EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y.

2018-2019

1) Armed Forces of the Philippines vs Republic of the Philippines was in open, continuous, exclusive,
the Philippines notorious, and peaceful possession and occupation
of the subject properties in the concept of an
KEYWORD: owner to the exclusion of the world since time
AFP Land Registration; Authority of Witness immemorial; petitioner, after the Republic of the
Philippines transferred ownership of the subject
DOCTRINE: properties to it, assumed open, continuous,
There is no substantive or procedural rule which exclusive, notorious, and peaceful possession and
requires a witness for a party to present some form occupation, and exercised control over them in the
of authorization to testify as a witness for the party concept of owner, and likewise assumed the
presenting him or her. All that the Rules require of a obligations of an owner; petitioner has been paying
witness is that the witness possesses all the the real estate taxes on the subject properties; and
qualifications and none of the disqualifications the subject properties are not mortgaged,
provided therein. encumbered, or tenanted. Subsequently, petitioner
submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence, following
FACTS: which, the court a quo granted the application in a
Petitioner filed an Application for Registration of Decision dated April 21, 2008.
Title over three parcels of land located in West
Bicutan, Taguig City, before the RTC of Pasig City. The In response, the Office of the Solicitor General
said application was later docketed and raffled to (OSG) filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
Branch 68 of the court a quo. May 12, 2008, wherein it argued that the
These three parcels of land constitute a land grant petitioner failed to prove that it has personality to
by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 1218, own property in its name and the petitioner failed
issued by former President Fidel V. Ramos on May 8, to show that the witness it presented was duly
1998. authorized to appear for and in its behalf.
The application was filed by Mr. Honorio S. Azcueta
(Mr. Azcueta), the then Executive Vice President and On February 17, 2009, the court a quo issued an
Chief Operating Officer of the petitioner, who was Order granting the Motion for Reconsideration of
duly authorized to do so by the Board of Trustees of the OSG on the ground that the petitioner failed to
the petitioner, as evidenced by a notarized prosecute its case.
Secretary’s Certificate dated August 18, 2003.
After due posting and publication of the requisite ISSUE:
notices, and since no oppositor registered any Whether the court a quo acted contrary to law and
oppositions after the petitioner met the jurisprudence when it dismissed petitioner’s
jurisdictional requirements, the court a quo issued application for land registration on the ground that
an order of general default against the whole world, petitioner failed to prosecute the subject case.
and the petitioner was allowed to present evidence
ex-parte. RULING:
The petitioner then presented as its witness, Ms. YES. Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Alma P. Aban (Ms. Aban), its Vice President and Procedure, as amended, provides only three
Head of its Asset Enhancement Office. She testified, instances wherein the Court may dismiss a case for
inter alia, that: among her main duties is to ensure failure to prosecute.
that the properties and assets of petitioner, An action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute
especially real property, are legally titled and freed in any of the following instances: (1) if the plaintiff
of liens and encumbrances; the subject properties fails to appear at the time of trial; or (2) if he fails
were acquired by the petitioner through a land grant to prosecute the action for an unreasonable length
under Presidential Proclamation No. 1218; prior to of time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the Rules
Presidential Proclamation No. 1218, the Republic of of Court or any order of the court. Once a case is

1| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

dismissed for failure to prosecute, this has the effect witness. All that the Rules require of a witness is
of an adjudication on the merits and is understood that the witness possesses all the qualifications
to be with prejudice to the filing of another action and none of the disqualifications provided therein.
unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal.
In other words, unless there be a qualification in Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific
the order of dismissal that it is without prejudice, disqualifications. Section 19 disqualifies those who
the dismissal should be regarded as an adjudication are mentally incapacitated and children whose
on the merits and is with prejudice. tender age or immaturity renders them incapable
of being witnesses. Section 20 provides for
First, the petitioner did not fail to appear at the time disqualification based on conflicts of interest or on
of the trial. In fact, the Decision of the RTC dated relationship. Section 21 provides for
April 21, 2008 ordering the registration of disqualifications based on privileged
petitioner’s title to the subject lots shows that the communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be
petitioner appeared before the Court and was a rule on disqualification of witnesses but it states
represented by counsel. Records would also reveal the grounds when a witness may be impeached by
that the petitioner was able to present its evidence, the party against whom he was called.
and as a result, the RTC rendered judgment in its
favor. The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses
excludes the operation of causes of disability other
Second, the petitioner did not fail to prosecute the than those mentioned in the Rules. As a general
subject case considering that it appeared during trial, rule, where there are express exceptions these
presented Ms. Aban, who gave competent testimony comprise the only limitations on the operation of a
as regards the titling of the subject lots, and the statute and no other exception will be implied. The
court a quo never held petitioner liable for any delay Rules should not be interpreted to include an
in prosecuting the subject case. exception not embodied therein.

Third, a perusal of the records would demonstrate Hence, Ms. Aban is qualified to testify as a witness
that the petitioner did not fail to comply with the for the petitioner since she possesses the
Rules or any order of the court a quo, as there is no qualifications of being able to perceive and being
ruling on the part of the latter to this effect. able to make her perceptions known to others.
Furthermore, she possesses none of the
Indeed, there was no basis for the court a quo’s disqualifications described above.
ruling that the petitioner failed to prosecute the
subject case, because none of the grounds provided The OSG and the court a quo did not question the
in the Rules for dismissing a case due to failure to Verification/Certification of the application, and
prosecute is present. neither did they question the authority of Mr.
Azcueta to file the subject application on behalf of
On the alleged lack of authority of the witness, Ms. the petitioner. Case records would reveal that the
Aban, to testify on behalf of the petitioner. (Related application was signed and filed by Mr. Azcueta in
to Evidence Class) his capacity as the Executive Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer of the petitioner, as
The SC ruled that there is no substantive or authorized by petitioner’s Board of Trustees. The
procedural rule which requires a witness for a party authority of Mr. Azcueta to file the subject
to present some form of authorization to testify as application was established by a Secretary’s
a witness for the party presenting him or her. No Certificate attached to the said application. The
law or jurisprudence would support the conclusion asseveration that the subject case was not
that such omission can be considered as a failure to prosecuted by a duly authorized representative of
prosecute on the part of the party presenting such the petitioner is thus unfounded.

2| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

the latter's direct descendants or

2) Alvarez vs Ramirez ascendants."
KEYWORD:
Arson by hubby The reasons given for the rule are:
1. There is identity of interests
DOCTRINE: between husband and wife;
The martial disqualification rule is not absolute and 2. If one were to testify for or against
admits of exceptions such as when the relationship the other, there is consequent
of the husband and wife is already strained that the danger of perjury;
preservation of the marriage the two is no longer an 3. The policy of the law is to guard the
interest the State aims to protect. security and confidences of private
life, even at the risk of an
FACTS: occasional failure of justice, and to
Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the prevent domestic disunion and
complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN unhappiness; and
for arson pending before the Regional Trial Court, 4. Where there is want of domestic
Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is Maximo tranquility there is danger of
Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of punishing one spouse through the
Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent. hostile testimony of the other.
The private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to But like all other general rules, the marital
the witness stand as the first witness against disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in
petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel civil actions between the spouses and in criminal
raised no objection. cases for offenses committed by one against the
Note (sa later part sa case nani gi discuss): Maximo other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed
Alvarez set Susan Ramirez’ house knowing fully well by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases,
that his wife, Esperanza was there. Their relationship outweigh those in support of the general rule.
was already strained and that they already For instance, where the marital and domestic
separated de facto six months prior to the incident. relations are so strained that there is no more
ISSUE: harmony to be preserved nor peace and
WON Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason
husband in the case for Arson based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In
such a case, identity of interests disappears and
RULING: the consequent danger of perjury based on that
Yes. The marital disqualification rule has its own identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a
exceptions. situation, the security and confidences of private
life, which the law aims at protecting, will be
As a general rule, Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised nothing but ideals, which through their absence,
Rules of Court provides: merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
"Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to
marriage. — During their marriage, petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation
neither the husband nor the wife may between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as
testify for or against the other without embodied in the Information for arson filed against
the consent of the affected spouse, him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life
except in a civil case by one against the such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which
other, or in a criminal case for a crime virtues the conjugal relationship survives and
committed by one against the other or flourishes.|||

3| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

It should be stressed that as shown by the records, It was discovered by the heirs of Andres that
prior to the commission of the offense, the Manuel Geurrero supposedly bought the property
relationship between petitioner and his wife was from their aunt Christina. So, the heirs of Andres
already strained. In fact, they were separated de went to court and filed an action to recover the
facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, property.
the evidence and facts presented reveal that the
preservation of the marriage between petitioner and At this time, the property was already owned by St.
Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to Claire, who bought it from the relatives of Manuel
protect. Geurrero, who in turn bought the property from
Manuel Gerrero himself. There were already series
At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being of transfers, from Manuel Gerrero to St. Claire.
interested in laying the truth before the courts so
that the guilty may be punished and the innocent During trial, they presented witnesses(Laura and
exonerated, must have the right to offer the direct Jose Cervantes) to prove that Manuel Geurrero did
testimony of Esperanza, even against the objection not acquire ownership over the property, because,
of the accused, because (as stated by this Court in Christina who purportedly executed a deed of sale
Francisco), "it was the latter himself who gave rise to in favor of Manuel Geurrero, was not the real
its necessity." owner as the real owner was Andres Guerrero. Also,
3) Guerrero vs St. Claire’s Realty and Co. they tried to prove that the actual transaction
KEYWORD: entered into was not a sale but a mortgage to
St. Claire guarantee the loan obligation of Christina

DOCTRINE: Defendants Guerreros filed a written motion to

Dead man’s statute applies only if the defending disqualify Laura Cervantes as a witness on the
party is sued in his representative capacity. basis of Section 20(a), Rule 130, of the New Rules
of Court.
FACTS:
Petitioners’ original and amended complaints On November 16, 1973, the trial court granted the
alleged that during their lifetime the spouses Isidoro motion and declared that Laura Cervantes, Jose
Guerrero and Panay Ramos were the absolute Cervantes as well as other witnesses similarly
owners of the disputed property, which is a parcel of situated, are disqualified to testify in the case.
land located at San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal.
During their lifetime the land were conveyed to ISSUE:
Andres Geurrero, one of their son and took Whether or not the witnesses Laura Cervantes and
possession over the property. Shortly after the Jose Cervantes were correctly disqualified from
beginning of the Japanese occupation, Andres testifying in the case and their testimonies excluded
Guerrero entrusted the land to his sister, Cristina on the basis of Section 20(a), Rule 130, of the Rules
Guerrero, and allowed her to have the property of Court.
cultivated and to retain the owner’s share in the
harvests. RULING:
Upon the facts and under the law, this Court is fully
Subsequently, Andres died, and his surviving heir persuaded that the affirmative rulings of both the
succeeded but, it was around this time that a trial court and the Court of Appeals were made in
relative named Manuel Geurrero came forward and error.
told them the property they were supposed to
inherit from their father, Andres, was already owned The plain truth is that Laura Cervantes and Jose
by Manuel Geurrero. Cervantes are not parties in the present case, and
neither are they assignors of the parties nor

4| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

"persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." They DOCTRINE:

are mere witnesses by whose testimonies the The adverse party is competent to testify to
plaintiffs aimed to establish that it was not Cristina transactions or communications with the deceased
Guerrero, but Andres Guerrero, who owned the or incompetent person which were made with an
disputed land at the time of its alleged sale to agent of such person in cases in which the agent is
Manuel Guerrero; that Cristina Guerrero did not still alive and competent to testify. But the
really sell but merely mortgaged the property to testimony of the adverse party must be confined to
Manuel Guerrero.chanr those transactions or communications which were
had with the agent.
"Following this rule of construction, it may be said
that incompetency to testify established in the FACTS:
provision above quoted, affects only the persons The Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas
therein mentioned, and no others, that is, only [TABACALERA] owned the three (3) haciendas
parties plaintiff or their assignors, persons in whose known as San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombre
behalf a case is prosecuted. Mere witnesses who are de Maria situated in the Municipality of Bais,
neither parties plaintiff, nor their assignors, nor Negros Oriental. Sometime in 1949, the late
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, are Praxedes T. Villanueva negotiated with TABACALERA
not included in the prohibition.” for the purchase of said haciendas. As he did not
have sufficient funds to pay the price, Villanueva
Moreover, the present case is not a claim or with the consent of TABACALERA, offered to sell
demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel Hacienda Sarria to one Santiago Villegas, who was
Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not the later substituted by Joaquin Villegas. Private
executors or administrators or representatives of respondent Gaspar Vicente stood as guarantor for
such deceased. They are being sued as claimants of Villegas in favor of TABACALERA. Villanueva further
ownership in their individual capacities of the contracted or promised to sell to the latter (Vicente)
disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre
Manuel Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of the de Maria for the sum of P13,807.00.
dead man’s rule. Vicente thereafter advised TABACALERA to debit
from his account the amount of P13,807.00 as
"It has been held that statutes providing that a party payment for the balance of the purchase price.
in interest is incompetent to testify where the However, as only the amount of P12,460.24 was
adverse party is dead or insane, must be applied actually needed to complete the purchase price,
strictly in accordance with their express wording, only the latter amount was debited from private
irrespective of their spirit. respondent’s account. The difference was
supposedly paid by private respondent Vicente to
The law uses the word ‘against an executor or Villanueva, but as no receipt evidencing such
administrator or other representative of a deceased payment was presented.
person.’ It should be noted that after the mention of
an executor or administrator the words or other Subsequent to the execution of the
representative follows, which means that the word contract/promise to sell, Villanueva was able to
‘representative’ includes only those who, like the raise funds by selling a property in Ayungon, Negros
executor or administrator, are sued in their Oriental. He thus went to private respondent
representative, not personal, capacity. Vicente for the purpose of rescinding the
contract/promise to sell. However, as the amount
4) Goni vs CA of P12,460.24 had already been debited from
KEYWORD: private respondent's account, it was agreed that
Sale of Hacienda; Recovery of Property and Damages lots 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de

5| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

Maria would merely be leased to private respondent reason of interest from testifying as to any matter
Vicente for a period of five (5) years. of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes T.
Villanueva, such disqualification being anchored on
On December 10, 1949, TABACALERA executed a Section 20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known as the
formal deed of sale covering the three haciendas in Survivorship Disqualification Rule or Dead Man
favor of Villanueva. Fields Nos. 3, 4 and 13 of the Statute. The object and purpose of Rule 130, Sec.
Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria were thereafter 20 par. (a) is to guard against the temptation to give
registered in the name of Villanueva. Meanwhile, false testimony in regard to the transaction in
Fields nos. 4 and 13 were delivered to private question on the part of the surviving party and
respondent Vicente. further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms
On November 12, 1951, Villanueva died. Intestate of equality in regard to the opportunity of giving
proceedings were instituted, among the properties testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the
included in the inventory submitted to the court party plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the
were fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce party defendant, in order to remove from the
Nombre de Maria. surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the
possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased.
Private respondent Vicente instituted an action for
recovery of property and damages. He sought to The case at bar, although instituted against the
recover field no. 3 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de heirs of Praxedes Villanueva after the estate of the
Maria, basing his entitlement thereto on the latter had been distributed to them, remains within
contract/promise to sell executed by the late the ambit of the protection. The reason is that the
Praxedes Villanueva in his favor on October 24, defendants-heirs are properly the "representatives"
1949. of the deceased, not only because they succeeded
to the decedent’s right by descent or operation of
The trial court rendered a decision ordering therein law, but more importantly because they are so
defendants-heirs to deliver to Gaspar Vicente field placed in litigation that they are called on to defend
no 3, to execute a formal deed of sale covering fields which they have obtained from the deceased and
nos. 3, 4 and 13 in favor of Vicente. CA affirmed make the defense which the deceased might have
lower Court. made if living, or to establish a claim which
ISSUE: deceased might have been interested to establish,
1. May Gaspar Vicente testify on matters of if living.
fact occurring before the death of HOWEVER, the protection under the Rules, was
Praxedes T. Villanueva, which constitutes effectively waived when counsel for petitioners
a claim or demand upon his estate, in cross-examined private respondent Vicente. "A
violation of Rule 130, sec. 20 par. (a) ? waiver occurs when plaintiff’s deposition is taken
2. May not a written promise to sell dated by the representatives of the estate or when
October 24 1949 be novated into a counsel for the representative cross-examined the
verbal agreement of lease during the plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased’s
lifetime of the promisor, whose death lifetime." It must further be observed that
occurred on November 12, 1951, by petitioners presented a counterclaim against
facts and circumstances substantiated private respondent Vicente. When Vicente thus
by competent oral evidence in this case? took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as
plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and
RULING: as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting
1. YES. Gaspar Vicente is qualified to testify on and surrender of fields nos. 13 and 14. Evidently, as
matters of fact occurring before the death of defendant in the counterclaim, he was not
Praxedes Villanueva. Under ordinary circumstances, disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact
private respondent Vicente would be disqualified by occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva,

6| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

said action not having been brought against, but by fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 either by demanding during
the estate of representatives of the estate/deceased the lifetime of Villanueva that the latter execute a
person. similar document in his favor, or causing notice of
his adverse claim to be annotated on the certificate
Under the great majority of statutes, the adverse of title of said lots.
party is competent to testify to transactions or
communications with the deceased or incompetent 5) Tongco vs Vianzon
person which were made with an agent of such KEYWORD:
person in cases in which the agent is still alive and “Widow asked for annulment of decrees of lots
competent to testify. But the testimony of the issued in the name of the conjugal partnership after
adverse party must be confined to those husband’s death”
transactions or communications which were had
with the agent. The inequality or injustice sought to DOCTRINE:
be avoided by Section 20 (a) of Rule 130, where one Dead Man’s Statute; the suit must involve a claim
of the parties no longer has the opportunity to against the estate of the deceased; the law was
either confirm or rebut the testimony of the other designed to aid in arriving at the truth and was not
because death has permanently sealed the former’s designed to suppress the truth.
lips, does not actually exist in the case at bar, for the
reason that petitioner Goni could and did not negate
the binding effect of the contract/promise to sell. FACTS:
Thus, while admitting the existence of the said Marcelino Tongco and Anastacia Vianzon
contract/promise to sell, petitioner Goni testified contracted marriage on July 5, 1984. Marcelino
that the same was subsequently novated into a died on July 8, 1925, leaving Anastacia as his widow.
verbal contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of Shortly before the death of Marcelino, he had
the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria. presented claims in a cadastral case in which he
had asked for titles to certain properties in the
2. YES. The contract was validly novated. Novation name of the conjugal partnership. Corresponding
takes place when the object or principal condition of decrees for these lots were issued in the name of
an obligation is changed or altered. In order, the conjugal partnership.
however, that an obligation may be extinguished by
another which substitutes the same, it is imperative After the death of Marcelino, the Judge of First
that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that Instance in a cadastral case rendered a decision
the old and the new obligations be on every point annulling decrees Nos. 191390, 191504, and
incompatible with each other. 190925, as well as the original certificates of title
The novation of the written contract/promise to sell Nos. 3247, 3298, and 3297 and ordering that in lieu
into a verbal agreement of lease was clearly and thereof new decrees and certificates of title be
convincingly proven not only by the testimony of issued as the exclusive property of Anastacia. A
petitioner Goñi, but likewise by the acts and conduct motion for new trial by counsel for the losing party
of the parties subsequent to the execution of the was denied.
contract/promise to sell. Thus, after the milling
season of crop year 1949-50, only fields nos. 4 and In an action for recovery of specified property filed
13 were delivered to private respondent Vicente. by the administratrix of the estate against Anastacia
Fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 were subsequently registered on July 19, 1926, a judgment was rendered by
in Villanueva's name. Villanueva likewise executed a Judge Rovira couched in the following language:
deed of sale covering Hacienda Sarria in favor of "Therefore, the court renders judgment absolving
Joaquin Villegas. All these were known to private the defendant from the complaint in this case, and
respondent Vicente, yet he did not take any steps only declares that one-half of the value of the
toward asserting and/or protecting his claim over shares in the Sociedad Cooperativa de Credito Rural

7| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

de Orani, to the amount of ten pesos (P10), belong before the death of such deceased person . . ."
to the intestate estate of Marcelino Tongco, which Counsel is eminently correct in emphasizing that
one-half interest must appear in the inventory of the the object and purpose of this statute is to guard
property of the estate of the deceased Marcelino against the temptation to give false testimony in
Tongco." The motion for new trial was denied. regard to the transaction in question on the part of
the surviving party. He has, however, neglected the
From both of the judgment, the administratrix of the equally important rule that the law was designed to
estate of Marcelino Tongco has appealed. As aid in arriving at the truth and was not designed to
pursuant to the agreement of the parties the two suppress the truth. The law twice makes use of the
cases were tried together. word "against." The actions were not brought
"against" the administratrix of the estate, nor were
ISSUE: they brought upon claims "against" the estate.
Whether the property in dispute should be assigned
to the estate of Marcelino Tongco, or whether it In the first case at bar, the action is one by the
should be set aside as belonging exclusively to the administratrix to enforce a demand "by" the estate.
widow. In the second case at bar, the same analogy holds
(This was not state in the case but to answer Atty true for the claim was presented in cadastral
Torreg’s question, “so tell me, why should we be proceedings where in one sense there is no plaintiff
interested in this case?” the evidence related issue I and there is no defendant. Moreover, a waiver was
think is: WON the widow’s testimony should be accomplished when the adverse party undertook to
disqualified pursuant dead man’s statute) cross-examination the interested person with
respect to the prohibited matter.
RULING:
SC ruled in favor of Vianzon and affirmed the 6) Lichauco vs Atlantic Gulf
judgment of the trial court. KEYWORD:
Pacific war, settlement of estate, claim against the
It is true that by reason of the provisions of article estate, self-serving statement
1407 of the Civil Code the presumption is that all the
property of the spouses is partnership property in DOCTRINE:
the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to A self-serving declaration is a statement
the husband or to the wife. But even proceeding on favourable to the interest of the defendant. It is
this assumption, we still think that the widow has inadmissible.
proved in a decisive and conclusive manner that the
property in question belonged exclusively to her, A declaration against interest of the person
that is, it would, unless we are forced to disregard making it is admissible in evidence
her testimony. notwithstanding its hearsay character, if the
declaration is relevant and the declarant has died,
The administratrix of the estate attack the ruling of become insane, or for some other reason is not
the trial judge to the effect that the widow was available as a witness.
competent to testify. Counsel relies on that portion
of section 383 of the Code of Civil Procedure as FACTS:
provides that "Parties or assignors of parties to an Fitzsimmons was a president of a corporation. He
action or proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an held 1000 shares of stock in a corporation, 545
action or proceeding is prosecuted, against an shares of which were not fully paid which was
executor or administrator or other representative of evidenced by a promissory notes in favor of the
a deceased person, . . ., upon a claim or demand corporation. Soon after the Japanese invasion,
against the estate of such deceased person . . ., Fitzsimmons died in an interment camp in Santo
cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring Tomas. A special proceeding was for the settlement

8| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

of the estate was instituted. The corporation of occurring before the death of such deceased
Fitzsimmons filed a claim of 63,000 pesos of which person.
Fitzsimmons owed to the corporation. The claim was
evidenced by the testimony of the chief accountant 2. YES. A self-serving declaration is a statement
and assistant accountant of the corporation. Aside favourable to the interest of the defendant. It is
from the accountant, the also presented the inadmissible. The vital objection to the
vice-president-treasurer and the president but was admission of this kind of evidence is its hearsay
objected to by the administrator of the estate for character. On the other hand, a declaration
being violative of the Rule 123. against interest of the person making it is
admissible in evidence notwithstanding its
The administrator of Fitzsimmons denied the claim hearsay character, if the declaration is relevant
and presented the Exhibit 1 which was an inventory and the declarant has died, become insane, or
made by Atty. Linchauco in the settlement of the for some other reason is not available as a
conjugal partnership brought about by the divorce of witness. “The true test in reference to the
Fitzsimmons and his wife. In the inventory there was reliability of the declaration is not whether it
no mention of any liabilities pertaining to the was made ante litem motam, as is the case with
corporation. reference to some classes of hearsay evidence,
but whether the declaration was uttered under
Complainant Contention: The testimony of the circumstances justifying the conclusion that
vice-president and president are not violative of the there was no probable motive to falsify.
Rule 123. Plaintiff also argues that the Exhibit 1 is
self-serving. In this case, there was no probable motive on the
part of Fitzsimmons to falsify his inventory Exhibit 1
Respondent Contention: That the vice-president and by not including therein the claim of the
treasurer of the corporation were incompetent corporation to be deducted from the assets of the
under Section 26 (c) of the Rule 123, they being not conjugal partnership. On the other hand, if Mr.
only large stockholders and members of the board of Fitzsimmons, who was the president and one of the
directors but they are also vice-president-treasurer largest stockholders of the claimant corporation,
of the claimant corporation. Respondent also argues really owed the latter around P63,000, and had not
that the Exhibit 1 is not self-serving paid it before he liquidated his conjugal partnership
as a consequence of the decree of divorce he
ISSUES: obtained against his wife, we see no reason why he
1. Whether the vice-president-treasurer and did not include such obligation in said liquidation.
president of the corporation which are a party to
an action against the executor or administrator Judging from the high opinion which the officers
are disqualified from testifying under the Rule and stockholders of the corporation entertained of
123, section 26 (c) of the rules of court? Fitzsimmons as shown by their resolution
2. Whether the Exhibit 1 is be admitted as hereinafter quoted, they cannot impute bad faith to
evidence? him in not acknowledging the claim in question. We
find, therefore, that Exhibit 1, insofar as the
HELD: omission therefrom of the claims in question was
1. NO. We are constrained to hold that the officers concerned, far from being self-serving to, was a
and/or stockholders of a corporation are not declaration against the interest of, the defendant
disqualified from testifying, for or against the Fitzsimmons. He having died and therefore cannot
corporation which is a party to an action upon a be made as a witness, said document was correctly
claim or demand against the estate of a admitted by the trial court in evidence.
deceased person, as to any matter of fact
7) Razon vs IAC

9| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

KEYWORD: The DMS rule applies only to a case filed AGAINST

Dead Man’s Statute rule does NOT apply in a case the administrator of an estate upon a claim against
filed by the administrator. the estate. This case was not filed against the
administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon
DOCTRINE: claims against the estate. Rather, it is the
Failure to object timely to oral testimony on the basis administrator Vicente who is filing this case.
of DMS rule is a WAIVER. Furthermore, he did not object to the oral
Mere oral testimony is NOT enough to prove valid testimony. A failure to make a timely objection is
transfer of shares of stocks. deemed to be a waiver the rule.

FACTS: 2. NO, mere oral testimony is insufficient to prove

In 1962, Enrique Razon organized the E. Razon, Inc. ownership over stocks.
for the purpose of bidding for the arrastre services in
South Harbor, Manila. On April 23, 1966, stock Several evidence shows that Chuidian was
certificate No. 003 for 1,500 shares of stock was considered a valid stockholder of the corporation:
issued in the name of Juan T. Chuidian. This was the stocks were registered under his name in the
registered under his name in the books of the books, he was elected as a director. In the case of
corporation. No one questioned his ownership of Embassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the
the stocks. He was even elected as a director. When Supreme Court held that, to be effective, the
he died intestate, his estate was administered by his transfer of shares of stock must follow the mode
son Vicente. Razon refused to deliver the stock and manner prescribed by law. Razon must show
certificate to Vicente, prompting the latter to file this that the transfer satisfied all the requirements
case. under the corporation's by-laws. Since he failed to
Alleging that Chuidian is a mere nominal investor, present any by-laws, the provisions of the
Razon asserts that he himself paid for the stocks, Corporation Code apply.
making him the true owner thereof. He claims that
he and the late Chuidian had an understanding that Under the Corporation Code, a stock certificate
Razon would possess the stock certificate until and if must be properly indorsed. The title to such
Chuidian will pay for the same. The CFI (now RTC) of certificate of stock is vested in the transferee by the
Manila ruled in favor of Razon. However, this was delivery of the duly indorsed certificate of stock.
reversed by the IAC (now CA), which applied the Since the stock certificate was no indorsed, the
Dead Man’s Statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule inevitable conclusion is that the shares of stock
130 of the Rules of Court. Razon argues that the rule belong to Chuidian. Furthermore, preponderance
does not apply because Vicente did not object to his of evidence shows that the stocks were given to
oral testimony regarding the oral agreement Chuidian for value, since he was the legal counsel
between him and Chuidian. who handled the legal affairs of the corporation.
The decision of the IAC is AFFIRMED. All cash and
ISSUE: stock dividends as, well as all pre-emptive rights
1. W/N the Dead Man’s Statute rule applies in this that have accrued and attached to the 1,500 shares
case. in E. Razon, Inc., since 1966 are declared to belong
2. W/N Razon’s oral testimony is enough to prove to the estate of Juan T. Chuidian.
that he owns the stocks
8) Mendezona vs Viuda de Goitia
RULING: KEYWORD:
1. NO, the Dead Man’s Statute rule does not apply.
Razon’s testimony is admissible. DOCTRINE:
Dead Man's Statute does not apply if what is being
testified against the executor is a denial of

10| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

something that happen before the deceased passed appealed from the committee's decision by means
away. of the complaints in these two cases.

FACTS: One of the assignment of errors raised by

Defendant Encarnacion C. Vda, de Goitia has been defendant relates to Exhibits A and B, being the
duly appointed judicial administratrix of the estate appellees' depositions made before the American
of her deceased husband Benigno Goitia in special consul at Bilbao, Spain, in accordance with section
proceeding No. 30273 of this court. 356 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Counsel for the
appellant was notified of the taking of these
Benigno Goitia was the representative and depositions, and he did not suggest any other
attorney-in-fact of the plaintiffs in the joint-account interrogatory in addition to the questions of the
partnership known as the "Tren de Aguadas" and committee. When these depositions were read in
located in the City of Manila, of which the plaintiff court, the defendant objected to their admission,
Leonor Mendezona, widow of Juan Bautista Goitia, invoking section 383, No. 7, of the Code of Civil
owns 180 shares worth P18,000, and the plaintiff Procedure. Her objection referred mainly to the
Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal owns 72 shares worth following questions:
P7,200. Prior to 1915, Benigno Goitia, at that time
the manager of the aforesaid co-partnership, 1. Did Mr. Benigno Goitia render you an account of
collected the dividends for the plaintiffs, which he your partnership in the "Tren de Aguadas?" — Yes,
remitted to them every year. until the year 1914.

Prior to 1915, the usual dividends which Benigno 2. From the year 1915, did Mr. Benigno Goitia send
Goitia forwarded to plaintiff Leonor Mendezona you any report or money on account of profits upon
each year were P540, and to plaintiff Valentina your shares? — He sent me nothing, nor did he
Izaguirre y Nazabal, P216, that from 1915 until his answer, my letters.
death in August, 1926, Benigno Goitia failed to remit
to the dividends upon their shares in the "Tren de 3. did you ever ask him to send you a statement of
Aguadas". your account — Yes, several times by letter, but I
never received an answer.
That some time before his death, more particularly,
in July, 1926, Benigno Goitia, who was no longer the The first of these questions tends to show the
manager of the said business, receive as relationship between the principals and their
attorney-in-fact of both plaintiff, the amount of P90 attorney-in-fact Benigno Goitia up to 1914.
as dividend upon plaintiff Leonor Mendezona's Supposing it was error to permit such a question, it
shares, and P36 upon Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal's would not be reversible error, for that very
stock, that from 1915 to 1926, the "Tren de relationship is proved by Exhibits C to F, and H to I.
Aguadas" paid dividends to the share-holders, one As to the other two questions, it is to be noted that
of them, Ramon Salinas, having received the total the deponents deny having received from the
amount of P1,155 as ordinary and special dividends deceased Benigno Goitia any money on account of
upon his 15 shares' that calculating the dividends profits on their shares, since 1915.
due from 1915 to 1926 upon Leonor Mendezona's
180 shares at P540 per annum, and at P216 yearly ISSUE:
upon the 72 shares held by Valentina Izaguirre y WON the deposition violates Dead Man's Statute
Nazabal.
RULING:
Counsel for both plaintiffs filed their claims with the No.
committee of claims and appraisal of the estate of
Benigno Goitia, and, upon their disallowance,

11| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

We are of opinion that the claimants' denial that a the "Tren de Aguadas" which is the ground of their
certain fact occurred before the death of their claim. It was incumbent upon the appellant to
attorney-in-fact Benigno Agoitia does not come prove by proper evidence that the affirmative
within the legal prohibitions (section 383, No. 7, proposition was true, either by bringing into court
Code of Civil Procedure). The law prohibits a witness the books which the attorney-in-fact was in duty
directly interested in a claim against the estate of a bound to keep, or by introducing copies of the
decedent from testifying upon a matter of fact which drafts kept by the banks which drew them, as was
took place before the death of the deceased. The the decedents's usual practice according to Exhibit I,
underlying principle of this prohibition is to protect or by other similar evidence.
the intestate estate from fictitious claims. But this
protection should not be treated as an absolute bar The appellant admits having found a book of
or prohibition from the filing of just claims against accounts kept by the decedent showing an item of
the decedent's estate P90 for the account of Leonor Mendezona and
another of P36 for the account of Valentina
The facts in the case of Maxilom vs. Tabotabo (9 Phil., Izaguirre, which agrees with the statement of
390), differ from those in the case at bar. In that case, Ruperto Santos, who succeeded Benigno Goitia in
the plaintiff Maxilom liquidated his accounts with the administration of said partnership, to the effect
the deceased Tabotabo during his lifetime, with the that the deceased attorney-in-fact had collected
result that there was a balance in his favor and the amounts due the plaintiffs as dividends on their
against Tabotabo of P312.37, Mexican currency. The shares for the months of May and June, 1926, or
liquidation was signed by both Maxilom and P90 for Leonor Mendezona, and P36 for Valentina
Tabotabo. In spite of this, some years later, or in Izaguirre, amounts which had not been remitted by
1906, Maxilom filed a claim against the estate of the deceased to the plaintiffs.
Tabotabo for P1,062.37, Mexican currency, alleging
that P750 which included the 1899 liquidation had 9) Garcia vs Dominga Robles
not really been received, and that therefore instead KEYWORD: Leasehold Agreement which excluded 2
of P312.37, Mexican currency, that liquidation heirs.
should have shown a balance of P1,062.37 in favor
of Maxilom. It is evident that in view of the DOCTRINE: The Dead Man’s Statute provides that
prohibition of section 383, paragraph 7, of the Code "if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded
of Civil Procedure, Maxilom could not testify in his from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental
own behalf against Tabotabo's estate, so as to alter disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the
the balance of the liquidation made by and between undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted
himself and the decedent. But in the case before us and unexplained account of the transaction."
there has been no such liquidation between the
plaintiffs and the deceased Goitia. They testify, FACTS: Makapugay is the owner of a 2.5-hectare
denying any such liquidation. To apply to them the farm being tilled by Eugenio as agricultural lessee
rule that "if death has sealed the lips of one of the under a leasehold agreement. Makapugay passed
parties, the law seals those of the other," would be away and was succeeded by her nephews and niece,
to exclude all possibility of a claim against the namely Amanda, Justo and Augusto. On the other
testamentary estate. We do not believe that this was hand, Eugenio’s children – Garcia, Salamat and
the legislator's intention. Pedro – succeeded him.

The plaintiffs-appellees did not testify to a fact Before she passed away, Makapugay appointed
which took place before their representative's death, Amanda as her attorney-in-fact. After Eugenio died,
but on the contrary denied that it had taken place at Amanda and Pedro entered into a leasehold
all, i.e. they denied that a liquidation had been made agreement, “Kasunduan sa Buwisan”, which
or any money remitted on account of their shares in

12| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

installed and recognized Pedro as the lone cropping; that Pedro has been the one
agricultural lessee and cultivator of the land. paying the lease rentals as evidenced by
receipts;
Pedro passed away in 1984, and his wife, Dominga, 4) that when Pedro died in 1984, she
took over as agricultural lessee. succeeded in his rights as lessee by
operation of law, and that she had been
Learning that the “Kasunduan sa Buwisan” excluded remitting lease rentals to the landowners
Pedro’s heirs - Amanda, Justo and Augusto, and since 1985; and
Pedro’s sisters Garcia and Salamat, entered into a 5) that petitioners had no right to institute
"Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" whereby Garcia themselves as her co-lessees.
and Salamat were acknowledged as co-lessees of
Pedro. Ruling of the PARAD
The PARAD held that Amanda’s act of executing the
Thereafter, petitioners Garcia and Salamat filed a July 10, 1996 Affidavit and "Kasunduan sa Buwisan
Complaint for nullification of the first leasehold ng Lupa" amounted to dispossession of Pedro’s
agreement. landholding and rights without cause

Garcia and Salamat claimed that: Ruling of the DARAB

1) they entered into an agreement with their Amanda’s Affidavit and the 1996 "Kasunduan sa
brother Pedro to farm the land on a Buwisan ng Lupa" between the landowners and
"per-season basis"; petitioners cannot defeat Pedro’s 1979 Agricultural
2) that Pedro reneged on this agreement and Leasehold Contract and his rights as the sole tenant
cultivated the land all by himself; over the land; that for sleeping on their rights,
3) that as a result, Amanda was deceived into petitioners are now barred by laches from claiming
installing him as sole agricultural lessee; that they are co-lessees
4) that when Amanda learned of Pedro’s
misrepresentations, she executed an ISSUE: WON Amanda’s Affidavit stating that “(the
Affidavit stating among others that Pedro late) Pedro assured her (Amanda) that he would
assured her that he would not deprive not deprive Garcia and Salamat of their "cultivatory
Garcia and Salamat of their "cultivatory rights” is admissible.
rights"; and
5) that in order to correct matters, Amanda, RULING:
Justo and Augusto executed in their favor No. Violation of the Dead Man’s Statute.
the "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa",
recognizing them as Pedro’s co-lessees. Amanda’s declaration in her Affidavit covering
Pedro’s alleged admission and recognition of the
In her Answer, herein respondent Dominga claimed alternate farming scheme is inadmissible for being
that: a violation of the Dead Man’s Statute, which
1) that Amanda’s July 10, 1996 Affidavit and provides that "if one party to the alleged
"Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" of even transaction is precluded from testifying by death,
date between her and the petitioners are insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other
self-serving and violate the existing 1979 party is not entitled to the undue advantage of
Agricultural Leasehold Contract; giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained
2) Dominga further claimed that Pedro has account of the transaction." Thus, since Pedro is
been in possession of the land even while deceased, and Amanda’s declaration which pertains
Eugenio lived; to the leasehold agreement affects the 1996
3) that petitioners have never cultivated nor "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" which she as
possessed the land even for a single assignor entered into with petitioners, and which is

13| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

now the subject matter of the present case and under Section 9, and operates to deprive her of
claim against Pedro’s surviving spouse and lawful such rights and dispossess her of the leasehold
successor-in-interest Dominga, such declaration against her will. Under Section 732 of RA 3844,
cannot be admitted and used against the latter, who Dominga is entitled to sennity of tenure; and under
is placed in an unfair situation by reason of her being Section 16,33 any modification of the lease
unable to contradict or disprove such declaration as agreement must be done with the consent of both
a result of her husband-declarant Pedro’s prior parties and without prejudicing Dominga's security
death. of tenure.

If petitioners earnestly believed that they had a right,

under their supposed mutual agreement with Pedro, 10) People v. Carlos
to cultivate the land under an alternate farming
scheme, then they should have confronted Pedro or PRINCIPLE: If documents were obtained from the
sought an audience with Amanda to discuss the addressee by voluntary delivery, they are privileged;
possibility of their institution as co-lessees of the but if they were obtained surreptitiously or
land; and they should have done so soon after the otherwise without the consent, the privilege should
passing away of their father Eugenio. However, it cease.
was only in 1996, or 17 years after Pedro was
installed as tenant in 1979 and long after his death FACTS:
in 1984, that they came forward to question Pedro’s
succession to the leasehold. As correctly held by the Dr. Pablo Sityar was a victom of an alleged murder.
PARAD, petitioners slept on their rights, and are thus He performed surgery on defendant Carlos’ wife
precluded from questioning Pedro’s 1979 for appendicitis. There after, the wife was required
agricultural leasehold contract. to go to the Doctor’s clinic several times to dress
the wounds. Carlos had always accompanied his
wide. On one vistit, Dr. Sityar asked Carlos to do
Amanda, on the other hand, cannot claim that Pedro an errand and buy medicine. While he was away,
deceived her into believing that he is the sole the Doctor outraged his wife. Nevertheless, Carlos
successor to the leasehold. Part of her duties as the went a week after to his clinic to consult his lung
landowner’s representative or administrator was to problem. Several months after, he was admitted to
know the personal circumstances of the lessee PGH where he remained under the care of two
Eugenio; more especially so, when Eugenio died. She other Physicians. While he was there, Dr. Sityar
was duty-bound to make an inquiry as to who billed him for professiona services he had
survived Eugenio, in order that the landowner – or rendered for his wife. A few days later, Carlos went
to the clinic of Dr. Sityar, found him there alone,
she as representative – could choose from among
and without any preliminary quarrel, attacked the
them who would succeed to the leasehold. Under Doctor and stabbed him twice.
Section 9 of RA 3844, Makapugay, or Amanda – as Carlos surrendered himself to police, admits he
Makapugay’s duly appointed representative or killed the deceased but argues that it was in
administrator – was required to make a choice, self-defense. He says that he went over the clinic
within one month from Eugenio’s death, who would to protest the charges of the doctor and asked for
succeed as agricultural lessee. an extension. He was allegedly insulted by the
doctor, and a quarrel ensued. The deceased took
There is no other logical conclusion than that the a pocket knife from his desk, attached Carlos, but
carlos was able to take away the knife from him,
"Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" between Amanda
and stabbed him.
and petitioners, which is grounded on Pedro’s The defendant's testimony as to the struggle
inadmissible verbal admission, and which agreement described is in conflict with the evidence presented
was entered into without obtaining Dominga’s by the prosecution. But assuming that it is true, it is
consent, constitutes an undue infringement of very evident that it fails to establish a case of
Dominga’s rights as Pedro’s successor-in-interest

14| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

self-defense and that, in reality, the only question thus inadmissible as evidence in a criminal case.
here to be determined is whether the defendant is The letter must be excluded for reasons not
guilty of murder or of simple homicide. discussed in the briefs. The letter was written by
the wife of the defendant and if she had testified at
The court found that there was premeditation that the trial the letter might have been admissible to
constituted murder. A letter written to Carlos made impeach her testimony, but she was not put on the
by the wife was presented where the wife feared witness-stand and the letter was therefore not
that Carlos would result to physical violence with offered for that purpose. If the defendant either by
the Doctor. Carlos argued that such letter was a answer or otherwise had indicated his assent to the
privileged communication and not admissible as statements contained in the letter it might also
evidence. have been admissible, but such is not the case; the
fact that he had the letter in his possession is no
ISSUE: Whether or not the letter was a admissible as indication of acquiescence or assent on his part.
evidence
The letter is nothing but pure hearsay and its
RULING: admission in evidence violates the constitutional
The Supreme Court ruled that it was not. right of the defendant in a criminal case to be
confronted with the witnesses for the prosecution
The letter was a privileged communication and not and have the opportunity to cross-examine them.
admissible. Where a privileged communication from
one spouse to another comes into the hands of a The question is radically different from that of the
third party, whether legally or not, without collusion admissibility of testimony of a third party as to a
and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the conversation between a husband and wife
spouses, the privilege is extinguished and the overheard by the witness. Testimony of that
communication, if otherwise competent, becomes character is admissible on the ground that it relates
admissible. to a conversation in which both spouses took part
and on the further ground that where the
“Professor Wigmore states the rule as defendant has the opportunity to answer a
follows: statement made to him by his spouse and fails to
For documents of communication do so, his silence implies assent. That cannot apply
coming into the possession of a third where the statement is contained in an
person, a distinction should obtain, unanswered letter.
analogous to that already indicated
for a client's communications (ante, Defendant is only guilty of homicide and not
par. 2325, 2326); i. e., if they were murder.
obtained from the addressee by
voluntary delivery, they should still 11) Uy Chico v. Union Life
be privileged (for otherwise the KEYWORD: Attorney compromised
privilege could by collusion be
practically nullified for written FACTS:
communications); but if they were The father of the plaintiff Uy Chico died in 1897, at
obtained surreptitiously or which time he was conducting a business under his
otherwise without the addressee's own name, Uy Layco. The plaintiff and his brother
consent, the privilege should cease.” took over the business and continued it under the
same name, "Uy Layco." The plaintiff purchased his
However, if the letter was obtained through a brother's interest in the business and continued to
search with no warrant, the documents are carry on the business under the father's name. A
considered as obtained through illegal search and fire engulfed the business premises. At the time of

15| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

the fire "Uy Layco" was heavily indebted and It is evident that a communication made by a client
subsequent to the fire, the creditors of the estate of to his attorney for the express purpose of its being
the plaintiff's father. communicated to a third person is essentially
inconsistent with the confidential relation. When
During the course of these proceedings, the the attorney has faithfully carried out his
plaintiff's attorney surrendered the policies of instructions be delivering the communication to the
insurance to the administrator of the estate, who third person for whom it was intended and the
compromised with the insurance company for latter acts upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning
one-half their face value, or P6,000. This money was whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a
paid into court and is now being held by the sheriff. privileged communication between the attorney
The plaintiff now brings this action, maintaining that and his client. It is plain that such a communication,
the policies and goods insured belonged to him and after reaching the party for whom it was intended
not to the estate of his deceased father and alleges at least, is a communication between the client and
that he is not bound by the compromise effected by a third person, and that the attorney simply
the administrator of his father's estate. occupies the role of intermediary or agent.

Defendant showed that plaintiff had agreed to the The testimony was to the effect that when the
compromise and his had surrendered the policy to attorney delivered the policies to the administrator,
the administrator. To prove this, the he understood that there was a compromise to be
defendant introduced evidence showing that the effected, and that when he informed the plaintiff of
plaintiff's attorney had surrendered the policies to the surrender of the policies for that purpose the
the administrator with the understanding that such a plaintiff made no objection whatever. The evidence
compromise was to be effected. is sufficient to show that the plaintiff acquiesced in
the compromise settlement of the policies. Having
The plaintiff was asked, while on the witness stand, agreed to the compromise, he cannot now disavow
if he had any objection to his attorney's testifying it and maintain an action for the recovery of their
concerning the surrender of the policies, to which he face value.
replied in the negative. The attorney was then called
for that purpose. Whereupon, counsel for the
plaintiff formally withdrew the waiver previously 12) Regala v Sandiganbayan
given by the plaintiff and objected to the testimony KEYWORD: Who’s your client?
of the attorney on the ground that it was privileged.
PRINCIPLE:
As a general rule, a lawyer may not invoke the
ISSUE: Was the testimony privileged? attorney-client privilege and refuse to identify the
identity of his client. However, such rule is qualified
RULING: The communication was not privileged. if revealing the client’s identity would implicate the
client in the very activity for which he sought legal
The evidence in question concerned the dealings of advice for, if disclosure would open client to civil
the plaintiff's attorney with a third person. The very liability or if revealing the client’s name would
essence of the veil of secrecy which surrounds establish the only link that would form the chain of
communications made between attorney and client testimony necessary to convict an individual and as
is that such communications are not intended for such, refuse to give the client’s identity in invoking
the information of third persons or to be acted upon the privilege.
by them, put of the purpose of advising the client as
to his rights. FACTS:
A complaint was filed by PCGG before the
Sandiganbayan for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten

16| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

wealth, among the defendants named in the case W/N the revelation of the client’s identity is within
are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. the ambit of the attorney-client privilege
Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio
A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and HELD:
Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent Under the circumstances of this case, yes.
Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law
firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz The general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the
Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the
Law Firm). privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity
of his client. The reasons advanced for the general
As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and rule are well established.
private respondent Raul Roco admit that they
assisted in the organization and acquisition of the First, the court has a right to know that the client
companies included in Civil Case No. 0033**, and in whose privileged information is sought to be
keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers protected is flesh and blood; Second, the privilege
acted as nominees-stockholders of the said begins to exist only after the attorney-client
corporations involved in sequestration proceedings. relationship has been established, privilege does
Respondent PCGG then filed a "Motion to Admit not attach until there is a client; Third, the privilege
Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended generally pertains to the subject matter of the
Complaint" which excluded respondent Raul S. Roco relationship. Finally, due process considerations
from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as require that the opposing party should, as a general
party-defendant, he in turn undertaking that he will rule, know his adversary.
reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he
acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies The general rule is however qualified by some
involved in PCGG Case No. 33. important exceptions.
1. Client identity is privileged where a strong
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their probability exists that revealing the client's name
"COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" with would implicate that client in the very activity for
Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly which he sought the lawyer's advice.
grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as 2. Where disclosure would open the client to civil
parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent liability, his identity is privileged
Roco. 3. Where the government's lawyers have no case
against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the client's name, the said name would furnish the
following conditions precedent for the exclusion of only link that would form the chain of testimony
petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the
of its clients; (b) submission of documents client's name is privileged.
substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c)
the submission of the deeds of assignments Summarizing these exceptions, information relating
petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit
their respective shareholdings. of the privilege when the client's name itself has
an independent significance, such that disclosure
Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein would then reveal client confidences.
questioned, denying the exclusion of petitioners in
PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with The circumstances in this case would reveal that
the conditions required by respondent PCGG the instant case falls under at least 2 exceptions to
the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged
ISSUE: client's name would lead to establish said client's

17| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

connection with the very fact in issue of the case, government concessions, etc., which acts
which is privileged information, because the constitute gross abuse of offi cial position and
privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject authority, flagrant breach of public trust.
matter or the substance. Furthermore, under the
third main exception, revelation of the client's name
would obviously provide the necessary link for the 13) Barton v Leyte Asphalt
prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise
exists. PRINCIPLE:
The privilege which protects communications
Compelling disclosure of the client's name in between attorney and client does not extend to a
circumstances such as the one which exists in the copy of a letter written by the client to his attorney
case at bench amounts to sanctioning fishing which comes to the hands of the adverse party.
expeditions by lazy prosecutors and litigants which Where the authenticity of such a document is
we cannot and will not countenance. The logical admitted, the court will take no notice of the
nexus between name and nature of transaction is so manner in which it was obtained.
intimate in this case that it would be di fficult to
simply dissociate one from the other. In this sense,
the name is as much "communication" as FACTS:
information revealed directly about the transaction James Barton, a US citizen residing in Manila sough
in question itself, a communication which is clearly to recover $318,563.30 in damages for breach of
and distinctly privileged. contract from Leyte Asphalt, a Philippine company
with principal office in Cebu. Leyte Asphalt is the
Moreover, the PCGG's demand not only touches owner of Lucio mine in Leyte, a valuable deposit of
upon the question of the identity of their clients but bituminous limestone and other asphalt products.
also on documents related to the suspected
transactions, not only in violation of the William Anderson, president and general manage
attorney-client privilege but also of the of Leyte Asphalt, wrote a letter to Barton
constitutional right against self-incrimination. authorizing him to sell the products in the
Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand.
(back story) Barton also eventually entered into subagency
**In Civil Case No. 0033, defendants therein, agreement in San Francisco and Australia.
including herein petitioners and Eduardo Cojuangco,
Jr. conspired with each other in setting up through There was a large order from Ludvigsen and
the use of coconut levy funds the fi nancial and McCurdy for 6,000 ton of bituminous limestone.
corporate framework and structures that led to the However, Anderson told Barton that the company
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others and was behind construction so it could not make big
that through insidious means and machinations, contracts at the moment. Despite Anderson’s
ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment arm, response, Barton wrote a notification to Leytre
ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder Asphalt for the company to be prepared to ship
of approximately fi fteen million shares. 5,000 tons.

The PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA There were six causes of actions for various
lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was agreements that Barton filed with the CFI. Howeber,
Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to the CFI only allowed Barton to recover from two.
subscription payment; hence, petitioners acted as
dummies, nominees and/or agents by allowing Among the evidences present in the case was a
themselves, among others, to be used as instrument carbon copy of a letter written by Barton to his
in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through lawyer, Atty. Ingersoll. He wrote that his profit from

18| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

the San Francisco contract would have been at the prohibition to third persons who obtain knowledge
rate of 85 cents per ton. When the letter was offered of the communications. One who overhears the
in evidence by Leyte Asphalt, Barton’s lawyer communications, whether with or without the
announced that he had no objection to the client's knowledge, is not within the protection of
introduction of the letter evidence if counsel for the the privilege. The same rule ought to apply to one
company would explain where the letter was who surreptitiously reads or obtains possession of a
secured. Upon this the attorney for the defendant document in original or copy.
informed the court that he received the letter from
the former attorneys of the defendant without 14) Orient Insurance Company vs. E. P. Revilla
explanation of the manner in which the document
had come into their possession. ONE LINER: Insurance Company only read the part
of the letter which is advantageous to it. Deemed
waiver of privileged communication.
Upon this Barton’s lawyermade this announcement:
"We hereby give notice at this time that unless such
an explanation is made, explaining fully how this FACTS:
carbon copy came into the possession of the
defendant company, or any one representing it, we The object of Orient Insurance Co.’s (Orient) petition
propose to object to its admission on the ground for writs of certiorari and mandamus is to require
that it is a confidential communication between respondent judge to permit Orient’s counsel to
client and lawyer." examine a letter, part of which has already been read
into the record in the course of the examination of
one of the witnesses testifying for private respondent
No further information was then given by the
Teal Motor Co., Inc. (TMC).
attorney for the defendant as to the manner in
which the letter had come to his hands. TMC, as plaintiff, filed a civil action against Orient for
the purpose of recovering upon 2 fire insurance
Trial judge thereupon excluded the document, on policies issued by the latter over TMC’s stock
the ground that it was a privileged communication merchandise. The policy contained a clause
between client and attorney. stipulating to the effect that all benefits would be
forfeited if, in case of loss, the claim should be
rejected by the insurer and action is not commenced
within 3 months after such rejection. Orient’s defense
RULING:
alleges that the claim was rejected on April 15, 1929,
CFU ruling was erroneous; for even supposing that and that notice of such rejection was given to plaintiff
the letter was within the privilege which protects by letter on the same day. However, suit was not
communications between attorney and client, this instituted by TMC until August 3, more than 3 months
privilege was lost when the letter came to the hands after rejection of the claim.
of the adverse party. And it makes no difference how
the adversary acquired possession. The law protects According to TMC, on the day they were notified of
the client from the effect of disclosures made by him the rejection, Orient representative E. E. Elser
expressly requested TMC to defer judicial action until
to his attorney in the confidence of the legal relation,
after July 31 for possibilities of compromise between
but when such a document, containing admissions
the parties. TMC relied on the request and delayed
of the client, comes to the hand of a third party, and institution of action.
reaches the adversary, it is admissible in evidence.
However, during the trial of the civil case, witness
Since the means of preserving secrecy of TMC president E. M. Bachrach made an oral
communication are entirely in the client's hands, statement as to the substance of part of a letter
and since the privilege is derogation from the received by TMC from its attorneys, saying that he
general testimonial duty and should be strictly waited for about a week longer and not having heard
construed, it would be improper to extend its

19| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

anything about it, he received a letter on July 13 from 238 of the Code of Civil Procedure, making the whole
our attorneys urging me to file these cases. of a declaration, conversation, or writing admissible
when part has been given in evidence by one party,
When asked by the counsel for Orient to produce the makes no exception as to privileged matter; and
letter, Bachrach only offered in evidence part of the neither do jurisprudence on the subject recognize any
letter supporting his testimony (relating to the urging exception. Hence, Orient was entitled to examine the
of the filing of complaints) but refused to reveal the whole of the letter, with a view to the introduction in
other part as it contained private matter privileged in evidence of such parts thereof as may be relevant to
nature between the attorneys and TMC (relating to the case on trial, and the respondent judge was in
contract of fees, retaining of counsel’s services in error in refusing to permit the inspection by Orient.
connection with the cases, alleged to be matters
entirely distinct from the issue). But, even supposing that the matter contained in
the letter and withheld from the inspection of the
Orient demanded for the production of “the best adversary was originally of a privileged nature, the
evidence,” it being well-known a rule of law that a privilege was waived by the introduction in
witness cannot be permitted to give oral testimony as evidence of part of the letter. The provision in
to the contents of a paper writing which can be section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure making
produced in court. In response, only a portion of the the whole of a declaration, conversation, or writing
letter referred to by the witness was read into the admissible when part has been given in evidence
record. Orient now insists that inasmuch as all the by one party, makes no exception as to privileged
letters refers to the case then in court, the entire matter; and the jurisprudence on the subject does
document should be exhibited pursuant to the rule not recognize any exception.
that when part of a document is offered in evidence,
the entire document must be presented.
15) People v Sandiganbayan
ISSUE: Does presentation of part of the letter
constitute waiver to present the whole document? Yes.
KEYWORDS: Congressman falsified his arraignment;
Is a contract for fees and other terms of employment Counsel testified against him; Privileged
between attorney and client privileged in nature? No. communication does not apply

RULING: FACTS:
The excerpt in question must be considered as proof Respondent Paredes was successively the Provincial
submitted by TMC, and there can be no question that, Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the
part of the letter having been introduced in behalf of same province, and then the Congressman.
the plaintiff, the whole of the letter could properly be Respondent Sansaet was the counsel for Paredes in
examined by Orient, in accordance with the express
several instances pertinent to the criminal charges
provision of section 283, Code of Civil Procedure.
involved in the present case.
As to the alleged privileged nature of the terms of
employment between attorney and client as contained Paredes applied for a free patent over a land which
in other portions of the letter, the court found it was approved and was granted an original
difficult to consider a contract for fees as privileged. certificate of title in his favor. However the Director
However irrelevant under the circumstances, it cannot of Lands filed an action for the cancellation of
be privileged in nature. Contracts between attorneys respondent Paredes patent and certificate of title
and clients are inherently personal and considered as since the land had been designated and reserved as
private matters, but they are a constant subject of
a school site. The trial court rendered judgment
litigation, and contracts relating to fees are essentially
not of privileged nature. nullifying said patent and title after finding that
Paredes had obtained the same through fraudulent
Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the letter misrepresentations in his application. Sansaet
contained privileged matters, such was waived by the served as counsel of Paredes in that civil case.
introduction in evidence of part of the letter. Section

20| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

An information for perjury was then filed against To avoid responsibility, Sansaet revealed in an
respondent Paredes in the MCTC. However, the Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications, that
proceedings were terminated on the ground of Paredes contrived to have the graft case dismissed
prescription. In this criminal case, Paredes was on the ground of double jeopardy by making it
likewise represented by Sansaet as counsel. appear that the perjury case had been dismissed by
the trial court after he had been arraigned. He
After that, the Tanodbayan recommended the filing further revealed that the documents were prepared
of a criminal case against Paredes for violation of the and falsified by his co-respondents in this case in
provisions of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. the house of Paredes. He claimed that he
It was alleged that by using his former position as participated in the scheme upon the instigation and
Provincial Attorney to influence and induce the inducement of Paredes. This was to pave the way
Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his for Sansaet’s discharge as state witness.
application for free patent, he had violated Section
3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. Sansaet The proposal for Sansaet to be a state witness was
was Paredes’ counsel of record therein. rejected by the Ombudsman since it was difficult to
believe that a lawyer of his stature, in the absence
By way of defense, Paredes alleged that double of deliberate intent to conspire, would be
jeopardy has already attached since the second unwittingly induced by another to commit a crime.
complaint filed in court arose from the same set of
facts and same evidence of the earlier perjury case Sandiganbayan ruled that a lawyer-client
which, after its arraignment, was ordered dismissed relationship existed between Paredes and Sansaet
by the court upon recommendation of the during the relevant periods so the facts and other
Department of Justice. To support such defense the confidential matters involved in this case must have
accused presented court records and transcripts as been disclosed by Paredes, as client, to respondent
proof that he was arraigned in the perjury case. Sansaet, as his lawyer. Because of this, Sansaet
cannot be presented as a witness against accused
Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury Paredes without the latter’s consent.
and graft charges against respondent Paredes, sent a
letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation ISSUE:
of the 3 respondents herein for falsification of public W/N the projected testimony of respondent
documents. He claimed that respondent Honrada, Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred by the
the Clerk of Court of the MCTC, in conspiracy with attorney-client privilege.
his herein co-respondents, simulated and certified as
true copies certain documents purporting to be a RULING:
notice of arraignment, and transcripts of No, the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet
stenographic notes supposedly taken during the is not barred by the attorney-client privilege.
arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge.
The facts of the case constitute an exception to the
In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter rule on privileged communication made during
a certification that no notice of arraignment was lawyer-client relationship.
ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal in
connection with that perjury case; and a certification In the American jurisdiction from which our present
of the Presiding Judge that said perjury case in his evidential rule was taken, the privilege is not
court did not reach the arraignment stage since confined to verbal or written communications
action thereon was suspended pending the review made by the client to his attorney but extends as
of the case by the Department of Justice. well to information communicated by the client to
the attorney by other means.

21| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

In the present case, it may correctly be assumed that the process of falsifying, the documents which
there was a confidential communication made by were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and
Paredes to Sansaet in connection with falsification, culminated in the criminal charges now pending in
and this may reasonably be expected since Paredes respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the
was the accused and Sansaet his counsel therein. confidential communications thus made by
The clincher for this conclusion is the undisputed Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in
fact that said documents were filed by Sansaet in reference to the crime of falsification which had
behalf of Paredes as annexes to the motion for not yet been committed in the past by Paredes but
reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of which he, in confederacy with his present
the graft case before the Tanodbayan. Also, the acts co-respondents, later committed. Having been
and words of the parties during the period when the made for purposes of a future offense, those
documents were being falsified were necessarily communications are outside the pale of the
confidential since Paredes would not have invited attorney-client privilege.
Sansaet to his house and allowed him to witness the
same except under conditions of secrecy and Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in
confidence. the commission of that crime of falsification which
he, Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted
However, a distinction must be made between upon the authorities. It is well settled that in order
confidential communications relating to past crimes that a communication between a lawyer and his
already committed, and future crimes intended to client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful
be committed, by the client. Corollarily, it is purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The
admitted that the announced intention of a client to existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the
commit a crime is not included within the privilege from attaching. In fact, it has also been
confidences which his attorney is bound to respect. pointed out to the Court that the prosecution of
the honorable relation of attorney and client will
For the application of the attorney-client privilege, not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and
the period to be considered is the date when the every communication made to an attorney by a
privileged communication was made by the client client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or
to the attorney in relation to either a crime attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to
committed in the past or with respect to a crime divulge, but which the attorney under certain
intended to be committed in the future. In other circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in
words, if the client seeks his lawyers advice with the interest of justice.
respect to a crime that the former has committed,
he is given the protection of a virtual confessional To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the
seal which the attorney-client privilege declares genesis of a crime which was later committed
cannot be broken by the attorney without the pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection
client’s consent. The same privileged confidentiality, thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the
however, does not attach with regard to a crime worst travesties in the rules of evidence and
which a client intends to commit thereafter or in practice in the noble profession of law.
the future and for purposes of which he seeks the
lawyers advice. 16) US v. GORDON-NIKKAR

In the present case, the testimony sought to be KEYWORD: lawyer’s advise to commit perjury; not
elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the protected by the attorney-client privilege)
communications made to him by physical acts
and/or accompanying words of Paredes at the time PRINCIPLE: A communication divulged to
he and Honrada, either with the active or passive "strangers" or outsiders can scarcely be considered
participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in

22| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

a confidential communication between attorney and No.

client. There were at least five persons present at
The attorney-client privilege does not extend to Estrumsa's office on this occasion; at least one of
communications regarding an intended crime. . the persons, Brenda Marchand, and perhaps others,
were not clients of Mr. Estrumsa. A communication
FACTS: divulged to "strangers" or outsiders can scarcely be
Appellant Gordon-Nikkar was convicted after trial considered a confidential communication between
by jury of the crime of conspiracy to possess with attorney and client. Therefore, this communication
intent to distribute approximately four kilograms of is not protected by the attorney-client privilege.
cocaine, and the possession with intent to distribute
and distribution of cocaine. On appeal, she contends But even if it appeared that the communication in
her conviction should be reversed because the question were otherwise privileged (i.e., that the
district court permitted a Government witness, communication was considered confidential despite
Brenda Marchand, to give testimony regarding the presence of a stranger), the testimony was
allegedly privileged conversations between nonetheless admissible. The conversations in
appellant's attorney and his clients question dealt with plans to commit perjury so as
to hide the criminal activity of appellant and others.
Brenda Marchand was charged as a co-defendant It is beyond dispute that the attorney-client
with the crimes for which appellant was convicted. privilege does not extend to communications
Marchand subsequently pled guilty and testified at regarding an intended crime. The policy underlying
trial for the Government. Prior to entering her plea, the attorney-client privilege is to promote the
Marchand had two meetings in the office of administration of justice. It would be a perversion
appellant's attorney, Mr. Estrumsa. Marchand, of the privilege to extend it so as to protect
however, was not a client of Estrumsa, and it is communications designed to frustrate justice by
unclear whether all the other persons in these committing other crimes to conceal past misdeeds.
meetings were Estrumsa's clients.

Of the two conversations related by Marchand, the 17) US v. MCPARTLIN

second was the subject of thorough
cross-examination by Estrumsa. The second KEY WORDS: bribery, sludge-hauling contract,
conversation involved Estrumsa's alleged attorney-client-privilege
recommendation that Marchand leave the country PRINCIPLE: Communications by a client to his own
and go to Venezuela. On redirect, the Government lawyer remain privileged when the lawyer
inquired, over defense objection, into the substance subsequently shares them with co-defendants for
of the conversation during the first meeting. purposes of a common defense. Waiver is not to be
Marchand testified that at this meeting the inferred from the disclosure in confidence to a
participants, at Mr. Estrumsa's suggestion, agreed to co-party's attorney for a common purpose.
give perjured cover-up testimony at trial to the
effect that none of them had possessed the cocaine, The privilege protects communications to the
but instead merely happened to be at a party where attorney's . . . agents . . for rendering his services.
the cocaine was discovered.

ISSUE: FACTS:
Whether the statements in Attorney Estrumsa's
The Sanitary District is a municipal corporation with
office were protected by the attorney-client
primary responsibility for disposing of sewage from
privilege.
Chicago and surrounding areas. The Sanitary
District operates a sewage treatment plant in
HELD:

23| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

Stickney, Illinois. The District announced plans to Evidence showed that Benton, acting with the
have the sludge from its treatment plant be knowledge and complicity of Frederick Ingram and
transported to Fulton County, Illinois, and solicited through intermediaries Bull and Weber, bribed
bids on the project. McPartlin and Janicki to cause the sludge-hauling
contract to be awarded to Ingram Corporation and
During the week before the bids were to be one of its subsidiaries, and later bribed the same
submitted, Bull (president of a towing company, and officials to secure favorable treatment under the
of the alleged intermediaries through whom many contract and modifications of the contract.
of the bribe payments were made) visited Robert
Howson (vice president of Ingram Contractors, Inc.), At trial, Ingram contended that he did not learn
and told Howson that if Ingram Corporation until the February, 1972 meeting with Benton that
expected to secure the contract, it would have to his company had secured a multi-million dollar
make a "political contribution." Howson responded contract by paying more than $300,000 to Chicago
that he was not in that sort of business, but then officials. Ingram testified that he protested against
took Bull to meet William J. Benton (vice president paying the bribes, but reluctantly agreed when
of Ingram Corporation and president of Ingram Benton informed him that if he refused to pay, the
Contractors, Inc.) Benton then telephoned Sanitary District would not pay the additional
defendant Frederick Ingram (chairman of the board $2,100,000 for the pipeline and would use the
of Ingram Corporation) to inform him of Weber's liquidated damages clause to penalize Ingram
"political contribution" proposal. Ingram agreed, Corporation.
provided that the contribution could be added to
the cost of the contract. These was the beginning of Throughout the period covered by the indictment,
a series of transactions between the defendants Benton kept diaries, or appointment calendars, in
which are the basis of the charges in this case. which he made notes concerning meetings and
telephone conversations, naming the persons
The indictment charged that defendant Frederick B. involved and often recording the substance of the
Ingram, had paid defendant Robert F. McPartlin, an conversations.
Illinois legislator (introduced by Weber to Benton as
the man who handled all political contributions for The defendants were convicted of numerous
the Democratic Party in Illinois), defendant Valentine violations of the Travel Act,18 U.S.C. § 1952, and
Janicki, a trustee for the Metropolitan Sanitary the Wire, Radio, Television Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C. §
District, and others more than $900,000 to secure 1343, and of conspiring to violate those acts in
for the Ingram Corporation a multi-million dollar violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.
sludge-hauling contract with the District. Destroying Benton's credibility was important to
Defendants Franklin H. Weber, a businessman, and Ingram, as it was to the other defendants, even
Edwin T. Bull, were alleged to be intermediaries though Ingram's defense was based, in part, on the
through whom many of the payments were made. argument that he had made the payments in
William J. Benton (vice president of Ingram response to the threats Benton had reported to him,
Corporation) was an unindicted co-conspirator who because Ingram's account of events in issue
played a major role in the conspiracy and testified as differed materially from Benton's, and because
a witness for the prosecution. the government's case hinged largely on Benton's
Sometime later, a federal grand jury commenced an testimony. Since Benton's diaries corroborated so
investigation of the events surrounding the much of his testimony, it was imperative from the
sludge-hauling contract. Later, the government standpoint of all defendants that an effort be
granted immunity to Benton (vice president of the made to discredit them.
Ingram Corp). Such an effort was made, and Frederick Ingram and
McPartlin cooperated in that effort.

24| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

An investigator acting for Frederick Ingram's be inferred from the disclosure in confidence to a
counsel twice interviewed McPartlin with the co-party's attorney for a common purpose.
consent of the latter's counsel for the purpose of
determining whether there was a basis for In the case at bar, the judge found, as a preliminary
challenging the truth of some of the diary entries. question of fact, that McPartlin had made the
In the second of these interviews McPartlin made statements to the investigator in confidence. That
certain statements, which Ingram argues tend to finding is not clearly erroneous.
support his defense. At trial, when Ingram offered Ingram even argued that the co-defendants'
evidence of these statements, McPartlin's counsel defenses must be in all respects compatible if the
objected on the ground of the attorney-client joint-defense privilege is to be applicable. The cases
privilege, and the court, after an in camera hearing, do not establish such a limitation, and there is no
sustained the objection on this ground. reason to impose it. Rule 503(b)(3) of the proposed
ISSUES: Federal Rules of Evidence, as approved by the
Supreme Court, stated that the privilege applies to
1. Whether statements made by McPartlin are communications by a client "to a lawyer
covered under the lawyer-client privilege representing another in a matter of common
communication. interest." The Advisory Committee's Note to
2. Whether the statement was covered by the proposed Rule 503(b) makes it clear that the
privilege since it was made to an investigator joint-interest privilege is not limited to situations in
rather than an attorney. which the positions of the parties are compatible in
all respects.
HELD:
In this instance the US SC followed such
1. YES, the statements made by McPartlin cannot be recommendation. The privilege protects pooling of
disclosed because they remain protected by the information for any defense purpose common to
attorney-client privilege. the participating defendants. Cooperation
McPartlin was entitled to the protection of the between defendants in such circumstances is often
attorney-client privilege, because his statements not only in their own best interests but serves to
were made in confidence to an attorney for a expedite the trial or, as in the case at bar, the trial
co-defendant for a common purpose related to both preparation.
defenses. They were made in connection with the NOTE: The exclusion of the McPartlin statements
project of attempting to discredit Benton, a project would not be reversible error even if he had not
in which Ingram and McPartlin and their attorneys been entitled to claim the privilege. The Court was
were jointly engaged for the benefit of both satisfied from their examination that the
defendants. statements merely corroborated facts which were
Ingram acknowledges that communications by a admitted in evidence and which the jury obviously
client to his own lawyer remain privileged when found to be true. The Court did not disclose the
the lawyer subsequently shares them with contents of the statements because they remain
co-defendants for purposes of a common defense. protected by the attorney-client privilege, on which
This is known as the common-defense rule which they alternatively based their ruling on this point.
has been recognized in cases. Uninhibited 2. The argument of Ingram that the
communication among joint parties and their communication was not privileged because it was
counsel about matters of common concern is often made to an investigator rather than an attorney
important to the protection of their interests. In will not prevail. The investigator was an agent for
criminal cases it can be necessary to a fair Ingram's attorney, however, so it is as if the
opportunity to defend. Therefore, waiver is not to communication was to the attorney himself. It has
never been questioned that the privilege protects

25| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

communications to the attorney's agents for schizophrenia "before, during and after the
rendering his services. marriage and until the present."
It was also not fatal to the privilege that McPartlin
made the statement to Ingram's attorney rather Juan’s counsel announced that he would present as
than his own. When the Ingram and McPartlin his next witness the Chief of the Female Services of
camps decided to join in an attempt to discredit the National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado,
Benton, the attorney for each represented both for a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry.
purposes of that joint effort. The relationship was Said counsel orally applied for the issuance of
no different than it would have been if during the a subpoena ad testificandum requiring Dr.
trial the Ingram and McPartlin attorneys had decided Acampado to testify. Nelly's counsel opposed the
that Ingram's attorney would cross-examine Benton motion on the ground that the testimony sought to
on behalf of both, and during cross-examination be elicited from the witness is privileged since Dr.
McPartlin passed Ingram's attorney a note Acampado had examined Nelly in a professional
containing information for use in the capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering
cross-examination. The attorney who thus from schizophrenia. Over such opposition,
undertakes to serve his client's co-defendant for a the subpoena was issued.
limited purpose becomes the co-defendant's
attorney for that purpose. Nelly's counsel filed an urgent omnibus motion to
quash the subpoena and suspend the proceedings
pending resolution of the motion.
18) Lim v. Court of Appeals
Before Dr. Acampado took the witness stand, the
KEYWORD:Annulment of Marriage; court heard this urgent motion. Nelly’s counsel
physician-patient relationship; wife is allegedly argued that having seen and examined Nelly in a
schizophrenic professional capacity, Dr. Acampado is barred from
testifying under the rule on the confidentiality of a
physician-patient relationship. Juan’s counsel
PRINCIPLE: The physician may be considered to be
contended, however, that Dr. Acampado would be
acting in his professional capacity when he attends
presented as an expert witness and would not
to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative
testify on any information acquired while attending
treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have
to Nelly in a professional capacity. The trial court
been made to the physician to enable him "safely
denied the motion and allowed the witness to
and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered by
testify. Dr. Acampado thus took the witness stand,
the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is the
was qualified by Juan’s counsel as an expert witness
tenor only of the communication that is privileged.
and was asked hypothetical questions related to
The mere fact of making a communication, as well as
her field of expertise. She neither revealed the
the date of a consultation and the number of
illness she examined and treated Nelly for nor
consultations, are therefore not privileged from
disclosed the results of her examination and the
disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is
medicines she had prescribed.
not stated."

Nelly filed with CA a petition for certiorari and

Facts:
prohibition to annul the order of respondent Judge
allowing Dr. Acampado to testify on the ground that
Nelly and Juan Lim are lawfully married to each the same was issued with grave abuse of discretion
other. Juan filed a petition for annulment of amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and to prohibit
marriage on the ground that Nelly has been him from proceeding with the reception of Dr.
allegedly suffering from a mental illness called Acampado's testimony.

26| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

CA denied the petition ruling that Nelly failed in In order that the privilege may be successfully
establishing the confidential nature of the testimony claimed, the following requisites must concur:
given by or obtained from Dr. Acampado when she 1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
testified. Hence, the respondent Judge committed 2. the person against whom the privilege is
no grave abuse of discretion. claimed is one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
ISSUE: 3. such person acquired the information while
W/N the information given by the physician (Dr. he was attending to the patient in his
Acampado) in her testimony in open court a professional capacity;
privileged communication? NO. 4. the information was necessary to enable
him to act in that capacity; and
HELD: 5. the information was confidential, and, if
Paragraph (c), Section 24 of the Revised Rules on disclosed, would blacken the reputation
Evidence which reads: (formerly character) of the patient."

"SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged These requisites conform with the four (4)
communication. — The following persons cannot fundamental conditions necessary for the
testify as to matters learned in confidence in the establishment of a privilege against the disclosure
following cases: of certain communications, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx 1. the communications must originate in
a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery 2. This element of confidentiality must be
or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the essential to the full and satisfactory
consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice maintenance of the relation between the
or treatment given by him or any information which parties.
he may have acquired in attending such patient in a 3. The relation must be one which in the
professional capacity, which information was opinion of the community ought to
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and be sedulously fostered
which would blacken the reputation of the patient." 4. The injury that would inure to the relation
by the disclosure of the communications
This rule on the physician-patient privilege is must be greater than the benefit thereby
intended to facilitate and make safe full and gained for the correct disposal of
confidential disclosure by the patient to the litigation."
physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms,
untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent The physician may be considered to be acting in his
and enforced disclosure and publication on the professional capacity when he attends to the
witness stand, to the end that the physician may patient for curative, preventive, or palliative
form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have
efficaciously to treat his patient. It rests in public been made to the physician to enable him "safely
policy and is for the general interest of the and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered
community. by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is
the tenor only of the communication that is
Since the object of the privilege is to protect the privileged. The mere fact of making a
patient, it may be waived if no timely objection is communication, as well as the date of a
made to the physician's testimony. consultation and the number of consultations, are

27| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as failure to seasonably object thereto amounted to
the subject communicated is not stated." One who a waiver thereof.
claims this privilege must prove the presence of
these aforementioned requisites.
19) Krohn vs CA

In this case, Nelly failed to establish the presence of KEY WORDS: annulment, psychiatric evaluation
the requisites. report

PRINCIPLE: The person against whom the privilege

Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an (physician-patient) is claimed is must be one duly
expert witness. She did not disclose anything authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obtained in the course of her examination, interview obstetrics.
and treatment of the petitioner. The facts and
conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did FACTS:
not refer to and had no bearing on whatever Edgar Krohn, Jr. and Ma. Paz Fernandez were
information or findings the doctor obtained while married in Manila on June 14, 1964 and had three
attending to the patient. There is, as well, no children. Their blessings notwithstanding, the
showing that Dr. Acampado's answers to the relationship between the couple developed into a
questions propounded to her relating to the stormy one. Ma. Paz underwent psychological
hypothetical problem were influenced by the testing purportedly in an effort to ease the marital
information obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise strain. The effort however proved futile. Later, they
stated, her expert opinion excluded whatever finally separated in fact.
information or knowledge she had about the
In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the
petitioner which was acquired by reason of the
confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz.
physician-patient relationship existing between
Presenting the report among others, he obtained a
them. As an expert witness, her testimony before
decree from the Tribunal Metropolitanum
the trial court cannot then be excluded.
Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying his church
marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of
While it may be true that Nelly’s counsel opposed "incapacitas assumendi onera conjugalia due to
the oral request for the issuance of a subpoena ad lack of due discretion existent at the time of the
testificandum to Dr. Acampado and filed a formal wedding and thereafter." This decree was
motion for the quashal of the said subpoena a day eventually confirmed and pronounced “Final and
before the witness was to testify, Nelly makes no Definite”.
claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel had
objected to any question asked of the witness on the On 1993, Edgar filed a petition for annulment of his
ground that it elicited an answer that would violate marriage with the RTC. In his petition, he cited the
the privilege, despite the trial court's advice that Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report which
said counsel may interpose his objection to the Ma. Paz merely denied in her Answer as “either
testimony "once it becomes apparent that the unfounded or irrelevant”.
testimony, sought to be elicited is covered by the
privileged communication rule." The particular Petitioner’s arguments: She argues that since Sec.
portions of the stenographic notes of the testimony 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court prohibits
of Dr. Acampado quoted in Nelly's Petition and a physician from testifying on matters which he
Memorandum, and in Juan's Memorandum, do not may have acquired in attending to a patient in
at all show that any objections were interposed. professional capacity, with more reason should a
Even granting ex gratia that the testimony of Dr. third person (like respondent-husband) be
Acampado could be covered by the privilege, the PROHIBITED from testifying on privileged matters
between a physician and patient or from submitting

28| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

any medical report, findings or evaluation prepared RULING: YES.

by a physician which the latter has acquired as a Statutes making communications between
result of his confidential and privileged relation with physician and patient privileged are intended to
a patient. inspire confidence in the patient and encourage
him to make a full disclosure to his physician of his
She further argues that to allow her husband to symptoms and condition. Consequently, this
testify on the contents of the psychiatric evaluation prevents the physician from making public
report will set a very bad and dangerous precedent information that will result in humiliation,
because it abets circumvention of the rule's intent in embarrassment, or disgrace to the patient. For, the
preserving the sanctity, security and confidence to patient should rest assured with the knowledge
the relation of physician and his patient. Her thesis is that the law recognizes the communication as
that what cannot be done directly should not be confidential, and guards against the possibility of
allowed to be done indirectly. his feelings being shocked or his reputation
tarnished by their subsequent disclosure. The
Respondent’s arguments: Edgar Krohn, Jr., however physician-patient privilege creates a zone of privacy,
contends that the rules are very explicit: the intended to preclude the humiliation of the patient
prohibition applies only to a physician. Thus, the that may follow the disclosure of his ailments.
legal prohibition to testify is not applicable to the Indeed, certain types of information communicated
case at bar where the person sought to be barred in the context of the physician-patient relationship
from testifying on the privileged communication is fall within the constitutionally protected zone of
the husband and not the physician of the petitioner. privacy, including a patient's interest in keeping his
In fact, according to him, the Rules sanction his mental health records confidential. Thus, it has
testimony considering that a husband may testify been observed that the psychotherapist-patient
against his wife in a civil case filed by one against the privilege is founded upon the notion that certain
other. forms of antisocial behavior may be prevented by
encouraging those in need of treatment for
Besides, private respondent submits that privileged emotional problems to secure the services of a
communication may be waived by the person psychotherapist.
entitled thereto, and this petitioner expressly did
when she gave her unconditional consent to the use Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however
of the psychiatric evaluation report when it was misplaced. Lim v. Court of Appeals clearly lays down
presented to the Tribunal Metropolitanum the requisites in order that the privilege may be
Matrimoniale which took it into account among successfully invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in
others in deciding the case and declaring their a civil case; (b) the person against whom the
marriage null and void. privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to
Private respondent further argues that petitioner practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such
also gave her implied consent when she failed to person acquired the information while he was
specifically object to the admissibility of the report attending to the patient in his professional
in her Answer where she merely described the capacity; (d) the information was necessary to
evaluation report as "either unfounded or enable him to act in that capacity; and, (e) the
irrelevant." At any rate, failure to interpose a timely information was confidential and, if disclosed,
objection at the earliest opportunity to the evidence would blacken the reputation (formerly character)
presented on privileged matters may be construed of the patient.
as an implied waiver. In the instant case, the person against whom the
privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to
ISSUE: WoN the psychiatric evaluation report is practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is
admissible. simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify
on a document executed by medical practitioners.

29| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the the burden to prove that Neomi had a pre-existing
claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be condition was under Blue Cross. The CA denied the
considered a circumvention of the prohibition motion for reconsideration of the
because his testimony cannot have the force and health care company.
effect of the testimony of the physician who
examined the patient and executed the report. ISSUE:
Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting 1. Whether petitioner was able to prove that
to the testimony of private respondent on the respondent Neomi's stroke was caused by a
ground that it was privileged. In his Manifestation pre-existing condition and therefore was excluded
before the trial court dated 10 May 1991, he from the coverage of the health care agreement.
invoked the rule on privileged communications but
never questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a RULING: No. Petition dismissed.
fatal mistake. For, in failing to object to the
testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, The contract of insurance as in this case is a
counsel waived his right to make such objection contract of adhesion. If there is ambiguity in the
and, consequently, the evidence offered may be terms must be interpreted and enforced stringently
admitted. against the insurer which prepared the contract.

20) Blue Cross Health v. Olivares Gr. No. 169737 The agreement defined a pre-existing condition as:

PRINCIPLES: Presumption; more specifically “a disability which existed before the

Disputable presumption; presumptions are commencement date
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be of membership whose natural history can
contradicted and overcome by other evidence. be clinically determined, whether or not
However there are exceptions, one of which when the Member was aware of such illness or
“suppression is an exercise of a privilege.” As such, condition. Such conditions also include
the presumption that an evidence wilfully supressed disabilities existing prior to reinstatement
is adverse when produce does not apply. date in the case of lapse of an Agreement.”

FACTS: “Under this provision, disabilities which

Neomi Olivares applied for a health care program existed before the commencement of
with Blue Cross for the amount of 12,000 pesos. 38 the agreement are excluded from its
days after she applied, she suffered from a stroke. coverage if they become manifest within
Ailments due to “pre-existing conditions” were one year from its effectivity.”
excluded from the coverage. She was confined in
Medical City and discharged with a bill of Php Petitioners:
34,000. Blue Cross refused to pay unless she had her averred that the non-disclosure of
physician’s certification that she was suffering from a the pre-existing condition made a
pre-existing condition. When Blue Cross still refused presumption in its favor.
to pay, she filed suit in the MTC. The
health care company rebutted by saying that the Respondents:
physician didn’t disclose the condition due to the Maintained that the petitioner had
patient’s invocation of the doctor-client privilege. the duty to prove its accusation.
The MTC dismissed for a lack of cause
of action because the physician didn’t disclose the (This is the one relevant in the subject of evidence)
condition. In the RTC, the spouses were awarded Petitioner never presented evidence to prove its
the amount of the hospital bills plus 60,000 in presumption that the Doctor’s report would work
damages. This was under the ratio that against Neomi. They only perceived that the

30| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

invocation of the privilege made the report adverse Johnny Chan, the dissolution of their conjugal
to Neomi and such was a disreputable presumption. partnership of gains, and the award of custody of
They should have made an independent assessment their children to her. She claimed that Johnny failed
of Neomi’s condition when it failed to obtain the to care for and support his family and that a
report. They shouldn’t have waited for the attending psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient
physician’s report to come out. due to incessant drinking and excessive use of
prohibited drugs. She had convinced him to
Under Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court undergo hospital confinement for detoxification
states: and rehabilitation.

Disputable presumptions. ― The following Johnny claimed that it was Josielene who failed in
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but her wifely duties. To save their marriage, he agreed
may be contradicted and overcome by to marriage counseling but when he and Josielene
other evidence: got to the hospital, two men forcibly held him by
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be both arms while another gave him an injection. The
adverse if produced. marriage relations got worse when the police
temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated
The exception on presenting evidence applies when crime and released her only after the case against
the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. her ended. By then, their marriage relationship
Hence, Neomi had the privilege not to present the could no longer be repaired.
Doctor’s report under the doctor-client privilege.
During the pre-trial conference, Josielene
pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form that Johnny
attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly
21) Chan vs. Chan confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The
form carried a physician's handwritten note that
KEYWORDS: Nullity of Marriage Case; Wife Johnny suffered from "methamphetamine and
requested subpoena duces tecum for the medical alcohol abuse."
records of husband before trial, latter objected
under Privileged Communication Rule Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to
PRINCIPLES: Medical City, covering Johnny's medical records
 Objections to evidence must be made after when he was there confined. The request was
the offer of such evidence for admission in accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit
court. in evidence" the records sought by subpoena duces
 Physician-Patient Privileged Communication tecum.
does not only cover the hospital records, but
also the examination of the physician at the Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the
trial. Physician memorializes all these medical records were covered by physician-patient
information in the patient's records. privilege.
Disclosing them would be equivalent to
compelling the physician to testify on RTC: sustained the opposition.
privileged matters he gained while dealing
with the patient, without the latter's prior CA: denied Josielene's petition. If courts were to
consent. allow the production of medical records, then
patients would be left with no assurance that
FACTS: Josielene Chan filed with the RTC a Petition whatever relevant disclosures they may have made
for the Declaration of Nullity of her marriage to to their physicians would be kept confidential. The

31| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also "testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be
affidavits, certificates, and pertinent hospital records. regarded as privileged. Section 24 (c) of Rule 130
Although Johnny can waive the privilege, he did not states that the physician "cannot in a civil case,
do so in this case. He attached the Philhealth form to without the consent of the patient, be examined"
his answer for the limited purpose of showing his regarding their professional conversation. The
alleged forcible confinement. privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the
hospital records, but only the examination of the
ISSUE: physician at the trial.
WON the denial of the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum covering Johnny's hospital records on the To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery
ground that these are covered by the privileged procedure of the hospital records — the results of
character of the physician-patient communication is tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of
correct the patient's illness, and the advice or treatment he
gave him — would be to allow access to evidence
RULING: that is inadmissible without the patient's consent.
Yes. Physician memorializes all these information in
the patient's records. Disclosing them would be
The time to object to the admission of evidence, the equivalent of compelling the physician to
such as the hospital records, would be at the time testify on privileged matters he gained while
they are offered. The offer could be made part of dealing with the patient, without the latter's prior
the physician's testimony or as independent consent.
evidence that he had made entries in those records
that concern the patient's health problems. Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his
answer to the petition before the RTC that he had
Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to been confined in a hospital against his will and in
evidence must be made after the offer of such fact attached to his answer a Philhealth claim form
evidence for admission in court. covering that confinement, he should be deemed
to have waived the privileged character of its
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, records.
Josielene's request for subpoena duces tecum is
premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin But, trial in the case had not yet begun.
before making a request for the issuance of a Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny's hospital already presented the Philhealth claim form in
records. It is when those records are produced for evidence, the act contemplated above which would
examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the
object, not just to their admission in evidence, but details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not
more so to their disclosure. yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he
filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his
It is possible to treat Josielene's motion for the hospital records would again be premature.
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the
hospital records as a motion for production of 22) NERI V SENATE COMMITTEE ON
documents, a discovery procedure available to a ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
litigant prior to trial. But the right to compel the
production of documents has a limitation: the DOCTRINE:
documents to be disclosed are "not privileged." The confidentiality of the President’s conversations
and correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the
Josielene claims that the hospital records subject of confidentiality of judicial deliberations. It possesses
this case are not privileged since it is the the same value as the right to privacy of all citizens

32| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

and more, because it is dictated by public interest (1) Whether or not there is a recognized
and the constitutionally ordained separation of presumptive presidential communications privilege
governmental powers. in our legal system;
(2) Whether or not there is factual or legal basis to
FACTS: hold that the communications elicited by the three
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions (3) questions are covered by executive privilege;
directing Senate Committee on Accountability of (3) Whether or not respondent Committees have
Public Officers and Investigations of the Senate shown that the communications elicited by the
(popularly known as the Senate Blue Ribbon three (3) questions are critical to the exercise of
Committee), among others, to conduct an their functions;
investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the
head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the RULING:
Senate Blue Ribbon. Petitioner appeared before (1) There Is a Recognized Presumptive Presidential
respondent Committees and testified for about Communications Privilege
eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the The Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez,
National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a affirmed that the presidential communications
project awarded by the Department of privilege is fundamental to the operation of
Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to government and inextricably rooted in the
Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE"). separation of powers under the Constitution.
He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos “There are certain types of information which the
offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of government may withhold from the public". There
the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the is a "governmental privilege against public
bribery and that she instructed him not to accept disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding
the bribe. However, when probed further on what military, diplomatic and other national security
they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to matters". "The right to information does not extend
answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, to matters recognized as ‘privileged information’
he refused to answer the questions on: under the separation of powers, by which the Court
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the meant Presidential conversations, correspondences,
NBN Project, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings.
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, In light of this highly exceptional nature of the
and privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve. President the power to invoke the privilege. She
On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to
before respondent Committees upon orders of the invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the
President invoking executive privilege. On November Executive Secretary must state that the authority is
22, 2007, the respondent Committees issued the "By order of the President", which means that he
show-cause letter requiring him to explain why he personally consulted with her. President may not
should not be cited in contempt. authorize her subordinates to exercise such power.
Respondent Committees found petitioner’s In this case, it was the President herself, through
explanations unsatisfactory, citing petitioner in Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive
contempt of respondent Committees and ordering privilege on a specific matter involving an executive
his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate agreement between the Philippines and China,
Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would which was the subject of the three (3) questions.
appear and give his testimony.
(2) There Are Factual and Legal Bases to Hold that
ISSUES: the Communications Elicited by the Three (3)
Questions Are Covered by Executive Privilege

33| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

A. The power to enter into an executive agreement freedom of speech or of the press nor of the
is a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential freedom of access to information."
power."
No Executive can effectively discharge
B. The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid constitutional functions in the face of intense and
down precisely to limit the scope of the presidential unchecked legislative incursion into the core of the
communications privilege but, in any case, it is not President’s decision-making process, which
conclusive. inevitably would involve her conversations with a
member of her Cabinet.
In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the
privilege "to a large swath of the executive branch" For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed
is absent because the official involved here is a Decision did not enjoin respondent Committees
member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the from inquiring into the NBN Project. All that is
term "advisor" of the President; in fact, her alter ego expected from them is to respect matters that are
and a member of her official family. covered by executive privilege.

C. The President’s claim of executive privilege is not (3) Respondent Committees Failed to Show that
merely based on a generalized interest; and in the Communications Elicited by the Three
balancing respondent Committees’ and the Questions Are Critical to the Exercise of their
President’s clashing interests, the Court did not Functions
disregard the 1987 Constitutional provisions on
government transparency, accountability and In U.S. v. Nixon, Court ruled that the President's
disclosure of information. generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the
demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a
The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive pending criminal trial.
Secretary Ermita specified presidential
communications privilege in relation to diplomatic In this case we must weigh the importance
and economic relations with another sovereign of the general privilege of confidentiality
nation as the bases for the claim. It is easy to discern of Presidential communications in
the danger that goes with the disclosure of the performance of the President's
President’s communication with her advisor. The responsibilities against the inroads of such
NBN Project involves a foreign country as a party to a privilege on the fair administration of
the agreement. It was actually a product of the criminal justice. (emphasis supplied)
meeting of minds between officials of the
Philippines and China. Whatever the President says xxx xxx xxx
about the agreement - particularly while official ...the allowance of the privilege to withhold
negotiations are ongoing - are matters which China evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a
will surely view with particular interest. criminal trial would cut deeply into the
guarantee of due process of law and
Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations gravely impair the basic function of the
In PMPF v. Manglapus, the therein petitioners were courts. A President's acknowledged need
seeking information from the President’s for confidentiality in the communications
representatives on the state of the then on-going of his office is general in nature, whereas
negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. the constitutional need for production of
The Court denied the petition, stressing that relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding
"secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is is specific and central to the fair
not violative of the constitutional provisions of adjudication of a particular criminal case
in the administration of justice. Without

34| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

access to specific facts a criminal by the Committee." Court rules which prohibit
prosecution may be totally frustrated. leading, hypothetical, or repetitive questions or
The President's broad interest in questions calling for a hearsay answer, to name a
confidentiality of communication will not few, do not apply to a legislative inquiry. Every
be vitiated by disclosure of a limited person, from the highest public official to the most
number of conversations preliminarily ordinary citizen, has the right to be presumed
shown to have some bearing on the innocent until proven guilty in proper proceedings
pending criminal cases. by a competent court or body.
We conclude that when the ground for 23) Lee vs. CA
asserting privilege as to subpoenaed
materials sought for use in a criminal trial is KEY WORDS: cheater Chinese husband; 1st
based only on the generalized interest in family(KEH) vs 2nd family (Tiu)
confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the
fundamental demands of due process of ONE LINER/PRINCIPLE: The parental and filial
law in the fair administration of criminal privilege rule applies only to “direct”
justice. The generalized assertion of ascendants/descendants, a family tie connected by
privilege must yield to the demonstrated, a common ancestry. It has no application to a
specific need for evidence in a stepdaughter who has no common ancestry to her
pending criminal trial. (emphasis supplied) stepmother.
In the case at bar, we are not confronted with a
court’s need for facts in order to adjudge liability in a FACTS:
criminal case but rather with the Senate’s need for Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng
information in relation to its legislative functions. (Keh) came to the Philippines as immigrants from
This leads us to consider once again just how critical China. They has 11 children (Lee-Keh children).
is the subject information in the discharge of
respondent Committees’ functions. The burden to Lee then brought from China Tiu Chuan (Tiu), a
show this is on the respondent Committees, since young Chinese woman to serve as housemaid. The
they seek to intrude into the sphere of competence respondent Leh-Keh children believes that Tiu left
of the President in order to gather information the Leh-Keh household and move into another
which, according to said respondents, would "aid" property of Lee and had an illicit relation and made
them in crafting legislation. 8 children

Interestingly, during the Oral Argument before this After Keh died, the Lee-Keh children learned that
Court, the counsel for respondent Committees Tiu’s children with Lee (Lee’s other children)
impliedly admitted that the Senate could still come claimed that they were too children of Lee and
up with legislations even without petitioner Keh.Leh-Keh children then requested the NBI to
answering the three (3) questions. In other words, investigate.
the information being elicited is not so critical after
all. NBI’s Findings
Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are NBI concluded that the mother of the 8 children is
not subject to the exacting standards of evidence obviously not Keh, but most probably Tiu. Upon
essential to arrive at accurate factual findings to further evaluation, this could be Lee’s grand design
which to apply the law. Hence, Section 10 of the in order to elevate the status of his 8 children as
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid legitimate children and secure their future. NBI also
of Legislation provides that "technical rules of found out from the hospital records that the eldest
evidence applicable to judicial proceedings which do among the Lee’s other children (who was recorded
not affect substantive rights need not be observed as the 12th child of Lee and Keh), was born of a 17

35| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

yo mother, when Keh was already 38 years old at the Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify
time and so forth. IOW, by the hospital records of against petitioner
the Lee’s other children, Keh’s declared age did not
coincide with her actual age when she supposedly 24) ESTRADA v. DESIERTO
gave birth to such other children, numbering 8. DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
On the basis of this report, the respondent Leh-Keh In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph
children file two separate petitions for the deletion Estrada (Erap) was elected president while Gloria
from the certificate of live birth of Petitioner Emma Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) was elected as his VP. 10
Lee, one of Lee’s other children, the name Keh and million Filipinos voted for petitioner believing he
replace the same with Tiu to indicate her true would rescue them from lifes adversity. They were
mother’s name. both to serve a 6-year term commencing June 30,
Lee-Keh children then filed a request for the 1998.
issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner
Tiu, petitioner’s presumed mother, to testify in the was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly
case. RTC granted it. Tiu moved to quash the same. but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent
from power started on October 4, 2000. Chavit
Tiu’s contention Singson, a longtime friend of petitioner, went on air
The subpoena issued on Tiu are: and accused the petitioner, his family and friends,
1. Oppressive considering her advanced age; and of receiving millions of pesos from juteng lords. The
2. It violates Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of next day, Senator Teofisto Guingona then took the
Court, the rule parental privilege, compelling floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled
her to testify against her stepdaughter “I Accuse”. He accused the petitioner of receiving
P220 million in jueteng money from Governor
Singson from 1998-2000. He also charged that the
RTC – granted the quashal for being oppressive petitioner took from Governor Singson 70 million
considering Tiu’s old age and the purpose of the on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur.
subpoena is to badger her to admit the she was The privilege speech was referred by then Senate
petitioner’s mother. President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon
Committee and the Committee on Justice for joint
CA- set aside the order of the RTC. investigation.
The HREP did no less. The House Committee on
ISSUE: WON TIU MAY BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY IN Public Order and Security decided to investigate the
THE CORRECTION OF ENTRY CASE TO SHOW THAT expose of Governor Singson. On the other hand,
PETITIONER EMMA LEE IS NOT KEH’S DAUGHTER Representatives Alvarez, Herrera, and Defensor
spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner.
RULING: Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the
YES, TIU MAY BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY. air. The church and former Presidents Cory Aquino
Sec. 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may and Fidel Ramos joined the cry for resignation.
be compelled to testify against his parents, other Respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the
direct ascendants, children or other direct Department of Social Welfare and Services and
descendants. later asked for the petitioner’s resignation. However,
The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule petitioner held on to his office and refused to sign.
applies only to “direct” ascendants and descendants, 4 economic advisers resigned, as well as Secretary
a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A Mar Roxas II of DTI.
stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her The month of November ended with a big bang. In
stepmother. a tumultuous session on November 13, House
Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of

36| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or Philippines. While along with

more than 1/3 of all the members of the HREP to the many other legal minds of our
Senate. This caused political convulsions in both country, I have strong and serious
house of the Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced doubts about the legality and
by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker constitutionality of her
Villar was unseated by Fuentebella. On November proclamation as President, I do
20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment not wish to be a factor that will
trial of the petitioner. 21 senators took their oath as prevent the restoration of unity
judges with SC CJ Justice Hilario Davide presiding. and order in our civil society.
In December, the impeachment trial started. They
It is for this reason that I
day to day trial was covered by live TV and during its
now leave Malacañang Palace,
course enjoyed the highest viewing rating. The
the seat of the presidency of this
dramatic point of the hearings was the testimony of
country, for the sake of peace and
Clarissa Ocampo, senior VP of Equitable-PCI Bank.
in order to begin the healing
She testified that she was one foot away from
process of our nation. I leave the
petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature
Palace of our people with
“Jose Velarde” on documents involving a P500
gratitude for the opportunities
million investment agreement with their bank.
given to me for service to our
On January 16, when by a vote of 11-10 the
people. I will not shirk from any
senator-judges ruled against the opening of the
future challenges that may come
second envelope which allegedly contained evidence
ahead in the same service of our
showing that the petitioner held a 3.3 billion secret
country.
bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The
prosecutors walked out in protest. This led to I call on all my supporters
protests all over Metro Manila demanding petitioner and followers to join me in the
to resign. promotion of a constructive
On January 19, the fall of petitioner seemed national spirit of reconciliation
inevitable. At 2:30pm petitioner agreed to the and solidarity.
holding of a snap election for President where he
would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the May the Almighty bless
growing crisis. At 3pm, the AFP withdrew their our country and beloved people.
support for the government. A little later, PNP Chief MABUHAY !
Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders
gave a similar announcement. Rallies for resignation ISSUE:
exploded around the nation. To stem the tide of rage, (daghan nig issue but I’ll just include the ones
petitioner announced that he was ordering his related to evidence)
lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly WON the use of the Angara Diary as evidence was
controversial second envelope. proper - YES
January 20 was the day of surrender. At 12 noon, WON the use of the Angara Diary to determine the
Chief Justice Davide, after negotiations in the state of mind of petitioner violates the rule against
Malacañang, administered the oath to respondent the admission of hearsay evidence – NO it does not
GMA as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 pm, violate hearsay evidence rule
petitioner and his family hurriedly left the Palace. He
then issued a press statement stating that: RULING:
At twelve o'clock To begin with, the Angara diary is NOT an out of
noon today, Vice President Gloria court statement. The Angara Diary is part of the
Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath pleadings in the cases at bar. Petitioner cannot
as President of the Republic of the complain he was not furnished a copy of the Angara

37| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

Diary. The said diary was frequently referred to by reaction as an admission of something stated or
the parties in their pleadings. The three parts of the implied by the other person. In the Angara Diary,
diary were attached as Annexes A-C of the the options of the petitioner started to dwindle
Memorandum of private respondents. In fact, when the armed forces withdrew its support from
petitioner even cited in his Second Supplemental him as President and commander-in-chief. Thus,
Reply Memorandum both the second part of the Executive Secretary Angara had to ask Senate
diary, and the third part. It was also extensively used President Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider
by the Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral the option of a dignified exit or resignation.
arguments. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity Petitioner did not object to the suggested option
to contest to the use of the Diary but unfortunately but simply said he could never leave the country.
failed to do so. Petitioner’s silence on this and other related
Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was suggestions can be taken as an admission by him.
an out of court statement, still its use is not covered Petitioner further contends that the use of the
by the hearsay rule. Evidence is called hearsay when Angara Diary against him violated the rule on res
its probative force depends on the competency and inter alios acta. The rule is expressed in Section 28
credibility of some persons other than the witness. of the Rule 130 of the Rules of Court: The rights of
There are 3 reasons for excluding hearsay evidence, a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration,
namely: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2) or omission of another, except as herein otherwise
absence of demeanor evidence; and (3) absence of provided.
oath. Not all hearsay evidence however is Petitioner errs in his contention. The res inter alios
inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge acta rule has several exceptions. One of them is
body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by the provided in Section 29 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
courts due to their relevance, trustworthiness, and Court with respect to admissions by a co-partner
necessity. or agent.
A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego
that we further determine whether the hearsay of the petitioner. He was the little president. Indeed,
evidence is one exempted from the rules of he was authorized by the petitioner to act for him
exclusion. A more circumspect examination of our in the critical hours and days before he left the
rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover Palace. Thus, according to the Angara Diary, the
admissions of a party and the Angara Diary belongs petitioner told Secretary Angara: “Since the start of
to this class. the campaign, Ed, you have been the only one I’ve
The Angara Diary contains direct statements of listened to. And now, at the end, you still are.” True
petitioner which can be categorized as admissions of to this trust, petitioner has to ask Secretary Angara
a party: his proposal for a snap presidential election if he already had to leave the Palace after their final
where he would not be a candidate, his statement lunch. Angara told him to go and he did. Petitioner
that he would leave by Monday if the second cannot deny that Angara headed his team of
envelope would be opened by Monday and “pagod negotiators that met with the team of respondent
na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Arroyo to discuss the peaceful and orderly transfer
Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. I just of power after his relinquishment. The Diary shows
want to clear my name then I will go”. The reason for that petitioner was always briefed by Secretary
the meltdown is obvious – his will not to resign has Angara on the progress of their negotiations.
wilted. Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the
It is, however, argued that the Diary is not the diary petitioner in the crucial days before respondent
of the petitioner, hence, not binding on him. The Arroyo took her oath as President. Consequently,
argument overlooks the doctrine of Adoptive petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of
Admission. An adoptive admission is a party’s Secretary Angara.
reaction to a statement or action by another Under our rules of evidence, the ban on hearsay
person when it is reasonable to treat the party’s evidence does not cover independently relevant

38| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

statements. These are statements which are FACTS:

relevant independently of whether they are true or
Accused-appellant Danny Godoy was charged in
not. They belong to 2 classes: (1) those statements
two separate informations filed before the RTC of
which are the very facts in issue, and (2) those
Palawan with rape and kidnapping with serious
statements which are circumstantial evidence of
illegal detention.
the facts in issue. The second class includes the
following: According to complainant Mia Taha, at
(a) Statements of a person showing his around 7:00 P.M. of January 21, 1994, she went to
state of mind, that is his mental the boarding house of her cousin, Merlylyn
condition, knowledge, belief, intention, Casantosan, at Pulot Center, Brooke's Point which is
ill will and other emotions; near the Palawan National School (PNS), Pulot
Branch, where she was studying. When she saw
xxx that the house was dark, she decided to pass
As aforediscussed, the Angara Diary contains through the kitchen door at the back because she
statements of the petitioner which reflect his state knew that there was nobody inside. As soon as she
of mind and are circumstantial evidence of his opened the door, somebody suddenly grabbed her,
intent to resign. It also contains statements of poked a knife on her neck, dragged her by the hand
Secretary Angara from which we can reasonably and told her not to shout. She was then forced to
deduce petitioner’s intent to resign. They are lie down on the floor. Although it was dark,
admissible and they are not covered by the rules on complainant was able to recognize her assailant, by
hearsay. the light coming from the moon and through his
Petitioner also contends that the rules on voice, as accused-appellant Danny Godoy who was
authentication of private writings and best evidence her Physics teacher at PNS.
were violated. It is true that the Court relied not
upon the original but only a copy of the Angara Diary. When she was already on the floor,
In doing so, the Court did NOT, however, violate the appellant removed her panty with one hand while
best evidence rule. holding the knife with the other hand, opened the
The Court held that with regard to the Best Evidence zipper of his pants, and then inserted his private
Rule, the production of the original may be organ inside her private parts against her will. She
dispensed with whenever in the case in hand the felt pain because it was her first experience and she
opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of cried. Throughout her ordeal, she could not utter a
the document and no other useful purpose will be word. She was very frightened because a knife was
served by requiring production. Secondary evidence continually pointed at her. She also could not fight
of the content of the writing will be received in back nor plead with appellant not to rape her
evidence if no objection is made to its reception. because he was her teacher and she was afraid of
With regard to the authentication, it is no longer him. She was threatened not to report the incident
required because the genuineness of such was not to anyone or else she and her family would be
denied. killed.
Thereafter, while she was putting on her
25) PEOPLE v GODOY (Teacher falsely prosecuted panty, she noticed that her skirt was stained with
for rape) blood. Appellant walked with her to the gate of the
house and she then proceeded alone to the
PRINCIPLE: No implied admission can be drawn from boarding house where she lived. She did not see
the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court, where appellant went after she left him at the gate.
where the accused did not take part in any of the When she arrived at her boarding house, she saw
negotiations her landlady but she did not mention anything
about the incident.

39| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

The following morning, January 22, 1994, appellant's willingness to become a Muslim so he
complainant went home to her parents' house at could marry Mia and thus settle the case. Helen
Ipilan, Brooke's Point. She likewise did not tell her Taha readily acceded because she wanted to see
parents about the incident for fear that appellant her daughter.
might make good his threat. At around 3:00 P.M. of
In the morning of January 27, 1994, she
that same day, appellant arrived at the house of her
went to the house of Naem who sent somebody to
parents and asked permission from the latter if
fetch complainant. She testified that when Mia
complainant could accompany him to solicit funds
arrived, she was crying as she reported that she
because she was a candidate for "Miss PNS Pulot."
was raped by appellant, and that the latter
When her parents agreed, she was constrained to go
threatened to kill her if she did not return within an
with appellant because she did not want her parents
hour. Because of this, she immediately brought Mia
to get into trouble.
to the hospital where the latter was examined and
She was forced to ride the jeep because then they proceeded to the municipal hall to file a
appellant threatened to kill her if she would not complaint for rape and kidnapping. Both Mia and
board the vehicle. The jeep proceeded to the Sunset Helen Taha executed separate sworn statements
Garden at the poblacion, Brooke's Point where they before the PNP at Brooke's Point.
alighted.
Later, Fruit Godoy, the wife of appellant,
At the Sunset Garden, appellant checked in went to their house and offered P50,000.00 for the
and brought her to a room where they stayed for settlement of the case. On their part, her husband
three days. During the entire duration of their stay at insisted that they just settle, hence all three of
the Sunset Garden, complainant was not allowed to them, Adjeril(father), Helen and Mia Taha, went to
leave the room which was always kept locked. She the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor where they
was continuously guarded and constantly raped by met with the mother of appellant who gave them
appellant. She was, however, never drunk or P30,000.00. Adjeril and Helen Taha subsequently
unconscious. Nonetheless, she was forced to have executed an affidavit of desistance for the case of
sex with appellant because the latter was always kidnapping pending in the prosecutor's office.
carrying a knife with him.
The defense presented a different version
In the early morning of January 25, 1994, of what actually transpired.
appellant brought her to the house of his friend at
According to appellant, he first met Mia
Edward's Subdivision where she was raped by him
Taha sometime in August, 1993 at the PNS.
three times. She was likewise detained and locked
Although he did not court her, he fell in love with
inside the room and tightly guarded by appellant.
her because she often told him " Sir, I love you".
After two days, or on January 27, 1994, they left the
What started as a joke later developed into a
place because appellant came to know that
serious relationship which was kept a secret from
complainant had been reported and indicated as a
everybody else.
missing person in the police blotter. They went to
see a certain Naem from whom appellant sought He stated that there was no rape and
help. On that same day, she was released but only kidnapping that was done as they were in a serious
after her parents agreed to settle the case with relationship. The defense presented witnesses that
appellant. corroborated their alleged relationship (will be
discussed in the ruling). The appellant also said that
Early the next morning, Helen (mother of
whenever she wanted to leave the complainant,
Mia) and her husband went to the PNP station at
she threatened to commit suicide.
Pulot, Brooke's Point and had the incident recorded
in the police blotter. When she returned home, a While appellant was already on his way out
certain Naem was waiting there and he informed her of Edward's Subdivision, he was met by Chief of
that Mia was at Brooke's Point. He further conveyed

40| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

Police Eliseo Crespo who invited him to the police perplexing how appellant could have known that
station. Appellant waited at the police station the she was going there on that particular day and at
whole afternoon but when complainant, her parents that time, considering that she does not even live
and relatives arrived at around 5:00 P.M., he was not there, unless of course it was appellant's intention
given the chance to talk to any one of them. That to satisfy his lustful desires on anybody who
afternoon of January 2 7, 1994, appellant was no happened to come along. But then this would be
longer allowed to leave and he was detained at the stretching the imagination too far aside from the
police station after Mia and her parents lodged a fact that such a generic intent with an
complaint for rape and kidnapping against him. indeterminate victim was never established nor
even intimated by the prosecution.
During his detention, Mia's cousin, Lorna
Casantosan, delivered to appellant on different Appellant, on the other hand, testified that
occasions two letters from complainant. As Mia's on that fateful day, he went to the boarding house
teacher, appellant is familiar with and was, therefore, upon the invitation of complainant because the
able to identify the handwriting in said letters as latter requested him to help her with her
that of Mia Taha. After a time, he came to know, monologue for the Miss PNS contest. However, they
through his mother, that an affidavit of desistance were not able to go inside the house because it was
was reportedly executed by complainants. However, locked and there was no light, so they just sat on a
he claims that he never knew and it was never bench outside the house and talked. This testimony
mentioned to him, not until the day he testified in of appellant was substantially corroborated by
court, that his mother paid P30,000.00 to Mia's defense witness Filomena Pielago. She affirmed
father because, although he did not dissuade them, that in the evening of January 21, 1994, she saw
neither did he request his mother to talk to both appellant and complainant seated on a bench
complainants in order to settle the case. However, outside the boarding house.
pursuant to a joint resolution issued on March 11,
It was further alleged by complainant that
1994 by the Prosecutor, two separate informations
after her alleged ravishment, she put on her panty
for rape and for kidnapping with serious illegal
and then appellant openly accompanied her all the
detention were nevertheless filed against appellant
way to the gate of the house where they eventually
Danny Godoy with no bail recommended in both
parted ways. This is inconceivable. It is not the
charges.
natural tendency of a man to remain for long by the
ISSUE: Whether the offer of compromise is an side of the woman he had raped, and in public in a
admission of guilt of the appellant highly populated area at that. Given the stealth that
accompanies it and the anxiety to end further
RULING: NO.
exposure at the scene, the logical post-incident
In the case at bar, several circumstances impulse of the felon is to distance himself from his
exist which amply demonstrate and ineluctably victim as far and as soon as practicable, to avoid
convince this Court that there was no rape discovery and apprehension.
committed on the alleged date and place, and that
Complainant's professed reason for going
the charge of rape was the contrivance of an
to the boarding house is vague and tenuous. At first,
afterthought, rather than a truthful plaint for redress
she asserted that she was at the boarding house
of an actual wrong.
talking with a friend and then, later, she said it was
The prosecution has palpably failed to prove her cousin. Subsequently, she again wavered and
beyond peradventure of doubt that appellant had said that she was not able to talk to her cousin.
sexual congress with complainant against her will. Furthermore, she initially stated that on January 21,
According to complainant, when she entered the 1994 at around 7:00 P.M., she was at the boarding
kitchen of the boarding house, appellant was already house conversing with her cousin. Then in the
inside apparently waiting for her. If so, it is quite course of her narration, she gave another version

41| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

and said that when she reached the boarding house relationship is uncovered, the alleged victim or her
it was dark and there was nobody inside. parents for that matter would rather take the risk of
instituting a criminal action in the hope that the
Complainant testified that appellant raped
court would take the cudgels for them than for the
her through the use of force and intimidation,
woman to admit to her own acts of indiscretion.
specifically by holding a knife to her neck. However,
And this, as the records reveal, is precisely what
the element of force was not sufficiently established.
happened to appellant.
The physical facts adverted to by the lower court as
corroborative of the prosecution's theory on the use Appellant's claim that he and complainant
of force are undoubtedly the medico-legal findings were lovers is fortified by the highly credible
of Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia. Upon closer scrutiny, testimonies of several witnesses for the
however, we find that said findings neither support defense, viz.: (daghan ni pero ang significant ra ako
nor confirm the charge that rape was so committed gi-include para di na kaayo taas)
through forcible means by appellant against
1. Filomena Pielago testified that on the
complainant on January 21, 1994.
night of January 21, 1994, she saw appellant and
In rape of the nature alleged in this case, we complainant sitting on a bench in front of the house
repeat, the testimony of the complainant must be where the sexual attack allegedly took place, and
corroborated by physical evidence showing use of the couple were talking intimately. She had warned
force. Mia about the latter's illicit affair with appellant.
There is likewise no evidence on record that 2. Fernando Rubio, an acquaintance of
she put up a struggle when appellant forced her to appellant and owner of the house at Edward's
lie on the floor, removed her panty, opened the Subdivision, testified that he asked Mia why she
zipper of his trousers, and inserted his organ inside decided to have an affair with appellant who is a
her genitals. Neither did she demonstrate that married man. Mia answered that she really loves
appellant, in committing the heinous act, subjected him. He heard her call appellant "Papa". The couple
her to any force of whatever nature or form. looked happy and were sweet to each other.
Complainant's enigmatic behavior after her 3. Erna Baradero, a co-teacher of appellant,
alleged ravishment can only be described as saw the couple the day before the alleged rape
paradoxical: it was so strangely normal as to be incident, inside one of the classrooms and they
abnormal. It seems odd, if not incredible, that upon were holding hands, and she heard Mia tell
seeing allegedly raped her only the day before, she appellant "Mahal na mahal kita Sir, iwanan mo ang
did not accuse, revile or denounce him, or show rage, iyong asawa at tatakas tayo." She tried to dissuade
revulsion, and disgust. Instead, she meekly went complainant from continuing with her relationship
with appellant despite the presence of her parents with appellant.
and the proximity of neighbors which, if only for
The positive allegations of appellant that he
such facts, would naturally have deterred appellant
was having an intimate relationship with
from pursuing any evil design.
complainant, which were substantially
The main defense proffered by appellant is corroborated by several witnesses, were never
that he and complainant were sweethearts. While successfully confuted. The rebuttal testimony of
the "sweetheart theory" does not often gain favor complainant merely consisted of bare, unexplained
with this Court, such is not always the case if the denials of the positive, definite, consistent and
hard fact is that the accused and the supposed detailed assertions of appellant. Mere denials are
victim are, in truth, intimately related except that, as self-serving negative evidence. They cannot obtain
is usual in most cases, either the relationship is illicit evidentiary weight greater than the declarations of
or the victim's parents are against it. It is not credible disinterested witnesses.
improbable that in some instances, when the

42| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

(TOPIC) The prosecution insists that the and traditions, in an effort to prevent further
offer of compromise made by appellant is deemed deterioration of the relations between the parties.
to be an admission of guilt. This inference in the
In the cases at bar, the letters written by
instant case. In criminal cases, an offer of
complainant to appellant are very revealing. Most
compromise is generally admissible as evidence
probably written out of desperation and
against the party making it. It is a legal maxim, which
exasperation with the way she was being treated by
assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to
her parents, complainant threw all caution to the
penalize, that in the matter of public crimes which
winds when she wrote. Oo aaminin ko nagkasala
directly affect the public interest, no compromise
ako sa iyo pinabilanggo kita dahil nagpanig ako sa
whatever may be entered into as regards the penal
mga magulang ko nadala nila ako sa sulsul nila
action. It has long been held, however, that in such
hindi ko naipaglaban ang dapat kong
cases the accused is permitted to show that the
ipaglaban obviously referring to her ineptitude and
offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt,
impotence in helping appellant out of his
but merely to avoid the inconvenience of
predicament. It could, therefore, be safely
imprisonment or for some other reason which
presumed that the rape charge was merely an
would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to
offshoot of the discovery by her parents of the
compromise was not in truth an admission of his
intimate relationship between her and appellant. In
guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences
order to avoid retribution from her parents,
which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.
together with the moral pressure exerted upon her
A primary consideration here is that the by her mother, she was forced to concoct her
evidence for the defense overwhelmingly proves account of the alleged rape.
appellant's innocence of the offense charged.
(Re: Kidnapping) When they left the house,
Further, the supposed offer of marriage did not
appellant walked ahead of her, obviously with her
come from appellant but was actually suggested by a
parents and their neighbors witnessing their
certain Naem, who is an imam or Muslim leader and
departure. It is difficult to comprehend how one
who likewise informed appellant that he could be
could deduce from these normal and innocuous
converted into a Muslim so he could marry
arrangement any felonious intent of appellant to
complainant. As a matter of fact, when said offer
deprive complainant of her liberty. One will look in
was first made to appellant, he declined because of
vain for a case where a kidnapping was committed
the fact that he was already married. On top of
under such inauspicious circumstances as described
these, appellant did not know, not until the trial
by complainant.
proper, that his mother actually paid P30,000.00 for
the settlement of these cases. Complainant's own Appellant declared that when they left the
mother, Helen Taha, testified that present during the house of the Taha family, complainant was bringing
negotiations were herself, her husband, Mia, and with her a plastic bag which later turned out to
appellant's mother. Appellant himself was never contain her clothes. This bag was left behind by Mia
present in any of said meetings. at Edward's Subdivision, as hereinbefore noted, and
was later delivered to appellant by Benedicto Rubio.
It has been held that where the accused was
Again, we cannot conceive of a ridiculous situation
not present at the time the offer for monetary
where the kidnap victim was first allowed to
consideration was made, such offer of compromise
prepare and pack her clothes, as if she was merely
would not save the day for the prosecution. In
leaving for a pleasant sojourn with the criminal, all
another case, this Court ruled that no implied
these with the knowledge and consent of her
admission can be drawn from the efforts to arrive at
parents who passively looked on without comment.
a settlement outside the court, where the accused
did not take part in any of the negotiations and the
effort to settle the case was in accordance with the 26) People vs Gener de Guzman
established tribal customs, that is, Muslim practices

43| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

FACTS: by the accused. Aquilino got angry and wanted to

Gilda Ambray filed with the MTC of Bacoor, Cavite, a retaliate but was prevailed upon not to by Gilda's
complaint charging accused Gener de Guzman with mother.
the crime of rape. On even date, de Guzman was Gilda and her mother reported the incident to one
arrested and detained but was later released upon Tony Antonio, the President of the Homeowners'
the filing and approval of his bail bond. Association. The accused was then brought to the
Finding a prima facie case against him on the basis municipal jail which ultimately resulted to the filing
of the evidence for the prosecution, the MTC of the instant case.
forwarded the record of the case to the Provincial Gener de Guzman interposed the defense of alibi.
Prosecutor for the filing of the necessary According to him, he had a drinking session with his
information with the appropriate court. A case for friends. In its decision, the trial court found the
rape was then filed. Trial followed. accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
Testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution crime of rape. The accused appealed hence the
established the following facts: case at bar.
Homeward bound from a Department Store where The upshot of the accused's stance in the errors
she worked as a sales clerk, complainant Gilda assigned is that he was not positively identified and
Ambray was at the gate of Meadow Wood that neither force nor intimidation was proven
Subdivision waiting for a tricycle ride toward her
residence. She waited for about ten minutes. When ISSUE: WON accused is guilty of rape – YES oy
she noticed the accused, sitting at the guardhouse,
she approached him and asked him some questions. RULING:
He answered in a stammering manner. The Rape is essentially an offense of secrecy, not
complainant recognized the accused very well generally attempted except in dark or deserted and
because it was summertime and the gate of the secluded places away from prying eyes, and the
subdivision was well-lit. crime usually commences solely upon the word of
After Gilda started to walk, the accused mounted his the offended woman herself and conviction
tricycle, followed her and offered her a ride, to invariably turns upon her credibility, as the People's
which she agreed. While on board the tricycle, Gilda single witness of the actual occurrence.
noticed that the accused took a different route. The The determination of the guilt of the accused
accused would once in a while stop the tricycle and depends primarily on the credibility of the
tell her that it was not in good condition. complainant Gilda Ambray, since only she and the
When they reached Phase II of the same subdivision accused witnessed the incident when it happened.
near an unfinished house, the accused stopped and Her testimony alone, if credible, would render the
told Gilda to push the tricycle. She alighted from the accused's conviction inevitable.
tricycle and paid him, which he did not accept. Gilda A meticulous assessment of Gilda's testimony
then walked away, but after she had taken about ten demonstrates beyond doubt the truthfulness of her
steps, the accused embraced her from behind, story, which she narrated in a categorical,
covered her mouth and held her neck tightly. The straightforward and candid manner. Further
accused then dragged her to a vacant lot 10 meters strengthening her credibility in recounting her
away from the unfinished house. Afterwards, the ordeal at the hands of the accused was her conduct
motherfucker consummated his ill intention. The immediately after the sexual assault. She ran home
accused then warned Gilda not to tell anybody, without looking back, and upon her arrival she
otherwise, he would kill her and all members of her reported the rape to her husband and her mother.
family. Gilda picked up her pants and underwear Immediately thereafter, she reported it to the
and hurriedly ran toward her home, without looking President of the Homeowners' Association who
back. then sought police assistance.
When Gilda arrived home, she told her mother and All the foregoing acts of Gilda were done within 24
her husband, Aquilino Ambray, that she was raped hours after the commission of the crime. The

44| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

quickness and spontaneity of these deeds witness is not permitted to testify as to a

manifested the natural reactions of a virtuous conclusion of law, among which, legal
woman who had just undergone sexual molestation responsibility is one of the most conspicuous. A
against herself. witness, no matter how skillful, is not to be asked
We likewise agree with the trial court that the or permitted to testify as to whether or not a
accused used force and intimidation upon Gilda. party is responsible to the law. The accused is
In this case, the accused embraced Gilda from guilty of rape.
behind, held her neck tightly, and covered her
mouth. As she struggled to free herself, she 27) San Miguel vs Kalalo
sustained her injuries. Moreover, the accused also KEYWORD: Inumin ng Tagumpay, San Miguel Beer
threatened Gilda with death if she would not yield to
his bestial desires. The threat certainly constituted FACTS:
intimidation. Kalalo was a dealer of San Miguel Corp. In the
The accused's contention that it was highly course of the dealings of Kalalo, an agent of SMC
incredible that there was force or intimidation since requested her to issue several postdated checks to
the assailant committed three acts of sexual secure her credit overdraft for the delivery of SMC
intercourse with Gilda in three hours, deserves scant beer products over the Christmas season. After
consideration. In the first place, Gilda explained in making several cash payments and returning a
her re-direct examination that the three hours number of empty beer bottles and cases, she
mentioned in her cross-examination referred to the noticed she still owed SMC a substantial amount.
time which elapsed from the moment she was at the She insisted a detailed statement of account but
gate of Meadow Wood Subdivision and until she SMC failed to do so. To protect her rights, she
reported the incident to the President of the ordered her bank to stop payment on the last seven
Homeowners' Association. checks she had issued to SMC totaling 921,215.
The principal object of re-direct examination is to SMC sent demand letters. Kalalo’s counsel made in
prevent injustice to the witness and the party who return an Offer of Compromise which SMC did not
has called him by affording an opportunity to the accept but instead, it filed a case for violation of the
witness to explain the testimony given on Bouncing Check Law. During trial and after the
cross-examination, and to explain any apparent prosecution rested its case, SMC now complied
contradiction or inconsistency in his statements, an with the statement of account showing that she
opportunity which is ordinarily afforded to him owed SMC 71,009. Kalalo recanted her Offer of
during cross-examination. The re-direct examination Compromise stating that at the time she prepared
serves the purpose of completing the answer of a the letter, she was threatened by SMC for
witness, or of adding a new matter which has been imprisonment and that she does not know how
omitted, or of correcting a possible much she owed. She was acquitted by the MeTC.
misinterpretation of testimony. The appeal before the RTC by SMC on the issue of
In the second place, on direct examination, Gilda civil liability (arguing that SMC is entitled 921,215)
categorically declared that the accused tried to and a subsequent Petition for Review before the CA
thrice insert his penis into her vagina. He failed in was likewise dismissed. Hence this petition.
the first and second attempts because she struggled,
but succeeded on the third because she was already ISSUE:
weak. While it may be true that on WON the Offer of Compromise may be considered
cross-examination she testified that she was raped in evidence against Kalalo?
once, yet on re-direct examination she said that she
was raped three times, no inconsistency at all may SMC argues that her Offer of Compromise
be deduced therefrom. There was merely confusion unequivocally admitted her liability while being
as to the legal qualifications of the three separate assister by her counsel.
acts, i.e., Gilda's answers were conclusions of law. A

45| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

RULING: No
Contrary to SMCs contention, the aforequoted letter 28) PEOPLE v YPARRAGUIRRE
does not contain an express acknowledgment of
liability. At most, what respondent acknowledged PRINCIPLE:
was the receipt of the statement of account, not the An offer to compromise does not require that a
existence of her liability to SMC. Furthermore, the criminal complaint be first filed before the offer can
fact that Kalalo made a compromise offer to SMC be received in evidence against the offeror. What is
cannot be considered as an admission of liability. In required is that after committing the crime, the
Pentagon Steel vs CA, the reason why compromise accused or his representative makes an offer to
offer may not be considered as evidence against the compromise and such offer is proved.
offerror:
FACTS:
1. Indeed, if every offer to buy peace could Rosita Bacaling, a 17 year old barrio lass, who was
be used as evidence against a person who not yet deflorated, was working as a housemaid
presents it, many settlements would be with accused-appellant Yparraguirre and his wife.
prevented and unnecessary litigation would While she was cooking porridge for the
result, since no prudent person would dare Yparraguirres, appellant arrived from work. Finding
offer or entertain a compromise if his or her out that the children were sleeping, he gave Rosita
compromise position could be exploited as a a white envelope with 15 tablets inside, allegedly
confession of weakness. for the skin disease of Rosita’s thigh. The latter took
all the tablets as instructed. However, she became
2. A true offer of compromise does not, in weak and fell down. She later on found herself on
legal contemplation, involve an admission on the bed of the appellant who pointed a hunting
the part of a defendant that he or she is knife at her neck and succeeded carnal knowledge
legally liable, or on the part of a plaintiff, against her will. She was later on punched on the
that his or her claim is groundless or even stomach and lost consciousness. She was
doubtful, since it is made with a view to threatened by the appellant should she report the
avoid controversy and save the expense of incident. After one month, she went home to her
litigation. mother where her mother found her helpless, not
being able to talk and eat, which resulted to her
SMC argues that Kalalo’s Offer of Compromise may confinement in a mental hospital in Davao. When
be received in evidence as an implied admission of Rosita finally revealed to her mother the incident, a
guilt pursuant to Sec. 27 Rule 130 ROC. case of rape was filed against appellant who
pleaded not guilty. He was later on convicted.
RULING: No
The Offer of Compromise was made prior to the Note: Prior to the filing of the case, the wife of the
filing of the criminal complaint against her for a appellant went to the house of Rosita and offered
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. The Offer of compromise with her mother so as to drop the case.
Compromise was clearly not made in the context of Not discussed in the facts.
a criminal proceeding and, therefore, cannot be
considered as an implied admission of guilt. Finally, ISSUE:
during the testimony of Kalalo and after her receipt WON the offer of compromise made before filing of
of the Statement of Account from SMC, she recanted a criminal complaint should be admitted as
the contents of the Offer of Compromise. She evidence.
explained that, at the time she had the letter
prepared, the final amount owed to SMC was yet RULING:
undetermined; and that she was constantly facing There is evidence that after Rosita revealed the
threats of imprisonment from SMCs agents. rape to her mother, appellant's wife, Mary Ann,

46| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

offered the mother, Merlyn P15,000.00 to dissuade at the scene of the crime. The public market was
her from filing the complaint. When Merlyn refused, merely a ten-minute walk from their rented room
Mary Ann increased the offer to P25,000.00. Still and during work breaks, appellant would
Merlyn refused to accept it. As pointed out by sometimes go home to bring food to his children.
appellant, no criminal complaint had been filed at
the time the compromise offer was made.
Nevertheless, the rape incident was already known
to appellant's wife. Wife herself testified that Merlyn 29) Bank of Commerce v Manalo
told her about it on the day when wife first offered
the money. An offer to compromise does not require KEYWORD: (Spouses purchased Lot 1 & 2, Block 2
that a criminal complaint be first filed before the in installments)
offer can be received in evidence against the offeror.
What is required is that after committing the crime, PRINCIPLE: Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the
the accused or his representative makes an offer to Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a
compromise and such offer is proved. certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove
that he did the same or similar thing at another
The prosecution’s evidence, which rests mainly on time, although such evidence may be received to
the testimony of Rosita, is credible, reliable and prove habit, usage, pattern of conduct or the intent
trustworthy. Rosita testified in a straightforward, of the parties.
spontaneous and candid manner and never wavered
even on cross-examination and rebuttal. The FACTS:
inconsistencies in her testimony are minor which In 1967, Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI) sold to The
tend to buttress, rather than weaken, the conclusion Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM) through a "Deed of
that her testimony was not contrived. Appellant's Sale of Real Estate" Lot 1, Block 2 and Lot 2, Block 2
allegation that Rosita should have fallen asleep for in Xavierville subdivision. Nevertheless, XEI
hours after ingesting the tablets is speculative. There continued selling the residential lots in the
is no evidence that the tablets were sleeping tablets. subdivision as agent of OBM.
They, however, weakened Rosita and prevented her In 1972, then XEI president Emerito Ramos
from making any resistance to appellant's lewd acts. contracted the services of Engr. Manalo who works
The delay in filing the complaint does not in any way for Hurricane Commercial for the installation of a
affect Rosita's credibility. She was afraid of water pump at the former's residence for
appellant's threat to her life. P34,887.66. Engr. Manalo proposed to XEI, through
Ramos, to purchase a lot in the Xavierville
Rosita was a seventeen-year old barrio lass and a subdivision, and offered as part of the
high school dropout. She was also the breadwinner downpayment the ₱34,887.66 Ramos owed him.
of the family. It is hard to believe that Rosita would XEI, through Ramos, agreed. The Manalo spouses
fabricate a story of defloration, open herself to chose both abovementioned lots for reservation
public trial and place her family, who depended on which was later on confirmed by Ramos. Eventually,
her, in a very humiliating and compromising the respondent spouses took possession of the lots
situation for no reason at all. She had been working and constructed a house thereon.
for the Yparraguirres for two months and the In the meantime, many of the lot buyers refused to
spouses actually found her to be a good worker. pay their monthly installments until they were
Rosita's psychological condition could not have been assured that they would be issued Torrens titles
the product of ill-motive and fabrication. over the lots they had purchased. The spouses
were notified of XEI’s resumption of selling
The positive identification of accused-appellant as operations. However, they did not pay the balance
the rapist prevails over his defense of alibi. It was of the downpayment because XEI failed toprepare a
not physically impossible for appellant to have been contract of conditional sale and transmit the same

47| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

to them for their signature. XEI furnished Manalo alleged therein that they had always been ready,
spouses with a statement of their account showing able and willing to pay the installments on the lots
that they had a balance of ₱34,724.34 on the sold to them but no contract was forthcoming; they
downpayment of the two lots after deducting the constructed their house worth ₱2,000,000.00 on
account of Ramos plus interests. the property in good faith; Manalo informed the
The spouses Manalo received another statement of defendantthat he would abide by the terms and
account from XEI, inclusive of interests on the conditions of his original agreement with the OBM;
purchase price of the lots. In reply, Manalo Jr. stated during the hearing of the ejectment case, they
they had not yet received the notice of resumption offered to pay ₱313,172.34 representing the
of XEI's selling operations, and that there had been balance on the purchase price of said lots; such
no arrangement on the payment of interests; hence, tender of payment was rejected, so that the subject
they should not be charged with interest on the lots could be sold at considerably higher prices to
balance of the downpayment on the property. third parties.
Further, they demanded that a deed of conditional Both RTC and CA upheld the respondent spouses.
sale over the two lots be transmitted to them for
their signatures. However, XEI ignored the demands. ISSUE: W/N XEI impliedly granted the respondent
Consequently, the spouses refused to pay the spouses the option to pay in 120 or 180 monthly
balance of the downpayment of the purchase price. installments when it did so for the other lot buyers.
Sometime in June 1976, Manalo constructed a
business sign in the sidewalk near his house. XEI RULING:
informed Manalo that business signs were not We agree with petitioner’s contention that, for a
allowed along the sidewalk. It demanded that he perfected contract of sale or contract to sell to exist
remove the same, on the ground, among others, in law, there must be an agreement of the parties,
that the sidewalk was not part of the land which he not only on the price of the property sold, but also
had purchased on installment basis from XEI. on the manner the price is to be paid by the vendee.
Subsequently, XEI turned over its selling operations Under Article 1458 of the New Civil Code x x x In a
to OBM. OBM warned Manalo, Jr., that "putting up contract to sell property by installments, it is not
of a business sign is specifically prohibited by their enough that the parties agree on the price as well
contract of conditional sale" and that his failure to as the amount of downpayment. The parties must,
comply with its demand would impel it to avail of likewise, agree on the manner of payment of the
the remedies as provided in their contract of balance of the purchase price and on the other
conditional sale. terms and conditions relative to the sale. Even if
The Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM) subsequently the buyer makes a downpayment or portion
acquired the Xavierville Estate from OBM. CBM thereof, such payment cannot be considered as
requested Perla Manalo to stop any on-going sufficient proof of the perfection of any purchase
construction on the property since it (CBM) was the and sale between the parties.
owner of the lot and she had no permission for such We reject the submission of respondents that they
construction. Perla informed them that her husband and Ramos had intended to incorporate the terms
had a contract with OBM, through XEI, to purchase of payment contained in the three contracts of
the property. She promised to send CBM the conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot
documents. However, she failed to do so. Thus, CBM buyers in the "corresponding contract of
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the conditional sale," which would later be signed by
spouses. Butlater on, CBM moved to withdraw its them. We have meticulously reviewed the
complaint because of the issues raised.In the respondents’ complaint and find no such allegation
meantime, CBM was renamed the Boston Bank of therein. Indeed, respondents merely alleged in
the Philippines. their complaint that they were bound to pay the
Respondent Spouses then fileda complaint for balance of the purchase price of the property "in
specific performance and damages against the bank. installments." When respondent Manalo, Jr.

48| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

testified, he was never asked, on direct examination admissible to prove that he did or did not do the
or even on cross-examination, whether the terms of same or a similar thing at another time; but it may
payment of the balance of the purchase price of the be received to prove a specific intent or
lots under the contracts of conditional sale executed knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit,
by XEI and other lot buyers would form part of the custom or usage, and the like.
"corresponding contract of conditional sale" to be However, respondents failed to allege and prove,
signed by them simultaneously with the payment of in the trial court, that, as a matter of business
the balance of the downpayment on the purchase usage, habit or pattern of conduct, XEI granted all
price. lot buyers the right to pay the balance of the
We note that, in its letter to the respondents which purchase price in installments of 120 months of
was sent to them almost three years from the fixed amounts with pre-computed interests, and
execution by the parties of their August 22, 1972 that XEI and the respondents had intended to
letter agreement, XEI stated, in part, that adopt such terms of payment relative to the sale
respondents had purchased the property "on of the two lots in question. Indeed, respondents
installment basis." However, in the said letter, XEI adduced in evidence the three contracts of
failed to state a specific amount for each installment, conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot
and whether such payments were to be made buyers merely to prove that XEI continued to sell
monthly, semi-annually, or annually. Also, lots in the subdivision as sales agent of OBM after
respondents, as plaintiffs below, failed to adduce a it acquired said lots, not to prove usage, habit or
shred of evidence to prove that they were obliged to pattern of conduct on the part of XEI to require all
pay the ₱278,448.00 monthly, semi-annually or lot buyers in the subdivision to pay the balance of
annually. The allegation that the payment of the the purchase price of said lots in 120 months. It
₱278,448.00 was to be paid in installments is, thus, further failed to prove that the trial court admitted
vague and indefinite. Case law is that, for a contract the said deeds as part of the testimony of
to be enforceable, its terms must be certain and respondent Manalo, Jr.
explicit, not vague or indefinite. Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must
Respondents, as plaintiffs below, failed to allege in be proved like any other facts. Courts must
their complaint that the terms of payment of the contend with the caveat that, before they admit
₱278,448.00 to be incorporated in the evidence of usage, of habit or pattern of conduct,
"corresponding contract of conditional sale" were the offering party must establish the degree of
those contained in the contracts of conditional sale specificity and frequency of uniform response that
executed by XEI and Soller, Aguila and Roque. They ensures more than a mere tendency to act in a
likewise failed to prove such allegation in this Court. given manner but rather, conduct that is
The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to semi-automatic in nature. The offering party must
pay the balance of the purchase price of lots allege and prove specific, repetitive conduct that
purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly might constitute evidence of habit. The examples
installments does not constitute evidence that XEI offered in evidence to prove habit, or pattern of
also agreed to give the respondents the same mode evidence must be numerous enough to base on
and timeline of payment of the ₱278,448.00. inference of systematic conduct. Mere similarity of
Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of contracts does not present the kind of sufficiently
Court, evidence that one did a certain thing at one similar circumstances to outweigh the danger of
time is not admissible to prove that he did the prejudice and confusion.
same or similar thing at another time, although In determining whether the examples are
such evidence may be received to prove habit, numerous enough, and sufficiently regular, the key
usage, pattern of conduct or the intent of the criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity
parties. of response. After all, habit means a course of
Similar acts as evidence. – Evidence that one did or behavior of a person regularly represented in like
did not do a certain thing at one time is not circumstances. It is only when examples offered to

49| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

establish pattern of conduct or habit are numerous it to spouses ALFONSO. In the TCT, there was a
enough to lose an inference of systematic conduct “Deed of Restrictions” which stated that the lot
that examples are admissible. The key criteria are shall be used exclusively for the establishment and
adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response or maintenance of a preparatory school
ratio of reaction to situations. (KINDERGARTEN and NURSERY) with playground
There are cases where the course of dealings to be and garage. ALI turned over the right and power to
followed is defined by the usage of a particular trade enforce the restrictions to Ayala Alabang Village
or market or profession. As expostulated by Justice Association (AAVA).
Benjamin Cardozo of the United States Supreme The spouses Alfonso opened a preparatory school
Court: "Life casts the moulds of conduct, which will named The Learning Child, Inc. However,
someday become fixed as law. Law preserves the subsequently the spouses decided to include a
moulds which have taken form and shape from life." GRADE SCHOOL program in violation of the Deed of
Usage furnishes a standard for the measurement of Restrictions, and did not hear the cries of AVAA to
many of the rights and acts of men. It is also cease from such. Hence, AAVA filed a case for
well-settled that parties who contract on a subject injunction in the RTC against the school and the
matter concerning which known usage prevail, spouses.
incorporate such usage by implication into their AAVA reasoned before the RTC that the
agreement, if nothing is said to be contrary. construction of grade school rooms is contrary to (1)
However, the respondents inexplicably failed to the Deed of Restrictions and also contrary to the (2)
adduce sufficient competent evidence to prove Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of NCR and its
usage, habit or pattern of conduct of XEI to justify related Barangay ordinance. The ordinance stated
the use of the terms of payment in the contracts of that Block 3 (where the school is located) is a
the other lot buyers, and thus grant respondents the “residential area” and the ordinance allows only
right to pay the ₱278,448.00 in 120 months, preparatory schools with TWO classrooms. Hence,
presumably because of respondents’ belief that the RTC ruled in favour of AAVA.
manner of payment of the said amount is not an However, when the spouses filed a motion for
essential element of a contract to sell. There is no reconsideration, the Municipality of Muntinlupa
evidence that XEI or OBM and all the lot buyers in corrected the ordinance and stated that Block 3 is
the subdivision, including lot buyers who pay part of an “institutional area” and no longer a “residential
the downpayment of the property purchased by area” (hence NO MORE limit as to classrooms). This
them in the form of service, had executed contracts was because of a typographical error since what
of conditional sale containing uniform terms and should’ve been residential was Block 1 and NOT
conditions. Moreover, under the terms of the Block 3 (where school was located). Because of this,
contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and RTC granted the MR and ruled in favour of spouses.
three lot buyers in the subdivision, XEI agreed to CA however reinstated the earlier decision of RTC.
grant 120 months within which to pay the balance of Hence, this petition was filed.
the purchase price to two of them, but granted one Before the Supreme Court, the spouses alleged that
180 months to do so. There is no evidence on record AAVA should be now estopped since it seems to
that XEI granted the same right to buyers of two or have abrogated the agreed Deed of Restrictions
more lots. due to the ff. acts:
1. AAVA Manager admitted that the
30) The Learning Child v Ayala Alabang construction of a school building with 24
rooms was approved in a “Site
(TAKE NOTE: 3 CONSOLIDATED CASES) Development Plan” with his signature
2. AAVA President authorized via letter the
FACTS: construction of a “new school building
Ayala Land, Inc. (herein known as “ALI”) sold a parcel extension”
of land to Spouses Yuson. Spouses Yuson in turn sold

50| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

3. ALI (NOT AAVA) impliedly requested the the title of the subject property, expressly state that
reclassification of the property as “compliance with the said restrictions…. and
“institutional”, and conditions maybe enjoined and/or enforced by
4. ALI subsequently assented to the Court action by Ayala Corporation and/or the Ayala
reclassification of the property via letter Alabang Village Association, their respective
successors and assigns”. [52] As such, it appears
ISSUE: that Ayala Corporation is JOINTLY INTERESTED with
1. WON acts 1 & 2 constitute estoppel by AAVA in an action to enforce the Deed of
deed? Restrictions, and is therefore covered under the
2. WON acts 3 & 4 comes under the rule of res following exception to the res inter alios acta rule:
inter alios acta, it being done by a third Sec. 29. Admission by copartner or agent. The act
party? or declaration of a partner or agent of the party
within the scope of his authority and during the
RULING: existence of the partnership or agency, may be
AAVA is not estopped, and the acts do NOT come given in evidence against such party after the
under the rule of res inter alios acta. partnership or agency is shown by evidence other
Estoppel by deed is a bar which precludes one party than such act or declaration. The same rule applies
from asserting as against the other party and his to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint
privies any right or title in derogation of the deed, or debtor, or OTHER PERSON JOINTLY INTERESTED
from denying the truth of any material facts asserted with the party.[53] (Emphasis supplied.)
in it. We have previously cautioned against the perils However, the acts of ALI are not at all damaging to
of the misapplication of the doctrine of estoppel. the position of AAVA. Since although ALI indeed
ACT#1 and #2 “assented” to the reclassification and expansion,
The alleged assent of AAVA to the construction of the assent stated that: “we interpose no objection
additional classrooms is not at all inconsistent with as long as the conditions are met” which are (1) the
the provisions of the Deed of Restrictions, which approval of the Board and (2) the approval of the
merely limit the use of the subject property residents. None of these were met based on the
exclusively for the establishment and maintenance records. Hence, in other words, the conditions for
thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) the assent were NOT met.
school which may include such installations as an IN OTHER WORDS (author’s own understanding),
office for school administration, playground and although Ayala Land Inc. (AYALA) is a party jointly
garage school vehicles. The deed did not limit the interested in the case and falls under the exception
number of buildings or rooms. The construction of to res inter alios acta rule, the required conditions
more rooms and building extensions is contrary to to its assent to the changing/alteration of the terms
the ORDINANCE, but NOT to the Deed of of the Deed of Restrictions were not met.
Restrictions. Hence, the acts enumerated above cannot
ACT#3 and # 4 prejudice AAVA. In fact, records show that AAVA
Numbers 3 and 4 are acts allegedly performed by ALI. has consistently insisted upon the compliance with
AAVA claims that these acts cannot be considered in the Deed of Restrictions by: consistently denying
the case at bar under the res inter alios acta rule, as the requests and letters of the spouses, and by
ALI is not a party to the case. Section 28, Rule 130 of immediately asking the spouses to cease and desist.
the Rules of Court embodies said rule: Hence, AAVA is not estopped.
Sec. 28. Admission by third party. The rights of a SC ruled in favour of AAVA in upholding the Deed of
party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or Restrictions since such Deed may be harmonized
omission of another, except as hereinafter provided. with the ordinance in this way: there could be
We have to clarify that ALIs statements, IF construction of MORE rooms provided it is used for
DAMAGING to AAVA, would be binding on the latter. preparatory schools. However, since this will
The terms attached to the Deed of Restrictions on prejudice the grade school students already

51| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

enrolled, they were allowed to graduate elementary. petitioners’ respective certificates for registration.
However, the school was not anymore allowed to Later, Redmont filed with the RTC a complaint
accept grade school enrolees. praying for the deferral of the MAB proceedings
OTHER TOPICS NOT RELATED TO EVIDENCE: pending resolution by the SEC. Before the RTC can
I. Intervention: decide, MAB issued a resolution finding the appeals
Motion for Intervention was denied since meritorious.
intervention was done during appeal and not before
judgment as required by the rules. ` Later, RTC issued an order granting the
II. The spouses cited Ortigas case injunction prayed for by Redmont for MAB to defer
Ortigas case ruled that the ordinance could change ruling. Nevertheless, MAB, ruling on the
the contract owing to police power. However, the reconsideration of Redmont, denied such.
Ortigas case does not apply here since 1.) the factual
antecedents are not the same and 2.) harmonization So, Redmont went to the CA assailing the
with the law can still be done. MAB orders. It reversed the MAB orders and
upheld the POA decision that petitioners are
31) Narra Nickel v. Redmont Consolidated disqualified. Reconsideration was likewise denied.
The decision is premised on the doubt as to the
KEYWORD: Admission by Co-partner or agent as nationality of petitioners because they had a
exception to Res Inter Alios Acta Rule common major investor, MBMI. Also, the
conversion of their MPSAs to FTAAs were
FACTS: suspicious. Moreover, POA was declared to have
Respondent Redmont, domestic corp organized jurisdiction over petitioners, with the capacity to
under Phil Laws, took interest in mining certain ascertain their nationality.
areas of Palawan. After inquiring with DENR, it
learned that said areas were already covered by Prior resolution by the CA, Redmont also
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) filed with the Office of the President a petition for
applications of petitioners. Later, Redmont filed the cancellation of petitioners’ FTAAs. The OP
before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of DENR 3 canceled and revoked the same because they
petitions for the denials of the said applications. It misrepresented that they are Filipino corporations.
argued that at least 60% of the capital stocks of It held that the filing of the conversion to FTAA by
petitioners are owned and controlled by MBMI petitioners while the case was still pending is
Resources, a Canadian corp, hence disqualified since indicative of their lack of qualification.
mining activities are reserved only for corporations
deemed Filipino Citizens. In their Answer, Hence, the present petition assailing the
petitioners averred that 60% of the capital stocks orders of the OP and CA.
are owned by Filpinos, POA has no jurisdiction, and
Redmont has no standing to sue since it has no ISSUES:
present application over the areas. 1) WON CA erred in not dismissing the case
on the ground of mootness coz the MPSAs
POA issued a resolution disqualifying were already converted to FTAAs
petitioners, since they are not qualified being
foreign corporations effectively controlled by MBMI. 2) WON petitioners are Foreign corps
Aggrieved, appealed to the Mines Adjudication
Board (MAB), again stressing that they are qualified 3) WON CA correctly applied the exceptions
and that they had their MPSAs converted to to res inter alios acta rule (RELEVANT TO
Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements EVIDENCE)
(FTAAs). Pending resolution, Redmont filed a
complaint before the SEC for the revocation of the 4) WON POA had jurisdiction

52| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

RULING: PETITION WITHOUT MERIT In their last attempt to prove that they are
Filipino corporations, they alleged before the Court
1. NOT MOOT that they have already sold/assigned their shares
and interest to DMCI Mining Corp, a Filpino Corp.
 Exception to Mootness principle (all must This only proves that they were in fact not Filipino
concur) corporations from the start.
a. grave violation of the Constitution –
misrepresented that they are Filipino corporations
2. GRANDFATHER TEST APPLIES SINCE THE 60-40
b. exceptional character and paramount public FILIPINO-FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF
interest involved – the intricate corporate layering PETITIONERS ARE IN DOUBT (NOT FILIPINO
made by MBMI greatly affects the exploitation of NATIONALS)
our resources
2 Acknowledged Tests in determining the
c. to guide the bench, bar, and the public – a ruling Nationality of a Corporations: NATIONALITY TEST
on this case will guide the bbp and GRANDFATHER TEST

d. capable of repetition yet evading review – MBMI CONTROL TEST (LIBERAL RULE):
can keep utilizing dummy Filipino corporations shares belonging to corporations or
partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is
All requisites are present. owned by Filipino citizens shall be considered as of
Philippine nationality, (1st par. DOJ Opinion 020)
 Conversion of MPSA applications to FTAA
applications GRANDFATHER TEST (STRINGENT RULE):
If the percentage of the Filipino ownership
The CA’s analysis of the actions of in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%,
petitioners after the case was filed against them by only the number of shares corresponding to such
respondent is on point. The changing of applications percentage shall be counted as Philippine
by petitioners from one type to another just nationality (2ND par. DOJ Opinion 020). Under this
because a case was filed against them, in truth, rule, the combined totals in the Investing
would raise not a few sceptics’ eyebrows. What is Corporation and the Investee Corporation must be
the reason for such conversion? traced (i.e., "grandfathered") to determine the
total percentage of Filipino ownership.
The filing of the Financial or Technical
Assistance Agreement application is a clear In other words, this rule applies ONLY
admission that the respondents are not capable of when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership
conducting a large scale mining operation and that is in doubt (i.e., in cases where the joint venture
they need the financial and technical assistance of corporation with Filipino and foreign stockholders
a foreign entity in their operation that is why they with less than 60% Filipino stockholdings [or 59%]
sought the participation of MBMI Resources, Inc. invests in other joint venture corporation which is
The participation of MBMI in the corporation only either 60-40% Filipino-alien or the 59% less Filipino).
proves the fact that it is the Canadian company Stated differently, where the 60-40 Filipino- foreign
that will provide the finances and the resources to equity ownership is not in doubt, the Grandfather
operate the mining areas for the greater benefit Rule will not apply.
and interest of the same and not the Filipino
stockholders who only have a less substantial
financial stake in the corporation.

53| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

While corporate layering is allowed under considered foreign since 60% or more of their
FIA, if it is used to circumvent the Constitution and capital stocks or equity interests are owned by
pertinent laws, then it becomes illegal. Further, the MBMI.
pronouncement of petitioners that the grandfather
rule has already been abandoned must be 3. EXCEPTION TO RES INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE
discredited for lack of basis. APPLIES – Sec. 29 Rule 130 ROC – ADMISSION
BY CO-PARTNER OR AGENT and ADMISSION
Revisiting the intent behind Art. XII of the BY PRIVIES
Constitution on National Economy and Patrimony,
vis-à-vis corporate layering , it was the intention of Contention of Petitioners vis-à-vis the application
the framers to apply the grandfather rule in cases of Sec. 29 Rule 130:
of corporate layering. Applying the statutory
construction, when there is a conflict between the Petitioners claim that the CA erred in
Constitution and a statute (FIA), the former prevails. applying Sec. 29, Rule 130 of the Rules by stating
that "by entering into a joint venture, MBMI have a
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, joint interest" with Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.
Grandfather rule applies when the 60-40 They challenged the conclusion of the CA which
Filipino-foreign ownership is in doubt. In this case, pertains to the close characteristics of
this rule should be applied based on the rulings of "partnerships" and "joint venture agreements."
the POA and affirmed by the OP, doubt prevails Further, they asserted that before this particular
and persists in the corporate ownership of partnership can be formed, it should have been
petitioners. Also, as found by the CA, doubt is formally reduced into writing since the capital
present in the 60-40 Filipino equity ownership of involved is more than three thousand pesos
petitioners Narra, McArthur and Tesoro, since their (PhP3,000).Being that there is no evidence of
common investor, the 100% Canadian written agreement to form a partnership between
corporation––MBMI, funded them. petitioners and MBMI, no partnership was
created.
IN THIS CASE, grandfathering” the A partnership is defined as two or more
petitioners, it was established that petitioners persons who bind themselves to contribute money,
McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are not Filipino since property, or industry to a common fund with the
MBMI, a 100% Canadian corporation, owns 60% or intention of dividing the profits among themselves.
more of their equity interests. Such conclusion is On the other hand, joint ventures have been
derived from grandfathering petitioners’ corporate deemed to be "akin" to partnerships since it is
owners, namely: MMI, SMMI and PLMDC. Going difficult to distinguish between joint ventures and
further and adding to the picture, MBMI’s partnerships.
Summary of Significant Accounting Policies
statement– –regarding the "joint venture" The relations of the parties to a joint
agreements that it entered into with the "Olympic" venture and the nature of their association are so
and "Alpha" groups––involves SMMI, Tesoro, similar and closely akin to a partnership that it is
PLMDC and Narra. Noticeably, the ownership of the ordinarily held that their rights, duties, and
"layered" corporations boils down to MBMI, liabilities are to be tested by rules which are closely
Olympic or corporations under the "Alpha" group analogous to and substantially the same, if not
wherein MBMI has joint venture agreements with, exactly the same, as those which govern
practically exercising majority control over the partnership. In fact, it has been said that the trend
corporations mentioned. In effect, whether looking in the law has been to blur the distinctions
at the capital structure or the underlying between a partnership and a joint venture, very
relationships between and among the corporations, little law being found applicable to one that does
petitioners are NOT Filipino nationals and must be not apply to the other.

54| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

DENIED
Though some claim that partnerships and
joint ventures are totally different animals, there are
very few rules that differentiate one from the other; 32) People V. Bokingo & Col
thus, joint ventures are deemed "akin" or similar to
a partnership. In fact, in joint venture agreements, KEYWORD: Res inter acta alio; Construction
rules and legal incidents governing partnerships are workers killed boss; Conspiracy; Confession of one
applied. of the accused

Accordingly, culled from the incidents and FACTS:

records of this case, it can be assumed that the The victim, Noli Paison, was the owner of several
relationships entered between and among apartment units which were being constructed by
petitioners and MBMI are no simple "joint venture the accused. Prosecution’s witness who was the
agreements." As a rule, corporations are prohibited victim’s brother in law testified that he saw the
from entering into partnership agreements; accused (Bokingo) mauled and killed the victim. On
consequently, corporations enter into joint venture the other hand, the victim’s wife saw the other
agreements with other corporations or partnerships accused(Pol) who sprayed tear gas to her and hit
for certain transactions in order to form "pseudo her with a sharp object. Upon hearing Bokingo
partnerships." Obviously, as the intricate web of shouting “Tara, patay na sya”, Pol fled the scene
"ventures" entered into by and among petitioners with him. Subsequently the accused were caught
and MBMI was executed to circumvent the legal and during the Preliminary Investigation, accused
prohibition against corporations entering into Bokingo admitted to the crime and that they
partnerships, then the relationship created should planned the killing days ahead. On such
be deemed as "partnerships," and the laws on extrajudicial admission, an information was filed
partnership should be applied. Thus, a joint venture against the accused for murder. In addition, on the
agreement between and among corporations may basis of the statement of Paison’s wife, conspiracy
be seen as similar to partnerships since the was alleged to be present in the commission of the
elements of partnership are present. crime.

Considering that the relationships found ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial confession is
between petitioners and MBMI are considered to admissible?
be partnerships, then the CA is justified in applying
Sec. 29, Rule 130 of the Rules by stating that "by RULING: No. The extra judicial confession is
entering into a joint venture, MBMI have a joint inadmissible for it violated his
interest" with Narra, Tesoro and McArthur. constitutional rights. Section 12. (1)Any
person under investigation for the
4. POA HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONS commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain
The POA has jurisdiction to settle disputes silent and to have competent and
over rights to mining areas. This refers to any independent counsel preferably of his own
adverse claim, protest, or opposition to an choice. If the person cannot afford the
application for mineral agreement. The POA services of counsel, he must be provided
therefore has the jurisdiction to resolve any adverse with one. These rights cannot be waived
claim, protest, or opposition to a pending except in writing and in the presence of
application for a mineral agreement filed with the counsel.
concerned Regional Office of the MGB.
xxx xxx xxx

55| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in of the Rules of Court provides that the act
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall or declaration of the conspirator relating to
be inadmissible in evidence against him. the conspiracy and during its existence may
be given in evidence against the
In People v. Sunga, we held that "the
co-conspirator provided that the conspiracy
right to counsel applies in certain pretrial
is shown by evidence other than by such
proceedings that can be deemed 'critical
act or declaration. In order that the
stages' in the criminal process. The
admission of a conspirator may be received
preliminary investigation can be no different
against his or her co-conspirators, it is
from the in-custody interrogations by the
necessary that first, the conspiracy be first
police, for a suspect who takes part in a
proved by evidence other than the
preliminary investigation will be subjected to
admission itself; second, the admission
no less than the State's processes,
relates to the common object; and third, it
oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of
has been made while the declarant was
pursuing those who might be liable for
engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. As
criminal prosecution." In said case, Sunga
we have previously discussed, we did not
made an uncounselled admission before the
find any sufficient evidence to establish the
police. He later acknowledged the same
existence of conspiracy. Therefore, the
admission before the judge in a preliminary
extrajudicial confession has no probative
investigation. Sunga was thrust into the
value and is inadmissible in evidence
preliminary investigation and while he did
against Col.
have a counsel, for the latter's lack of
vigilance and commitment to Sunga's rights, Since no sufficient evidence was given to
he was virtually denied his right to counsel. show col’s guilt and conspiracy was not
Thus, the uncounselled admission was held established, Col is acquitted.
inadmissible. In the instant case, the
extrajudicial confession is inadmissible
against Bokingco because he was not 33) City of Manila vs. Del Rosario
assisted at all by counsel during the time his
confession was taken before a judge. KEYWORDS: “City of Manila seeking recovery of a
parcel of Land”
MAIN TOPIC (CONFESSION OF A
CONSPIRATOR AS TO THE CONSPIRACY)
FACTS:
Since the extrajudicial confession is Petitioner(plaintiff) sought the recovery of a parcel
inadmissible against the confessor Bokingo, of land in Calles Clavel and Barcelona, district of
the same may not be used against accused Tondo. This parcel of land was registered in the
Pol. name of and was in possession of
respondent(defendant) Jacinto Del Rosario.
Under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Jacinto Del Rosario alleged that he bought
Court, the rights of a party cannot be
the land from his brother Lorenzo Del Rosario.
prejudiced by an act, declaration or
Lorenzo Del Rosario in turn bought the land from a
omission of another. Res inter alios acta
certain Cipriano Roco.
alteri nocere non debet.Consequently, an
Petitioner alleged that it was the owner of
extrajudicial confession is binding only on
such land, and to prove his claim, he presented
the confessant, is not admissible against his
documentary evidence consisting of a document
or her co-accused, and is considered as
containing an offer by the City of Manila to
hearsay against them. An exception to
purchase the land and another document
the res inter alios acta rule is an admission
establishing the transfer of such land to
made by a conspirator. Section 30, Rule 130

56| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

respondent Jacinto. A map was also presented as the allegations in the complaint. This motion was
evidence. overruled by the court.
1st document – offer to purchase by City of
Manila ISSUE: WON the court was correct in overruling
2nd document – evidence of the transfer of the motion of defendant.
the land to respondent Jacinto
It was however established that Lorenzo del HELD: No, the court was wrong in overruling the
Rosario signed the first document (the offer by the motion. The case was remanded to the Trial court
city of manila to purchase the land) before he for further proceedings.
acquired from Cipriano Roco y Vera the ownership of
the land referred to therein, the second document As to the testimony of the third witness.
being signed after he had transferred the land to the
defendant Jacinto del Rosario, who took possession Villega's [third witness] testimony was
of the same and had it registered. merely hearsay. It consisted of what he had learned
Further, petitioner offered the testimonies from some of the oldest residents in that section of
of several witnesses including the ones who vouched the city. His testimony was introduced by the
for the authenticity of the documentary evidence plaintiff apparently for the purpose of proving that
presented by the petitioner: the city was generally considered the owner of the
1st witness - testified that he did not know of his land, drawing from this fact the presumption of
own knowledge if the land in question belonged to actual ownership under paragraph 11, section 334,
the city. of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such testimony,
however, does not constitute the "common
2nd witness - testified that the land included in Calles reputation" referred to in the section mentioned.
Clavel and Barcelona was formerly part of Plaza "common reputation," as used in that section, is
Divisoria, which belonged to the Central equivalent to universal reputation. The testimony
Government (not the city), and that he did not of this witness is not sufficient to establish the
know to whom it now belongs. presumption referred to.

3rd witness - testified that the land in question was As to the testimony of Lorenzo
formerly included in the Gran Divisoria, and that all
the land included in it belonged to the city. We accordingly hold that the provisions of
section 346 of the Code of Civil Procedure are
4th witness - testified merely that Lorenzo del applicable to the case at bar in so far as they
Rosario had paid 100 pesos to her brother Cipriano declare that an offer of compromise is not
Roco for the purpose of instituting a possessory admissible in evidence.
information as to the property abutting on Calle Again, Lorenzo del Rosario signed the first
Clavel. document before he acquired from Cipriano Roco y
Vera the ownership of the land referred to therein,
Lorenzo Del Rosario – testified as to the authenticity the second document being signed after he had
of the documents but he made a statement that the transferred the land to the defendant Jacinto del
President of the Municipal Board, Señor Herrera, Rosario, who took possession of the same and had
advised him to do so in order to avoid litigation with it registered, as the plaintiff admits (par. 2 of the
the city, and such was not contradicted. (it was thus complaint), on the 23d of February, 1893. If this is
akin to a compromise agreement) so, whatever statements Lorenzo del Rosario might
have made in the documents mentioned, they are
At the trial, after the plaintiff rested, the not binding upon the defendant, because, under
defendant moved for the dismissal of the case upon section 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure, "where
the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish one derives title to real property from another, the

57| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

declaration, act, or omission of the latter, in relation Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I, inclusive, under
to the property, is evidence against the former only subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450 duly approved by
when made while the latter holds the title." the Land Registration Commission, Lot 2476-D,
among others, was adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero
who was then alive at the time of extra-judicial
The plaintiff also introduced in evidence a map of settlement and partition in 1966.
the city of Manila. This map is not before us. It is Plaintiff (private respondent herein) filed an action
sufficient to say, in order to show that it has no value with the CFI (now RTC) of Misamis Oriental to quiet
as evidence, that the reliability of the map was not title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of
proven at the trial. The map identified by the Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same prejudices
witness John R. Wilson was introduced by the the land which it acquired a portion of lot 2476.
plaintiff for the sole purpose of showing the location RTC rendered judgement declaring the plaintiff
of the land in question. It has, therefore, no value in corporation as the true and absolute owner of that
establishing the right of possession claimed by the portion of Lot. 2476. From said decision, defendant
plaintiff. heirs of Ricardo Gevero (petitioners herein)
appealed to the IAC (now Court of Appeals) which
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the defendant subsequently, on March 20, 1986, affirmed the
had a perfect right to ask for the dismissal of the decision appealed from.
case on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to
establish the allegations in the complaint, and the ISSUE: 1.)WON the deed of sale executed by
court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss. Ricardo Gevero to Lancer is valid, 2.) WON the ½
interests of Teodorica Babangha in one of the lots
34) GEVERO VS IAC under Lot 2476 is included in the deed of sale and
3.) WON the respondents action is barred by Laches
FACTS:
The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 of RULING:
the Subdivision Plan Psd-37365 containing an area of Petitioners maintain that the deed of sale is entirely
20,119 square meters and situated at Gusa, Cagayan invalid citing alleged flaws thereto, such as that the
de Oro City. Said Lot was acquired by purchase from signature of Ricardo was forged without his
Luis Lancero in Sept. 15 1964 whom in turn issued knowledge of such fact and that Lancero had
TCT 4320 to plaintiff (DELCOR). Luis Lancero recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed of sale
acquired such parcel of land from Ricardo Gevero on when he signed the document in 1968 entitled
Feb 1952 per deed of sale executed by Ricardo "Settlement to Avoid the Litigation. However, it will
Gevero which was duly annotated as entry No. 1128 be observed that the deed of sale in question was
at the back of Original Certificate of Title No. 7610 executed with all the legal formalities of a public
covering the mother lot identified as Lot No. 2476 in document. The 1952 deed was duly acknowledged
the names of Teodorica Babangha — 1/2 share and by both parties before the notary public, yet
her children the other undivided share of the whole petitioners did not bother to rebut the legal
area. Teodorica Ddief long before WW2 and was presumption of the regularity of the notarized
survived by 6 children namely Maria, Restituto, document. It has the presumption of regularity and
Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquiop and Ursula all surnamed to contradict all these, evidence must be clear,
Gevero. convincing and more than merely preponderant.
The heirs of Teodorica Babangha on October As to petitioners' contention that Lancero had
17,1966 executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement and recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed when
Partition of the estate of Teodorica Babangha, he signed the document in 1968 entitled
consisting of two lots, among them was lot 2476. By "Settlement to Avoid Litigation", it is a basic rule of
virtue of the extra-judicial settlement and partition evidence that the right of a party cannot be
executed by the said heirs of Teodorica Babangha, prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of

58| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

another (Sec. 28. Rule 130, Rules of Court). This

particular rule is embodied in the maxim "res inter FACTS:
alios acta alteri nocere non debet." Under Section Santiago Pineda was a registered pharmacist and
31, Rule 130, Rules of Court "where one derives title was an owner of a drug store. Feliciano Santos,
to property from another, the act, declaration, or having some sick horses, presented a copy of a
omission of the latter, while holding the title, in prescription (obtained from Dr. Richardson) to
relation to the property is evidence against the Pineda to buy medicine for his sick horses. The
former." It is however stressed that the admission prescription specifically read “POTASSIUM
of the former owner of a property must have been CHLORATE”. After it was prepared he used it on 2
made while he was the owner thereof in order that horses which were sick. Shortly thereafter they died.
such admission may be binding upon the present When he had the medicine checked with the
owner. Hence, Lanceros' declaration or acts of Bureau of Science, they found out that the
executing the 1968 document have no binding effect medicine contained “BARIUM CHLORATE”. At the
on DELCOR, the ownership of the land having passed instance of Santos, two chemists also went to the
to DELCOR in 1964. drug store and and the same happened. Dr.
Lastly, Petitioners claim that DELCOR's action is Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy
barred by laches considering that the petitioners on the horses, and found that death was the result
have remained in the actual, open, uninterrupted of poisoning. They were given Barium Chlorate.
and adverse possession thereof until at present. ). (Barium chlorate is a poison, potassium chlorate is
The execution of a public instrument is equivalent to not.)
the delivery of the thing and is deemed legal delivery. ISSUE:
Hence, its execution was considered a sufficient Whether the court may admit the testimony of Drs.
delivery of the property. Besides, the property sold Pena and Darjuan as to their purchase of potassium
is a registered land. It is the act of registration that chlorate which turned out to be poison. (Four
transfers the ownership of the land sold. If the issues here as this is for the most part a torts case,
property is a registered land, the purchaser in good, but this is the issue relevant to evidence)
faith has a right to rely on the certificate of title and
is under no duty to go behind it to look for flaws. HELD:
The Court of Appeals found that it had first The lower court in admitting the testimony of the
investigated and checked the title in the name of chemist Peña and Darjuan as to their purchase of
Luis Lancero. It likewise inquired into the Subdivision potassium chlorate at the drug store of the accused,
Plan, the corresponding technical description and which substance proved on analysis to be barium
the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero in favor chlorate. What appellant is here relying on is the
of Luis Lancero and found everything in order. It maxim res inter alois acta. As a general rule, the
even went to the premises and found Luis Lancero to evidence of other offenses committed by a
be in possession of the land to the exclusion of any defendant is inadmissible. But appellant has
other person. DELCOR had therefore acted in good confused this maxim and this rule with certain
faith in purchasing the land in question. exceptions thereto. The effort is not to convict the
accused of a second offense. Nor is there an
35) US v. Pineda attempt to draw the mind away from the point at
issue and thus to prejudice defendant's case. The
KEYWORD: Barium Chlorate instead of Potassium purpose is to ascertain defendant's knowledge and
Chlorate intent, and to fix his negligence is intensified, and
fraudulent intent may even be evidence of
PRINCIPLE: Evidence is admissible in a criminal negligence than the frequency of accidents.
action which tends to show motive, although it
tends to prove the commission of another offense The United States Supreme Court has held that:
by the defendant."

59| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

"On the trial of a criminal case where the the responsibility for the quality of drugs which the
question relates to the tendency of certain law imposes on druggist and the position of the
testimony to throw light upon a particular made unlawful is the giving of a false name to the
fact, or to explain the conduct of a particular drug asked for.
person, there is a certain discretion on the
part of the trial judge which a court of errors 36) People vs Irang
will not interfere with, unless it manifestly
appear that the testimony has no legitimate KEYWORD: The pockmark on his face
bearing upon the question at issue, and is
calculated to prejudice the accused. PRINCIPLE: Res inter alios acta rule, second batch.

"Whenever the necessity arises for a resort FACTS:

to circumstancial evidence, either from the The accused is charged with robbery with homicide.
nature of the inquiry or the failure of direct
proof, objections to the testimony on the On the night of November 9, 1935, 7 armed
ground of irrelevancy are not favored. individuals with white stripes on their faces went to
the house of spouses Perfecto Melocotones and
"Evidence is admissible in a criminal action Maximiniana Vicente. Some went upstairs, ordered
which tends to show motive, although it Perfecto to bring out his money, and was attacked
tends to prove the commission of another with bolos and fell to the floor. Some also went up,
offense by the defendant." approached Maximinia, struck her in the face with
the butt of the gun, and lost consciousness.
As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the When she regained consciousness she saw her
quality of all drugs and poisons which he sells. And husband already dead. Maximinia turned over to
finally it is provided that it shall be unlawful for him the man who had struck her with the butt of his
to sell any drug or poison under any "fraudulent gun P70 and jewelry valued at P200. She looked at
name." the man's face and saw that he had pockmarks and
a scar on his left eyelid.
Where a customer calls upon a druggist for a
harmless remedy, delivery of a poisonous drug by That same night the house of Juana de la Cruz was
mistake by the druggist is prima facie negligence, assualted by malefactors. All of them had white
placing the burden on him to show that the mistake stripes upon their faces. Juana de la Cruz noticed
was under the circumstances consistent with the that one of them had pockmarks and a scar on the
exercise of due care. The druggist cannot, for left eyelid and was dressed in a maong-colored suit.
example in filling a prescription calling for potassium
chlorate give instead to the customer barium Maxima Vicente informed Lieutenant Roman
chlorate, a poison, place this poison in a package Alejandre of the Constabulary that a person who
labeled "potassium chlorate", and expect to escape struck her with the butt of his gun and taker her
responsibility on a plea of mistake. His mistake, money and jewelry was a man of regular stature,
under the most favorable aspect for himself, was with a lead body and pockmarked face.
negligence.
Having arrested a group of persons, he brought
A plea of accident and mistake cannot excuse for them to Maximiniana Vicente's house so that the
they cannot take place unless there be wanton and latter might identify. She identified the herein
criminal carelessness and neglect. How the accused-appellant Benjamin Irang as the one who
misfortune occurs in unimportant, if under all the had struck her with the butt of his gun and
circumstances the fact of occurrence is attributable demanded delivery of her money and jewelry.
to the druggist as a legal fault. Rather considering Juana de la Cruz also recognized Benjamin Irang,

60| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

through his pockmarks and scar on his left eyelid, as approved or repeated by the declarant after he had
one of the men who had gone up her house that abandoned all hope of recovery.
same nght.
FACTS:
ISSUE: Justo Babiera sold two parcels of land to Basilio
Whether or not the testimony of Juana de la Cruz Copreros with the right of repurchase, but having
may me admitted as evidence to prove the identity failed to repurchase them within the period
of Benjamin Irang as the perpetrator of the crime stipulated, the title thereto was consolidated in the
charged. purchaser, who leased them to Severino Haro.
Justo Babiera resorted to every lawful means to
HELD: regain possession of said two parcels of land, but
Yes, the testimony of Juana de la Cruz may me he failed.
admitted as evidence to prove the identity of
Benjamin Irang as the perpetrator of the crime The prosecution’s version:
charged. On the day of the incident, Severino visited his land
with three companions. When he arrived, he was
While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not told by Fermin Bruces, Severino’s copartner, that
admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is he had found Clemente Babiera’s, son of Justo
admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it Babiera, cow grazing on the land. Severino
tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the informed Clemente of what his cow had done and
robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at told him to take better care of his animal and not
the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time to let it run loose. Severino then ordered Fermin to
charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance take the cow where the Babiera family lived.
connected with the crime. Severino and his companions made use of a torch
when they were making their way back to town
The testimony of Juana de la Cruz to the effect that because it was already dark. When they were on
her house, situated only about one hundred meters the road near Rosendo Paycol’s house, Clemente
from that of Perfecto Melocotones, was assaulted suddenly sprang from the cogon grass, went after
that same night by some malefactors with white Severino and struck him with his bolo in the back.
stripes upon their faces, and that one of them, with When Severino turned to see who attacked him,
pockmarks on his face and a scar on his left eyelid Severino received another bolo blow in the
and dressed in a maong colored suit, who later forehead.
turned out to be the herein accused-appellant,
opened her box, indirectly corroborates Then, Dominga Bores, Clemente’s partner, and
Maximiniana Vicente's testimony that the man of Justo appeared, and pinned down Severino.
the same description was the one who went to her Severino’s companions were not able to help him
house and demanded delivery of her money and because of the threat from Clemente. When the
jewelry, having recognized him later to be the herein assailants already departed, Severino’s companions
accused-appellant. were directed to bring him to town. They were able
to bring Severino to the hospital. Severino made a
sworn statement before the deputy fiscal about
37) PEOPLE v. BABIERA the incident. This sworn statement was ratified by
him before the same deputy fiscal when he was
KEYWORD: Doctrine of Ratification near death.

PRINCIPLE: A statement made under circumstances The defense’s version:

which would not render it admissible as a dying Clemente was in the house of one Oper, when
declaration becomes admissible as such, it is held, if Justo arrived, and later on, Severino, who at once

61| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

said to him, “Clemente, why do you leave your cow repeated by the declarant after he had abandoned
loose?” Clemente denied the imputation, but all hope of recovery.”
Severino insisted and the latter added that the cow
had damaged his plantation. Severino charged him 38) US vs Mercado
of 2 pesos for the damage, however Clemente told
him that he had no money. Clemente told Severino KEYWORD: “He has a Pugnacious Disposition”
that he will pay on the following day. At about 7pm,
Clemente saw Buenaventura Cabalfin leading his PRINCIPLE:
cow, and Severino and his companions followed. A witness cannot be impeached by the party
Clemente asked them why they are taking the cow against whom he has been called, except by
away when they already have an agreement with showing
regards the payment of the damaged plantation. A (a) that he has made contradictory
commotion then happened wherein Clemente was statements; or
allegedly struck by one Margarito Mediavilla, and (b) by showing that his general reputation
Severino was hit in the back by a bolo blow. The for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad. (Sec.
defense attempted to prove that Severino was of a 342, Act No. 190.)
quarrelsome disposition, provoking, irascible, and
fond of starting quarrels in the municipality. FACTS:
The defendants in this case were charged with the
The RTC adjudged Clemente Babiera, Justo Babiera, crime of coaccion (translates to coercion):
and Dominga Bores guilty of the crime of murder,
the first as principal, and the last two as That the said accused on December 22,
accomplices. 1911, in the municipality of Baliuag,
Province of Bulacan, P. I., did willfully and
ISSUE: criminally, without legitimate authority
Whether the ante mortem declaration of the therefor, and by means of violence or force
deceased is admissible in evidence. employed upon the person of Claro
Mercado, prevent the latter from rendering
RULING: aid to Maria R. Mateo in order that
YES. while the first affidavit could not be admissible, Santiago Mercado might at his pleasure
the second affidavit which confirms the first is now maltreat the said Maria R. Mateo, in
admissible. When a witness made a certain violation of law."
statement unconscious of impeding death and They were then found guilty of the crime charged.
reiterates at the time he is already conscious, is During trial, Mr. Ricardo Gonzalez Lloret, attorney
deemed to have ratified the earlier statement. for the private prosecutor, asked the witness for the
defense, the said Santiago Mercado, who is
Although said statement in itself is inadmissible as mentioned in the complaint presented in said cause,
an ante-mortem declaration, inasmuch as there is the following question:
nothing to show that at the time he made it "How many times have you been convicted
Severino Haro knew or firmly believed that he was at of assault upon other persons?"
the point of death, nevertheless, having ratified its To this question, the defendant Tomas Mercado
contents a week later when he was near death as a objected on the ground that the question was
result of his wounds, said declaration is admissible impertinent. Mr. Lloret explained the purpose of his
as a part of that which he made ante-mortem. “A question by saying:
statement made under circumstances which would "I wish to demonstrate that he has a
not render it admissible as a dying declaration pugnacious disposition. I have had occasion
becomes admissible as such, it is held, if approved or to defend him in various causes for
assault."

62| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

The defendants contended that the character of the attempted to assault or illtreat Maria R. Mateo, to
witness, Santiago Mercado, has an intimate relation show that there was occasion for the interference
or may have a strong relation with the facts being of Claro Mercado.
investigated in the present cause,” but this objection A witness cannot be impeached by the party
was overruled. against whom he has been called, except by
The only argument which the appellant presents in showing
support of his assignment of error is that the (a) that he has made contradictory
question had no relation to the question which was statements; or
being discussed by the court and did not tend to (b) by showing that his general reputation
show that the defendants were either guilty or not for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad. (Sec.
guilty of the crime charged; that questions tending 342, Act No. 190.)
to disclose the character of a witness are immaterial. The question to which the defendant objected
In reply to the argument of the appellant, the neither attempted to show that the witness had
Attorney-General contends that the question was a made contradictory statements nor that his general
proper question, because it tended to impugn the reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity was bad.
credibility of the witness and that such questions While you cannot impeach the credibility of a
were for that purpose material and pertinent. It will witness, except by showing that he has made
be remembered that the complaint charged that on contradictory statements or that his general
the occasion when the alleged crime was committed reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, yet,
Santiago Mercado was attempting to and did assault nevertheless, you may show by an examination of
and illtreat one Maria R. Mateo. In answer to said the witness himself or from the record of the
question, the witness admitted that complaint had judgment, that he has been convicted of a high
been presented against him for the offense of crime. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.)
assault and battery. In the present case, the other offense to which the
question above related was not a high crime, as
ISSUE: Whether the witness should be impeached that term is generally used, and we assume that the
due to the character of the witness. phrase "high crime," as used in section 342, is used
in its ordinary signification. High crimes are
HELD: generally defined as such immoral and unlawful
The prosecution, to show the circumstances under acts as are nearly allied and equal in guilt to
which the crime charged here was actually felonies.
committed, showed that this witness, Santiago We believe that the objection to the above
Mercado, had assaulted and illtreated Maria R. question was properly interposed and should have
Mateo, under the circumstances described in the been sustained. If there was proof enough adduced
complaint. That was an important fact. If the said during the trial of the cause, excluding the
assault did not actually take place, then the theory particular proof brought out by this question to
of the prosecution must fail. If there was no assault show that the defendants are guilty of the crime,
or attempted assault, there was no occasion for the then the question and answer and the ruling of the
alleged interference on the part of the said Claro court upon the same did not affect prejudicially the
Mercado to prevent it, and the probability of the interests of the defendants. Errors committed by
guilt of the defendants is greatly lessened. the trial court, which are not prejudicial to the
If the witness who had committed the alleged rights of the parties, should be disregarded by the
assault, had assaulted other persons and had been court. In our opinion the evidence clearly shows
prosecuted therefor, may that fact be considered by that the witness committed the assault to which
the court in weighing the proof and in testing the reference is made in the complaint in the present
credibility of the witness? It was an important fact to cause. Whether he had committed other assaults
prove that Santiago Mercado, at the time and place or not was a matter of no importance in the
mentioned in the complaint, had assaulted or present action. The admission or rejection,

63| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

therefore, of the proof to which such question awakened by heat beside his bed. The room was on
related could in no way prejudice the rights of the fire. He shouted for help and Canlas tried to help
defendants. him but they failed to extinguish it. Gonzales
After a careful examination of the record, we are denied he and his aunt were quarreling that
persuaded that the same shows, beyond a evening before the fire started. As his aunt was
reasonable doubt, that the defendants were guilty of partly deaf, he said he had to speak in a loud voice.
the crime charged and that the sentence of the He averred that he merely asked his aunt to buy
lower court should be affirmed, with costs. So food because they ran out of LPG. Gonzales said
ordered. that when he met PO1 Mendoza, he explained that
he noticed the fire had started in his room. He
39) Gonzales v. People sought police protection from his neighbors who
accused him of starting it.
FACTS:
Gonzales was charged with arson for allegedly The defense presented a Physical Science Report
burning two-storey residential building to which he prepared by a Police Inspector showing that the
pleaded not guilty. ashes obtained from the burnt premises were
negative of any flammable substance.
The prosecution presented eyewitness Carlos C.
Canlas, owner of the two-storey building testifying RTC convicted petitioner. The CA sustained the
that at about 9:30 p.m. he was watching television in conviction holding that the denial of Gonzales
his room when his daughter called his attention to cannot prevail over the positive identification of a
check the commotion in an adjacent room. On his witness, that the prosecution established
way to the room rented by Gonzales, he smelled gas. circumstantial evidence sufficient to support the
He saw Gonzales ignite a flame and throw it on a pile conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
of clothes in the middle of the living room where and that although there were discrepancies in the
Gonzales had also placed an LPG tank. Fire quickly testimony of Canlas and his affidavits, the
spread to the other parts of the building. discrepancies did not necessarily discredit him
because affidavits taken ex parte are generally
The prosecution also presented two tenants, Villaflor considered to be inferior to the testimony given in
and Simpao, as witnesses. Villaflor testified that he open court. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held
heard Gonzales and his aunt quarreling before the that the alleged discrepancies pertain to minor
fire. He said he heard Gonzales yell "Susunugin ko matters negated any suspicion that the testimony
itong bahay na ito!" Alarmed, he went to the was perjured and rehearsed.
Barangay Hall to report the incident but immediately
went back to his place when someone informed him In this petition for review, petitioner argues that
his house was on fire. Simpao testified that he saw the trial court and the appellate court erred in
the fire coming from Gonzales's room. He added giving credence to the testimony of prosecution
that Gonzales was laughing while the building was witness Canlas. He claims that the sworn
burning. statements of Canlas before the investigating
officer of the fire department and before the city
The testimonies were corroborated by P01 Mendoza, prosecutor were inconsistent.
who testified that when he and his fellow officer
arrived at the crime scene, Gonzales admitted Petitioner cites People v. Salik Magonawal, where
responsibility for the fire. the material discrepancies between the court
testimony and prior statements of a witness at a
On the other hand, Gonzales averred that the fire preliminary investigation made the testimony
was caused by faulty electrical wiring. He testified incredible.
that he was napping inside his room when he was

64| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

The OSG contends that the discrepancies in the the circumstantial evidence coupled with the
testimonies of the witnesses and their sworn positive identification of the accused as the
statements were not substantial to warrant a review perpetrator of the offense by a credible witness..
of the findings of fact of the trial court. The OSG
asserts that the testimony of Canlas in court clarified, 40) Republic v Kenrick Developent
corroborated and complemented his affidavit.
Likewise, the testimony of the other prosecution KEYWORD: Unsigned Pleading = Mere scrap of
witnesses corroborated Canlas's testimony paper; Adoptive admission constituting judicial
admission
ISSUE:
Whether the discrepancies in the affidavit and the PRINCIPLES:
court testimonies of a witness are sufficient to  By adoptive admission, a third person's
exculpate Gonzales of the crime of arson. statement becomes the admission of the party
embracing or espousing it.
HELD:  Only the signature of either the party himself or
NO. In the prosecution for arson, proof of the crime his counsel operates to validly convert a
charged is complete where the evidence establishes pleading from one that is unsigned to one that is
the corpus delicti and the identity of the defendant signed.
as the one responsible for the crime. In arson, the
corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare FACTS:
fact of the fire and of it having been intentionally Kenrick built a concrete perimeter fence around
caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a parcels of land behind the Civil Aviation Traininger
single eyewitness, if credible, is enough to prove the Center of the Air Transportation Office. As a result
corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. When these of this, ATO was dispossessed of huge tracts of land.
are present, the only issue is the credibility of the Kenrick, on the other hand, claimed that the land
witness. Whenever there is inconsistency between was theirs, showing a TCT issued in its name which
the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, was sold to it by Alfonso Concepcion.
the testimony commands greater weight considering
that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to The Registrar of Deeds had no record of such TCT
testimony in court, the former being almost nor of its ascendant TCT. ATO verified the
invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate, authenticity of Kenrick's titles with the Land
sometimes from partial suggestions and sometimes Registration Authority. LRA submitted its report.
from want of suggestions and inquiries, without the Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City had no record of
aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the the TCT and its ascendant title. The land allegedly
connected circumstances necessary for his accurate covered by Kenrick's titles was also found to be
recollection of the subject. within Villamor Air Base (headquarters of the
Philippine Air Force) in Pasay City.
The eyewitness positively identified Gonzales as the
culprit who caused the fire. Both the trial and By virtue of a report, OSG filed a complaint for
appellate courts found the testimony of eyewitness revocation, annulment and cancellation of
Canlas credible. As a general rule, when the findings certificates of title against Kenrick and an Answer
of both courts are in agreement, this Court will not was filed by the latter which was purportedly
reverse their findings of fact. signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as counsel for
respondent.
The findings of the Physical Science Report is a
negative evidence and taken together with the bare During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue
denial of petitioner, supported only with testimonies Ribbon Committee conducted a hearing in aid of
of relatives, constitute inferior evidence as against

65| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

legislation on the matter of land registration and assented to or adopted the statements of another,
titling. During the hearing, Atty. Garlitos (former evidence of those statements is admissible against
counsel of Kenrick) testified that he prepared him. This is the essence of the principle of adoptive
Kenrick’s answer and transmitted an unsigned draft admission.
to Victor Ong (Kenrick’s President). He further stated
that the signature in the answer was not his and he An adoptive admission is a party's reaction to a
authorized no one to sign in his behalf and he did statement or action by another person when it is
not know who signed the answer. reasonable to treat the party's reaction as an
admission of something stated or implied by the
When the Republic found out about this, they other person.
promptly filed an urgent motion to declare Kenrick
in default for failure to file a valid answer since it By adoptive admission, a third person's statement
was an unsigned pleading which in effect is a mere becomes the admission of the party embracing or
scrap of paper and produced no legal effect pursuant espousing it. This may occur when a party:
to Sec. 3 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. a) Expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral
statement made by another
Trial court: granted Republic's motion. It found b) Hears a statement and later on essentially
Kenrick's answer to be sham, false and intended to repeats it
defeat the purpose of the rules. It ordered the c) Utters an acceptance or builds upon the
answer stricken from the records, respondent in assertions of another
default and allowed the Republic to present its d) Replies by way of rebuttal to some specific
evidence ex parte. points raised by another but ignores further
points which he or she has heard the other
CA: Granted respondent’s petition for certiorari and maker
directed the lifting of the order of default against e) Reads and signs a written statement made by
respondent and ordered the trial court to proceed to another
trial with dispatch. It found that Atty. Garlitos'
statements in the legislative hearing were unreliable Kenrick accepted the pronouncements of Atty.
since they were not subjected to cross-examination. Garlitos and built itscase on them. At no instance
It also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos' acts after the filing did it ever deny or contradict its former counsel's
of the answer and concluded that he assented to the statements. It went to great lengths to explain Atty.
signing of the answer by somebody in his stead Garlitos' testimony as well as its implications, as
which supposedly cured whatever defect the answer follows:
may have had. 1) While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer,
the fact was that the answer was signed. Hence,
ISSUE: the pleading could not be considered invalid for
Whether Kenrick should be declared in default being an unsigned pleading. The fact that the
person who signed it was neither known to Atty.
RULING: YES Garlitos nor specifically authorized by him was
Trial court correctly ruled that respondent's answer immaterial. The important thing was that the
was invalid and of no legal effect as it was an answer bore a signature.
unsigned pleading. Respondent was properly 2) While the Rules of Court requires that a
declared in default and the Republic was rightly pleading must be signed by the party or his
allowed to present evidence ex parte. counsel, it does not prohibit a counsel from
giving a general authority for any person to sign
A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily the answer for him which was what Atty.
adopt or ratify another's statement. Where it Garlitos did. The person who actually signed
appears that a party clearly and unambiguously the pleading was of no moment as long as

66| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

counsel knew that it would be signed by another,

similar to addressing an authorization letter "to The blanket authority respondent claims Atty.
whom it may concern" such that any person Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was void. Any act
could act on it even if he or she was not known taken pursuant to that authority was likewise void.
beforehand. There was no way it could have been cured or
3) Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the ratified by Atty. Garlitos' subsequent acts.
answer; he never disowned its contents and he
resumed acting as counsel for respondent Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998
subsequent to its filing. These circumstances Senate hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos consented
show that Atty. Garlitos conformed to or ratified to the signing of the answer by another "as long as
the signing of the answer by another. Kenrick it conformed to his draft." We give no value
completely adopted Garlitos’ statements as its whatsoever to such self-serving statement. No
own. doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given
blanket authority for just anyone to sign
The adoptive admission constituted a judicial the answer.
admission which was conclusive on it.
Contrary to respondent's position, a signed pleading Respondent insists on the liberal application of the
is one that is signed either by the party himself or rules. It maintains that even if it were true that its
his counsel. (Section 3, Rule 7) answer was supposedly an unsigned pleading, the
defect was a mere technicality that could
Only the signature of either the party himself or his be set aside.
counsel operates to validly convert a pleading from
one that is unsigned to one that is signed. Counsel's Procedural requirements which have often been
authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have
him. He may not delegate it to just any person. The their own valid raison d' etre in the orderly
signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him administration of justice. To summarily brush them
that he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice.
knowledge, information and belief, there is a good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed
delay. except only when, for the most persuasive of
reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of
Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by an injustice not commensurate with the degree of
affixing his signature, who can certify to these his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
matters. The preparation and. signing of a pleading prescribed procedure. Respondent failed to show
constitute legal work involving practice of law which any persuasive reason why it should be exempted
is reserved exclusively for the members of the legal from strictly abiding by the rules.
profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a
pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor The Court cannot close its eyes to the acts
of one who is not. committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the
ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: made to account for his possible misconduct.
Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any Decision is furnished the Commission on Bar
unqualified person the performance of any task Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
which by law may only be performed by a member for the commencement of disbarment proceedings
of the Bar in good standing. Moreover, a signature against Atty. Garlitos, Jr. for his possible
by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unprofessional
unqualified persons something the law strongly
proscribes.

67| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

41) Civil Service Commission vs. Allyson Belagan employees of the DECS in Baguio City were charging
a high-ranking DECS official with sexual harassment.
PRINCIPLE: When the credibility of a witness is Upon inquiry, she learned that the official being
sought to be impeached by proof of his reputation, complained of was respondent. She then wrote a
it is necessary that the reputation shown should be letter-complaint for sexual indignities and
that which existed before the occurrence of the harassment to former DECS Secretary Ricardo
circumstances out of which the litigation arose, or at Gloria.
the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a On October 4, 1994, respondent was
period remote from the commencement of the suit. placed under suspension.
This is because a person of derogatory character or
reputation can still change or reform himself.

FACTS: LIGAYAN:
The instant case stemmed from two (2) separate On 4 separate occasions, Belagan touched
complaints filed respectively by Magdalena Gapuz, her breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her groins,
founder/directress of the "Mother and Child embraced her from behind, pulled her close to him
Learning Center," and Ligaya Annawi, a public school with his organ pressing against her. Aside from this,
teacher at Fort Del Pilar Elementary School, against Ligaya charged him with delaying teachers' salaries,
respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of failing to release differentials to substitutes,
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports refusing to release teachers' uniforms and
(DECS), all from Baguio City. Magdalena charged allowances, and failing to constitute the Selection
respondent with sexual indignities and harassment, and Promotion Board, as required by the DECS rules
while Ligaya accused him of sexual harassment and and regulations.
various malfeasances

MAGDALENA: DECS Secretary: Belagan guilty of sexual indignities

Magdalena Gapuz filed an application with DECS and ordered dismissed. He was absolved of charges
Office in Baguio City for permit to operate a of administrative malfeasance or dereliction of duty
pre-school. One of the requisites for the issuance of CSC: Guilty of grave misconduct. His position is that
the permit was the inspection of the school which requires a high degree of moral uprightness
premises by the DECS Division Office. Respondent Respondent filed a MR, contending that he has
and complainant visited the school. In the course of never been charged of any offense in his
inspection, while both descending the stairs, thirty-seven years of service. By contrast,
respondent suddenly placed his arms around Magdalena was charged with several offenses
complainant's shoulders and kissed her cheek. before the MTC of Baguio City. (Respondent listed
Fearful that her application might be all the cases; there were A LOT)
jeopardized and that her husband might harm
respondent, Magdalena just kept quiet. Respondent claimed that the numerous cases filed
against Magdalena cast doubt on her character,
Several days later, Magdalena went to the integrity, and credibility, MR was denied
DECS Division Office and asked respondent about CA: reversed the CSC and held that Magdalena is an
the status of her permit. His reply was "Mag-date unreliable witness, her character being
muna tayo." She declined, explaining that she is questionable
married. She then left and reported the matter to
DECS Assistant Superintendent Peter Ngabit. ISSUE: W/N the complaining witness, Magdalena ,
Sometime in September 1994, Magdalena is Credible
read from a local newspaper that certain female
RULING:

68| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

Generally, the character of a party is regarded as Credibility means the disposition and intention to
legally irrelevant in determining a tell the truth in the testimony given. It refers to a
controversy. 15 One statutory exception is that relied person's integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy
upon by respondent, i.e.,Section 51 (a) 3, Rule 130 of belief. 19A witness may be discredited by
of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which we quote evidence attacking his general reputation for
here: truth, 20 honesty 21 or integrity. 22 Section 11,
Rule 132 of the same Revised Rules on Evidence
"SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally reads:
admissible; exceptions. —
"SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse party's
(a) In Criminal Cases: witness. — A witness may be impeached by
xxx xxx xxx the party against whom he was called, by
contradictory evidence, by evidence that
(3) The good or bad moral character of the his general reputation for truth, honesty, or
offended party may be proved if it tends integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has
to establish in any reasonable degree the made at other times statements
probability or improbability of the inconsistent with his present testimony, but
offense charged." not by evidence of particular wrongful acts,
except that it may be shown by the
It will be readily observed that the above provision
examination of the witness,
pertains only to criminal cases, not to administrative
offenses. And even assuming that this technical rule or the record of the judgment,
of evidence can be applied here, still, we cannot that he has been convicted of an
sustain respondent's posture. offense."
Not every good or bad moral character of the
offended party may be proved under this provision.
Only those which would establish the probability or With the foregoing disquisition, the Court of
improbability of the offense charged. This means Appeals is correct in holding that the character or
that the character evidence must be limited to the reputation of a complaining witness in a sexual
traits and characteristics involved in the type of charge is a proper subject of inquiry. This leads us
offense charged. Thus, on a charge of rape — to the ultimate question — is Magdalena's
character for chastity, on a charge of assault — derogatory record sufficient to discredit her
character for peaceableness or violence, and on a credibility?
charge of embezzlement — character for honesty. In A careful review of the record yields a negative
one rape case, where it was established that the answer.
alleged victim was morally loose and apparently
uncaring about her chastity, we found the conviction 1) Magdalena's derogatory record is NOT
of the accused doubtful. sufficient to discredit her credibility. Evidence
of one's character or reputation must be
In the present administrative case for sexual confined to a time not too remote from the
harassment, respondent did not offer evidence that time in question. What is to be determined is
has a bearing on Magdalena's chastity. What he the character or reputation of the person at
presented are charges for grave oral defamation, the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not
grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries, at a period remote from the commencement
malicious mischief, etc. filed against her. Certainly, of the suit. Most of the twenty-two (22) cases
these pieces of evidence are inadmissible under the filed with the MTC of Baguio City relate to acts
above provision because they do not establish the committed in the 70s and 80s and one was in
probability or improbability of the offense charged. 1994. Surely, those cases and complaints are

69| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

no longer reliable proofs of Magdalenas inconsistency is a serious flaw which cannot be

character or reputation. Every person can repaired by her statement on the witness stand.
change Accused-appellant makes capital of
2) Belagan also failed to prove that Magdalena Joseph’s bad reputation in their community. He
was convicted of any of the criminal cases. It is alleges that the victim’s drug habit led him to
not permissible to show that a witness has commit other crimes and he may have been shot by
been arrested or that he has been charged with any of the persons from whom he had stolen. As
or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or proof of Joseph’s bad character, appellant
confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his presented Herminia’s letter to the mayor of
credibility Caloocan City seeking his assistance for Joseph’s
rehabilitation from drugs.
42) People vs Noel Lee
ISSUES:
FACTS: 1) Whether or not the trial court should not have
Herminia Marquez and her son, Joseph, accepted Herminia’s testimony because it is
were in the living room of their house. They were inconsistent.
watching a basketball game on television. Herminia 2) Whether or not the character evidence is
was seated across, Joseph, who sat on a sofa against admissible in this case.
the wall and window of their hous. When Herminia
casually glanced at her son, she saw a hand holding RULING:
a gun coming out of the open window behind 1) Herminia corrected her affidavit by saying
Joseph. She looked up and saw accused-appellant in open court that she saw the hand and the gun
Noel Lee peering through the window and holding coming out of the open window, not from a hole in
the gun aimed at Joseph. Before she could warn him, the window. Between Herminia’s testimony in open
Joseph turned his body towards the window, and court and her sworn statement, any inconsistency
simultaneously, appellant fired his gun hitting therein does not necessarily discredit the witness.
Joseph’s head. Joseph slumped on the sofa. Affidavits are generally considered inferior to
Herminia stood up but could not move as open court declarations because affidavits are
accused-appellant fired a second shot at Joseph and taken ex-parte and are almost always incomplete
three shots more, two hit the sofa and one hit the and inaccurate.
cement floor. When no more shots were fired, 2) Character is defined to be the possession
Herminia ran to the window and saw by a person of certain qualities of mind and morals,
accused-appellant, in a blue sando, flee towards the distinguishing him from others; his reputation.
direction of his house. Joseph was then brought to Good moral character includes all the elements
the MCU Hospital where he later died. essential to make up such a character; among these
Herminia filed a complaint for murder are common honesty and veracity. The rule is that
against accused-appellant. The trial court ruled the character or reputation of a party is regarded
against accused-appellant and sentenced him with as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy,
the penalty of death. Hence, the automatic review so that evidence relating thereto is not admissible.
by the Supreme Court. In criminal cases, sub-paragraph 1 of
Accused-appellant points out inconsistencies Section 51 of Rule 130 provides that the accused
in the eyewitness testimony. In her affidavit before may prove his good moral character which is
the police officers, Herminia declared that the hand pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
holding a gun pointed at her son came out of a hole charged. Sub-paragraph 2 provides that the
in the window, i.e., butas ng bintana. On prosecution may not prove the bad moral character
cross-examination, Herminia stated that she saw a of the accused except only in rebuttal and when
hand holding a gun in the open window, i.e., bukas such evidence is pertinent to the moral trait
na bintana. According to accused-appellant, this involved in the offense charged. Both

70| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS

EVIDENCE | Batch 3 | Atty. Torregosa | EH 501 S.Y. 2018-2019

sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 51 of Rule 130 same time, qualifies the killing of Joseph Marquez
refer to character evidence of the accused. And this to murder.
evidence must be pertinent to the moral trait Supreme Court affirmed but reduced the
involved in the offense charged, meaning, that the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.
character evidence must be relevant and germane to
the kind of the act charged.
Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said
Rule refers to the character of the offended party.
Character evidence, whether good or bad, of the
offended party may be proved if it tends to establish
in any reasonable degree the probability or
improbability of the offense charged.
In the instant case, proof of the bad moral
character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the
probability or improbability of his killing.
Accused-appellant has not alleged that the victim
was the aggressor or that the killing was made in
self-defense. There is no connection between the
deceased’s drug addiction and thievery with his
violent death in the hands of accused-appellant.
Moreover, proof of the victim’s bad moral
character is not necessary in cases of murder
committed with treachery and premeditation. In
People v. Soliman, a murder case, the Supreme Court
held: “While good or bad moral character may be
availed of as an aid to determine the probability or
improbability of the commission of an offense, such
is not necessary in the crime of murder where the
killing is committed through treachery or
premeditation. The proof of such character may only
be allowed in homicide cases to show that it has
produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in
the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction
that a prompt defensive action was necessary.”
In the case at bar, accused-appellant is
charged with murder committed through treachery
and evident premeditation. The evidence shows that
there was treachery. There was no opportunity at all
for the victim to defend himself or retaliate against
his attacker. The suddenness and unexpectedness of
the attack ensured his death without risk to the
assailant. Following the ruling in People v. Soliman,
where the killing of the victim was attended by
treachery, proof of the victim’s bad character is not
necessary. The presence of this aggravating
circumstance negates the necessity of proving the
victims bad character to establish the probability or
improbability of the offense charged and, at the

71| UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS