Toward an Anthropology of the Life-World: Alfred Schutz's Quest for the Ontological

Justification of the Phenomenological Undertaking

Author(s): Helmut R. Wagner
Source: Human Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1983), pp. 239-246
Published by: Springer
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HUMAN STUDIES 6, 239-246 (1983)

Toward an Anthropology of the Life

World:
Alfred Schutz's Quest for the Ontological
Justification of the Phenomenological
Undertaking*
Helmut R Wagner
Department of Sociology
Hobart and William Smith Colleges
Geneva, N.Y.

Insofar as phenomenology in its original sense of a method is presuppositionless,

it is self-contained, that is, not in need of metaphysical support. If it departs from
the natural stance (natuerliche Einstellung) of the mundane ego, it rests on the
given existential ground of the life-world.
Husserl, with his demand to "return to the things" themselves and by declar?
ing phenomenology a "rigorous science" intended to emphasize the anti-meta?
physical character of his philosophy in the radical sense in which the creator of
transcendentalism, Kant, had asserted his.
Schutz definitely understood phenomenology in this sense. Why, then, did he
speak in 1943 of the "courage to enter metaphysics"? (letter to Voegelin,
November 11, 1943). The answer is simple: He felt uncomfortable with the
foundations of phenomenology as he saw them.
The existence of the life-world had to be taken for granted. Phenomenology
could not go "below" it with the help of its methods. In this sense, it could not
provide its justification. By this, I refer, first, to the reasons in terms of which I
explain to myself the because motive which led me to the acceptance of the
phenomenological method, and, secondly, to the philosophical reasons in terms
of which 'we phenomenologists' justify the claim that phenomenology be taken
seriously as the scholarly and philosophical undertaking it is. Schutz's "courage
to enter metaphysics" was the courage to face the problem of justification and to

* Originally presented at the meetings of the Ad Hoc Group "Phenomenological Sociology"

World Congress of Sociology, Mexico City, 1982. Correspondence and requests for reprints should
be addressed to Helmut R. Wagner, Department of Sociology, Hobart and William Smith Colleges,
Geneva, NY 14456.

239

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 240 WAGNER

acknowledge that any answer to it would necessarily lie outside the realm of
phenomenology itself.
Schutz explained already in 1932 that the "sciences of the social world" may
take other forms than that which deals with subjectively meaningful relations in
human conduct. Thus, they could deal with "the real-ontological content of
the . . . constituted social world" without concern for the subjective origin of
that which was constituted (1932, p. 283). He closed his study by enumerating
three tasks for the continuation of his own work. The last of these centered in the
"circle of problems" surrounding the constitution of the Thou and the "clarifi?
cation of the intersubjective structure of all thinking ..." Schutz expected the
solution of the problems from the continuation of Husserl's analyses of the
transcendental ego, but he added that "a definite solution may well result only
from an ontology of Man on a phenomenological foundation" (1932, p. 285).
In his later work, Schutz revised these programmatic expectations in two
respects. First, his doubts in the possibility of solving the "problem of intersub?
jectivity" on the transcendental level grew and eventually became practical
certainty.1 Second, he convinced himself that the ontology of Man he envisaged
could not be established by phenomenological means. Yet he maintained that
such an ontology was needed, knowing well that it could neither be borrowed
whole from one philosopher, nor put together from elements abstracted from the
works of several thinkers. At best, segments for it could be found in the writings
of philosophers as different from each other as Scheler, Dempf and Santayana.

II

The idea of an ontology of Man, a philosophical anthropology as adjunct to

phenomenology was contrary to Husserl's intentions. For instance, in 1931 he
protested the penetration of Dilthey's "philosophy of life, an anthropology in a
new form," into the phenomenological movement. To him, it presented "a
complete reversal of the principal position" of transcendental and constitutive
phenomenology, representing the same psychologism he had demolished thirty
years ago. He added that the specific phenomenological sense of subjectivity is a
priori codetermined in the "Begruendungsmethode"?justification, proof, and
foundation rolled into one?of his philosophy. The question is "anthropolog
ism" or "transcendentalism"; the definite answer has already been provided in
the development of constitutive phenomenology.2

!See Schutz's essay on the problem of intersubjectivity, published in 1957.

2Speaking before an audience of philosophers in Berlin, Husserl addressed the topic "Phae
nomenologie und Anthropologie." The speech was published, in German, in Philosophy and Phe
nomenomenological Research (PPR) 1, 1941: 1-14. The passages referred to appear on pp. 1-2.
Schutz, by the way, counselled against the publication of this speech; he felt that the implied attack
against Dilthey was not justified and that Husserl had said much better elsewhere what he offered
here as an exposition of his own position. I may add that, in matters of a philosophical anthropology,
he was closer to Dilthey than to Husserl.

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 ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE LIFE-WORLD 241

Yet Husserl spoke of "regional ontologies" in the first volume of the Ideas,
and of an "ontology of the life-world" in the Krisis. In the Ideas, Husserl had
stated that "every concrete empirical objectivity" falls into a given "region of
empirical objects." To any such region belongs a corresponding "regional eide?
tic science" which, in turn, forms the "essential theoretical basis" ofthe factual
science which deals with the empirical objectivities in question. These eidetic
sciences, would they exist, would be identical with regional ontologies.
Beyond this purely programmatic announcement,3 Husserl explained that, in
principle, ontological explanations of eidetic findings are not necessary; these
findings are already confirmed in apodictic judgments (1913, sections 9 and 6).
In the continuation of the /?teas-investigations, which were posthumously pub?
lished as Ideas III, Husserl repeated his argument that "ontology itself" is
"actually irrelevant." As "science of transcendental consciousness," phe?
nomenology comprises both a "pure" and a "psychological ontology"; they are
inherent in it. All that Husserl was willing to concede was that "the appeal to
ontological matters . . . lends direction to intuitive investigations" (1952, p. 78,
77, 92); it facilitated the selection of topics for phenomenological investigations.
The Krisis volume contains Husserl's basic considerations of the life-world,
including a short section on "The Task of an Ontology of the Life-World"
(1954, p. 176-177). However, it must be stressed that he made the life-world
thematic basically not for what it is as the immediately given sphere of "life for
all," but as the original ground of all Science. Further, he turned toward it
mainly in order to establish a new staging ground for the reconstruction of
transcendental-constitutive phenomenology. As such it captured his transitory
attention in a similar way in which, twenty years before, the natural stance (or
attitude) had become the staging ground for eidetic psychology. This, of course,
was his privilege. But I feel compelled to point out that both objectives named?
as important as they were?did crowd out the third and, for men like Schutz,
crucial one. Husserl himself mentioned it in passing: The life world, legit?
imately, "could have been made into the theme of a separate science without any
transcendental interest, that is, in the 'natural stance'." Such a science would be
"an ontology of the life-world purely as world of experience" (1954, pp.
176-177).
I assume that Schutz had this discarded possibility in mind, when, in 1957, he
explained during the discussion of the Husserl Colloquium in Royaumont: Hus?
serl has opened the way which a phenomenological analysis of the social world
should follow ontologically, but he did not go it himself (1957c, p. 90). Years
before, he had already made clear that he considered Husserl's position toward
ontology evasive. In his review of Ideas III (PPR 13, 1953), he agreed with Fink,

3I have found in the phenomenological literature?past and present?many sophisticated reflec?

tions about regional ontologies; if anyone has concretely and penetratingly studied any "region of
empirical objects", and seriously developed parallel to it a "regional eidetic science," or ontology,
it has escaped my attention.

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242 WAGNER

whom he reported saying in a recent article "that the ontological problem has
been dodged by Husserl in all phases of its development" (1953; CP III: 47 n.
2).?Thereby, he explained why he was looking elsewhere for support in his
attempts at gaining access to the problems of a viable anthropology.

Ill
Schutz's fascination with Scheler's work, manifested in no less than three arti?
cles about him (1942, 1956, 1957), was not in the least nourished by the brilliant
and undisciplined scholar's philosophical anthropology. The first started, the
second closed with it. In the third, he elaborated Scheler's sociology of knowl?
edge, culminating in the thesis of the three kinds of knowledge (for the sake of
domination, the sake of knowing, and the sake of salvation), calling it "the heart
of Scheler's philosophical anthropology" and according to his best students "his
greatest achievement" (CP I: 150-153; CP III: 144; CP III: 150).
In his search for a viable anthropology, Schutz came under cross fire from
Voegelin, the philosopher of history, and Gurwitsch, the creator of a phe?
nomenological Gestalt theory.4 Voegelin, in his sharp critique of Husserl's late
philosophy, pushed him toward the recognition of the philosophical necessity to
transcend phenomenology philosophically. Voegelin's metaphysical position
was unacceptable to Schutz, but made him realize all the more that the idea of a
self-contained phenomenology was untenable. His friend acquainted him with
the writings of Dempf, the Munich philosopher, which he found penetrating and
challenging. He drew the line, however, at Dempf s contention that a philosophi?
cal anthropology is "possible only if it is also an 'anthropodicy'."5
Gurwitsch pushed Schutz in the opposite direction. Being aware of "On?
tological Problems" (part six of The Field of Consciousness?French 1957;
English 1964) he saw them as problems of regional anthropologies, which he
renamed "orders of existence" which are "intrinsically connected realms
. . . exhibiting unity and continuity." They are sub-orders of a general order of
reality: the perceptional world is its fundamental stratum; its universality is
secured by "objective time" as "the constitutive relevancy principle of reality in
general" (1964, pp. 401, 392).6 The descriptive evidence is drawn from experi

4I base this on the extensive unpublished correspondence of Schutz with Gurwitsch and Voegelin.
Likewise, his correspondence with Felix Kaufmann, Maurice Natanson, and Herbert Spiegelberg
should be consulted. I regret that I cannot possibly submit this evidence here in full; its presentation
and interpretation would require a treatise of its own. I appeal to my readers to accept part of my
exposition as that of someone who had the occasion to look at all the available evidence.
5Anthropodicy: the ultimate justification of Man parallel to Leibniz's conception of Theodicy, the
ultimate justification of God.
Gurwitsch based himself on Husserl's Erfahrung und Urteil?It ought to be kept in mind that
Gurwitsch's concept of "orders of relevance" is different from Schutz's concept of "finite provinces
of meaning", and that they also defined relevance differently.

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 ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE LIFE-WORLD 243

enees in the life-world; its phenomenological grasp is gained by the eidetic

method. Gurwitsch responded as follows to Schutz's report of his controversy
with Voegelin:

Ultimately, my opposition to your inclination to ontologize stems from

Hobbes who postulated the great principle that we understand nothing that
we did not create ourselves. I should like to vary this by saying that we
cannot accept anything if we cannot penetrate it and grasp it wholly in its
structure and the inner construction of its meaning", (letter June 11, 1953)

Schutz agreed with this statement but rejected its implications. He did not deny
his "inclination to ontologize" but also did not wish to identify it with that of
Voegelin. He conceded that we do not understand what we did not create: "The
ontological basis of all understanding and self-understanding itself is ununder
standable as a matter of principle." Yet, "nevertheless it can be described." Its
description is not only possible but necessary:

"It is not in our power (Vermoeglichkeit) to accept or not accept that which
is pressed upon us. And what is imposed? Our position as human beings in
the cosmos. I mean no more than that this position?in its ununderstan
dability?simply exists ontologically even though all understanding be?
comes possible only on its ultimate foundation: as life-world." (letter of
June 15, 1953)

Schutz's "courage to enter metaphysics," then, stems from existential rea?

sons: If, in Heidegger's phrase, I am "thrown into the world", I insist on my
privilege to reflect about this brute existential fact. It was 'pressed upon him' as a
theme of his personal life, but he also felt that 'we phenomenologists' are
obliged to face the ontological fact of human existence; we should reflect on it
just because phenomenology ultimately bases itself on a life-world whose exis?
tence must be taken for granted.
Gurwitsch insisted correctly that phenomenologists can only accept what, by
virtue of the phenomenological method, has become evident to them. Doing
phenomenology, Schutz was just as adamant in this principle. However, neither
his human nor his philosophical concerns were exhausted by it. The risk of
stepping outside phenomenology must be taken in full recognition that we have
to do there without phenomenological evidence. He could have added that, if this
step is not taken deliberately in full awareness of the dangers involved, phe?
nomenologists, under the pressure of existential impositions, slide into the meta?
physical realm without being aware of it. In fact, part of Schutz's Husserl
critique can be read in exactly this sense.

IV

There is no direct evidence showing that Schutz planned to write an anthropology

of the life-world, not to mention a broader ontology covering the whole range of

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244 WAGNER

his social and phenomenological concerns.7 The task to create it was posed to the
fraternity of phenomenologists. However, he was alert to it, marking down
specific problems, and gathering building stones for it.8
This may be taken as a sign that the whole matter was of secondary impor?
tance to him. However, the opposite is the case. In a letter to Natanson, he called
ontology?in his sense?"the crux ofthe whole phenomenological philosophy"
(July 25, 1954). This indicates that he ascribed to it the same importance for
phenomenology which he ascribed to relevance for his sociology.
I cannot here attempt an outline of an anthropology of the life-world as it may
be put together from his scattered statements. I will merely mention that he gave
a clue to its formal structure. In his review of Ideas III, he spoke affirmatively of
the "infinitely remote ideal of Husserl's phenomenology" to cover the "uni?
verse of ideas," all essential objectivities and "conceptual essences", and there?
by to arrive "at a complete stock of fully clarified concepts." This perfected
phenomenology would be "the matrix from which all ontological insights origi?
nate" (CP III: 50).
This suggests an ideal parallelity of phenomenology and ontology. For Hus?
serl, it meant that the latter was superfluous; for Schutz, that the "same"
concepts are of quite different content when occurring in both spheres. In phe?
nomenology, they pertain to intentional objects and "positing of meaning"; in
ontology, they refer to "objects as such" and thus to "positing of objects".
In the case of Schutz, this parallelity cannot be taken literally. Husserl estab?
lished the primacy of the transcendental ego and thus of transcendental subjec?
tivity. Schutz, as Dr. Srubar emphasized in a noteworthy paper (unpublished),
postulated the "ontological primacy of intersubjectivity" and thus, I add, the
primacy of the experience of the We in the life-world. This leads to a crucial
reversal of the conceptual structures of phenomenology and ontology.9
Turning to the content which Schutz may have envisaged for an ontology of
the life-world, I am on less secure ground. At this moment, I can only suggest
that it would have to be derived from the critical strutiny of those writers he
explicitly mentioned. These would be: Leibniz for opening the way philosophi

7But Gurwitsch, who was in closest contact and theoretical exchange with Schutz during their
common American years, wrote in an article of 1970 that Schutz wanted to write an anthropology.
(See Gurwitsch's contribution to the Schutz memorial volume, published in 1970).
8Aside from the programmatic statement in Schutz's book of 1932, his concern with ontological
anthropological matters found expression in at least ten of his American papers, covering the period
from 1942 to 1959.
9In the draft of another paper I have discussed the external and methodological-pedagogical
reasons which motivated Schutz to start his own investigations in the meaning of social action and the
working of consciousness in social situations from the phenomenal-psychological, and thus subjec?
tive angle. I will try to show that this procedure, in a state of the development of the Schutzian
approach which is "infinitely remote" from the ideal of ultimate perfection, is compatible with the
principle of the ontological primacy of intersubjectivity.

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 ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE LIFE-WORLD 245

cally, Kierkegaard for fundamental existential considerations, the Munich phi?

losopher Alois Dempf for the modern ontological challenge. But, as far as the
specific target of a philosophical anthropology of the life-world is concerned,
Scheler would have to be given a prominent place. It is understood that, singly or
in combination, these thinkers provide background and suggestions; beyond
them, an anthropology of the life-world will have to be developed from and in
the spirit of Schutz's work himself.

In this paper, I attempted to show:

1. that Schutz did not think that phenomenology can provide all the
to all problems pertinent to the understanding of its foundations;
2. that he disagreed with Husserl's conviction of the basic superf
separate ontological considerations;
3. that he was convinced of the necessity of going outside of phenom
in order to develop a viable anthropology of the life-world;
4. that he insisted that this necessity was imposed by the brute existen
of human existence "in the world";
5. that he ascribed primary importance to the task of creating an anth
of the life-world;
6. that, nevertheless, his own steps in this direction were exploratory
accidental, and that he had no plans to carry out the propagated task him
systematic and comprehensive manner; and therefore
7. that his forays were appeals to his fellow-phenomenologists?and
his successors?to collectively accept the responsibility for carrying
ontological-anthropological task: it is "pressed upon" all of us.
I hope that I have been able to convince my readers that the "pro
ontology" cannot be indefinitely dodged by those who base their
Schutz's sociology of the life-world.

REFERENCES
SHUTZ'S AMERICAN WRITINGS CONTAINING
STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE PROBLEM OF
ANTHROPOLOGY
CP I?III: References to the English-language edition of Schutz's Collected Pa?
pers, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1962, 1964, 1966.

1942 Scheler's theory of intersubjectivity and the general theory of the alter ego. CP I: 150-179.

1945 On multiple realities. CP I: 207-259.

1952 Santayana on society and government. CP II: 201-225.

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 246 WAGNER

1953 Discussion: Die phaenomenologie und die fundamente der Wissenschaften (Ideas III by Ed?
mund Husserl). CP III: 40-50.

1955 Symbol, reality, and society. CP I: 287-356.

1956 Max Scheler's philosophy. CP III: 133-144.

1957 Equality and the meaning structure of the social world. CP II, 226-273.

1957 The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity by Husserl. CP III: 51-84.

1957 Answers to comments made in the discussion of 'The problem of transcendental intersubjec?
tivity' CP III: 51-84.
1957, 1958 Max Scheler's epistemology and ethics, I and II.
1958 CP III. 144-154, 163-178.

1959 Type and eidos in Husserl's late philosophy. CP III: 147-165.

1959 Husserl's importance for the social sciences. CP I: 140-149.

1966 Scheler's criticism of Kant's philosophy. CP III: 155-163.

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