GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 109

CHAPTER 5

A D ECADE 0 F H UMANITARIAN I NTERVENTION :

T HE R OLE OF G LOBAL C IVIL S OCIETY
Mary Kaldor

This developing international norm in favour of intervention to protect civilians from wholesale
slaughter will no doubt continue to pose profound challenges to the international community.
Any such evolution in our understanding of state sovereignty and individual sovereignty will, in some
quarters, be met with distrust, scepticism, even hostility. But it is an evolution we should welcome.
Why? Because despite its limitations and imperfections, it is testimony to a humanity that cares more,
not less, for the suffering in its midst, and a humanity that will do more, and not less, to end it.
It is a hopeful sign at the end of the twentieth century.
Kofi Annan, Report to the United Nations General Assembly, 20 September 1999

The progress made . . . in standing up to crimes against humanity represents more than a doctrinal
qualification of the prerogatives of sovereignty. Behind the advances in international justice and the
increased deployment of troops to stop atrocities lies an evolution in public morality. More than at
any time in recent history, the people of the world today are unwilling to tolerate severe human rights
abuses and insistent that something be done to stop them. This growing intolerance of inhumanity
can hardly promise an end to the atrocities that have plagued so much of the twentieth century.
Some situations will be too complex or difficult for easy outside influence. But this reinforced
public morality does erect an obstacle that, at least in some cases, can prevent or stop these crimes
and save lives.
Human Rights Watch (2000a)

It was a French idea . . . We came over the border . . . The appeal must not come from the government
but from the voice of the victims . . . The right to interfere has now been written into 150 resolutions
of the United Nations. Victims are now a category of international law. So we succeeded . . . This is
the revolution . . . The victim, not the government, speaking in the name of the victim—for the first
time . . . We are coming back to ’68. We want to change the world. We want no more Auschwitz, no
more Cambodia, no more Rwanda, no more Biafra.
Bernard Kouchner, founder of Médecins Sans Frontières (Allen and Styan 2000: 825)

T
his chapter is about humanitarian intervention in society in conflict prevention and conflict management
the classic sense, that is to say, military intervention is addressed only indirectly.
in a state, with or without the approval of that As the above quotations indicate, during the 1990s
state, to prevent genocide, large-scale violations of there has been a fundamental change in the norms
human rights (including mass starvation), or grave governing the behaviour of states and international
violations of international humanitarian law (the ‘laws organisations. Throughout the cold war and the anti-
of war’). It addresses the narrow question about the role colonial period, the principle of non-intervention
of civil society in supporting or opposing the use of expressed in Art. 2(4) of the United Nations Charter
military force for humanitarian purposes. The wider was the dominant norm in international affairs.
and undoubtedly important story of the role of civil Starting with the establishment of a safe haven in

109
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 110

northern Iraq in 1991, and culminating in the NATO civil society. Moreover, this consensus, in turn, is the
air strikes in Yugoslavia in 1999, the presumption outcome of a global public debate on these issues. It
that there is a right to use armed force in support of should be stressed that a growing global consensus
humanitarian objectives has become widely accepted. about the need to prevent suffering does not imply
This evolution is demonstrated by the increase in, a consensus about military intervention. On the
and the changing character of, peace- monitoring, contrary, the actual experience of intervention has
peacekeeping, and peace-enforcement operations. been disappointing and in some cases shameful. The
At the start of the 1990s there were only eight failure to intervene to prevent the genocide in
United Nations peacekeeping operations, involving Rwanda and the failure to protect the UN-declared
some 10,000 troops. As of the end of 2000, there safe haven of Srebrenica are two particularly
were some 15 United Nations operations involving opprobrious moments in the history of international
some 38,000 military troops.1 And a number of action. Indeed, it is hard to find a single example of
regional organisations were also involved in various humanitarian intervention during the 1990s that
missions concerned with conflict prevention or can be unequivocally declared a success. Especially
management. In Europe the most significant are after Kosovo, the debate about whether human
the three NATO deployments in the former rights can be enforced through military means is
Yugoslavia (Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia) ever more intense.
authorised by the United Nations. There are also This chapter is about the role that civil society
four Russian peacekeeping operations, under the actors played in bringing about the changing
umbrella of the Commonwealth of Independent international norms and about the character of the
States, in Tajikistan, Transdnestr, Abkhazia, and South public debate. The chapter is divided into four
Ossetia. In addition, the European Union has three sections. The first section describes the actors who
missions and the Organisation for Security and Co- participate in the debate. The second section describes
operation in Europe (OSCE) has some eleven the evolution of humanitarian intervention, with
missions, all of which involve small numbers of particular emphasis on the role of civil society groups,
Mary Kaldor

military personnel. In Africa, the Economic up to the end of the 1990s. The third section
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has summarises the character of the global public debate.
been heavily involved in Sierra Leone and has The final section is about developments in 2000, in
conducted operations in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau. particular the military intervention(s) in Sierra Leone.
A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

The Organisation for African Unity (OAU) also has

three mainly civilian missions in Burundi, Comoros,
and the Democratic Republic of Congo (SIPRI 2000;
United Nations Peacekeeping Department URL). Only
Global Civil Society Actors
a few of these missions can be defined under the

T
he actors who have put pressure on governments
rubric of ‘humanitarian intervention’. But their and on international organisations for or against
number is evidence of the growing acceptance of the humanitarian intervention can be divided into
use of military force for humanitarian purposes. three groups. One group comprises what are normally
Table 5.1 summarises the most significant considered the classic actors of civil society, who
interventions of the last decade in terms of the often claim to speak on behalf of the victims: NGOs,
evolution of a humanitarian norm. social movements, and networks. The second group
The changing international norms concerning comprises those who tend to be closer to the elite and
humanitarian intervention can be considered an make use primarily of the power of words: think
expression of an emerging global civil society. The tanks and commissions. The third group consists of
changing norms do reflect a growing global con- forms of communication, in particular the media:
sensus about the equality of human beings and the radio, television, print media, and Websites.
responsibility to prevent suffering wherever it takes It should be stressed that in the debate about
place, which necessarily has to underpin a global humanitarian intervention a key role has been played
by dynamic individuals. Names like Bernard Kouchner
1 The peak of UN operations was 1993 when some 78,000 military or Fred Cuny (see Box 5.1) have resonance throughout
troops were involved. The biggest operations were UNPROFOR in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and UNOSOM II in Somalia. The Balkans the field of humanitarianism and undoubtedly directly
operations are now undertaken by NATO. or indirectly influenced government action. In the US,

110
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 111

where there has been little in the way of a grass-roots NGOs concerned with humanitarian intervention are
movements, individuals like George Soros, Morton primarily humanitarian and human rights NGOs,
Abramovitz of the Carnegie Endowment, and Aryeh although there are increasing numbers of conflict-
Neier of Human Rights Watch and the Open Society resolution NGOs. Humanitarian NGOs were initially
Foundation have been very influential in the debates formed to provide relief to the victims of war, but
about various interventions. In France and in central increasingly the term has come to include the victims
Europe, individual intellectuals have been heavily of all types of disasters which result in mass suffering:
engaged in the debate. In France, for example, Bernard floods, earthquakes, and so on. These NGOs have a
Henri Levy had a powerful impact with his film about long history. The International Committee of the Red
the siege of Sarajevo; and in central Europe many of Cross (ICRC) was founded in 1859 by Henri Dunant
the well-known former dissidents became deeply after witnessing the horrors of the Battle of Solferino.
involved in the debate about intervention in Bosnia The ICRC provided the impetus for the development of
and later Kosovo. humanitarian law in the late nineteenth century and
As well as intellectuals, public personalities from subsequently. It was the ICRC that pioneered some of
the world of popular culture have added their voices the principles of humanitarian action such as
to concerns about victims of war and/or starvation, impartiality, neutrality, and the principle of consent:
thus helping to popularise humanitarian con- principles which presupposed a notion of ‘civilised’
sciousness. Examples include Bob Geldof and Bandaid wars and ‘honourable’ soldiers (see Ignatieff 1998;
and Bono of U2. During the siege of Sarajevo, a Moorehead 1998). The wars and famines of the
number of these figures travelled to Sarajevo to twentieth century and the erosion of notions of
support secular culture. Many of these individuals ‘civilised’ forms of warfare have spawned many more
are, of course, linked to civil society organisations humanitarian NGOs. Thus, Save the Children was
described below. formed in World War II. Cooperative for American
Relief Everywhere (CARE) was formed by 22 charities
NGOs, social movements, networks and trades unions in 1945 to distribute left-over

Mary Kaldor
American Army rations to Europe; later it shifted to the
NGOs are professional organisations, sometimes with distribution of American agricultural surpluses to the
memberships, and often dependent on a few donors, Third World. Oxfam was founded in 1942 and
including governments. International NGOs, that is to Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) in 1971 during the war

A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

say, NGOs that operate across borders, tend to be
based in advanced industrial countries. NGOs can be
both service providers—delivering humanitarian
assistance, monitoring human rights, and providing
mediation services in conflicts—and advocacy
groups—putting pressure on governments and
international organisations. Social movements are
looser organisations, often based on grass-roots
groups and making use of volunteers. By and large
they are campaigning groups engaged in various,
often innovative, forms of protest. Because of their
grass-roots nature, social movements tend to be
locally based, although they can and do make
coalitions across borders. Networks have been an
increasingly significant phenomenon in the 1990s.
They are loose coalitions of NGOs and social
movements, often making use of the opportunities
offered by the Internet and providing a vehicle to
transmit directly the voices and arguments of
Southern and Eastern groups rather than indirectly
through the Northern-based NGOs. The band U2 played at Sarajevo’s Kosovo stadium in September
1997 (photo: © Reuters/Popperfoto).

111
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 112

Box 5.1: The role of individuals: Fred Cuny and Bernard Kouchner

The lives of two individuals—one American, Fred In 1971, Kouchner founded the NGO Médecins
Cuny, and one Frenchman, Bernard Kouchner— Sans Frontières. The aim was the rapid deployment
could be said to encapsulate the story of the of doctors to disaster areas, with or without official
evolution of humanitarian intervention over the permission, with heavy reliance on the use of the
last three decades. media both to secure funding and to provide
Both were born during World War II. Both were immunity from hostile governments. The same year
influenced by the student movement of the 1960s. Cuny founded a company, Intertect Relief and
Cuny, who had been a Republican, became active Reconstruction, which specialised in giving tech-
in the civil rights movement in the late 1960s. nical assistance and training in disaster relief to
Kouchner was involved in the French evénements UN and volunteer agencies. Unlike MSF, which
of 1968. Cuny was training to be an engineer and raised money from the public, the company
Kouchner was training to be a doctor. depended on contracts from governments and
Both went to Biafra in 1969 and were involved international institutions. Both MSF and Intertect
in the airlift that was undertaken without the were involved in numerous disasters in the 1970s
permission of the Nigerian government. Kouchner, and 1980s—earthquakes, wars, floods, massacres,
who was working for the International Red Cross, hurricanes—and gained their practical and political
was shocked by the unwillingness of the ICRC to experiences from these events. Disaster areas
speak out about what was happening. ‘By keeping included Nicaragua, Honduras, Peru, Sri Lanka,
silent, we doctors were accomplices in the system- Sudan, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Vietnam, El
atic massacre of a population’ (quoted in Allen and Salvador, and the Lebanon, among others. Both
Styan 2000: 830). Kouchner started the Inter- published books. In Disasters and Development,
national Committee Against Genocide in Biafra and Cuny (1983) says that it was during this period that
started to use the media to publicise what was he began to understand the connection between
Mary Kaldor

happening. ‘We were using the media before it the military and humanitarianism. ‘More than
became fashionable . . . We refused to allow sick anything else, the images of those planes delivering
people and doctors to be massacred in silence and everything from food to coal fostered acceptance
submission’ (quoted in Allen and Styan 2000: 830). of the link between armed forces and humanitarian
A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

Biafra, according to Cuny, was the ‘mother’ of all assistance and, more importantly, acceptance of
humanitarian operations. ‘We still use the yardstick the costs involved’ (quoted in Weiss 1999: 17).
of Biafra to measure our performance in other Kouchner’s (1986) book Charité Business is
disasters. It’s the defining moment’ (quoted in about the relationship between the media, NGOs,
Shawcross 1995). Cuny was shocked by the lack of and policy-makers. Indeed, it was Kouchner’s
planning and the amateurishness of the relief effort. emphasis on dramatic media events which led to
In 1970, he left Biafra convinced that the airlift the split in 1979 when Kouchner went on to found
was prolonging the war. Médecins du Monde.

in Biafra. In the 1980s and 1990s a myriad of NGOs Human rights NGOs differ from humanitarian NGOs
have been formed in response to increased ‘complex in that their concern is primarily with state repression
emergencies’ which include both famines and wars, and with violations of human rights, especially
greater public consciousness of suffering in faraway political and civil rights. Like humanitarian NGOs,
places perhaps as a result of television, and the human rights NGOs have a long history. The Anti-
growing tendency of governments to contract-out Slavery Society founded in 1839 is probably the
relief to NGOs. Many humanitarian NGOs are church- oldest international human rights NGO still in
based or linked to other religions. An increasing share existence.2 The term ‘human rights’ is a post-World
of official humanitarian assistance is disbursed through
2 Local anti-slavery campaigning groups existed long before the
NGOs and, in parallel, NGOs are becoming increasingly founding of the anti-slavery society in places like Manchester
dependent on government funds. and Philadelphia

112
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 113

The turning point for both men was the Gulf water purification plant and providing access to
War of 1991. Kouchner had begun to promote the gas for heating. Kouchner was a staunch advocate
concept of a Droit d’Ingérence in the late 1980s. In of an international air offensive and became known
1988 he was appointed Minister for Health and as the proponent of ‘war to end war’.
Humanitarian Action in the French government led Thereafter, their careers diverged. Cuny was sent
by Michel Rocard. He was able to promote his ideas by Soros to Chechnya. After his first visit in
in the United Nations and after the Gulf War pushed December 1994 he said that the destruction of
for the Droit d’Ingérence to help the Kurds in Grozny made Sarajevo seem like a picnic. He was
northern Iraq. The haven in northern Iraq did provide convinced that he could arrange a ceasefire but he
an important precedent in humanitarian inter- disappeared when on a trip to try to meet the
vention. Cuny was also there. He had convinced the Chechen leader. He was probably executed on 14
US Ambassador to Turkey, Morton Abramowitz, that April 1995.
it was possible to bring the Kurdish refugees back to Kouchner was appointed UN Special Represen-
their homes in a two-month period and was given tative in Kosovo and became head of the new UN
an opportunity to carry our his ideas. Subsequently, administration in Kosovo established after the NATO
through Morton Abramowitz, Cuny was able to bombing. He left after a year and became French
influence policy in Washington. Minister of Health again in the government of Lionel
Both Cuny and Kouchner advocated military Jospin. His record in Kosovo has been criticised but
intervention in Somalia, and their voices were he enjoyed the full support of Kosovar Albanians.
influential in both the US and France. Cuny favoured The differences between the two men reflected
the creation of armed relief enclaves. Both were their cultural backgrounds. Cuny focused on
critical of the way the intervention was carried out. practical solutions to humanitarian crises; Kouchner
Cuny thought it was inefficient from the point of focused on political solutions. Kouchner tried to

Mary Kaldor
view of delivering aid. Kouchner considered the develop a new language and a new ethics of
intervention to have been a success although he humanitarianism. Cuny tried to develop new
was critical of the American use of overwhelming methodologies and procedures. But their differences
force. ‘There are no humanitarian catastrophes only were complementary; Kouchner’s approach

A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

political catastrophes . . . No! What was catastrophic necessarily involved practical implementation and
was the American attitude . . . A war without Cuny’s search for common-sense solutions led him
prisoners, a war without dead people . . . this is just to politics. Both contributed in important ways, for
crazy’ (quoted in Allen and Styan 2000: 838). good or for ill, to the emerging consensus about
During the Bosnian war Cuny was recruited by humanitarian intervention by the late 1990s.
George Soros to provide $50 million of humanitarian
assistance to Bosnia. He focused on the restoration
of basic utilities in Sarajevo, building a protected

War II invention, attributed to Eleanor Roosevelt, that existed. Since the wars of this period also
who objected to the ‘rights of man’, although the involved massive violations of human rights, these
term Menschenrechte was always used in the groups necessarily became more concerned with war.
Germanic languages. The official international The best-known international NGOs are Amnesty
commitment to human rights was expressed in the International and Human Rights Watch, but there
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the are thousands of smaller groups not only in advanced
Genocide Convention (1948), and the two human industrial countries but especially in the East and
rights Covenants (1966) among other treaties and South.
declarations. As in the case of humanitarian NGOs, Conflict-resolution NGOs are more recent. Well-
the 1980s and 1990s witnessed a proliferation of known examples include International Alert and
human rights groups and a strengthening of those Conciliation Resources, based in Britain, and San

113
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 114

Egidio, the Vatican group, both of which have played

significant roles in mediation in recent years. San
Egidio, for example, was responsible for initiating
peace negotiations in Mozambique, for the Education
Agreement in Kosovo in 1997 (which seemed to offer
a prospect for averting war), and also for bringing
together the various opposition groups in Algeria.
The Carter Center in the US has also been an
important player in conflict mediation. There are
many less well-known groups, especially women’s
groups, that engage in conflict resolution at local
levels. Conflict-resolution groups were established
in part by peace groups seeking a new direction after
the end of the cold war and in part by human rights
and humanitarian groups who became aware of the
need for a more political approach. (For European
groups, see European Platform for Conflict Prevention
and Transformation URL.) Demonstrators in Sarajevo, December 1992 (photo: ©
Three types of social movement have been involved Reuters/Popperfoto).
in humanitarian intervention. First of all, in the
countries where wars have taken place, movements parties are often linked to organised nationalist
supporting intervention have developed among the movements or nationalist currents of opinion. These
potential victims. Thus, an anti-war movement movements intensified in the 1990s in response to
developed in Bosnia calling for an international globalisation. In particular, diaspora groups have
protectorate before the outbreak of war; and the become increasingly significant in influencing both
Mary Kaldor

Kosovar resistance movement was making similar the character of nationalist movements and their
appeals throughout the 1990s (Andjelic 2000; Kaldor impact on the international community (see Kaldor
1999; Independent International Commission on 1999; Smith 1996). On the whole, this type of
Kosovo 2000). Today, the Palestinian people are calling movement jealously guards the notion of sovereignty,
A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

for international protection. as in Serbia for example. But some nationalist

In the countries where outside governments have movements favour intervention: Palestine and Kosovo
been involved, civil society actors have tended not to are two current examples. The role of transnationally
be movements except in the case of the former organised Islamic movements in calling for inter-
Yugoslavia. During the Bosnian war, however, a vention in, say, Bosnia is also important.
second type of movement developed, primarily in One of the criticisms that is often made about
Europe. Although it had its origins in peace, human Northern-based NGOs is that, while claiming to speak
rights, and women’s movements, it was a new on behalf of the victims, they often drown out the
movement in which local groups sprang up primarily victims’ voices. The advantage of networks is that
to provide humanitarian assistance but also to express they provide an organisational form that allows NGOs
political positions on the Bosnian war, often with and grass-roots organisations outside war zones to
deep divisions among them. link up with local groups within the war zones.
During the Kosovo war, there were mass demon- Networks may be less effective at organised lobbying
strations against the NATO bombing or against the but they do provide a forum through which the
‘double war’ (NATO bombing and Serbian President knowledge and views of local groups can be
Milosevic’s campaign of ethnic cleansing), especially transmitted. This was very important during the
in Serbia, Greece, and Italy. Yugoslav wars; important examples were the Helsinki
A third type of movement, which has been Citizens Assembly (see Box 5.2) and the Verona Forum
influential both for and against intervention, is established by the Italian Green MEP Alexander Lange.
nationalist and fundamentalist. In this chapter I do not There are also a number of emerging networks in
include non-state warring parties—paramilitary groups Africa: the West Africa peace-building network and
or warlords—as part of civil society. But the warring the Great Lakes Policy Forum. Women’s groups have

114
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 115

played a pioneering role in developing the network Nations. The Brandt, Palme, and Brundtland Com-
form of organisation. Women in Black is an important missions were important in pioneering this way of
example, which began out of solidarity with the using groups of prominent individuals to make policy
Belgrade-based group Women in Black and has spread inputs on significant global issues. In the 1990s,
to other conflict regions. It organised weekly international commissions concerned with various
international vigils during the war in Bosnia and also aspects of humanitarian intervention have proliferated.
increasingly engages in various conflict resolution The Carnegie Endowment organised two commissions,
projects (see Cockburn 2000). one on ‘Preventing Deadly Conflicts’ and one on
Although the distinctions between humanitarian, the Balkans,3 replicating the experience of an important
human rights, peace, and women’s groups are useful in and pioneering Carnegie Commission on the Balkans in
tracing the history of these civil society organisations, 1912. There have been three important reports under
in practice they are becoming less and less meaningful. UN auspices concerning Rwanda, Srebrenica, and UN
Today’s wars involve massive violations of human rights, Peacekeeping (United Nations 1999a, b; 2000). After
including atrocities against women. In this context, Kosovo, the Swedish government took the initiative in
peace movements may engage in solidarity actions as establishing an Independent International Commission
do the humanitarian groups or may find themselves to investigate the Kosovo Crisis under the Chairmanship
increasingly taking on the human rights agenda. of the South African Judge, Richard Goldstone.
Women’s groups become peace and human rights And more recently, the Canadian government has
groups. Human rights groups are increasingly concerned established a new commission to investigate the
with violations of international humanitarian law concept and practice of humanitarian intervention
and war crimes as well as human rights violations. under the chairmanship of Gareth Evans and Mahoud
Humanitarian groups, traditionally non-political, find Sahnoun.
themselves adopting the causes of peace and justice. As Richard Goldstone has put it in the course of
Thus, an important development in this period has an interview for the BBC in February 2001, these
been what is sometimes known as civil society Commissions are an important device for increasing

Mary Kaldor
intervention, where the presence of international civil the transparency and public accountability of
society groups, even if unarmed, constitutes a form of international institutions: they represent ‘civil society
protection for civilians. This was the basic idea behind judging governments’.
Peace Brigades International, formed in 1981, which

A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

began its work in Central America and now mobilises Media and websites
thousands of volunteers to accompany returning
refugees, for example (see Mahoney and Eguren 1997). The importance of the international media in drawing
Many of the groups formed during the Yugoslav wars attention to crises in far-off places is often stressed.
saw themselves carrying out similar missions. Politicians often complain about the way their actions
are media-led. Undoubtedly, at certain moments—
Think tanks and commissions the famine in Ethiopia in the 1980s, the discovery of
detention camps in Bosnia in 1993 by ITN and the
While movements and NGOs raise public awareness, Guardian, the furore about the camps in eastern
expert groups are often closer to governments and Zaire in the autumn of 1994—media attention has
frame specific policy proposals. The growth during the played an important role. But by and large the media
1980s and 1990s of think tanks and commissions have been a tool, an expression of a public debate
addressing global issues is yet another sign of the rather than an actor in their own right. Undoubtedly,
emergence of global civil society. Think tanks like the access to the media has been uneven and sometimes
International Crisis Group and the Institute or War and distorting; in particular, starvation and violence are
Peace Reporting, both established during the 1990s, more newsworthy than peace negotiations.
have become significant purveyors of information and Nevertheless, those civil society actors who have
opinions. Older established think tanks concerned with learned to use the media have been able to make
defence and foreign affairs, which exist in almost every their voices heard more effectively.
country, have also joined the debate. Similar to these
think tanks are international commissions, both 3See
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997)
independent and under the auspices of the United and Carnegie Endowment for Peace (1996).

115
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 116

Box 5.2: Helsinki Citizens Assembly activities during the war in Bosnia

In the second half of the 1980s, parts of the and a series of activities was planned which laid
West European peace movement developed a the basis for the later war-time activism.
strategy of ‘détente from below’, making links with One of these activities was a peace caravan,
opposition groups in central and eastern Europe. which was organised in September 1991. Some 40
Many of the techniques of networking—providing European activists travelled by bus through
support to civil society groups in difficult and Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia, making links
dangerous situations, simultaneously lobbying with local anti-war activists. The caravan culmin-
different governments and international insti- ated in Sarajevo, where a human chain of 10,000
tutions—were developed during people linked the mosque, the synagogue, the
this period, even before the Orthodox Church, and the Catholic Church. The
advent of the Internet. links made during this expedition were sustained,
The Helsinki Citizens Assembly by and large, throughout the war. Another activity
(HCA) was established in 1990 was Yugofax; a monitoring service written by people
to formalise this network. from the region, which later became Balkan War
The goal was to integrate Europe Report and eventually the Institute for War and
from below, to establish a Peace Reporting.
pan-European civil society. As war in Bosnia became imminent in the spring
Vaclav Havel spoke at the of 1992, it was Grebo who called on people to come
founding assembly which into the streets and tear down the barricades being
brought together over 1,000 erected by Serbian and Muslim paramilitary groups.
people from all over Europe Indeed, the war began when snipers fired on a
who had been involved in citizens’ demonstration of some 200,000 people,
Mary Kaldor

the dialogue, and an inter- mobilised by Grebo, who were demanding the
national secretariat was resignation of the government and the establishment
established in Prague. of an international protectorate. Thousands more
The Yugoslav branch of the had come by bus but were prevented from entering
A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

Helsinki Citizens Assembly was founded in Sarajevo Sarajevo by roadblocks. The official international
in May 1991. The chairperson was Zdravko Grebo, a negotiators, who were visiting Sarajevo that day, did
law professor from the University of Sarajevo, who not have time, so they said, to meet with the
had played a key role in the democratisation process demonstrators. The demonstration of 12 April 1992
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At that time, the slogan was was the last peace demonstration of its kind; no
‘Let’s Co-operate!’ Whether Yugoslavia falls apart or wonder that Sarajevans were later to say that ‘Europe
stays together, civil society must remain united. ends in Sarajevo’.
When federal troops entered Slovenia in June During the war, HCA activities were of three
1991, an emergency meeting of the HCA was kinds. First, the network of civic activists was
organised in Belgrade to discuss how to prevent maintained through meetings, conferences,
war. The meeting included several luminaries of the workshops, newsletters, and pamphlets, as well as
cold war oppositions, including Milovan Djilas, Adam electronic communication. It was in Bosnia that the
Michnik, Bronislaw Geremek, and Ernest Gellner. HCA e-mail network was first established, and
Grebo warned that, if Yugoslavia disintegrated, indeed, at that time, it represented a pioneering
Bosnia would also disintegrate and a war in Bosnia kind of technology. A parallel network of
would be ‘hell’. It was agreed to press for an municipalities was also established. A particularly
international protectorate for Bosnia-Herzegovina, important event was the Citizens and Municipal

In the 1980s and 1990s, many NGOs and social Kouchner pioneered the médiatique approach. But it
movements deliberately fostered what the French has also been taken up by other NGOs and, in the
call a médiatique strategy. MSF under Bernard 1990s, by social movements.

116
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 117

Peace Conference held in Ohrid, Macedonia, in the shared values and a commitment to mutual
autumn of 1992. The network was a way of solidarity which takes precedence over loyalty to
expressing solidarity with the groups in the region governments or abstract principles. All the local
and planning future activities. groups are self-organised and self-financing. They
Second, many groups collected and delivered gain legitimacy and visibility in their own societies
humanitarian assistance. The Italians and the Czechs from being branches of a transnational organisation
were particularly active in this respect. with access to international policy-makers. They
Third, HCA campaigned and lobbied governments gain strength from international contacts and
and international institutions for what was, in effect, meetings through which they can develop and
a new kind of humanitarian intervention. This was discuss their campaigns and projects and plan joint
particularly important in France, where there were activities. HCA’s networking involves a two-way
some 40 local HCA groups and HCA played a key role learning process. By comparing experiences and
in coordinating the movement in France, Britain, trying to understand different local situations on
Denmark, Switzerland, Turkey, and The Netherlands. the basis of the knowledge of those who live in
HCA pushed for an international protectorate. At the region, HCA develops new ideas, practical
Ohrid the idea of local protectorates was developed. analyses, and strategies. Essentially, HCA is a
And this was the origin of the Safe Havens campaign mechanism for the transmission and processing of
in early 1993, in which some 300,000 postcards information from local activists to other activists
calling for safe havens were sent to the negotiators and to institutions.
and to governments from all over Europe (around This work has not always been easy, partly because
one third were sent from The Netherlands). of the difficult circumstances in which some groups
HCA also campaigned for international admin- operate; local activists are often harassed and some

Mary Kaldor
istrations in Sarajevo and Mostar. And a major effort have lost their lives in war. Several activists from
of HCA from 1994 onwards was the campaign to Bosnia, Italy, and France were killed during the war
publicise and support the town of Tuzla, which was in Bosnia. Another factor is the character of the
the only town in Bosnia-Herzegovina that had organisation. HCA emerged out of the movements of

A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

maintained a non-nationalist administration and the 1980s. It was never able to transform itself into
that kept alive multicultural civic cosmopolitan an international NGO of the type demanded by
values throughout the war. donors. The latter tend to expect more emphasis on
In September 1994 a seminar brought NGOs and the transfer of skills from West to East than on the
municipalities to Tuzla, which pledged all kinds of transfer of understanding from East to West, on the
support to the town. A year later, one week after the provision of services at a local level rather than
ceasefire, HCA held its assembly bringing to Tuzla campaigns at an international level, on offices rather
300 activists from abroad, including 70 people from than groups, and on professionalism rather than
Serbia. political mobilisation. For all these reasons HCA has
Undoubtedly, the HCA campaigns did contribute found it difficult to sustain the expensive task of
to the international community’s policies towards international networking. Nevertheless, this strange
Bosnia-Herzegovina. But at that time official support ‘political animal’, as the co-chair Bernard Dreano
for humanitarian intervention was half-hearted; the has described it, continues to exist. There is now a
safe havens were never defended effectively and generation, less bound by the movement traditions
there was no serious support for citizens’ efforts. of the past, that may be better able to combine
The Helsinki Citizens Assembly sometimes individual activism with the professionalism
describes itself as a family founded on certain demanded by global donors.

The media and the civil society groups have developed Relief agencies depend upon us for publicity
a sort of symbiotic relationship. As George Alagiah of and we need them to tell us where the stories
the BBC put it: are. There’s an unspoken understanding

117
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 118

intervention’ was first used in the nineteenth century

to justify interventions by European powers to protect
(mainly Christian) people oppressed by the Ottoman
Empire. The first instance was the intervention
in Greece in 1827, which was to lead to Greek
independence in 1830. This notion of humanitarian
intervention clashed with the growing presumption
that states had equal rights to protect their
sovereignty and that interference in the affairs of
other states was therefore wrong. This insistence on
the importance of sovereignty and non-interference
is sometimes dated back to the Treaty of Westphalia
of 1648. But actually it is a more recent idea, which
gained intellectual credentials in the middle of the
eighteenth century in the writings of Wolff and Vattel
but became widely accepted only in the twentieth
Bosnian prisoners in a detention camp, Nakjaca, Bosnia, 1992 century with the independence of many former
(photo: © Reuters/Popperfoto). colonies and the spread of communism. Newly
independent and/or Communist countries regarded
between us, a sort of code. We try not to ask the doctrine of non-intervention as an important
the question too bluntly: ‘Where are the defence against what they saw as the ‘constant and
starving babies’. And they never answer endemic intervention’ of great powers (Bull 1984: 4).
explicitly. But we get the pictures all the same. During the cold war period, the principle of non-
(Quoted in de Waal 1997: 83) intervention was widely considered to take priority over
humanitarian considerations. After 1945, the United
Mary Kaldor

A very important development in the 1990s was the Nations Charter strengthened the rules restricting the
extensive use of Websites. Many civil society rights of states to use force. At the same time a body
organisations have Websites, which have speeded up of law developed in the various human rights
information gathering on these issues. Websites have declarations and conventions which forbade states to
A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

also provided a way in which institutions in the war ill-treat individuals, including their own nationals. In
zones can have more impact on the global debate. practice, the former overrode the latter up until the end
Thus the Radio B92 (URL) Website, which provided an of the 1980s (see Akehurst 1984).
English language digest of developments in Serbia or There were many interventions during this period,
the Website of the independent Kosovar newspaper especially by the two super-powers, but these were
Kohaditore (URL) have been crucial sources of justified in cold war terms as interventions against
information about developments in former communism or capitalism and usually legitimised on
Yugoslavia. Likewise, the South Asia Citizens Web the grounds that outside powers were ‘invited’ to
(URL) provides a local perspective on the Kashmir intervene (Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, or Afghanistan).
conflict and also a mechanism for networking within As Nicholas Wheeler (2000) shows, there were also
South Asia. Websites are also important sources of interventions which could be described as
propaganda for nationalist and fundamentalist humanitarian, notably the Indian intervention in
movements, a service often provided by more extreme Bangladesh in 1971, the Vietnamese intervention in
groups in the diaspora. Cambodia in December 1977 which led to the fall of
the Khmer Rouge, and the Tanzanian intervention
The Evolution of Humanitarian in Uganda which led to the overthrow of Idi Amin in
April 1979. But none of these interventions was
Intervention justified in humanitarian terms.4

T
he idea of intervention ‘to defend the rights of
4 In
foreign subjects of an oppressive ruler’ was the case of the Indian intervention of 1971, the Indian
Ambassador to the United Nations Security Council used
advanced by Hugo Grotius in the seventeenth humanitarian arguments. He claimed that the suffering of the
century (Bull 1984: 3). But the term ‘humanitarian Bangladeshi people was sufficient to ‘shock the conscience of the

118
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 119

The debates in the United Nations Security of refugees and internally displaced persons (see
Council during this period, described by Wheeler, Kaldor 1999).
show the strength of the non-intervention norm. A second factor was the growth of humanitarian
Thus, in the debate over Vietnam’s intervention in NGOs. The war in Nigeria in 1971 was a turning point
Cambodia, the French Ambassador Leprette said: for the humanitarian NGOs. It was the moment when
‘The notion that because a regime is detestable the ICRC abandoned its insistence on neutrality and
foreign intervention is justified and forcible operating within the framework of consent. The ICRC
overthrow is legitimate is extremely dangerous. That was conscious that its insistence on neutrality had
could ultimately jeopardise the very maintenance prevented the ICRC from publicly protesting about
of international law and order and make the what it knew to be happening to the Jews in World
continued existence of various regimes dependent on War II and there were fears of genocide in Biafra. Thus
the judgement of their neighbours’ (Wheeler 2000: the ICRC, together with more recent humanitarian
93). Similar arguments were put forward by other NGOs influenced by the student movements of the
members of the Security Council. As late as 1986, the 1960s and the interrogations about World War II,
prominent international theorist, Hedley Bull, argued: decided to organise an airlift to Biafra without the
consent of the Nigerian authorities.
The growing moral conviction that human For many of the newer NGOs, Biafra was the defining
rights should have a place in relations among moment. Subsequently many of the groups formed or
states has been deeply corrosive of the rule of shaped by that experience went on to respond to crises
non-intervention, which once drew strength in various parts of the world: earthquakes, floods,
from the general acceptance that states alone famines, and war. In 1984, the famine in Ethiopia
have rights in international law. sparked a debate about humanitarianism and political
(Bull 1984: 183) action. Groups like Bandaid had helped to stimulate a
media-orchestrated response to the famine. But other
What were the factors that led to such a dramatic groups argued that the famine was being created

Mary Kaldor
change in international norms in the late 1980s and deliberately as an instrument of war by Mengistu, the
1990s? One was the spread of ‘new’ or ‘post-modern’ Ethiopian leader, and that the humanitarians were
wars, especially in Africa and eastern Europe. These keeping Mengistu in power. MSF, which took this
are wars that have evolved out of the guerrilla and position, was thrown out of Ethiopia at this time. During

A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

counter-insurgency wars of an earlier period. They this period the NGOs increasingly began to operate
are often called ‘civil’ or ‘internal’ wars although without consent, as had happened earlier in Biafra.
they involve an array of global actors. They are wars Indeed, in Ethiopia a split developed among those NGOs
in which direct fighting between the contestants is that worked in non-governmental areas and those that
rare and most violence is directed against civilians. cooperated with the government. Only the ICRC was
Indeed, techniques, such as population displacement, allowed to work openly with both sides, although Save
and various atrocities which directly violate both the Children managed to do so informally.
the laws of war and human rights are central to By the mid-1980s this new type of war had
the strategies of these wars. They are also wars in become increasingly important. In Mozambique and
which the manipulation of food supply, loot and Afghanistan, official agencies increasingly began to
pillage, and the control of valuable commodities see the advantage of NGOs as a form of non-
are built into the functioning of a war economy. governmental intervention and a way of working in
Not only did these wars increase in number during war zones without permission. In several places,
this period but there was also a big increase in ‘corridors of tranquillity’ or ‘humanitarian corridors’
civilian suffering, as measured by the ratio of were established to provide relief. Operation LifeLine
military to civilian casualties and by the explosion in Sudan was another particularly important episode
where many of these techniques were developed,
world’. And he asked ‘what has happened to our conventions on particularly through UNICEF and its programmes for
genocide, human rights, self-determination and so on? . . . Why
[are members of the Security Council] so shy about speaking of immunisation of children. It was then that ‘clamours
human rights? . . . What has happened to the justice part [of the for more muscular support’ began to be raised.5
UN Charter]?’ (Wheeler 2000: 63). But he did not invoke these
arguments to justify the intervention; instead he referred to the
(outlandish) crime of ‘refugee aggression’. 5 Interview with Mark Bowden of Save the Children, 9 March 2001.

119
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 120

Table 5.1: The evolution of humanitarian intervention

Purpose Dates Troops involved

Northern Iraq Operation Provide safe haven for Kurds April 1991–3 20,000 troops from US,
Provide Comfort in northern Iraq. Establish Britain and France.
no-fly zones in north and
south of Iraq.

Bosnia-Herzegovina Safe havens, humanitarian 1992-5 UNPROFOR involving 23,000

corridors, no-fly zone, troops.
establishment of war crimes
tribunals.

Somalia Protect food convoys and 1992-3 UNITAF (37,000 troops led by
provide secure relief centres. the US) and UNOSOM II
(28,000 troops).

Rwanda Small UN force withdrawn 1994 UNAMIR I. (1,500 troops) and

before massacre. French led II (5,500 troops). Main
force to protect refugees contingents: France, Canada,
after the massacre. and Belgium.
Mary Kaldor
A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

Haiti Operation American-led force to September 1994 Multi-national Force (MNF)

Restore Democracy restore democratically including 21,000 US troops
elected government. and 1,250 troops from the
Caribbean.

Kosovo NATO air strikes against March-July 1999 NATO aircraft from 13
Yugoslavia. countries flew 38,400 sorties,
including 10,484 strike sorties.

East Timor Australian-led force after September 1999 International Force for East
massive violence following Timor (INTERFET). Some
referendum on independence. 10,000 troops led by Australia.

Sierra Leone Series of interventions to 1994–2000 Ghurkas. Executive Outcomes,

restore democratic ECOMOG, UNAMSIL, British
government. forces.

120
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 121

Authorisation Global civil society groups Comments

United Nations Security Council Pressure from media and hunan First safe haven; provided
(UNSC) Resolution 688. rights groups e.g. Human Rights precedent for humanitarian
Watch. Hesitation from intervention. Initial success, but
humanitarian groups e.g. Oxfam. not sustained.

Various UN Security Council Combination of NGOs, think Marked an important precedent

Resolutions, especially 770 tanks, local groups in Europe but insufficiently robust. Low point
(protection of humanitarian and inside Bosnia, networks. was fall of Srebrenica in July 1995.
convoys) and 836 (safe areas).

UNSC Resolution 794 authorised Humanitarian NGOs mainly in Excessive use of force, failure to
UNITAF UNSCR 814 authorised favour. Save the Children and disarm militia. Widely considered a
UNOSOM II. Africa Rights against. debacle. American soldiers killed
and bodies publicly paraded.

UNSC Resolution 872 authorised NGOs and media strongly in Failure to intervene and prevent
UNAMIR to monitor ceasefire. favour of intervention. ICRC genocide despite request of UN
Request for reinforcements when lost 13 staff members. Commander General Dallaire.
massacre began followed by

Mary Kaldor
decision to withdraw UNAMIR.
UMNAMIR II authorised after
massacre was over.

A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

UNSC Resolution 940 Apparently successful Generally considered a successful
operation. intervention carried out in the US
national interest.

No UN authorisation. Civil society groups involved in Did not prevent ethnic cleansing of
transnational networks call for Albanians and then Serbs but did
intervention. Demonstrations enable the return of all Albanians
against in Greece, Italy, and and end the rule from Belgrade
Serbia.

UNSC Resolution 1264 Civil society pressure for

intervention much earlier. Too late although effective.

UNAMSIL authorised by UNSC Strong civil society pressure in

Resolution 1270. ECOMOG West Africa. International NGOs Rebels still control parts of the
authorised by ECOWAS. divided. country.

121
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 122

This was the period that Bernard Kouchner, together and the relationship of peace to justice. Some parts
with his colleague, the lawyer Mario Bettani, launched of the peace movements made links with eastern
the idea of a Devoir d’Ingérence (Duty to Interfere), human rights groups and pioneered the concept of
which later became a Droit d’Ingérence (Right/Law ‘détente from below’ and the idea of a new form of
of Interference). Kouchner became French Minister civil society intervention in support of human rights;
of Humanitarian Action in 1988, and in the same they argued that the threat of nuclear weapons had
year the United Nations General Assembly passed prevented interference in support of human rights.
Resolution 43/131, which put these arrangements Other parts of the peace movement insisted on non-
on a more formal footing. The resolution reaffirmed interference, arguing that the danger of nuclear war
the sovereignty of states but recognised that the was the overriding concern and that support for
‘international community makes an important human rights could contribute to cold war rhetoric.
contribution to the sustenance and protection’ The 1989 revolutions gave further impetus to the
of victims in emergency situations. Failure to human rights movements. The discourse of civil
provide humanitarian assistance ‘constitutes a threat society was the discourse of the movements which
to life and human dignity’. The resolution stressed the toppled the communist regimes. To this was added
‘important contribution’ of ‘intergovernmental and the language of transnationalism and global
non-governmental organisations working with strictly responsibility that came out of the cross-border links
humanitarian motives’. Subsequently, General made in the 1980s. Moreover, the revolutions seemed
Assembly Resolution 45/100 praised the Secretary- to discredit traditional left thinking, which was
General for continuing consultations on the associated with notions of non-interference and of
establishment of ‘humanitarian corridors’ (Allen and collectivism that were supposed to take priority over
Styan 2000: 831–2). individual rights.
A third factor in the changing international The final factor was, of course, the post-cold war
climate was the growth of human rights groups. global context. The end of the cold war provided an
Particularly important were the emergence of pro- opportunity, for the first time, for concerted
Mary Kaldor

democracy and human rights movements in the Third international action. It also allowed the ‘new wars’ to
World and eastern Europe. In part, this was a become more visible and a new global discourse
consequence of the exhaustion of post- colonial and about humanitarianism and human rights to supplant
communist projects: the loss of appeal of earlier the tired cold war rhetoric.
A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

emancipatory ideas. And it part it has to be The Gulf War of 1991 provided the first oppor-
understood in the context of growing global tunity to display the new international consensus. The
interconnectedness and the possibility to obtain war, of course, was not a humanitarian intervention;
support and to make links across borders, which it was a response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq,
provided a way of opening up closed societies. In and once Kuwait had been liberated a ceasefire was
Europe and North America, the movements which declared. Indeed, the war is probably better described
evolved after the 1960s spawned human rights as an American attempt to assert its new found
groups sometimes in dispute with the traditional left. unchallenged global hegemony: this was the essence
In the United States, it was the coup in Chile and the of President Bush’s ‘new world order’.
growth of human rights groups in Latin America In the aftermath of the war, however, there were
during the 1970s and 1980s that led to the uprisings by Kurds in the north and Shiites in the
emergence of transnational human rights networks south in the expectation that Saddam Hussein would
(see Keck and Sikkink 1998: Ch. 3). In France, the be overthrown. The uprisings were brutally
debate about tiermondisme led many French suppressed. This was the moment for Kouchner
intellectuals to attack the simplicities of those and the French government to push for a Droit
traditional left groups who had unquestioningly d’Ingérence. Public sympathy for the plight of the
supported liberation movements in the Third World Kurds also propelled other governments, particularly
and to place increasing emphasis on democratic in Britain and the United States, into action. The
freedoms and human rights; the group Libertés sans consequence was United Nations Security Council
Frontières was an expression of this line of thought. Resolution 688, which established a safe haven in
In the rest of Europe, the mass peace movement of northern Iraq for the Kurds. The resolution did not
the 1980s stimulated a debate about human rights actually mandate the use of troops; nevertheless

122
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 123

In 1991, thousands of Iraq’s Kurdish refugees settled in Isikveren camp, Turkey (photo: © Reuters/Popperfoto).

Operation Provide Comfort involved the deployment The relative success of the safe haven, at least initially,
of over 20,000 troops to protect the safe haven. At was to change attitudes among many NGOs.
the time, only the French were pushing for a Droit The international troops were withdrawn in 1993
d’Ingérence. The resolution was couched in terms of and replaced by a small UN guard and a ‘residual’

Mary Kaldor
the threat to ‘international peace and security’ posed force based in Turkey. The Kurds have re-established
by refugees and by the situation in the area. The a measure of autonomy (which they had enjoyed
term ‘haven’ was used in preference to ‘enclaves’ at years earlier) but they remain vulnerable to Iraqi
the insistence of the British Ambassador, Sir David raids. The no-fly zone has not prevented the ethnic

A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

Hannay, on the grounds that ‘enclaves’ suggested a cleansing of Shiites in the south.
redrawing of boundaries. Nevertheless, the resolution But the safe haven in northern Iraq did turn out
did create a precedent in that it demanded that Iraq to be a precedent. The genie was out of the bottle.
‘immediately end this repression’ and ‘ensure that As Adam Roberts (1996: 16) points out, the
the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are proclamation of humanitarian interests has an
respected’. inevitable ‘ratchet effect’.
Although public pressure and media exposure of
what was happening in northern Iraq were important It is inherently difficult for major powers to
in propelling forward the proposal for a safe haven, proclaim humanitarian principles and policies
it is interesting to note that, at the time, there were in relation to a conflict, and then do nothing
doubts among UN officials as well as NGOs operating to protect the victims and/or punish their
in northern Iraq, who feared alienating the Iraqi tormentors when atrocities occur. Thus an
government. According to an Oxfam staff member in initial humanitarian involvement can lead to a
the region: more military one—a process involving
awkward changes of direction. Further, it is
The feeling is that we can’t jeopardise the good inherently difficult to preach humanitarianism
work we already have going by getting into a in one crisis and then not to do so in the next,
conflict with the Iraqi government up here . . . however unpromising the situation and
It’s the sort of thing we ought to be doing but however slim the interests of outside powers.
it would violate Oxfam’s line at the moment.6

6 Washington Post, 25 April 1991.

123
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 124

The war in Bosnia of the nuclear-free zone idea of the 1980s. Many
municipalities were twinned with municipalities in the
After Iraq came the disintegration of Yugoslavia and former Yugoslavia and others introduced twinning
the wars in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. arrangements during the war. Thus, Norwich was
It was the war in Bosnia, which lasted from April 1992 twinned with Novi Sad and, at the height of the war,
to October 1995, which was to generate the most Tuzla decided to twin with Bologna. These twinning
heated public debate about humanitarian intervention. arrangements provided a mechanism for the provision
There were many other wars in the world, and many of humanitarian assistance and for various other
other tragedies just as terrible as in Bosnia, as the kinds of support. Particularly in Germany, The
United Nations Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros Netherlands, and Scandinavia, municipalities became
Ghali, was to point out when he visited Sarajevo in an important source of relief and political support.
1992. But it was the war in Bosnia and the plight of As well as grass-roots groups, intellectuals and
Sarajevo that captured global attention. cultural figures (artists, writers, actors, and actresses)
In Europe a mass movement developed in the wake played an important role in the movement. In France,
of the war. Hundreds of groups sprang up both to prominent intellectuals became the ‘voice’ of the
collect and distribute aid and to increase awareness and movement. In the United States, where there were
make protests. In Italy, for example, the Italian fewer grass-roots movements, and in Europe, elite
Consortium for Solidarity was established in 1993 campaigning groups were established like Action
linking civil society groups and organisations. From Council for Peace in the Balkans which were to be
Italy alone more than 15,000 volunteers travelled to very influential. There were also cultural festivals
the war zones and some 2,200 convoys were organised. aimed at drawing attention to Sarajevo’s secular
But throughout Europe similar mobilisations took culture; and a number of writers, film makers, and
place, including the new democratic countries of people from the world of theatre travelled to
central Europe. In the Czech Republic, for example, the Sarajevo.
People in Need Foundation (Clovek v Tisni) ran a Unlike the peace movement of the 1980s, the
Mary Kaldor

television campaign and even persuaded army officers movement against the war in Bosnia was rather
to donate part of their salaries. A particularly fragmented. There were some Europe-wide networks,
interesting group was Workers Aid for Tuzla, which for example the Helsinki Citizens Assembly, but these
later became International Worker’s Aid. This group was by no means could claim to speak for the movement
A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

started by British miners who had received support as a whole. Indeed, in political terms the movement
from the town of Tuzla during the 1984 miners’ strike was deeply divided and these divisions generated a
and wanted to repay their debt. Those who drove debate about Bosnia that constituted a social learning
convoys or established local offices in war zones did process. Although there was an implicit consensus
risk their lives and a number of volunteers from several about the role of civil society in providing solidarity
European countries were killed. and a sort of unarmed protection, there were big
As well as collecting aid, local groups organised differences about what governments and inter-
novel forms of protest to draw attention to the plight national organisations should be doing and these
of Sarajevo, especially in France. In Nantes, the main differences tended to reflect different analyses of
square was renamed Sarajevo Square. In Strasbourg, the character of the war.
a checkpoint was set up on one of the main bridges, Public pressure led to a series of interventions by the
arbitrarily stopping people from crossing. And in international community: the protection of aid convoys
Grenoble, the sound of shelling and sirens was and the establishment of humanitarian corridors, safe
reproduced throughout the town at 2 a.m. to give havens, a no-fly zone, a tribunal for war crimes
the local inhabitants the feeling of what it was like committed in the former Yugoslavia, and international
to be in Sarajevo. In Britain, a group of well-known administrations for Sarajevo and Mostar. In retrospect,
personalities presented bottles of dirty water to the latter two innovations were to have considerable
the Prime Minister’s residence and to Members of significance. The Hague and Arusha Tribunals created
Parliament to show what the people in Sarajevo were a momentum for an international criminal court and
being forced to drink. the demand for the arrest of war criminals raised the
A remarkable feature of the movement was the issue of international law enforcement. Likewise, the
role played by local municipalities, a development establishment of international administrations paved

124
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 125

Body bags of victims found in mass graves after the 1995 Srebenica massacre (photo: © Reuters/Popperfoto).

the way for the protectorates in Bosnia and Kosovo. Ukrainian troops refused to hand over local people to
Again, the problem of public security in both these the Serbs and in the end were able to negotiate their
cases led to further demands for some form of safe passage.

Mary Kaldor
international policing.
But despite these innovations and despite the From Somalia to Kosovo
continuing negotiation process, the war continued
for three and a half years. It was brought to an end The war in Bosnia is the context in which to

A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

through the Dayton Agreement, which some attribute understand the decision of President George Bush
to the NATO air strikes at the end of the war and to intervene in Somalia. The Bush Administration
others to the fact that ethnic cleansing was virtually was under pressure to make a stronger commitment
complete and the Serbs and Croats had, more or less, to Bosnia and to give substance to the notion of a
succeeded in carving out ethnically pure territories. ‘new world order’. It believed that Somalia was an
The humanitarian innovations are widely considered easier case than Bosnia and that intervention in
to have been a failure. Despite the presence of troops, Somalia would relieve the pressure to step up
the Serbs and Croats were still able to dictate the intervention in Bosnia. According to Lawrence
terms of aid delivery. The safe havens of Srebrenica Eagleburger, then Secretary of State:
and Zepa fell towards the end of the war. In particular,
the massacre of 8,000 men in Srebrenica was, at The fact of the matter is that a thousand
least for the international community, the most people are starving to death every day and that
humiliating moment of the war. is not going to get better if we don’t do
The failure is attributed to the inadequacy of the something about it, and it is an area where we
mandate and the provision of insufficient troops. can affect events. There are other parts of the
Nevertheless, there were successes that suggest the world where things are equally tragic, but
failures had more to do with the difficulty of adapting where the cost of trying to change things
traditional military concepts than with insufficient would be monumental. In my view, Bosnia is
resources. Both the British and the Danish demon- one of those. (Quoted in Ramsbotham and
strated on occasion that more ‘robust’ peacekeeping Woodhouse 1996: 206)
could be effective even though they were reprimanded
by the UN command for their actions. In Zepa,

125
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 126

After the fall of the long-time Somalian dictator,

Mohammed Siad Barre, a ‘new war’ developed in which
clan-based warlords established control over territory
through displacement and atrocities inflicted by groups
of fighters known as mooryan, often under the
influence of the drug, Qat. Between November 1991
and March 1992, some 50,000 people died and 1.5
million became refugees or Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs): some 29 per cent of the pre-war population.
Humanitarian NGOs were calling for intervention and
drawing the media’s attention to the suffering in
Somalia. CARE was particularly influential and held
regular meetings with the Bush administration. Fred
Cuny was calling for armed protection of relief
enclaves. The ICRC hired armed guards for the first Mogadishu, August 1993: A Somali points at human remains
and fragments of US army cloth allegedly belonging to a US
time in its history. The European Commission was soldier (photo: © Reuters/Popperfoto).
calling for UN convoys as early as August under the
influence of European NGOs. A large advertisement in
a Dutch newspaper calling for intervention was signed The Somali intervention turned out, however, to be
by several European NGOs including Oxfam. According a debacle, as a few groups had predicted. The
to Eurostep, an organisation representing some 20 American-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) succeeded
European NGOs, there is ‘general agreement among at first in protecting aid convoys and providing secure
many European NGOs that it was not sufficient to relief centres but failed to disarm the militias,
send aid without a certain level of military protection disappointing most local Somalis. In May UNITAF was
to stop piracy’7 replaced by UNOSOM II (United Nations Operation in
Mary Kaldor

A few NGOs opposed the intervention. These included Somalia) with an even stronger mandate. However,
Save the Children, particularly its director, Mark Bowden, attacks on Pakistani troops led the American
and a group of individuals, including Alex de Waal and Commander Admiral Howe to engage in warfare
Rakiya Omaar, who broke away from Human Rights against the clan faction responsible, led by General
A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

Watch because they opposed the intervention Aideed. Despite the use of what many considered to
and formed Africa Rights. They believed that the be excessive force, the Americans failed to capture
negotiations carried out by the UN envoy Mahmoud Aideed. On the contrary, Somali militia succeeded in
Sahnoun were bearing fruit, that the immediate needs shooting down two American helicopters, killing 18
for food supply had already been solved, and that a American soldiers and wounding 75. The bodies of the
US-led intervention could be the harbinger of a new American soldiers were paraded publicly in front of
form of imperialism (Africa Rights 1993). international television cameras. Shortly thereafter
United Nations Security Council Resolution 794, the Clinton Administration took the decision to
which was passed unanimously on 2 December 1992, withdraw from Somalia.
was widely considered to break new ground. Even The debacle in Somalia led to the decision to issue
though the resolution mentions, as in 688, the threat Presidential Decision Directive 25 in May 1994, which
to ‘international peace and security’, it was the first one author has described as a ‘Somali corollary to the
resolution to authorise the use of force, under Chapter Vietnam syndrome’ (Weiss 1999: 90). PDD 25 strictly
VII of the UN Charter, to relieve human suffering. limited American participation in future peacekeeping
Many states that had opposed 688, particularly in operations. It was invoked as pressure mounted from
Africa, supported 794. For Kouchner, it was a triumph: NGOs and the media to intervene to stop the
‘a fantastic step forward, a new legal base for the horrifying genocide of Tutsis and tolerant Hutus that
international Droit d’Ingérence’. The headline in was taking place in April, May, and June 1994 in
Liberation the next day was: ‘L’humanitaire s’en va t’en Rwanda. Between 500,000 and 1 million people were
guerre’ (Allen and Styan 2000: 838). killed in 100 days. The massacre was orchestrated by
the government and the army, and carried out by
7 Interpress Service, 12 August 1992. local officials and government-organised paramilitary

126
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 127

groups using machetes and mobilised through ‘hate intervention. All the same, the immediate aftermath
radio’, Radio Milles Collines. of the tragedy seems to have led to excessive
There was at the time a small UN force of 1,500 enthusiasm for interventions; many humanitarian
troops, United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda NGOs called for intervention to protect the refugee
(UNAMIR). Despite warnings from the local com- camps of eastern Zaire, which were run by former
mander General Dallaire and proposals to seize Hutu militiamen. Before a Canadian intervention
weapons and create safe havens, the Security Council force could be mobilised, however, the camps were
took the decision to prepare for withdrawal and to overrun by Zairian rebels, and the refugees returned
scale down the UN force. Later, when it was clear that to Rwanda. It was a low point for the humanitarian
Dallaire’s warnings should have been taken seriously, NGOs. As Mark Bowden of Save the Children, one of
the Secretary-General proposed an intervention force the few NGOs to oppose intervention, put it, ‘Agencies
of 5,500; several African forces were prepared to are competing for dwindling resources, competing for
take part but they needed American logistical contracts and position and profile in the media.
support, which was not forthcoming. Indeed, the Philosophically, we are bankrupt. “Go and feed them”
Clinton Administration actively mobilised against is always our response’ (Financial Times, 3 December
those governments, NGOs, and media who wanted to 1996). Only the human rights NGOs took a different
describe what was happening in Rwanda as ‘genocide’ tack, calling for the militia to be brought before a war
for fear that this would oblige it to act under the crimes tribunal.
1948 Genocide Convention (see Wheeler 2000: Interestingly enough, at the very moment that
224–5). Rwanda was being debated, the Americans, with UN
At the end of August 1994, a French intervention authorisation, undertook a classic humanitarian
force was dispatched. But by this time the genocide intervention in Haiti. Operation Restore Democracy
was over and the Rwandan Patriotic Front had was launched in July 1994 to overthrow a brutal
succeeded in overthrowing the extremists in part. military dictatorship that had displaced the
The French intervention was suspect because of democratically elected government. In Clinton’s words,

Mary Kaldor
French support for the previous regime; and all it the purpose was ‘to protect our interests, to stop the
was able to achieve was to provide safe havens for brutal atrocities that threaten Haitians, to secure our
fleeing Hutus, many of whom were former militiamen borders and to preserve stability and democracy on our
engaged in the genocide. continent ’ (quoted in Weiss 1999: 184). Many NGOs

A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

The tragedy and disgrace of Rwanda had a were doubtful about intervention by the United States,
powerful impact on the humanitarian NGOs and on the dominant power in the region. But perhaps the
public opinion. The ICRC lost 13 staff: it was the intervention in Haiti can be considered the most
moment of change of heart towards humanitarian successful intervention of the 1990s.
During this period, there were also significant
regional interventions—ECOWAS Monitoring and
Observation Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia, the CIS
(mainly Russia) in Tajikistan—although it would
probably be misleading, especially in the Russian
case, to describe them as humanitarian. An important
part of the story is, of course, the wars in Chechnya
in 1994–6 and since 1998. Despite the fact that these
wars involved widespread violations of human rights,
outside involvement was minimal even from the
hardiest NGOs: it was here that Fred Cuny met his
end. The fact that there was no consideration of
humanitarian intervention there has been cited by
opponents of intervention as evidence of its selective
character. Although NGOs and movements like
An estimated 250,000 Rwandese refugees swept into Tanzania Soldiers Mothers and Memorial and the well-known
in 24 hours, fleeing the genocide. (photo: © UNHCR/P. human rights leader, Sergei Kovalev, did try to
Moumtzis). mobilise international support, none of these groups

127
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 128

or individuals advocated international military and the refugees returned. Bernard Kouchner was
intervention. The war against the Kurds in Turkey is chosen to head the UN Mission.
also often cited as a case of double standards since The war over Kosovo deeply divided civil society.
even international condemnation is rare. Some groups felt the intervention was justified. Some
The case of Kosovo was different. The crisis had favoured military intervention but criticised the form
been developing throughout the 1990s. From 1991, of intervention: the use of air strikes instead of ground
NGOs and commentators were warning of a likely war troops, which could have directly protected people.
in Kosovo. After Milosevic, the Serbian president, Human Rights Watch (2000b), in particular, drew
removed the autonomy of Kosovo and imposed a form attention to the ways in which NATO bombings may
of apartheid on the province, the Kosovar Albanians have violated international humanitarian law.8 For
organised a non-violent resistance movement many human rights groups Kosovo was a troubling
including the establishment of parallel institutions, moment. Many sympathised with the plight of the
especially in health and education. They called for Kosovars but at the same time found bombing
international intervention and the establishment of an repugnant and an inappropriate way to enforce human
international protectorate. It was evident that this rights. This was especially true in eastern Europe, where
situation could not be sustained. A turning point was bombing has always been regarded as much more
the Dayton Agreement, from which the issue of Kosovo unacceptable than in the West. Yet at the same time
was deliberately excluded. Many Kosovars, exhausted east European human rights groups were uneasy about
by the parallel system, concluded that non-violence criticising the air strikes, both because of sympathy
was an ineffective strategy for calling international with the Kosovars and because of the legacies of the
attention to their plight. In 1997, the Kosovo Liberation cold war. Dimitrina Petrova (2000) writes that:
Army first made its appearance with the deliberate
strategy of using violence to provoke an international Human rights defenders feared that whatever
intervention (see Independent International Com- they say immediately places them in one of two
mission on Kosovo 2000). camps—for or against NATO. And if one is
Mary Kaldor

As the conflict intensified in the spring of 1998, against NATO, one is enemy to democracy, etc.
Western leaders began to make strong statements The black and white scheme prevailed and
about the necessity for action in Kosovo. ‘We are not nuances were only possible if they were about
going to stand by and watch the Serb authorities do details. Political correctness dictated unholy
A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with in alliances.

Bosnia’, said the US Secretary of State, Madeline
Albright, in March. Similar pronouncements were
made by the UN Secretary-General, Nato’s Secretary-
General, and various foreign and defence ministers.
However, the method chosen to prevent war was
diplomacy backed by the threat of air strikes.
American leaders had drawn the—probably wrong—
conclusion from Bosnia that the Dayton Agreement
succeeded because of air strikes. Many groups inside
Kosovo and elsewhere in Europe were calling for the
deployment of ground troops to protect civilians
from the ethnic cleansing that had already begun. But
the Americans were unwilling to commit ground
troops until a very late stage in the negotiations.
When diplomacy failed, a campaign of air strikes was
undertaken. At the same time, ethnic cleansing was
dramatically accelerated. Over a million Kosovar
Albanians, the majority of the population, were
expelled from the province, and some 10,000 people
were killed. Eventually, Milosevic capitulated; an Kosovars, dumped out of trains near the F.Y.R. Macedonia, wait to
international protectorate was established in Kosovo cross the border (photo: © UNHCR/R. LeMoyne).

128
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 129

Among Palestinians almost an opposite dilemma had behaviour of the non-military United Nations Mission
to be confronted. On the one hand, there was a deep in East Timor deserves mention. They refused to be
and innate suspicion of any action by NATO and the evacuated from their headquarters in Dili until local
United States. On the other hand, many could see the staff, family members, and also Timorese who had
similarities between the plight of the Kosovars and sought refuge in the UN compound were evacuated
their own situation. Even an organisation like Human with them. This was a notable contrast to the OSCE
Rights Watch was torn by the NATO bombing monitoring mission in Kosovo, which withdrew before
between those who were strongly in favour and those the NATO bombing, leaving their local staff behind
who felt that bombing had accelerated ethnic to be killed.
cleansing.9 Part of the story of the 1990s is the way in which
Others argued more strongly that ‘military political leaders consistently learned the wrong lessons
humanism’, the phrase coined by Noam Chomsky from each intervention, which then contributed to the
(1999), had become the new justification for American failures of the next intervention, rather as generals
imperialism and the American military industrial tend to fight the previous war. In particular, inter-
complex following the demise of the Soviet threat. This national policy seems to have swung from inaction or
was the predominant view among groups which inadequate action to overwhelming force, especially
viewed themselves as peace activists, for example at the use of air strikes, and back again. It seems to have
the Hague Peace Conference, attended by some 8,000 been very difficult to chart a middle course. The safe
activists from all over the world, which took place in haven in Iraq was initially successful but was not
May during the bombing. As mentioned above, there sustained. The intervention in Bosnia was too weak and
were mass demonstrations against the bombing, or it was (probably) wrongly concluded that air strikes had
against the ‘double war’, in several countries. been a crucial factor in the success of the final
The final intervention of the 1990s was in East agreement. The intervention in Somalia was supposed
Timor. The intervention in East Timor was simply too to compensate for the weaknesses of the mandate in
late, as many civil society groups had earlier foreseen. Bosnia, however, the US-led force emphasised the use

Mary Kaldor
In reaching agreement with the Indonesian of overwhelming force at the expense of politics. The
government to hold a referendum on independence Somali debacle resulted in the non-intervention in
in East Timor, the United Nations made the tragic Rwanda, which was probably the most serious failure
mistake of leaving the Indonesian government to of the whole period. The need to restore credibility and

A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

provide security. Subsequently, Western powers may act forcefully led to the NATO air attacks against
have been too preoccupied with Kosovo as army- Yugoslavia. And the intervention in East Timor was
supported violence against the population intensified too late.
in the spring and summer of 1999. When the East What can be concluded from this sorry story? Is
Timorese voted overwhelmingly for independence, the notion of humanitarian intervention inherently
militia groups supported by the Indonesian army flawed? Is there no middle ground between inaction
went on an organised rampage, killing and displacing and overwhelming force? Or is it still possible to
people from their homes. It was not until the adapt thinking and institutions to fit the new reality?
Indonesian government agreed to a United Nations These are the questions that confront the civil society
military presence that an Australian-led force was actors concerned with this issue.
able to restore order, although by then much of the
damage had been done. In terms of the evolution of
norms of humanitarian intervention, the courageous
The Global Public Debate

A
s this story indicates, civil society actors took
8 These included cases where NATO forces: ‘conducted air attacks different positions in different conflicts, and
using cluster bombs near populated areas; attacked targets of
questionable military legitimacy including Serb Radio and opinions evolved throughout the period. Four
Television, heating plants and bridges; did not take adequate broad strands of opinion can be identified, although
precautions in warning civilians of attack; took insufficient
precautions in identifying the presence of civilians when there are overlaps and nuances that are not
attacking convoys and mobile targets; and caused excessive necessarily captured by these categories. Table 5.2
civilian casualties by not taking sufficient measures to verify
that military targets did not have concentrations of civilians summarises the different positions and the actors.
(such as Korisa)’. These categories parallel the those adopted in the
9 Interview with Human Rights Watch, February 2001. other issue chapters in this Yearbook.

129
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 130

Table 5.2: The debate about humanitarian intervention

Position Arguments Civil society groups Bosnia

Sovereignist Believe in non- interference. Individual politicians, War was a civil war. Should
Wars for national interest only. especially on right. Traditional not risk lives of nationals for
left and nationalist groups. others in civil war. Should not
jeopardise principle of non-
intervention.

Just war War is justified for Rhetoric of centre politicians War was an international war
humanitarian purposes. and prominent intellectuals. of aggression by Serbia (and
Morality is more important Civil society groups among Croatia) against Bosnia.
than legality. victims of large-scale human Support for Bosnian
rights abuses. government including lifting
arms embargo and air strikes
against Serb positions.

Humanitarian Governments cannot be Many humanitarian and peace Opposed military intervention.
peace trusted. Humanitarian groups. Human rights groups Favoured negotiation at both
intervention is a cover for divided. governmental and grass-roots
imperialism. Should be civil levels.
society intervention.
Mary Kaldor

Human rights Civil society needs framework International human rights Pressed for safe
enforcement of law. Humanitarian groups especially in havens and international
intervention is not war but Europe and North America. criminal tribunal. Wanted
A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

international law enforcement. Also some think tanks and more robust military role on
Must involve direct protection commissions. the ground in support of
of civilians and arrest of war these objectives.
criminals.

Sovereignist (rejectionists) 1996; Jackson 2000). The latter are known as ‘realists’
in the international relations literature; they believe in
This is a French term which describes those people or a Hobbesian world characterised by international
groups who oppose humanitarian intervention either anarchy where states have to act according to the
because they support the principle of non-intervention dictates of survival. With the collapse of communism
or because they believe that intervention should be and the spread of democracy in Africa and Latin
carried out only in the national interest. The former are America, the number of sovereignists is declining.
known in the international relations literature as However, they are still to be found among Third World
‘pluralists’ who believe in a rule-governed society of and Eastern elites, particularly in authoritarian states,
states in which an important rule is the principle of and on the Western right.
non-intervention. The principle is considered important Among intervening countries, an important
because it promotes stability and inhibits powerful version of the realist argument is the nationalist
states from imposing their hegemony on weak states argument that nationals are privileged over
(see Wheeler 2000; Ramsbotham and Woodhouse foreigners. The job of states is to protect their own

130
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 131

Somalia Kosovo Sierra Leone

Intervention was human rights Air strikes were NATO Authoritarian leaders with geo-
imperialism. imperialism. political interest in non-
Should not risk lives for others in Should not prioritise Kosovo intervention by others.
civil war. over relations with Russia.

Favoured overwhelming force Supported air strikes against Support for unilateral
against warring clans particularly Yugoslavia. interventions: Executive Outcomes,
Aideed. ECOMOG, and Britain.

Opposed military intervention. Against ‘double war’: both Distrust of all military forces.
Supported efforts of UN NATO bombing and Milosevic Interventions too one-sided.
negotiator, Mahmoud Sahnoun, to war against Kosovar Albanians. Favour civil society reconciliation.
involve civil society in talks. Supported stronger OSCE
presence.

Mary Kaldor
Favoured military intervention Favoured ground intervention Favour more robust UN presence.
aimed at disarming militias and to protect Kosovar Albanians Greater efforts to protect civilians,
providing security on the ground, based on more robust OSCE arrest criminals, and implement

A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

not just delivering aid. presence. disarmament and demobilisation.

nationals and not others. Thus, for example, Samuel ‘Why did you accept such a ridiculous job?’
Huntington wrote in 1992 that ‘it is morally Heath asked me in a friendly tone. I told him
unjustifiable and politically indefensible that that I thought prosecuting war criminals was
members of the armed forces should be killed to important, especially given the magnitude of
prevent Somalis from fighting one another’ (quoted the crimes committed in Bosnia. Heath replied
in Weiss 1999: 90). Similar views were expressed to the effect that if people wished to murder
during the Bosnian war, especially among those who one another, as long as they did not do so in
understood the war as an endless continuation of his country, it was not his concern and should
ancient rivalries. Richard Goldstone (2000: 74), for not be the concern of the British government.
example, describes meeting Edward Heath just after At the time, his opinion startled me. Little did I
he had been appointed Chief Prosecutor for the realise that he was candidly stating what many
Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals: leading politicians in major Western countries
were saying privately—and what many of them
believe.

131
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 132

Among Third World and east European nationalist the ‘laws of war’, military necessity is considered to
movements, intervention is viewed as imperialism. override the laws of war in some instances. Moreover,
In Serbia and Iraq, nationalist demonstrations, they privilege the lives of nationals. Thus, the lives of
undoubtedly orchestrated by the governments, were foreign civilians are sometimes risked in order to save
held to oppose Western intervention. Serbian the lives of soldiers.
opposition to sanctions and later to the bombing The Blair position is supported by many intel-
during the Kosovo war seems to have strengthened lectuals who took a similar stance during the Bosnian
nationalist feelings and helps to explain the war, especially in France, the United States, and
nationalist character of the post-Milosevic regime. central Europe. They argued that the war in Bosnia
The imperialist argument is also shared by radical was international, initiated by Serbian (and Croatian)
anti-globalisation groups. These groups oppose the aggression against the Bosnian state; they lobbied for
spread of global capitalism and see the state as military intervention and tended to favour air strikes
defending the poor. For them, Chomsky’s theory of and lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia to allow
‘military humanism’ is an expression of a view of the for self-defence as a way of minimising outside
United States and NATO as the military arm of global casualties. These groups are often the descendants of
capitalism. They point to the selective character of the cold war human-rights community. Kouchner
intervention and suggest that so-called humanitarian belongs to this strand of opinion, as do some
intervention is undertaken only in places where it American intellectuals like Aryeh Neier.
suits Western interests and not elsewhere. These Another important group that supports the just
groups bring together remnants of the traditional war position is the direct representatives of the
left and a new generation which has not experienced victims. Civil society groups in Kosovo, Rwanda, Haiti,
the traumas of communism. Of course, it needs to or East Timor supported intervention of any kind—it
be stressed that these groups overlap with the did not matter how or by whom the intervention
humanitarian peace position (see below); they may was carried out nor whether it was approved by the
not be against all forms of intervention. UN Security Council. They wanted protection. The
Mary Kaldor

Kosovars, of course, favoured ground troops but they

Just war (supporters) were grateful for the air strikes.

The most well-known proponent of the just war Humanitarian peace (alternatives)
A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

position is the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who

famously proclaimed that the NATO air strikes over The third strand of opinion is to be found among
Kosovo represented the first ‘war for human rights’: some humanitarian organisations and among peace
‘This is a just war, based not on territorial ambitions groups. These groups share some of the scepticism of
but values’ (Blair 1999). The ‘just war’ position differs the sovereignists. They distrust US-led interventions
from the human-rights enforcement position (see because they fear a new form of Western imperialism;
below) in that it combines national and humanitarian defending human rights becomes a new ‘colonising
assumptions. War is between two sides and the enterprise’. They do not believe that governments,
goal of war is to defeat an enemy with minimum whose job is to protect the ‘national interest’, can act
casualties on one’s own side. Typically, the ‘just war’ for ‘noble purposes’. In addition, some of these groups
proponents favour air strikes and the use of are pacifist and believe that it is a fundamental
overwhelming force, although they also favour contradiction to suppose that human rights can be
precision bombing to minimise ‘collateral damage’, defended by military means. Where they differ from
that is, civilian casualties. the sovereignists is in their insistence on civil society
‘Just war’ proponents tend to place more emphasis intervention. Human rights protection, the delivery
on morality and military necessity than on legality. If of relief, and conflict prevention and resolution,
the cause is just, they favour unilateral intervention, according to this view, are the job of civil society, not
that is to say, intervention without UN Security Council governments.
authorisation. (According to the UN Charter, all forms This debate about humanitarian peace versus just war
of force, except self-defence, are prohibited unless was an important reason for the split in MSF in 1979.
authorised by the Security Council.) Although they Kouchner and his supporters, known as the
would insist that wars should be fought according to ‘légitimiste’ tendency, took the view that NGOs lacked

132
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 133

the capacity to meet serious humanitarian needs. protection of the victims, and the arrest of war
Their role was symbolic: to draw attention to the criminals. It scrupulously respects human rights and
plight of victims, to mobilise the media, and to humanitarian law in implementing its mission. It is
influence governments. The other group, known as the more like policing than war, although it may require
‘indépendantiste’ tendency, argued that morality more robust action than domestic policing. It
should not be confused with politics and that only involves impartiality in the sense that all civilians,
NGOs were capable of genuinely humanitarian action whatever their views or ethnic background, need
(see Brauman 1996). As François Jean of MSF put it: to be protected and, likewise, all war criminals need
to be opposed whatever side they are on. But this is
We were against this principle [of not the same as neutrality—a position implied by the
humanitarian intervention] because we felt sovereignists and the humanitarian peace groups—
that it was mainly the right for a strong state since one side is almost always more responsible for
to intervene in a weak state . . . we questioned human rights abuses than the other. The war in
the purity of any state undertaking so-called Kosovo, justifiable or not, cannot be classified as a
humanitarian intervention. humanitarian intervention since it was a war
(Allen and Styan 2000: 836) between NATO and Yugoslavia rather than a direct
intervention to protect Kosovar Albanians on the
A similar position is taken by peace groups, especially ground.
those that took on humanitarian roles, and conflict For the human rights enforcement position, legality
resolution groups. Groups in Germany and Italy often is very important since the very concept of humani-
argued that the Bosnian war was a civil war between tarian intervention is based on the idea of
different nationalist groups; they opposed any form strengthening international law. In effect, humani-
of military intervention and favoured negotiations tarian intervention is understood as filling the
both at a political level and at the level of civil society. enforcement gap in international law. Those who
Many of these groups mobilised humanitarian support this position would accept that, at present,

Mary Kaldor
assistance and undertook local mediation projects. there is a gap on occasion between morality and
Indeed, the practice of civil society intervention in legality since the Security Council is dominated by the
conflicts greatly increased in the 1990s not only in great powers, who can veto humanitarian intervention
the former Yugoslavia but in other regions as well, for reasons of self-interest. They would favour a

A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

especially the Transcaucasus and the Middle East. An strengthening of international law to close that gap.
important aspect of this civil society activity is the A thoughtful expression of this view has been
links that are made with local groups and the elaborated by the president of the Sierra Leone Bar
knowledge that is gained about the local situation. Association in comparing the legality of the NATO
The argument is that civil society is better equipped intervention in Kosovo and the ECOMOG intervention
than governments to undertake actions at the level in Sierra Leone:
of society that are needed in the new types of wars
(Marcon and Pianta 2001). Regardless of the legality, missions such as
NATO’s and ECOMOG’s will become the norm
Human rights enforcement (reformists) rather the exception. The United Nations made
a mortal mistake in Rwanda, when it sat back
The fourth strand of opinion is to be found among and watched genocide occur. This must never
parts of the peace movement, especially those which happen again . . . Increasingly, the question will
took up human rights issues like the Helsinki Citizens not simply be whether it is legal but whether it
Assembly, and large parts of the human rights is moral. These moral and ethical questions will
movement. It distinguishes humanitarian inter- increasingly force the international community
vention from war. Humanitarian intervention is a to accept this exception and formulate better
method of enforcing international law with respect laws to avoid these catastrophes and better
to human rights and the laws of war where the protect human rights. (Tejan-Cole 2001)
state has collapsed or where the state itself violates
the law. Law enforcement is different from war. It Those who favour human rights enforcement share the
involves minimising casualties on all sides, direct views of the humanitarian peace groups about the

133
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 134

important role of civil society. But they take the view Intervention in 2000:
that civil society, while playing a crucial role in
correcting the abuses of the state, can exist only in the The Case of Sierra Leone
framework of the rule of law. This lesson was rudely
learned at the outbreak of the Bosnian war, when, in

T
here were two main new UN missions in 2000.
the euphoric aftermath of the 1989 revolutions, it One was the force sent to Congo to implement
was hoped that citizens could prevent war through the ill-fated Lusaka Peace Accord, which has
mass public action. In the months leading up to never been able to fulfil its mandate since none of the
the war there were demonstrations and campaigns parties has respected the agreement (International
throughout Bosnia. But the war began when snipers Crisis Group 2000). The other was the intervention in
fired on a mass demonstration in Sarajevo, demanding Sierra Leone, which led to an additional unilateral
the establishment of an international protectorate. In British intervention. The war in Sierra Leone is a
wars, civil society is the first victim, and the longer the typical ‘new war’. Events during 2000 attracted the
wars are the more civil society is destroyed. attention of the humanitarian, peace, and human
Humanitarian intervention cannot resolve con- rights communities; all of the positions described
flicts. But it can create a secure environment in which above can be illustrated in relation to outside
civil society can be strengthened and peaceful intervention. For these reasons, and because it took
solutions found. It was this strand of opinion, mainly place in 2000, it is worth exploring the example in
to be found in western Europe and inside Bosnia, that some detail.
in the case of the Bosnian war favoured a new kind of
military intervention aimed directly at protecting Background
civilians and creating space for political alternatives.
Hence, it was this group that, together with some of The war in Sierra Leone began on 23 March 1991,
the humanitarian NGOs, called for an international when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by
protectorate for Bosnia, and later for safe havens, for Foday Saybana Sankoh invaded Sierra Leone with a
Mary Kaldor

local protectorates especially in Sarajevo and Mostar, group of dissident Sierra Leoneans, Liberians, and
for opening Tuzla airport, and for lifting the siege of mercenaries (Hirsch 2001). The rebels, the RUF, were
Sarajevo. Likewise, it was this group that favoured led by a group of radical student leaders trained in
ground intervention in Kosovo. Libya and backed by Charles Taylor of Liberia.
A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

The version of humanitarian intervention favoured According to one view, they were angry about the
by the human rights enforcers occupies the middle corrupt character of the patrimonial state and their
ground between inaction (favoured by sovereignist and exclusion from power (Richards 1996). They mobilised
humanitarian peace proponents) and overwhelming poor, unemployed, rural young people through a
force (favoured by just war proponents). So far, combination of fear, material inducements, and the
no international military operation easily fits this offer of adventure. The methods of the rebels were
description of humanitarian intervention. Does this particularly brutal: the practice of amputation in the
mean that the human rights enforcement position is areas they conquered is legendary.10 Whatever
utopian? Will either the just war position or the their original motivations, however, the conflict
humanitarian peace position bring us closer to coping increasingly became a war about ‘pillage not politics’
with ‘new wars’? It is certainly true that neither the and about control of the lucrative diamond trade. The
legal system nor the structure and training of military rebels were under the control of Charles Taylor and
forces is yet adapted to humanitarian intervention. the war enabled him to gain access to the diamond
But those who insist on human rights enforcement fields. Diamonds have always played a central role in
would argue that this has to be done. The humani-
tarian peace approach, they would say, can do no 10 According to Paul Richards (1996: 164), ‘Rebel violence in Sierra
Leone is no instructive response to population pressure but a
more than alleviate suffering. The just war position mobilisation of youth on behalf of a small group of people angry
can have the opposite effect from that intended by at their exclusion from an opaque patrimonial political system
serving mineral extraction interests. In working through their
engaging in forms of violence that are not so very anger some of the cultural scar tissue from the days of the slave
different from those they are supposed to prevent; trade—a trade active in the forests of eastern Sierra Leone until
mid-nineteenth century—is once more exposed. The upper
there is no such thing as a civilised war any longer if Guinean forests continue to resonate with the seizure of young
there ever was. people and their induction into a world of heightened violence’.

134
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 135

Sierra Leonean politics, involving a murky mixture of Tribunal for Sierra Leone as well as confirmation of
the various warring factions in Lebanon, Israeli Mary Robinson’s position that the agreement cannot
‘investors’, and American and Russian crime families, apply to ‘crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity,
not to mention the Antwerp diamond traders. As war crimes, and other serious violations of
Smillie, Gberie, and Hazelton (2000: 1) put it: ‘The international humanitarian law’.
point of the war may not actually have been to win In October 1999 the UN Security Council
it but to engage in profitable crime under the cover authorised the establishment of the United Nations
of warfare’. Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which replaced
Since the war began, around 75,000 people have the UN Observer Mission set up in 1998. At that time,
died and around half the population of 4.5 million has up to 6,000 troops were authorised. UNAMSIL’s
been displaced. All sides have recruited children and mission was to assist the implementation of the
have given them drugs, particularly cocaine and Agreement and it included an explicit mandate, under
marijuana. Terrible atrocities have been committed Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to ‘protect’ civilians
including ‘amputation of limbs, ears and lips with under ‘imminent threat of physical violence’. In
machetes, decapitation, branding, and the gang rape February 2000 UNAMSIL’s troops were increased to
of women and children’ (Conciliation Resources 2000: 11,100 and its mandate further extended to include
13). The first outside intervention occurred in 1993, the provision of security at key locations in and near
when Gurkha Security Group, a private security Freetown and at all disarmament sites. Despite the
company mainly made up of Nepalese Gurkhas, was mandate, UNAMSIL was very slow to implement the
hired by the government; it was forced to withdraw disarmament and demobilisation provisions of the
after suffering heavy casualties, including the murder agreement and was considered insufficiently robust
of its American commander, Robert Mackenzie. Then in protecting civilians. In May, the RUF attacked UN
in 1995 the private South African company Executive personnel; a number of troops were killed and some
Outcomes repelled an RUF attack on Freetown. 500 taken hostage.
Indeed, throughout the period a number of private At this point, the British sent to Sierra Leone some

Mary Kaldor
security companies have been present in Sierra Leone. 700 troops, who were well-trained and well-equipped
In 1996, as a result of pressure from civil society, and given a robust mandate; they helped to protect
elections were held and were won by Ahmed Tejan the capital and to create the conditions for the release
Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People’s Party; this was of the hostages. The UN troops were also increased

A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

followed by the Abidjan peace agreement. However, to 13,000. In August, eleven British soldiers were also
the following year Kabbah was overthrown in a coup captured by the rebels. Five were released and the
by parts of the Sierra Leonean army led by Major remaining six were rescued in September. In the
Johnny Paul Koroma. He formed the Armed Forces process, the notorious West Side Boys, one of the
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and invited the RUF to most brutal rebel groups, were rounded up. British
join it. Then in February 1998, the AFRC, in turn, was troops later withdrew but additional reinforcements
overthrown by the Nigerian-led West African force were announced in October; emphasis was placed
ECOMOG. Despite a brutal attack on Freetown by the on training the army and the police. The Indian and
rebels in January 1999, the return of Kabbah paved the Jordanian contingents also withdrew after the Indian
way for a peace agreement signed in July 1999. The commander, Major-General Vijay Jetley, wrote a secret
agreement included a blanket amnesty as well as memorandum to the Security Council accusing
important positions in government for the rebels. As Nigerian officials, including the UN Special
the then American Ambassador, John Hirsch (2001: Representative and the UNAMSIL deputy commander,
80), put it, ‘For the democratic forces, the Lomé of colluding with the rebels. A new ceasefire
negotiations were a bitter and painful reversal from agreement was signed in November 2000.
the international ostracism of the RUF almost Other measures taken by the United Nations
two years earlier’. The Agreement was criticised by include further strengthening of UNAMSIL, the
Mary Robinson, the UN High Commissioner for Human imposition of an arms embargo and a diamond
Rights, and several international NGOs, primarily for embargo on Liberia (from where rebel diamonds are
the blanket amnesty. In a letter to the UN Security exported), the introduction of diamond certification,
Council dated 19 May 2000, Human Rights Watch and the establishment of a war crimes tribunal,
requested the setting up of an International Criminal although funds for the latter have not been secured.

135
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 136

Box 5.3: A chronology of the interventions in Sierra Leone

23 March 1991: RUF invades Sierra Leone with RUF to join them. Widespread civil disobedience
support from Liberia and Burkina Faso, led by Foday and international condemnation. Thousands flee
Sankoh. Sierra Leone, including Kabbah and many civil
29 April 1992: Coup against authoritarian leader, society activists.
Joseph Momoh. Formation of National Provisional February 1998: Nigerian led ECOMOG forces
Ruling Council (NPRC), led by Captain Valentine overthrow AFRC.
Strasser. 6 January 1999: RUF and AFRC attack Freetown.
1993: NPRC hires mercenaries including Gurkha After two weeks of fighting in which 5,000–6,000
unit, which is later defeated. people die and hundreds are mutilated, ECOMOG
restores control.
April–July 1995: South African-led company
Executive Outcomes expels the RUF from Freetown 7 July 1999: Signing of Lomé Peace Accord.
and the environs, retakes the bauxite and rutile Includes power sharing between government and
mines, and secures the Kono diamond fields. rebels, blanket amnesty for rebels, disarmament
Payment is cash and diamond concessions. and demobilisation, and establishment of
commissions for human rights and for truth and
August 1995: After massive demonstrations
reconciliation. Civil society groups play an active
organised by women’s groups, a National
role through parallel negotiations. Although civil
Consultative Conference is held. The conference
society has an important role in implementation,
calls for elections and for a negotiated settlement.
there is great disappointment about power sharing
March 1996: After Strasser is overthrown in a and the blanket amnesty.
palace coup, elections are held. Won by former UN
22 October 1999: UN Security Council authorises
Mary Kaldor

bureaucrat Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.

establishment of UN Mission in Sierra Leone
November 1996: Abidjan peace accord. Includes (UNAMSIL) of up to 6,000 troops including 260
amnesty for RUF, transformation of RUF into a unarmed observers, under Chapter VII (Resolution
A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

political party, disarmament and demobilisation of 1270).

combatants, reduction of armed forces, and 7 February 2000: UN Security Council expands
withdrawal of Executive Outcomes. (Executive UNAMSIL to 11,100 troops. Mandate expanded to
Outcomes is dismissed in January because Kabbah provision of security at key locations in and near
cannot pay them.) Within a few weeks, fighting Freetown and at all disarmament sites.
resumes.
1 May 2000: RUF seizes nearly 500 Kenyan and
March 1997: Sankoh is arrested in Nigeria on Zambian peacekeepers in remote locations in north
weapons charges. and east. Britain sends 700 paratroopers to restore
25 May 1997: Coup by junior officers calling security in and around Freetown and to bolster
themselves Armed Forces Revolutionary Council morale and resolve of peacekeepers.
(AFRC). New Leader is Major Johnny Paul Koroma.
The junta suspends the constitution and invites the

The role of civil society donors, like the US and the UK, diaspora groups,
international NGOs present in Sierra Leone, and West
Since 1994 and 1995 a number of civil society peace African networks, particularly links with Nigerian
initiatives have been taken. Most of these initiatives civil society.
were local but they would not have been possible, at In 1996 a coalition of groups including trades
least not on the same scale, without international unions, journalists, paramount chiefs, and well-known
support. This included support from international academics began to press for elections. Particularly

136
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 137

8 May 2000: Massive civil society protest in 25 August 2000: Eleven British military personnel
Freetown demanding release of peacekeepers. 30,000 taken hostage by West Side Boys together with one
people move towards Sankoh’s house. Sankoh’s member of the Sierra Leone Army.
bodyguards open fire, killing 19 people and injuring 10 September 2000: British rescue mission releases
dozens. Sankoh flees over a back wall in women’s hostages and attacks the West Side Boys’ base. Some
clothing. West Side Boys killed and many surrender as a result
12 May 2000: Funeral of civilians killed in protest. of both British attacks and Operation Thunderbolt.
14 May 2000: Friends of Sierra Leone send letter to 20 September 2000: India announces the
President Clinton calling for stronger action in Sierra withdrawal of Indian troops from UNAMSIL
Leone following disagreement between Indian commander
17 May 2000: Sankoh captured and arrested. and Nigerian officials about conduct of war.
19 May 2000: UN Security Council authorises 26 September 2000: US Congressional hearing on
further increase in strength of UNAMSIL up to child amputees.
13,000 (Resolution 1299). 9–14 October 2000: UN Security Council Mission
20 May 2000: Human Rights Watch letter to UN to Sierra Leone. Stresses need for a comprehensive
Security Council. strategy and for regional approach (S/2000/922).
June 2000: Most hostages released after 10 October 2000: British government announces a
negotiations through Charles Taylor of Liberia. package of additional measures, including military
assistance to the Sierra Leone government, a rapid-
5 July 2000: UN Security Council imposes an reaction capability in support of UNAMSIL, and staff
embargo on all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone

Mary Kaldor
officers seconded to UNAMSIL.
unless they have a government of Sierra Leone
Certificate of Origin (Resolution 1306). 19 October 2000: Jordan announces the withdrawal
of Jordanian troops from UNAMSIL.
22 July 2000: UNAMSIL Operation Thunderbolt

A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

frees roadblocks between Freetown and airport and 10 November 2000: Ceasefire signed under
attacks Occra base of West Side Boys, a paramilitary ECOWAS auspices in Abuja. Under agreement, RUF
group including RUF and AFRC personnel. agrees to free movement of persons and goods
throughout the country, to return seized weapons,
14 August 2000: UN Security Council authorises the and to disarm. UNAMSIL guaranteed free movement
UN Secretary-General to negotiate the establishment throughout Sierra Leone
of an independent Special Court to try persons
responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity, 30 March 2001: UN Security Council authorises
and violations of international humanitarian law, further increase in UNAMSIL up to 17,500 troops
as well as crimes under relevant Sierra Leonean law (Resolution 1346).
committed on the territory of Sierra Leone
(Resolution 1315).

important was the women’s movement. Women’s Women’s Forum, in order to prepare for the United
groups had always been active in Sierra Leone, in the Nations’ Women’s Conference in Beijing, with
churches, local communities, or Descendants groups — international support. This was the moment they
that is, descendants from original slave settlers. These became aware of their potential, and some of the
groups were active all over the country and had an
enormous mobilising potential.11 But it was not until 11 Interview with Yasmin Jusu-Sherif, a prominent member of Sierra
1994 that they came together to establish the Leone Women’s movement, 27 March 2001.

137
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 138

women argued for a more political stance and in needed to cement any agreement that would
particular the need for women to play a role in come out. Both parties were confronted with
securing peace; as a result the Sierra Leonean women’s what was going to happen after the signing of
peace movement was formed. It was felt that women an agreement and the problems to be
were able to play a more active role because they confronted in the process of peace
were less threatening to the military government and consolidation. It also helped to bring into the
therefore had more room to act. The first peace open the bitterness of the war that had caused
demonstration was held in January 1995. It was: so much destruction both in terms of human
life and property. The RUF needed to see and
a joyous carnival affair led by a then little- feel the bitterness of Sierra Leonean society
known paediatrician, Fattima Boie-Kamara . . . against them to bring them down from the
Female professionals, previously known for Ivory Tower they had created for themselves at
standing aloof from the concerns of ordinary Lomé. (Oludipe 2000: 88)
people, danced through Freetown, linking arms
with female soldiers, petty traders, and student Civil society representatives were appointed to the
nurses, singing choruses. The message of the various commissions responsible for the implemen-
demonstrators was simple and compelling: ‘Try tation of Lomé. The capture of UN equipment and
peace to end this senseless war.’ (Yasmin Jusu- peacekeepers was a bitter disappointment. As Zainab
Sherif in Conciliation Resources 2000: 47–9) Bangura put it: ‘When civil society groups realised
that true peace was still an illusion, despite all efforts
Previous peace groups had been considered rebel and sacrifices, they became very angry.’ The con-
sympathisers or ‘fifth columnist’. The emergence of a sequence was a massive demonstration in Freetown,
mass women’s movement made peace a respectable demanding the release of the peacekeepers. Some
option. The demand for democratisation was seen 30,000 people moved towards the house of Foday
as a condition for ending the war and women played Sankoh, where his bodyguards opened fire and killed
Mary Kaldor

a key role in the National Consultative Conference 17 people. Sankoh ran away but a few days later he
that was held in August 1995 and prepared the way was captured and arrested.
for elections. In the event, there was disappointment
that the first peace agreement and the Kabbah The public debate about intervention
A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

government, in practice, excluded women.

After the coup, some 200,000 people left Sierra All four global civil society positions can be identified
Leone, many of them civil society activists. Branches in relation to the debate about intervention in Sierra
of the Women’s Forum were established in London Leone.
and in Conakry, Guinea. Nevertheless, civil society The sovereignist position is rather limited, put
groups were to play an active role in the Lomé forward primarily by President Charles Taylor of
agreement. In addition to the women’s movement, Liberia and President Blaise Campaore of Burkina
new groups were important like the Inter-Religious Faso. Both are authoritarian leaders supporting the
Council, established in 1997, and the Campaign for rebels and engaged in the illegal diamond trade.
Good Governance led by Zainab Bangura. A Nigerian The dominant opinion among civil society groups
NGO, the Centre for Democracy and Development inside Sierra Leone lies somewhere between just war
(CDD), organised a Round Table in parallel with the and human rights enforcement. Civil society groups
formal negotiations. According to Zainab Bangura: inside Sierra Leone were strongly supportive of
effective outside intervention, whether or not it was
To my mind, more was achieved in the two-day authorised by the United Nations. Thus, they supported
meeting than during the entire process of Executive Outcomes, ECOMOG, and the latest British
negotiation. The round-table brought together intervention, although they have become increasingly
two extreme positions and unveiled the disillusioned with UNAMSIL. When the British arrived,
arrogance of the rebels and the defiance of civil the main reaction of Sierra Leonean civil society,
society. The two forces clashed and accepted according to Kayode Fayemi of CDD was ‘thank god’.12
for the first time that they would have to deal
with each other. It was a reality that was 12 Interview, March 2001.

138
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 139

The failure of the two peace agreements has left civil Ganda, are interested only in diamonds. Ganda thinks
society activists disillusioned with the possibility of a that the British ought to have put their forces under
negotiated peace, while the weakness and corruption UN command and to have helped to enhance the
of the government have underlined the necessity for legitimacy and effectiveness of the UN forces. Instead,
outside intervention. In an e-mail communication of they are retraining an army which had earlier been
24 January 2001, Zainab Bangura explains: involved in coups and repression. What is needed,
according to Ganda, is grass-roots reconciliation on a
The only language the RUF understands is broad scale and not elections since ‘politicians prey on
violence. For there to be peace, the military the prejudices and fears of the electorate to retain or
capability of the RUF has to be reduced. This gain power’.
can be only done by force. This is a fact that A similar view is expressed by Christopher
every Sierra Leonean with the exception of the Clapham, an Africanist at the University of Lancaster.
government understands. And the only people According to Clapham, the Lomé Agreement of 1999:
who have ever successfully subdued the RUF
are the Executive Outcomes and the ECOMOG. ostensibly established a coalition between an
This is why Sierra Leoneans have very fond ineffectual elected government and a ruthless
memories of the two forces and always armed opposition with a record of reneging on
want them to stay . . . On the issue of neo- agreements. It is open to the UN to send real
colonialism over 90 per cent of Sierra Leoneans fighting forces into situations like Sierra Leone,
believe and know that our predicament is due to kill or be killed, if the states concerned
to mismanagement, corruption, and bad would allow it. That would be a very hazardous
governance. The people responsible are still enterprise and unlikely to lead to the
running the country. So there is big disdain, reconstruction of Sierra Leone. But at least the
hatred and bitterness for the ruling class. UN would have some idea of what it was
Most people would like to see the bulk of the supposed to be doing. Peacekeeping in recent

Mary Kaldor
institutions of government run by expatriates. conflicts is a farce, fuelled by wishful thinking.
This tells you how despondent they are with We’d be better off without it . . . No matter how
their own people. tragic the loss of life, and how appalling the
abuse of rights, the UN and its leading states

A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

In other words, civil society groups inside Sierra Leone must recognise the limitations on their
want order restored and see the rebels as the main capacities and come to terms with a world they
problem. Of course, they would prefer an intervention cannot control. They must resist the temptation
that minimises casualties and prioritises the protection to send peacekeepers into situations where
of civilians, just as the Kosovar Albanians would have they add to the number of victims of the UN’s
preferred ground intervention to air strikes, but they naivety and over-ambition.13
prefer any kind of intervention to none.
Outside Sierra Leone, views are more mixed. Clapham argues that both intervention and efforts at
Ambrose Ganda, who runs the influential Website negotiation have failed. The only alternative is a
Focus on Sierra Leone (URL), puts forward an argument massive internal civil society effort at reconciliation
that is closer to the humanitarian peace position. (CDD 2000).
Ganda argues that the intervention is too one-sided. The final position, human rights enforcement, can
Basically it is propping up a corrupt government—a be found among international and Nigerian NGOs.
‘bunch of discredited, crooked and obnoxious Throughout 2000, human rights groups like Human
politicians’. In theory, it should be possible to have a Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Friends of
genuine humanitarian intervention that is non- Sierra Leone—a group made up of former Peace Corps
partisan and even-handed and under UN auspices. volunteers in Sierra Leone—were lobbying for a more
However, in practice it is difficult to conceive of forceful UN presence. They pressed for more robust
genuinely disinterested outside intervention. The UN protection of civilians, for the prosecution of war
is dominated by the great powers, which have little
interest in Africa. Moreover, the mainly Nigerian UN 13 ‘Saturday Debate: Should the UN get out of Sierra Leone?’,
peacekeepers at present in Sierra Leone, according to Guardian, 22 May 2000.

139
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 140

British, the UN forces, and private security forces.

The primary mission of an outside force is to protect
civilians and to reduce and control these various
soldiers and rebels. Up to now, the most that outside
forces seem to be able to achieve is to freeze the
status quo with the rebels still controlling the eastern
diamond areas and the government with British
support in control of Freetown. Under the Lomé
agreement the UN forces were supposed to protect
civilians from physical harm and to carry out a
disarmament and demobilisation programme, which
would offer fighters a more productive and stable
alternative to their present employment and provide
an opportunity to integrate the country. That is still
the priority. Reducing the number of men in arms
and the amounts of armaments requires more
Freetown, Sierra Leone, March 1998: Welcome messages were effectiveness and robustness than has been displayed
daubed on the roads in February 1998 when ECOMOG so far. The advantage of the UN is that, at least in
peacekeepers intervened (photo: Reuters/Popperfoto).
theory, it enjoys more legitimacy than forces closely
identified with the government.
crimes, and for the control of diamonds. They also
favour a regional approach towards negotiation.
Friends of Sierra Leone ( URL ) organised a US
Conclusion
congressional hearing in September for child

W
hat is striking about the last decade is the
amputees. emergence of what might be called a global
Mary Kaldor

Nigeria dominates ECOMOG and Nigerian NGOs humanitarian regime. It involves changing
faced real dilemmas about its role. The Nigerian norms: a growing consensus about respect for human
dictator, General Abacha, was using ECOMOG to serve rights, a strengthening of international law (the
his own ambition of becoming a regional hegemon. International Criminal Court, international protect-
A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

This was costing some $1 million a day. Moreover, by orates, land mines convention, universal jurisdiction
using humanitarian arguments he was able to shore for grave human rights violations, and so on), a
up his own position. At the same time there was growing readiness by governments to commit
much sympathy for the plight of the Sierra Leoneans. resources (money and troops) to humanitarian
As Kayode Fayemi put it, ‘The internal project of purposes, and above all a significant growth of global
dislodging the military from power conflicted with civil society groups who focus on the issue of
the pan-African ideal of helping Africans in need humanitarian intervention in various ways.
which all Africans imbibe from birth’.14 A public The role of global civil society has been crucial in
debate after the death of Abacha and the transition underpinning this global humanitarian regime. During
to democracy led to the withdrawal of ECOMOG the 1990s, international NGOs, think tanks, and com-
and the establishment of UNAMSIL, to which the missions concerned with conflict prevention,
Nigerians were the main contributors. management, and resolution have proliferated. Many of
Thus the human rights enforcement position these groups are actively engaged on the ground in
basically entails the view that outsiders do need to conflict zones. Equally, if not more important, has been
provide security in Sierra Leone if the project of civil the emergence of local grass-roots groups, as in Bosnia
society reconciliation is to be achieved. However, and Sierra Leone, which have seen the advantage of
that outside role has to take a specific form. At making transnational links or developing networks as
present there is a proliferation of military forces in a way of protecting local civic space, as a source of
Sierra Leone: the rebels, various government forces technical and financial assistance, and as a way of
including militia groups such as the kamajors, the transmitting local knowledge, proposals, and ideas to
global decision-makers. Global civil society has provided
14 Interview, March 2001. a direct form of protection for civilians in conflict zones,

140
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 141

with or without the support of outside governments, rights activists but opposes the use of soldiers. Even in
and has generated a global public debate about the most well-ordered societies, police take risks to
whether, when, and how humanitarian intervention maintain the security of ordinary citizens. The human
should be undertaken. rights enforcement position would require the same
Of the four positions outlined in this chapter, three sort of commitment at an international level.
(just war, humanitarian peace, and human rights The trend towards global humanitarianism is, of
enforcement) favour humanitarian intervention, course, reversible. The fourth position—the rejectionist
although they differ about what this means. For the just sovereignist position—seemed to be a minority view
war position it can mean war; for the humanitarian during the 1990s. However, the new Bush administration
peace position it means civil society intervention; and in the US is much closer to a sovereignist position than
for the human rights enforcement position it means a the previous administration; and the spread of
combination of civil society intervention and a new nationalist and fundamentalist political movements
form of international policing. Few of the conflicts of shows no sign of abating. An equally plausible scenario
the 1990s have been resolved. Indeed, one of the is one in which global civil society finds itself
characteristics of ‘new wars’ is that pre-conflict and increasingly embattled both on the ground in conflict
post-conflict phases increasingly resemble each other. zones and in the global debate.
Agreements stabilise the violence but tend not to
provide solutions. Moreover, the ‘new wars’ have a I should like to thank Mark Bowden, Kayode
tendency to spread through criminal networks, refugees, Fayemi, Yasmin Jusu-Sherif, and John Hirsch for
and the virus of exclusivist ideologies. The risk is that the giving interviews, and Zainab Bangura, Walid
just war and humanitarian peace positions could end up Salem, and Abdul Tejan-Cole for responding to my
prolonging these wars perhaps indefinitely. Air strikes questions via e-mail.
and overwhelming force tend to reinforce particularist
views of the world and can contribute to polarisation
and destabilisation while giving the impression of action. References

Mary Kaldor
Humanitarian peace may alleviate hunger and even
sometimes protect people, but, by being ineffective, Akehurst, M. (1984). ‘Humanitarian Intervention’,
too even-handed, and sometimes vulnerable, there is a in H. Bull (ed.), Intervention in World Politics.
risk of discrediting the non-violent civil society position. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

For human rights enforcement, the third option, to Africa Rights (1993). Somalia and Operation
work, there needs to be a much more substantial Restore Hope: A Preliminary Assessment.
commitment than displayed hitherto: a commitment London (May).
that goes beyond rhetoric. In part it is a commitment Allen, T. and Styan D. (2000). ‘A Right to Interfere?
to resources. Humanitarian intervention perhaps needs Bernard Kouchner and the New
to be reconceptualised as international presence in Humanitarianism’. Journal of International
conflict-prone areas, a presence that represents a Development, 12: 825–42.
continuum from civil society actors to international Andjelic, N. (2000). ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina: Politics
agencies up to and including international peacekeeping and Society at the end of Yugoslavia’ (Ph.D.
troops on a much larger scale than seen so far. In part thesis). Brighton: University of Sussex.
it means a change in outlook, especially the training, Blair, T. (1999). ‘Doctrine of the International
equipment, principles, and tactics of peacekeeping Community’. Chicago (23 April).
troops. But above all it involves a genuine belief in the http://www.primeminister.gov.uk
equality of all human beings; and this entails a readiness Brauman, R. (1996). Humanitaire: le dilemme.
to risk the lives of peacekeeping troops to save the Conversations pour demain. Paris: Les Éditions
lives of others where this is necessary. It should be Textuel.
stressed that I am not talking about full-scale war, and Bull, H. (ed.) (1984). Intervention in World Politics.
the risks are therefore, less than in a conventional Oxford: Clarendon Press.
ground war; nevertheless, they exist. Neither the just Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly
war position nor the humanitarian peace position is Conflict (1997). Preventing Deadly Conflict:
ready to risk soldiers’ lives. The former privileges the lives Final Report. Washington, DC: Carnegie
of soldiers; the latter is willing to risk the lives of human Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.

141
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 142

Carnegie Endowment for Peace (1996). Unfinished Kaldor, M. (1999). New and Old Wars: Organised
Peace: Report of the International Commission Violence in a Global Era. Cambridge: Polity
on the Balkans. Washington, DC: Carnegie Press.
Endowment for Peace. Keck, Margaret E. and Sikkink, Kathryn (1998).
CDD (Centre for Democracy and Development) Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks
(2000). Engaging Sierra Leone (Strategy in International Politics. Ithaca, NY and London:
Planning Series 4). London: CDD. Cornell University Press.
Chomsky, N. (1999). The New Military Humanism: Kohaditore. http://www.kohaditore.com
Lessons from Kosovo. London: Pluto Press. Kouchner, Bernard (1986). Charité Business. Paris:
Cockburn, C. (2000). ‘The Women’s Movement: Le Pré aux clercs.
Boundary-crossing on Terrains of Conflict’, in R. Mahoney, L. and Eguren, L. E. (1997). Unarmed
Cohen and Shirin M. Rai (eds), Global Social Bodyguards: International Accompaniment for
Movements. London: Athlone Press. the Protection of Human Rights. Bloomfield:
Conciliation Resources (2000). Issue 9. Kumarian Press.
Cuny, Frederick C. (1983). Disasters and Marcon, Giulio, and Pianta, Mario (2001). ‘New
Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wars, New Peace Movements’. Soundings: A
de Waal, A. (1997). Famine Crimes: Politics and the Journal of Politics and Culture, 17: 11–24.
Disaster Relief Industry in Africa. Oxford and Moorehead, C. (1998). Dunant’s Dreams: War,
Indiana: James Currey/Indiana University Press. Switzerland and the History of the Red Cross.
European Platform for Conflict Prevention and London: Harper Collins.
Transformation. http://www.euconflict.org Oludipe, O. (ed.) (2000). Sierra Leone: One Year
Focus on Sierra Leone. http://www.freespace. After Lomé (One-Day Analytical Conference on
virgin.net/ambrose.ganda/ the Peace Process,. London, 15 September; CDD
Friends of Sierra Leone. http://www.fosalone.org Strategy Planning Series No. 5). London: CDD.
Goldstone, R. J. (2000). For Humanity: Reflections Petrova, D. (2000). ‘The Kosovo War and the Human
Mary Kaldor

of a War Crimes Investigator. New Haven and Rights Community’. Paper presented to LSE
London: Yale University Press. seminar, 18 November.
Hirsch, J. L. (2001). Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Radio B92. http://www.b92.net
Struggle for Democracy (International Peace Ramsbotham, O. and Woodhouse, T. (1996).
A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

Academy Occasional Papers). Boulder, CO and Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary

London: Lynne Rienner. Conflict: A Reconceptualization. Cambridge:
Human Rights Watch (2000a). World Report 2000. Polity Press.
New York. http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000 Richards, P. (1996). Fighting for the Rainforest:
— (2000b). Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone.
Campaign. New York (February). Oxford: International African Institute, James
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato Currey.
Ignatieff, M. (1998). The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic Roberts, A. (1996). Humanitarian Action in War
War and the Modern Conscience. London: (International Institute of Strategic Studies,
Chatto and Windus. Adelphi Paper 305). Oxford: Oxford University
Independent International Commission on Kosovo Press.
(2000). Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Shawcross, William (1995). ‘A Hero of our Time’.
Response, Lessons Learned. Oxford: Oxford New York Review of Books, 30 November .
University Press. SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research
International Crisis Group (2000). Scramble for the Institute) (2000). SIPRI Yearbook 2000:
Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War. Brussels (20 Armaments, Disarmament, and International
December). http://www. intl-crisis-group.org Security. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jackson, Robert (2000). The Global Covenant: South Asia Citizens Web.
Human Conduct in a World of States. Oxford: http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex
Oxford University Press. Smillie, I., Gberie, L., and Hazelton, R. (eds) (2000).
The Heart of the Matter. Sierra Leone:

142
GCS2001 pages [05-06] 3/04 24/8/01 11:47 am Page 143

Diamonds and Human Security. Partnership — (2000). Report of the Panel on United Nations
Africa (January). Peace Operations (UN Doc. A/55/305-
Smith, A. D. (1996). Nations and Nationalism in a S/2000/809, 21 August). New York: United
Global Era. Cambridge: Polity Press. Nations.
Tejan-Cole, A. (2001). ‘The Legality of NATO and United Nations Peacekeeping Department.
ECOMOG Interventions’. Unpublished http://www.un.org/depts/dpko
manuscript. Weiss, T. G. (1999). Military-Civilian Interactions:
United Nations (1999a). Report on the Fall of Intervening in Humanitarian Crises. Lanham,
Srebrenica (UN Doc. A54/549,15 November). Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.
New York: United Nations. Wheeler, N. J. (2000). Saving Strangers:
— (1999b). Report of the Independent Inquiry into Humanitarian Intervention in International
Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Genocide in Rwanda (UN Doc. S/1999/1257,
15 December). New York: United Nations.

Mary Kaldor
A DECADE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

143