation agreements (Berman,
2003). Thus, in the 1997 census, there were almost as many mono-functional
agencies (special – purpose authorities, 34 683) as municipalities (multi-
purpose governments, 36 001). Moreover, between 1992 and 1997, the number
of special-purpose authorities rose rapidly (+9.9%). During this period, the
number of such authorities increased in 43 out of the 50 States, in some cases
in spectacular fashion (Wisconsin +84.6%, New Mexico +462.9%). In short, in
the United States in general and metropolitan areas in particular, territorial
organisation is constantly evolving and voluntary co-operation is being
preferred to imposed solutions such as the merger of municipalities or the
annexation of territories.

98 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s
playing a more effective role in local economic io
development through
w
exchanging information, sharing responsibility for certain investments, the

n
o
joint production of knowledge, territorial labelling and marketing schemes to

D Br
differentiate themselves from other areas, etc. This has led to the creation of

y
metropolitan agencies, as in Montreal for instance, responsible for the

nl
planning and co-ordination of economic development. This issue is not

O
exclusive to urban regions. In rural areas, the European LEADER17 programme

u le
warrants mention. In intermediate regions, inter-municipal co-operation

d
EC
often takes the form of city networks (Emilia-Romagna), sometimes featuring

ea
the creation of innovative structures (Consortia of cities in the Valencia Region

se
of Spain), with the aim of increasing the region’s visibility and helping to make

R
local enterprises more competitive.18 These co-operative mechanisms, which
O
lead to the creation of new institutional territories within the perimeters of

e
r
social-economic areas and are adapted to territorial development strategies,
An
As is clearly shown in Part I, the promotion ofL
u
are particularly evident in the concept of micro-regions (see Box 2.4).
candtthe local
e
clusters
diffusion of innovations above all concern the local labour markets, meaning
that there is no reason for the administrative boundaries to be exactly the
same as those of the municipalities. The overlapping of responsibilities on this
issue does not necessary hamper its good functioning and can, on the
contrary, be a good support to joint strategies in the municipalities concerned.
The same applies to tax rivalry, sometimes fictive, which has an influence on
the localization strategies of companies. Finally, combining competencies
rather than confronting them serves as a good support for innovation policies.
Canada referred to the case of purely voluntary co-operation by communes
which were a priori in competition with one another, which led to the setting
up of an effective local system for innovation. Not only were the Province or
Federal State not involved, but the successful outcome encouraged them
rather to reduce the subsidies given to the territory in question (source:
Symposium of TDPC, June 2004).
Therefore, following closely on from the “subsidiarity” principle, inter-
municipal co-operation has the advantage over mergers or a strict
institutional fragmentation, of proposing greater flexibility as regards
determining the most appropriate territorial scale. In recent reforms in France
aimed at aligning the administrative and socio-economic perimeters, the
territory can even be the result of co-operation between municipalities. In
practice, plans for a district (“pays”) can arise out of agreement between the
local authorities, and then gain recognition from central government. Inter-
communalities are a key part of the machinery, as is seen from the case of the
state – regional plan contracts of the last generation. The territorial arm that
accounts for 25% of the budgets no longer falls under the responsibility of

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
99
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s io
w
Box 2.4. An illustration of place-based
The micro-regions
policy in rural areas:

n
o
D Br
A way to conceptualise the new vision of local development is what is

y
called in many countries a micro-region, that is to say an association of

nl
municipalities aiming to achieve common development goals. They involve

O
voluntary associations of local governments, groups of citizens and

u le
community participation. These actors are redrawing the boundaries of their

d
territory, based on factors such as natural endowments, common identity, or

EC

ea
shared economic characteristics. Micro-regions across OECD countries

se
present three major features. Firstly, local actors develop their proper
strategies to capitalise on their own assets. Secondly, they function as

R
O
sources of information for central and regional governments. Thirdly,
leadership in this kind of partnership is not the exclusive competence of

e
An
elected authorities but can be assumed by groups of entrepreneurs or civil r
c tu
s oc iety o rg anisa tio ns aim ing to co ntrib ute to the defin itio n and
implementation of local development strategies and projects. Le
Support from the Government can consist in providing an adequate legal
framework, as well as financial incentives such as in France, Italy and Canada. In
other cases, “managed inclusion” of local authorities can help build associations
based on the concept of “natural area of development”, regardless of
administrative borders. Such is the situation in Ireland where 34 LEADER Local
Action Groups (LAGs), operating as Area-Based Partnerships manage a wide
range of development projects (entrepreneurial, educational, social inclusion,
employment and training, village renewal, cultural heritage and environmental
preservation) without substituting the County’s Development Boards.19
The size of the territory and number of co-operating municipalities are also
variable and necessarily linked to population density. The territory of
Matawinie, in Quebec (45 000 inhabitants), covers an area of 10 600 km2 with
only 15 municipalities, whereas the size of the Micro-region of Moravska
Trebova-Jevicko in the Czech Republic is only 400 km2, for a population of
close to 28 000 people, distributed over 33 municipalities ranging from
36 inhabitants to 11 662 in 2001. In Mexico, total population in a micro-region
can vary from 16 000 in the Micro-region “Sierra Gorda” in the State of
Queretaro, to 122 000 inhabitants in the Micro-region “Sierra Norte” in the
central state of Puebla. In some cases, the critical mass necessary to
articulate a specific bottom-up initiative can be even higher. In the
United States, a central Iowa project (pharmaceutical/nutraceutical plant
production) involves 23 counties, with a population close to 480 000.
However, currently only 72 farm families, playing the role of local leaders, are
engaged in this up-scaling initiative (Mortensen, 2002).

100 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
representatives of the different ministriessconcerned but under thatiof the
chairmen of the inter-municipalities ofw
the region.
o

n
o
Diverse forms of co-operation

D Br

y
nl
Variety of legal forms: The forms of co-operation between local authorities
may range from simple “areas of co-operation” (like Spain’s comarcas) to

u le
associations (like the mancomunidades de municipios in Spain, associations in
Portugal, communautés de communes in France or the unioni di comuni in Italy) or

d
EC
the creation of “syndicates” as is the case in the Netherlands. In Luxembourg

ea
(with the approval of the Minister for the Interior) they may involve

se
agreements that include both public and private entities working for the joint

R
O
interests of the communes concerned. They may even result in the creation of
inter-municipal co-operative authorities as in Finland, which has radicalised

e
this concept to some extent, since the “region” as a territorial unit is based
An r
c tu
there on municipal co-operation (the regions were created starting in the
Le
early 1990s). In the Finnish system, regional autonomy was thus established
“from the bottom up”, with the result that, legally, the regions have the status
of ordinary inter-municipal authorities.
Variety of economic types: Inter-municipal co-operation may be
“functional”, in which case the local authorities concerned will share the
provision of specific public services, usually through establishments that are
responsible for this undertaking, such as Germany’s Stadtwerke, set up under
the legislation of the Länder which requires all municipalities to merge their
service provision units into one local public company (which in half the cases
is a prelude to privatisation of the merged establishment) and is applicable to
transport, drinking water, waste and sanitation, etc. Sometimes agreements
lead to the initiation of a sort of trade exchange between neighbouring towns.
The supply of public services is concentrated in some jurisdictions, which
receive compensation from other jurisdictions benefiting from the services.
This approach has been implemented is Switzerland, in particular in the area
of hospital care services (more at an inter-cantonal level than an inter-
municipal one) (Joumard and Kongsrud, 2003). On the other hand, inter-
municipal arrangements can be geared towards more strategic local
development missions and then cover a much wider field of action,
sometimes supported by multi-sectoral agencies (especially in metropolitan
areas).
Variety of geographical types: While inter-municipal co-operation is not a
specifically rural or a specifically urban phenomenon, the distinction is
significant. This is borne out by the division of inter-municipal structures into
three types in France: the communautés des communes; the communautés
d’agglomération (areas with a population of over 50 000); and, the communautés
urbaines that can be set up only when the population exceeds the

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
101
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
io
sextreme form of coming together
500 000 mark. Evidence shows that the most
w
(merger) only makes sense where the zones or municipalities are very close to

n
o
each other geographically. There are still some agreements for the joint

D Br
provision of public services that cannot be set up between rural communes at

y
a great distance from each other. What may be considered appropriate policy

nl
for urban areas may not help much in dispersed rural communities where the

O
delivery of high quality public services is an important tool used for regional

u le
development objectives (e.g. Norway). The case of the Canadian Province of

d
EC
Quebec also illustrates the importance of developing differentiated policies for

ea
urban and rural areas. In the course of its municipal reform, from 1999 to 2002,

se
the provincial government was highly aware of the fact that heavily urbanised

R
O
areas, rural areas and mixed urban/rural areas each required their own special
strategy. So the preference went to consolidating municipalities in urban and

e
metropolitan areas, strengthening the intermediate regional structure in rural
An r
c tu
areas, and stepping up inter-municipal co-operation in mixed rural/urban

Le
areas. This differentiating strategy aims to take into account the fact that
these three types of municipal environments have different skills and above
all utilise these skills in different ways, as is observed in the case of
intermediate regions (see Box 2.5).

Assessment
Results of evaluations of inter communal policies are rare: a few studies
have been carried out in Switzerland and the United States, but, paradoxically,
hardly any in France, where it is a major tool of regional policy. The main
benefits noted do not really include a reduction in the cost of delivering public
services (Steiner, 2003 for the case of Switzerland; Moiso A. and Uusitalo R.
(2003) for the case of Finland). An obvious advantage, on the other hand, is
that local decision-makers enhance their skills as a result of sharing
knowledge and of having to deal with bigger problems than those which a
single commune has to face.
On this type of agreement, the effect of joining efforts for providing
multi-services appears to produce significant economies of scope. On this
subject, a pioneering analysis by Kathryn A. Foster (1997) of the situation in
the United States showed that, overall, it is more costly to have local public
services provided by specialised agencies rather than multi-purpose
municipal governments and that this trend increases over time.
Neither academic research nor evaluations made by public or para-public
bodies have shown that merging municipalities leads to economies of scale in
all, or even most, cases (Sancton, 2000; Keating, 1995). Today, it is widely
thought that the main advantages are not to be found in this sphere, but
rather in a range of other values relating to community life and equity. In
particular, in countries which have embarked on a significant decentralisation

102 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s io
w
Box 2.5. Inter-municipal co-operation
in intermediate regions

n
o
D Br
Rationale: Lack of co-operation is a major problem of governance in

y
intermediate regions, both in the private sector and between governmental

nl
jurisdictions. Competitiveness now depends on the quality of manufactured

O
goods, on design and technological innovation. Every small or medium-sized

u le
city acting alone cannot provide all of the necessary human and material

d
resources required for the development of the business sector. In this respect,

EC

ea
it is essential to improve inter-city industrial networking policies and

se
regional co-operation. Small and medium-sized towns will then be able to
offer facilities and services that they could never afford on their own. This co-

R
O
operative approach makes possible supporting the critical mass necessary for
intermediate regions to gain a higher economic profile domestically and

e
An
internationally. Networking of cities is optimised when it goes together with r
a process of specialisation of cities, whether in niche market products,
Le
through local industrial districts, or in industries based on tourism and c tu
natural and cultural amenities.
Examples: Regional networks of small and medium-sized towns and cities
are a still modest but growing phenomenon in OECD areas.
One excellent example is the region of Emilia Romagna in northeastern
Italy. Widely recognised for its industrial districts, Emilia Romagna is
economically a high-performing intermediate region. It has registered an
employment growth rate of 4.2% between 1995 and 1999 and a Gross
Do mestic Produc t (GDP) growth rate of about 4.5%. T he region is
characterised by an important cultural industry of festivals, attractions, and
arts. Policymakers have encouraged the networking of the small and medium
sized-towns coupled with a specialisation of each city in specific aspects of
culture and the arts. This process of networking and specialisation was first
borne from independent initiatives by local private entrepreneurs. Aware that
these actions could help enhance cultural amenities, promote employment,
and boost tourism, regional public authorities also supported the process but
in an informal way.
Another interesting economic co-operation initiative, which has taken a
more formal framework, concerns the Central Comarcas Valencianas (CCV),
an intermediate region located in the central eastern part of Spain,
comprising 155 separate municipalities in two different provinces. The CCV
intermediate region has an important manufacturing sector specialising in
textiles, clothing, and toys, organised in classical industrial cluster structure
and highly oriented toward production for export. The public and private
sectors have decided to work together in promoting new regional economic

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
103
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s io
w
Box 2.5. Inter-municipal co-operation
in intermediate regions (cont.)

n
o
D Br
and industrial policies. To pursue this agenda, they formed in 1999 the

y
Consortium of Cities of the Valencian Central Districts. Its main purpose is to

nl
generate co-operation in overcoming the relative political marginalisation of

O
the smaller industrial communities from the major metropolitan areas of the

u le
region, the cities of Valencia and Alicante, and to create a critical mass

d
enabling the region to address strategically the new economic dynamics

EC

ea
brought about by the ongoing process of economic globalisation.

se
In France, the réseaux de villes (network of cities), is a contractual public/

R
O
private partnership with associated representatives from the business sector,
different local administrative entities, and the central government. These

e
French city networks are neither political bodies nor institutions. Generally
An r
c tu
speaking, medium-sized cities join together in order to share costs and risks

Le
with a view to achieving complementarities and improving administrative
procedures. The organisations that take part in the city networks collaborate
on strategic planning, public-private partnerships, and joint development
projects. Co-operation covers a wide range of issues including promoting
tourism and culture, improving transportation, business marketing,
environmental enhancement, and investing in new information and
communications technologies.

process, consolidation is said to bring further benefits. Thus, because they

shoulder a larger number of responsibilities, consolidated municipalities are
thought to aid the revitalisation of democracy said to be needed, if not
urgently, in our political systems.
One explanation given for the difficulty in showing a clear increase in
efficiency brought about by the development of inter-municipalities is that the
existing structures are becoming more and more complex. Thus in France, it is
generally observed that the increase in public inter-communal co-operation
establishments (EPCI), which can vary greatly in size, can make the system of
36 600 communes more complicated. Even if inter-municipal co-operation is
generally positively assessed, there are, nonetheless, some cases where co-
operation is not real, where it has not worked, where bypass strategies have
been employed or even attempts to reverse cooperative efforts (Gaxie, 1997).
Such cases of co-operation need appropriate and transparent cost accounting
in order to determine the “price” of the public service at a fair level, and to
limit the risk of free riding behaviour for “too” public goods (non excludable at
all) such as roads.

104 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
The presence and above all the increase io
sin the number of inter-municipal
w
agencies constitutes a threat to municipal autonomy; which also can

n
o
potentially erode accountability, particularly as they cloud the transparency of
democratic processes.20 Co-operation may also lead to awkward situations, as

D Br

y
is the case when municipalities join together for a number of their functions

nl
while remaining competitors as regards territorial attractiveness (mentioned

O
by Spain with regard to rural areas, June 2004, Symposium of TDPC). In fact,

u le
according to different situations, the former government system adapts to

d
EC
new realities by multiplying its actions. As a result only precarious and

ea
complicated solutions are found.

se
One of the pitfalls of inter-municipal co-operation is that of political

R
O
representation which, generally speaking, is indirect rather than direct. In
practice, it is local municipalities or member communes who appoint

e
representatives to the decision-making body (political and/or administrative).
An r
c tu
Serious consideration should be given to the democratic argument. Voices
Le
have also been raised in France claiming that the representatives of the “inter-
communalities” should be elected by universal suffrage, the more so where
“inter-communality” in a metropolitan zone is concerned where the budgets
for common activities are often even higher than those of the cities at the
heart of these metropolitan areas.21
Regarding the available resources of the co-operative structure, it is
important to note that direct powers of taxation are rare. The inter-municipal
body depends, for its funding, on transfers from higher governments, on the
one hand, and on contributions from member communes, on the other. As a
rule, the result is a longer decision-making process, and reduced ability to
adapt to changing situations, business conditions or technical developments.

Trends noted and policy issues

Despite these controversial results, countries which have actively
pursued a policy of inter-communality tend to want to extend co-operation to
a wider area than that involved in simple rapprochements between
neighbouring communes. It is essentially the economic development goals of
a whole territory (for example the “pays” in France) which motivate this type
of approach. At the end of the day, the main factor distinguishing different
forms of inter-communality is therefore the goal pursued: some “simply” aim
to improve the supply of a number of day-to-day services, while others adopt
a more dynamic approach, endeavouring to establish a strategic vision for the
region. Some “multifunctional” forms of inter-communality, as in Hungary,
fall somewhere between these two types. Certain features appear to greatly
facilitate inter-communal co-operation, especially in adding a fiscal
dimension to the institutional one (sharing taxes and/or harmonising local tax
bases and rates).22

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
105
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s
The need for responsible structures at intermediate levels io
w in inter-municipal co-operation
One of the major risks of the increase

n
o
agreements is that the general interest of the conurbation or region can be lost

D Br

y
from view. As Berman (2003) notes: “Inter-local agreements on services or

nl
facility use, while saving money, do little to promote a general area-wide
perspective or to solve area-wide problems.” Moreover since associations, in

u le
responding to a given problem, are usually sectoral, the joint approach means
that an overall vision is somewhat lost. That is why it is desirable to set up or

d
EC
strengthen intermediate structures which encourage co-operation.

ea
The very notion of pooling and of inter-municipal co-operation takes on

se
much greater significance wherever there are strong – supra-municipal or

R
O
regional – intermediate, multipurpose structures, as most co-operation
initiatives are or can be part of a local community approach that is open to

e
An
policy debate. The most common approach would be metropolitan associations r
Le
and boundaries are decided on by higher levels of government. The introductionc tu
of local municipalities at regional or sub-regional levels, where implementation

of such an intermediate level of government (supra-municipal or other level)

plays an active role in structuring municipal co-operation. These formulas,
typically with opt-in, opt-out possibilities, contribute to flexibility of the
experiment by allowing for a step-by-step inter-municipal co-operation
according to local circumstances and culture. They provide a driving force
toward developing and intensifying co-operation among all or part of the
municipalities in an area. Intermediate structures, like conferring
responsibilities to an intermediate level (such as the regional level) for regional
policy on inter municipalities, lends cohesion to the policies pursued in a given
region, to the exchange of good practices, the bringing together of a greater
variety of players in regional development projects, and thus to the creation of
more favourable conditions for constructive innovation to emerge. This is the
meaning to be given to the new French territorial structures (the districts [pays])
which, even though their responsibilities still seem ill-defined, were conceived
of as “inter-inter- municipalities”.
There are different examples to illustrate the variety of forms these
intermediate inter municipal structures can take (see Box 2.6).

Consistency with the national governance system

In Helsinki, as elsewhere in Finland, a culture of co-operation between
municipalities in the agglomeration is part of the broader organisation of
central government and the public sector (Haila and Le Galès, 2002). Among
the key factors for success for inter-municipal co-operation, voluntary
commitment is important as well as institutional customs and the experience
of elected officials. So this is first and foremost a process involving local and

106 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s io
w
Box 2.6. Examples of intermediate levels for
inter-municipality agreements
co-ordinating

n
o
D Br
In some United States conurbations, fields such as infrastructure

y
management and funding, recreational facilities and activities, sport, culture

nl
and tourism have been identified as offering the potential for more co-operation

O
throughout the metropolitan area. The latest example is that of the Allegheny

u le
Regional Asset District (ARAD, core city Pittsburgh) in Pennsylvania. In this

d
County a tax formula was introduced which the legislator and local players saw

EC

ea
as a means of simultaneously resolving, at least partly, two separate issues: i) the

se
funding of infrastructure and/or activities on a supra-municipal or even regional
scale; ii) the need to restore greater tax equity across local municipalities and

R
O
alleviate the local tax burden for the largest taxpayers. By and large, the scheme
reflects a determination to give the region better regional governance, without

e
An
interfering with municipal arrangements, which are particularly fragmented. r
This formula, inspired by a measure introduced in Denver, Colorado, is a 1% sales
Le
tax levied by the State in accordance with the usual sales-tax rules in c tu
Pennsylvania, but all of the revenue goes to the region. The revenue is split into
two equal parts, the first going to an independent body, the Allegheny Regional
Asset District (ARAD), a single-purpose agency with a mandate to grant annual
subsidies for infrastructure and recreational/tourism activities with a regional
impact, in particular civic and cultural/recreational facilities, libraries, parks and
s tadiu m s; th e se co n d is div ided u p b etween th e c o un ty an d th e
128 municipalities it covers. This experiment is now recognised to have made a
significant contribution in two areas, in that it has alleviated tension between
the core city and the suburbs regarding the specification, implantation, funding
and management of regional-scale infrastructure, and secondly, it has created
the potential to strengthen municipal co-operation throughout the metropolitan
area, thereby generating a major reform of Allegheny County’s policy structures
and missions in 2002.
The “county regional municipalities” (municipalités régionales de comté, or
MRCs) in the province of Quebec (Canada) are another interesting example,
showing how much momentum can be gained from an intermediate entity of
this kind in rural areas. Set up between 1980 and 1982, MRCs are federations
of local municipalities that exercise some mandatory and some optional
powers on behalf of their members. The list of these has been growing by the
year, particularly since the municipal reform in 2000/2001. There is evidence
here that several MRCs – because of the territorial framework they create and
the momentum they give – have played a decisive role in the emergence and
shaping of inter-municipal clusters in fields that may or may not necessarily
correspond to MRC policy areas (e.g. economic and tourism industry
development, leisure facilities such as cycle-paths, and selective household
waste collection) (Collin et al., 1998).

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
107
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s io
w
Box 2.6. Examples of intermediate levels for co-ordinating
inter-municipality agreements (cont.)

n
o
D Br
The experience of regional districts in the Canadian Province of British

y
Columbia is often cited as an example. The flexibility of the intermediate

nl
model adopted there, in particular the Greater Vancouver Regional District

O
(GVRD), is viewed by many academics as a very positive feature. The novelty

u le
of the GVRD lies primarily in its approach to metropolitan management. The

d
municipalities belonging to it are free to opt out on some issues. Conversely,

EC

ea
municipalities located outside the GVRD area, which is roughly synonymous

se
with the Vancouver Census Metropolitan Area, may opt in to the GVRD or any
of the agencies it heads.

R
O
In Switzerland for some years now, the Federal Office for Territorial

e
Development has been initiating and providing technical and financial
An r
c tu
backing for an urban policy based on co-operation in model projects on

Le
agglomerations to promote the emergence of a territorial framework of
sustained co-operation and planning between municipalities.
A similar form of co-operation is found in the Berlin-Brandenburg area of
Germany, now that the Federal State of Brandenburg has set up an Urban
Forum, whose achievements include the creation of an association
representing the interests of Regional Development Centres, with a view to
institutionalising a joint political arena and co-operation between local
authorities, at least in the field of planning (Arndt et al., 2000).

regional stakeholders. This review of the experiments, however, shows that

the process cannot gain momentum, or fully succeed, if it is not part of a
clearly enunciated and demanding government strategy, at both the
institutional and fiscal level. A clear stance by central government has a more
decisive influence than any of the policy areas addressed here can have on
their own. Inter-municipal co-operation is a process which should form part of
a more general reflection about the role of the public sector. This questioning
must focus on re-assignment of responsibilities (following the “subsidiarity”
principle) and on promoting more effective mechanisms to ensure democracy.

Cross border governance: a special case in horizontal co-operation

Interest in mechanisms for managing cross-border reigons is the result of
two distinct international trends: first, supra-national integration is reducing
trade barriers between countries, and second, decentralisation is putting more
power into the hands of subnational governments. Both trends increase the
feasibility and potential benefits of collaboration across the border.

108 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
Cross-border regions typically suffer sfrom handicaps that make iothe
challenge of increasing competitivenessw greater than in a single country

n
o
region. For example, cross-border regions generally suffer from fragmentation

D Br
– of markets, of the labour force and of institutions. The border, even if

y
completely or relatively open, usually constitutes a significant rupture of the

nl
natural or optimal delimitation of the area’s economic space. Often, border

O
regions feel the friction created by diverging fiscal or labour market

u le
regulations and some try to circumvent this friction through intensified cross-

d
EC
border co-operation. This friction decreases the competitiveness of the region

ea
as a whole and of its constituent parts. Similar points can be made about the

se
sub-optimal diffusion of technology, co-operation among enterprises, social

R
O
capital development, and allocation of labour and infrastructure in a cross-
border region. The creation of a functioning cross-border region where these

e
weaknesses are addressed and complementarities are maximised promises
An r
significant benefits for the participating regions.
t u
cprogressively
Lmoving
Developing a successful cross-border region implies
23
e
to a higher degree of integration. A “higher degree of integration” can have
an enormous range of manifestations, economic, social, cultural and
institutional. In the economic sphere integration would normally be
accompanied by, for example, increased trade between the two regions, an
increasing number of enterprises with contacts/co-operation agreements/
joint ventures with enterprises on the other side, increasing harmonisation of
the labour markets as evidenced by higher commuting flows and/or
establishment of common employment services, with demonstrable increases
in the number of cross-border job placements and training placements, and
increases in the number and quality of cross-border research and
development initiatives. Closer social and cultural relations could be reflected
by increasing numbers of inhabitants on one side of the border speaking the
language of the other. Greater integration of institutions could be evidenced by
the establishment of joint planning committees and unified development
plans. Finally, integration of physical infrastructure would result in, for
example, reduction of travelling times between centres on different sides of
the border and completion of “missing links” in the infrastructure system.
These and many other outcomes would reflect an increasing level of
integration between two regions separated by a border (European Commission
[DG REGIO], 2000).
Yet, while the concept is clear, and many elements that would constitute
a cross-border integration strategy are obvious, the practicalities of
formulating and managing a coherent strategy are not. Cross-border
integration is a kind of political-economic spectrum that runs from simple
institutional co-operation all the way to functional economic interdependence
implying joint decision making and resource sharing. Within the same

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
109
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
country, the latter is difficult legally ands io
administratively; across national
w
borders it is extremely complex. As a result, the process is inevitably gradual

n
o
and somewhat piecemeal, and policy making tends to be an amalgam of the

D Br
different economic, social and political aspirations of different actors that are

y
linked more or less closely with the development of exchanges across a

nl
border. Because the interest in building a cross-border integrated region is not

O
only a local issue, non-local actors are strongly involved and their interests are

u le
reflected in the formulation of policies and institutions to encourage cross

d
EC
border exchanges. The interest “matrix” is vertical as well as horizontal,

ea
national (even supra-national) as well as local, both public sector and private.

se
Cross-border governance can be defined as the establishment of and

R
O
adherence to a set of incentives, norms and organisations that are set up to
co-ordinate policy making in a region where the functional area of economic

e
activities does not coincide with the geographical pattern of political
An r
c tu
jurisdictions. The mismatch between catchment areas and political
Le
jurisdictions leads to negative externalities and financial imbalances and can
complicate coherent planning for region-wide infrastructures and network
industries. The issue for policymakers is to find governance mechanisms,
i.e. tools and incentives, that enable policy coherence in spatially and
economically homogenous but politically fragmented areas.
The economic logic that drives efforts to build cross border co-operation
is often explained in terms of relative transcation costs. On the one hand,
there is the cost of policy non-coherence, and, on the other, there is the cost of
adhering to and maintaining cross-border institutions and rules. The policy
question is which governance rules best reduce or eliminate negative
externalities, and which adapt the most smoothly to national frameworks.
Cross-border frameworks and their ability to reach political objectives can be
evaluated along four lines (in brackets the perceived economic transaction
cost): 1) the nature and integrity of co-operation (social capital in the region);
2) the positioning strategies of the partners (costs and benefits of co-operation
versus non-co-operation); 3) the contribution to organisational diversity (risk
diminution and stability); and 4) the interaction between cross-border co-
operation and other national, local and regional networks (transaction costs
between institutions).
In Europe, cross-border issues, always important, have become more
important with the wave of EU integration during the 1990s. Supranational
integration made cross-border collaboration easier since it lowered the cost of
interchange. Integration and cohesion are viewed as essential in maintaining
an effective and internationally competitive European Union; as a result,
border regions have become somewhat the darling of regional policy. As
demand for cross-border governance has multiplied, so has the supply of
governance and programmes sustaining it (see Box 2.7 for an example). The

110 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s io
Box 2.7. w
Cross-border governance: The
and Öresund
examples of TriRhena

n
o
D Br
During the last decade, cross-border initiatives have proliferated in OECD

y
nl
member countries. TriRhena on the Swiss-German-French border and
Öresund on the Danish-Swedish border are among the most active cross-

O
border regions in Europe.

u le
The Öresund Region, covering the cross-border area along the Öresund belt

d
EC
between Denmark and Sweden, established in 1994 the so-called “Öresund

ea
Committee”, a broad platform for horizontal partnerships and formalised

se
advice and information exchange. The Committee is composed of local and

R
O
regional political bodies from both sides of the Sound and – which is quite
exceptional for transnational regionalism – by the two national ministries as

e
r
observers. There are no private actors in the Committee. Although elected
An u
local politicians represent the Committee, it does not act as a local or regional

L e c t on
government but as a meeting place for the elaboration of public strategies
both sides of the border.
Regio TriRhena is located right in the heart of Europe, representing parts of
north-western Switzerland, southern Alsace (France) and southern Baden
(Germany). Regional policy actors in 1995 created the Council of the Regio
TriRhena, a 60-member council bringing together representatives of cities,
municipalities, economic organisations, and universities that meet at least
twice a year. Cross-border institutions, tri-national congresses and other
initiatives enhance cross-border projects and initiatives by making
information easily available. The TriRhena Council operates as an organ of
co-operation parallel and complementary to the Upper Rhine Conference
that represents a much bigger area.

European Union has started numerous programmes to foster cross-border

collaboration such as the INTERREG programme, but also other programmes
that intend to hoist the number of transnational networks and to increase the
competitive edge of border regions. The European style of cross-border
integration has often resulted in a multitude of organisations that cover many
policy areas simultaneously by relatively complex governance structures.
Despite their ambitious declarations, cross-border governments in
Europe have often failed to reach regional development objectives. The cost of
co-ordination and common decision making often appears to outweigh
expected benefits. It appears that horizontal partnerships are successful and
sustainable only if they benefit both partners and the benefits are distributed
more or less equally.24 Effective collaboration fails in cases where both regions
stand in strong competition or where a common endeavour benefits only one

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
111
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
of the partners. 25Particularly in the field ioco-
sof urban planning or fiscal
ordination, local ambitions and strongw competitive pressure have impeded

n
o
most attempts at better co-ordinated cross-border regionalisation. In some

D Br
cases, cross-border collaboration has hardly extended beyond the reach of EU

y
sponsored INTERREG projects (Scott, 1999). Moreover, there remains a high

nl
degree of administrative complexity and public sector dominance on co-

O
operation incentives. Europe’s dense institutional and policy networks

u le
supporting cross-border co-operation have not automatically resulted in the

d
EC
establishment of new public-private alliances to address regional and local

ea
development issues (see Box 2.8). At its most successful, collaboration has

se
worked mainly where public agencies have been strongly involved and had a

R
O
direct say in project definition and implementation.

e
An r
c tu
Box 2.8. Obstacles to cross border institution building:
the starting point for Vienna-Bratislava Le
To establish regional cross-border institutions in the Vienna-Bratislava
region appears relatively more difficult than in other cross-border regions.
First, although both regions have a common history, the rigorous separation
of the last 40 years has left the region with only a weak cross-border network.
There has been no gradual evolution of cross-border institutions, like in the
Swiss-French-German “TriRhena” region or the German-Belgian-Dutch
“Euroregion”. Second, unlike, e.g. in the Nordic countries, institutional
differences between Austria and the Slovak Republic are quite significant,
and, moreover, there are no supra-regional integration frameworks like the
Council of the Nordic Ministers in place. Third, the Vienna-Bratislava region
somewhat lacks a large infrastructure item to symbolise integration such as
the bridge that links Southern Sweden to Eastern Denmark and acts as a
symbol for “Öresund” integration. In Vienna-Bratislava, cross-border
collaboration is starting from a low level and has to proceed in a very
pragmatic way.

This differs somewhat from the pattern on the North American continent
where governance structures tend to be more flexible, more oriented towards
a few purposes, better able to react to specific problem situations and more
driven by the private sector and local governments. North America’s drive for
regional integration is motivated much more by direct economic concerns
rather than by a sense of a common “North American destiny” (see Box 2.9).
Cross-border co-operation has a very pragmatic appeal in North America.
There is no broad policy platform for this co-operation and little national
incentive for co-operation at the local level. It is not driven mainly by the idea

112 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s io
w
Box 2.9. The example of Cascadia

n
o
An example of a young but dynamic cross-border region in North America

D Br
is Cascadia at the western edge of the US-Canadian border. Cascadia is

y
nl
dominated by the Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER), a public-
private partnership which was founded in 1991 among legislators,

O
governments and businesses of five American states – Washington, Oregon,

u le
Idaho, Montana and Alaska – and three Canadian provinces/territories –

d
British Columbia, Alberta and the Yukon. Over two decades, it has grown

EC

ea
into a comprehensive institution that promotes regional economic

se
development and competitiveness. PNWER has forged a unique collaboration

R
between the public and private sector. PNWER has designated nine targeted

O
sectors of business and industry that are strong within the PNWER
jurisdictions and developed proactive working groups for each sector. Each

e
An
working group is led by a legislative, public sector, and private sector co-chair. r
Le
The working groups have initiated legislation, sponsored teleconferences,
industry forums, and produced research papers.
c tu

of “overcoming borders” but rather by case-to-case problems, which for their

efficient solution require selected action across the border. There is no lack of
regional transnational problems such as water resource management
(particularly in the case of Mexico-United States), environmental protection,
public health and in more densely populated areas, fiscal and labour market
regulation issues in cross-border commuting regions. The governance
solutions follow the case-by-case approach: they are mostly carried out by
single body associations such as Water Advisory Boards, Commissions on
Environmental Co-operation and others.
Since NAFTA was signed, however, several organisations at the national
level have emerged to promote cross-border interaction. For example, the
North America Development Bank was made responsible for providing loans
to projects on the US-Mexican border. This demonstrates, as has been the case
in Europe, the importance that national policymakers put in local level cross-
border initiatives as a means of reinforcing international agreements.

6. New actors in economic development strategies

Why cooperate with private actors?
Beyond the closer collaboration between central and local governments,
or between local or reg ional authorities, there has been increasing
acknowledgment that purely public intervention has its limits, and this has
opened the way for greater co-operation between the public and the private

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
113
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s in the supply of so-callediolocal
sector. In fact, the involvement of private actors
w has been a recent increase in the
public goods is nothing new (even if there

n
o
use of these methods in the fields of social welfare, environmental protection,

D Br
etc.) and there are some who regard it as the key element in the definition of

y
governance. 26 As long ago as 1974, Coase (Nobel prize 1991) relied on the

nl
example of lighthouses to expound the notion of the public good. The

O
metaphor of the history of lighthouses and maritime signalling helps to

u le
understand that a public good does not necessarily have to be supplied by the

d
EC
government. Indeed, throughout the centuries, lighthouses have been built

ea
and managed by private investors, maritime corporations and associations

se
from the public and private sectors. (Coase, 1974; 357-76).

R
O
The main normative advantage of PPPs is that they split the costs and
risks of a project between the public and private sectors, particularly by

e
tapping into the expertise and economies of scale in the private sector.
An r
c tu
However, beyond this advantage, the main issue is the shared will of the
different actors to improve their living conditions and the economic Le
development of the territory. The economic dynamics of the regions requires
that all the actors at national, regional, and local level, from the public as well
as the private sector, can be involved in decisions regarding their future. This
e n ab l e s p r iv a t e p a r t n e r s t o s h a r e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g o r ev e n t h e
implementation of existing services with the public authorities, either out of
direct economic interest, as suppliers, or out of an indirect economic interest
as users. In an economy that places a very high value on knowledge, regional
development policy cannot afford to disregard the cognitive resources
available. Public private partnerships (PPPs) therefore aim to enhance or
provide an institutional framework for the involvement of firms, citizens and
a variety of associations in local and regional economic development. Thus
the key issue becomes not how to improve the efficiency of public spending,
but more how to ensure that private governance of “public” activities can still
function in the interests of society.

PPPs and regional competitiveness: three types of arrangements

● PPPs which are designed to enhance territorial competitiveness and
therefore attempt to build, improve or promote the local and regional
economy through interaction between public and private instruments for
developing research, innovation and its diffusion at local level (where
partnerships will primarily link public organisations and firms) (see
Box 2.10). To this category can be added PPPs that aim to transform a natural
amenity into a competitive asset. Such is the case in Sweden, in the region
of Arjeplog, where the private sector has asked assistance from public
authorities to bring into profit the economy of a remote area with very
difficult climatic conditions. These conditions have made it possible to

114 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s io
Box 2.10. PPPs forw
local innovation

n
o
Support for innovation provided by clusters (or innovation ecosystems,

D Br
districts, “pôles de compétences”, etc.) consists of two types of public/private

y
nl
interaction.
The first is one in which firms located within a territory co-operate with

u le
public research and training institutions. Besides programmes aimed at
involving industry in public research activities (either through the provision of

d
EC
funding or by identifying research targets), consideration must also be given to

ea
the bodies that draw up the technical and vocational training programmes

se
offered at the territorial level and that include representatives of local industry.

R
O
This type of partnership should not focus solely on the dissemination of
research findings, but should also help to assist “receptive” firms (primarily

e
SMEs) gain access to these unknown sources of competitiveness. An
An r
u
interesting initiative in this respect is due to be launched in the Midi-Pyrénées

L e c t day a
region in France. The aim is to make available a mature researcher one
week to an SME (the SME will pay 50% of the daily salary of the researcher, with
the remainder covered by public funds) to assist with the firm’s technological
watch and in identifying potential scientific partners.
In the second type of interaction, the public actor encourages partnerships
between firms at the local level. This may be achieved by offering financial
incentives to firms to co-operate and to join networks (Italy), through the
training and provision of intermediaries (SEBRAE agents in Brazil, Brokers in
Denmark and Business Links in the United Kingdom), through support for the
creation of shared service centres (Emilia-Romagna and Lombardy regions in
Italy), and through risk-sharing incentives to firms to support the creation of
local start-ups. A heavy emphasis is also placed on organising venues where
actors can meet, talk to each other and share in activities of not only a
professional but also a social nature (organisation of regular cultural events
associated with the location, organisation of sporting activities, clubs for
managers involved in various cultural associations, etc.). In the United States,
the involvement of the private sector in territorial development is one of the
very criteria for granting subsidies by the Federal State. In order to receive
such subsidies, local actors must form a network, propose projects that are
coherent with the regional programme and are “market based”, in the sense
that leadership or the larger part of the capital invested is provided by the
private sector. This is seen as essential if the assistance contributed by the
central government is to lead to the creation of jobs.
These various options are aimed at building trust between actors on the
basis of practical projects, at establishing a proper management system for
the business network and, above all, at fostering a coherent vision to which
managers from both the public and the private firms can subscribe.

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
115
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s conditions, attracting iallothe
establish a “crash test” cluster in extreme
major automobile manufacturers (OECDw Symposium, TDPC 2004).

n
o
● In some cases, and this was the earlier approach, PPPs are a means of

D Br

y
finding other sources of funding for the provision of public services. The

nl
formal partnerships may include a wide range of distinct practices that can
be traced to two major models. On the one hand, there are PPPs that have a

u le
purely contractual nature, in which the partnership between the public and
the private sector is based solely on contractual links, and on the other

d
EC
hand PPPs with an institutional nature, involving co-operation between the

ea
public and the private sector within a distinct entity (source European

se
Commission, green paper). These two normative types show differences in

R
O
the remuneration of private actors and the public authority’s capacity of
control. However, they only concern one type of objective, which is assigned

e
to the participation of the private actors: that of supplying one or several
An r
c tu
given public services. These partnerships are well developed and in
Le
particular have lead to extensive analysis from the point of view of
competitive regulation and contractual methods linking the different
partners. Still today, in many countries, most partnerships between local
authorities and the private sector relate essentially to infrastructure supply
(for schools, hospitals, etc., as is the case in Japan). PPPs are aimed at
providing the infrastructure (in terms of network technology, housing, etc.)
required for the local supply of public services (see Box 2.11). These
agreements are based on a wide variety of contracts between local public
actors and private firms, and may take the form of sub-contracting,
concessions, the creation of mixed companies, agencies, etc. Depending on
the circumstances, partnerships may be formed for a single targeted action
or as a vehicle for longer-term co-operation between public and private
actors.
● PPPs which are aimed at developing services of general economic interest
that help local development, and which involve the active participation of
civil society (i.e. the firms and user members of the public concerned) (see
Box 2.12). Regional development projects are complex from the governance
standpoint since most of the time they involve more public/public/private/
private partnerships (PPPPs) than public/private ones (PPPs). Vertical
agreements between different levels of government and/or horizontal
agreements between municipalities and local public agencies are combined
with relations with private actors.

The selection of the private partner

The European Commission, in order to improve the efficiency of the
competition regulation concerning PPPs, has proposed a distinction between PPPs
having a purely contractual nature, and PPPs with an institutional nature.27

116 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s io
w
Box 2.11. PPPs for the supply of local infrastructure*

n
o
PPPs of this kind are traditionally divided into three types of models

D Br
according to institutional format, the ways in which private partners are

y
nl
selected, the resources and input provided by the various partners, and lastly
the way in which risks, and also benefits, are divided between the partners.

u le
Local public enterprise: an enterprise pursuing public goals of general
economic interest and in which one or more local authorities hold at least

d
EC
50% of the capital (or a genuine controlling share). In 2001, for example,

ea
13 000 local enterprises of this type were reported in Europe. Their businesses

se
covered all services of general interest to the economy (networks, transport,

R
O
infrastructure, etc.). Examples include “limited companies” in Sweden,
Stadtwerke in Germany and Austria, “communal firms” in Spain,

e
“intercommunales” in Belgium, etc. Work of general economic interest is
An r
either mandated or sub-contracted to firms.
u
c ttype of
Mixed company: in this model (which encompasses Ltheeabove
enterprise), transparency in the choice of private actor is an important issue. In
Belgium, for example, the Société de développement de la Région bruxelloise issues
competitive calls for tender in order to choose the most efficient private
partner, thereby ensuring that the process is both competitive and transparent.
French and Italian mixed companies tend to resemble this model.
Concession: an arrangement whereby the public authority transfers the
responsibility for funding (mostly provided by the private sector) to the
private sector, with the risk borne entirely by the private operator, while
benefits are shared between the parties. The Public Finance Initiative in the
United Kingdom, designed to save on public funding, is one example of this
type of agreement.
These three definitions circumscribe the type of arrangements found in
practice. It is important to note that in many cases the types of PPP
encountered in practice are based on joint bodies that “institutionalise” the
intermediation between partners (agencies, management committees, etc.)
* These may include common infrastructures, facilitating educational exchange, tourism
activities, environmental protection, and maintaining water resources, parks and natural
reserves, as well as other local facilities and their cross-border use, where projects have
flourished.

In the case of contractual partnership, the selection of the private partner

could be based on an adapted procedure (defined for European countries by
Directive 2004/18/C) commonly known as “competitive dialogue”, which may
apply when awarding particularly complex contracts. The competitive
dialogue procedure is launched in cases where the authority is unable to
define the technical means that would best satisfy its needs and objectives or

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
117
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s io
w
Box 2.12. Participatory PPPs for “territorial projects”

n
o
Involving private actors in regional strategy and planning seems to be

D Br
increasingly widespread today. In the United Kingdom, for example, it is a

y
nl
characteristic of the recent PPP arrangements (especially in northern
regions), where it is considered to be a prerequisite for strengthening the

O
commitment of the various parties to shared objectives. In this type of

u le
partnership, the private sector actors are invited to participate in the

d
definition of objectives and strategies with respect to local and regional

EC

ea
policies. This could be an institutionalised form of participation as is the case

se
with Conseils économiques et sociaux régionaux (regional economic and social

R
councils) which represent the interests of enterprises and business

O
associations in the planning contracts (contrats de plan) in France or the strong
rules on participation in local development policy in Finland. In other cases,

e
An
public-private interaction is more spontaneous. r
u
L e c tfederal
The Sacramento Water Forum (an association made up of firms,
agencies, local government, environmental protection associations) spent
5 years building a consensus to draw up, in 1999, an agreement on water
management strategy and procedures in a semi-arid environment. This
result, obtained after an initial context of tension, has prompted the regional
government to reproduce this model of partnership-based decision-making
in other domains. It has primarily been disseminated through “frontier
actors”, who, having been won over by this type of practice, have encouraged
other groups, notably from industry, to take part in local programmes for
sustainable development.
Another example is the QIM (Montreal International District)(an
association made up of the federal government of Canada, the Montreal
International District residents association (ARQIM), the city of Montreal,
etc.) as part of a partnership-based project to promote the district which has
involved residents not only in the decision-making phases but also in the
financing of the project.
These examples reflect the important role played by time in creating a
convergence between interests that are initially antagonistic, as well as the
strong influence exerted by reputation in the concluding of agreements and
the relevance of having a flexible structure for interaction (notably with
regard to mutual learning processes). Such examples are legion. In most
cases they are found in the areas of tax reform, education, environmental
protection, approaches to economic development, transport, etc. In most
cases it is practical necessity that lies behind efforts to work in co-operation
with new networks of actors. Indeed, policy practice is often the first instance
in which individuals sharing a specific space (regional or local) intentionally
meet and interact.

118 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s the legal and/or financialioform
in cases where it is objectively unable to define
of a project. This new procedure allows w the contracting bodies to open a

n
o
dialogue with candidates for the purpose of identifying solutions capable of

D Br
meeting these needs. At the end of this dialogue, the candidates will be invited

y
to submit their final tender on the basis of the solution or solutions identified

nl
in the course of the dialogue. Those tenders must contain all the elements

O
required for the performance of the project. The authority must assess the

u le
tenders on the basis of the pre-stated award criteria. The competitive dialogue

d
EC
procedure will provide the necessary flexibility in discussions with candidates

ea
on all aspects of the contract during the set-up phase, while ensuring that

se
these discussions are conducted in compliance with the principles of

R
O
transparency and equality of treatment, especially the rules concerning state
aid, frequently involved in case of territorial development and R&D.

e
By creating an institutional partnership, e.g. joint venture, the mixed entity
An r
c tu
has the task of ensuring the delivery of work or services for the benefit of the
Le
public. Direct co-operation between the public partner and the private partner
with legal personality allows the public partner, through its participation as a
shareholder and in the decision-making bodies of the joint entity, to retain a
relatively high degree of control over how the projects go forward, which it can
adapt over time as circumstances require. It also allows the public partner to
develop its own experience of running the service in question, while having
the support of a private partner. This kind of partnership is more and more
frequently used in regional development for these reasons. The selection of a
private partner called on to undertake such tasks while functioning as part of
a mixed entity can not be based exclusively on the quality of its capital
contribution or its experience, but should also take account of the features of
its bid – the most economically advantageous – measured against the specific
services to be provided.
Despite these rules and recent efforts to define them (in particular at the
European level), results of the selection process are not homogenous. Some
authorities practice tried and tested procedures, as in Liverpool, but other
municipalities find themselves mired in disputes or fear of corruption, which
paralyse the entire dynamic. For instance, this was the case in Prague for the
building of a suitable ice hockey arena in time for the 2004 World Ice Hockey
Championship.

Risks and recommendations

Two aspects of PPP arrangements must be capable of assessment: their
performance in terms of the implementation of local development projects
(improvement in the quality of public services, benefits produced in terms of
employment, investment by private partners, etc.), and also their ability to put
in place efficient co-operative structures making it possible to build up trust

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
119
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
io on
s difficult to gather data
and shared references. Nonetheless, it is extremely
w
these aspects, mostly due to the following problems:

n
o
● The distribution of responsibilities: even where contracts or protocols

D Br

y
define the role of each partner as strictly as possible, the result can still be

nl
unclear. Where the partnership has been presented as a way of improving
matters, it can become a source of confusion, diluting responsibilities and

u le
in the long term undermining credibility.
● The second problem comes from the unequal sharing of costs and benefits

d
EC
between the partners (for example, private partners generally fear that

ea
public authorities will treat them as instruments and control them).

se
● The third has to do with the search for windfall effects: some partners will

R
O
only take part in “ public production ” for as long as it takes to derive the
benefits without contributing to the costs that go with them. Follow-up in

e
An
the provision of public services risks falling on the public actor if the private r
●
partner should default.
Le
The fourth problem is that private logic might overtake public logic, for
c tu
example, where everything depends on the specific asset the subcontractor
is asked to deploy, there is nothing to prevent the public authority from
becoming the hostage of its own subcontractor. This type of locked in
situation may also appear when one partner has a dominant position which
can make regional development mono-functional (see Box on Logistic
Centre Wolfsburg GmbH – Germany). Governments then find themselves
obliged to serve the interests of individual actors first, in the hope that they
will subsequently act in the common interest (by maintaining employment
in the territory, by participating in the local market, etc.).
These principal-agent types of risk, argue for the involvement of a third
party with powers. The idea of central or regional intermediation appears to
be a more effective solution than merely having control agencies to ensure
that certain rules are complied with, and also to ensure that there is enough
incentive in terms of reputation derived from the possibility of repeating the
process in other regions. Furthermore, this intermediation body can be given
powers of sanction making the “threats” (penalties for non-performance) in
the contractual mechanism real.
Information asymmetries are frequent where the dialogue between
public and private sectors did not allow all the possibilities for collaboration to
be identified at the outset. In recent years, some countries have developed
centres of expertise, which have facilitated a common understanding and
which offer the authorities their assistance in clearly identifying needs and
expectations. In the Netherlands, communities of firms launched initiatives to
develop similar information, playing the role of “sparring partner” for the local
authorities. Also in that country, a centre of expertise has been set up with

120 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s io
Box 2.13. w
Logistic Centre Wolfsburg GmbH – Germany

n
o
The headquarters of the internationally operating global player in the

D Br
transport sector, Volkswagen AG, have been located in the German region and

y
city of Wolfburg since the company’s foundation in the 30s. Interdependencies

nl
have always existed on economic development and regional planning and

O
transport infrastructure between the city and the dominant regional company.

u le
Already, since the end of the 80s, the city and the company, as the most

d
important actors in the region made an effort to establish a Logistics Centre

EC

ea
(Güterverkehrszentrum: LC/GVZ), which connects the two transportation
systems “railroad” and “highway” via a technical interface.

se
The GVZ Wolfsburg PPP is strategically embedded in the regional renewal

R
O
concept “Auto Vision”, which covers as main elements new measures of
labour policy, a start up campus and tourist events (“Car City Wolfsburg”).

e
An
This concept was developed and is managed by another public-private joint r
c tu
venture, the so-called “Wolfsburg AG”. While this “framework company” is a
Le
50:50 PPP, the majority of the shares of the GVZ joint venture is in private
hands: VW AG and the city of Wolfsburg both hold 26% and an association of
local logistics SME 48% of the shares.
The most important strategic and financial objectives of a GVZ-PPP-project
were the following:
● To contribute to compensating staff reduction of the Volkswagen AG in the
early 90s (app. 6 000 jobs between 1992 to 1994) due to the fostering of start
ups in the regional logistics sector (industrial park) to establish an
attractive regional transportation centre for VW AG, as dominant regional
player, and other private and public actors in the transportation sector.
● Fund raising of public financial support (diverse EU Structure and
Cohesion Funds via the state of Hesse: app. DM 4.75 m altogether), as the
potential public and private partners were unable to invest the estimated
DM 18 m for the first phase of construction.
● The integration of the Deutsche Bahn AG in the financial responsibility for
th e PP P inves tm ent , wh ich sh ou ld be nefit lo ng te rm fro m the
reorganisation of the internal transportation of VW and in the region in aid
of the railroad system.
● To reduce the traffic emission up to app. 15 to 20% as an explicit
environmental objective.
Five years after the start of the GVZ Wolfsburg, the balance of the public and
private partners is quite positive. The creation of approximately 1 500 new jobs
was directly or indirectly influenced by the construction of the LC and the
surrounding industrial park. There is sometimes slight criticism that the GVZ
Wolfsburg and the public financial support are “tailor-made” for the Volkswagen
AG as dominant player in the regional economy, while logistics SME (46% of the
shares) bear the main economical and financial risk of the GVZ PPP.

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
121
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s and adviser i
central government backing, to act as intermediary
o
in PPP
relationships (see Box 2.14). w

n
o
Finally, we should mention the risk that such local partnerships might be

D Br

y
set up essentially for the benefit of large businesses, which would exclude

nl
drawing on the competences of local SMEs. In a world where globalisation
affects all segments of the economy, the size of the proposed operations

u le
becomes a factor for competitiveness; and it can be seen that a growing
number of regional development operations are becoming larger in size, more

d
EC
complex and with more specific expertise. Nonetheless, the involvement of

ea
mixed companies and local investors has to be evaluated with particular care,

se
and their participation in PPP operations should be encouraged, because these

R
O
actors seem, despite the potential for short-term disruption, to be the most
motivated by regional development issues, as they are in urban development

e
where the actors concerned are accustomed to taking major risks. It is
An r
c tu
important to insure that the size of the operations does not discourage some
Le
actors and that inequality in risk-taking does not lead to an increase in prices.
In the light of this, authorities have to intervene efficiently to ensure
equal access to information. There is currently a market for PPP, but it is
reserved to the larger actors, who alone are able to be present on the different
regional and national markets. Now, the high stakes regionally and locally are
such as to justify public funds being allocated to incite medium and small
actors to participate, especially local ones.
Looking more towards the future, the risks vary depending on the
economic success of the regions concerned: in rich areas, market forces may
allow private/private partnerships to operate, involving risks in terms of the
local supply of public services and of coherence with regional and national
programmes. In areas in difficulty, on the other hand, it may prove difficult to
motivate private actors to participate in local development projects, and
effective incentives will be needed. However, it has been found that in
disadvantaged urban areas, for example, those involved at an early stage can
expect to make a good profit, but this is less certain for those coming after
(Vermaylen, 2001).

7. Shared issues in co-operative governance instruments

The following describes three shared issues in multi-level governance.

The dual policy goal

In each of the institutional devices set up, there can be instrumental and/
or relational outcomes.
● Instrumental outcomes: inter-municipal co-operation to improve the scale
of supply of public services, PPPs to make use of private sector funding,

122 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s io
w
Box 2.14. Expertise advice and comprehension between
public and private sectors – The Netherlands

n
o
D Br
The PPS knowledge centre from the Dutch Ministry of finances has worked

y
for 4 years. It provides services to the various local authorities, mainly the

nl
municipalities, in order to create various types of infrastructures, especially

O
when considerable investments are needed, and to address regional

u le
development projects. PPP is considered solely as an instrument for politics,

d
there is no centre for debate or evaluation about operational orientations.

EC

ea
The centre provides three services of advising and supporting, but does not

se
substitute for managers:

R
O
● The identification of projects which can be run through PPP
methodologies, the definition of the principal features, the selection of an

e
appropriate methodology.
An r
c tu
● Assistance to achieve the objectives according to the agenda and the
methodologies which are set up.
Le
● Good communication on the results which are reached, in order to allow
an improved partnership, particularly regarding the confidence of the
private sector.
The OPS foundation (Onderneming voor partnership in stadvernieuwing)
established in 1998; participants in the OPS are companies and organisations
that have economic interests in the urban renewal neighbourhoods. The OPS
operates from this economic perspective: “It is important to create better
investment conditions and to induce more commercial investments in
vulnerable areas. Good business opportunities and a strong local social-
economic climate go hand in hand.”
The key-objectives are as follows:
● Adding economic perspective to urban renewal areas.

● Providing a platform for combining and exchanging knowledge and

expertise in urban renewal.
● Promoting interests through available knowledge and expertise in the
business community.
The working method is based on:
● stimulation, information and advice for local parties such as city councils,
businesses, building corporations, investors, Government authorities;
● playing the role of sparring partner in concrete urban renewal project,

● being a centre for discussion and exchange of know-how.

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
123
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
io of
s authorities rather than
devolution of management to local public
strategic responsibility. w

n
o
● Relational outcomes: intended to ensure that co-operative practices

D Br

y
produce a genuine improvement in knowledge and possibilities for

nl
innovation based on the variety of stakeholders involved in determining
local strategies. This relational objective means trying to obtain better

u le
relations among the parties, increased trust, increased social capital,
empowerment of the community concerned.

d
EC
Both instrumental and relational outcomes must be taken into account

ea
when evaluating a co-operative process, and are partially connected. If a co-

se
operative process fails on a substantive ground (it does not produce any sound

R
O
solution or ends up in a general impasse), it will hardly generate better
relations among the participants. Indeed it will be likely to spread resentment,

e
An
frustration and mistrust. But the two aspects are not always so tightly r
c tu
connected. A co-operative process can lead to poor substantive solutions, and
Le
yet offer the participants the opportunity to know each other and generate
some solidarity among them. Or it can happen that a process produces good
substantive solutions, but once concluded the participants lose all contact
among themselves and no relational good is produced.
The relevance of each of these outcomes should also be evaluated on the
basis of the nature of the task in hand, and of the degree of uncertainty
associated with it. In practice, in a stable context, to take responsibility for a
public good the conditions for production and use of which are entirely
predictable, devolution pure and simple will be enough. Instrumental logic
takes over, and can even go as far as reducing the variety of partners involved
by handing it over to one single “agency” (specialised in the production of the
good in question) concentrating specialised sectoral resources (as is seen, for
example, in the administrations used for local public transport or its
concession to specialised businesses). But, as soon as the problem becomes
more complex, requiring the mobilisation of different competences and/or
where sometimes the precise objectives are difficult to translate, mixed
partnerships should be favoured. The emergence of relationships of trust
between these actors, as well as their capacity to effectively manage the
problems that arise, become in this more uncertain context objectives in their
own right. Par excellence, questions of economic development fall into this
category.
In the short run the instrumental outcomes are more relevant. The
evaluator should estimate whether such results have been reached in an
efficient way and whether they offer an appropriate response to the
community problems. But in the long run policy makers should look especially
at the relational aspects. The accumulation of social capital is a worthy

124 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s for the future. So, in theiolong
mechanism, because it opens new possibilities
w
run, we should ask: what is left after the process has been concluded? What

n
o
have the participants learnt? Were they able to reinforce their co-operation

D Br
and to launch new initiatives, even when the incentives from central

y
government were exhausted? The goal of regional policy is not only that of

nl
generating development, but also of generating local networks that will be

O
able to design new solutions in the future.

u le
d
The critical question of local capacity building

EC

ea
In all cases, one of the main challenges for the co-operation mechanisms

se
described is to enhance the competence of local actors, a precondition for

R
O
successful decentralisation. This applies not only to relationships between
municipalities and access to knowledge through relations with private sector

e
partners, but also to the sharing of skills which can result from relations with
An r
c tu
higher levels of government. In Korea (OECD Territorial Reviews: Korea), local
Le
governments are expected to effectively integrate sectoral measures provided
by different ministries into a comprehensive policy for the development of
their own jurisdiction. This requires broad knowledge and administrative
skills, and reforms in the training of local public officials. For the time being in
Korea, regional, provincial and metropolitan city governments have their own
separate training institutes for local officials. Opportunities for local
government officials to learn from central government officials or other local
governments remain very limited so far, and intergovernmental exchanges of
personnel could be encouraged, both vertically and horizontally. Personnel
secondment is one possible method of learning, and could be further
explored. For its part, Finland rests on the increasing use of co-operative
practices and on the quest for coherence between mechanisms in the
programme for the new regional development policy. It has also stressed the
need to involve the different stakeholders not only in the implementation, but
especially in the actual preparation of strategies, since this can only help
motivate the actors involved (see OECD TDPC Symposium 2004).
P ublic a u t h o r i t i e s ’ c o m p e t e n c e s h av e un d e rg o n e ch a n g e. In
administrative tradition, the first duty of the civil servant is to conform: to
established rules, and to orders received. In the framework of multi-level
governance, “the question of conformity gives way to the question of
relevance” (Calame, 2003). Where it is possible to invent the best-adapted
responses locally by applying the guiding principles recognised by everyone,
the actors will be held responsible if they fail to try to find such an adaptation.
This “capacity for invention” and recognition of the competences of partners
forms part of the responsibilities of the local authorities. One of the main ways
in which central government can thus support local communities is to

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
125
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
io
s responsible is thus the primary
reinforce their capacity to act. Making them
way of strengthening their competences.w

n
o
Relying on local competences is as much about the need for effective

D Br

y
decentralisation as it is an objective in itself. The advantage of training the

nl
actors involved in the processes of governance is thus borne out by a certain
number of mechanisms designed to spread, train and even persuade the local

u le
actors. It consists of standardising their knowledge, where that is possible,
sharing experiences, including those at national level, following repetitive

d
EC
procedures, the monitoring of which will rely on incremental changes and the

ea
progressive readjustment of objectives, and finally using management charts

se
and any other current management tools. These goals can be seen at work in

R
O
the setting up of assistance agreements, the creation of observer functions, or
in making available central government officials to local governments.28

e
An
Although practical and functional training is provided, qualitative r
c tu
training (i.e., creative thinking, brainstorming practices, teamwork spirit, etc.)
Le
remains marginal and could be significantly reinforced. Reforming the overall
mentality of local public administration towards a more open and innovative
system is a long-term task. In this respect, the private sector could perhaps
offer a source of inspiration in terms of entrepreneurial culture. Some OECD
countries have actually started to introduce new learning initiatives for their
local public officials so as to generate know-how spillovers from the private
sector and learn certain management skills (see Box 2.15).
Further along, it should be possible to set up common training efforts for
the different categories of civil and public servants. This is where a common
culture could be forged, even if later on division into various specialisations
could be helpful. But one challenge remains: that of evaluating civil and public
servants. Finally, one way to help local public officials develop their capacity to
perform new responsibilities would be to set up precise self-evaluation
criteria. Designing a set of accurate performance objectives and measurement
standards would provide local public officials with useful guidance by giving
them a clear idea of what is expected from them. In some cases, local
governments can even be associated directly in the process of designing such
criteria. In Spain for example, the Spanish Federation of Communes and
Provinces (FEMP), the Observatory for the Quality of Public Services
(Observatorio de la Calidad de los Servicios Públicos, OCSP) and the Ministry of
Public Administration have involved local governments in the diffusion of self-
evaluation tools, called EFQM (European Foundation for Quality Management)
and CAF (Common Assessment Framework). The OCSP then ensures the
training of local public officials to use those evaluation tools. In other countries,
local capacity development came about through the establishment of new
regional institutions. In Hungary, for example, with the first PHARE Regional
Development Programme (OECD Territorial Reviews: Hungary, 2001), regional

126 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s io
w
Box 2.15. Example of learning initiatives
officials in OECD countries
for local public

n
o
D Br
The US is probably offering the widest range of private sector-led learning

y
opportunities for civil servants. This trend has started quite early with the

nl
awareness that public managers would increasingly need a cross-

O
understanding of public, private and non-profit organisations work. As a

u le
consequence, practices of “contracting out” have become a recurrent

d
exercise. This is not only restricted to contracts with business or non-profit

EC

ea
organisations, but governments also contract with other governments.

se
Approximately 24% of local government services in the US are estimated to
be delivered through contracting out. Between 1992 and 1997, around 96% of

R
O
local governments contracted out a new service (Wagner and Hefetz, 2001).

e
Also in Germany where the fundamental source of public officials’ training
An r
c tu
used to be the federal, regional training institutes, the 1990s saw a

Le
remarkable evolution towards a more open and interconnected system. Local
authorities started to request management courses and an increasing
number of private institutions have responded to that demand. More active
exchanges between public and private institutions have been fostered. For
example, general polytechnics (Fachhochschulen) have created several public
management courses mainly within their departments of business
administration. Moreover, universities that had largely ignored the public
sector have created master programmes in public management, such as the
University of Konstanz and the University of Potsdam.
In Busan, a new partnership programme started in 2003 so as to develop
collaboration with the private sector. Some civil servants take a one-week
internship in a large private firm in order to learn management techniques.
S u ch l e ar n i n g po s s ib i li ti e s s h o u ld b e m o re f ul ly deve lo p e d a n d
encouraged (TR Busan).

development agencies were established on an experimental basis. These RDAs

then played a key role in launching a pilot planning programme for the South
Great Plain and South Transdanubia.

The difficulty and inadequacy of evaluation

Whether in regard to relations between municipalities, relations between
the public and private sectors or vertical relations between levels of
government, enough time must be allowed to establish shared references, a
common “language” and a minimum degree of trust in the undertakings of the
different parties. This makes it very difficult to evaluate how these
mechanisms are working. But it makes it possible to fashion tools and

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
127
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
sprove to be effective in theiolong
construct co-operation networks that may
w of development strategies.
term for the programming and implementation

n
o
It is clear that such mechanisms suffer from a lack of tried and tested

D Br

y
evaluation tools and even of appropriate performance criteria. This is due to

nl
the length of time needed to establish partnerships. It is also a result of the
twofold objective which such institutional arrangements must pursue: that of

u le
the effectiveness of the tasks to be accomplished on the one hand, and that of
effective co-operation in terms of the networks set up, on the other.

d
EC
Whatever would be the results of the evaluation they can help to re-

ea
organise the operational aspects of the device but not to renounce to the share

se
of responsibilities among levels of government. Commitments entered into

R
O
concerning decentralisation (in countries that have taken this path recently or
longer ago) seem today to be more or less irreversible. It seems to be a matter

e
An
of political sensitivity to consider now that situations of increased autonomy r
c tu
do not amount to lock ins. Some solutions, that might be effective from an
Le
economic standpoint, are not from a sociopolitical point of view, as is
illustrated by the case of mergers between municipalities. The implication of
citizens in local democracy and their participation in the process of decision-
making should not be considered as reversible, but constitute an objective “in
itself” for creating new forms of governance.
The process of evaluation gains to be built in reference to “best practice”
solutions. They are often the result of policies in favour of institutional
experiments.
Governance is not a science. It is necessary to provide the stimulus for
innovation and observation in order to find out what are good practices,
because no satisfactory theory exists that determines the optimal choice.
Governance thus looks to solutions that are satisfactory rather than seeking to
identify solutions that are optimal. In practice, when the models do not allow
optimal solutions to be found, how does one obtain information on the
possible solutions? Experimentation, which allows training through practice,
provides the answer to this question. Where there is imperfect information,
with learning-by-doing, there are potential gains from experimenting with a
variety of policies for addressing social and economic problems. For Oates
(1999; p. 1132) it is also possible to defend the idea that federal states are
especially well adapted for promoting “technical progress” in public policy
because their institutional structure allows them more room for manoeuvre in
their local choices. In the United States, a group of measures concerning social
and environmental policy have in this way been initiated at the regional or
local level before being adopted either by other public authorities, or even at
the federal level. “States, of course, may learn from others that the diffusion of
successful policy innovations may be horizontal as well as vertical”. (Oates,

128 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s forms of diffusion ofio
1999; p. 1133) Some have even noticed cumulative these
w
innovations, strongly reminiscent of the S-curve of technological innovations

n
o
(even though the examples are more often to do with “horizontal” diffusions –

D Br
among the same levels of government – rather than “vertical” ones – across

y
levels of government). Within the European Union today there exists a sort of

nl
reciprocal training that transcends the level of individual states. Experiences

O
of strengthening regional and local democracy (or other forms of objective)

u le
within a State can serve the needs of others facing the same challenges

d
EC
(Delcamp and Loughlin, 2002).

ea
Central action and experimentation: this dimension is important for regional

se
competitiveness. In practice, information travels relatively fast regarding

R
O
innovations that are put in place; but information about their value takes
longer, especially for those who have had to set them up and invest in order to

e
generate knowledge. This could act as a disincentive for those regions more
An r
c tu
interested in a “free ride”, which will want to wait for information to emerge
about the value of these innovative mechanisms before adopting them, Le
without taking the risk of initiating them (and letting competing regions
know). Central action that supports institutional innovation is therefore
indispensable in order to correct the disincentive effects of going ahead
without support (particularly through the practices of matching, in which
central government shares the costs and the risks of new programmes put in
place locally). Besides constituting a correction to the lack of incentives, this
type of central support can bring coherence at the national level, choosing
innovations that do not contain too many negative externalities for other
regions, but also because, by being informed in this way from the beginning
and throughout the process, the State can make early choices as to the
initiatives to put in place in other territories. 29 In France, for instance,
experimentation is today enshrined in constitutional law. The “right to
experiment” for central government as well as local communities was upheld
during the first wave of recent decentralisation reforms in 2003.30 Parliament
remains the guarantor of this process, authorising it upstream and evaluating
it downstream. In Finland more autonomy at regional level and reinforcement
of inter municipal co-operation are tested in some specific areas. These
various institutional experiments are tools for progress in governance.

Notes
1. Which are considered to be the relevant categories for composite competitive
capacity measures of territories (Weiler, 2004).
2. OECD High Level Meeting, “Innovation and Effectiveness in Territorial
Development Policy”, Martigny, Switzerland, 25-26 June 2003.

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
129
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s io
3. Or depending on the amount of local resources the local authority has been able
to generate.
w

n
o
4. In federal countries, the budget available for sharing is sometimes determined by
a mechanism known as “revenue-sharing” whereby the “rich” states contribute to

D Br

y
the budget of “poor” ones. For example, public finance indicators suggest that

nl
Denmark and Sweden – recognised as unitary countries – are more “decentralised”
than federal Germany, Mexico or the United States. Devolution in Great Britain,

O
which occurred after 2000, is not yet reflected in those statistics.

u le
5. Incentives theory analyses situations in which contracts are signed between a

d
principal and an agent under imperfect and asymmetric conditions of information.

EC
In such cases, one of the parties to the contract – the agent – is in possession of

ea
relevant information that the other party – the principal – is not aware of. A moral

se
hazard situation occurs when the principal is not in a position to observe the agent’s

R
O
decisions and actions. It is therefore desirable that the contractual arrangement
include incentives to ensure that the actions of the agent really do target the agreed
objectives and/or the disclosure of private information (FARES, 2002).

e
An
6. However, this does not mean that the institutional and legal framework does not r
c tu
matter. For instance, they do not exist in the United Kingdom, where similar
Le
problems of co-ordination existed that could have favoured their use, even though
central government has created and strengthened the Government Offices in the
Regions (GOs), which are committed to supporting the implementation of its
policies through local government. The City Challenge, which later became the
Single Regeneration Programmes, as well as the current programmes are based on
tenders and the selection of projects submitted by local authorities, usually in
partnership with private actors. Whereas a contract is required for the
partnership, there is no contract between the central government and the
applicant local authority. The reason is probably to be found in the fact that British
local authorities are in law the creatures of Parliament, and the unitary conception
of the contract in common law does not allow a contract to be entered into
between the Crown and a local authority. However, the broad array of
responsibilities devolved to the Scottish Parliament, the Northern Ireland
Assembly and the Welsh National Assembly (which is not a parliament but a local
authority, with no legislative powers) made it necessary to reconcile regional
autonomy with the unity of the UK. This gave rise in 2000 and 2001 to new forms
of agreements that are not legally enforceable contracts.
7. This is, for example, the case in some Italian contractual arrangements and in the
ROM contracts in the Netherlands. Private local actors (businesses and
associations) are also represented in the CESR (Regional Economic and Social
Councils) that issue opinions and offer proposals to the French conseils régionaux
under the planning contracts between the State and the regions.
8. This objective played an important role in Italy at the time of the adoption of
law No. 142/1990 and is considered a positive consequence of the French state-
region planning contract.
9. In France, no third-party complaints of failure to comply with “plan contracts”
appear to have resulted in penalties. So the conception in France is a very
restrictive one which sees contracts more as protocols of reciprocal agreements
than as real legal commitments. The Swiss view is different, making the granting
of funds for a number of years conditional on achieving the stated intermediary
objectives (especially as regards spending controls).

130 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s io
10. Verwaltungsvereinbarung: this agreement is based on article 104a of the Basic Law;

w
the agreement has 16 articles and 32 pages, and is completed by a protocol on the
interpretation of a number of provisions on request of certain governments.

n
o
11. This objective was clearly stated by the former French Minister of Planning in 1982,

D Br

y
when planning contracts between the State and the regions were first launched.

nl
Presenting the economic planning reform bill to parliament, Michel Rocard
explained that planning without decentralisation could lead to “totalitarianism”,

O
whereas “decentralisation without planning could cause chaos”. This objective can

u le
also be found in presidential decree No. 677/1976 in Italy, as well as in Spain.

d
12. For instance, France has a highly fragmented local government system, (the system

EC
became more fragmented after the reforms leading to decentralisation in the

ea
early 1980s) and local autonomy is protected by the constitution. France also relies

se
heavily on administrative law. Public administrations frequently use administrative

R
O
contracts to carry out their duties or to cover their needs. With the decline in
legitimacy of centralised administration and “government by command” since the
late 1960s, contracts appeared to be an alternative solution to keep institutional

e
An
relationships working within the public sector. While planning contracts between
r
c tu
the State and the regions may be the best known example, they are not, by any

Le
means, the only contractual arrangements across levels of government in the
French context. On the contrary, contracts soon became the standard instrument
the law provided, used even by departments for their own sectoral policies
whenever responsibilities had to be shared, with local authorities being given
competence while central government kept its responsibility for policy-making.
13. To avoid “moral hazard risks”, long periods of consultation, preparation and
negotiation are necessary before a contract can be drawn up. In France, the
“upstream” phase took two years for the preparation of the present round of
planning contracts between the State and the regions (Contrats de Plan État Régions)
(from 1998 to 2000 for 7-year contracts from 2000 to 2006). In Italy, contractual
procedures involve stringent selection between projects in order to secure funding.
14. The closest body to a co-ordinating body for territorial policy is the National and
Regional Planning Bureau which has developed a new perspective of territorial/
regional policy and provided a network for local authorities as well as other local
actors. However, substantial integration of these measures and effective policy
implementation has yet to be seen due to persistent compartmentalism.
15. Since January 2003.
16. This was put to the test in Switzerland, for example, where although public
expenditure was not reduced by inter-municipal co-operation, it was found that
the more Swiss communes co-operated with each other, the more they tended to
extend the scope of their co-operation (Steiner, 2003).
17. The LEADER (Liaison Entre Actions de Développement de l’Économie Rurale)
programme is a European Union programme for rural areas that has played a
pioneering role. By promoting local development initiatives, managed and
designed by groups of local representatives, it has had a major impact in creating
synergies between rural businesses in the areas concerned. Many countries have
adopted this approach at national level.
18. There are also more “defensive than offensive” forms of co-operation among
municipalities. In this context, voluntary mutual adjustment policies between
local, and sometimes regional, players mean that co-operation also, at times, acts
as a defence against the introduction of more demanding arrangements such as

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
131
II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s io
the setting up of regional and metropolitan agencies or councils, or the merger of
local municipalities.
w

n
o
19. A representative case is the IRD Duhallow, a rural development company
established in 1989, operating a LEADER and Mainstream Rural Development

D Br

y
Programme in an area between the North West of County Cork and the East of

nl
County Kerry (about 1 880 km2, population of over 30 000). It manages a staff of
more than 16 qualified professionals in programmes that range from social

O
inclusion initiatives, tourism infrastructure development, and cultural activities.

u le
Local authorities have a relatively small representation on the Board (two out of
25 members) (IRD Duhallow, Annual Report, 2002-2003).

d
EC
20. Dafflon and Ruegg (2002) in their analysis of the case of Switzerland note that “this

ea
form of collaboration, which is supposed to resolve the discrepancy between

se
institutional and functional territories, tends to cause as many problems as it

R
O
solves”.
21. While national power is centred in the town hall, the communities control the

e
finances. Thus, the budget of the French city of Lille amounts to a little less than
An
EUR 300 million, in contrast to EUR 1.3 billion for Lille’s urban community (CUDL). r
Le c tu
22. Even if sharing local taxes could be perceived as renouncing independence in
countries where municipal autonomy is a building block of the national
institutions (for example in Finland).
23. For example, the INTERREG programme distinguishes between “low”,
“intermediate” and “high” levels of integration, defined as: Low, if the border
regions operate as separate socio-economic units (necessitating in the case of
previous INTERREG programmes separate sub-programmes for each side of the
border); Intermediate, if various forms of co-operation between public
administrations, private business, and other interests from either side of the
border exist (with partly integrated or closely co-ordinated management of
INTERREG programmes); High, if the two sides of the border effectively function as
a single socio-economic unit (in EU terms, this would mean cross-border
institutions and a fully integrated management structure for programming). See
European Commission (DG REGIO) (2000) for more information.
24. These may include common infrastructures, facilitating educational exchange,
tourism activities, environmental protection, and maintaining water resources,
parks and natural reserves, as well as other local facilities and their cross-border
use, where projects have flourished.
25. For a more extended analysis of the scope and limits of horizontal collaboration,
see Territorial Review of Switzerland (OECD, 2002).
26. “As opposed to a wider notion of governance, which consists of all conceivable
notions of government, a stricter notion of governance implies that private actors
are involved in decision making in order to provide common goods and
nonhierarchical means of guidance are employed. Government by contrast
indicates that only public actors are involved and the hierarchical steering can be
used. Where there is governance private actors may be independently engaged in
self-regulation, or a regulatory task may have been delegated to them by a public
authority, or they may be regulating jointly with a public actor. This interaction
may occur across levels (vertically) or across arenas (horizontally)” (A. Héritier,
2002).
27. For instance, the institutionalised PPP model involves the establishment of an
entity held jointly by the public partner and the private partner. The joint entity

132 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 II. GOVERNANCE

e _it E d it
s io
thus has the task of ensuring the delivery of a work or service for the benefit of the

w
public. In the member countries, public authorities sometimes have recourse to
such structures, in particular to administer public services at local level, for

n
o
example, water supply services, waste collection services and the development of

D Br
accommodation in districts in crisis. The legal aspect of the joint entity allows the

y
public partner, through its participation as one of the shareholders and in the

nl
decision-making bodies, to retain a relatively high degree of control over the
development of the projects, which it can adapt over time depending on the

u le
circumstances. It also allows the public partner to build up its own experience of
running the service in question, while being able to call upon the support of a

d
private partner. An institutionalised PPP can be set up either by creating an entity

EC
held jointly by the public sector and the private sector, or by the private sector

ea
taking control of an existing public undertaking.

se
28. Moreover, elected officials are often reluctant to sign themselves up, although

R
O
they do not hesitate to encourage their partners to join training programmes. The
fact that they have been elected validates their level of skill and discourages them

e
from joining the programmes (Calame, 2003).
An r
c tu
29. While this support for experimentation is backed by block grants, which are

Le
unconditional, it can still fail in its mission when there is not enough sharing of
information with the central powers. By contrast, where central government is an
attentive partner, giving conditional support to the project (depending on its cost
and its expected impact, tying the stages of financing to the stages of project
completion, putting in place bonuses for good performance), financial transfers
will undoubtedly be more effective. This is worth considering in the sense that
where the local authorities have no room to manœuvre at the outset, particularly
where transfers are unconditional, all forms of innovation risk being stifled.
30. Some authors note, nonetheless, that the very notion of “the right to
experimentation” reveals the exceptional freedom left to local initiative (Calame,
2003).

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
133
 ISBN 92-64-00946-9
Building Competitive Regions
Strategies and Governance
e _it E d it
© OECD 2005
s io
w

n
o
D Br

y
nl
Bibliography

u le
d
EC
Arndt, M., T. Gawron and P. Jähnke (2000), “Regional Policy through Co-operation: From

ea
Urban Forum to Urban Network”, Urban Studies, Vol. 37, No. 11, p. 1903-1923.

se
Ashcroft, B. (2002), “The Scottish Economy” in N. Hood, J. Peat, E. Peters and S. Young
(Eds.) Scotland in a Global Economy: The 20:20 Vision, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire.

R
O
Bachtler, J. (2001), Where is Regional Policy Going? A New Paradigm of Regional Policy, Report
to EoRPA Regional Policy Research Consortium, European Policies Research Centre,

e
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow.
An r
c tu
Bachtler, J. and P. Raines (2002), A New Paradigm of Regional Policy? Reviewing Trends in
Le
Regional Policy in Europe, Report to EoRPA Regional Policy Research Consortium,
European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow.
Benneworth, P., M. Danson, , P. Raines and G. Whittam (2003), “Confusing Clusters?
Making Sense of the Cluster Approach in Theory and Practice”, European Planning
Studies, Vol. 11(5), pp. 511-520.
Berman, D. R. (2003), Local Governments and the States: Autonomy, Politics, and Policy, New
York, M.E. Sharpe.
Best, M. (2000), “Silicon Valley and the Resurgence of Route 128: Systems Integration
and Regional Innovation”, in J. Dunning (Ed.) Regions, Globalization, and the
Knowledge-Based Economy, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Bobbio, L. (2003), “Building Social Capital through Democratic Deliberation: the Rise of
Deliberative Arenas”, in Social Epistemology, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 343-357.
Calame P. (2003), La démocratie en miettes : Pour une révolution de la gouvernance, Éditions
Descartes and Cie, Paris.
Charles, D., B. Perry, and P. Benneworth (2004), Towards a Multi-level Science Policy:
Regional Science Policy in a European Context, Regional Studies Association, Seaford.
Coase, R. (1974), “The Lighthouse in Economics”, Journal of Law and Economics, 17 (Oct.)
pp 357-76
Collin, J-P. and J. Léveillée, with the collaboration of M. Rivard and M. Robertson, (2004),
Municipal Organisation in Canada: Tradition and Transformation, Varying from Province
to Province, Villes Régions Monde/Institut de Ciences Politiques i Socials/Centre per
a la Innovacio Local, 50 p. (forthcoming).
Cooke, P. (2004a), “Regional knowledge capabilities, embeddedness of firms and
industry organisation: bioscience megacentres and economic geography”,
European Planning Studies, Vol. 12, pp. 625-641.
Cooke, P. (2004b), University Research and Regional Development, Report to EC-DG
Research, European Commission, Brussels.
Cooke, P. (2004c), “Regional Transformation and Regional Disequilibrium: New
Knowledge Economies and their Discontents,” in G. Fuchs and P. Shapira. Rethinking
Regional Innovation and Change: Path Dependency or Regional Breakthrough? Kluwer.

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
135
BIBLIOGRAPHY

e _it E d it
s io
Cooke, P., M. Heidenreich and H-J. Braczyk (2004d), Regional Systems of Innovation: The

w
Role of Governance in a Globalized World (Second Edition), Routledge, London.

n
o
Cooke, P. (2001) “Regional Innovation Systems, Clusters and the Knowledge Economy”,
Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 945-974.

D Br

y
Cooke, P. and K. Morgan (1991), Industry, Training and Technology Transfer: The Baden-

nl
Wurttemberg System in Perspective, Regional Industrial Research Report No. 6,
Department of City and Regional Planning, University of Wales College of Cardiff.

u le
Crouch, C., P. Le Galès, C. Trigilia and H. Voelzkow (2001), Local Production Systems in
Europe: Rise or Demise, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

d
EC
Dafflon, B. and R. Jean (2002), “Innovations institutionnelle et logique ‘de bas-en-haut’

ea
en Suisse”, Organisations et territoire, Réflexion sur la gestion, l’innovation et

se
l’entrepreneurship. Vol. 11, No. 2, p. 127-137.

R
O
DATAR (2002), Les Contrats de Plan État-Région, série Territoires en mouvement, La
documentation française.

e
An
Dankbaar, T. (2004), “Embeddedness, Context, Proximity and Control”, European
r
c tu
Planning Studies, Vol. 12, pp. 691-701.

Le
Delcamp A. and J. Loughlin (eds) (2002), La décentralisation dans les États de l’Union
européenne, La documentation française, Paris.
Doloreux, D. (2004), “Regional Innovation Systems in Canada: A Comparative Study”,
Regional Studies, Vol. 38, pp. 481-494.
Dunning, J. (1992), “The Competitive Advantage of Countries and the Activities of
Transnational Corporations”, Transnational Corporations, Vol. 1.1.
DTI (2004), Competing in the Global Economy: The Innovation Challenge, DTI Economics
Paper No. 7, Department for Trade and Industry, London.
DTI/DfEE (2001), Opportunity for All in a World of Change, Department for Trade and
Industry and Department for Education and Employment, London.
Fares, M. (2002), “Canonical models of theories of contracts”, in E. Brousseau and
J.-M. Glachant (eds) The Economics of Contracts, Cambridge University Press.
Foster, K.A. (1997), The Political Economy of Special-Purpose Government, Washington, D.C.,
Georgetown University Press.
Garnsey E. and C. Longhi (2004), “High Technology Locations and Globalization:
Converse Paths, Common Processes”, Int. J. Technology Management, Vol. 28, Nos. 3/4.
Gaxie D. (1997), “Introduction : les chemins tortueux de l’intercommunalité”, in Rémy
Le Saout, dir., L’intercommunalité. Logiques nationales et enjeux locaux, Rennes,
Presses de l’Université de Rennes, p. 11-21.
Garfoli, G and B. Musyck (2001), “Innovation Policies for SMEs in Europe: Towards an
Interactive Model?”, Regional Studies, Vol. 9, pp. 869-872.
Greffe, X. (2001), “Devolution of Training: A Neccesity for the Knowledge Economy”, in
Devolution and Globalisation: Implications for Local Decision-Makers, Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.
Haila, A. and P. Le Galès (2002), “Combining the maintenance of the welfare state and
the competitiveness of Finland: The contradictions of urban governance in
Helsinki” Paper presented at the Workshop “The politics of metropolitan
governance”, 30th ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Turin, 22-27 March.

136 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

e _it E d it
s io
Hajer, M.A. and H. Wagenaar (eds) (2003), Deliberative Policy Analysis; Understanding

w
Governance in the Network Society, Cambridge University Press.

n
o
Hassink, R. (2002), “Regional Innovation Support Systems”, European Planning Studies,
Vol. 10(2), pp. 153-164.

D Br

y
Hayashi, M. (2002a), “Congestion, Technical Returns and the Minimum Efficient Scales

nl
of Local Government Expenditures: The Case of Japanese Municipalities”,
Discussion Paper Series No. 01, Institute for Research in Business and Economics,

u le
Meiji Gakuin University, www.meijigakuin.ac.jp/~hayashim/Works/optimalsizef/PDF.
Hayashi, M. (2002b), “Incentives and Technical Inefficiencies in the Production of Local

d
EC
Public Services”, Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office,

ea
Government of Japan, Tokyo.

se
Héritier A. ed. (2002), Common Goods – Reinventing European and International Governance,

R
O
Lanham, Maryland, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.
Hilpert, U. (1992), Regional Innovation and Decentralization: High Tech Industry and

e
Government Policy, London and New York, Routledge.
An r
c tu
Huggins, R. (2004), European Competitiveness Index 2004: Measuring the Performance and

Le
Capacity of Europe’s Nations and Regions, Robert Huggins Associates, Pontypridd.
Inman R.P. (1988), “Federal assistance and local services in the United States: The
evolution of a new federalist fiscal order” in Fiscal Federalism Harvey Rosen (ed.)
Chicago: U. Chicago Press pp. 33-74.
IRD Duhallow (2002), Annual Report 2002/2003.
Jehiel P. (1997) “Bargaining between benevolent jurisdictions or when delegation
induces inefficiencies,”Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Vol. 65(1), pages 61-74.
Joumard I. and P.M. Kongsrud (2003), “Fiscal Relations across Government Levels”,
OECD Economic Department Working Paper No. 375.
Kanter, R. M. (1995), World Class: Thriving Locally in a Global Economy, Simon
and Schuster, New York.
Keating, M. (1995), “Size, Efficiency and Democracy: Consolidation, Fragmentation and
Public Choice”, in Dennis Judge, Gerry Stoker and Harold Wolman (dir.), Theories of
Urban Politics, London, Sage Publications, p. 117-134.
Krugman P. and A.J. Venables (1990) “Integration and the competitiveness of the
peripheral industry”, pp. 55-77 in Bliss, C. and J. Braga de Macedo (eds.), Unity with
Diversity in the European Economy, Cambridge University Press/CEPR, Cambridge/
London.
Lagendijk, A., and D. Charles, (undated) Regional Institutions facilitating technology
transfer to SMEs: A Review paper for OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, Paris.
Landabaso. M., C. Oughton, and K. Morgan, (2003) “Learning Regions in Europe:
Theory, Policy and Practice through the RIS Experience”, in D. V. Gibson et al. (eds.)
Systems and Policies for the Global Learning Economy, Praeger Press.
Lawton Smith, H. (2005), Invited keynote paper “The impact of tertiary education on
urban development’ OECD International conference on city competitiveness,
Tenerife, March 3 and 4 2005.

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
137
BIBLIOGRAPHY

e _it E d it
s io
Longhi, C. (1999), “Networks, collective learning and technology development in

w
innovative high- technology regions: the case of Sophia Antipolis”, Regional Studies,
Vol. 33.4.

n
o
Longhi C. and M. Quere, 1997b, “The Sophia-Antipolis Project or the Uncertain

D Br

y
Creation of an Innovative Milieu”, in Ratti, Bramanti, Gordon (eds), The Dynamics of

nl
Innovative Regions, Eldershot, Ashgate Pub.
Lundvall, B.A. (1992) National Systems of Innovation: Towards a theory of innovation and

u le
interactive learning, Pinter, London.
Lundvall, B. A. and B. Johnson (1994), “The Learning Economy”, Journal of Industry

d
EC
Studies, Vol. 1, pp. 23-42.

ea
Luger, M.I. and H. A. Goldstein (1991), Technology in the Garden, Chapel Hill, N.C.: UNC

se
Press.

R
O
Marcou, G. (2004), La planification à l’échelle des grands territoires. Etude comparative
(Allemagne, Espagne, Italie, Pays-Bas, Royaume-Uni), Paris, Ministère de

e
l’Equipement, du Logement et des Transports (forthcoming).
An r
c tu
Marcou, G. and H. Wollman (eds.) (2004), Réforme de la décentralisation, réforme de
l’État : régions et villes en Europe, CNRS éditions, Paris.
Le
Markusen, A. (1996), “Sticky Places in slippery space: A typology of industrial districts”,
Economic Geography, Vol. 72. pp. 293-313.
Martin, R. and P. Sunley (1998), “Slow Convergence? The New Endogenous Growth
Theory and Regional Development”, Regional Studies, Vol. 74, pp. 201-227.
Martin R. and P. Sunley (2003), “Deconstructing Clusters: Chaotic Concept or Policy
Panacea?”, Journal of Economic Geography, 1, 5-35.
Martin, R. and P. Tyler (2000), “Regional Employment Evolutions in the European
Union: A Preliminary Analysis”, Regional Studies, Vol. 34, pp. 601-616.
Massey, D. and D. Wield (1992), “Evaluating Science Parks”, Local Economy, Vol. 7,
pp. 10-25.
Moiso A. and Uusitalo R. (2003), “Kuntien yhdistymisen vaikutukset kuntien
menoihin”, (The effects of amalgamations of municipalities on expenditure of
municipalities). Sisäasiainministeriö, Finland.
Oates W.E. (1999), “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37,
No. 3, Sept., pp. 1120-1149.
OECD (1997), National Innovation Systems, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Paris.
OECD (1999), Report on Innovation and Territories: U-grading Knowledge and Diffusing
Technology in a Regional Context, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Paris.
OECD (2001a), Territorial Review of Italy, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Paris.
OECD (2001b), OECD Territorial Outlook, 2001, Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, Paris.
OECD (2001c), Territorial Review of Hungary, Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, Paris.

138 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

e _it E d it
s io
OECD (2002a), Benchmarking of Science Industry Relationships, Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.
w

n
o
OECD (2002b), Territorial Review of Switzerland, Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, Paris.

D Br

y
OECD (2002c), Territorial Review of Canada, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

nl
Development, Paris.

O
OECD (2002d), Territorial Review of Champagne-Ardennes, France, Organisation for

u le
Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.

d
OECD (2003a), Territorial Review of Mexico, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

EC
Development, Paris.

ea

se
OECD (2003b), Territorial Review of Helsinki, Finland, Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, Paris.

R
O
OECD (2003c), Territorial Review of Öresund (Copenhagen and Malmo), Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.

e
An
OECD (2003d), Territorial Review of Vienna – Bratislava, Organisation for Economic r
c tu
Co-operation and Development, Paris.
Le
OECD (2004), Territorial Review of the Czech Republic, Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, Paris.
OECD (2005), Territorial Review of Japan, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Paris.
OECD Territorial Review of Finland, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Paris, (forthcoming).
OECD (2004), Territorial Review of Mexico City, Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, Paris.
OECD (2004), Territorial Review of Montreal, Canada, Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, Paris.
OECD (2005), Territorial Review of Busan – Korea, Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, Paris.
OECD, Territorial Review of Seoul – Korea, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Paris. Forthcoming.
OECD (2002), Territorial Review of Tzoumerka, Greece, Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, Paris.
OECD (2003), Territorial Review of Moravska Trebova-Jevicko, Czech Republic, Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.
OECD (2000), Territorial Review of Bergamo, Italy, Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, Paris.
OECD (2001), Territorial Review of the Valencian Central Districts, Spain, Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.
OECD (2002), Urban Renaissance Review: Glasgow: Lessons for Innovation and
Implementation, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.
OECD (2000), Urban Renaissance Review: Belfast, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Paris.

BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
139
BIBLIOGRAPHY

e _it E d it
s io
OECD (2000), Cultivating Rural Amenities: An Economic Development Perspective,

w
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.

n
o
Patel, P. and Pavitt, K. (1991), “Larger firms in the production of the world’s technology:
An important case of ‘non-globalization’”, Journal of International Business Studies,

D Br

y
Vol. 22, pp. 35-54.

nl
Porter, M. (1990), The Competitive Advantage of Nations, The Free Press, New York.

O
Porter, M. (1994), “The Role of Location in Competition”, Journal of the Economics of

u le
Business, Vol. 1, No. 1.

d
Porter, M. (2003), “The Economic Performance of Regions”, Regional Studies, Vol. 37,

EC
pp. 549-578.

ea
Power, D. and M. Lundmark, (2004), “Working through Knowledge Pools: Labour

se
Market Dynamics, the Transference of Knowledge and Ideas, and Industrial

R
O
Clusters”, Urban Studies, Vol. 41, pp. 1025-1044.
Raines, P. (2001), “The Cluster Approach and the Dynamics of Regional Policymaking”,

e
September, EPRC Research Paper No. 47.
An r
c tu
Reich, R. (1991), The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism, New
York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Le
Rosenfeld, S. (1998), Technical Colleges, Technology Deployment and Regional Development,
draft stock-taking paper prepared for the OECD, Regional Technology Strategies
Inc, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
Rosenfeld, S. (2002), Creating smart systems: A guide to cluster strategies in less-favoured
regions, Regional Technology Strategies Inc, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
Sancton, A. (2000), Merger Mania: The Assault on Local Government, Westmount, Price-
Patterson Ltd.
Saxenian, A. (1994), Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route
128, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Scott, A. and M. Storper (2003), “Regions, Globalization and Development”, Regional
Studies, Vol. 37, pp. 579-593.
Simmie, J., J. Sennett, P. Wood and D. Hart (2002), “Innovation in Europe: A Tale of
Networks, Knowledge and Trade in Five Cities”, Regional Studies, Vol. 36, pp. 47-64.
Steiner, R. (2003), “The Causes, Spread and Effects on Inter-Municipal Co-operation
and Municipal Mergers in Switzerland”, Public Management Review, Vol. 5, No. 4,
p. 551-571.
Storper, M. (1997) The Regional World: Territorial Development in a Global Economy,
Guildford Press, New York.
Tornatzky, L., P. Waugaman, and D. Gray (2002), “Innovation U: New University Roles in
a Knowledge Economy”, Southern Growth Policies Board, Research Triangle Park,
NC, www.southern.org/pubs/innovationU/.
Vermeylen P. (2001), “Public Private Partnerships and Urban Renewal”, OGM
preparatory report for the Informal Councils of Ministers on Urban Policy, Brussels.
Wishlade, F., Brown, R., and Yuill, D. (1996), A Comparative Overview of Research and
Development Incentive Policies in the EU, Report to Ministry of Industry, France,
European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow.
Yuill, D. (2003), Regional Policy in Europe, Annual Review, 2002/03, Report to the EoRPA
Regional Research Consortium, European Policies Research Centre, University of
Strathclyde, Glasgow.

140 BUILDING COMPETITIVE REGIONS: STRATEGIES AND GOVERNANCE – ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – © OECD 2005
 e _it E d it
s io
w

n
o
D Br

y
nl
O

u le
d
EC

ea

se
R
O

e
An r
Le c tu

OECD PUBLICATIONS, 2, rue André-Pascal, 75775 PARIS CEDEX 16

PRINTED IN FRANCE
(04 2005 04 1 P) ISBN 92-64-00946-9 – No. 54049 2005