Property cases for Art.

419-426
Villanueva v. Castaneda - It would have been far more amiable if the petitioners themselves, recognizing their
G.R. No. L-61311 own civic duty, had at the outset desisted from their original stance and withdrawn in
21 September 1987 (public plaza) good grace from the disputed area to permit its peaceful restoration as a public plaza
and parking place for the benefit of the whole municipality
FACTS
- Subject of the petition is a talipapa in San Fernando Pampanga. Petitioners claim they Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic
have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous G.R. No. 179987
authorization granted to them by the municipal government. The respondents deny 3 September 2013 (land)
this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property
- In 1961, municipal council of San Fernando authorized members of the fernandino FACTS
united merchants and trader’s association to construct permanent stags and sell in - Property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in
the place Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite
- A writ of preliminary injunction was issued that prevented the defendants from - Applicant Mario Malabanan purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an
constructing the said stalls until final resolution of the controversy. Four years later, application for land registration claiming that the property formed part of the alienable
on November 2, 1968, Judge Andres C. Aguilar decided the aforesaid case and held and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in interest
that the land occupied by the petitioners, being public in nature, was beyond the had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and
commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy. The occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial
writ of preliminary injunction was made permanent. confirmation of his title.
- The decision was apparently not enforced, for the petitioners were not evicted from - To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
the place; in fact, they paid daily fees to the municipal government Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR.
COURT - RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s application for land registration
- The place occupied by the petitioners and from which they are sought to be evicted - OSG appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove
is a public plaza. that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
- A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in
or any other contractual undertaking. This is elementary. the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect
- The petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and title.
cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. - CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for
They should have realized and accepted this earlier, considering that even before Registration. CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Civil Case No. 2040 was decided, the municipal council of San Fernando had already Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable
adopted Resolution No. 29, series of 1964, declaring the area as the parking place and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of
and public plaza of the municipality. the period of possession.
- Respondent Macalino was seeking to enforce when he ordered the demolition of the
stags constructed in the disputed area. As officer-in-charge of the office of the mayor, COURT
he had the duty to clear the area and restore it to its intended use as a parking place - Malabanan failed to establish possession and occupation of the property on his part
and public plaza of the municipality of San Fernando. He directed the demolition of and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
the stalls only after, upon his instructions, the municipal attorney had conducted an - Different classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land registration
investigation, to look into the complaint filed by the Association of Concerned Citizens laws of the Philippines.
and Consumers of San Fernando. o Classifications of land according to ownership
- There is evidence that the petitioners were notified of this hearing which they chose  Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of public
to disregard. dominion or of private ownership.
- The respondent mayor was justified in ordering the area cleared on the strength alone  Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public
of its status as a public plaza as declared by the judicial and legislative authorities. use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is
- Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have intended for some public service or for the development of the national
effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be wealth.
surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract.
Property cases for Art. 419-426
 Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the
such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. - Disposition of alienable public lands
 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, o Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which
provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can
private individual. be disposed of, to wit:
- Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), all lands of the public domain  Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed
belong to the State. This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to of only as follows, and not otherwise:
ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony. (1) For homestead settlement;
- All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong (2) By sale;
to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain (3) By lease; and
unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons. (4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
o Classifications of public lands according to alienability (a) By judicial legalization; or
 Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable (b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
primarily rests on the classification of public lands made under the - The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in
Constitution. relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession
 The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added o Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
national parks. Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
to the uses to which they may be devoted. therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
 The identification of lands according to their legal classification is done to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive Department. confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
- The Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public  (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be. interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
- Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
o Patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
under Article 425 of the Civil Code, without limitation; and ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
o Lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title,
but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
 Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
reclassified as agricultural. certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
 A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such - The applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to
reclassification, and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree to wit:
existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. o 1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has
 If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or been in possession and occupation of the property subject of the
timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended application;
for public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby o 2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive,
effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a and notorious;
declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly o 3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of
enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the acquisition of ownership;
President is duly authorized by law to that effect. o 4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12,
 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify 1945, or earlier; and
or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the o 5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the
public domain.
Property cases for Art. 419-426
- The Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands of the public disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under
domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the the Civil Code.
Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for  If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or
registration must have been already classified as agricultural land of the public extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to
domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive
classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article
overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. incharacter shall not be the object of prescription.
- The classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable
agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, Republic of the Philippines v. Cortez
because any possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification G.R. No. 186639
produced no legal effects. 5 February 2014(land)
- Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed FACTS
statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of - Cortez (Cortez) filed with the RTC an application for judicial confirmation of title over
the period the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and a parcel of land in Pateros.
disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary - In support of his application, Cortez submitted (1) tax declarations for various years
only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable. from 1966 until 2005; (2) survey plan of the property, with the annotation that the
- To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public property is classified as alienable and disposable; (3) technical description of the
land or lands of the public domain, namely: property, with a certification issued by a geodetic engineer, etc.
o (1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the - He alleged that the subject property had been in the possession of his family since
public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not time immemorial; and is not part of the reservation of the Department of Environment
clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and Natural Resources (DENR) and is, in fact, classified as alienable and disposable
and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed; by the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD).
o (2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit: - RTC granted Cortez’ application for registration
 (a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable - Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), represented by the Office of the Solicitor
and disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated General, appealed to the CA, alleging that the RTC erred in granting the application
under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. for registration despite the failure of Cortez to comply with the requirements for original
 If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under registration of title.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land - Although Cortez declared that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in possession
subject of the application needs only to be classified as of the subject parcel of land since time immemorial, no document was ever presented
alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, that would establish his predecessors-in-interest’s possession of the same during the
provided the applicant’s possession and occupation of the period required by law. That petitioner claimed that Cortez’ assertion that he and his
land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. predecessors-in-interest had been in open, adverse, and continuous possession of
 Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has the subject property for more than thirty (30) years does not constitute well-neigh
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant incontrovertible evidence required in land registration cases; that it is a mere claim,
arises and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by which should not have been given weight by the RTC.
virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the - There was no certification from any government agency that the subject property had
land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and already been declared alienable and disposable. As such, the petitioner claims,
has become private property. Cortez’ possession of the subject property, no matter how long, cannot confer
 (b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or ownership or possessory rights.
declared as no longer intended for public use or for the - CA affirmed the RTC Decision
development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of
public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial ISSUE Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision
lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or
RULING
Property cases for Art. 419-426
- YES. RTC did not cite any specific provision of law under which authority Cortez’ land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per
application for registration of title to the subject property was granted verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO.
- RTC merely stated that "the possession of the land have been in open, actual, - Cortez failed to present a certification from the proper government agency as to the
uninterrupted, and adverse possession, under claim of title and in the concept of classification of the subject property. Cortez likewise failed to present any evidence
owners, all within the time prescribed by law." showing that the DENR Secretary had indeed classified the subject property as
- Applicants for original registration of title to land must establish compliance with the alienable and disposable.
provisions of Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529, which pertinently provides that: - Second and third requirements, the Court finds that Cortez likewise failed to establish
o Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court the same. Cortez failed to present any evidence to prove that he and his
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
personally or through their duly authorized representatives possession and occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
 (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in - Cortez failed to present any evidence to show that he and his predecessors-in-interest
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious indeed possessed the subject property prior to 1946.
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of - The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since by private persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which
June 12, 1945, or earlier. states that "[a]ll things which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to
 (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription," and that property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial
prescription under the provision of existing laws. in character shall not be the object of prescription."
- The Court finds that Cortez failed to comply with the legal requirements for the - Two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired under the
registration of the subject property under Section 14(1) and (2) of P.D. No. 1529. Civil Code.
- Under Section 14(1) [of P.D. No. 1529], applicants for registration of title must o The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117,
sufficiently establish requires possession in good faith and with just title; and,
o first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands o Under Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten (10) years
of the public domain; - The Court nevertheless emphasized that there must be an official declaration by the
o second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public use, public
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of service, or for the development of national wealth before it can be acquired by
the same; and prescription; that a mere declaration by government officials that a land of the public
o third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or domain is already alienable and disposable would not suffice for purposes of
earlier. registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.
- The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. - The Court further stressed that the period of acquisitive prescription would only begin
o To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, to run from the time that the State officially declares that the public dominion property
an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the is no longer intended for public use, public service, or for the development of national
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an wealth.
administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands - Respondent would have been eligible for application for registration because his claim
investigators, and a legislative act or statute. of ownership and possession over the subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years.
o The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the However, it is jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for
lands applied for are alienable and disposable. purposes of acquiring ownership and registration of public land under Section 14 (2)
- Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment the State expressly declares that the
prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development
- Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial
of the land. - Although lands of the public domain that are considered patrimonial may be acquired
o In this connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of by prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, before acquisitive prescription
land classification status issued by the Community Environment and could commence, the property sought to be registered must not only be classified as
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or the Provincial Environment and alienable and disposable; it must also be declared by the State that it is no longer
Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that intended for public use, public service or the development of the national wealth.
the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the - Thus, absent an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be property of
public dominion.
Property cases for Art. 419-426
cannot be appropriated, is outside the commerce of man, or to put it in more simple
Laurel v. Garcia terms, it cannot be alienated nor be the subject matter of contracts.
187 SCRA 797 - Respondents, for their part, refute the petitioner's contention by saying that the
25 July 1990 subject property is not governed by our Civil Code but by the laws of Japan where
the property is located. Respondents add that even assuming for the sake of
FACTS argument that the Civil Code is applicable, the Roppongi property has ceased to
- Subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the become property of public dominion. It has become patrimonial property because it
Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on has not been used for public service or for diplomatic purposes for over thirteen (13)
May 9, 1956, years now and because the intention by the Executive Department and the Congress
- The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government and consists of to convert it to private use has been manifested by overt acts.
the land and building "for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy" - The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out.
- It became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding
Nampeidai on July 22, 1976 when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the
to the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property Japanese government.
has remained undeveloped since that time. - No doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property
- A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine has become patrimonial.
Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the subject of a lease - As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It
agreement with a Japanese firm – Kajima Corporation — which shall construct two cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use
(2) buildings in Roppongi and one (1) building in Nampeidai and renovate the present and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in
Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the
- Government has not acted favorably on this proposal which is pending approval and citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of
ratification between the parties. appropriation.
- On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino - The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:
citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of o ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including the Roppongi were o ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion
specifically mentioned in the first "Whereas" clause.  (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
- The Executive branch of the government has been pushing, with great vigor, its torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks
decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. The property shores roadsteads, and others of similar character;
has twice been set for bidding at a minimum floor price of $225 million.  (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use,
and are intended for some public service or for the development
ISSUES of the national wealth.
- Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine o ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character
Government?; and stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.
- Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, - Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil
to sell the Roppongi property? Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.
- Has the intention of the government regarding the use of the property been changed
RULING because the lot has been Idle for some years? Has it become patrimonial?
- In Laurel he asserts that the Roppongi property and the related lots were acquired o The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual
as part of the reparations from the Japanese government for diplomatic and consular Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property.
use by the Philippine government. Vice-President Laurel states that the Roppongi Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public
property is classified as one of public dominion, and not of private ownership under use
Article 420 of the Civil Code. - A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
- Petitioner submits that the Roppongi property comes under "property intended for appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
public service" in paragraph 2 of the above provision. He states that being one of government to withdraw it from being such an abandonment of the intention to use
public dominion, no ownership by anyone can attach to it, not even by the State. it the Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial property under
Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite.
Property cases for Art. 419-426
- Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was - Hence, the assessment of real property taxes made on said lands, as well as the levy
attributable not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack thereon, and the public sale thereof on April 7, 2003, including the issuance of the
of financial support to repair and improve the property certificates of sale in favor of the respondent Parañaque City, are invalid and of no
force and effect.
Republic v. City of Paranaque - City of Parañaque (respondent) argues that PRA since its creation consistently
G.R. No. 191109 represented itself to be a GOCC. Hence, since PRA is a GOCC, it is not exempt from
18 July 2012 (reclaimed property) the payment of real property tax.

FACTS RULING
- Public Estates Authority is a GOCC created by PD 1084. It was designated as he - The Court agrees with PRA that the subject reclaimed lands are still part of the public
agency responsible for integrating, directing and coordinating all reclamation projects domain, owned by the State and, therefore, exempt from payment of real estate
for and on behalf of the National Government. taxes.
- Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued E.O. No. 380 transforming PEA into - Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part, as follows:
PRA, which shall perform all the powers and functions of the PEA relating to o Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
reclamation activities. PRA reclaimed several portions of the foreshore and offshore and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
areas of Manila Ba. timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
- Parañaque City Treasurer Liberato M. Carabeo issued Warrants of Levy on PRA’s the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
reclaimed properties (Central Business Park and Barangay San Dionisio) located in resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and
Parañaque City based on the assessment for delinquent real property taxes made utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
by then Parañaque City Assessor Soledad Medina Cue for tax years 2001 and 2002. supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities,
- PRA filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
and/or writof preliminary injunction against Carabeo before the RTC. agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
- RTC issued an order denying PRA’s petition for the issuance of a temporary 60 per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
restraining order. PRA sent a letter to Carabeo requesting the latter not to proceed agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
with the public auction of the subject reclaimed properties. Carabeo sent a letter renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
stating that the public auction could not be deferred because the RTC had already conditions as may provide by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation,
denied PRA’s TRO application. water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
- PRA was not exempt from payment of real property taxes, the RTC reasoned out that waterpower, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
it was a GOCC under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1084. - Similarly, Article 420 of the Civil Code enumerates properties belonging to the State:
- PRA asserts that it is not a GOCC under Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions o Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
of the Administrative Code. Neither is it a GOCC under Section 16, Article XII of the  (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
1987 Constitution because it is not required to meet the test of economic viability. torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,
Instead, PRA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers and shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
performing an essential public service pursuant to Section 2(10) of the Introductory  (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use,
Provisions of the Administrative Code. and are intended for some public service or for the development
- PRA insists that, as an incorporated instrumentality of the National Government, it is of the national wealth.
exempt from payment of real property tax except when the beneficial use of the real - The subject lands are reclaimed lands, specifically portions of the foreshore and
property is granted to a taxable person. PRA claims that based on Section 133(o) of offshore areas of Manila Bay. As such, these lands remain public lands and form part
the LGC, local governments cannot tax the national government which delegate to of the public domain. Reclaimed lands such as the subject lands in issue are reserved
local governments the power to tax. lands for public use. They are properties of public dominion. The ownership of such
- It explains that reclaimed lands are part of the public domain, owned by the State, lands remains with the State unless they are withdrawn by law or presidential
thus, exempt from the payment of real estate taxes. Reclaimed lands retain their proclamation from public use.
inherent potential as areas for public use or public service. While the subject - Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged
reclaimed lands are still in its hands, these lands remain public lands and form part areas of Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other
of the public domain. natural resources" and consequently "owned by the State.
Property cases for Art. 419-426
- As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be alienated," unless they are
classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these COURT
areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into - Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or unlawfully withholds possession. After the expiration or termination of his right to hold
presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant
disposable and open to disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or
cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them for some termination of the right to possess.
public or quasi-public use. o The only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is the physical or
material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the parties
Fullido v. Gino Grilli o Fullido chiefly asserts that Grilli had no right to institute the action for unlawful
G.R. No. 215014 detainer because the lease contract and the MOA, which allegedly gave him the
February 29, 2016 right of possession over the lot, were null and void for violating the Constitution.
o Grilli contends that Fullido could not question the validity of the said contracts in
FACTS the present ejectment suit unless she instituted a separate action for annulment
- Grilli, an Italian national, courted Fullido. They decided to build a residential house of contracts.
where they would stay when Grilli is in the country. R assisted P in procuring the lot,
the same was registered in P’s name. They constructed a house funded by R. A void contract cannot be the source of any right; it cannot be utilized in an ejectment suit
- 1998, they executed a contract of lease, MOA, SPA to define their respective right - A void or inexistent contract is one which lacks, absolutely either in fact or in law, one
over the house. or some of the elements which are essential for its validity. It is one which has no
o Contract of Lease: R is the lessee for a period of 50 years and it automatically force and effect from the very beginning, as if it had never been entered into; it
renews after expiry. P is the lessor and is prohibited from selling, donating, or produces no effect whatsoever either against or in favor of anyone contracts may be
encumbering the said lot without R’s consent. declared void even in a summary action for unlawful detainer because, precisely, void
o MOA: Since R paid for the house, ownership was his. In any case that their contracts do not produce legal effect and cannot be the source of any rights.
common-law relationship terminated, P could only sell it to who R desires.
o SPA: Allowed Grilli to administer, manage, and transfer the house and lot on The lease contract and the MOA circumvent the constitutional restraint against foreign
behalf of Fullido. ownership of lands
- Their relationship turned sour and both charged each other with infidelity. They could - Lease contract and MOA are null and void for virtually transferring the reigns of the
not agree as to who should leave the common property. land to a foreigner.
- MTC: dismissed the case after finding that Fullido could not be ejected from their o As can be gleaned from the contract, the lease in favor of Grilli was for a period
house and lot because she was a co-owner of the house as she contributed to it by of fifty (50) years, automatically extended for another fifty (50) years upon the
supervising its construction expiration of the original period.
- RTC: reversed and set aside the MCTC decision because they allege that Grilli had o It strictly prohibited Fullido from selling, donating, or encumbering her land to
the exclusive right to use and possess the house and lot by virtue of the contract of anyone without the written consent of Grilli. For a measly consideration of
lease executed by the parties. P10,000.00, Grilli would be able to absolutely occupy the land of Fullido for 100
o Since the period of lease had not yet expired, Fullido, as lessor, had the years, and she is powerless to dispose the same.
obligation to respect the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the leased o The terms of lease practically deprived Fullido of her property rights and
premises by Grilli as lessee. Absent a judicial declaration of nullity of the contract effectively transferred the same to Grilli.
of lease, its terms and conditions were valid and binding. - Under Section 1 of Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, natural resources shall not be
o CA: upheld the decision of the RTC emphasizing that in an ejectment case, the alienated, except with respect to public agricultural lands and in such cases, the
only issue to be resolved would be the physical possession of the property. As alienation is limited to Filipino citizens.
Fullido executed both the MOA and the contract of lease, which gave Grilli the - If an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land by
possession and use of the house and lot, the same constituted as a judicial virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this
admission that it was Grilli who had the better right of physical possession. to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of
ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy
ISSUE: Whether a contract could be declared void in a summary action of unlawful detainer. the land but also of the right to dispose of it — rights which constitute ownership.
Property cases for Art. 419-426
- A house, which is occupied by respondents Felix and Marilou, stands in the subject
Grilli does not have a cause of action for unlawful detainer lot.
- The complaint filed by Grilli was an action for unlawful detainer. Section 1 of Rule 70 o Their mother, Claudia, occupied the lot during her lifetime and it was earmarked
of the Rules of Court lays down the requirements for filing a complaint for unlawful to become her share in Lot No. 1907-A.
detainer, to wit: Who may institute proceedings, and when. – o They stayed in the lot for decades after inheriting the same from Claudia, who
o Subject to the provision of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the had in turn succeeded her own parents, Carlos and Asuncion.
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or - R were asked by their cousins, who are the Heirs of Vicente, to vacate the subject lot
stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the and to transfer to Lot No. 1907-A-5, a landlocked portion san a right of way.
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or - They refused to comply insisting that Claudia’s inheritance pertained to Lot No. 1907-
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or A-2.
implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, - A demand letter was sent to R which required them to vacate the lot. They were
vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful informed that Carmencita had already purchased on February 12, 2004 the subject
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal lot from the former’s relatives.
Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of - R ignored the demand and discovered anomalies in the record.
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of - MTCC: Carmencita filed before the MTCC for unlawful detainer. Upheld Carmencita’s
such possession, together with damages and costs. claim.
- A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the o She alleged that she bought the subject lot, the registered owners thereof and
following: the persons who allowed the respondents to occupy the same by mere tolerance.
o (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by o As their successor-in-interest, she claimed her entitlement to possession of the
tolerance of the plaintiff; subject lot and the right to demand from the respondents to vacate the same.
o (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to - R were ordered to vacate
defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession; - RTC affirmed in its entirety the MTCC ruling which was challenged by the R in the
o (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and CA.
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and o R argued that they have been occupying the subject lot in the concept of owners
o (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, for several decades.
the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.  Carmencita, on the other hand, was a buyer in bad faith for having purchased
- Grilli has no cause of action for unlawful detainer against Fullido. the property despite the notice of lis pendens clearly annotated on the subject
o The complainant must either be a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person lot’s title
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld. In - CA rendered a decision reversing the MTCC and RTC decisions and dismissing
other words, the complainant in an unlawful detainer case must have some right Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer. Basis for the decision are as follows.
of possession over the property.
- Lease contract and the MOA, from which Grilli drew his right of possession were null CA’s basis for the decision
and void for being unconstitutional. Grilli had no possessory right over the subject - Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides Who may institute proceedings, and
land. A person who does not have any right over a property from the beginning cannot when.
eject another person possessing the same. o Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section - a person deprived of
- Grilli’s complaint for unlawful detainer must be dismissed for failure to prove his cause the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
of action. stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
Suarez v. Mr. and Mrs. Emboy termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or
G.R. No. 187944 implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor,
March 12, 2014 vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal
FACTS Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
- Dispute involves a 222-square meter parcel of land located in Cebu City which used possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
to be a part of Lot No. 1907-A, which was partitioned among the heirs of Spouses such possession, together with damages and costs.
Carlos Padilla (Carlos) and Asuncion Pacres (Asuncion).
Property cases for Art. 419-426
- The distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer was lucidly explained in - Carmencita had not amply alleged and proven that all the requisites for unlawful
Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals: detainer are present in the case at bar.
o Forcible entry: - Three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property:
 One is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, o (a) accion interdictal;
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.  Comprises two distinct causes of action:
 Possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who  Forcible entry (detentacion) –
has the prior possession de facto. o one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of
o Unlawful detainer: force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth
 One unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or o possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning and that the
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or issue is which party has prior de facto possession.
implied. o must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the
 Possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or land
termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is  Unlawful detainer –
decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the o one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination
plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the defendant’s right to continue of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied.
in possession. o possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due
- What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land. to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
o If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder within o must be brought within the date of last demand
one (1) year therefrom is forcible entry.  The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.
o If the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one o (b) accion publiciana –
of unlawful detainer which must be filed within one (1) year from the date of the  Plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in
last demand. the proper RTC when dispossession has lasted for more than one year.
- Carmencita’s complaint reveals that the action was neither one of forcible entry nor  It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession
unlawful detainer but essentially involved an issue of ownership which must be of realty independently of title.
resolved in an accion reivindicatoria.  If at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed
o It did not characterize the respondents’ alleged entry into the land: whether the since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s
same was legal or illegal. possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry
o It did not state how the respondents entered the land and constructed a house or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana.
thereon. o (c) accion reivindicatoria.
o It was also silent on whether the respondents’ possession became legal before  An action to recover ownership also brought in the proper RTC in an ordinary
Carmencita demanded from them to vacate the land. civil proceeding.
- The complaint merely averred that their relatives previously owned the lot the - In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be
respondents were occupying and that after Carmencita purchased it, she demanded alleged and sufficiently established:
respondents to vacate the land. o (1) Possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance
- When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful of the plaintiff;
detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when o (2) Such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion termination of the latter’s right of possession;
reivindicatoria in the proper RTC. o (3) The defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
- If Carmencita is truly the owner of the subject property and she was unlawfully plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
deprived of the real right of possession or ownership thereof, she should present her o (4) Within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property,
claim before the RTC in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
before the municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or - In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above is markedly absent. Carmencita
forcible entry. failed to allege and prove how and when the respondents entered the subject lot and
constructed a house upon it.
COURT
Property cases for Art. 419-426
- The absence of the first requisite assumes even more importance in the light of the - Respondent Sunvar moved to dismiss the Complaint and argued that the allegations
respondents’ claim that for decades, they have been occupying the subject lot as of petitioners in the Complaint did not constitute an action for unlawful detainer, since
owners thereof. no privity of contract existed between them.
o It also argued that petitioners’ cause of action was more properly an accion
Republic v. Sunvar Realty publiciana, which fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC, and not the MeTC,
G.R. No. 194880 considering that the petitioners’ supposed dispossession of the subject property
June 20, 2012 by respondent had already lasted for more than one year.

FACTS ISSUE: Whether the Complaint filed by petitioners is properly an action for unlawful detainer
- Petitioners Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and National Power Corporation within the jurisdiction of the MeTC or an accion publiciana lodged with the RTC?
(NPC) are registered co-owners of several parcels of land located along Pasong
Tamo Extension and Vito Cruz in Makati City. COURT
- Main subject matter is one of four parcels of land. Eighty percent (80%) of the subject - Petitioners correctly availed themselves of an action for unlawful detainer
property is owned by petitioner, while the remaining twenty percent (20%) belongs to - Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom possession of any land is unlawfully
petitioner NPC. withheld after the expiration of the right to hold possession may – by virtue of any
- Petitioners leased the four parcels of land, including the subject property, to the express or implied contract, and within one year after the unlawful deprivation – bring
Technology Resource Center Foundation, Inc., (TRCFI) for a period of 25 years an action in the municipal trial court against the person unlawfully withholding
o Under the Contract of Lease (the main lease contract), petitioners granted TRCFI possession, for restitution of possession with damages and costs
the right to sublease any portion of the four parcels of land. - Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who
 TRCFI consequently subleased a majority of the subject property to illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
respondent Sunvar through several sublease agreements possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession by the defendant
- During the period of its sublease, respondent Sunvar introduced useful improvements in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or
and leased out the spaces therein. It also profitably utilized the other open spaces on termination of the right to possess. The proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction
the subject property as parking areas for customers and guests. over which lies with the proper MTC or metropolitan trial court. The action must be
- TRCFI was dissolved. In its stead, the Philippine Development Alternatives brought up within one year from the date of last demand, and the issue in the case
Foundation (PDAF) was created, assuming the functions previously performed by must be the right to physical possession
TRCFI. - Hence, a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it
- Sunvar wrote to PDAF as successor of TRCFI and expressed its desire to exercise states the following elements:
the option to renew the sublease over the subject property. Petitioner NPC notified o 1. Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with
PDAF not to renew contact. or by tolerance of the plaintiff.
- The Republic reasoned that the parties had earlier agreed to shorten the corporate o 2. Eventually, the possession became illegal upon the plaintiff’s notice to the
life of PDAF and to transfer the latter’s assets to the former for the purpose of selling defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession.
them to raise funds o 3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived
- Main lease contract with PDAF, as well as its sublease agreements with respondent the plaintiff of the latter’s enjoyment.
Sunvar, all expired. Hence, petitioners recovered from PDAF all the rights over the o 4. Within one year from the making of the last demand on the defendant to vacate
subject property and the three other parcels of land. the property, the plaintiff instituted the Complaint for ejectment
- Sunvar continued to occupy the property. - There are no substantial disagreements with respect to the first three requisites for
- Six years after the main lease contract expired, petitioner, through OSG, advised an action for unlawful detainer.
Sunvar to vacate the property, but failed to vacate and remained. o Respondent Sunvar initially derived its right to possess the subject property from
- Sunvar received from OSG a final notice to vacate but again refused and continued its sublease agreements with TRCFI and later on with PDAF. However, with the
to occupy it. expiration of the lease agreements on 31 December 2002, respondent lost
- Petitioners filed for unlawful detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of possessory rights over the subject property. Nevertheless, it continued
Makati City. Petitioners prayed that respondent Sunvar be ordered to vacate the occupying the property for almost seven years thereafter. It was only on 03
subject property and to pay damages. February 2009 that petitioners made a final demand upon respondent Sunvar to
turn over the property.
- What is disputed, however, is the fourth requisite of an unlawful detainer suit.
Property cases for Art. 419-426
- The Court rules that the final requisite is likewise availing in this case, and that the - The petitioner insists that contrary to the ruling of the CA, he has the legal personality
one-year period should be counted from the final demand made on 03 February 2009. to bring and institute the present action against the respondent, considering that title
In case several demands to vacate are made, the period is reckoned from the date of issued on the basis of a patent is annullable on the ground of fraud. Furthermore, the
the last demand. one-year period within which to file an action to cancel a torrens title under Section
32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 does not apply where the registered owner, or the
Caro v. Sucaldito successor-in-interest, knew that the property described in the title actually belongs to
G.R. No. 157536 another, as in this case.
May 16, 2005
COURT
FACTS - The Court agrees with the ruling of the RTC and the CA, and holds that the petitioner
- P bought a parcel of land in Iloilo City, consisting of more or less 18 hectares. He sold has no personality to file a suit for reconveyance of the subject property.
a portion to his son Melchor Caro consisting 70,124 sqm. Father and son executed a - The essence of an action for reconveyance is that the decree of registration is
Deed of Definite Sale. Melchor Caro applied for a free patent before the Bureau of respected as incontrovertible but what is sought instead is the transfer of the property
Lands. which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its
- The application was, however, opposed by Deogracias de la Cruz. Regional Director rightful owner or to one with a better right
rendered a Decision canceling the said application and De la Cruz testified that the - Reversion, on the other hand, is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert
land in controversy was bought by him from Cipriano Gallego in 1965; that he the land back to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the
thereafter occupied, possessed and improved the land by planting coconut trees; and land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation
that in 1968 he was forcibly driven out by Gregorio Caro from the land in question. is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.
- On August 29, 1982, Susana R. Sucaldito, as the buyer of Lot No. 4512, filed an - Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended
Application for a Free Patent covering the said lot, Sucaldito then filed a Petition for in the name of the real party-in-interest, or one "who stands to be benefited or injured
Writ of Possession before the RTC of Iloilo City, which was granted by the judgment in the suit."
- Caro filed a Complaint against Sucaldito for "Annulment of Title, Decision, Free Patent - Corollarily, legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in
and/or Recovery of Ownership and/or Possession with Damages" before the RTC. the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
o He later filed an amended complaint, alleging that he was the owner of the the challenged act.
subject lot, and had been in possession of the same "since 1953 and/or even - Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or
prior thereto in the concept of owner, adversely, openly, continuously and instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved
notoriously." suit filed by one who is not a party-in-interest must be dismissed.
o Hefurther alleged that the said lot had been declared for tax purposes in his name - In this case, the petitioner, not being the owner of the disputed property but a mere
and that of his predecessors-in interest, and that the corresponding land taxes applicant for a free patent, cannot thus be considered as a party-in-interest with
had been paid therefor. personality to file an action for reconveyance.
o Caro further alleged that since the issuance of the free patent over the subject - The petitioner is not the proper party to file an action for reconveyance that would
lot in favor of Sucaldito was wrongful and fraudulent, she had no right whatsoever result in the reversion of the land to the government. The petitioner has no personality
over the subject lot. to "recover" the property as he has not shown that he is the rightful owner thereof.
- RTC: ruled that Caro had no personality to file the action for the annulment of the free
patent issued in favor of Sucaldito, which could only be brought by the Solicitor German Management v. Court of Appeals
General. It held that "an applicant for a free patent who is not the owner of a parcel of G.R. No. 76217
land cannot bring an action in court to recover the land, for the court may not usurp September 14, 1989
the authority of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture to dispose lands
of the public domain through administrative proceedings under the Public Land Act," FACTS
or Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended - Sps. Jose, residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel
- The remedy of a rival-applicant for a free patent over the same land was through of land in Antipolo, Rizal. It was originally registered on August 5, 1948 in the Office
administrative channels, not judicial, because even if the oppositor succeeds in of the Register of Deeds of Rizal as OCT No. 19, pursuant to a Homestead Patent
annulling the title of the applicant, the former does not thereby become the owner of granted by the President.
the land in dispute
- CA Affirmed RTC ruling.
Property cases for Art. 419-426
- Sps. executed a SPA authorizing German Management Services to develop their - Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even
property into a residential subdivision. Petitioner obtained Development Permit from against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if
the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission for said development. he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on
- Part of the property was occupied by private respondents and twenty other persons. the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion
They were advised by the petitioners to vacate the premises but the latter refused. publiciana or accion reivindicatoria
Nevertheless, petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject property - MTC and RTC rationalized petitioner's action of bulldozing and destroying the crops
which included the portions occupied and cultivated by private respondents. of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine of self-help enunciated in Article
- Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner alleging that 429 of the New Civil Code.
they are mountainside farmers of Antipolo, Rizal and members of the Concerned o Such justification is unavailing because the doctrine of self-help can only be
Citizens of Farmer's Association; that they have occupied and tilled their farm holdings exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in
some twelve to fifteen years prior to the promulgation of P.D. No. 27. the case at bar.
- August 1983, petitioner was allowed to improve the Barangay Road at Sitio Inarawan, o When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial
San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal at its expense, subject to the condition that it shag secure process for the recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536 of the Civil
the needed right of way from the owners of the lot to be affected; Code which states,
o that on August 15, 1983 and thereafter, petitioner deprived private respondents  "(I)n no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as
of their property without due process of law by: long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he
 (1) forcibly removing and destroying the barbed wire fence enclosing their has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke
farm holdings without notice; the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."
 (2) bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other crops of private
respondents by means of force, violence and intimidation, in violation of P.D.
1038 and
 (3) trespassing, coercing and threatening to harass, remove and eject private
respondents from their respective farm holdings in violation of P.D. Nos. 316, STATEMENT OF THE CASE
583, 815, and 1028. Before the Court are six consolidated petitions, docketed as G.R. nos. 71169, 74376, 76394,
- MTC and RTC dismissed forcible entry complaint of respondents. 78182, 82281 and 60727. The first five petitions for a motion for reconsideration raise the issue
- CA reversed the decision. Since private respondents were in actual possession of the of whether Jupiter Street is for the exclusive use of Bel-Air Village residents. Meanwhile, the
property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have last petition (G.R. 60727) raises the lone issue of whether or not the Mayor of Makati could have
a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality validly opened Jupiter and Orbit Streets to vehicular traffic.
of possession.
Facts
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against Ayala Corporation (original owner of the property subsequently subdivided as Bel-Air Village)
petitioner. executed a Deed of Donation covering Jupiter and Orbit streets to Bel-Air Village Association
(BAVA).
COURT Respondents allege that upon instructions of the Mayor of Makati, studies were made by the
- It is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, private respondents on the feasibility of opening streets in Bel-Air Village calculated to alleviate traffic congestions
were already in possession thereof. along the public streets adjacent to Bel-Air Village.
o There is no evidence that the spouses Jose were ever in possession of the o Accordingly, it was deemed necessary by the Municipality of Makati in the interest of the general
subject property. public to open to traffic several village streets including Jupiter and Orbit streets.
- Private respondents' peaceable possession was manifested by the fact that they even Respondent’s claim: BAVA had agreed to the opening of Bel-Air Village streets and that the
planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees twelve to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act opening was demanded by public necessity and in the exercise of police power.
of destroying their crops. Petitioner’s counter-argument: It has never agreed on the opening of Jupiter and Orbit streets.
- Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the monuments By virtue of its ownership of the streets, it should not be deprived without due process of law
of title it presented, such evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior and without just compensation.
actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of
the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession ISSUES/HOLDING
shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. a. W/N the Mayor of Makati could have validly opened Jupiter and Orbit streets? – YES
 Property cases for Art. 419-426
b. If yes, what is the nature of the state power being invoked by the Mayor? – POLICE POWER - Petitioner (Lilia Sanchez) constructed a house owned by her parent-in-law. The lot
was registered under a TCT with 5 co-owners, one of which is Petitioner. Same lot
RATIO was registered under a new TCT in the name of respondent Virgina Teria by virtue of
a. BAVA cannot rightfully complain that the Mayor of Makati, in opening up Jupiter and Orbit a Deed of Absolute Sale which was supposedly executed by the 5 owners in her favor.
streets, had acted arbitrarily. - P claimed she did not affix her signature in the document and refused to vacate the
o Citing Sangalang v. IAC, the Court held that Jupiter street lies as the boundary lot. R filed an action recover possession of said lot with MTC. MTC: Ruled in favor of
between Bel-Air Village and Ayala Corporation’s commercial section. Being considered as R, declaring sale was valid only to the extent of 5/6 for R and 1/6 for P.
merely a boundary – and hence not part of Ayala’s real estate development projects – it cannot - MeTC issued writ of execution in favor of R and a Notice to Vacate was served on P
be said to have been for the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air Village residents. but refused to heed notice. 1999 April, P started demolishing P’s house without any
o The very Deed of Donation executed by Ayala Corp. covering Jupiter and Orbit special permit of demolition.
Streets, amongst others, effectively required both passageways open to the general public.
o “…the property will be used as a street for the use of the members of the DONEE (BAVA), their Issue to be resolved the present controversy that was brought about by the absence of any
families, personnel, guests, domestic help and under certain reasonable conditions and partition agreement among the parties who were co-owners of the subject lot in question.
restrictions, by the general public…”
o As the Court asserted in Sangalang, the opening of Jupiter and Orbit streets was RULING
warranted by the demands of the common good, in terms of traffic decongestion and public Co-ownership
convenience. - Sanchez Roman "the right of common dominion which two or more persons have in
a spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically divide.
b. The act of the Mayor now challenged is in the concept of police power. - Manresa "manifestation of the private right of ownership, which instead of being
o The demolition of the gates at Orbit and Jupiter streets does not amount to deprivation of property exercised by the owner in an exclusive manner over the things subject to it, is
without due process of law or expropriation without just compensation – there is no taking of exercised by two or more owners and the undivided thing or right to which it refers is
property involved. one and the same."
o Police power as the “state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty - Characteristics of co-ownership are:
or property in order to promote the general welfare.” o (a) plurality of subjects, who are the co-owners,
o Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act accordingly to one’s o (b) unity of or material in division, which means that there is a single object
will. It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number. which is not materially divided, and which is the element which binds the
o Public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be made to prevail subjects, and,
through the state’s exercise of its police power. o (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which determines the rights and
o The exercise of police power, however, may not be done arbitrarily or unreasonably. But obligations of the co-owners.
theburden of showing that it is unjustified lies on the aggrieved party. - In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary
o In the case at bar, BAVA has failed to show that the opening up of Orbit and Jupiter streets was in character and attribute.
unjustified or that the Mayor acted unreasonably. o Each co-owner becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-owners and he
o The fact that the opening has led to the loss of privacy of BAVA residents is no argument against may not do any act prejudicial to the interest of his co-owners.
the Municipality’s effort to ease vehicular traffic in Makati. The duty of local executive is to take o Legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in co-ownership is
care of the needs of the greater number, in many cases at the expense, of the minority. to create an express trust among the heirs as co-owners of the properties.
Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the
others.
DISPOSITIVE: Motion for reconsideration by Bel-Air Village Association is DENIED with - Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property
FINALITY. The petition in G.R. 60727 is GRANTED. the right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may validly
lease his undivided interest to a third party independently of the others co-owners.
Sanchez v CA But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the
GR No. 152766 thing owned in common because his right over thing is represented by quota or ideal
June 20, 2003 portion without any physical adjudication.
- As she was not a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the
FACTS other co-owners, her right to 1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition needs
to be effected to protect her right to her definite share and determine the boundaries
Property cases for Art. 419-426
of her property. Such partition must be done without prejudice to the rights of private - While under Article 493 of the Civil Code, even if he had the right to freely mortgage
respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute. or even sell his undivided interest in the disputed property, he could not dispose of or
mortgage the entire property without his children's consent.
PNB v. Garcia - As correctly emphasized by the trial court, Jose Sr.'s right in the subject property is
GR No. 182839 limited only to his share in the conjugal partnership as well as his share as an
June 2, 2014 heir on the other half of the estate which is his deceased spouse's share.

FACTS Dino v. Dino

- Subject of the case is a parcel of land in Isabela which is covered by a TCT and under GR No. 178044
the name of Jose Garcia who acquired the property during his marriage with Ligaya January 19, 2011
Garcia who died. Their marriage produced 4 children (R in present case).
- SPS Garcia obtained a loan from PNB and one of the security was Jose Garcia’s FACTS
property. Jose executed a SPA which authorized SPS Garcia to apply, borrow, secure - P and R were childhood friends and sweethearts. Lived together from 1984-1994,
loan from PNB and executed an Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage. All these then 1996 and married on 1998. 2001, P filed Nullity of Marriage alleging
happened without Jose’s children knowing. psychological incapacity for neglecting her duty to love and support him and went on
- SPS Garcia failed to pay loan. R filed with RTC a nullity of the Amendment of Real shopping spree. R was apparently in the states and obtained a divorce and now
Estate Mortgage as they were not parties to the contract. married with another man. Dr. Tayag said she was a narcissist and the declaration of
o R further alleged that it is conjugal property. That upon their mother’s death, nullity is confirmed. This dissolved their property regime – ACP.
they became pro indiviso of the property.
- SPS Garcia allege that Jose Garcia was indebted to them and he volunteered the ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
property to the SPS. shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties' properties under
- RTC: Dismissed for lack of cause of action. Since conjugal property it is presumed Article 147 of the Family Code.
that upon death of spouse, ½ passed to Jose and the others to his children as co-
owners RULING
- Elements for Art. 147 to apply:
RULING o The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
- Upon the death of Ligaya the conjugal partnership automatically dissolved and o They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
terminated. The conjugal partnership was converted into an implied ordinary co- o Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.
ownership between the surviving spouse, on the one hand, and the heirs of the - All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147
deceased, on the other. of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and
- Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and respondent.
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and - Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages,
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are meaning, marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a
involved. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the co- competent court in an action for annulment.
owners shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the o In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed
division upon the termination of the co-ownership." either by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains
o Under this provision, each co-owner has the full ownership of his part or unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage
share in the co-ownership and may, therefore, alienate, assign or mortgage settlement entered into before the marriage.
it except when personal rights are involved. o Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute
o Should a co-owner alienate or mortgage the co-owned property itself, the community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to
alienation or mortgage shall remain valid but only to the extent of the portion liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co- annulment could be issued.
ownership. o That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
- Jose Sr. constituted the mortgage over the entire subject property after the death of Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-
Ligaya, but before the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. ownership.
Property cases for Art. 419-426
- P's marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code - Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and
and not under Article 40 or 45. finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.
o What governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner - Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof
and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. of ownership over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always be considered as
- In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage conclusive evidence of ownership.
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the - In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not
Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or
Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "partition may be made by agreement between that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the
the parties or by judicial proceedings. . .. ." It is not necessary to liquidate the issuance of the certificate of title.
properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage. - Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over a property, but may be the
best evidence thereof.
Lacbayan v. Samoy
GR No. 165427 ONA v. CIR
March 21, 2011 GR-L No. 19342
May 25, 1972
FACTS
- P and R both married with respective partners but P gave birth to a son. During their FACTS
relationship they established a manpower services company, together with other - Julia Bunales died, leaving as her heirs Lorenzo Ona (R) and children. R appointed
incorporators. 5 parcels of land were acquired, registered in P and R’s name as administrator of the estate of the deceased and submitted project of partition. R also
husband and wife. applied as guardianship for minor children.
- Relationship turned sour, and both decided to divide their properties and terminate - The partition shows that the heirs have undivided ½ interest in 10 parcels of land, six
the partnership. Originally P agreed to get two properties and the 3 to the R, but P houses, and an undetermined amount from the war damage omission. They received
demanded more and R refused. P filed with the RTC complaint for judicial partition. amount from this but was not partitioned. Instead it was used to rehabilitate the owned
- RTC and CA dismissed the petition properties.
- No attempt was made to divide the properties and still remained under Ona’s
ISSUE administration, who used the same to lease or sell them, investing the income derived
- Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownership; therefrom.
- Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties was collaterally attacked in the
action for partition; and ISSUES
- Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership over the subject - Should petitioners be considered as co-owners of the properties inherited by them
realties. from the deceased

RULING RULING
- Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia the determination as to the existence of co-ownership - 1955 and 1956 the CIR treated petitioners as co-owners not liable to corporate tax,
is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition. and it was only from 1955 that he considered them as having formed an unregistered
o The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the partnership.
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a - Tax Court found "the properties remained under the management of Lorenzo T. Oña
partition is proper who used said properties in business by leasing or selling them and investing the
o The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable income derived therefrom and the proceeds from the sales thereof in real properties
to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. and securities.
- The complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the o Increase of properties and investments were all because of petitioners
existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she never actually receiving any share of the income or profits from Lorenzo T.
is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on the transfer Oña, and instead, they allowed him to continue using said shares as part of
certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject properties. Respondent maintains the common fund for their ventures, even as they paid the corresponding
otherwise.
Property cases for Art. 419-426
income taxes on the basis of their respective shares of the profits of their - MTC: R does not have preferential right over the properties occupied by P since it
common business. was not yet partitioned. RTC Reversed the decision citing Article 487 of the Civil Code,
- From the moment petitioners allowed not only the incomes from their respective which allows any one of the co-owners to bring an action in ejectment, may
shares of the inheritance but even the inherited properties themselves to be used by successfully be invoked by the respondent because, in a sense, a co-owner is the
Oña as a common fund in undertaking several transactions or in business, with the owner and possessor of the whole, and that the suit for ejectment is deemed to be
intention of deriving profit to be shared by them proportionally, instituted for the benefit of all co-owners. CA Affirmed the decision.
o Such act was tantamount to actually contributing such incomes to a
common fund and, in effect, they thereby formed an unregistered RULING
partnership within the purview of the above-mentioned provisions of the Tax - R has a right to eject the petitioners from Lot No. 2587. Art 487 of the Civil Code,
Code. provides simply that "any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment," is
- In cases of inheritance, there should be a period when the heirs can be considered a categorical and an unqualified authority in favor of respondent to evict petitioners
as co-owners rather than unregistered co-partners within the contemplation of our from the portions of Lot No. 2587.
corporate tax laws aforementioned. - Palarca v. Baguisi: an action for ejectment must be brought by all the co-owners.
- Before the partition and distribution of the estate of the deceased, all the income Thus, a co-owner may bring an action to exercise and protect the rights of all. When
thereof does belong commonly to all the heirs, obviously, without them becoming the action is brought by one co-owner for the benefit of all, a favorable decision will
thereby unregistered co-partners, benefit them; but an adverse decision cannot prejudice their rights.
o But it does not necessarily follow that such status as co-owners continues - Respondent's action for ejectment against petitioners is deemed to be instituted for
until the inheritance is actually and physically distributed among the heirs, the benefit of all co-owners of the property 16(16) since petitioners were not able to
for it is easily conceivable that after knowing their respective shares in the prove that they are authorized to occupy the same.
partition, they might decide to continue holding said shares under the o Petitioners' lack of authority to occupy the properties, coupled with
common management of the administrator or executor or of anyone chosen respondent's right under Article 487, clearly settles respondent's
by them and engage in business on that basis. prerogative to eject petitioners from Lot No. 2587.
- For tax purposes, the co-ownership of inherited properties is automatically converted - Time and again, this Court has ruled that persons who occupy the land of another at
into an unregistered partnership the moment the said common properties and/or the the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are
incomes derived therefrom are used as a common fund with intent to produce profits necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand,
for the heirs in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance as determined failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
in a project partition either duly executed in an extrajudicial settlement or approved by o Petitioners are obliged to establish a legal basis for their continued
the court in the corresponding testate or intestate proceeding. occupancy of the properties. The mere tolerance of one of the co-owners,
- If after such partition, he allows his share to be held in common with his co-heirs under assuming that there was such, does not suffice to establish such right.
a single management to be used with the intent of making profit thereby in proportion
to his share, there can be no doubt that, even if no document or instrument were SPS Santos v. Lustre
executed for the purpose, for tax purposes, at least, an unregistered partnership is GR No. 151016
formed. This is exactly what happened to petitioners in this case. August 6, 2008

Resuena v. CA FACTS
GR No. 128338 - Dominga Lustre died in 1989. She owned a lot in Nueva Ecija which she mortgaged
March 28, 2005 to SPS Santos for 38K. She sold the same through a Deed of Absolute Sale to one
of the SPS and the mortgages has been canceled. TCT issued in the of the SPS and
FACTS the same executed a deed of sale transferring the property to their son.
- Private R Borromeo is the co-owner and overseer of certain parcels of land in Cebu. - Heirs of Lustre (husband and children) filed with the RTC a complaint for declaration
He owns 6/8 of a lot with SPS Cascon (2587). The other lot is owned in common by of the inexistence of contract, annulment of title, re-conveyance and damages against
him and one named Maneja (2592), where the proportion of their undivided shares is the son. Sale of property to SPS were simulated, spurious or fake and only discovered
not determined. the transfer of property to the Son when he filed an ejectment case against them.
- R developed both lots into Borromeo Beach Resort and ordered the petitioners to - While the other case was pending, another case was filed by the heirs of Lustre.
vacate the property so he can expand end extend its facilities. P’s refused to vacate
which lead to the filing of a complaint for ejectment in the MTC against P. RULING
Property cases for Art. 419-426
- Plaintiffs in both cases are the heirs of Dominga Lustre; they are therefore co-owners - Respondents are co-owners of the subject property. As such co-owners, each of the
of the property. However, the fact of being a co-owner does not necessarily mean that heirs may properly bring an action for ejectment, forcible entry and detainer, or any
a plaintiff is acting for the benefit of the co-ownership when he files an action kind of action for the recovery of possession of the subject properties.
respecting the co-owned property. o Thus, a co-owner may bring such an action, even without joining all the
- Co-owners are not parties inter se in relation to the property owned in common. The other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted
test is whether the "additional" party, the co-owner in this case, acts in the same for the benefit of all.
capacity or is in privity with the parties in the former action. - We uphold the validity of the complaint because of the following circumstances:
- A co-owner may bring an action to recover the co-owned property without the o (1) the caption of the instant case is Heirs of Enrique Santos v. Iglesia ni
necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed Cristo;
to be instituted for the benefit of all. In such case, the other heirs are merely necessary o (2) the opening statement of the complaint states that plaintiffs are the heirs
parties. Parenthetically, the inclusion among the defendants of Cecilia Macaspac, of Enrique Santos and likewise names the particular heirs of the latter who
who refused to join the other heirs as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2115, was not actually instituted the complaint below;
necessary. o (3) the case involves a property owned by the predecessor-in-interest of
- If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, as in Civil Case No. 1330, the action plaintiffs therein; and
will not prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable o (4) the verification signed by Enrique G. Santos clearly states that he is one
parties. of the children of the late Enrique Santos and that he represents the heirs
- Doctrine that any adverse ruling in the earlier case will not, in any way, prejudice the of said Enrique Santos.
heirs who did not join, even if such case was actually filed in behalf of all the co- - On the issue of prescription of action, petitioner avers that the action of respondents
owners. is one to quiet title and/or accion reivindicatoria, and that respondents asserted
o In fact, if an action for recovery of property is dismissed, a subsequent ownership over the property and sought the recovery of possession of the subject
action by a co-heir who did not join the earlier case should not be barred by parcel of land. It insists that the very nature of the action presupposes that
prior judgment. respondents had not been in actual and material possession of the property, and that
o Any judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit the others, it was petitioner which had been in possession of the property since 1984 when it
but if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the acquired title thereon. The action of respondent prescribed in ten years from 1984
unimpeded co-owners when petitioner allegedly dispossessed respondents, in accordance with Article
555(4) of the New Civil Code.
Iglesia ni Cristo v. Ponferrada - The nature of an action is determined by
GR No. 168943 o the material allegations of the complaint and
October 27, 2006 o the character of the relief sought by plaintiff, and
o the law in effect when the action was filed
FACTS - Irrespective of whether he is entitled to all or only some of such relief. As gleaned
- The Santos’ represented by Enrique Santos filed for quieting title and/or Accion from the averments of the complaint, the action of respondents was one for quieting
Reivindicatoria with the RTC against petitioners. They allege that Enrique Santos is of title under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Article 476 of the New Civil
the owner of a parcel of land in QC and has been in open and peaceful passion Code. The latter provision reads:
thereof. He died in 1970 survived by wife and children. Register of deeds of QC o Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
burned so the original of their title burned. They found out that R is claiming ownership therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
of their titles because Enrique allegedly encumbered and disposed the property. proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is, in truth and in fact,
- RTC and CA: the action for quieting title/Accion Reivindicatoria has prescribed invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to
because petition was filed beyond the 10-years statutory period. said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the
title. An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon
title to real property or any interest therein.
o The owner of a real property, as plaintiff, is entitled to the relief of quieting
of title even if, at the time of the commencement of his action, he was not
RULING in actual possession of real property. After all, under Article 477 of the New
Civil Code, the owner need not be in possession of the property
Property cases for Art. 419-426
- Petitioner's claim that it had been in actual or material possession of the property - P filed with the RTC Declaration of Nullity or for Annulment of Contract to Sell.
since 1984 when TCT No. 321744 was issued in its favor is belied by the allegations Judgement in favor of R. Same with the CA
in the complaint that respondents had been in actual and material possession of the - P claim that their signatures did not confer any authority to Ernesto to sell their shares
property since 1961 up to the time they filed their complaint. and the Contract to Sell should be void.
- An accion reivindicatoria does not necessarily presuppose that the actual and material
possession of the property is on defendant and that plaintiff seeks the recovery of RULING
such possession from defendant. - Signature of the 5 petitioners on the Contract to sell did not confer any authority to
o It bears stressing that an accion reivindicatoria is a remedy seeking the Ernesto to sell their respective shares because Article 1874 of the Civil Code, which
recovery of ownership and includes jus possidendi, jus utendi, and jus expressly provides that:
fruendi as well. o Art. 1874. When a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through
o It is an action whereby a party claims ownership over a parcel of land and an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale
seeks recovery of its full possession. shall be void.
o Thus, the owner of real property in actual and material possession thereof - The law itself explicitly requires a written authority before an agent can sell an
may file an accion reivindicatoria against another seeking ownership over a immovable. The conferment of such an authority should be in writing, in as clear and
parcel of land including jus vindicandi, or the right to exclude defendants precise terms as possible.
from the possession thereof. - It is worth noting that petitioners' signatures are found in the Contract to Sell. The
- In this case, respondents filed an alternative reivindicatory action claiming ownership Contract is absolutely silent on the establishment of any principal-agent relationship
over the property and the cancellation of TCT No. 321744 under the name of between the five petitioners and their brother and co-petitioner Ernesto as to the sale
petitioner. In fine, they sought to enforce their jus utendi and jus vindicandi when of the subject parcels of land. Thus, the Contract to Sell, although signed on the
petitioner claimed ownership and prevented them from fencing the property. margin by the five petitioners, is not sufficient to confer authority on petitioner Ernesto
- Since respondents were in actual or physical possession of the property when they to act as their agent in selling their shares in the properties in question.
filed their complaint against petitioner on October 24, 2001, the prescriptive period for - Despite petitioner Ernesto's lack of written authority from the five petitioners to sell
the reivindicatory action had not even commenced to run, even if petitioner was able their shares in the subject parcels of land, the supposed Contract to Sell remains valid
to secure TCT No. 321744 over the property in 1984. and binding upon the latter.
o The reason for this is that. . . one who is in actual possession of a piece of o As can be clearly gleaned from the contract itself, it is not only petitioner
land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is Ernesto who signed the said Contract to Sell; the other five petitioners also
disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the personally affixed their signatures thereon.
reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a o Therefore, a written authority is no longer necessary in order to sell their
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and shares in the subject parcels of land because, by affixing their signatures
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on on the Contract to Sell, they were not selling their shares through an agent
his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. but, rather, they were selling the same directly and in their own right.
- The Contract to Sell was perfected when the petitioners consented to the sale to the
Oesmer v Paraiso Dev’t Cor respondent of their shares in the subject parcels of land by affixing their signatures
GR No. 157493 on the said contract. Such signatures show their acceptance of what has been
February 5, 2007 stipulated in the Contract to Sell and such acceptance was made known to respondent
corporation when the duplicate copy of the Contract to Sell was returned to the latter
FACTS bearing petitioners' signatures. As to petitioner Enriqueta's claim that she merely
- P together with Adolfo and Jesus are siblings who co-owns an undivided share of 2 signed as a witness to the said contract, the contract itself does not say so. There
parcels of agricultural and tenanted land in Cavite. Both lots are unregistered and was no single indication in the said contract that she signed the same merely as a
originally belonged to their parents. When they died the heirs, petitioners herein, witness.
acquired the lots.
- R is engaged in real estate business. One of the P was brought in a meeting for the
purpose of brokering the sale of P’s properties to R. Two of the P’s signed the Contract
to sell but wanted to rescind the contract. R did not respond to the canceling of
contract.
Property cases for Art. 419-426
Aguilar v. Aguilar - In this case, the sale took place in January 1989. Petitioner admits that he has actual
GR No. 141613 knowledge of the sale. However, he only asserted his right to redeem the property in
December 16, 2007 March 1995 by filing the instant complaint. Both the trial court and the Appellate Court
ruled that this was seven (7) years late
FACTS - Petitioner now contends that there being no written notice to him of the sale by the
- Senen and Virgilo purchased a house and lot in Paranaque for their father Maximiano vendee or vendor, the thirty-day redemption period has not prescribed
Aquilar. They executed an agreement stating that their shares in the house would be - Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
equal. 1974 the father died and Virgilio demanded Senen to vacate the house to be to do that which could or should have been done earlier through the exercise of due
sold and profit to split between them. Senen refused to leave. diligence.
- CFI granted house and lot to be sold and the same be split in half. Ordered Senen to o Otherwise stated, laches is the negligence or omission to assert a right
vacate the property. CA reversed CFI decision within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
- Senen filed with the RTC an action for legal redemption against Virgilo and another assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it.
brother. He alleged that Virgilio sold ½ share of the property to their brother and was - Its elements are:
not informed of the sale. As co-owner he has the right to redeem the property. o (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
RULING o (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had
- Legal redemption (retracto legal de comuneros) is a privilege created by law, partly knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct as having been afforded an
by reason of public policy and partly for the benefit of the redemptioner to afford him opportunity to institute a suit;
a way out of a disagreeable or inconvenient association into which he has been thrust. o (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
- With respect to redemption by co-owners, in case the share of a co-owner is sold to complainant would assert the right in which he bases his suit; and
a third person, the governing law is Article 1620 of the Civil Code which provides: o (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event, relief is accorded to the
o "ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in complainant, or the suit is not held barred.
case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them are sold to a - Petitioner has actual knowledge of the sale of Virgilio's share to Angel in 1989.
third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the o As provided by Article 1623, he has thirty days from such actual knowledge
redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable rate. Should two or more co- within which to exercise his right to redeem the property.
owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in o Inexplicably, petitioner did not take any action. He waited for seven (7)
proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in years before filing his complaint.
common. o Definitely, such an unexplained delay is tantamount to laches. To be sure,
o The purpose behind Article 1620 is to provide a method for terminating the to uphold his right would unduly cause injury to respondent-intervenor, a
co-ownership and consolidating the dominion in one sole owner. purchaser in good faith and for value
- Article 1623 of the same Code also provides:
o "ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be Francisco v. Boiser
exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the GR No. 137677
prospective vendee, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale May 31, 2000
shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by
an affidavit of the vendee that he has given written notice thereof to all FACTS
possible redemptioners. The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that - Petitioner Adalia B. Francisco and three of her sisters were co-owners of four parcels
of adjoining owners." of registered lands on which the Ten Commandments Building at 689 Rizal Avenue
- Requisites for the exercise of legal redemption: Extension, Caloocan City, was erected.
o (1) There must be a co-ownership; - They sold 1/5 of their undivided share in the subject parcels of land to their mother,
o (2) one of the co-owners sold his right to a stranger; - Adela Blas, for P10,000.00. Without the knowledge of the other co-owners, Adela
o (3) the sale was made before the partition of the co-owned property; Blas sold her 1/5 share to R who is another sister of petitioner. P received summons,
o (4) the right of redemption must be exercised by one or more co-owners with a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No. 15510 filed by R demanding her share
within a period of thirty days to be counted from the time that he or they in the rentals being collected by P from the tenants of the building. P then informed R
were notified in writing by the vendee or by the co-owner vendor; and that she was exercising her right of redemption as a co-owner of the subject property.
o (5) the vendee must be reimbursed for the price of the sale.
Property cases for Art. 419-426
- P instituted Civil Case before the RTC. She alleged that the 30 day period for Acabal v. Acabal
redemption under Art. 1623 of the Civil Code had not begun to run against her since GR No. 148376
the vendor, Adela Blas, never informed her and the other owners about the sale to R. March 31, 2005
o She learned about the sale only on August 5, 1992, after she received the
summons in Civil Case No. 15510, together with the complaint FACTS
- Respondent, on the other hand, contended that petitioner knew about the sale as - R owned a parcel of land in Negros Occidental. His parents transferred ownership of
early as May 30, 1992, when she wrote petitioner a letter informing the latter about the land to him by way of Deed of Absolute Sale. R was then married then became a
the sale, with a demand that the rentals corresponding to her 1/5 share be remitted widow. He executed a deed conveying same property to P. R claims that what he
to her. Said letter was sent with a copy of the Deed of Sale between respondent and signed was a Lease Contract and not Deed of Absolute Sale. Thus he filed a
Adela Blas. complaint in the RTC against P for annulment of the deeds of sale.
- On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. - P asserts that it was a Deed of Absolute Sale which he already paid for 10k and has
She moved for reconsideration but her motion was denied by the appellate court. become the absolute owner of the property.
Hence, the present petition. - RTC dismissed complaint. CA reversed alleging that the Deed of absolute sale was
fictitious and simulated. Thus this petition from the P.
RULING
- Art. 1623 of the Civil Code provides: The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall RULING
not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective - There is no question that the property is conjugal. Article 160 of the Civil Code
vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded provides:
in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he o ART. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners. The right of redemption partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners. or to the wife.
o It is clear in requiring that the written notification should come from the - The presumption applies to all properties acquired during marriage. For the
vendor or prospective vendor, not from any other person. There is, presumption to be invoked, therefore, the property must be shown to have been
therefore, no room for construction. acquired during the marriage
o Indeed, the principal difference between Art. 1524 of the former Civil Code o In the case at bar, the property was acquired on July 6, 1971
and Art. 1623 of the present one is that the former did not specify who must duringVillaner's marriage with Justiniana Lipajan. It cannot be seriously
give the notice, whereas the present one expressly says the notice must be contended that simply because the tax declarations covering the property
given by the vendor. Effect must be given to this change in statutory was solely in the name of Villaner it is his personal and exclusive property.
language. o Since the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage of
- "Art. 1623 does not prescribe any particular form of notice, nor any distinctive method Villaner and Justiniana, the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code
for notifying the redemptioner." So long, therefore, as the latter is informed in writing is that it is the couple's conjugal property. The burden is on petitioners then
of the sale and the particulars thereof, the 30 days for redemption start running, and to prove that it is not. This they failed to do.
the redemptioner has no real cause to complain - The property being conjugal, upon the death of Justiniana Lipajan, the conjugal
- It is clear that by not immediately notifying the co-owner, a vendor can delay or even partnership was terminated. With the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, Villaner's
effectively prevent the meaningful exercise of the right of redemption. interest in the conjugal partnership became actual and vested with respect to an
o In the present case, for instance, the sale took place in 1986, but it was kept undivided one-half portion. Justiniana's rights to the other half, in turn, vested upon
secret until 1992 when vendee (herein respondent) needed to notify her death to her heirs including Villaner who is entitled to the same share as that of
petitioner about the sale to demand 1/5 rentals from the property sold each of their eight legitimate children.
- Receipt by petitioner of summons in Civil Case No. 15510 on August 5, 1992 o As a result, then of the death of Justiniana, a regime of co-ownership arose
amounted to actual knowledge of the sale from which the 30-day period of redemption between Villaner and his co-heirs in relation to the property.
commenced to run. Petitioner had until September 4, 1992 within which to exercise - While Villaner owns five-ninths (5/9) of the disputed property, he could not claim title
her right of legal redemption, to any definite portion of the community property until its actual partition by agreement
- WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED or judicial decree. Prior to partition, all that he has is an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the property.
o Villaner however, as a co-owner of the property has the right to sell his
undivided share thereof.
Property cases for Art. 419-426
- The Civil Code provides so: Torres Jr. v. Lapinid
o ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of GR No. 187987
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, November 20, 2014
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or FACTS
the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion - P filed a complaint in the RTC for the nullification of the sale of real property by Velez
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co- in favor of Lapinid. They alleged that they and Velez are co-owners of several parcels
ownership. of land in Cebu. That Velez filed a partition for the parcels against petitioners and co-
- Thus, every co-owner has absolute ownership of his undivided interest in the co- owners and compromised agreement signed by the parties where they agreed that
owned property and is free to alienate, assign or mortgage his interest except as to Mariano and Vicente were jointly authorized to sell property and receive proceeds.
purely personal rights. This was amended to exclude Velez.
o While a co-owner has the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided - Pursuant to mandate they inspected property and found Lapinid occupying a portion.
interest, nevertheless, as a co-owner, he cannot alienate the shares of his They filed a forcible entry case against him.
other co-owners — nemo dat qui non habet. - petitioners prayed that the deed of sale be declared null and void arguing that the
- Villaner, however, sold the entire property without obtaining the consent of the other sale of a definite portion of a co-owned property without notice to the other co-
co-owners. Following the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract owners is without force and effect.
must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so —quando res non valet ut
ago, valeat quantum valere potest — the disposition affects only Villaner's share pro ISSUE: Whether Jesus, as a co-owner, can validly sell a portion of the property he co-owns in
indiviso, and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantor's share in the favor of another person.
partition of the property owned in common.
- As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property RULING. YES
as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who - Admittedly, Jesus sold an area of land to Lapinid on.
did not consent to the sale. - A co-owner has an absolute ownership of his undivided and pro-indiviso share in the
- From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his co-owned property. He has the right to alienate, assign and mortgage it, even to the
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of extent of substituting a third person in its enjoyment provided that no personal rights
the other co-owners is not null and void. will be affected. This is evident from the provision of the Civil Code:
- The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or the recovery o Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign
the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
possessed and administered it. mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
o Settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
consent was not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale ownership.
merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for - A co-owner is an owner of the whole and over the whole he exercises the right of
PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. Neither recovery dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract.
of possession nor restitution can be granted since the defendant buyers are Hence, his co-owners have no right to enjoin a co-owner who intends to alienate or
legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint ownership of the common substitute his abstract portion or substitute a third person in its enjoyment.
property claimed - Jesus can validly alienate his co-owned property in favor of Lapinid, free from any
opposition from the co-owners. Lapinid, as a transferee, validly obtained the same
rights of Jesus from the date of the execution of a valid sale.
- Absent any proof that the sale was not perfected, the validity of sale subsists. In
essence, Lapinid steps into the shoes of Jesus as co-owner of an ideal and
proportionate share in the property held in common. Thus, from the perfection of
contract on 9 November 1997, Lapinid eventually became a co-owner of the property
Property cases for Art. 419-426
Imperial v. CA o In such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be
GR No. 102037 invoked or applied when one of the co-owners has adversely possessed the
July 17, 1996 property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by
prescription.
FACTS - In order that possession is considered averse to the cestui que trust amounting to a
- 2 lots in Quezon were owned by Imerial who died but was survived by two daughters. repudiation of the co-ownership, the following elements must concur:
One daughter died and is survived by the heirs. Sometime in 1979 the siblings agreed o The trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui
to register the 2 lots they got from their mother. They executed several documents trust;
one of Adela is entitled to one half share in proceeds of the sale of subdivision of lots o Such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust;
in said lots. Melanio sold in favor of SPS Cabisuela. The sale was discovered by one and
name Solleza when she paid the realty taxes. o The evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive
- Petitioners filed in this case to return or give proceeds to Adela for the sale. RTC - Evidence shows that TCT No. 2744 in the name of the legal heirs of Lino Delima,
ordered Melanio to pay represented by Galileo Delima, was cancelled by virtue of an affidavit executed by Galileo
Delima v. CA Delima and that on February 4, 1954, Galileo he obtained the issuance of a new title in his
GR No. 46296 name numbered TCT No. 3009 to the exclusion of his co-heirs.
September 24, 1991 o The issuance of this new title constituted an open and clear repudiation of the
trust or co-ownership, and the lapse of ten (10) years of adverse possession by
FACTS Galileo Delima from February 4, 1954 was sufficient to vest title in him by
- Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in Cebu prescription.
by sale on installments from the government. Later he died and left his heirs, thee brother o As the certificate of title was notice to the whole world of his exclusive title to the
and one sister. TCT was issued in the name of his heirs, as represented by one of the land, such rejection was binding on the other heirs and started as against them
brothers (Galileo). the period of prescription.
- Previous TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in favor of Galileo alone, excluding o When petitioners filed their action for reconveyance and/or to compel partition
the other. He declared the lot under his name for taxation purposes and paid the taxes. on February 29, 1963, such action was already barred by prescription. Whatever
- Other heirs filed an action for partition and for annulment of the TCT issued to Galileo claims the other co-heirs could have validly asserted before can no longer be
alone. RTC granted partition and annulment. CA reversed the RTC’s decision. invoked by them at this time.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners' action for partition is already barred by the statutory period Adille v. CA
provided by law which shall enable Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by GR-L 44546
acquisitive prescription to the exclusion of petitioners from their shares in the disputed property January 29, 1988

RULING FACTS
- Art. 494: No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may - The land in question is located in Legaspi city which originally belonged to one named
demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is Felisa Azul as her own private property. She married twice (1) Brnable Adille – one child,
concerned. "Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period Rustico Adille; and (2) Procopio Asejo – also with kids.
of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new - Felisa sold property to 3rd persons in 1939, period of repurchase is 3 years but she died in
agreement. "A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed 1942 without being able to redeem, but Adille repurchased it by himself and executed a
twenty years. "Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law. "No deed of extra-judicial partition representing himself to be the only heir and child of his
prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so mother
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership." - After some efforts of compromise had failed, his half-brothers and sisters, herein plaintiffs,
- An action to compel partition may be filed at any time by any of the co-owners against the filed present case for partition with accounting on the position that he was only a trustee
actual possessor. No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or on an implied trust when he redeemed the property.
co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. - Emeteria Asejo was occupying a portion, defendant counterclaimed for her to vacate
- From the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner - Petitioner's contention that the property subject of dispute devolved upon him upon the
of the properties and denies the others any share, the question involved is no longer one failure of his co-heirs to join him in its redemption within the period required by law.
of partition but of ownership.
Property cases for Art. 419-426
o He relies on the provisions of Article 1515 of the old Civil Code, Article 1613 of o We hold in the negative.
the present Code, giving the vendee a retro the right to demand redemption of o Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have
the entire property. been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership).
o The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions:
ISSUE May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in common?  (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership;
 (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-
RULING owners;
- The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his share alone.  (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and
While the records show that the petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering  (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive,
the expenses therefor, that did not make him the owner of all of it. and notorious possession of the property for the period required by
o In other words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership. law.
- Necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to his right to collect - The instant case shows that the petitioner had not complied with these requisites.
reimbursement from the remaining co-owners. There is no doubt that redemption of o We are not convinced that he had repudiated the co-ownership; on the contrary,
property entails a necessary expense. he had deliberately kept the private respondents in the dark by feigning sole
o Under the Civil Code: ART. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the heirship over the estate under dispute.
other co-owners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right o He cannot therefore be said to have "made known" his efforts to deny the co-
owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself ownership.
from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be
equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made Vda de Daffon v. CA
if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership. GR No. 129017
- The property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. August 20, 2017
- While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to consent
to a partial redemption," the redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its FACTS
totality does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to - Petitioner was married to the late Amado Daffon, with whom she begot one son, Joselito
redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title thereto in Daffon. Joselito married Lourdes Osmeña, and they bore six children. Joselito died after
his name. his father's demise.
o But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire - Respondent Lourdes, together with her six children, instituted an action for partition against
property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership. petitioner (Grandmother/ Mother-in-law) over the properties left by Amado which formed
o Neither does the fact that the petitioner had succeeded in securing title over the part of his conjugal partnership with petitioner.
parcel in his name terminate the existing co-ownership. - Properties were never partitioned. Petitioner claimed absolute ownership over all the
- While his half-brothers and sisters are, as we said, liable to him for reimbursement as and properties and deprived them of the fruits there of.
for their shares in redemption expenses, he cannot claim exclusive right to the property - Respondents prayed that the conjugal properties of Amado and petitioner be partitioned
owned in common. Registration of property is not a means of acquiring ownership. It and that the one-half share of Amado be further partitioned between petitioner, on one
operates as a mere notice of existing title, that is, if there is one. hand, and the respondents as heirs of Joselito, on the other hand.
- Fraud attended the registration of the property. - Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, but the trial court denied the same. Petitioner's motion
o The petitioner's pretension that he was the sole heir to the land in the affidavit of for reconsideration was also denied by the trial court. Subsequently, petitioner filed a
extrajudicial settlement he executed preliminary to the registration thereof petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but the latter dismissed the same.
betrays a clear effort on his part to defraud his brothers and sisters and to
exercise sole dominion over the property RULING
- Prescription bars any demand on property (owned in common) held by another (co-owner) - By stating their relationship to the deceased, they established their line of succession as
following the required number of years. the basis for their claim. Their rights to succeed as heirs were transmitted from the moment
o In that event, the party in possession acquires title to the property and the state of death of the decedent
of co-ownership is ended. - Contrary to petitioner's contention, the fact that she repudiated the co-ownership between
- In the case at bar, the property was registered in 1955 by the petitioner, solely in his name, her and respondents did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
while the claim of the private respondents was presented in 1974. Has prescription then, action for partition.
set in? - In a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks
Property cases for Art. 419-426
o First, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject properties; and - R allege that his mother died intestate and was survived by him and his father and his
o Second, the conveyance of his lawful shares. grandmother. R’s grandmother allegedly demanded delivery of his mother’s share in
- An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for parcels of land but Sepulveda refused to do so that he can reap the produce therefrom
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. If the which he used for the payment of the realty taxes of the properties.
defendant asserts exclusive title over the property, the action for partition should not be - R further provides that P executed an affidavit stating that he was the sole heir of Dionisia
dismissed. when she died. He also executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Danao City but never
o Rather, the court should resolve the case and if the plaintiff is unable to sustain gave any share to R.
his claimed status as a co-owner, the court should dismiss the action, not - R prayed that he be declared the absolute owner of ½ portion of 2 parcel of land.
because the wrong remedy was availed of, but because no basis exists for
requiring the defendant to submit to partition. RULING
o If, on the other hand, the court after trial should find the existence of co- - Petition is granted for the sole reason that the respondent failed to implead as parties, all
ownership among the parties, the court may and should order the partition of the the indispensable parties in his complaint.
properties in the same action - R sought the recovery of the ownership and possession of the ten (10) parcels of land and
- An action for partition is comprised of two phases: the partition thereof; and for the payment of his share in the proceeds of the sale of the
o first, an order for partition which determines whether a co-ownership in fact property which Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. sold to Danao City amounting to P7,492.00, which
exists, and whether partition is proper; and Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. claimed was left unpaid.
o second, a decision confirming the sketch or subdivision submitted by the parties - When R filed the complaint, his father, Rodolfo Pelaez, was still alive. Thus, when his
or the commissioners appointed by the court, as the case may be. mother Dulce Pelaez died intestate on March 2, 1944, she was survived by her husband
- The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of Rodolfo and R.
whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and may be made by voluntary agreement of - Article 996 of the New Civil Code, Rodolfo Pelaez (father of R), as surviving spouse, is
all the parties interested in the property. entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding by way of legitime to each of
o This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a the legitimate children who has not received any betterment.
partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally - Under articles 807 and 834 of the old Civil Code the surviving spouse is a forced heir and
prohibited. entitled to a share in usufruct in the estate of the deceased spouse equal to that which by
o It may end, upon the other hand, with an ad judgment that a co-ownership does way of legitime corresponds or belongs to each of the legitimate children or descendants
in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and who have not been bettered or have not received any share in the one-third share destined
profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. for betterment.
- In the latter case, the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among - The right of the surviving spouse to have a share in usufruct in the estate of the deceased
themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition spouse is provided by law of which such spouse cannot be deprived and which cannot be
so agreed upon. ignored. Of course, the spouse may waive it but the waiver must be express.
- Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides that in an action for partition, all persons
Sepulveda v. Pelaez interested in the property shall be joined as defendants.
GR No. 152195 - All the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties;
January 31, 2005 as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.
o The mere fact that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. has repudiated the co-ownership
FACTS between him and the respondent does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to
- R Pacifico Palez filed a complaint against his granduncle, Pedro Sepulveda Sr for the take cognizance of the action for partition, for, in a complaint for partition, the
recovery of possession and ownership of his plaintiff seeks,
o ½ undivided share of parcels of land;  first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject property; and,
o his undivided 1/3 in several other lots; and  second, the conveyance of his lawful shares
o the partition thereof among the co-owners. - In De Mesa v. Court of Appeals, the first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or
- 11 lots were among the 25 which R’s mother inherited from his grandmother under the accounting is concerned with the determination of
project of partition which Pedro Sepulveda was the administrator. Under the deed, o Whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, that is, it
Sepulveda appeared to be the owner of an undivided portion while his brother was is not otherwise legally proscribed and may be made by voluntary agreement of
undivided owner of another land. all the parties interested in the property.
Property cases for Art. 419-426
o This phase may end in a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the desired September 17, 1998
partition either because a co-ownership does not exist or a partition is legally
prohibited. FACTS
o It may also end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does - Late sps Alejandrino and Labunos left their children a 219 square meter lot in Cebu. When
in truth exist, that partition is proper in the premises, and that an accounting of Alejandrino died, the property should have been divided among the children but the estate
rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in of alejandrino was not settled in accordance with the procedure in the rules of court.
order. - Petitioner Mauricia, one of the children, allegedly purchased a portion of Gregorio’s and
 In the latter case, "the parties may, if they are able to agree, make Abundio’d share (also a sibling). It turned out that a 3rd party named Licerio also purchased
partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and portions of the property through one of the siblings named Laurencia, buying a total area
the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties. of 121. 67 sqm.
 In either case, whether the action is dismissed or partition and/or - Laurencia, alleged seller, questioned the sale in an action for quieting of title against buyer
accounting is decreed, the order is a final one and may be appealed Licerio Nique.
by any party aggrieved thereby. - Meanwhile, Mauricia filed a complaint for redemption and recovery of properties from
o The second stage commences when the parties are unable to agree upon the Nique. She alleged that Nique never notified Mauricia of the purchase of undivided shares
partition ordered by the court. In that event, partition shall be effected for the nor did she give her the redemptive right to buy the area as a co-owner of the sale lot.
parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) - In her amended complaint, marucia prayed that she be allowed to redeem the area for a
commissioners. redemption prices, and Nique be ordered to execute necessary documents for redemption.
 This second phase may also deal with the rendition of the accounting
itself and its approval by the Court after the parties have been ISSUE Whether or not as an heir of the Alejandrino property, Laurencia may validly sell specific
accorded the opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the portions thereof to a third party.
recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just shares in
the rents and profits of the real estate in question. . . Ruling
- R failed to implead the following indispensable parties: his father, Rodolfo Pelaez; the heirs - Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole
of Santiago Sepulveda, and the City of Danao which purchased the form Pedro Sepulveda, estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the
Sr. and maintained that it had failed to pay for the purchase price of the property. payment of the debts of the deceased.
- Rodolfo Pelaez is an indispensable party he being entitled to a share in usufruct, equal to - Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different
the share of the respondent in the subject properties. There is no showing that Rodolfo persons.
Pelaez had waived his right to usufruct. o Each co-owner of property which is held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the
- The plaintiff is mandated to implead all the indispensable parties, considering that the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than
absence of one such party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners.
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.  The underlying rationale is that until a division is made, the respective
o One who is a party to a case is not bound by any decision of the court, otherwise, share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises,
he will be deprived of his right to due process. together with his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso
o Without the presence of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial court could not property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same
validly render judgment and grant relief in favor of the private respondent. - "ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
o The failure of the private respondent to implead the other heirs as parties- benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
plaintiffs constituted a legal obstacle to the trial court and the appellate court's substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But
exercise of judicial power over the said case, and rendered any orders or the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited
judgments rendered therein a nullity. to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
- To reiterate, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the ownership."
court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even - With respect to properties shared in common by virtue of inheritance, alienation of a pro
as to those present. Hence, the trial court should have ordered the dismissal of the indiviso portion thereof is specifically governed by Article 1088 that provides:
complaint. o "ART. 1088.Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before
the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the
Alejandrino v. CA purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within
GR No. 114151
Property cases for Art. 419-426
the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by acquired the shares of their brothers and therefore, it was only the two of them that needed
the vendor." to settle the estate. The fact that the document was not notarized is no hindrance to its
- In the instant case, Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling her pro indiviso effectivity as regards the two of them. The partition of inherited property need not be
share in Lot No. 2798. embodied in a public document.
o However, because the property had not yet been partitioned in accordance with - Deed of extrajudicial settlement executed by Mauricia and Laurencia evidence their
the Rules of Court, no particular portion of the property could be identified as yet intention to partition the property. It delineates what portion of the property belongs to each
and delineated as the object of the sale. other.
o Thus, interpreting Article 493 of the Civil Code providing that an alienation of a - On the part of Laurencia, the court found that she had transmitted her rights over portions
co-owned property "shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to (the she had acquired from her brothers to private respondent Nique.
seller) in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership," o The sale was made after the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of
o the Court said: "pursuant to this law, a co-owner has the right to alienate his pro- the estate that private respondent himself witnessed. The extrajudicial
indiviso share in the co-owned property even without the consent of the other settlement of estate having constituted a partition of the property, Laurencia
co-owners. Nevertheless, as a mere part owner, he cannot alienate the shares validly transferred ownership over the specific front portion of the property with
of the other co-owners. The prohibition is premised on the elementary rule that an area of 146square meters.
'no one can give what he does not have'
 '. . . since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of
the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other
co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-
owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of
the property.
- 'The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery
of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co- Arriola v. Arriola
owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property GR No. 177703
of the co-owners who possessed and administered it.' " January 28, 2008
- Partition of the estate of a decedent may only be effected by
o (1) the heirs themselves extra judicially, FACTS
o (2) by the court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the course of - Respondent Arriola filed civil action with RTC against Arriola (P) for judicial partition of
administration proceedings, properties of decedent Fidel Arriola. R is the son of decedent with his first wife, while P is
o (3) by the testator himself, and the son of decedent with the second wife.
o (4) by the third person designated by the testator - RTC: ordered partition of land, 1/3 each. Parties failed to agree on partition, R sought its
- The trial court may not, therefore, order partition of an estate in an action for quieting of sale in a public auction an P acceded to it.
title. As there is no pending administration proceedings, the property of the Alejandrino - RTC ordered auction. The same had to be re-set when P refused to include the house in
spouses can only be partitioned by the heirs themselves in an extrajudicial settlement of the auction, which lead to another filing in the RTC for contempt against the P.
estate. However, evidence on the extrajudicial settlement of estate was offered before the o This was denied by RTC for the P was allegedly justified in refusing the house
trial court and it became the basis for the order for segregation of the property sold to to be included. Sought the CA to reverse the RTC decision, which they did. Thus
private respondent. this petition.
- Petitioner Mauricia does not deny the fact of the execution of the deed of extrajudicial - RTC excluded the subject house because respondent never alleged its existence in his
settlement of the estate. She only questions its validity on account of the absence of complaint for partition or established his co-ownership thereof.
notarization of the document and the non-publication thereof. - On the other hand, citing Articles 440, 445 and 446 of the Civil Code, the CA held that as
the deceased owned the subject land, he also owned the subject house which is a mere
"ART. 1082.Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees accessory to the land.
or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a o Both properties form part of the estate of the deceased and are held in co-
compromise, or any other transaction ownership by his heirs, the parties herein. Hence, the CA concludes that any
decision in the action for partition of said estate should cover not just the subject
- execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate reflected the intention of both
Laurencia and petitioner Mauricia to physically divide the property. Both of them had RULING
Property cases for Art. 419-426
- The subject house is covered by the judgment of partition for reasons postulated by the - It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the family
CA. We qualify, however, that this ruling does not necessarily countenance the immediate home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate partition under
and actual partition of the subject house by way of public auction in view of the suspensive Article 159 of The Family Code, viz.:
proscription imposed under Article 159 of The Family Code which will be discussed o Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both
forthwith. spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as
- The existence of the subject house was not specifically alleged in the complaint for long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same
partition. Such omission, the subject house is deemed part of the judgment of partition for unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply
two compelling reasons. regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.
o First, as correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of the Civil Code, the  First, that the heirs cannot extra-judicially partition it for a period of 10
subject house is deemed part of the subject land. years from the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head
 RTC ratiocinated that since the house constructed on the subject lot of the family, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary
was not alleged in the complaint and its ownership was not passed residing therein; and
upon during the trial on the merits, the court cannot include the house  second, that the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid
in its adjudication of the subject lot. periods unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor.
o The court disagrees. Following the reasoning of the RTC will in effect render - No compelling reason has been alleged by the parties; nor has the RTC found any
meaningless the pertinent rule on accession. compelling reason to order the partition of the family home, either by physical segregation
 In general, the right to accession is automatic (ipso jure), requiring no or assignment to any of the heirs or through auction sale as suggested by the parties.
prior act on the part of the owner or the principal. So that even if the - Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of the family home
improvements including the house were not alleged in the complaint regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if the family home has passed by
for partition, they are deemed included in the lot on which they stand, succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this
following the principle of accession. Consequently, the lot subject of fact alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property.
judicial partition in this case includes the house which is permanently o In the case at bar, at the time petitioners filed their complaint for injunction and
attached thereto, otherwise, it would be absurd to divide the principal, damages against private respondents, no sale of the latter's pro-indiviso shares
i.e., the lot, without dividing the house which is permanently attached to a third party had yet been made. Thus, Article 1620 of the New Civil Code
thereto. finds no application
o Second, respondent has repeatedly claimed that the subject house was built by o Neither do petitioners have the legal right to enjoin private respondents from
the deceased. Petitioners never controverted such claim. There is then no alienating their pro-indiviso shares to a third party.
dispute that the subject house is part of the estate of the deceased; as such, it o The rights of a co-owner of a property are clearly specified in Article 493 of the
is owned in common by the latter's heirs, the parties herein, any one of whom, New Civil Code, thus:
under Article 494 of the Civil Code, may, at any time, demand the partition of the  Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and
subject house. of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
 Therefore, respondent's recourse to the partition of the subject house alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in
cannot be hindered, least of all by the mere technical omission of said its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect
common property from the complaint for partition. of the alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners shall
- We must emphasize that, while we treat the subject house as part of the co-ownership of be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
the parties, we stop short of authorizing its actual partition by public auction at this time. upon the termination of the co-ownership.
- It bears emphasis that an action for partition involves two phases: - The law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share
o first, the declaration of the existence of a state of co-ownership; and in the property held in common. The law merely provides that the alienation or mortgage
o second, the actual termination of that state of co-ownership through the shall be limited only to the portion of the property which may be allotted to him upon
segregation of the common property. termination of the co-ownership
 What is settled thus far is only the fact that the subject house is under - Set against the foregoing rules, the family home — consisting of the subject house and lot
the co-ownership of the parties, and therefore susceptible of partition on which it stands — cannot be partitioned at this time, even if it has passed to the co-
among them ownership of his heirs, the parties herein.
- Subject house accede to R was built by Fidel in his exclusive property. P on the other hand - Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003. Thus, for 10 years from said date or until March
adds that it has been his residence, thus it is a family home. 10, 2013, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the
family home he constituted cannot be partitioned, much less when no compelling reason
Property cases for Art. 419-426
exists for the court to otherwise set aside the restriction and order the partition of the o that petitioners' shares in the subject properties be sold to private respondents,
property. at the rate of P12.50 per square meter; or
- There is no obstacle to the immediate public auction of the portion of the subject land o that the subject properties be sold to a third party, VOLCANO LAKEVIEW
covered by TCT No. 383714, which falls outside the specific area of the family home. RESORTS, INC. (claimed to have been erroneously referred to in the pre-trial as
VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION)
Reyes v. Concepcion and its proceeds thereof distributed among the parties.
GR No. 56550 - Private respondents filed a "Constancia" expressing that they were willing to allot their
October 1, 1990 shares in the subject properties to Socorro Marquez Vda. De Zaballero, at the rate of
P12.50 per square meter, and that they did not know of any other party who was willing
FACTS and able to purchase the subject properties under more favorable conditions than that
- P filed complaint in the RTC seeking to enjoin the R from selling to a 3 rd party their pro- offered by VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC.
indiviso shares as a co-owner in 8 parcels of registered land in Cavite. Petitioner claimed - RTC Judge ruled that petitioners did not possess a pre-emptive right to purchase private
that under Article 1620 of the new Civil Code, they, as co-owners, had a preferential right respondents' shares in the co-ownership. Thus, finding that the subject properties were
to purchase these shares from private respondents for a reasonable price. RTC denied. essentially indivisible, respondent trial judge ordered the holding of a public sale of the
- Pre-trail hearing the parties, the following were discussed that: subject properties pursuant to Article 498 of the New Civil Code
o 12 hectares were subject to expropriating proceedings by the National Housing
authority. That sometime in 1960, P was informed that Volcano securities traders RULING
and agricultural business offered to buy the same. - P claim that they had a pre-emptive right to purchase pro-indiviso shares of their co-owners
o That in the letter the P requested to exercise their pre-emptive right to purchase, from R at a reasonable price. This claim is patently without basis.
agree to a physical partition, or sell their shares with the R but at the price and o In this jurisdiction, the legal provisions on co-ownership do not grant to any of
under terms. the owners of a property held in common a pre-emptive right to purchase the
- In sum, PLAINTIFFS pro-indiviso shares of his co-owners.
o That the subject properties are incapable of physical partition; o Petitioners' reliance on Article 1620 of the New Civil Code is misplaced.
o That the price of P12.50 per square meter is grossly excessive;  Article 1620 provides: A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of
o That they are willing to exercise their pre-emptive right for an amount of not more redemption in case the shares of all the co-owners or of any of them,
than P95,132.00 per hectare, which is the fair and reasonable value of said are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly
properties; excessive, the redemption shall pay only a reasonable one. Should
o That the statutory period for exercising their pre-emptive right was suspended two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they
upon the filing of the complaint; may only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have
- DEFENDANTS AND INTERVENOR in the thing owned in common.
o That the reasonable price of the subject properties is P12.50 per square meter; o Article 1620 contemplates of a situation where a co-owner has alienated his pro-
o That plaintiffs' right of legal pre-emption had lapsed upon their failure to exercise indiviso shares to a stranger. By the very nature of the right of "legal redemption",
the same within the period prescribed in Art. 1623 of the Civil Code of the a co-owner's right to redeem is invoked only after the shares of the other co-
Philippines; owners are sold to a third party or stranger to the co-ownership
o That, assuming the soundness of plaintiffs' claim that the price of P12.50 per - Court further discussed Article 494 of the New Civil Code which lays down the general rule
square meter is grossly excessive, it would be to the best interest of the plaintiffs that no co-owner is obliged to remain in the co-ownership.
to sell their shares to the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI- o None of the legal exceptions under Article 494 applies to the case at bar.
BUSINESS CORPORATION, whose sincerity, capacity and good faith is beyond o Private respondents' counterclaim for the partition of the subject properties was
question, as the same was admitted by the parties herein; therefore entirely proper
o That the subject properties consisting approximately 95 hectares may be - P also insists that property is indivisible and cannot be partitioned or it will decrease it
physically partitioned without difficulty in the manner suggested by them to economic value, Article 498 provides that:
plaintiffs, and as graphically represented in the subdivision plan, which will be o Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that
furnished in due course to plaintiffs' counsel. it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and
- In order to settle once and for all the controversy between the parties, private respondents its proceeds distributed.
filed a motion requesting that petitioners be required to formally specify which of the two  The sale of the property held in common referred to in the above article
options under Article 498 of the New Civil Code they wished to avail of: is resorted to when
Property cases for Art. 419-426
 (1) the right to partition the property among the co-owners - CA affirmed RTC. The Quimpos insist on the validity of the deeds of sale between Joaquin
is invoked by any of them but because of the nature of the and Eustaquia. They assail the probative value and weight given by the RTC and the CA
property, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would in favor of the respondents' pieces of evidence while refusing to give credence or value to
prejudice the interests of the co-owners and the documents they presented
 (2) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among
them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon RULING
reimbursement of the shares of the other co-owners. - Consideration of the sale was for 5k and 6k, difficult for Joaquin to raise since he was
studying in Mania then The Quimpos failed to override this.
Quimpo Sr. v. Vda de Beltran - Eustaquia was 91 years old, weak and senile, at the time the deeds of sale were executed.
GR No. 160956 In other words, she was already mentally incapacitated by then, and could no longer be
February 13, 2008 expected to give her consent to the sale.
- For forty-three (43) years, Consuelo and Ireneo occupied their portions of the San Jose
FACTS property and significantly, Joaquin never disturbed their possession. They also installed
- Eustaquia Abad was the owner of several parcels of land (4 parcels) in Camarines Sur. He tenants in parcel IV, and Joaquin did not prevent them from doing so, nor did he assert his
died intestate leaving the land to her grandchild and great grandchildren (respondent in ownership over the same. These unerringly point to the fact that there was indeed an oral
this case) partition of parcels III and IV.
- Joaquinn and respondents undertook oral partition of parcel III and parcel IV. Half was - Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot, we held, viz.: partition may be inferred from circumstances
given to Joaquin (P) and the other to R. No document of partition was executed because sufficiently strong to support the presumption. Thus, after a long possession in severalty,
P refused to execute a deed. R occupied their respective properties and installed several a deed of partition may be presumed. It has been held that recitals in deeds, possession
tenant over their share. Joaquin, on the other hand, became the administrator of the and occupation of land, improvements made thereon for a long series of years, and
remaining undivided properties and of the shares of respondents Danilo, Marites, Anita acquiescence for 60 years, furnish sufficient evidence that there was an actual partition of
and Helen, who were still minors at that time. land either by deed or by proceedings in the probate court, which had been lost and were
- 1989, Danilo, Marites, Anita and Helen wanted to take possession of the portions allotted not recorded.
to them, but Joaquin prevented them from occupying the same. Joaquin also refused to - General principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have
heed respondents' demand for partition of parcels I and II, prompting respondents to file a enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed. Regardless of
complaint for judicial partition and/or recovery of possession with accounting and damages whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity
with RTC. will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking
- Joaquin denied the material allegations and asserted absolute ownership over parcels III of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective
and IV, claiming that he purchased these lands from Eustaquia in 1946, evidenced by portions set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the
deeds of sale. He, likewise, claimed continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of parties thereunder.
these lots since 1946, and alleged that Consuelo's occupation of the portion of the San - Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under
Jose property was by mere tolerance. which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly
- During the pendency of the case, P died and substituted by his wife and children all performed the partition agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper
surnamed Quimpo. RTC rendered decision in favor of R declaring them as co-owners left case decree title in accordance with the possession in severalty.
by Eustaquia. - In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the
- It rejected Joaquin's claim of absolute ownership over parcels III and IV, and declared void ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of
the purported deeds of sale executed by Eustaquia for lack of consideration and consent. land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of
o At the time of the execution of these deeds, Joaquin was not gainfully employed individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement
and had no known source of income, which shows that the deeds of sale state a and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties
false and fictitious consideration. as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.
o Eustaquia could not have possibly given her consent to the sale because she - A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have
was already 91 years old at that time. acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts
- The RTC also sustained the oral partition among the heirs in 1966. According to the trial of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.
court, the possession and occupation of land by respondents Consuelo and Ireneo, and - A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have
Joaquin's acquiescence for 23 years, furnish sufficient evidence that there was actual stated that a part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation
partition of the properties. of the statute of frauds.
Property cases for Art. 419-426
- It has been held that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in common, and - The lower court therefore is correct in ejecting the petitioners even if the portion
a part performance, a court of equity would have regard to and enforce such partition occupied by them is in the salvage zone.
agreed to by the parties. - Lot A, is part of the public domain, hence, beyond the commerce of men and not
capable of registration. In fact, the land is within the salvage zone fronting the China
Sea as well as the property covered by OCT No. P-13350 in the name of R.
Gulla vs. Heirs of Labrador o Article 440 does not apply in this case, considering that Lot A is a foreshore
GR No. 149418 land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by the
July 27, 2006 ordinary flow of the tides.
o Such property belongs to the public domain and is not available for private
FACTS ownership until formally declared by the government to be no longer needed
- The Labradors filed a complaint against SPS Gulla (P) for accion publiciana. Involved for public use.
is a 22,590 sqm lot and 562 sgm lot adjoining the property located in Zambales. o R have no possessory right over the property unless upon application, the
According to the Labradors, the property was declared for taxation purposes under government, through the then Bureau of Lands, had granted them a permit.
their names and corresponding taxes were paid. - R have no cause of action to cause petitioners' eviction from the subject property. The
- P occupied a portion of the property fronting the West China Sea and the 562 sqm real party-in interest to file a complaint against petitioners for recovery of possession
lot. They constructed a house and occupied the property, fencing the same. Labrador of the subject property and cause petitioner's eviction therefrom is the Republic of the
alleged that the P’s claims was acquired though a Deed of Waiver of Rights executed Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General.
in their favor by a squatter named Bacatad. P claims 2,888 sqm and had been in - Consequently, petitioners cannot be required to pay any rentals to respondents for
possession since 1984, declaration for tax purposes I under their name. their possession of the property.
- MTC in favor of Labradors, asked the P to vacate. RTC affirmed the same.
o Labradors were able to establish ownership over the subject property 448 SULO vs. Nayong Pilipino
GR No. 170923
ISSUE Whether P are entitled to the possession of Lot A January 20, 2009

RULING FACTS
- The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is - R is a GOCC who owns a parcel of land in Pasay City known as Nayong Pilipino
produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or Complex. P is a domestic corporation organized and existing under Philippine Laws.
artificially (Article 440, Civil Code). Accession is the right of an owner of a thing to the - R leased a portion of their complex to P for the construction and operation of a hotel
products of said thing as well as to whatever is inseparably attached thereto as an building – Philippine Village Hotel. The lease is for 21 years, renewal for 25 years as
accessory (Sanchez Roman, Vol. II, p. 89). long as they say so 6 months before expiration.
o In this case, the area of 562 square meters is outside the titled property of - P expressed its desire to renew the contract thus executed a Voluntary Addendum to
the R and is within the salvage zone adjacent to R property. the Lease Agreement. P defaulted in rent despite demand to pay and vacate.
o The salvage zone cannot be the subject of commerce, the adjoining owner
thereof, R, has the priority to use it. Otherwise stated, R do not own the ISSUE Whether the rules on accession, Art. 488 and 546, apply to the instant case.
salvage zone but as an adjacent owner, he has the right to use it more than
the P. RULING
- The law provides the different modes of acquiring ownership, namely: - Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in
o (a) occupation; (b) intellectual creation; (c) law; (d) donation; (e) succession; good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,
(f) tradition, as a consequence of certain contracts; and (g) prescription. after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the
o Accession is not one of those listed therein, thus is not a mode of acquiring one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the
ownership. The reason is simple: proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its
 accession presupposes a previously existing ownership by the value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall
owner over the principal. pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the
o Accession is a right implicitly included in ownership, without which it will building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the
have no basis or existence. lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
Property cases for Art. 419-426
o This article is manifestly intended to apply only to a case where one builds, altered the form and substance of the land. On the other hand, the lessee
plants, or sows on land in which he believes himself to have a claim of title, may remove the improvements should the lessor refuse to reimburse.
and not to lands where the only interest of the builder, planter or sower is - P argue that to apply Article 1678 to their case would result to sheer injustice, as it
that of a holder, such as a tenant. Calubayan v. Pascual, from which we quote:
- Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the o x x x. It has been held that a person who occupies the land of another at
possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor. the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand,
right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value them. The status of defendant is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant
which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof. whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
- In this case P have no adverse claim or title to the land. As lessees, they recognize - Second Issue: Appearance at the Preliminary Conference
that R is the owner of the land. Rights of a Builder in Good Faith
o What petitioners insist is that because of the improvements, which are of - Articles 447 and 1678 of theCivil Code Inapplicable continued by tolerance of the
substantial value, they introduced on the leased premises with the owner. In such a case, the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be
permission of respondent, they should be considered builders in good faith counted from the date of the demand to vacate. As explained earlier, Ismael and
who have the right to retain possession of the property until reimbursement Teresitas possession of the two lots was not by mere tolerance, a circumstance that
by respondent. negates the applicability of Calubayan.would amount to giving away the hotel and its
- Introduction of valuable improvements on the leased premises does not give the other structures at virtually bargain prices.
petitioners the right of retention and reimbursement which rightfully belongs to a o They allege that the value of the hotel and its appurtenant facilities amounts
builder in good faith. Otherwise, such a situation would allow the lessee to easily to more than two billion pesos, while the monetary claim of respondent
improve the lessor out of its property. against them only amounts to a little more than twenty-six-million pesos.
o We reiterate the doctrine that a lessee is neither a builder in good faith nor o Thus, they contend that it is the lease contract that governs the relationship
in bad faith that would call for the application of Articles 448 and 546 of the of the parties, and consequently, the parties may be considered to have
CivilCode. impliedly waived the application of Article 1678.
o His rights are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code, which reads: - We cannot sustain this line of argument by petitioners.
 Art. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements
which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, Macasaet v. SPS Macasaet
without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the GR No. 154391-92
lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one- September 30, 2004
half of the value of the improvements at that time. Should the
lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove FACTS
the improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer - Ismael is the son of the R and Teresita is the wife of Ismael. R filed with the MTC of
damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more Lipa an ejectment suit against their children. That the R are the owners of 2 parcels
impairment upon the property leased than is necessary. With of land and by way of a verbal lease agreement, P occupied the lot and used it for
regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to their residence and business. P failed to pay depiste repeated demands.
any reimbursement, but he may remove the ornamental objects, - P denied the existence of a verbal lease agreement. They allege that they were invited
provided no damage is caused to the principal thing, and the to live in the subject lot so that they could live near one another. They further allege
lessor does not choose to retain them by paying their value at the that the lot has been allotted to P as inheritance and another lot as payment for
Petitioners allege that they cannot be ejected from the lots construction materials used in the renovation of R’s house.
because respondents based their Complaint regarding the - MTC ruled in favor of R and ordered P to vacate the premises. RTC upheld the
nonpayment of rentals on a verbal lease agreement, which the decision. CA sustained the orders.
latter failed to provetime the lease is extinguished.
o Under Article 1678, the lessor has the option of paying one-half of the value ISSUE Whether Article 1678 of the Civil Code should apply to the case on the matters of
of the improvements which the lessee made in good faith, which are improvements, or is it Article 447 of the Civil Code in relation to the Article 453 and 454 thereof
suitable for the use for which the lease is intended, and which have not that should apply.
Property cases for Art. 419-426
RULING same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the
- Accession refers to the right of the owner to everything that is incorporated or attached possession having the option of refunding the amount of the
to the property. Accession industrial -- building, planting and sowing on an immovable expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may
-- is governed by Articles 445 to 456 of the Civil Code. have acquired by reason thereof.
- Articles 447 and 1678 of the Civil Code Inapplicable o Consequently, respondents have the right to appropriate -- as their own --
o Article 447 is not applicable, because it relates to the rules that apply when the building and other improvements on the subject lots, but only after
the owner of the property uses the materials of another. It does not refer to  (1) refunding the expenses of petitioners or
the instance when a possessor builds on the property of another, which is  (2) paying the increase in value acquired by the properties by
the factual milieu here. reason thereof.
- Article 448 Applicable. - They have the option to oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its value
o When a person builds in good faith on the land of another, the applicable is considerably more than that of the structure in which case, petitioners shall pay
provision is Article 448, which reads: reasonable rent.
 Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been
built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to 448 PNB v. De Jesus
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after GR No. 149295
payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or September 23, 2003
to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,
and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or FACTS
planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is - R filed a complaint against P for recovery of ownership and possession, with
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, damages, over a property. R states that he acquired a parcel of land and discovered
he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not that a building of P was encroaching R’s area. Despite demand letters, P failed and
choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. refused to vacate the area.
The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case - P asserts that when it acquired the lot from the Mayor, encroachment already existed
of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. and as a remedy, the Mayor offered to sell the area to P which they accepted. Sale
o This provision covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or planters did not materialize and without the knowledge and consent of P, the Mayor mortgaged
believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of the lot to DBP.
title thereto. It does not apply when the interest is merely that of a holder, - RTC in favor of R. CA sustained the decision.
such as a mere tenant, agent or usufructuary.
o Good faith is identified by the belief that the land is owned; or that – by some RULING
title -- one has the right to build, plant, or sow thereon. - Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted
o Based on the facts of the case, Article 448 applies. The established facts of in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or
this case show that respondents fully consented to the improvements planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to
introduced by petitioners. In fact, because the children occupied the lots oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
upon their invitation, the parents certainly knew and approved of the sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the
construction of the improvements introduced thereon. land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such a case,
 Thus, petitioners may be deemed to have been in good faith when he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate
they built the structures on those lots. the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of
- Rule on Useful Expenses the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
o The structures built by petitioners were useful improvements, because they - Article 449. He who builds, plants, or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses
augmented the value or income of the bare lots. what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.
o The indemnity to be paid by respondents under Article 448 is provided for - Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown
by Article 546, which we quote: in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be
 Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the
possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay
thing until he has been reimbursed therefor. Useful expenses the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent. A builder in good faith can, under
shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the the foregoing provisions, compel the landowner to make a choice between
Property cases for Art. 419-426
appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to - Kee bought on installment Lot 8 from CTTEI (exclusive real estate agent of P).
pay the price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that Unfortunately, lot pointed to Kee was Lot 9. He proceeded to construct his residence,
accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal a store, an auto repair and other improvements on the lot.
and not the other way around. - Jardinico confronted Lee and failed in making an amicable settlement. Jardinico’s
- Owner must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building lawyer demanded Kee to remove all improvements and vacate Lot 9. Kee however
to instead remove it from the land. In order that the builder can invoke that accruing refused to vacate, which lead to a filing of a complaint for ejectment against Kee in
benefit and enjoy his corresponding right to demand that a choice be made by the the MTC.
landowner, he should be able to prove good faith on his part. o Kee filed a third party complaint against P and CTTEI.
o Good faith, here understood, is an intangible and abstract quality with no - MTC provides that the erroneous delivery was attributable to CTEI and it could not
technical meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other successfully invoke as a defense the failure of Kee to give notice of his intention to
things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design begin construction required under paragraph 22 of the Contract to Sell on Installment
to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. and his having built a sari-sari store without the prior approval of petitioner required
o An individual’s personal good faith is a concept of his own mind and, under paragraph 26 of said contract, saying that the purpose of these requirements
therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his protestations alone. It was merely to regulate the type of improvements to be constructed on the lot
implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances - MTCC found that petitioner had already rescinded its contract with Kee over Lot 8 for
which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. failure to pay the installments due, and that Kee had not contested the rescission. The
o The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of ones right, rescission was effected in 1979, before the complaint was instituted. The MTCC
ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach concluded that Kee no longer had any right over the lot subject of the contract
another. between him and petitioner.
 Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not o Kee must pay reasonable rentals for the use of Lot 9, and, furthermore, he
aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw cannot claim reimbursement for the improvements he introduced on said
which invalidates it. lot.
- P was not in good faith because he was quite aware prior to its acquisition of the land - RTC: P and CTTEI were not at fault or were not negligent, there being no
and building from Mayor that a part of the building sold to it stood on the land not preponderant evidence to show that they directly participated in the delivery of Lot 9
covered by the land conveyed to it. to Kee.
- The building, constructed on the land by Ignacio, has in actuality been part of the o It found Kee a builder in bad faith. Assuming Kee was acting in good faith,
property transferred to petitioner. he was, nonetheless, guilty of unlawfully usurping the possessory right of
- Article 448, of the Civil Code refers to a piece of land whose ownership is claimed by Jardinico over Lot 9 from the time he was served with notice to vacate said
two or more parties, one of whom has built some works (or sown or planted lot, and thus was liable for rental.
something) and not to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or - CA: Kee was a builder in good faith, as he was unaware of the mix-up when he began
planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or otherwise for, elsewise construction of the improvements on Lot 8. The erroneous delivery was due to the
stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own land, the issue negligence of CTTEI, and that such wrong delivery was likewise imputable to its
of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant principal, petitioner herein. Award of rentals was without basis.
- P cannot invoke Article 448 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE
456 Pleasantville Dev’t Corp. vs. CA (1) Was Kee a builder in good faith?
GR No. 79688 (2) What is the liability, if any, of petitioner and its agent, C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc.?
February 1, 1996
RULING
FACTS Good Faith
- Edith Robillo purchased a parcel of land from P in Bacolod City. In 1975, R bought - The roots of the controversy can be traced directly to the errors committed by CTTEI,
the rights to the lot from Robillo and at that time the lot was vacant. Upon completing when it pointed the wrong property to Wilson Kee and his wife.
payments, Jardinico secured a TCT in his name and discovered that improvements - Highly improbable that a purchaser would knowingly and willingly build his residence
were introduced to the lot by Wilson Kee (another R) who had taken possession on a lot owned by another, deliberately exposing himself and his family to the risk of
thereof. being ejected from the land and losing all improvements thereon.
Property cases for Art. 419-426
- Kee acted in the manner of a prudent man in ascertaining the identity of his property. o The deed of sale can have no effect on the liability of petitioner. Petitioners
As Kee is a layman not versed in the technical description of his property, he had to liability is grounded on the negligence of its agent.
find a way to ascertain that what was described in his TCT matched Lot 8. o On the other hand, what the deed of sale regulates are the reciprocal rights
o He went to the subdivision developer’s agent to seek advice. Having full of Kee and Jardinico; it stressed that they had reached an agreement
faith and confidence in the reputation of CTTEI, and because of the independent of the outcome of the case.
company’s positive identification of the property, Kee saw no reason to
suspect that there had been a misdelivery. The steps Kee had taken to - Petitioners liability lies in the negligence of its agent CTTEI. For such negligence, the
protect his interests were reasonable petitioner should be held liable for damages. The extent and/or amount of damages
- Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and to be awarded is a factual issue which should be determined after evidence is
his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, petitioner adduced. However, there is no showing that such evidence was actually presented in
has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee. the trial court; hence no damages could now be awarded.
o At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was - The rights of Kee and Jardinico vis-a-vis each other, as builder in good faith and owner
what he bought from petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to in good faith, respectively, are regulated by law (i.e., Arts. 448, 546 and 548 of the
him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kees good faith. Civil Code.
o Petitioner failed to prove otherwise. To demonstrate Kees bad faith,
petitioner points to Kees violation of the Contract of Sale on Installment.
 Such violations have no bearing whatsoever on whether Kee was 457 Galang v. Reyes
a builder in good faith, that is, on his state of mind at the time he GR NOo. 18746
built the improvements on Lot 9. August 15, 2012
 Violations may give rise to petitioners cause of action against Kee
under the said contract but may not be bases to negate the FACTS
presumption that Kee was a builder in good faith. - SPS Reyes filed a case for the annulment of original certificate of title against SPS
o Petitioner next contends that Kee cannot claim that another lot was Galang with the RTC. R alleged that they owned two properties (1) subdivision project
erroneously pointed out to him because the latter agreed to the following known as Ponderosa Heights Subdivision ad (2) adjoining property. Both properties
provision in the Contract of Sale on Installment – declaring that the Vendee are separated by a creek which dried up. The P were able to obtain a cert of title over
examined the property the dried creek from the DENR, as discovered by their caretaker. That their caretaker
 We do not agree with the interpretation of petitioner that Kee entoroso applied for titling of the property and that he had been occupying the same
contracted away his right to recover damages resulting from and in fact built a lot on it.
petitioners negligence. Such waiver would be contrary to public - P denied that the land subject used to be part of the creek. That their predecessors
policy and cannot be allowed. Rights may be waived, unless the had been in possession, occupation, cultivation, and ownership of the land. That the
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or property was transferred under the R through a falsified document.
good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right - RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. R presented no evidence of
recognized by law. fraud despite their allegations that the P were in possession of the property of the
dried creek. No evidence, contentions are mere allegations.
Petitioner’s Liability - CA reversed the decision. That the R proved by preponderance of evidence that the
- The principal is responsible for the acts of the agent, done within the scope of his land was part of the creek.
authority, and should bear the damage caused to third persons. On the other hand,
the agent who exceeds his authority is personally liable for the damage. ISSUES Whether the Reyesses can file the present action for annulment of a free patent title
o CTTEI was acting within its authority as the sole real estate representative and reconveyance.
of petitioner when it made the delivery to Kee. In acting within its scope of
authority, it was, however, negligent. RULING
 It is this negligence that is the basis of petitioners liability, as - Complaint instituted by the R before the RTC was for the annulment of the title issued
principal of CTTEI, per Articles 1909 and 1910 of the Civil Code. to the P and not reversion. The real part in interest is not the State but the R who
- Jardinico and Kee entered into a deed of sale, wherein the former sold Lot 9 to Kee. claim a right of ownership over the property in question. CA reversed RTC decision
Jardinico and Kee did not inform the Court of Appeals of such deal. because the R failed to adduce substantial evidence to establish allegation that P
fraudulently registered the property in their names.
Property cases for Art. 419-426
o CA decision: property was the former bed of Marigman Creek, which o (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a
changed its course and passed through their Ponderosa property, river.
ownership was automatically bested in him. - Cagayan River moved year by year from 1919 to 1968 (49 years) the alluvium
- Law applicable then it Art. 461 which provides: deposited on the other side has become greater in area than the original lands of the
o Art. 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in P in both cases. It was gradual and imperceptible.
the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are - The reason for this principle is because, if lands bordering on streams are exposed
occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. However, the to floods and other damage due to the destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue
owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the of law they are subject to encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is only
same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value just that such risks or dangers as may prejudice the owners thereof should in some
of the area occupied by the new bed. way be compensated by the right of accretion.
 Thus, if a property formed the bed creek that changed its coursed - R ownership of the accretion to their lands was not lost upon the sudden and abrupt
and passed through the property of the claimant, ownership of old change of the course of the Cagayan River.
bed was automatically acquired by the claimant o Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from
- The fact of natural abandonment of the old course must be shown. Claimant, R in this an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another
case, must prove estate, the owner of the land to which the segregated portion belonged
o Old course of the creek retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the same within two
o New course of the creek years.
o Change of course of the creek from the old location to the new location by o Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving
natural occurrence. a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his
- R failed to provide evidence to prove the old course, its natural abandonment, and ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated from the estate
the new course. by the current.
- Sudden change of the River as a result of the typhoon caused a portion of the lands
Agustin v. IAC of R to be separated from the estate by the current. R retained ownership of the
GR No. L-66075-76 portion that was transferred by avulsion to the other side of the river.
July 5, 1990
Jagualing v. CA
FACTS GR No. 94283
- Cagayan River separates the town of Solana and Tuguegarao. Lands of the east of March 4, 1991
the river were covered by the Tugegarao Cadastre. OCT was issued for land east of
the Cagayan River owned by Petitioner Agustin. Cagayan river gradually moved FACTS
eastward. All lands west of the river were included in the Solana Cadastre. Among - Parties of the case dispute ownership of a parcel of land in Misamis Oriental, more or
the occupying lands covered by the Solana Cadastre were occupied by private less forming part of an island in a non-navigable river. R filed with the RTC an action
respondents. to quiet title and/or remove a cloud over the property in question.
- A big flood happened and the Cagayan River changed its course, returned to its 1919 - CA allege that: Respondent Eduave claims she inherited the land from his father
bed, which cut through the lands of private respondent, whose lands were transferred together with his co-heirs and acquired sole-ownership of the property. Further state
on the Tugegarao side of the river. One time, the R had to plant crops on their east that the land is approximately 17k sqm but only 5k sqm in the tax declaration. The
farm, P who was accompanied by the mayor and policemen drove the R away, reason as that she included the land under water. Land was eroded due to typhoon,
claiming the land as is own. Thus this complaint. destroying bigger portion of improvements.in 1966 due to movement of the river
deposits in the land that was not eroded increased the area to almost half a hectare
RULING and 1970 appellant stated planning bananas. P asked permission from R to plant corn
- Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion and bananas provided that they prevent squatters from coming in the area.
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. - There was a previous case between R (Eduave) and Factura, where a land was
- Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present, such as subject of a reconveryance case. That the Factura’s ceded a portion of their land to
in this case where all the requisites are present: Eduave.
o (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
o (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and
Property cases for Art. 419-426
o P of this case denied claim of R, and asserted that they are the real owners. o Hence, not qualifying as possessors in good faith, they may acquire
During the typhoon Ineng in 1964 the river control was washed away ownership over the island only through uninterrupted adverse possession
causing the formation of an island, which is now the land in litigation. for a period of thirty years.
- RTC dismissed complaint. R failed to establish by preponderance of evidence their  By their own admission, petitioners have been in possession of
claim of ownership over the land. the property for only about fifteen years. Thus, the island cannot
be adjudicated in their favor.
ISSUE Between the one who has actual possession of an island that forms in a non-navigable - This case is not between parties as opposing riparian owners contesting ownership
and non-floatable river and the owner of the land along the margin nearest the island, who has over an accession but rather between a riparian owner and the one in possession of
the better light thereto? the island.

RULING Office of the Mayor of Paranque v. Ebio

- It is clear petitioners do not dispute that the land in litigation is an island that appears GR No. 178411
in a non-flotable and non-navigable river; they instead anchor their claim on adverse June 23, 2010
possession for about fifteen years. It is not even controverted that private respondents
are the owners of a parcel of land along the margin of the river and opposite the island. FACTS
On the other hand, private respondents do not dispute that the island in question has - R claim they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land in Paranaque City. Land was
been in the actual physical possession of petitioners; private respondents insist only an accretion of cut-cut creek. R asserts that the original occupant and possessor of
that such possession by petitioners is in the concept of caretakers thereof with the land was their great grandfather, who gave the land to his son Pedro. That pedro lived
permission of private respondents. continuously and exclusively occupied and possess the lot. That Ebio married Pedro’s
- The parcel of land in question is part of an island that formed in a non-navigable and daughter and they established their home the lot. R secured building permits from
non-flotable river; from a small mass of eroded or segregated outcrop of land, it pque for house construction. Pedro ceded his claim over land in favor of Ebio.
increased to its present size due to the gradual and successive accumulation of - On the other hand, Sangguniang Barangay sought assistance of Pque for
alluvial deposits. construction of an access road along the creek, traversing the lot occupied by R. City
o Article 465 of the Civil Code - the island belongs to the owner of the land government advised affected residents to vacate the area to which the R opposed.
along the nearer margin as sole owner thereof; or more accurately, because - RTC applied a writ for preliminary injunction against P, which was denied.
the island is longer than the property of private respondents, they are o R not able to prove that they have an established right to the property since
deemed ipso jure to be the owners of that portion which corresponds to the they have not instituted an action for confirmation of title and their
length of their property along the margin of the river. application for sales patent has not yet been granted. Additionally, they
- Lands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner. This preferential right is, failed to implead the Republic of the Philippines, which is an indispensable
under Article 465, also granted the owners of the land located in the margin nearest party.
the formed island for the reason that they are in the best position to cultivate and
attend to the exploitation of the same. RULING
o No specific act of possession over the accretion is required. - P argues that the creek, being a tributary of the river, is classified as part of the public
o However, if the riparian owner fails to assert his claim thereof, the same domain, any land that may have formed along its banks through time should also be
may yield to the adverse possession of third parties, as indeed even considered as part of the public domain. And respondents should have included the
accretion to land titled under the torrens system must itself still be State as it is an indispensable party to the action.
registered. o Court does not agree.
- Petitioners may acquire said property by adverse possession for the required number - Uncontested fact that the and was formed from the alluvial deposits that gradually
of years under the doctrine of acquisitive prescription. Their possession cannot be settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. The law that governs ownership over the
considered in good faith, however, because they are presumed to have notice of the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in
status of private respondents as riparian owners who have the preferential right to the effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.
island as recognized and accorded by law; they may claim ignorance of the law, - Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers ownership over
specifically Article 465 of the Civil Code, but such is not, under Articles 3 and 526 of alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek. It reads:
the same code, an adequate and valid defense to support their claim of good faith. o ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks,
streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters
thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.
Property cases for Art. 419-426
o ART. 457 of the CC states – To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of September 3, 2014
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of
the current of the waters. FACTS
- Explicit from the provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not - Information was filed against R before the RTC of Naga for violating Sec.11, Art. II of
form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the RA 9165, Comprehensive drugs Act of 2002: That the accused had in possession,
owner of the estate to which it may have been added. custody and control of 9½ bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves with fruiting
o The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining tops.
property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the Version of the Prosecution
alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third - The intelligence section of Naga received an information concerning R that he was
persons. involved in drug trafficking. Surveillance operation confirmed the identity and exact
- Properties of public domain cannot be acquired by prescription. There can be no location of R. A test-buy was conducted, and police assets were able to buy marijuana
prescription against the state regarding the property of public domain. cubes, leaves from R. Code name of R is Leonidas de Leon and name of plan is Code
o While it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which Plan Sativa. Another test-buy was conducted and police assets were able to
is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments purchase.
along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision - Police applied for a search warrants from RTC in NAGA. (1) for violating RA 9165 and
of law. (2) PD 1866 for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions because police saw
appellant had a gun during the second test-buy.
Yu v. Pacleb - They proceeded with the arrest and when R was asked to produce the items
GR No. 130316 enumerated in the warrant, he voluntarily presented them. No firearm was found in
January 24, 2017 the residence. R and the items were seized and brought to the Police Station.
Version of the Defense
FACTS - In the early morning, R was in a house in Naga together with his wife and children.
- Ruperto Javier offered to sell a 18,000sqm lot in Dasmarinas Cavite to P. Javier That somebody knocked and he noticed a lot of people were outside. That he was
supposedly bough the lought from one name Rebecca del Rosario who in turn asked to stay aside and asked to bring out the gun and illegal drugs. When asked to
acquired it from R. title of the property remained in the names of the R. instruments bring out the drugs, someone from the inside shouted “ I have already fond it.” That
in support of the sales were not registered. R was not able to see what they were doing. He was asked to sign a paper and it was
- P accepted the offer and gave Javier downpayment for the lot. javir delivered allegedly for the things found in his house. A man approached him and read the
supposed muniments of title to P. After execution of contract to sell, he turned ove the contents of the warrant.
property to P. RTC
- At the time of turn-over, portion of lot was occupied by Ramon Pacleb and wife and - R found guilty because prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
son. Later, they allegedly surrendered possession of the portion to P. P appointed offense charged. That during the trial, all the elements of the offense were proven.
Ramon Pacleb as their trustee over the subject. That the officers strictly complied with the guidelines prescribed by law on drug
- Aside possession of property, they caused annotation on the TCT. P allege that they operations.
exercised ownerhip rights as well as enjoyed open, public and peaceful possessin - Accused failed to present substantial evidence to establish his defense of frame-up.
over the property from September 1992-1995. R was in the US. RTC placed more weight on the affirmative testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
- R returned to the PH, he allegedly entered the property by means of FISTS, ousting rather than the denials of the accused because positive testimonies are weightier than
P and their trustee Ramon. Despite demands, R refused to vacate the property negative ones.
asserting his right as registered owner. CA
- P filed forcible entry in the MTC against R. MTC: R ordered to surrender physical - Affirmed RTC decision, finding that all elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
possession of lot in favor of P. RTC affirmed the decision. have been proven.
- CA: Set aside MTC decision and forcible entry case against R is dismissed.
RULING
This case no yet finish. Continue - R maintains he has no knowledge as to where the drugs came from since he was not
in possession of th same. That the bricks of marijuana were merely planted by the
People v. De La Trinidad police operatives.
GR No. 199898
Property cases for Art. 419-426
- Defense of frame-up is disfavored by the Court because it can be used as a common - P and Valerio were charged with violating PD 1866. That the P had in their possession
defense. 2 receivers of caliber .45 pistol, 2 short magazing of M16 armalite rifle, among others.
- In the prosecution of illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the following Items were confiscated and recovered from their possession during a search
elements must beestablished: conducted.
o (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which isidentified to - Both pleaded not guilty when they were arraigned. They provided thath
be prohibited or regulated drug; o Search warrant does exist. That subject of the warrant is Fajardo and that
o (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and Valerio was in Fajardo’s house at the time of the search. That both are not
o (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug licensed firearm holders. That both were seen in possession of firearm one
- All these elements were present. night, but was not arrested upon arrival of the military.
- Chain of events which lead to the filing of the present case.
Jurisprudence is consistent in thatmere o A complaint from concerned citizens alleging that armed men drinking liquor
possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima facieevidence of knowledge or animus at the residence of P were indiscriminately firing guns. Members of the
possidendi sufficient to Aklan Police Office noticed that several persons scampered from the area,
convict an accused inthe absence of any satisfactory explanation.38 and the team managed to see Valerio holding a .45 caliber pistol. That she
fired shots at the policemen and ran inside the house of Fajardo. That P
People v. Lagman39 is instructive.1âwphi1 It held that illegal possession ofregulated drugs is was seen tucking a .45 caliber between her waist.
mala o To prevent any commotion, police desisted from entering P’s house. Later,
prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution in the middle of the night, a stationed police officer saw Valerio go to the top
must prove that the of the house and throw something. Upon checking, they found it to be 2
accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, receivers of .45 calliber pistol. Items were surrendered and applied and
includes not only actual obtained a search warrant.
possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the o Warrant was served and was able to confiscate other weapons.
immediate - Since P failed to provide documents showing their authority to possess the firearms,
possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists an information was filed against them.
whenthe drug is under the - P maintains that warrant is defective. That the search was effective. Denied
dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control confiscated items.
over the place where - RTC: accused found liable for illegal possession of firearms.
it is found.Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid o That Valerio is Fajardo’s body guard. With his his military background he
conviction if his right to would be familiar about different types of firearms.
exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with
another. the residence of Elenita Fajardo is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are
the usual depositories for firearms, explosives and ammunition. Granting arguendo that those
It must be emphasized that the finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a house or building firearms and
owned or occupied by ammunition were left behind by Benito Fajardo, a member of the Philippine army, the fact
a particular person raises the presumption of knowledge and possession thereof which, remains that it is a
standing alone, is sufficient government property. If it is so, the residence of Elenita Fajardo is not the proper place to store
to convict.40 Here, accused-appellant failed to p those items. The
logical explanation is that those items are stolen proper

CASE NOT YET DONE The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. What the
Fajardo v. People law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also
GR No. 190889 constructive
January 10, 2011 possession or the subjection of the thing to one’s control and management. This has to be so if
the manifest intent
FACTS
Property cases for Art. 419-426
of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever.
penalizes exist whether But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for
the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the unlawful possession of
object of this law[,] the firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This query
proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever. assumes significance
since the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a special
[I]n order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused law, in which case
had no good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses.
authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not
such possession was necessary. It is sufficient
made in good faith and without criminal intent. that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to
commit the crime and
To convict an accused for illegal possession of firearms and explosive under P.D. 1866, as intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended
amended, two (2) to commit a crime;
essential elements must be indubitably established, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself.
ammunition or In the first (intent to
explosive which may be proved by the presentation of the subject firearm or explosive or by the commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is
testimony of enough that the
witnesses who saw accused in possession of the same, and (b) the negative fact that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously.
accused has no license or In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess.
permit to own or possess the firearm, ammunition or explosive which fact may be established While mere
by the testimony or possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a
certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused has firearm, it must still be
no license or permit shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused.
to possess the subject firearm or explosive (Exhibit G). Such intent to possess
is, however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have
CA concurred with RTC but declared the search warrant void. harbored in
possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an
The liability for their offense with the use
possession, however, should fall only on Valerio and not on petitioner.1avvphil of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree
The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, we find that petitioner is not liable for illegal No. 1866. Hence, in
possession of part of a order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused
firearm. had no authority or
license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession
how and when liability for illegal possession of firearms attaches, People was made in good
v. De Gracia2 faith and without criminal intent.
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm
ammunition. What the cannot be considered
law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, such as Presidential
constructive Decree No. 1866.
possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control and management. This has to be so if Thus, although there is physical or constructive possession, for as long as the animus
the manifest intent possidendi is absent, there is
of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law no offense committed.23
penalizes exist whether Certainly, illegal possession of firearms, or, in this case, part of a firearm, is committed when
the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the the holder thereof:
object of this law the (1) possesses a firearm or a part thereof
Property cases for Art. 419-426
(2) lacks the authority or license to possess the firearm.2 - P further alleges sge has been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner,
that her possession ahs been peaceful, public, uninterrupted and continous sine 1948
petitioner was neither in physical nor constructive possession of the subject receivers. The or earlier; and tacking her possession with that of her predecessors-in-interest,
testimony of petitioner has been in possession of the land for more than 50 years.
SPO2 Nava clearly bared that he only saw Valerio on top of the house when the receivers were - R filed an opposition to P’s application. During intialr hearing,only P appeared and
thrown. None of the presented evidence.
witnesses saw petitioner holding the receivers, before or during their disposal. o One of the witness, heir neighbor testified that property for application was
At the very least, petitioner’s possession of the receivers was merely incidental because Valerio, previously owned and possessed by the P’s father.
the one in actual o Anothr witness provides that Maria Carolos used to own it until she passed
physical possession, was seen at the rooftop of petitioner’s house. Absent any evidence which now belongs to P.
pointing to petitioner’s - P admits that her mother sold the land to a development corporation in 1996 but failed
participation, knowledge or consent in Valerio’s actions, she cannot be held liable for illegal to deiver the tile. Thus, heir of maria carlos made a commitment to the corporation to
possession of the deliver the titele so they could collect unpaid balance of the purchase price.
receivers. - Application for title was granted
Petitioner’s apparent liability for illegal possession of part of a firearm can only proceed from the - CA: reversed ans set aside this decision. It noted that:
assumption that o P was no longer in possession and occupation of the land at the time she
one of the thrown receivers matches the gun seen tucked in the waistband of her shorts earlier applied for the registration of title.
that night. o Possession and occupation now refrs to the development corporation. Thus
Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to convert such assumption into concrete evidence. P has no registrable title over the land.

The CA correctly convicted Valerio with illegal possession of part of a firearm. RULING
In illegal possession of a firearm, two (2) things must be shown to exist: (a) the existence of the - CA ruling is affirmed.
subject firearm; and Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a) that the land forms
(b) the fact that the accused who possessed the same does not have the corresponding license part of the disposable
for it.26 and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open,
By analogy then, a successful conviction for illegal possession of part of a firearm must yield continuous, exclusive,
these requisites: and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership
(a) the existence of the part of the firearm; and either since time
(b) the accused who possessed the same does not have the license for the firearm to which the immemorial or since June 12, 1945.12
seized
part/component corresponds. petitioner has met the first requirement but not the second.
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the
Carlos v. Republic conjunction ["]and["], the
GR No. 164823 clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader
August 31, 2005 than occupation
because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word
FACTS occupation, it seeks to delimit
- P, represented by her daughter ictoria, filed an application fr registration and the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open,
confirmation of title ovr a parcel ofland with nearly 4000 sqm. P alleges that continuous, exclusive
o She is owner of the land which she openly and exclusively and notoriously and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify,
possessed and occupied since july 1945 or earlier under a bonaifde claim his possession must
of ownership. not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of
o No omrtgahe or encumerbace affectinc property or is it part of any military dominion over it of such a
or naval reservation nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.
o That is being used for industrial purposes It is clear in the case at bar that the applicant, Maria Carlos, no longer had possession of the
o No tenants of lessees on the property. property at the time of
Property cases for Art. 419-426
the application for the issuance of a certificate of title. The application was filed in court on he said court found to its satisfaction that claimant Escritor acquired the
December 19, 2001. land by inheritance from his father who in turn acquired it by purchase, and that his open, public,
Teresita Carlos Victoria, the daughter of Maria Carlos, admitted during the hearing that her continuous,
mother had sold the adverse, exclusive and notorious possession dated back to the Filipino-Spanish Revolution. 13
property to Ususan Development Corporation in 1996. It must also be recalled that in
its Order for the issuance of decrees dated July 15, 1958, the same Court declared that the
Escritor v. IAC above-mentioned decision had become final. Significantly, nowhere
GR No. 71283 during the entire cadastral proceeding did anything come up to suggest that the land belonged
November 12, 1987 to any person other than Escritor.

FACTS Escritor honestly believed that he is the legal owner of the land. With this well-grounded belief
- Lot 2749 in Quezon was the subect of cadastral proceedings in the CFI, P as the of ownership, he
claimant and confirming his title. Immediately thereafter, P took possession of the continued in his possession of Lot No. 2749. This cannot be categorized as possession in bad
property. The court directed chief of the lnd registration office to issue the faith.
corresponding decree of registration in favo of P, the decision ecoming final. As defined in the law, a possessor in bad faith is one in possession of property knowing that his
- Respindent Acuna filed a petition for review contending that the land was obtained by title thereto is
P through fraud and misrepresentation. This was granted. While proceedings were defective. 14 Here, there is no showing that Escritor knew of any flaw in his title. Nor was it
ongoing, P however died and his heir took possession of the property. proved that petitioners were aware that the title of their
- 13 yeas after the disputed decision, court adjudicated lot to Acuna, ordering P to predecessor had any defect.
vacate the land. Nevertheless, assuming that claimant Escritor was a possessor in bad faith, this should not
- 4 years later, R filed a complaint for recovery of damages against P for te fruits of the prejudice his
lot which was allegedly possessed by the P unlawfully for 13 years. According to R, successors-in-interest, petitioners herein, as the rule is that only personal knowledge of the flaw
registration of lot was effected by Escritor through fraud, malice, and in one's title or
misrepresentation. Lowercout dismissed R’s complaint stating that P enjoyed the mode of acquisition can make him a possessor in bad faith, for bad faith is not transmissible
fruits of the property, they were in GF possessing under a just ititle, and the cause of from one person to
action has already rescribed. another, not even to an heir. 15 As Article 534 of the Civil Code explicitly provides, "one who
- IAC: decision was reversed. succeeds by hereditary title shall not suffer the
consequences of the wrongful possession of the decedent, if it is not shown that he was aware
The IAC made the pronouncement that petitioners of the flaws affecting it; ..." The reason for this article is that bad
were possessors in bad faith from 1958 up to 1971 and should be held accountable for faith is personal and intransmissible. Its effects must, therefore, be suffered only by the person
damages. This conclusion who acted in bad faith; his heir should not be saddled with such
was based on the statement of the cadastral court in its August 21, 1971 decision, readjudicating consequences. 16
Lot No. 2749 to Under Article 527 of the Civil Code, good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges
respondent Simeon Acuna, that "Miguel Escritor forcibly took possession of the land in May, bad faith on the part
1958, and benefited of a possessor rests the burden of proof. If no evidence is presented proving bad faith, like in
from the coconut trees thereon. 10 The Intermediate Appellate Court observed that on the basis this case, the
of the unimpeached conclusion of the cadastral court, presumption of good faith remains.
it must be that the petitioners have wrongfully entered possession of the land. 11 The
Intermediate Appellate Court further explains that as such possessors in bad petitioners' predecessor in having the land registered under his (the predecessor's) name. A
faith, petitioners must reimburse respondent Acuna for the fruits of the land they had received review of the record,
during their possession. 12 however, does not indicate the existence of any such fraud. It was not proven in the cadastral
court nor was it shown
RULING in the trial court.
- Court does not agree with the IAC. Lot No. 2749 was not awarded to Escritor on the basis of his machinations. What is clear is that
- In the first decision of the cadastral court, it was adjudicated in favor of Escritor. in the hearing of
Property cases for Art. 419-426
January 22, 1958, the Court permitted Escritor to adduce his evidence of ownership without
opposing evidence as It is not disputed that the lot on which petitioner’s alleged "right of way" exists belongs to the
the lot had become uncontested. 17 Respondent Acuna himself failed to appear in this hearing state or property of
because of a misunderstanding with a lawyer. 18 public dominion. Property of public dominion is defined by Article 420 of the Civil Code as
There is no finding that such failure to appear was caused by petitioners in this case. On the follows:
contrary, all the requirements of publication were followed. Notice of "ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public
hearing was duly published. Clearly then, the allegation of fraud is without basis. use such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
Respondent having failed to prove fraud and bad faith on the part of petitioners, We sustain the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and other of similar character.
trial court's finding (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
that petitioners were possessors in good faith and should, therefore, not be held liable for public service or
damages. for the development of the national wealth."
Public use is "use that is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite
DBP v. CA public."6 Records show
GR No. 111737 that the lot on which the stairways were built is for the use of the people as passageway to the
October 13, 1999 highway.
Consequently, it is a property of public dominion.
FACTS Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and hence it: (1) cannot be
- Respondents Pineda are registered owners of a 238,406 sqm land in Capiz, covered alienated or leased or
by a homestead patent, and OCT. that R mortgaged thhe land to Petitioner DBP to otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot be acquired by prescription against the
secure their agricultural loan worth 20,000 State; (3) is not
subject to attachment and execution; and (4) cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement.7
Villarico v. Sarmiento
GR No. 136438 - The lot where the stairways were conducted is of public dominion, can’t be burdened
November 11, 2004 by a voluntary easement of right of way of P. Its use by the public is mere tolerance
of the gov’t through DPWH. P can’t appropriate it for himself.
FACTS - Can’t claim right of possession over it. This is clear from Article 530 of the Civil Code
- P is an owner of a 66 sqm lot in Paranaque covered by a TCT. It is separated from which provides:
the Ninoy Aquino highway by a strip of land belonging to the government. Since "ART. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object
highway is higher than adjoining areas, DPWH constructed stairways to enable of
people to access it. possession."
- R built a building on portion of said government land. Later, Andok’s Chicken
occupied a part thereof.
- By deed of exchange of real property, P acquired 74.3 sqm of the area owned by the Edu v. Gomez
government. Covered by a TCT and registered. P field accion publiciana against R GR No. L-33397
because R’s structures closed his right of way to Ninoy Aquino Avenue and June 22, 1984
encroached on his portion.
- R denied allegations. R claims that since they were issued with licenses and permit FACTS
to construct on the area, P has no right over the subject property since it belongs to - Subject of the case is a 1968 Volkswagen, allegedly owned by Lt. Walter A. Bala
the government. under whose name the car was already registered. Office of the commission on Land
- RTC: P has never been in possession of any portion of the public land in question. R Transportation were informed that the car was stolen from the house of Bala. That the
has been the one in actual possession. P not deprived of ‘right of way”. CA affirmed Petitioners, agents of Anti-Carnapping Unit, recognized the car in possession of the
decision. respondent Abello and immediately seized and impounded the car as stolen property.
- Petitioner Edu seized the car Pursuant to Sec. 60 of RA 4136 which empowers him
RULING to seize the motor vehicle for delinquent and to seize motor vehicles fraudulently or
- P claims that R, by constructing buildings on the lot, deprived him of his right of way otherwise not properly registered.
and right of possession over a portion of the same lot.
Property cases for Art. 419-426
- Respondent Abello filed a complaint for replevin with damages with the respondent Dios was, the same answered that he did not know him. He immediately went back
court, praying that the property be in his custody. to the house of Marella who was also gone.
o Judge issued seizure of the property. That Abello purchased the car from - On the same day, Marella was able to see the car to the Petitioner. That the petitioner
its registered owner, Marcelino Guansing for 9,000, under the notarial deed acquired it from Marella in good faith. While the car was in P’s possession, agents of
of absolute sale. That she has been in possession of the car since February the Philippine constabulary seized and confiscated the same as a result of the report
1971. to them by Teodoro Santos.
- RTC: rendered in favor of Teodoro. That he had been unlawfully deprived of his
RULING personal property by Marella, and under Art. 559 of the NCC, he was entitled to
- The complaint is for replevin – delivery of personal property. All the requirements are recover.
present in the complaint. o Aznar appeals this decision.
o Plaintiff is the owner of the automobile in question
o That the property was seized from Abello against her will. ISSUE: Between Teodoro Santos and Jose Aznar, who has a better right to the possession of
o Property is wrongfully detained by the defendants. the automobile.
- The acquirer or the purchaser in good faith of a chattel of movable property is entitled
to be respected and protected in his possession as if he were the true owner thereof RULING: Teodoro Santos.
until a competent court rules otherwise. - P contends that the applicable provision is Art. 1506 instead of Art. 559. Art. 1506
- In the meantime, as the true owner, the possessor in good faith cannot be compelled provides:
to surrender possession nor to be required to institute an action for the recovery of o ART. 1506. Where the seller of goods has a voidable title thereto, but his,
the chattel. title has not been voided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good
- The filing of an information charging that the chattel was illegally obtained through title to the goods, provided he buys them in good faith, for value, and without
estafa from its true owner by the transferor does not warrant disturbing the possession notice of the seller's defect of title.
of the chattel against the will of the possessor. - The contention is unmeritorious. Under the provision, it is entitled that the seller should
have a voidable title at least. In this case, the seller had no title at all.
Aznar v. Yapdiangco - Marella did not have any title to the property because it was never delivered to him.
GR No. L-18536 He sought ownership by virtue of a contract or acquisition of it by virtue of a contract.
March 31, 1965 He could have acquired ownership or title only by the delivery or tradition of the car
to him.
FACTS - Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, "ownership and other real rights over property are
- In May 1959, Teodoro Santos advertised in two metropolitan papers the sale of his acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by testate and intestate succession,
Ford Fairlane 500. That a certain L. De Dios went to the place of Santos to answer and in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition."
the ad. Only his son Irineo Santos was home at that time, and he was informed that o Ownership is not transferred by contract merely but by tradition or delivery.
De Dios went in behalf of his uncle Vicente Marella, who has interested in buying the o Contracts only constitute title or rights to the transfer or acquisition of
car. ownership, while tradition is the mode of accomplishing the same.
- Teodoro instructed his son to see Vicente Marella. Marella agreed to buy the car only o For the legal acquisition and transfer of ownership and other property rights,
after it has been registered under his name. They want to the house of one name Atty. the thing transferred must be delivered, inasmuch as, according to settled
Jose Padolina where a deed of sale of the car was executed in favor of Marella. They jurisprudence, the tradition of the thing is a necessary and indispensable
registered the car under his name as well. No purchase price has been paid. requisite in the acquisition of said ownership by virtue of contract.
- Teodoro gave the registration papers and a copy of deed of sale to his son. He o So long as property is not delivered, the ownership over it is not transferred
instructed him not to part with them until Marella gives the full payment of the car. L by contract merely but by delivery.
De Dios and Irineo went to the house of Marella, however he claims he was short of - In the case at hand, the car was never delivered to the vendee by the vendor as to
2,000. He told them that will just go to his sister to get money. Marella ordered the complete or consummate the transfer of ownership by virtue of the contract.
two to go to the house of the sister, and he asked the registration papers and deed o While there was a contract of sale between Marella and Santos, the former
od sale on the pretext that he would like to show them to his lawyer. took possession of the property by stealing it from the custody of Santos’
- At the sister place, De Dios asked Irineo to wait in the sala while he went inside the son.
room. That was the last he saw of him. The car was no longer there, as well as the - Lower court correctly applied Art. 559, the rule is to effect that if the owner has lost a
unidentified companion. Going back the house he inquired from a woman where De thing, or if he has been unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not only
Property cases for Art. 419-426
from the diner, thief or robber, but also from third persons who may have acquired it - P filed a motion for reconsideration, calling the attention of the courts to the SPA
in good faith from such finder, thief or robber. executed in favor of her husband, which did not authorize him to sell any property. It
o Exceptions merely entitled him to collect and receive sums due.
 He has lost the thing; or o This was denied
 He has been unlawfully deprived thereof.
o In these cases, possessor cannot retain the thing as against the owner, who ISSUE: Proper application of Art. 599
may recover it without paying any indemnity, except when the possessor
acquired it in a public sale. RULING
- Respondent court acted arbitrarily and with grave abuse of discretion in directing the
Alcantara-Pica v. CFI release of the car to Carigo rather than the P, who is the rightful owner and has been
GR No. L-36434 unlawfully deprived thereof in disregard of Art. 559 which provides:
October 27, 1973 o That the owner may recover the lost article of which he or she has been
unlawfully deprived without reimbursement of the sum received by the
FACTS embezzler or wrongdoer from the possessor, even granting that the
- P, a LT in the AFP Nurse Corps, is the lawful owner of a 1966 Toyota, having possessor acquired possession by purchase or other means in good faith.
purchased the same on installment basis from Delta Motor Sales Corporation to which - Art. 559 was correctly cited but wrongly applied by the respondent court
she mortgaged the same to secure payment of the balance of the price thereof. o The rule is to the effect that if the owner has lost a thing, or if he has been
- Private respondent Carigo claims ownership of the same vehicle by purchase from unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not only from the finder,
one name Moico Maniquiz. Maniquiz purchased it from one named Pica who held a thief or robber, but also from third persons who may have acquired it in good
SPA from P authorizing him only to “ask, demand, sue for, and received all sums of faith from such finder, thief or robber."
money…”  The only exception provided - which is not applicable here — is
- Car was impounded in QC in connection with criminal case of Carigo for illegal where such third party has acquired in good faith the article "at a
possession of firearm and ammunition which had been intercepted from said vehicle. public sale" in which case "the owner cannot obtain its return
- P and Carrigo, conflicting claimant of the same car. That an order was issued to without reimbursing the price paid therefor."
investigate the conflicting claims and that the same shall remain in possession of the - In this case, P was unlawfully deprived of her car by her husband who successfully
Metrocom, until the real owner of the car is determined. illegally disposed the same to Maniquiz, notwithstanding that his SPA did not
- History of the car: authorize him to sell any property of P.
o P executed the SPA in favor of her husband. That the sale was made by
the husband as her attorney-in-fact to Maniquiz. That Maniquiz sold it to EDCA Publishing v. Santos
Carigo and was registered, and that he was in possession of the car since GR No. 80298
July 1971 as registered owner until he was apprehended by Metrocom. April 26, 1990
o That the car is still mortgaged to Delta Motor Sales Corporation by the
Petitioner with an outstanding balance. FACTS
- Fiscal recommended that car be released to Carigo which the respondent court - Movable property in this case consists of books which were bought from P by an
affirmed on the following grounds: impostor who sold it to the private R. Ownership of the books was recognized in the
o He is a possessor in good faith thus, his possession of the same is private R by the MTC, RTC, and CA. P asks to declare that all these courts have erred
equivalent to a title. and should be reversed.
o Registration of a motor vehicle in the name of a person is prima facie - This case arose when on October 1981, a person identifying himself as Prof. Cruz
evidence of the fact that the person in whose name said vehicle is registered who claims to be a dean in DLSCollege placed an order by telephone with the P for
is the owner. 406 books, payable on delivery. Cruz issued a personal check for the payment of the
o The registered owner of a motor vehicle is the recognized owner thereof for books. He sold the books to private respondent Santos for 1,700.
all intents and purposes. - Cruz placed a second order with P before the first check was cleared. They made
o The validity of the Deed of Sale executed by Pica and Maniquiz cannot be inquiries with DLSC and found out that no employee exists, and that he had no
attacked collaterally. account with Philippine manah Bank where he had drawn the check. P went to the
police to set a trap against him. His real name is Tomas de la Pena.
Property cases for Art. 419-426
- P sought assistance of the police which forced their way into the store of Santos and a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by R to the
threatened Leonor Santos with prosecution for buying stolen property. They seized books.
120 books without warrant and returned to petitioner. - Leonor Santos took care to ascertain first that the books belonged to Cruz before she
- Cruz sued for recovery of the books after EDCA rejected demand to return. Writ of agreed to purchase them. The EDCA invoice Cruz showed her assured her that the
preliminary attachment was issued and P finally surrendered the books to R. books had been paid for on delivery.
o By contrast, EDCA was less than cautious — in fact, too trusting in dealing
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner has been unlawfully deprived of the books because the check with the impostor. Although it had never transacted with him before, it
issued by the impostor in payment was dishonored. readily delivered the books he had ordered (by telephone) and as readily
accepted his personal check in payment. It did not verify his identity
RULING although it was easy enough to do this. It did not wait to clear the check of
- P contends that R have not established their ownership of the books because no this unknown drawer. Worse, it indicated in the sales invoice issued to him,
receipt has been produced to prove they bought the stock. by the printed terms thereon, that the books had been paid for on delivery,
o Unacceptable because the first sentence of Article 559 provides that "the thereby vesting ownership in the buyer
possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a
title," thus dispensing with further proof.
o Santos ascertained ownership of books from EDCA invoice showing that Moralidad v. SPS Diosdado Pernes
they had been sold to Cruz, who said he was selling them for a discount GR No. 152809
because he was in financial need. That R is in the business of buying and August 3, 2006
selling books. To Leonel Santos, Cruz must have been only one of the many
such sellers. FACTS
o As payment check bounced for lack of funds, there was a failure - A parcel of land is located in Davao City and registered under the name of the petitioner
consideration that nullified the contract of sale between it and Cruz. under a TCT. During the younger years of the Petitioner, she had the opportunity to teach
- The contract of sale is consensual and is perfected once agreement is reached in the USA. She would come to the Philippines and spend her vacation at the house of her
between the parties on the subject matter and the consideration. According to the niece, Arlene Perenes (Respondent).
Civil Code: - While in the USA, she received news from Arlene that the outskirts of Davao City were
o Art. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting infested by NPA. Shocked by this news, she immediately sent money to Arlene’s Older
of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the sister, Acaeli. She was instructed to look for a lot in Davao city where Arlene and her family
price. From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand could settle down. This is why she bought the parcel of land.
performance, subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of - Initially, the lot was acquired to let Arlene settle down but P subsequently wanted the
contracts. property to be available to any of her kins who wish to live and settle in Davao City. She
o Art. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee made this intention known to Arlene through an executed document.
upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof. - Following the petitioners’ retirement, she went back to the Philippines and stayed at the
o Art. 1478. The parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing shall not house of respondent which was built on the subject property. In the course of time, the
pass to the purchaser until he has fully paid the price. relationship between the P and R turned sour. In one instance, P brought a matter before
- It is clear from the provisions, especially the last, that ownership in the sold shall not the lupon where she lodged a complaint for slander, harassment, and others against the
pass to the buyer until full payment of the purchase ONLY if there is a stipulation to Respondents. Deciding on this, the Lupon ordered the Pernes to vacate the property after
that effect. they have been reimbursed for the value of the house they built. Both parties could not
o Otherwise, the rule is that such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the agree on the amount.
vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the - Eventually, the P filed with the MTCC of Davao City a case for unlawful detainer against
purchase price has not yet been paid. the Respondent Spouses. P alleges that she is the registered owner of the land on which
- Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to the R’s built their house; that through her counsel, a letter was sent to the R demanding
criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. them to vacate the premises and pay the rentals, to which R refused to heed.
o Absent the stipulation, delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer - R alleges that they entered the property and maintained it as their residence with full
ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another. knowledge and consent of the P.
- Actual delivery of the books, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he could
then validly transfer to the private respondents. Fact that he had not paid EDCA was
Property cases for Art. 419-426
- MTCC ruled in favor of the P. The court provided that although they R’s were builders in and frail condition, are enough factual bases to consider the usufruct as having
GF, R’s continued possession of the premises became unlawful upon their receipt of the been terminated.
demand to vacate.
- R’s appealed to the RTC, and the decision of the MTCC was reversed. The court provides National Housing Authority v. CA
that the occupation of the R was because of the express consent of the P and not by mere GR No. 148830
tolerance. The RTC further ruled that the Art. 448 and 546 of the CC governs the April 13, 2005
relationship of the parties. The court explains that since respondents are possessors of the
property by permission petitioner, and builders in good faith, they have the right to retain FACTS
possession of the property subject of this case until they have been reimbursed the cost of - Former President Marcos issued Proclamation no. 481, setting aside a 120-hectare portion
the improvements they have introduced on the property. of land in QC owned by the P as reserved property site of the National Government Center
- CA Affirmed the decision of the RTC. It ruled that (NGC). Former president issued another proclamation, which removed a 7-hectare portion
o It is still premature to apply Art. 448 and 546 of the CC to the case at hand of the NGC and another proclamation which gave Manila Seedling Bank Foundation
o What governs the rights of the parties is the law on usufruct but petitioner failed (MSBF) usufructary rights over the segregated portion.
to establish that respondents’ right to possess had already ceased o That the usufructary right was granted for their use in its operation and projects,
and to future survey.
ISSUES: Whether the CA erred in applying Art. 448 and 456 and the provisions of the code of - MSBF occupied the area, and exceeded the 7-hectares subject to its usufructary right over
Usufruct instead of Art. 1678 of the CC; and whether the existing usufruct may be deemed to the years. By 1987, it occupied nearly 16 hectares. On the same year, MSBF leased a
have been extinguished or terminated. portion of the area to BGC and other stallholders.
- On the same year, former president Corazon Aquino issued a memorandum which revoked
RULING: The court rules in favor of P. the reserved status of the 50 hectares remaining from the 120 hectares of NHA property.
- What was constituted between the parties is one of usufruct over a piece of land. The It also authorized NHA to commercialize the area and sell it to the public.
petitioner being the owner of the property upon whom the naked title thereto remained and - NHA gave BGC ten days to vacate its occupied area, any structure left within the period
the respondents being two (2) among other unnamed usufructuaries who were simply will be demolished. BGC filed a complaint for injunction with the trial court.
referred to as petitioner’s kin. - RTC dismissed the complaint for injunction and ruled that the MSBF failed to do its right to
- Usufruct under Article 562 of the Civil gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the conduct a survey. To allow MSBF to determine the 7-hectare now would be unfair to the
obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law grantor of the usufruct.
otherwise provides. - BGC Appealed the RTC ruling to the CA. The court reversed the decision of the RTC
- Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to enjoy another’s property.
It is the right to enjoy the property of another temporarily, including both the jus utendi and ISSUES: Whether the premises leased by BGC form MSBF is within the seven-hectare area
the jus fruendi, with the owner retaining the jus disponendi or the power to alienate the that Proclamation No. 167 granted to MSBF by way of Usufruct.
same.
- It is undisputed that the P made known her intention to give R and her other kins the right RULING: Court remands the petition to the trial court for a joint survey to determine finally the
to use and enjoy the fruits of her property. metes and bounds of the seven-hectare area subject to MSBF’s usufructuary rights.
- On the second issue whether the existing usufruct may be deemed to have been - A usufruct may be constituted for a specified term and under such conditions as the parties
extinguished or terminated. If the question is resolved in the affirmative, then the may deem convenient subject to the legal provisions on usufruct. A usufructuary may lease
respondents’ right to possession, proceeding as it did from their right of usufruct, likewise the object held in usufruct. Thus, the NHA may not evict BGC if the 4,590 square meter
ceased portion MSBF leased to BGC is within the seven-hectare area held in usufruct by MSBF.
- Art. 603 enumerates the modes on how a Usufruct is extinguished. In the document The owner of the property must respect the lease entered into by the usufructuary so long
executed by the petitioner, it sets forth a resolutory condition over the usufruct "[T]hat as the usufruct exists. However, the NHA has the right to evict BGC if BGC occupied a
anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail the use thereof. portion outside of the seven-hectare area covered by MSBF’s usufructuary rights.
Provided, however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose thereof" - MSBF’s survey shows that BGC’s stall is within the 7-hectare area while the NHA survey
- Based on the facts and circumstances submitted by the P, it can be seen that that usufruct shows otherwise.
terminated or extinguished by the occurrence of the resolutory condition. - ART. 565. The rights and obligations of the usufructuary shall be those provided in the title
o the continuing animosity between the petitioner and the Pernes family and the constituting the usufruct; in default of such title, or in case it is deficient, the provisions
violence and humiliation she was made to endure, despite her advanced age contained in the two following Chapters shall be observed.
Property cases for Art. 419-426
- In the present case, Proclamation No. 1670 is the title constituting the usufruct. o ART. 474. Civil fruits are deemed to accrue day by day, and belong to the
Proclamation No. 1670 categorically states that the seven-hectare area shall be usufructuary in proportion to the time the usufruct may last.
determined "by future survey under the administration of the Foundation subject to private o ART. 475. When a usufruct is created on the right to receive an income or
rights if there be any." Based on this proclamation, it authorized MSBF to determine the periodical revenue, either in money or fruits, or the interest on bonds or
location of the seven-hectare and left it to choose the location of the seven-hectare area securities payable to bearer, each matured payment shall be considered as
under its usufruct the proceeds or fruits such right. When it consists of the enjoyment of the
- A usufruct is not simply about rights and privileges. A usufructuary has the duty to protect benefits arising from an interest in an industrial or commercial enterprise,
the owner’s interests. One such duty is found in Article 601 of the Civil Code which states: the profits of which are not distributed at fixed periods, such profits shall
ART. 601. The usufructuary shall be obliged to notify the owner of any act of a third person, have the same consideration. In either case they shall be distributed as civil
of which he may have knowledge, that may be prejudicial to the rights of ownership, and fruits, and shall be applied in accordance with the rules prescribed by the
he shall be liable should he not do so, for damages, as if they had been caused through next preceding article.
his own fault. A usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of - The shares of stock are part of the usufruct. The stock dividends are civil fruits of the
preserving its form and substance,unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise original investment.
provides.

Bachrach v. Seifert
GR No. L-2659
October 12, 1950

FACTS
- The deceased petitioner left his widow, Mary McDonoald, all the fruits and usufruct of the
remainder of all his estate; and that she may enjoy the use of the usufruct of spend the
fruits in any manner she wishes. His will provided that upon the death of his widow, ½ of
all his estate shall be divided by his legal heirs except his brother.
- P owned 108,000 shares of stock from a mining company. The widow petitioned the lower
court to authorize the People Bank and Trust Company to her share of stock dividend paid
out in the form of stock, is fruit or income and therefore belonged to her as usufructary.
o Legal heirs of the deceased opposed the petition on the ground that the stock
dividend was not income but formed part of the capital. Thus is did not belong to
the usufructary but to the remainderman.

ISSUE: W/ stock dividends can be considered as income.

RULING: The shares of stock are part of the usufruct.

- The court should consider the Pennsylvania rule which provides that, all earning of the
corporation made prior to the death of the testator stockholder belong to the corpus of the
estate, and that all earning, when declared as dividends in whatever form, and during the
lifetime of the usufructary or life tenant.
- Under Sec. 16 of the Corporation Law, no corporation may make or declare any dividend
except from the surplus profits arising from its business. Any dividend, therefore, whether
cash or stock, represents surplus profits.
- Article 471 of the Civil Code provides that the usufructuary shall be entitled to receive all
the natural, industrial, and civil fruits of the property in usufruct. And articles 474 and 475
provide as follows: