G.R. No. 144476. April 8, 2003.*SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION.

ONG YONG, JUANITA TAN ONG, WILSON T. ONG, ANNA L. ONG, WILLIAM T. ONG, WILLIE T. ONG, and
JULIE ONG ALONZO, petitioners, vs. DAVID. S. TIU, CELY Y. TIU, MOLY YU GAW, BELEN SEE YU, D.
TERENCE Y. TIU, JOHN YU, LOURDES C. TIU, INTRALAND RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CORP., MASAGANA
TELAMART, INC., REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASAY CITY, and the SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, respondents.

G.R. No. 144629. April 8, 2003.*SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION.

DAVID S. TIU, CELY Y. TIU, MOLY YU GAW, BELEN SEE YU, D. TERENCE Y. TIU, JOHN YU, LOURDES C. TIU,
and INTRALAND RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CORP., petitioners, vs. ONG YONG, JUANITA TAN ONG,
WILSON T. ONG, ANNA L.

_______________

* SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION.

2
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ong Yong vs. Tiu

ONG, WILLIAM T. ONG, WILLIE T. ONG, and JULIA ONG ALONZO, respondents.

Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Motions; Motion for Reconsideration; A motion for
reconsideration is not pro-forma for the reason alone that it reiterates the arguments earlier passed
upon and rejected by the appellate court.—The procedural rule on pro-forma motions pointed out by
the Tius should not be blindly applied to meritorious motions for reconsideration. As long as the same
adequately raises a valid ground (i.e., the decision or final order is contrary to law), this Court has to
evaluate the merits of the arguments to prevent an unjust decision from attaining finality. In Security
Bank and Trust Company vs. Cuenca, we ruled that a motion for reconsideration is not pro-forma for the
reason alone that it reiterates the arguments earlier passed upon and rejected by the appellate court.
We explained there that a movant may raise the same arguments, if only to convince this Court that its
ruling was erroneous. Moreover, the rule (that a motion is pro-forma if it only repeats the arguments in
the previous pleadings) will not apply if said arguments were not squarely passed upon and answered in
the decision sought to be reconsidered.

Civil Law; Contracts; Parties; Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs.—
Article 1311 of the Civil Code provides that “contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns
and heirs . . .” Therefore, a party who has not taken part in the transaction cannot sue or be sued for
performance or for cancellation thereof, unless he shows that he has a real interest affected thereby.
Corporation Law; Corporation Code; Remedies; The Corporation Code, SEC Rules and even the Rules of
Court provide for appropriate and adequate intra-corporate remedies, other than rescission.—The
Corporation Code, SEC rules and even the Rules of Court provide for appropriate and adequate intra-
corporate remedies, other than rescission, in situations like this. Rescission is certainly not one of them,
specially if the party asking for it has no legal personality to do so and the requirements of the law
therefor have not been met. A contrary doctrine will tread on extremely dangerous ground because it
will allow just any stockholder, for just about any real or imagined offense, to demand rescission of his
subscription and call for the distribution of some part of the corporate assets to him without complying
with the requirements of the Corporation Code.

Same; Same; Trust Fund Doctrine; This doctrine is the underlying principle in the procedure for the
distribution of capital assets.—The Trust Fund Doctrine, first enunciated by this Court in the 1923 case
of Philippine Trust Co. vs. Rivera provides that subscriptions to the capital stock of a corporation
constitute a fund to which the creditors have a right to look for the satisfaction of their claims. This
doctrine is the underlying princi-

VOL. 401, APRIL 8, 2003

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Ong Yong vs. Tiu

ple in the procedure for the distribution of capital assets, embodied in the Corporation Code, which
allows the distribution of corporate capital only in three instances: (1) amendment of the Articles of
Incorporation to reduce the authorized capital stock, (2) purchase of redeemable shares by the
corporation, regardless of the existence of unrestricted retained earnings, and (3) dissolution and
eventual liquidation of the corporation. Furthermore, the doctrine is articulated in Section 41 on the
power of a corporation to acquire its own shares and in Section 122 on the prohibition against the
distribution of corporate assets and property unless the stringent requirements therefor are complied
with.

Same; Same; Same; The distribution of corporate assets and property cannot be made to depend on
the whims and caprices of the stockholders, officers and directors of the corporation, or by the court.—
The distribution of corporate assets and property cannot be made to depend on the whims and caprices
of the stockholders, officers or directors of the corporation, or even, for that matter, on the earnest
desire of the court a quo “to prevent further squabbles and future litigations” unless the indispensable
conditions and procedures for the protection of corporate creditors are followed. Otherwise, the
“corporate peace” laudably hoped for by the court will remain nothing but a dream because this time, it
will be the creditors’ turn to engage in “squabbles and litigations” should the court order an unlawful
distribution in blatant disregard of the Trust Fund Doctrine.

Same; Same; “Business Judgment Rule”; Definition.—Truth to tell, a judicial order to decrease capital
stock without the assent of FLADC’s directors and stockholders is a violation of the “business judgment
rule” which states that: xxx xxx xxx (C)ontracts intra vires entered into by the board of directors are
binding upon the corporation and courts will not interfere unless such contracts are so unconscionable
and oppressive as to amount to wanton destruction to the rights of the minority, as when plaintiffs aver
that the defendants (members of the board), have concluded a transaction among themselves as will
result in serious injury to the plaintiffs stockholders.
Same; Same; Same; Rationale; The social contract in the corporate family to decide the course of the
corporate business has been vested in the board and not with courts.—Courts and other tribunals are
wont to override the business judgment of the board mainly because, courts are not in the business of
business, and the laissez faire rule or the free enterprise system prevailing in our social and economic
set-up dictates that it is better for the State and its organs to leave business to the businessmen;
especially so, when courts are ill-equipped to make business decisions. More importantly, the social
contract in the corporate family to decide the course of the corporate business has been vested in the
board and not with courts.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ong Yong vs. Tiu

MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION of the decision of the Supreme Court and MOTION for issuance of
Writ of Execution in the Supreme Court.

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

Feria, Feria, Lugtu, La’O, Noche and Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioners.
 Tan, Acut & Lopez for respondents.

Gonzales, Batiller, Bilog & Associates for Willie Ong.

Aquilino L. Pimentel III for Landlink, etc.

Arturo Santos for Masagana.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

Before us are the (1) motion for reconsideration, dated March 15, 2002, of petitioner movants Ong
Yong, Juanita Tan Ong, Wilson Ong, Anna Ong, William Ong, Willie Ong and Julia Ong Alonzo (the Ongs);
(2) motion for partial reconsideration, dated March 15, 2002, of petitioner movant Willie Ong seeking a
reversal of this Court’s Decision,1Ong Yong, et al. vs. Tiu, et al., G.R. No. 144476; Tiu, et al. vs. Ong Yong,
et al., G.R. No. 144629. dated February 1, 2002, in G.R. Nos. 144476 and 144629 affirming with
modification the decision2Rollo of G.R. No. 144476, pp. 111-135. of the Court of Appeals, dated October
5, 1999, which in turn upheld, likewise with modification, the decision of the SEC en banc, dated
September 11, 1998; and (3) motion for issuance of writ of execution of petitioners David S. Tiu, Cely Y.
Tiu, Moly Yu Gow, Belen See Yu, D. Terence Y. Tiu, John Yu and Lourdes C. Tiu (the Tius) of our February
1, 2002 Decision.

A brief recapitulation of the facts shows that:

In 1994, the construction of the Masagana Citimall in Pasay City was threatened with stoppage and
incompletion when its owner, the First Landlink Asia Development Corporation (FLADC), which was
owned by the Tius, encountered dire financial difficulties. It was heavily indebted to the Philippine
National
_______________

1 Ong Yong, et al. vs. Tiu, et al., G.R. No. 144476; Tiu, et al. vs. Ong Yong, et al., G.R. No. 144629.

2 Rollo of G.R. No. 144476, pp. 111-135.

VOL. 401, APRIL 8, 2003

Ong Yong vs. Tiu

Bank (PNB) for P190 million. To stave off foreclosure of the mortgage on the two lots where the mall
was being built, the Tius invited Ong Yong, Juanita Tan Ong, Wilson T. Ong, Anna L. Ong, William T. Ong
and Julia Ong Alonzo (the Ongs), to invest in FLADC. Under the Pre-Subscription Agreement they entered
into, the Ongs and the Tius agreed to maintain equal shareholdings in FLADC: the Ongs were to
subscribe to 1,000,000 shares at a par value of P100.00 each while the Tius were to subscribe to an
additional 549,800 shares at P100.00 each in addition to their already existing subscription of 450,200
shares. Furthermore, they agreed that the Tius were entitled to nominate the Vice-President and the
Treasurer plus five directors while the Ongs were entitled to nominate the President, the Secretary and
six directors (including the chairman) to the board of directors of FLADC. Moreover, the Ongs were given
the right to manage and operate the mall.

Accordingly, the Ongs paid P100 million in cash for their subscription to 1,000,000 shares of stock while
the Tius committed to contribute to FLADC a four-storey building and two parcels of land respectively
valued at P20 million (for 200,000 shares), P30 million (for 300,000 shares) and P49.8 million (for 49,800
shares) to cover their additional 549,800 stock subscription therein. The Ongs paid in another P70
million3The testimony of Wilson Ong, never refuted by the Tius, was that the parties’ original agreement
was to increase FLADC’s authorized capital stock from P50 million to P340 million (which explains the
Ongs’ 50% share of P170 million). Later... to FLADC and P20 million to the Tius over and above their
P100 million investment, the total sum of which (P190 million) was used to settle the P190 million
mortgage indebtedness of FLADC to PNB.

The business harmony between the Ongs and the Tius in FLADC, however, was shortlived because the
Tius, on February 23, 1996, rescinded the Pre-Subscription Agreement. The Tius accused the Ongs of (1)
refusing to credit to them the FLADC shares covering their real property contributions; (2) preventing
David S. Tiu and Cely Y. Tiu from assuming the positions of and

_______________

3 The testimony of Wilson Ong, never refuted by the Tius, was that the parties’ original agreement was
to increase FLADC’s authorized capital stock from P50 million to P340 million (which explains the Ongs’
50% share of P170 million). Later on, the parties decided to downgrade the proposed new authorized
capital stock to only P200 million but the Ongs decided to leave the overpayment of P70 million in
FLADC to help pay off the loan to PNB. (TSN at the SEC, January 29, 1997 cited in CA Rollo, pp. 429-452;
TSN at the SEC, February 6, 1997 cited in CA Rollo, pp. 485-489).

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ong Yong vs. Tiu

performing their duties as Vice-President and Treasurer, respectively, and (3) refusing to give them the
office spaces agreed upon.

According to the Tius, the agreement was for David S. Tiu and Cely S. Tiu to assume the positions and
perform the duties of Vice-President and Treasurer, respectively, but the Ongs prevented them from
doing so. Furthermore, the Ongs refused to provide them the space for their executive offices as Vice-
President and Treasurer. Finally, and most serious of all, the Ongs refused to give them the shares
corresponding to their property contributions of a four-story building, a 1,902.30 square-meter lot and a
151 square-meter lot. Hence, they felt they were justified in setting aside their Pre-Subscription
Agreement with the Ongs who allegedly refused to comply with their undertakings.

In their defense, the Ongs said that David S. Tiu and Cely Y. Tiu had in fact assumed the positions of Vice-
President and Treasurer of FLADC but that it was they who refused to comply with the corporate duties
assigned to them. It was the contention of the Ongs that they wanted the Tius to sign the checks of the
corporation and undertake their management duties but that the Tius shied away from helping them
manage the corporation. On the issue of office space, the Ongs pointed out that the Tius did in fact
already have existing executive offices in the mall since they owned it 100% before the Ongs came in.
What the Tius really wanted were new offices which were anyway subsequently provided to them. On
the most important issue of their alleged failure to credit the Tius with the FLADC shares commensurate
to the Tius’ property contributions, the Ongs asserted that, although the Tius executed a deed of
assignment for the 1,902.30 square-meter lot in favor of FLADC, they (the Tius) refused to pay P 570,690
for capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax. Without the payment thereof, the SEC would not
approve the valuation of the Tius’ property contribution (as opposed to cash contribution). This, in turn,
would make it impossible to secure a new Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) over the property in FLADC’s
name. In any event, it was easy for the Tius to simply pay the said transfer taxes and, after the new TCT
was issued in FLADC’s name, they could then be given the corresponding shares of stocks. On the 151
square-meter property, the Tius never executed a deed of assignment in favor of FLADC. The Tius
initially claimed that they could not as yet surrender the TCT because it was “still being reconsti-

VOL. 401, APRIL 8, 2003

Ong Yong vs. Tiu

tuted” by the Lichaucos from whom the Tius bought it. The Ongs later on discovered that FLADC had in
reality owned the property all along, even before their Pre-Subscription Agreement was executed in
1994. This meant that the 151 square-meter property was at that time already the corporate property of
FLADC for which the Tius were not entitled to the issuance of new shares of stock.

The controversy finally came to a head when this case was commenced4Docketed as SEC Case No. 02-
96-5269. by the Tius on February 27, 1996 at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), seeking
confirmation of their rescission of the Pre-Subscription Agreement. After hearing, the SEC, through then
Hearing Officer Rolando G. Andaya, Jr., issued a decision on May 19, 1997 confirming the rescission
sought by the Tius, as follows:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered confirming the rescission of the Pre-Subscription
Agreement, and consequently ordering:

(a) The cancellation of the 1,000,000 shares subscription of the individual defendants in FLADC;

(b) FLADC to pay the amount of P170,000,000.00 to the individual defendants representing the return of
their contribution for 1,000,000 shares of FLADC;

(c) The plaintiffs to submit with (sic) the Securities and Exchange Commission amended articles of
incorporation of FLADC to conform with this decision;

(d) The defendants to surrender to the plaintiffs TCT Nos. 132493, 132494, 134066 (formerly 15587),
135325 and 134204 and any other title or deed in the name of FLADC, failing in which said titles are
declared void;

(e) The Register of Deeds to issue new certificates of titles in favor of the plaintiffs and to cancel the
annotation of the Pre-Subscription Agreement dated 15 August 1994 on TCT No. 134066 (formerly
15587);

(f) The individual defendants, individually and collectively, their agents and representatives, to desist
from exercising or performing any and all acts pertaining to stockholder, director or officer of FLADC or
in any manner intervene in the management and affairs of FLADC;

(g) The individual defendants, jointly and severally, to return to FLADC interest payment in the amount
of P8,866,669.00

_______________

4 Docketed as SEC Case No. 02-96-5269.

8
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ong Yong vs. Tiu

and all interest payments as well as any payments on principal received from the P70,000,000.00
inexistent loan, plus the legal rate of interest thereon from the date of their receipt of such payment
until fully paid;

(h) The plaintiff David Tiu to pay individual defendants the sum of P20,000,000.00 representing his loan
from said defendants plus legal interest from the date of receipt of such amount.

SO ORDERED.”5Rollo of G.R. No. 144476, pp. 114-116.

On motion of both parties, the above decision was partially reconsidered but only insofar as the Ongs’
P70 million was declared not as a premium on capital stock but an advance (loan) by the Ongs to FLADC
and that the imposition of interest on it was correct.6Ibid., pp. 116-117.

Both parties appealed7Docketed as SEC Cases Nos. 598 and 601. to the SEC en banc which rendered a
decision on September 11, 1998, affirming the May 19, 1997 decision of the Hearing Officer. The SEC en
banc confirmed the rescission of the Pre-Subscription Agreement but reverted to classifying the P70
million paid by the Ongs as premium on capital and not as a loan or advance to FLADC, hence, not
entitled to earn interest.8Rollo of G.R. No. 144476, pp. 117-118.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a decision on October 5, 1999, thus:
“WHEREFORE, the Order dated September 11, 1998 issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission
En Banc in SEC AC CASE NOS. 598 and 601 confirming the rescission of the Pre-Subscription Agreement
dated August 15, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. The Ong and Tiu Groups are ordered to liquidate First Landlink Asia Development Corporation in
accordance with the following cash and property contributions of the parties therein.

(a) Ong Group—P100,000,000.00 cash contribution for one (1) million shares in First Landlink Asia
Development Corporation at a par value of P100.00 per share;

(b) Tiu Group:

_______________

5 Rollo of G.R. No. 144476, pp. 114-116.

6 Ibid., pp. 116-117.

7 Docketed as SEC Cases Nos. 598 and 601.

8 Rollo of G.R. No. 144476, pp. 117-118.

VOL. 401, APRIL 8, 2003

9

Ong Yong vs. Tiu

1) P45,020,000.00 original cash contribution for 450,200 shares in First Landlink Asia Development
Corporation at a par value of P100.00 per share;

2) A four-storey building described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15587 in the name of Intraland
Resources and Development Corporation valued at P20,000,000.00 for 200,000 shares in First Landlink
Asia Development Corporation at a par value of P100.00 per share;

3) A 1,902.30 square-meter parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15587 in the name
of Masagana Telamart, Inc. valued at P30,000,000.00 for 300,000 shares in First Landlink Asia
Development Corporation at a par value of P100.00 per share.

2) Whatever remains of the assets of the First Landlink Asia Development Corporation and the
management thereof is (sic) hereby ordered transferred to the Tiu Group.

3) First Landlink Asia Development Corporation is hereby ordered to pay the amount of P70,000,000.00
that was advanced to it by the Ong Group upon the finality of this decision. Should the former incur in
delay in the payment thereof, it shall pay the legal interest thereon pursuant to Article 2209 of the New
Civil Code.

4) The Tius are hereby ordered to pay the amount of P20,000,000.00 loaned them by the Ongs upon the
finality of this decision. Should the former incur in delay in the payment thereof, it shall pay the legal
interest thereon pursuant to Article 2209 of the New Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.”9Ibid., pp. 133-135.

An interesting sidelight of the CA decision was its description of the rescission made by the Tius as the
“height of ingratitude” and as “pulling a fast one” on the Ongs. The CA moreover found the Tius guilty of
withholding FLADC funds from the Ongs and diverting corporate income to their own MATTERCO
account.10CA Decision dated October 5, 1999, p. 18; CA Records, p. 1045; Penned by Associate Justice
Ramon A. Barcelona and concurred in by Associate Justices Mariano M. Umali and Edgardo P. Cruz. Then
Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria dissented while also then... These were findings later on
affirmed in our own February 1, 2002

_______________

9 Ibid., pp. 133-135.

10 CA Decision dated October 5, 1999, p. 18; CA Records, p. 1045; Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A.
Barcelona and concurred in by Associate Justices Mariano M. Umali and Edgardo P. Cruz. Then Associate
Justice Demetrio G. Demetria dissented while also then Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales
concurred and dissented.

10

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ong Yong vs. Tiu

Decision which is the subject of the instant motion for reconsideration.11Supreme Court Decision dated
February 1, 2002, pp. 34-35; Rollo, pp. 299-300.

But there was also a strange aspect of the CA decision. The CA concluded that both the Ongs and the
Tius were in pari delicto (which would not have legally entitled them to rescission) but, “for practical
considerations,” that is, their inability to work together, it was best to separate the two groups by
rescinding the Pre-Subscription Agreement, returning the original investment of the Ongs and awarding
practically everything else to the Tius.

Their motions for reconsideration having been denied, both parties filed separate petitions for review
before this Court.

In their petition docketed as G.R. No. 144476, Ong et al. vs. Tiu et al., the Ongs argued that the Tius may
not properly avail of rescission under Article 1191 of the Civil Code considering that the Pre-Subscription
Agreement did not provide for reciprocity of obligations; that the rights over the subject matter of the
rescission (capital assets and properties) had been acquired by a third party (FLADC); that they did not
commit a substantial and fundamental breach of their agreement since they did not prevent the Tius
from assuming the positions of Vice-President and Treasurer of FLADC, and that the failure to credit the
300,000 shares corresponding to the 1,902.30 square-meter property covered by TCT No. 134066
(formerly 15587) was due to the refusal of the Tius to pay the required transfer taxes to secure the
approval of the SEC for the property contribution and, thereafter, the issuance of title in FLADC’s name.
They also argued that the liquidation of FLADC may not legally be ordered by the appellate court even
for so called “practical considerations” or even to prevent “further squabbles and numerous litigations,”
since the same are not valid grounds under the Corporation Code. Moreover, the Ongs bewailed the
failure of the CA to grant interest on their P70 million and P20 million advances to FLADC and David S.
Tiu, respectively, and to award costs and damages.

In their petition docketed as G.R. No. 144629, Tiu et al. vs. Ong et al, the Tius, on the other hand,
contended that the rescission should have been limited to the restitution of the parties’ respective
investments and not the liquidation of FLADC based on the

_______________
11 Supreme Court Decision dated February 1, 2002, pp. 34-35; Rollo, pp. 299-300.

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Ong Yong vs. Tiu

erroneous perception by the court that: the Masagana Citimall was threatened with incompletion since
FLADC was in financial distress; that the Tius invited the Ongs to invest in FLADC to settle its P190 million
loan from PNB; that they violated the Pre-Subscription Agreement when it was the Lichaucos and not
the Tius who executed the deed of assignment over the 151 square-meter property commensurate to
49,800 shares in FLADC thereby failing to pay the price for the said shares; that they did not turn over to
the Ongs the entire amount of FLADC funds; that they were diverting rentals from lease contracts due to
FLADC to their own MATTERCO account; that the P70 million paid by the Ongs was an advance and not a
premium on capital; and that, by rescinding the Pre-Subscription Agreement, they wanted to wrestle
away the management of the mall and prevent the Ongs from enjoying the profits of their P190 million
investment in FLADC.

On February 1, 2002, this Court promulgated its Decision (the subject of the instant motions), affirming
the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals but with the following modifications:

1. the P20 million loan extended by the Ongs to the Tius shall earn interest at twelve percent (12%) per
annum to be computed from the time of judicial demand which is from April 23, 1996;
2. the P70 million advanced by the Ongs to the FLADC shall earn interest at ten percent (10%) per
annum to be computed from the date of the FLADC Board Resolution which is June 19,1996; and

3. the Tius shall be credited with 49,800 shares in FLADC for their property contribution, specifically, the
151 sq. m. parcel of land.

This Court affirmed the fact that both the Ongs and the Tius violated their respective obligations under
the Pre-Subscription Agreement. The Ongs prevented the Tius from assuming the positions of Vice-
President and Treasurer of the corporation. On the other hand, the Decision established that the Tius
failed to turn over FLADC funds to the Ongs and that the Tius diverted rentals due to FLADC to their
MATTERCO account. Consequently, it held that rescission was not possible since both parties were in
pari delicto. However, this Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the remedy of specific
performance, as espoused by the Ongs, was not practical and sound either and would only lead to
further “squabbles and numerous litigations” between the parties.

12

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ong Yong vs. Tiu

On March 15, 2002, the Tius filed before this Court a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution on the
grounds that: (a) the SEC order had become executory as early as September 11, 1998 pursuant to
Sections 1 and 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court; (b) any further delay would be injurious to the rights of
the Tius since the case had been pending for more than six years; and (c) the SEC no longer had quasi-
judicial jurisdiction under RA 8799 (Securities Regulation Code). The Ongs filed their opposition,
contending that the Decision dated February 1, 2002 was not yet final and executory; that no good
reason existed to issue a warrant of execution; and that, pursuant to Section 5.2 of RA 8799, the SEC
retained jurisdiction over pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes already submitted for final
resolution upon the effectivity of the said law.

Aside from their opposition to the Tius’ Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, the Ongs filed their
own “Motion for Reconsideration; Alternatively, Motion for Modification (of the February 1, 2002
Decision)” on March 15, 2002, raising two main points: (a) that specific performance and not rescission
was the proper remedy under the premises; and (b) that, assuming rescission to be proper, the subject
decision of this Court should be modified to entitle movants to their proportionate share in the mall.

On their first point (specific performance and not rescission was the proper remedy), movants Ong
argue that their alleged breach of the Pre-Subscription Agreement was, at most, casual which did not
justify the rescission of the contract. They stress that providing appropriate offices for David S. Tiu and
Cely Y. Tiu as Vice-President and Treasurer, respectively, had no bearing on their obligations under the
Pre-Subscription Agreement since the said obligation (to provide executive offices) pertained to FLADC
itself. Such obligation arose from the relations between the said officers and the corporation and not
any of the individual parties such as the Ongs. Likewise, the alleged failure of the Ongs to credit shares
of stock in favor of the Tius for their property contributions also pertained to the corporation and not to
the Ongs. Just the same, it could not be done in view of the Tius’ refusal to pay the necessary transfer
taxes which in turn resulted in the inability to secure SEC approval for the property contributions and
the issuance of a new TCT in the name of FLADC.

13

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Ong Yong vs. Tiu

Besides, according to the Ongs, the principal objective of both parties in entering into the Pre-
Subscription Agreement in 1994 was to raise the P190 million desperately needed for the payment of
FLADC’s loan to PNB. Hence, in this light, the alleged failure to provide office space for the two
corporate officers was no more than an inconsequential infringement. For rescission to be justified, the
law requires that the breach of contract should be so “substantial or fundamental” as to defeat the
primary objective of the parties in making the agreement. At any rate, the Ongs claim that it was the
Tius who were guilty of fundamental violations in failing to remit funds due to FLADC and diverting the
same to their MATTERCO account.

The Ongs also allege that, in view of the findings of the Court that both parties were guilty of violating
the Pre-Subscription Agreement, neither of them could resort to rescission under the principle of pari
delicto. In addition, since the cash and other contributions now sought to be returned already belong to
FLADC, an innocent third party, said remedy may no longer be availed of under the law.

On their second point (assuming rescission to be proper, the Ongs should be given their proportionate
share of the mall), movants Ong vehemently take exception to the second item in the dispositive portion
of the questioned Decision insofar as it decreed that whatever remains of the assets of FLADC and the
management thereof (after liquidation) shall be transferred to the Tius. They point out that the mall
itself, which would have been foreclosed by PNB if not for their timely investment of PI90 million in 1994
and which is now worth about P1 billion mainly because of their efforts, should be included in any
partition and distribution. They (the Ongs) should not merely be given interest on their capital
investments. The said portion of our Decision, according to them, amounted to the unjust enrichment of
the Tius and ran contrary to our own pronouncement that the act of the Tius in unilaterally rescinding
the agreement was “the height of ingratitude” and an attempt “to pull a fast one” as it would prevent
the Ongs from enjoying the fruits of their P190 million investment in FLADC. It also contravenes this
Court’s assurance in the questioned Decision that the Ongs and Tius “will have a bountiful return of their
respective investments derived from the profits of the corporation.”

14
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Willie Ong filed a separate “Motion for Partial Reconsideration” dated March 8, 2002, pointing out that
there was no violation of the Pre-Subscription Agreement on the part of the Ongs; that, after more than
seven years since the mall began its operations, rescission had become not only impractical but would
also adversely affect the rights of innocent parties; and that it would be highly inequitable and unfair to
simply return the P100 million investment of the Ongs and give the remaining assets now amounting to
about P1 billion to the Tius.

The Tius, in their opposition to the Ongs’ motion for reconsideration, counter that the arguments
therein are a mere re-hash of the contentions in the Ongs’ petition for review and previous motion for
reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Tius compare the arguments in said pleadings to
prove that the Ongs do not raise new issues, and, based on well-settled jurisprudence,12Estrada vs. Sto.
Domingo, 28 SCRA 890 [1969]; Cruz vs. Tuazon & Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 543 [1977]); Llanter vs. Court of
Appeals, 105 SCRA 609 [1981]; Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Building Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305
[1978]. the Ongs’ present motion is therefore pro-forma and did not prevent the Decision of this Court
from attaining finality.

On January 29, 2003, the Special Second Division of this Court held oral arguments on the respective
positions of the parties. On February 27, 2003, Dr. Willie Ong and the rest of the movants Ong filed their
respective memoranda. On February 28, 2003, the Tius submitted their memorandum.
We grant the Ongs’ motions for reconsideration.

This is not the first time that this Court has reversed itself on a motion for reconsideration. In Philippine
Consumers Foundation, Inc. vs. National Telecommunications Commission,13131 SCRA 200 [1984]. this
Court, through then Chief Justice Felix V. Makasiar, said that its members may and do change their
minds, after a re-study of the facts and the law, illuminated by a mutual exchange of views.14Id., at p.
221. After a thorough re-examination of the case, we find that our Decision of February 1, 2002
overlooked certain aspects which, if not corrected, will cause extreme and irreparable damage and
prejudice to the Ongs, FLADC and its creditors.

_______________

12 Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo, 28 SCRA 890 [1969]; Cruz vs. Tuazon & Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 543 [1977]);
Llanter vs. Court of Appeals, 105 SCRA 609 [1981]; Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Building Co.,
Inc., 86 SCRA 305 [1978].

13 131 SCRA 200 [1984].

14 Id., at p. 221.

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Ong Yong vs. Tiu

The procedural rule on pro-forma motions pointed out by the Tius should not be blindly applied to
meritorious motions for reconsideration. As long as the same adequately raises a valid ground15See
Section 1, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. (i.e., the decision or final order is contrary to
law), this Court has to evaluate the merits of the arguments to prevent an unjust decision from attaining
finality. In Security Bank and Trust Company vs. Cuenca,16G.R. No. 138544, October 3, 2000, 341 SCRA
781 citing Guerra Enterprises vs. CFI, 32 SCRA 314 [1970]. we ruled that a motion for reconsideration is
not pro-forma for the reason alone that it reiterates the arguments earlier passed upon and rejected by
the appellate court. We explained there that a movant may raise the same arguments, if only to
convince this Court that its ruling was erroneous. Moreover, the rule (that a motion is pro-forma if it
only repeats the arguments in the previous pleadings) will not apply if said arguments were not squarely
passed upon and answered in the decision sought to be reconsidered. In the case at bar, no ruling was
made on some of the petitioner Ongs’ arguments. For instance, no clear ruling was made on why an
order distributing corporate assets and property to the stockholders would not violate the statutory
preconditions for corporate dissolution or decrease of authorized capital stock. Thus, it would serve the
ends of justice to entertain the subject motion for reconsideration since some important issues therein,
although mere repetitions, were not considered or clearly resolved by this Court.

Going now to the merits, we resolve whether the Tius could legally rescind the Pre-Subscription
Agreement. We rule that they could not.

FLADC was originally incorporated with an authorized capital stock of 500,000 shares with the Tius
owning 450,200 shares representing the paid-up capital. When the Tius invited the Ongs to invest in
FLADC as stockholders, an increase of the authorized capital stock became necessary to give each group
equal (50-50) shareholdings as agreed upon in the Pre-Subscription Agreement. The authorized capital
stock was thus increased from 500,000 shares to 2,000,000 shares with a par value of P100 each, with
the Ongs subscribing to 1,000,000 shares and the Tius to 549,800 more shares in addition to their
450,200 shares to complete 1,000,000
_______________

15 See Section 1, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

16 G.R. No. 138544, October 3, 2000, 341 SCRA 781 citing Guerra Enterprises vs. CFI, 32 SCRA 314
[1970].

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Ong Yong vs. Tiu

shares. Thus, the subject matter of the contract was the 1,000,000 unissued shares of FLADC stock
allocated to the Ongs. Since these were unissued shares, the parties’ Pre-Subscription Agreement was in
fact a subscription contract as defined under Section 60, Title VII of the Corporation Code:
Any contract for the acquisition of unissued stock in an existing corporation or a corporation still to be
formed shall be deemed a subscription within the meaning of this Title, notwithstanding the fact that
the parties refer to it as a purchase or some other contract (Italics supplied).

A subscription contract necessarily involves the corporation as one of the contracting parties since the
subject matter of the transaction is property owned by the corporation—its shares of stock. Thus, the
subscription contract (denominated by the parties as a Pre-Subscription Agreement) whereby the Ongs
invested P100 million for 1,000,000 shares of stock was, from the viewpoint of the law, one between the
Ongs and FLADC, not between the Ongs and the Tius. Otherwise stated, the Tius did not contract in their
personal capacities with the Ongs since they were not selling any of their own shares to them. It was
FLADC that did.

Considering therefore that the real contracting parties to the subscription agreement were FLADC and
the Ongs alone, a civil case for rescission on the ground of breach of contract filed by the Tius in their
personal capacities will not prosper. Assuming it had valid reasons to do so, only FLADC (and certainly
not the Tius) had the legal personality to file suit rescinding the subscription agreement with the Ongs
inasmuch as it was the real party in interest therein. Article 1311 of the Civil Code provides that
“contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs . . . .” Therefore, a party who has
not taken part in the transaction cannot sue or be sued for performance or for cancellation thereof,
unless he shows that he has a real interest affected thereby.17Sustiguer vs. Tamayo, 176 SCRA 579
[1989] citing Marimperio Compania Naviera vs. Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA 368 [1987].

In their February 28, 2003 Memorandum, the Tius claim that there are two contracts embodied in the
Pre-Subscription Agreement: a shareholder’s agreement between the Tius and the Ongs defining and
governing their relationship and a subscription con-

_______________

17 Sustiguer vs. Tamayo, 176 SCRA 579 [1989] citing Marimperio Compania Naviera vs. Court of Appeals,
156 SCRA 368 [1987].

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tract between the Tius, the Ongs and FLADC regarding the subscription of the parties to the
corporation. They point out that these two component parts form one whole agreement and that their
terms and conditions are intrinsically related and dependent on each other. Thus, the breach of the
shareholders’ agreement, which was allegedly the consideration for the subscription contract, was also
a breach of the latter.

Aside from the fact that this is an entirely new angle never raised in any of their previous pleadings until
after the oral arguments on January 29, 2003, we find this argument too strained for comfort. It is
obviously intended to remedy and cover up the Tius’ lack of legal personality to rescind an agreement in
which they were personally not parties-in-interest. Assuming arguendo that there were two “sub-
agreements” embodied in the Pre-Subscription Agreement, this Court fails to see how the shareholders
agreement between the Ongs and Tius can, within the bounds of reason, be interpreted as the
consideration of the subscription contract between FLADC and the Ongs. There was nothing in the Pre-
Subscription Agreement even remotely suggesting such alleged interdependence. Be that as it may,
however, the Tius are nevertheless not the proper parties to raise this point because they were not
parties to the subscription contract between FLADC and the Ongs. Thus, they are not in a position to
claim that the shareholders agreement between them and the Ongs was what induced FLADC and the
Ongs to enter into the subscription contract. It is the Ongs alone who can say that. Though FLADC was
represented by the Tius in the subscription contract, FLADC had a separate juridical personality from the
Tius. The case before us does not warrant piercing the veil of corporate fiction since there is no proof
that the corporation is being used “as a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality, or to work
injustice.”18Boyer-Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 470 [1992].

The Tius also argue that, since the Ongs represent FLADC as its management, breach by the Ongs is
breach by FLADC. This must also fail because such an argument disregards the separate juridical
personality of FLADC.

The Tius allege that they were prevented from participating in the management of the corporation.
There is evidence that the Ongs did prevent the rightfully elected Treasurer, Cely Tiu, from

_______________

18 Boyer-Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 470 [1992].

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Ong Yong vs. Tiu

 exercising her function as such. The records show that the President, Wilson Ong, supervised the
collection and receipt of rentals in the Masagana Citimall;19TSN, December 11, 1996, pp. 699-702, Rollo,
pp. 705-706. that he ordered the same to be deposited in the bank;20TSN, December 17,1996, pp. 28-
34; Rollo, pp. 699-702. and that he held on to the cash and properties of the corporation.21TSN, January
17, 1997, pp. 92-93; Rollo, pp. 705-706. Section 25 of the Corporation Code prohibits the President from
acting concurrently as Treasurer of the corporation. The rationale behind the provision is to ensure the
effective monitoring of each officer’s separate functions.

However, although the Tius were adversely affected by the Ongs’ unwillingness to let them assume their
positions, rescission due to breach of contract is definitely the wrong remedy for their personal
grievances. The Corporation Code, SEC rules and even the Rules of Court provide for appropriate and
adequate intra-corporate remedies, other than rescission, in situations like this. Rescission is certainly
not one of them, specially if the party asking for it has no legal personality to do so and the
requirements of the law therefor have not been met. A contrary doctrine will tread on extremely
dangerous ground because it will allow just any stockholder, for just about any real or imagined offense,
to demand rescission of his subscription and call for the distribution of some part of the corporate assets
to him without complying with the requirements of the Corporation Code.

Hence, the Tius, in their personal capacities, cannot seek the ultimate and extraordinary remedy of
rescission of the subject agreement based on a less than substantial breach of subscription contract. Not
only are they not parties to the subscription contract between the Ongs and FLADC; they also have other
available and effective remedies under the law.

All this notwithstanding, granting but not conceding that the Tius possess the legal standing to sue for
rescission based on breach of contract, said action will nevertheless still not prosper since rescission will
violate the Trust Fund Doctrine and the procedures for the valid distribution of assets and property
under the Corporation Code.

_______________

19 TSN, December 11, 1996, pp. 699-702, Rollo, pp. 705-706.

20 TSN, December 17,1996, pp. 28-34; Rollo, pp. 699-702.

21 TSN, January 17, 1997, pp. 92-93; Rollo, pp. 705-706.

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The Trust Fund Doctrine, first enunciated by this Court in the 1923 case of Philippine Trust Co. vs.
Rivera2244 Phil. 469 [1923]. provides that subscriptions to the capital stock of a corporation constitute a
fund to which the creditors have a right to look for the satisfaction of their claims.23Id; Garcia vs. Lim
Chu Sing, 59 Phil. 562 [1934]; Boman Environmental Dev’t. Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 540
[1988]. This doctrine is the underlying principle in the procedure for the distribution of capital assets,
embodied in the Corporation Code, which allows the distribution of corporate capital only in three
instances: (1) amendment of the Articles of Incorporation to reduce the authorized capital
stock,24Section 38 of the Corporation Code provides for the process to be followed for reduction of the
authorized capital stock. First, a proposal to decrease capital stock must be approved by a majority vote
of the board of directors and affirmed by stockholders... (2) purchase of redeemable shares by the
corporation, regardless of the existence of unrestricted retained earnings,25Section 8 of the Corporation
Code provides that:SEC. 8. Redeemable shares.—Redeemable shares may be issued by the corporation
when expressly so provided in the articles of incorporation. They may be purchased or taken up by the
corporation upon the... and (3) dissolution and eventual liqui-

_______________

22 44 Phil. 469 [1923].

23 Id; Garcia vs. Lim Chu Sing, 59 Phil. 562 [1934]; Boman Environmental Dev’t. Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals, 167 SCRA 540 [1988].

24 Section 38 of the Corporation Code provides for the process to be followed for reduction of the
authorized capital stock. First, a proposal to decrease capital stock must be approved by a majority vote
of the board of directors and affirmed by stockholders who own 2/3 of the outstanding capital stock in a
meeting duly called for that purpose. Written notice of the time and place of the meeting on the
proposed decrease in the capital stock must be served to each of the stockholders at his place of
residence as shown in the corporate books. Thereafter, the SEC shall approve the certificate of decrease
of capital stock only if the same is accompanied by a new treasurer’s affidavit stating that 25% of the
authorized capital stock has been subscribed while 25% of the subscribed capital stock has been paid-
up, and also if said decrease will not prejudice the rights of corporate creditors.

25 Section 8 of the Corporation Code provides that:

SEC. 8. Redeemable shares.—Redeemable shares may be issued by the corporation when expressly so
provided in the articles of incorporation. They may be purchased or taken up by the corporation upon
the expiration of a fixed period, regardless of the existence of unrestricted retained earnings in the
books of the corporation, and upon such other terms and conditions as may be stated in the articles of
incorporation, which terms and conditions must also be stated in the certificate of stock representing
said shares.
Section 5, par. 5, SEC Rules Governing Redeemable and Treasury Shares provides that redeemable
shares may be redeemed regardless of the existence of unrestricted retained earning, provided that the
corporation has, after such redemption, assets in its books to coyer debts and liabilities of capital stock.
Therefore, redemption, according to SEC Opinion, January 23, 1985, may not be made

20

20

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ong Yong vs. Tiu

dation of the corporation. Furthermore, the doctrine is articulated in Section 41 on the power of a
corporation to acquire its own shares26Section 41 of the Corporation Code provides that:SEC. 41.
Power to acquire own shares.—A stock corporation shall have the power to purchase or acquire its own
shares for a legitimate corporate purpose or purposes, including but not limited to the f... and in Section
122 on the prohibition against the distribution of corporate assets and property unless the stringent
requirements therefor are complied with.27xxx xxx xxxExcept by decrease of capital stock and as
otherwise allowed by this Code, no corporation shall distribute any of its assets or property except upon
lawful dissolution and after payment o...

The distribution of corporate assets and property cannot be made to depend on the whims and caprices
of the stockholders, officers or directors of the corporation, or even, for that matter, on the earnest
desire of the court a quo “to prevent further squabbles and future litigations” unless the indispensable
conditions and procedures for the protection of corporate creditors are followed. Otherwise, the
“corporate peace” laudably hoped for by the court will remain nothing but a dream because this time, it
will be the creditors’ turn to engage in “squabbles and litigations” should the court order an unlawful
distribution in blatant disregard of the Trust Fund Doctrine.

_______________

where the corporation is insolvent or if such redemption would cause insolvency or inability of the
corporation to meet its debts as they mature, (cited in Hector De Leon, The Corporation Code of the
Philippines, 1999 Ed., pp. 96-97).

26 Section 41 of the Corporation Code provides that:

SEC. 41. Power to acquire own shares.—A stock corporation shall have the power to purchase or
acquire its own shares for a legitimate corporate purpose or purposes, including but not limited to the
following cases: Provided, That the corporation has unrestricted retained earnings in its books to cover
the shares to be purchased or acquired:

(1) To eliminate fractional shares arising out of stock dividends;

(2) To collect or compromise an indebtedness to the corporation, arising out of unpaid subscription, in a
delinquency sale, and to purchase delinquent shares sold during said sale; and

(3) To pay dissenting or withdrawing stockholders entitled to payment for their shares under the
provisions of this Code. (Italics supplied)

27 xxx xxx xxx

Except by decrease of capital stock and as otherwise allowed by this Code, no corporation shall
distribute any of its assets or property except upon lawful dissolution and after payment of all its debts
and liabilities.

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Ong Yong vs. Tiu

In the instant case, the rescission of the Pre-Subscription Agreement will effectively result in the
unauthorized distribution of the capital assets and property of the corporation, thereby violating the
Trust Fund Doctrine and the Corporation Code, since rescission of a subscription agreement is not one of
the instances when distribution of capital assets and property of the corporation is allowed.

Contrary to the Tius’ allegation, rescission will, in the final analysis, result in the premature liquidation of
the corporation without the benefit of prior dissolution in accordance with Sections 117, 118, 119 and
120 of the Corporation Code.28Sections 117, 118, 119, and 120 of the Corporation Code provide
that:SEC. 117. Methods of dissolution.—A corporation formed or organized under the provisions of this
Code may be dissolved voluntarily or involuntarily. (n)SEC. 118. Voluntary disso... The Tius maintain
_______________

28 Sections 117, 118, 119, and 120 of the Corporation Code provide that:

SEC. 117. Methods of dissolution.—A corporation formed or organized under the provisions of this
Code may be dissolved voluntarily or involuntarily. (n)

SEC. 118. Voluntary dissolution where no creditors are affected.—If dissolution of a corporation does
not prejudice the rights of any creditor having a claim against it, the dissolution may be effected by
majority vote of the board of directors or trustees, and by a resolution duly adopted by the affirmative
vote of the stockholders owning at least two -thirds (2/3) of the outstanding capital or of at least two-
thirds (2/3) of the members at a meeting to be held upon call of the directors or trustees after
publication of the notice of time, place and object of the meeting for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper published in the place where the principal office of said corporation is located; and if no
newspaper is published in such place, then in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, after
sending such notice to each stockholder or member either by registered mail or by personal delivery at
least thirty (30) days prior to said meeting. A copy of the resolution authorizing the dissolution shall be
certified by a majority of the board of directors or trustees and countersigned by the secretary of the
corporation. The Securities and Exchange Commission shall thereupon issue the certificate of
dissolution. (62a)

SEC. 119. Voluntary dissolution where creditors are affected.—Where the dissolution of a corporation
may prejudice the rights of any creditor, the petition for dissolution shall be filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The petition shall be signed by a majority of its board of directors or trustees or
other officers having the management of its affairs, verified by its president or secretary or one of its
directors or trustees, and shall set forth all

22
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ong Yong vs. Tiu

that rescinding the subscription contract is not synonymous to corporate liquidation because all
rescission will entail would be the simple restoration of the status quo ante and a return to the two
groups of their cash and property contributions. We wish it were that simple. Very noticeable is the fact
that the Tius do not explain why rescission in the instant case will not effectively result in liquidation.
The Tius merely refer in cavalier fashion to the end-result of rescission (which incidentally is 100%
favorable to them)

_______________

claims and demands against it, and that its dissolution was resolved upon by the affirmative vote of the
stockholders representing at least two-thirds (2/3) of the outstanding capital stock or by at least two-
thirds (2/3) of the members, at a meeting of its stockholders or members called for that purpose.

If the petition is sufficient in form and substance, the Commission shall, by an order reciting the purpose
of the petition, fix a date on or before which objections thereto may be filed by any person, which date
shall not be less than thirty (30) days nor more than sixty (60) days after the entry of the order. Before
such date, a copy of the order shall be published at least once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in
a newspaper of general circulation published in municipality or city where the principal office of the
corporation is situated, or if there be no such newspaper, then in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines, and a similar copy shall be posted for three (3) consecutive weeks in three (3) public
places in such municipality or city.

Upon five (5) days’ notice, given after the date on which the right to file objections as fixed in the order
has expired, the Commission shall proceed to hear the petition and try any issue made by the objections
filed; and if no such objection is sufficient, and the material allegations of the petition are true, it shall
render judgment dissolving the corporation and directing such disposition of its assets as justice
requires, and may appoint a receiver to collect such assets and pay the debts of the corporation. (Rule
104, RCa)

SEC. 120. Dissolution by shortening corporate term.—A voluntary dissolution may be effected by
amending the articles of incorporation to shorten the corporate term pursuant to the provisions of this
Code. A copy of the amended articles of incorporation shall be submitted to the Securities and Exchange
Commission in accordance with this Code. Upon approval of the amended articles of incorporation or
the expiration of the shortened term, as the case may be, the corporation shall be deemed dissolved
without any further proceedings, subject to the provisions of this Code on liquidation. (n)

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Ong Yong vs. Tiu

 but turn a blind eye to its unfair, inequitable and disastrous effect on the corporation, its creditors and
the Ongs.

In their Memorandum dated February 28, 2003, the Tius claim that rescission of the agreement will not
result in an unauthorized liquidation of the corporation because their case is actually a petition to
decrease capital stock pursuant to Section 38 of the Corporation Code. Section 122 of the law provides
that “(e)xcept by decrease of capital stock . . ., no corporation shall distribute any of its assets or
property except upon lawful dissolution and after payment of all its debts and liabilities.” The Tius claim
that their case for rescission, being a petition to decrease capital stock, does not violate the liquidation
procedures under our laws. All that needs to be done, according to them, is for this Court to order (1)
FLADC to file with the SEC a petition to issue a certificate of decrease of capital stock and (2) the SEC to
approve said decrease. This new argument has no merit.

The Tius’ case for rescission cannot validly be deemed a petition to decrease capital stock because such
action never complied with the formal requirements for decrease of capital stock under Section 33 of
the Corporation Code. No majority vote of the board of directors was ever taken. Neither was there any
stockholders meeting at which the approval of stockholders owning at least two-thirds of the
outstanding capital stock was secured. There was no revised treasurer’s affidavit and no proof that said
decrease will not prejudice the creditors’ rights. On the contrary, all their pleadings contained were
alleged acts of violations by the Ongs to justify an order of rescission.

Furthermore, it is an improper judicial intrusion into the internal affairs of the corporation to compel
FLADC to file at the SEC a petition for the issuance of a certificate of decrease of stock. Decreasing a
corporation’s authorized capital stock is an amendment of the Articles of Incorporation. It is a decision
that only the stockholders and the directors can make, considering that they are the contracting parties
thereto. In this case, the Tius are actually not just asking for a review of the legality and fairness of a
corporate decision. They want this Court to make a corporate decision for FLADC. We decline to
intervene and order corporate structural changes not voluntarily agreed upon by its stockholders and
directors.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ong Yong vs. Tiu

Truth to tell, a judicial order to decrease capital stock without the assent of FLADC’s directors and
stockholders is a violation of the “business judgment rule” which states that:

xxx xxx xxx (C)ontracts intra vires entered into by the board of directors are binding upon the
corporation and courts will not interfere unless such contracts are so unconscionable and oppressive as
to amount to wanton destruction to the rights of the minority, as when plaintiffs aver that the
defendants (members of the board), have concluded a transaction among themselves as will result in
serious injury to the plaintiffs stock-holders.29Gamboa vs. Victoriano, 90 SCRA 40 [1979].

The reason behind the rule is aptly explained by Dean Cesar L. Villanueva, an esteemed author in
corporate law, thus:

Courts and other tribunals are wont to override the business judgment of the board mainly because,
courts are not in the business of business, and the laissez faire rule or the free enterprise system
prevailing in our social and economic set-up dictates that it is better for the State and its organs to leave
business to the businessmen; especially so, when courts are ill-equipped to make business decisions.
More importantly, the social contract in the corporate family to decide the course of the corporate
business has been vested in the board and not with courts.30Cesar L. Villanueva, Philippine Corporate
Law, 1998 Ed., p. 228.
Apparently, the Tius do not realize the illegal consequences of seeking rescission and control of the
corporation to the exclusion of the Ongs. Such an act infringes on the law on reduction of capital stock.
Ordering the return and distribution of the Ongs’ capital contribution without dissolving the corporation
or decreasing its authorized capital stock is not only against the law but is also prejudicial to corporate
creditors who enjoy absolute priority of payment over and above any individual stockholder thereof.

Stripped to its barest essentials, the issue of rescission in this case is not difficult to understand. If
rescission is denied, will injustice be inflicted on any of the parties? The answer is no because the
financial interests of both the Tius and the Ongs will remain intact and safe within FLADC. On the other
hand, if rescission is granted, will any of the parties suffer an injustice? Definitely yes because the Ongs
will find themselves out in the streets with nothing but the money they had in 1994 while the Tius will
not

_______________

29 Gamboa vs. Victoriano, 90 SCRA 40 [1979].

30 Cesar L. Villanueva, Philippine Corporate Law, 1998 Ed., p. 228.

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Ong Yong vs. Tiu

only enjoy a windfall estimated to be anywhere from P450 million to P900 million31Estimates of
FLADC’s current net worth cited during the oral arguments on January 29, 2003 ranged from P450
million to P1 billion. but will also take over an extremely profitable business without much effort at all.

Another very important point follows. The Court of Appeals and, later on, our Decision dated February 1,
2002, stated that both groups were in pari delicto, meaning, that both the Tius and the Ongs committed
breaches of the Pre-Subscription Agreement. This may be true to a certain extent but, judging from the
comparative gravity of the acts separately committed by each group, we find that the Ongs’ acts were
relatively tame vis-à-vis those committed by the Tius in not surrendering FLADC funds to the corporation
and diverting corporate income to their own MATTERCO account. The Ongs were right in not issuing to
the Tius the shares corresponding to the four-story building and the 1,902.30 square-meter lot because
not title for it could be issued in FLADC’s name, owing to the Tius’ refusal to pay the transfer taxes. And
as far as the 151 square-meter lot was concerned, why should FLADC issue additional shares to the Tius
for property already owned by the corporation and which, in the final analysis, was already factored into
the shareholdings of the Tius before the Ongs came in?

We are appalled by the attempt by the Tius, in the words of the Court of Appeals, to “pull a fast one” on
the Ongs because that was where the problem precisely started. It is clear that, when the finances of
FLADC improved considerably after the equity infusion of the Ongs, the Tius started planning to take
over the corporation again and exclude the Ongs from it. It appears that the Tius’ refusal to pay transfer
taxes might not have really been at all unintentional because, by failing to pay that relatively small
amount which they could easily afford, the Tius should have expected that they were not going to be
given the corresponding shares. It was, from every angle, the perfect excuse for blackballing the Ongs. In
other words, the Tius created a problem then used that same problem as their pretext for showing their
partners the door. In the process, they stood to be rewarded with a bonanza of anywhere between P450
million to P900 million in assets (from an investment of only P45 million which was nearly foreclosed by
PNB), to
_______________

31 Estimates of FLADC’s current net worth cited during the oral arguments on January 29, 2003 ranged
from P450 million to P1 billion.

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26

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Ong Yong vs. Tiu

the extreme and irreparable damage of the Ongs, FLADC and its creditors.

After all is said and done, no one can close his eyes to the fact that the Masagana Citimall would not be
what it has become today were it not for the timely infusion of PI90 million by the Ongs in 1994. There
are no ifs or buts about it. Without the Ongs, the Tius would have lost everything they originally invested
in said mall. If only for this and the fact that this Resolution can truly pave the way for both groups to
enjoy the fruits of their investments—assuming good faith and honest intentions—we cannot allow the
rescission of the subject subscription agreement. The Ongs’ shortcomings were far from serious and
certainly less than substantial; they were in fact remediable and correctable under the law. It would be
totally against all rules of justice, fairness and equity to deprive the Ongs of their interests on petty and
tenuous grounds.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration, dated March 15, 2002, of petitioners Ong Yong, Juanita
Tan Ong, Wilson Ong, Anna Ong, William Ong, Willie Ong and Julie Ong Alonzo and the motion for
partial reconsideration, dated March 15, 2002, of petitioner Willie Ong are hereby GRANTED. The
Petition for Confirmation of the Rescission of the Pre-Subscription Agreement docketed as SEC Case No.
02-96-5269 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The unilateral rescission by the Tius of the subject
Pre-Subscription Agreement, dated August 15, 1994, is hereby declared as null and void.

The motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, dated March 15, 2002, of petitioners David S. Tiu,
Cely Y. Tiu, Moly Yu Gow, Belen See Yu, D. Terence Y. Tiu, John Yu and Lourdes C. Tiu is hereby DENIED
for being moot.

Accordingly, the Decision of this Court, dated February 1, 2002, affirming with modification the decision
of the Court of Appeals, dated October 5, 1999, and the SEC en banc, dated September 11, 1998, is
hereby REVERSED.

Costs against the petitioner Tius.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

27
VOL. 401, APRIL 8, 2003

27

Coronel vs. Desierto

Motion for reconsideration dated March 15, 2002 granted, Petition for confirmation of Presubscription
Agreement docketed as SEC Case No. 02-96-5269 dismissed. Motion for issuance of Writ of execution
denied. Decision of February 1, 2002 reversed.

Note.—It is the Board of Directors, not the President, that exercises corporate powers. (Safic Alcan & Cie
vs. Imperial Vegetable Oil Co., Inc., 355 SCRA 559 [2001])

——o0o—— Ong Yong vs. Tiu, 401 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 144476, G.R. No. 144629 April 8, 2003