People v.
MACEREN Case Digest
People v. MACEREN
G.R. No. L-32166 October 18, 1977
FACTS: This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries,
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old
Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission.
Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a
Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative
Order No. 84-1.
The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous
substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy
conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit
electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful.
As legal background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or
poisonous substance" in fishing.
Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing with a
fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand, and by imprisonment for not less than six
months nor more than five years.
It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing."
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban
against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries (63 O.G. 9963).
Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine waters" found in section 2, was changed by the amendatory order
to read as follows: "in fresh water fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation canals
and other bodies of fresh water."
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN ISSUING
ADMINISTARTIVE ORDERS.
HELD: The Court is of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders
are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under
that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to
penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any
legal basis.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily
embodied in the old Fisheries Law.
That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in
deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen
to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations.
Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing electro fishing,
does not contemplate that such an offense fails within the category of "other violations" because, as already shown,
the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous
substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations
fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law.
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an
offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself.
(People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur. 965 on p. 11 32).
However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries Law and that it
cannot be penalized merely by executive revolution because Presidential Decree No. 704, which is a revision and
consolidation of all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which was promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71
O.G. 4269), expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and salt water areas.
n examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and administrative agencies and, in particular, of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of Natural Resources) under the Fisheries Law
sustains the view that he ex his authority in penalizing electro fishing by means of an administrative order.
Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not
impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing
the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that
it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125; Director of Forestry
vs. Muñ;oz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198; Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712).
The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular statute (U.S. vs.
Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 125, citing U.S. vs. Grimaud 220 U.S. 506; Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. vs. Coll. of
Internal Revenue, 98 Phil. 290, 295-6).
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers
and is an exception to the nondeleption of legislative, powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation
calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law"
Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726; People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeñ;a, 68 Phil. 328).
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such
regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency
cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the d of
Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29,
1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law
as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo
Tomas vs. Board of Tax A 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see of Internal Revenue
vs. Villaflor 69 Phil. 319, Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del March vs. Phil. Veterans Administrative, L-27299,
June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).
People v Dacuycuy
Facts:
Private respondents were charged with violation of RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. They also charged
constitutionality of Sec.32 (…be punished by a fine of not less than P100 nor more than P1000, or by imprisonment, in
the discretion of the court.) of said R.A on grounds that it a.) imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, b.) constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power. Judge Dacuycuy ruled that the said section is a matter of statutory construction
and not an undue of delegation of legislative power.
Issue:
W/N Sec. 6 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power and is valid.
Held:
NOT VALID! The duration of penalty for the period of imprisonment was left for the courts to determine as if the judicial
department was a legislative dep’t. The exercise of judicial power not an attempt to use legislative power or to prescribe
and create a law but is an instance of the admin. of justice and the app. of existing laws to the facts of particular cases.
Said section violates the rules on separation of powers and non-delegability of legislative powers
Case No. 11. People v Dacuycuy
People vs Dacuycuy
173 SCRA 90 (1989)
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondent: Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy, Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval, and Cirilio M. Zanoria
Facts:
On April 4, 1975, private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval, and Cirilio M. Zanoria, public school
officials from Leyte were charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte for violating Republic Act No. 4670
(Magna Carta for Public School Teachers). The respondents pleaded not guilty and petitioned for certeriori and
prohibition with preliminary injuction before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VII alleging that:
a. The Municipal Court of Hindang has no jurisdiction over the case due to the correctional nature of the penalty of
imprisonment (as state in Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 4670) prescribed for the offense
b. Section 32 of R.A. No. 4670 is unconstitutional because, (1) the term of imprisonment is unfixed and may run to
reclusion perpetua; and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of
imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative department of the
Government.
On March 30, 1976, the petition was transferred to Branch IV where the respondent Judge, Judge Dacuycuy ruled that
R.A. No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its violation fall outside of the jurisdiction of municipal and city
courts.
Issue:
Whether or not Repbulic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional.
Whether or not the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
Yes, Republic Act No. 4760 is unconstitutional.
Section 32 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power by vesting in the court
the responsibility of imposing a duration on the punishment of imprisonment, as if the courts were the legislative
department of the government.
Yes, the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case.
Republic Act. No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, considers crimes punishable by fine of not more than Php
3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of municipal courts.
Decision:
The decision and resolution of respondent Judge (Judge Dacuycuy) are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case
No. 555 filed against private respondents herein is hereby ordered to be remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of
Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.
Demetrio Demetria vs Manuel Alba
148 SCRA 208 – Political Law – Transfer of Funds – Power of the President to Realign Funds
Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Manuel
Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the
Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the
said PD. This Section provides that:
“The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.”
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations,
however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under the
Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau,
office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau
or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to
whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are
to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer
is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby
amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed,
such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GAA may
be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to
another here.
SUMULONG vs. COMELEC
73 P.R. 288, 1942
Facts: Under the authority of Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657, Comelec adopted a resolution providing for
the appointment of election inspectors to be proposed by the political parties and persons named therein. Petitioner,
Juan Sumulong, President of the political party Pagkakaisa ng Bayan, claims the exclusive right to propose the
appointment of such inspectors. He contends that the resolution of the Comelec, by giving the so-called rebel
candidate or free-zone faction of the Nationalista Party the right to propose one election inspector for each of the
precincts in each of the 53 legislative districts, contravenes Section 5 of the Commonwealth Act No. 657. He argues
that under that section the Nationalista Party has the right to propose one, and only one inspector for each precinct,
and that the resolution has the effect of giving that party two inspectors in each and every precinct within those
legislative districts. Petitioner maintains that the discretion given by Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657 to the
Comelec in the Choice of election inspectors is not absolute, but limited by the provision of the Act that the majority
party shall have the right to propose only one inspector.
Issue: Whether or not the Comelec, in giving the so-called rebel candidates and free-zone factions of the Nationalista
Party the right to propose election inspectors, has acted within the limits of the discretion granted to it by law.
Held: The present case is not an appropriate case for review by the Supreme Court. The Comelec is a constitutional
body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. It should be allowed considerable
latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was
created – free, orderly, and honest elections. The Supreme Court may not agree fully with its choice of means, but
unless these are clearly illegal / constitute grave abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. The Comelec
because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual
experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political
questions. Due regard to the independent character of the Commission, as ordained in the Constitution requires that
the power of the Supreme Court to review the acts of that body should, as a general proposition, be used sparingly,
but firmly in appropriate cases.
Bara Lidasan vs Commission on Elections
21 SCRA 496 – Political Law – Effect if Title Does Not Completely Express the Subject
Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No. 4790, entitled “An Act Creating
the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” was passed. Lidasan however discovered
that certain barrios located in Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA
4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law,
COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan
then filed a case to have RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not
clearly indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in its territory several barrios from
Cotabato.
ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province –
Cotabato – to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill”?
HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to
perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise
the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of
their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of
Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the
bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of
his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790.
CIR v CTA (1994)
CIR v CTA
GR No 106611, July 21, 1994
FACTS:
Citytrust filed a petition with the Court of Tax Appeals claiming the refund of its income tax overpayments for
the years 1983, 1984 and 1985 in the total amount of P19,971,745. The CIR could not present any evidence
due to the repeated failure of the tax credit/refund division of the BIR to transmit the records of the case and
the investigation report to the Solicitor General. The case was decided in favor of City Trust. Upon motion of
reconsideration, petitioner alleged that through an inter-office memorandum of the Tax Credit/Refund Division,
dated August 8, 1991, he came to know only that Citytrust had outstanding tax liabilities for 1984 in the amount
of P56,588,740.91 representing deficiency income and business taxes.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the BIR was denied its day in court
2. Whether the CTA erred in denying petitioner’s supplemental motion for reconsideration alleging bringing to
said court’s attention the existence of deficiency income and business taxes
RULING:
1. Yes, the BIR is denied its day in court. When it was petitioner’s turn to present evident evidence, several
postponements were sought by its counsel, the Solicitor General, due to the unavailability of the necessary
records which were not transmitted by the Refund Audit Division of the BIR to said counsel. It was under such
predicament and in deference to the tax court that the counsel was constrained to submit the case for decision
without presenting any evidence. It is a long and firmly settled rule of law that the Government is not bound by
the errors committed by its agents.
2. Yes. The fact of such deficiency assessment is intimately related and inextricably intertwined with the right of
the bank. The private respondent cannot be entitled to refund and at the same time be liable for a deficiency
tax assessment for the same year.
Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance
235 SCRA 630 (1994) – 249 SCRA 635 (1995) – Political Law – Origination of Revenue Bills – EVAT –
Amendment by Substitution
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded
Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the
House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716
originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3
readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter
Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have
done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way “the
bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. (It’s
ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was
consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in
the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come
from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version
rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of
amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter
of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over
what has been done.
