VOL.

267, FEBRUARY 3, 1997 339

Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 108547. February 3, 1997.

FELICIDAD VDA. DE CABRERA, MARYJANE CABRERA

and FELICIDAD TEOKEMIAN, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and VIRGILIA ORAIS DE FELICIO,
represented by her Attorney­in­Fact, ERNESTO M.
ORAIS, respondents.

Land Registration; Land Titles; Ownership: Registration does

not vest title—it is merely evidence of such title over a particular
property.—As can be discerned from the established facts, the
Certificates of Title of the vendees Orais are, to say the least,
irregular, and were issued in a calculated move to deprive
Felicidad Teokemian of her dominical rights over the property
reserved to her by descent. Plaintiff could not have registered the
part reserved to Felicidad Teokemian, as this was not among
those ceded in the Deed of Sale between Daniel/Albertana
Teokemian and Andres Orais. It must be remembered that
registration does not vest title, it is merely evidence of such title
over a particular property. (Embrado vs. Court of Appeals, 233
SCRA 335)
Same; Same; The defense of indefeasibility of the Torrens Title
does not extend to a transferee who takes the certificate of title with
notice of a flaw in his title.—The defense of indefeasibility of the
Torrens Title does not extend to a transferee who takes the
certificate of title with notice of a flaw in his title. (Añonuevo vs.
Court of

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

340

340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals

Appeals, 244 SCRA 28) The principle of indefeasibility of title is

unavailing where there was fraud that attended the issuance of
the free patents and titles. (Meneses vs. Court of Appeals, 246
SCRA 162)
Same; Same; Trusts; Prescription; Actions; An action for
reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive
trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of
registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate
of title over the property, but this rule applies only when the
plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the
property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in
actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance,
which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe.—Be that as it may, that the right of the defendants for
reconveyance of the subject property arising from an implied trust
under Article 1456 of the Civil Code is material to the instant
case, such remedy has not yet lapsed, as erroneously submitted by
the plaintiff, and, is thus, a bar to the plaintiff’s action. In the
case of Heirs of Jose Olviga vs. Court of Appeals, we observed that
an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference
being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the
issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule
applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is
not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be
the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the
defendants are in the instant case, the right to seek reconveyance,
which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual
possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may
wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before
taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being,
that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to
seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the
nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his
own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in
possession.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites before the period of
prescription may start in regard to an action based on implied
trust.—As it is, before the period of prescription may start, it must
be shown that: (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust, (b)
such positive acts

341
 VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 3, 1997 341

Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals

of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust, and,
(c) the evidence thereon is clear and positive.
Same; Same; Laches; Ownership; Possession; Where the action
for reconveyance (quieting of title) was instituted only after thirty
years from the time a party was able to acquire a Certificate of
Title covering a particular property, while the occupant has been
in active possession of the same, this surely constitutes such
tardiness on the part of the former constituting the basis for
laches.—On the other hand, the action for reconveyance (quieting
of title) of the plaintiff was instituted only in 1988, that is, thirty
years from the time the plaintiffs husband was able to acquire
Certificate of Title covering the properties inherited by the
Teokemians, and apparently including that portion belonging to
Felicidad Teokemian. In the meantime, defendant Felicidad vda.
De Cabrera and her late husband have been actively in possession
of the same, tilling it, and constructing an irrigation system
thereon. This must surely constitute such tardiness on the part of
the plaintiff constituting the basis for laches.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Laches, Defined;
Prescription; Laches is not concerned merely with lapse of time,
unlike prescription—while the latter deals with the fact of delay,
laches deals with the effect of unreasonable delay.—Laches has
been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting
a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. The defense of laches is an
equitable one and does not concern itself with the character of the
defendant’s title, but only with whether or not by reason of
plaintiffs long inaction or inexcusable neglect, he should be barred
from asserting his claim at all, because to allow him to do so
would be inequitable and unjust to defendant. Laches is not
concerned merely with lapse of time, unlike prescription. While
the latter deals with the fact of delay, laches deals with the effect
of unreasonable delay.
Same; Same; Same; It is an enshrined rule that even a
registered owner of property may be barred from recovering
possession of property by virtue of laches.—In our jurisdiction, it is
an enshrined rule that even a registered owner of property may
be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of
laches. Under the Land Registration Act (now the Property
Registration Decree), no

342

342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals

title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered

owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
The same is not true with regard to Laches. As we have stated
earlier in Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia, while the defendant may
not be considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and
\\is predecessor’s long continued possession (37 years) the
original owner’s right to recover back the possession of the
property and the title thereto from the defendant has, by the
latter’s long period of possession and by patentee’s inaction and
neglect, been converted into a stale demand.
Same; Same; Co­Ownership; Possession; When there has been
a partial partition, as where the transferees of an undivided
portion of the land allowed a co­owner of the property to occupy a
definite portion thereof and had not disturbed the same, for a
period too long to be ignored, the possessor is in a better condition
or right.—In Go Ong vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that
the heirs, as co­owners, owners, shall each have the full
ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining to it.
An heir may, therefore, alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when the
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
mortgage, with respect to the co­owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co­ownership, Undisputed is the fact that since
the sale of the two­third portion of the subject property to the
plaintiff, the latter had allowed Felicidad Teokemian to occupy
that one­third portion allotted to her. There has, therefore, been a
partial partition, where the transferees of an undivided portion of
the land allowed a co­owner of the property to occupy a definite
portion thereof and has not disturbed the same, for a period too
long to be ignored—the possessor is in a better condition or right
(Potior est conditio possidentis).

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals,

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Belo, Gozon & Elma for petitioners.
      Ramirez, Corro & Associates for private respondent.

343

VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 3, 1997 343

Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals

TORRES, JR., J.:

Assailed1 in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the

Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated
January 7, 1993 in CA­G.R. No. 22407­CV, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby

REVERSED and judgment is hereby entered ordering defendants
Felicidad Vda. de Cabrera and Maryjane Cabrera to vacate the
portion of Lot 2238 occupied by them and surrender possession
thereof to plaintiff.
SO ORDERED."

Reversed2
by the foregoing pronouncements was the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Baganga,
Davao Oriental in Civil Case No. 379, an action for
“Quieting of Title to Real Property, Damages with
Preliminary Injunction.” The trial court’s disposition reads:

“WHEREFORE, the plaintiff is hereby ordered:

(a) To execute a reconveyance within thirty (30) days after

this decision shall have become final and executory in
favor of defendant Felicidad Vda. De Cabrera
corresponding only to that portion of Lot No. 2239 actually
and physically possessed and occupied by the defendant as
seen from the sketch plan of Engr. Enecio Magno (Exh. ‘2')
and pinpointed and identified during the ocular
investigation as to its extent and boundaries of the said
portion bought by defendants Felicidad Vda. De Cabrera
from Felicidad Teokemian;
(b) To reimburse defendants for litigation expenses and
attorney’s fees in the amount of P7,000; and
(c) To pay the cost.

SO ORDERED."

We are restating the facts as determined by the appellate

court, viz:

_______________
 1 Annex “A," Petition, p. 35, Rollo.
2 Annex “B," Petition, p. 49, Rollo.

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344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals

“On January 16, 1950, a Deed of Sale (Exh. B) was

executed by Daniel Teokemian and Albertana Teokemian
in favor of Andres Orais over a parcel of unregistered land
situated at Abejod, Cateel, Davao Oriental with an area
described as 7.3720 hectares. The property was owned in
common by Daniel and Albertana and their sister Felicidad
Teokemian, having inherited the same from their late
father, Domingo Teokemian. However, the Deed of Sale
was not signed by Felicidad, although her name was
printed therein as one of the vendors. On January 26, 1950,
the parcel of land was surveyed in the name of Virgilia
Orais, daughter of the vendee Andres Orais, and
denominated as Lot No. 2239, PLS­287, Cateel Cadastre.
As surveyed, the property had an area of 11.1000 hectares.
On June 24, 1957, Virgilia Orais was issued Free Patent
No. V­79089. Original Certificate of Title No. P­10908 was
issued in her name (Exh. A).
On July 27, 1972, Alberto (sic Albertana) Teokemian
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to Elano
Cabrera, husband of Felicidad Cabrera, ‘ONE HALF
PORTION OF LOT NO. 2239, Cad287, eastern portion,
containing an area of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED TEN (55,510) SQUARE METERS, more or
less’ (Exh. 3), which portion supposedly corresponded to the
onethird share in Lot 2239 of Felicidad Teokemian who
was not a party to the Deed of Sale earlier executed by her
brother and sister in favor of Andres Orais, Virgilia Orais’
predecessor­in­interest. It was explained by Felicidad
Cabrera that the Deed of Sale was signed by Albertana
Teokemian, not by Felicidad Teokemian, because the whole
of Lot 2239 was adjudicated to Albertana in a decision of a
cadastral court dated June 8, 1965 as evidenced by a
Certification of an officer­in­charge of the Office of the
Clerk of Court, RTC, Br. 7, Baganga, Davao Oriental (Exh.
4). Felicidad Cabrera and her husband immediately took
possession of the western portion of Lot 2239.
In 1974 and 1978, Virgilia Orais’ brothers, Rodolfo and
Jimmy Orais went to Cateel, Davao Oriental and
confronted the Cabreras of the latter’s alleged
encroachment and illegal occupation of their sister’s land,
but no concrete action on the matter was pursued by
Virgilia Orais until February 11, 1988 when she filed Civil
Case No. 379 against Felicidad Cabrera, now a widow, and
her daughter Maryjane Cabrera for ‘Quieting of Title to
Real Property, Damages with Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction/
The complaint, which was amended on June 22, 1988 by
including Felicidad Teokemian as party defendant (pp. 42–
47, Rec­

345

VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 3, 1997 345

Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals

ords), alleged that sometime in 1972 and 1973 the late

Elano Cabrera and defendant Felicidad Cabrera, knowing
that Lot 2239 was already registered in the name of the
plaintiff, prepared a document of sale and had Felicidad
Teokemian sign it conveying a portion of said lot to them as
described in the Sketch Map (Annex D of the Complaint),
after which they entered and possessed said portion and
enjoyed the fruits thereon. Plaintiff further averred that by
reason of the document of sale and the declaration of the
property involved in the name of defendant Felicidad Vda.
de Cabrera, there created a cloud of doubt on the former’s
title on said property.
Plaintiff prayed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiff through the

undersigned counsel respectfully prays this Honorable Court that:

a) After due notice and hearing, a Writ of Preliminary

Mandatory Injunction be issued restraining the
defendants from further dispossessing the plaintiff of the
land in question;
b) Ordering the defendants to pay jointly the plaintiff the
amount of not less than Sixteen Thousand Two Hundred
(P16,200) as total value of the rice produced from the
riceland in question, and the amount of Twenty One
Thousand Six Hundred (P21,600.00) Pesos as the total
proceeds of the nuts of the coconut land in question;
c) The Defendants be ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount
of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos and Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as litigation expenses;
d) The defendants be ordered to pay Six Thousand
(P6,000.00) Pesos for attorney’s fees; Four Hundred
 (P400.00) Pesos as expenses for every­appearance in
Court;
e) The document of sale executed by Felicidad Teokemian
and the Tax Declarations issued to the late Elano Cabrera
and Felicidad Vda. de Cabrera and the subsequent Tax
Declaration creating a cloud of doubt on the title,
possession, rights and interest be declared null and void
for being fraudulent and without any legal basis and
inexistent; and
f) Such other reliefs and remedies which this Honorable
Court may deem just, proper, and equitable in the
premises.’

In their answer with counterclaim (pp. 10–18, Records),

defendants alleged that they acquired a portion of Lot 2239
in good faith and for value; that said portion was owned by
Felicidad Teokemian

346

346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals

who was not a party to the Deed of Sale executed by Daniel

and Albertana Teokemian on January 16, 1950 in favor of
Andres Orais over Lot 2239; that not having signed the
Deed of Sale, Felicidad Teokemian’s one­third share in Lot
2239 could not have been legally conveyed to Andres Orais;
that Virgilia Orais (successor­in­interest of Andres Orais)
committed fraud in including the portion owned by
Felicidad Teokemian in her applying for free patent over
Lot 2239 is concerned pursuant to Art. 1456 of the Civil
Code; and that plaintiff is guilty of laches for not initiating
an action against defendants to recover the western portion
of Lot 2239 despite plaintiffs knowledge of defendant’s
acquisition thereof in 1972, as in fact it was only in 1988
when the complaint for quieting of title was filed in court.
Defendants prayed, thus:

“WHEREFORE, this Honorable Court, after due notice and

hearing on the merits of this case; to issue order or orders;

1. Finding the defendants as the rightful, lawful, and legal

owner of that portion which was sold to them by Felicidad
Teokemian and which was included in the title of plaintiff;
2. To find that the plaintiff did not own the said portion and
that they have personal knowledge of the same when the
 plaintiff filed and secured the title under the
Administrative Proceeding;
3. Finding that the plaintiff is only holding the title to that
portion only in an implied trust in favor of the real owner;
4. Finding the plaintiff legally obligated to cause the
segregation of the portion at their expense and deliver
formally the said portion to the real owners, the
defendants;
5. To order the plaintiff to execute, prepare and or make any
instrument or document to finally vest in the Defendants
absolute, clear and flawless title or ownership over the
portion which the plaintiff holds title in trust in
defendant’s favor;
6. To order the Plaintiff to pay actual damages in the sum of
P2,000.00 as litigation expense and Attorney’s fees in the
sum of P5,000.00 in favor of defendants;
7. To direct the plaintiff to account for the share of the real
owner of the portion of land illegally cultivated and
planted by plaintiff to rice in favor of FELICIDAD
TEOKEMIAN to be paid thru the Defendants who are the
owners, which consisted in ONE THIRD OF THE RICE
HARVEST

347

VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 3, 1997 347

Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals

every year since the year 1950 to 1972 when the portion
was sold and cultivated by defendant based on the
computation of income by the plaintiff in Paragraph 16, a
paragraph in the Second Cause of Action of the complaint;

and to grant the defendants such other reliefs and

3
remedies proper and equitable in the premises.

On April 27, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment in

favor of defendants and against the plaintiff, ruling that
the latter can no longer recover the western portion of Lot
2239 conveyed in 1972 by Felicidad Teokemian in favor of
the late Elano Cabrera and Felicidad Cabrera due to
laches. In support of its findings, the trial court referred to4
the Court’s pronouncements in Lola vs. Court of Appeals,
where it was held that although the defense of prescription
is unavailing to the petitioners, because, admittedly, the
title to the subject lot was still registered in the name of
the respondent, still the petitioners have acquired title to it
by virtue of the equitable principle of laches due to the
respondent’s failure to assert her claim and ownership for5
thirty­two years; and in Republic vs. Court of Appeals
that, while it is true that by themselves tax receipts and
declaration of ownership for taxation purposes are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong
evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when
accompanied by proof of actual
6
possession of the property;
and in Miguel vs. Catalino, that even granting appellant’s
proposition that no prescription lies against their fathers’
recorded title, their passivity and inaction for more than
thirty four years justifies the defendant appellee in setting
up the equitable defense of laches in his own behalf.
The respondent Court of Appeals reversed such findings
upon appeal.

_______________

3 Court of Appeals Decision, pp. 36–40, Rollo.

4 G.R. No. L­46573, November 13, 1986, 145 SCRA 439.
5 G.R. Nos. L­43105 and L­43190, August 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 532.
6 G.R. No. L­23072, November 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 234.

348

348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals

Even as the appellate court observed that the registration

made by the plaintiff was fraudulent insofar as it involved
the one­third interest of Felicidad Teokemian, which was
not included in the sale executed by Albertana and Daniel
Teokemian, it nevertheless upheld its effects, on the
justification that the defendants’ action for reconveyance
based on an implied trust had already been barred by
prescription. Furthermore, the action of the plaintiff is not
barred by laches, as was held by the lower court. Said the
appellate court:

“We disagree with the lower court’s ruling that plaintiff is barred
from bringing an action for recovery of ownership.
Parenthetically, while the complaint filed by plaintiff is
designated as one for quieting of title, the allegations therein
show that it is actually for recovery of ownership/possession.
First. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 27, 1972 (Exh. 3)
executed by Albertana Teokemian in favor of Elcano Cabrera over
the portion of 55,510 square meters of Lot 2238 which allegedly
pertained to the one­third interest of Felicidad Teokemian did not
convey any title to Elcano Cabrera, assuming that Felicidad
Teokemian still owned a one­third portion of Lot 2238 which was
already registered in plaintiffs name, considering that Albertana
did not have any authority from Felicidad Teokemian to effect
such conveyance. Consequently, defendants Felicidad vda. De
Cabrera and Maryjane Cabrera had acquired no title upon which
to anchor their claim of ownership over the one­third portion.
Such being the case, plaintiffs cannot be barred by laches from
instituting the action to quiet title against defendants.
xxx
Second, There was no allegation, much less proof, that Lot
2239 had been partitioned among the co­owners Daniel,
Albertana, and Felicidad, all surnamed Teokemian, before the
land was sold to Andres Orais in 1950 when the same was still
unregistered. This being the case, and assuming that Felicidad
Teokemian had retained ownership over an undivided one­third
portion of Lot 2239 despite its being titled in plaintiffs name in
1958, Felicidad Teokemian could only dispose her undivided
interest, not a definite portion described in the Deed of Sale
executed on July 27, 1972 (Exh. 3) as “eastern part.” Worse, the
supposed vendee, Elcano Cabrera, and her successors­in­interest,
defendants Felicidad vda. de Cabrera and Maryjane Cabrera,
occupied the western portion of Lot 2239, not the

349

VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 3, 1997 349

Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals

eastern portion which was the subject of the sale. Their

occupation of a definite portion of an undivided property, without
any color of title, could not have ripened into ownership on the
principle of laches.
Third. As testified to by Jimmy Orais, plaintiffs brother, it was
only in 1974 when plaintiff came to know that her property was
occupied by Elcano Cabrera. According to Jimmy, he and his elder
brother Dr. Rodolfo Orais went to the house of Elcano Cabrera
three times in 1974 and in 1979 complaining of the latter’s
occupancy of their sister’s property. Jimmy further declared that
after Elcano Cabrera was shown plaintiffs title to the property,
Elcano Cabrera proposed a relocation survey of the area to
determine whether the premises occupied by him were included in
the plaintiffs title (T.S.N. pp. 39–44, January 3, 1989). It appears,
however, that nothing came out of the proposal to conduct a
relocation survey. From the time plaintiff became aware of
Cabrera’s possession of the western portion of Lot 2239, which
was in 1974, up to the time she instituted the action for quieting
of title in 1988, only fourteen (14) years had elapsed. This case,
therefore, has no congruency with those cases where the Supreme
Court ruled that the registered owner is barred by laches from
recovering his property. Thus, in Lola vs. Court of Appeals (145
SCRA 439), the petitioners acquired title to the land owned by
respondent by virtue of the equitable principles of laches due,
according to the Supreme Court, to respondent’s failure to assert
her claims and ownership for thirty­two (32) years/ In Miguel vs.
Catalino (26 SCRA 234), the Supreme Court said that appellant’s
‘passivity and inaction for more than 34 years (1928–1962)
justifies the defendant­appellee in setting up the equitable
defense of laches in his behalf.’ In Mejia vs. Gampomana (100
Phil. 277), it was held that ‘the original owner’s right to recover
back the possession of the property and title thereto from the
defendant has by the long period of 37 years and by the patentee’s
inaction and neglect been converted into a stale demand/
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
the exercise of due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 32 SCRA 29). Since
imprescriptibility is one of the basic features of a Torrens title, it
is not an ordinary delay in asserting one’s right that will give rise
to the application of the principle of laches, otherwise, registered
title can easily be defeated by

350

350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals

prescription. This is precisely the reason why, in the cases cited,

the delay or inaction by the registered owners in asserting their
rights was considered unreasonable and unexplained because it
took them from 32 to 37 years to do so. In contrast, the delay in
the case at bar was only fourteen years.
While possession of defendants Felicidad vda. De Cabrera and
Maryjane Cabrera could not have ripened into ownership as
already discussed, they are possessors in good faith of the portion
occupied by them and, therefore, entitled to the benefits accorded
7
by the Civil Code as such."

Sisters Felicidad Vda. de Cabrera and Maryjane Cabrera,

together with Felicidad Teokemian are now before the
Court as Petitioners in this Petition for Review on
Certiorari, seeking relief from the respondent court’s
decision, assigning as errors the following:

A
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S COMPLAINT FILED IN 1988
FOR QUIETING OF TITLE WHICH ACTUALLY IS ONE FOR
RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION AS FOUND
BY RESPONDENT COURT IS NOT BARRED BY LACHES
BECAUSE:

1. A PERIOD OF 30 YEARS HAD ELAPSED FROM 1958

WHEN TORRENS TITLE WAS ISSUED TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENT TO 1988 WHEN HER COMPLAINT
BELOW WAS FILED DURING WHICH PERIOD OF
TIME THE PROPERTY HAS BEEN IN OPEN,
CONTINUOUS AND ADVERSE POSSESSION OF THE
ORIGINAL OWNER, FELICIDAD TEOKEMIAN, FROM
1958, OR EVEN EARLIER IN 1941 WHEN SHE
INHERITED THE PROPERTY, TO 1972 WHEN SHE
SOLD IT TO THE CABRERAS WHO CONTINUED THE
PRIOR POSSESSION UNTIL 1988 WHEN PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT WAS FILED.
2. ASSUMING ARGUENDO RESPONDENT COURT’S
HOLDING THAT ONLY 14 YEARS HAD ELAPSED
COUNTED FROM 1974 WHEN CABRERAS'
POSSESSION

________________

7 Court of Appeals Decision, supra.

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VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 3, 1997 351

Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals

WAS QUESTIONED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S

BROTHERS, STILL THAT PERIOD CONSTITUTES
LACHES.

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT LACHES DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE WHAT WAS
SOLD TO THE CABRERAS WAS A DEFINITE PORTION OF
THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY BEFORE PARTITION, HENCE,
VOID AND THAT ALBERTANA TEOKEMIAN WHO SIGNED
THE DOCUMENT OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE CABRERAS
HAD NO AUTHORITY FROM HER SISTER­CO­OWNER
FELICIDAD TEOKEMIAN TO EXECUTE THE DEED OF
8
CONVEYANCE.
The bone of the petitioners’ contention rests on the alleged
waiver of the plaintiff to recover any interest she had in the
one­third portion of the property inherited by Daniel,
Albertana and Felicidad Teokemian from their late father,
Domingo, due to the long period of time which lapsed from
the time the plaintiff’s title was registered until the action
for quieting of title was instituted.
We find merit in the petition.
At the outset, it must be observed that the Certificate of
Title of the plaintiff, which was derived from Free Patent
No. V79089, issued in the name of Virgilia Orais, leaves
much to be desired in propriety, considering that the Deed
of Sale executed by Daniel and Albertana Teokemian, on
one hand and Andres Orais on the other, did not bear the
signature of Felicidad Teokemian, and therefore, did not
cover the latter’s share.
It was the respondent appellate court which observed
that “the registration of the plaintiff’s title over the subject
property was fraudulent insofar as it involved the one­third
interest of Felicidad Teokemian who did not sign the Deed
of Sale in favor of plaintiff’s predecessor­in­interest and,
therefore, the latter held that portion as a trustee of an
implied trust for

________________

8 Petition, pp. 16–17, Rollo.

352

352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals

the benefit
9
of Felicidad, pursuant to Art. 1456 of the Civil
Code." Needless to state, these conclusions, being matters
of fact, are entitled to our full affirmation, since they are
congruent with the findings of the trial court, thus:

“It would seem from the facts of the case that the basis of the
right of plaintiff over the land in litigation specifically Lot No.
2239 now titled in the name of the plaintiff; located at Buayahon,
Abejod, Cateel, Davao Oriental, proceeded from the Deed of Sale
executed by Daniel Teokemian and Albertana Teokemian on
January 16, 1950 acknowledged before Judge Proserador Danao
as Notary Ex Oficio. Taking a hard look over the aforesaid deed of
sale (Exh “B") the said document apparently included the third
heir of Domingo Teokemian Felicidad Teokemian because her
name was typewritten together with her sister Albertana and
brother Daniel all surnamed Teokemian in the said document.
Again this fact will come to mind that the vendee Andres Orais
was anticipating at the time Felicidad Teokemian will also sell
her share in this portion of land (Lot No. 2239) which at the time
of the sale it was still unregistered land. The non­signing of
Felicidad Teokemian over her typewritten name in this deed of
sale (Exh. “B") will attest to the fact that she did not sell her
share in the lot in question. After this sale the vendee Andres
Orais through his encargado Melecio Capilitan and later
Servillano Abarca immediately took possession of the two­third
portion of said parcel of land respecting the third portion owned
10
by Felicidad Teokemian."

However, the appellate court stated further that

nonetheless, the plaintiff’s attempt to recover the property
is justified because defendant Felicidad Teokemian’s own
action for reconveyance
11
has already been barred by
prescription, which is the same as stating that the very
tardiness of the plaintiff in pursuing the present action for
reconveyance of the subject property has rendered the
defendants’ defense nugatory, and has made the fortress of
the plaintiff’s case impregnable.

________________

9 Court of Appeals Decision, p. 45, Rollo.

10 RTC Decision, pp. 60–61.
11 Court of Appeals Decision, p. 45, Rollo.

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VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 3, 1997 353

Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals

This conclusion is incorrect. As can be discerned from the

established facts, the Certificates of Title of the vendees
Orais are, to say the least, irregular, and were issued in a
calculated move to deprive Felicidad Teokemian of her
dominical rights over the property reserved to her by
descent. Plaintiff could not have registered the part
reserved to Felicidad Teokemian, as this was not among
those ceded in the Deed of Sale between Daniel/Albertana
Teokemian and Andres Orais. It must be remembered that
registration does not vest title, it is merely evidence of such
title over12 a particular property. (Embrado vs. Court of
Appeals)
The defense of indefeasibility of the Torrens Title does
not extend to a transferee who takes the certificate of title
with notice
13
of a flaw in his title. (Añonuevo vs. Court of
Appeals) The principle of indefeasibility of title is
unavailing where there was fraud that attended the
issuance of14the free patents and titles. (Meneses vs. Court
of Appeals)
Be that as it may, that the right of the defendants for
reconveyance of the subject property arising from an
implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code is
material to the instant case, such remedy has not yet
lapsed, as erroneously submitted by the plaintiff, and, is
thus, a bar to the plaintiff’s action.15In the case of Heirs of
Jose Olviga vs. Court of Appeals, we observed that an
action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied
or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of
reference being the date of registration of the deed or the
date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the
property, but this rule applies only when the plaintiff or the
person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the
property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof
is in actual possession of the property, as the defendants
are in the instant case, the right to seek reconveyance,
which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe.

________________

12 G.R. No. 51457, June 27, 1994, 233 SCRA 335.

13 G.R. No. 113739, May 2, 1995, 244 SCRA 28.
14 G.R. No. 82220, July 14, 1995, 246 SCRA 162.
15 G.R. No. 104813, October 21, 1993, 227 SCRA 330.

354

354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals

The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession

of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait
until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked
before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the
rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to
ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of
a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can
be claimed only by one who is in possession.
As it is, before the period of prescription may start, it
must be shown that: (a) the trustee has performed
unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of
the cestui que trust, (b) such positive acts of repudiation
have been made known to the cestui que 16
trust, and, (c) the
evidence thereon is clear and positive.
In the case at bar, the defendant Felicidad Teokemian,
and thereafter, the Cabreras, were in actual possession of
the property since it was left to Felicidad Teokemian by her
father in 1941, which possession had not been interrupted,
despite the sale of the two­third portion thereof to the
plaintiff in 1950, and the latter’s procurement of a
Certificate of Title over the subject property in 1957. Until
the institution of the present action in 1988, plaintiff,
likewise, had not displayed any unequivocal act of
repudiation, which could be considered as an assertion of
adverse interest from the defendants, which satisfies the
above­quoted requisites. Thus, it cannot be argued that the
right of reconveyance on the part of the defendants, and its
use as defense in the present suit, has been lost by
prescription.
On the other hand, the action for reconveyance (quieting
of title) of the plaintiff was instituted only in 1988, that is,
thirty years from the time the plaintiffs husband was able
to acquire Certificate of Title covering the properties
inherited by the Teokemians, and apparently including
that portion belonging to Felicidad Teokemian. In the
meantime, defendant

________________

16 Huang vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108525, September 13, 1994,
236 SCRA 420.

355

VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 3, 1997 355

Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals

Felicidad vda. de Cabrera and her late husband have been

actively in possession of the same, tilling it, and
constructing an irrigation system thereon. This must
surely constitute such tardiness on the part of the plaintiff
constituting the basis for laches.
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence could or should have
been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to 17
assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it. The defense of laches is an
equitable one and does not concern itself with the character
of the defendant’s title, but only with whether or not by
reason of plaintiff’s long inaction or inexcusable neglect, he
should be barred from asserting his claim at all, because to
allow him to do so would be inequitable and unjust to
defendant. Laches is not concerned merely with lapse of
time, unlike prescription. While the latter deals with the
fact of18delay, laches deals with the effect of unreasonable
delay.
This Court
19
emphasized in Mejia de Lucas vs.
Gamponia, the reason upon which the rule is based is not
alone the lapse of time during which the neglect to enforce
the right has existed, but the changes of condition which
may have arisen during the period in which there has been
neglect. In other words, where a court finds that the
position of the parties has to change, that equitable relief
cannot be afforded without doing injustice, or that the
intervening rights of third persons may be destroyed or
seriously impaired, it will not exert its equitable powers in
order to save one from the consequences of his own neglect.

________________

17 Olizon vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107075, September 1, 1994, 236
SCRA 148.
18 Palmera vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 110168, August 4,
1994, 235 SCRA 87.
19 G.R. No. L­9335, October 31, 1956, 100 Phil. 277.

356

356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals

In our jurisdiction, it is an enshrined rule that even a

registered owner of property may be barred from
recovering possession of property by virtue of laches. Under
the Land Registration Act (now the Property Registration
Decree), no title to registered land in derogation to that of
the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse20possession. The same is not true with regard to
Laches. As we have stated earlier in Mejia de Lucas vs.
Gamponia, while the defendant may not be considered as
having acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessor’s
long continued possession (37 years) the original owner’s
right to recover back the possession of the property and the
title thereto from the defendant has, by the latter’s long
period of possession and by patentee’s inaction and neglect,
been converted into a stale demand.
The argument that laches does not apply because what
was sold to the Cabreras was a definite portion of the
community property, and, therefore, void, is likewise
untenable.
Under Article 493 of the Civil Code:

“Each co­owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and even he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co­owners, shall be limited to the portion which may
be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co­
ownership.”
21
In Go Ong vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the
heirs, as co­owners, shall each have the full ownership of
his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining to it. An heir
may, therefore, alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
the personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co­owners, shall
be limited to the

________________

20 Claverias vs. Quingco, G.R. No. 77744, March 6, 1992, 207 SCRA 66;
De la Calzada­Cierras vs. CA, G.R. No. 95431, August 7, 1992, 212 SCRA
390.
21 G.R. No. 75884, September 24, 1987, 154 SCRA 270.

357

VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 3, 1997 357

Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals

portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon

the termination of the co­ownership.
Undisputed is the fact that since the sale of the two­
third portion of the subject property to the plaintiff, the
latter had allowed Felicidad Teokemian to occupy that one­
third portion allotted to her. There has, therefore, been a
partial partition, where the transferees of an undivided
portion of the land allowed a co­owner of the property to
occupy a definite portion thereof and has not disturbed the
same, for a period too long to be ignored—the possessor is
in a better condition or right (Potior est conditio
possidentis).
Clearly, the plaintiff in this instance is barred from
asserting her alleged right over the portion subject matter
in the instant case on the ground that their right has been
lost by laches. In Bailon­Casilao vs. Court of Appeals, we
ruled that:

“As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co­owner
sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own
share but not those of the other co­owners who did not consent to
the sale (Punzalan vs. Boon Liat, 44 Phil. 320 [1923]). This is
because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or
other disposition affects only his undivided share and the
transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the
partition of the things owned in common (Ramirez vs. Bautista,
14 Phil. 528 [1909]). x x x For Article 494 of the Civil Code
explicitly declares: No prescription shall lie in favor of a co­owner
or co­heir so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co­
22
ownership."

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is hereby GRANTED

The decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 7, 1993
is hereby SET ASIDE. The decision of the trial court dated
April 27, 1989 is hereby REINSTATED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

          Regalado (Chairman), Puno and Mendoza, JJ.,

concur.

________________

22 G.R. No. L­78178, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 738.

358

358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Pepito

     Romero, J., No, part. Related to attorney who is a

partner in law firm which is counsel of record. No part.

Petition granted.

Notes.—After a lapse of one year, a decree of

registration is no longer open to review or attack but the
aggrieved party may still file an action for reconveyance if
title has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value.
(Javier us. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 498 [1994])
 The prescriptive period for an action for reconveyance of
real property based on implied or constructive trust, which
is counted from the date of registration of the property,
applies when the plaintiff is not in possession of the
contested property. (Vda. de Esconde vs. Court of Appeals,
253 SCRA 66 [1996])

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