LARRY V. CAMINOS, JR., G.R. No.
147437
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J.*
Chairperson,
- versus - TINGA,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO DE CASTRO,** and
BRION, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondent.
May 8, 2009
Facts:
1. Arnold Litonjua , was traversing Ortigas Avenue. He prepared to make a left turn as he reached
the intersection of Ortigas Avenue and Columbia Street, and as soon as he had maneuvered the
turn through the break in the traffic island, the car driven by petitioner suddenly came ramming
into his car from his right-hand side. Petitioner, who was also traversing Ortigas Avenue,
approached the same intersection from the opposite direction.
2. The sketch, signed by both petitioner and Arnold and countersigned by Patrolman Santos, shows
petitioners car which, it seems, was able to keep its momentum and general direction even upon
impact, was stalled a few feet away from the intersection whereas Arnold’s car had settled on
the outer lane.
3. The report revealed that at the time of the collision, Arnold’s car, which had no right of way, was
turning left whereas petitioner’s car was going straight and was exceeding lawful speed. It also
indicated that the vision of the drivers was obstructed by the center island flower bed.
4.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals had misapplied the principle of last clear chance.
Rulings:
2. Yes, but such misapplication did not work for the benefit of the petitioner. Principle of last clear
chance states that a negligent plaintiff can nonetheless recover if he is able to show that the
defendant had the last opportunity to avoid the accident. It operates when the plaintiff is unable
to avoid the accident by the exercise of reasonable vigilance and care, whereas, the defendant is
negligent in failing to utilize, with reasonable care and competence, his then existing opportunity
to avoid the harm when latter: (a) knows of the plaintiff's situation, and (b) realizes or has
reason to realize that the plaintiff is inattentive and therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time
to avoid the harm, and (c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and
competence his then existing opportunity to avoid the harm.
In this case, physical evidence on record likewise seems to negate petitioner’s contention that he was
driving at a reasonable speed at the time of the accident. The entry in the TAIR also noted
petitioner’s speed to be beyond what is lawful which raises the presumption of imprudent
driving. As to Arnold, as shown by the evidence, had been able to establish himself at the
intersection significantly ahead of petitioner. This defies logic to accord even a semblance of
truth to petitioner’s assertion that he had not seen Arnolds car entering the intersection. Also,
Arnold’s view at an intersection is obstructed so he was not able to get a good view to the right
or left until he is close to the intersection. Prudence would dictate that he take particular care to
observe the traffic before entering the intersection or otherwise use reasonable care to avoid a
collision.
With these, the benefit of the principle of last clear chance should not be granted to the petitioner.