doi:10.1017/hgl.2016.

66 Hegel Bulletin, page 1 of 18

© The Hegel Society of Great Britain, 2017

Hegel and Husserl: Two Phenomenological

Reactions to Kant
Tom Rockmore

Abstract

The widespread tendency to understand phenomenology on a Husserlian model makes

it incomparable with other views. I will use the term ‘phenomenology’ in a wider sense
to refer to approaches to cognition based on phenomena. From the latter angle of
vision, ’phenomenology’ includes not only Husserl and the Husserlians but also a
wider selection of thinkers stretching back to early Greece. Although this will enlarge
the scope of what counts as phenomenology, I will not be claiming that everyone is
a phenomenologist. I will, however, be arguing that Kant, Hegel and Husserl are
phenomenologists, or again phenomenological thinkers, and that Hegel and Husserl
can be understood through their different reactions to Kantian phenomenology.

Philosophical theories are formulated to respond to perceived difficulties. The

widespread tendency to understand phenomenology on a Husserlian model
makes it incomparable with other views. This article will contest the view that
‘phenomenology’ should only be understood in a Husserlian manner, proposing a
broadened definition intended to make it easier to compare and contrast, hence
to estimate the degree of progress with respect to outstanding concerns, of
Husserlian and non-Husserlian forms of phenomenology.
‘Phenomenology’ obviously means different things to different observers.
Observers disagree—often basically disagree—about the meaning of the term, as
well as about how to understand Husserl. It goes beyond the scope of this
discussion to propose a correct reading of Husserlian phenomenology. Although
Husserl thinks that he invented ‘phenomenology,’ I will use the term in a wider
sense, to refer to approaches to cognition based on phenomena. From the latter
angle of vision, ‘phenomenology’ includes not only Husserl and the Husserlians
but also a wider selection of thinkers stretching back to early Greece. Although
this will enlarge the scope of what counts as phenomenology, I will not be
claiming that everyone is a phenomenologist. I will, however, be arguing that
Kant, Hegel and Husserl are phenomenologists, or again phenomenological
1
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 Hegel and Husserl

thinkers, and that Hegel and Husserl can be understood through their different
reactions to Kantian phenomenology.

I. What is phenomenology?

Husserl’s claim to discover phenomenology suggests that it originates in the

Logical Investigations. According to this view, the phenomenologists are the series
of thinkers influenced by Husserl, who form what Spiegelberg influentially
identifies as the phenomenological movement (Spiegelberg 1960). Yet this
account is too simplistic. Though he continued to refer to ‘phenomenology’,
Husserl’s understanding of this term evolved in ways that many ‘Husserlians’
later rejected. Heidegger’s view of ‘phenomenology’ is, for instance, not only
different from but also starkly opposed to Husserl’s.1
‘Phenomenology’ comes from the Greek term phainomenon, meaning thing
appearing to view, from phainein, to show, or what appears, as opposed to reality.
It was later used in a natural scientific context, for instance by Newton. In the
Scholium to the Principia, he claimed to deduce his experimental philosophy from
phenomena in eliciting the laws of nature directly from experience.
Phenomenon was apparently in use in the late sixteenth century. The term
‘phenomenology’, which only emerged in a philosophical context in the middle of
the eighteenth century, was used slightly earlier than 1762 by both F. C. Oetinger
and J. H. Lambert. The latter, with whom Kant corresponded, was apparently the
first to use ‘phenomenology’ in a specifically philosophical manner. Francis
Bacon discusses four kinds of idols, or illusions, that impede us from correctly
knowing the world. Under Bacon’s influence, Lambert developed a theory of
phenomenology as false appearance (Schein) in Das neue Organon (1764).
Phenomenology, understood as the study of phenomena in a cognitive
context, was important long before the term emerged in the eighteenth century.
Plato, for instance, studies the relation between appearances and forms or ideas,
in short reality. According to Plato, since we cannot go from phenomena to
reality, knowledge is possible if, on grounds of nature and nurture, some amongst
us can directly intuit mind-independent reality. In different ways, the general view
that cognition depends on metaphysical realism runs throughout the
philosophical tradition. As used here, ‘phenomenology’ will be understood in a
wide, but specifically epistemic sense, as based on phenomena.

II. Husserlian impedimenta

The Husserlian conviction that he invented phenomenology creates a series of

impedimenta to earlier epistemic approaches to phenomena. These include the
2
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 Tom Rockmore

Husserlian conviction that Hegel lacks a critique of reason (however, see Forster
1998), and the ‘French’ view that Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger share a single
phenomenological method (for this view, see Grondin 1985: 274).
If Husserl has no significant phenomenological predecessors, then Hegel is
not and in fact could not be a phenomenologist. According to Kant, philosophy
worthy of the name begins and ends in the critical philosophy. Husserl makes a
similar claim about phenomenology.2 In linking phenomenology to the history of
philosophy, which he did not know well, Husserl describes phenomenology as ‘the
secret longing of the whole philosophy of modern times’ (I: §62, 166).3 No one
denies that Husserl began a kind of phenomenology, but it is unclear what that is,
whether he was the first phenomenologist, or again whether some version of
Husserlian phenomenology is the only acceptable philosophical approach.
Husserl’s Kantian conviction about phenomenology explains in part his
relative disinterest, which he shares with Kant, in the history of philosophy. His
grasp of the tradition is weak in comparison to such contemporaries as Cassirer,
Gadamer and Heidegger. For most Husserlians, the history of ‘phenomenology’
does not play more than a tangential role in their discussion. If Husserl had been
better acquainted with the history of philosophy, he might have been more
cautious in his claims for originality, more generous in acknowledging significant
phenomenological predecessors.
Alhough there is no space here to argue the point in detail, all the main
German idealists, including Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, are concerned with
cognition based on phenomena. Depending on how phenomena are understood,
all the main German idealists can be considered as phenomenologists.
Husserl’s unsubstantiated claim that Hegel lacks a critique of reason points to
the former’s superficial grasp of the philosophical tradition.4 This assertion must be
substantiated by an account of what Husserl means by ‘reason’ and ‘rigorous
science’, but also by a similar account of Hegel’s position. There is no evidence in
Husserl’s voluminous writings that he ever seriously attempted to read Hegel.
Heidegger, who often discusses Hegel, claims that if philosophy is to survive, it
must come to grips with Hegel. He often wrote and lectured about Hegel, whom,
during his Nazi period, he assimilated to his own vision of the Nazi view of the
total state.5 He clearly thinks that dialogue with Hegel is essential to what he
melodramatically casts as the survival of philosophy.
Husserl’s belief that the critique of reason which he detects in Kant and Fichte
is missing in Hegel and the romantic school is, as concerns Hegel, if ‘romanticism’
means ‘early German romanticism’, simply uninformed. Hegel opposed romanti-
cism in all its forms. A post-Kantian version of the Kantian critique of reason is
present on virtually every page in Hegel’s writings. Post-Kantian German idealism
consists of a lengthy post-Kantian critique of reason, including most prominently
Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Though post-Kantian German idealism widens and in
3
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 Hegel and Husserl

that sense rehabilitates the Kantian view of reason, it does not follow that any of the
major post-Kantian thinkers ‘lacks’, to use Husserl’s term, a critique of reason.
Post-Kantian German idealism features a concerted effort, by different
hands, to interpret, criticize, reformulate and realize the intrinsic aims of the critical
philosophy. Kant launches a blanket claim of dogmatism against pre-Kantian
philosophy in general. Hegel, who rejects the Kantian claim to overcome
dogmatism, consistently takes Kant to task for the supposedly dogmatic character
of the critical philosophy. Yet he does not turn away from, but rather seeks to
deepen, Kant’s position which, he says, ‘constitutes the foundation and the starting
point of the new German philosophy, and this is a merit of which it can boast
undiminished whatever fault may be found in it’ (Hegel 2010: 40).
Hegel is best understood, as he suggests in the preface to the Differenzschrift,
his initial philosophical text, as rejecting the letter but accepting the spirit of the
critical philosophy. He attempts, as he suggests Fichte and Schelling also attempt,
to complete the Kantian critique of reason according to its spirit but not
according to its letter. Kant, who thought he was misinterpreted by his initial
readers, appeals to this ancient Pauline distinction, which is in turn restated by
Fichte, and then referenced by Hegel in the preface to the Differenzschrift.
A different kind of difficulty, also based on ignorance, is presented by attention
to method as the criterion of phenomenology. Husserl and Heidegger both insist on
method as central to phenomenology. This Husserlian conviction leads to the familiar
French belief, inspired by the familiar Cartesian emphasis on method, that the
so-called three Hs—namely Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger—share a commitment to
the same phenomenological method (see Kojève 1947: 470).6
Descartes believes that method is central to philosophy. Yet it is in fact false
that there is a phenomenological method common to Hegel, Husserl and
Heidegger, or to Husserl and Hegel, or even to Hegel and Husserl. Hegel rejects
the view that philosophy depends on method. Kant seeks to identify the general
conditions of cognition as distinguished from the process of knowledge. Hegel,
who thinks that the conditions of knowledge cannot be isolated from the process
of knowledge, rejects this Kantian distinction. He cannot consistently criticize
Kant’s effort to formulate a method and also characterize his own position as
based on a method. Efforts to describe Hegel’s position as a method approach it
from a perspective that he rejects (see Kosok 1978: 237–88).7

III. Kant and phenomenology

Important thinkers often, perhaps always, react against different views. Hegel
initially responds to Kant, Fichte and Schelling. He later takes into account the
entire Western tradition. Husserl is influenced by Hume, Brentano, Bolzano, Kant
4
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 Tom Rockmore

and others. The relation between Hegel and Husserl is mediated through Kant,
hence indirect. Kant influences Hegel and Husserl, who each independently, in
Kant’s wake, turn to phenomenology. Hegel and Husserl react to, build on and
in different ways go further down the path opened by the critical philosophy.
The term ‘phenomenology’ has at least four distinguishable meanings in Kant’s
writings. In the immediate aftermath of the Inaugural Dissertation (1770), Kant defined
the positive part of this work as a phaenomenologia generalis. In a letter to Lambert, he
calls attention to the difference between general laws of sensation as opposed to
concepts and basic principles of pure reason with respect to metaphysics. He
describes phaenomenologia generalis as a special but negative science that precedes
metaphysics, in order to avoid confusion over judgments about objects of pure
reason. At this point, he understands phenomenology as a propaedeutic discipline,
which preserves true metaphysics from any sensory contamination.8 This view of
phenomenology is at least roughly similar to Lambert’s view, differing mainly in that
it is prolegomenal. In sum, in this pre-critical period, Kant intended phenomenology
to precede science as a separate, propadeutic discipline whose role lies in testing the
validity and limits of sensory knowledge.
Kant’s view rapidly changes. In the famous Herz letter, written early in the
critical period, ‘phenomenology’ refers to general phenomenology understood as
equivalent to epistemology. At this point, ‘phenomenology’ is synonymous with
what will later become the critical philosophy as such. What was earlier understood
as a preliminary, negative discipline in the pre-critical period has apparently become
equivalent to the entire philosophical discipline. Kant now understands critical
philosophy as phenomenology and phenomenology as critical philosophy. This
meaning is retained by Kant, for instance in his letter to Lambert, cited above,
where he toys with the idea of calling the critical philosophy expounded in the
Critique of Pure Reason by the name ‘phenomenology’. Kant later abandoned the
term ‘phenomenology’ in favour of ‘critical philosophy’, a term he uses often in the
first Critique, but less frequently later on, to refer to his position.
Phenomenology plays another, further role in Kant’s view of philosophical
physics. The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science studies the a priori
conditions of physics. In its last chapter, which is entitled ‘Phenomenology’, this
term refers to a modal account (possibility, actuality and necessity) of the
experience of matter in motion. Kant here describes phenomenology as a theory
of true appearances (Erscheinungen), as a theory that explains how, within the
realm of material natural science, empirical phenomena become experience.
In this respect, Kant writes:
At issue here is not the transformation of semblance [Schein]
into truth, but rather of [true] appearance [Erscheinung] into
experience; for, in the case of semblance, the understanding
5
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 Hegel and Husserl

with its object-determining judgments is always in play,

although it is in danger of taking the subjective for objective;
in the [true] appearance, however, no judgment of the
understanding is to be met with at all—which needs to be
noted, not merely here, but in the whole of philosophy, because
otherwise, when appearances are in question, and this term is
taken to have the same meaning as semblance, one is always
poorly understood. (Kant 1910ff: IV, 555)

The term ‘phenomenology’ does not occur in the first Critique, in which there is
extensive discussion of phenomena. Yet the position that Kant expounds in this
treatise arguably concerns a fourth form of phenomenology, which Kant links to
a distinction between two different, incompatible epistemic strategies. Kant’s
crucial but enigmatic claim to know Plato better than the latter knows himself
directs attention to his relation to Plato and, if there is a difference, to Platonism
(CPR: B370, 395). Like Plato, Kant is a dualist. The critical philosophy states the
epistemic problem in a recognizably Platonic manner. Plato’s distinction between
appearances and forms or ideas is apparently reformulated in Kant’s distinction
between appearance (or representation) and noumenon (or thing in itself). Kant’s
post-Platonic approach to cognition, on the basis of a revised form of the ancient
Platonic ontological distinction between appearance and reality, is arguably
intended to solve the Platonic problem: that of the relation between appearance
or phenomena and forms, ideas or reality. Plato rejects the backward epistemic
inference from appearance to the mind-independently real, or from thought to
being, or again in causal terms from an effect to its cause. He relies instead on
intellectual intuition, or the direct epistemic grasp of what is.
Kant, who rejects intellectual intuition, invokes epistemic constructivism to
grasp the relation between appearance and reality. Kant multiplies technical
vocabulary as he unclearly restates two main readings of the Platonic relation
between appearance and reality: either as a phenomenon, that is as an appearance
(Erscheinung), or again as a representation (Vorstellung), two terms that Kant
appears to use as synonyms, on the one hand; and as a thing in itself or as a
noumenon, on the other. Since each of these terms can be read in different ways,
the interpretation of the critical philosophy is difficult. There seem to be two
main interpretations of Kant’s epistemic position: as an Erscheinungslehre, or
roughly the appearance or the representation (Vorstellung) of what is as it is. The
latter, or thing in itself, can without contradiction be thought but neither
experienced nor known, since it refers to an unknown and unknowable reality
(CPR: B566, 535). This view, which is sometimes called the two aspects thesis, or
again the double aspect thesis, is a sophisticated form of empiricism. It suggests
that mind-independent reality can not only be thought without contradiction but
6
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 Tom Rockmore

also in fact appears. This reading of Kant, which has support in texts, is currently
best illustrated by Allison (2004). Yet it is incompatible with the so-called
Copernican revolution in philosophy (a term Kant never uses to refer to his
position, but that was in use by Reinhold, Schelling and perhaps others while
Kant was active), or the view that we know only what we in some sense can be
said to ‘construct’.

IV. Hegelian phenomenology and epistemic constructivism

Hegel and Husserl both develop phenomenological theories in Kant’s wake. Both
theories can be understood to be independent efforts to deepen and complete
Kant’s approach to cognition. Husserlian and post-Husserlian phenomenology
has been carefully studied, but there has been little attention to Hegelian
phenomenology.9 Hegel, who entitled his study Phenomenology of Spirit, never
claims to be doing phenomenology. Yet examination of his position suggests that
he proposes a sophisticated a posteriori reformulation of Kant’s a priori
epistemic constructivism in his phenomenological account of cognition.
Hegel sharply criticizes causal theories of perceptual cognition in proposing
a phenomenological alternative. The causal theory of perception, sometimes
known as the new way of ideas, includes what is usually designated as rationalism,
or theories running from ideas to the mind-independent world, and empiricism,
or theories based on empirical experience of the world. Rationalism and
empiricism share a causal relation between ideas and the world—between the
world, which causes ideas, and the ideas through which we know the world. Both
further rely on the anti-Platonic reverse causal inference from ideas, taken as an
effect, to the world, taken as their cause.
In reacting to Kant, Hegel overlooks the phenomenological dimension of the
critical philosophy, which he misreads as if it were a representational approach to
knowledge. This is an obvious misreading, since Kant, who claims that
‘representation’ cannot even be defined, rejects a representational approach to
cognition, as the basis of his Copernican turn. According to Kant, we have never
made progress on the assumption that cognition must conform to objects, and we
cannot cognize mind-independent reality. Hegel, who overlooks this possibility,
analyzes the Kantian view, which he describes as dogmatic, under the headings of
empiricism and consciousness, to which he proposes an alternative epistemic
approach—influenced by Fichte—which is based on self-consciousness.
Kant’s Copernican alternative is phenomenological. It presents an approach
to cognition based on an account of the construction of the phenomena of
consciousness. This is the meaning of the Kantian suggestion that cognition is
possible if and only if the cognitive object is not independent of, but rather
7
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 Hegel and Husserl

depends on, the cognitive subject. Hegelian phenomenology is not intended simply
to reject but rather to improve on Kant’s phenomenological approach to cognition
in the Copernican revolution. Kant’s Copernican revolution is constructivist, or
based on a non-standard form of identity between subject and object, knower
and known. According to Kant, cognition is possible if and only if the subject
that cognizes and the object that is cognized are identical. This identity, which is
phenomenological, concerns the phenomenal contents of experience. Hegel
formulates a version of the philosophy of identity (Identitätsphilosophie), more
precisely of the identity of subject and object, which are both given in the form of
phenomena within consciousness.
In this regard, Hegel makes two basic points. First, within consciousness the
self-conscious subject distinguishes between two phenomenological objects: itself
as the self-conscious subject and the object of which it is conscious. Second, the
cognitive subject makes the assumption, or posits, that the mind-independent
real world is given phenomenally. ‘Consciousness’, Hegel writes,
simultaneously distinguishes itself from something, and at the
same time relates itself to it, or, as it is said, this something
exists for consciousness; and the determinate aspect of this
relating, or of the being of something for a consciousness, is
knowing. But we distinguish this being-for-another from being
in-itself; whatever is related to knowledge or knowing is also
distinguished from it, and posited as existing outside-of this
relationship … (PhG: §82, 51–52)
Hegel criticizes the critical philosophy, which he controversially understands as a
form of empiricism, in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in the passage on the
second ‘Position of Thought with Respect to Objectivity’ and again in the very
detailed account of ‘Consciousness’ in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel agrees with
Kant that the metaphysical realist claim to grasp a mind-independent external world
is indemonstrable. This suggestion undermines all forms of metaphysical realism,
and supports Kant’s Copernican turn to cognitive constructivism.
Constructivist thinkers such as Hobbes, Vico, Kant, Hegel and Dewey need to
explain what it means to ‘construct’ the cognitive object. Hegel substitutes empirical
realism, or the idea that we can only know what is given in conscious experience, for
metaphysical realism, or the unsupported claim to know the mind-independent world
as it is. Hegel’s critique of Kant shifts the cognitive process from cognition based on
representations, or representationalism, which he mistakenly takes to be the Kantian
view, to cognition based on phenomena. All appearances are phenomena, but
only some phenomena are representations. Representations form a sub-class of
phenomena that refer beyond themselves to objects that appear. In giving up
reference to what conceivably lies beyond the limits of conscious experience, Hegel
8
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 Tom Rockmore

abandons any and all cognitive claims about things in themselves, noumena, or again
the way the mind-independent world is. Hegel’s phenomenological aim is not, as in
empiricism, to correctly represent the world. It is rather to cognize the phenomena,
which make up the contents of conscious experience.
Identity is a minimal condition of cognition. According to Hegel, difference
points toward the need to seek an underlying unity, or identity, which is the condition
of overcoming difference. This is the meaning of Hegel’s conception of idealism,
which he describes in different ways pointing to the same insight: ‘In general … [since]
substance is in itself or implicitly Subject, all content is its own reflection into itself’
(PhG: §54, 33). The subject does not know something other than or different from
itself, since knowing is self-knowing. Hegel repeats the same basic claim in different
words when he writes that: ‘Reason is the certainty of being all reality’ (§235, 142).
In other words, to know is to know oneself phenomenally in the form of otherness.
Hegel works out his view of phenomenology in the Phenomenology of Spirit, and
in the ‘Phenomenology’ section of the Encyclopedia. Kant contends that the subject
must construct what it knows, but he fails to describe ‘epistemic construction’,
which he ascribes to a pre-conscious, uncognizable activity (CPR: B181, 274).
Like Kant, Hegel thinks that we can only grasp the contents of experience
indirectly through a series of categories. Unlike the Kantian ones, Hegelian
categories are not fixed, innate, or a priori. They are rather theories that derive
from experience, and are further tested and if necessary corrected through
experience. According to Hegel, the cognitive object is not independent of, but
rather dependent on, the theory or conceptual framework one employs to
cognize that object. As the theory changes, the object also changes. The cognitive
object is literally constructed through theories intended to grasp it. Hegel thinks
cognitive objects arise within a historical cognitive process aimed toward
formulating a theory adequate to the test of experience.

V. Husserlian phenomenology and epistemic representationalism

Hegel ‘naturalizes’ Kantian a priorism. He describes the a posteriori construction

of the contents of consciousness through a dialectical interaction between what
we necessarily posit as the mind-independent world and the cognitive subject.
His reaction to Kant runs from the transcendental or a priori to the a posteriori
plane. He begins on the a posteriori plane, in reformulating Kantian
phenomenological constructivism as a posteriori. Husserl’s reaction to Kant
runs, on the contrary, from the a posteriori to the a priori plane. He starts on the
a posteriori level, or with what is given to consciousness, in rising through
reduction either to or at least toward the a priori level examining the constitution
of the phenomenological contents of consciousness.
9
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 Hegel and Husserl

After his initial breakthrough to phenomenology, Husserl never tires of

utilizing the term, which he understands in an ever-expanding series of different
ways in his published and unpublished corpus. Unlike Hegel, who rarely changes
his mind, Husserl largely carries out his philosophical education in public.
Commentators favourable to Husserl concede the difficulty of specifying his
understanding of ‘phenomenology’. According to Orth, Husserl never arrived at
a definitive view of ‘phenomenology’ and simply identified everything he did or
wrote as ‘phenomenological’ (see Orth 1982: 231–49).
Husserlian phenomenology includes at least three main elements: the
structures of consciousness from the first-person point of view; a theory of
knowledge based on the ancient dream of philosophy as a rigorous science; and
intentionality, or some version of the general view that thought is about or
directed toward some real or imaginary object in order to grasp its essence, or in
another definition as the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand
for, things, properties and states of affairs.
Husserl’s position develops in an enormous series of published and
unpublished writings. Since we cannot study the evolution of his position in detail,
it will suffice to identify two main phases of the development of his theories through
brief reference to two main works, the Logical Investigations (1900–1) and Ideas 1
(1913). The former features a descriptive, non-transcendental phenomenology, and
the latter expounds transcendental phenomenology which took shape after the
discovery of the transcendental reduction.
Husserlian phenomenology is developed in complex ways in an enormous
bibliography. Since Husserl’s relation to Kant has been studied in detail (see Kern
1964), it will suffice to reconstruct his position in terms of three concepts only, each
of which has a Kantian predecessor, including: psychologism, the phenomenological
reduction and the concept of constitution.
Psychologism, which Husserl discusses in the Logical Investigations, runs like a red
thread throughout all his later writings, linking together Husserl’s many concerns.
Kant rejects what Husserl later calls psychologism in distinguishing the psychological
and the logical components of cognition. Frege famously accused Husserl of falling
prey to psychologism in a review of the latter’s pre-phenomenological Philosophy of
Arithmetic. Husserl’s breakthrough to phenomenology arises, following Frege’s lead, in
the process of formulating a complex account of psychologism in the first volume of
Logical Investigations.
‘Psychologism’ is understood in different ways,10 but mainly as the conflation
of psychological and non-psychological entities—what Kant, in reference to Locke,
calls ‘physiology’. Husserl is centrally concerned with this theme throughout his
phenomenological writings. This includes his early turn toward Kant, and his later
turn away from Kant and toward Descartes. Husserl, who denies that either Kant or
Descartes is already a phenomenologist, thinks that, on the basis of the Cartesian
10
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 Tom Rockmore

ego cogito, it is possible to arrive at transcendental subjectivity.11 In the Crisis of European

Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, his last, unfinished work, he calls attention to
Kant’s uncritical assumption of the life-world (see Husserl 1970: §§28–34, 103–35).
The phenomenological reduction was initially formulated in 1911. Speaking
generally, ‘reduction’ is the starting point of phenomenology, through which one rises
from the natural attitude within the world to the presuppositionless level of
philosophy as a rigorous science, in short to the a priori plane. The reduction was
rejected by many of Husserl’s followers, perhaps most famously by Merleau-Ponty,
but Husserl later thought that it was the cornerstone of transcendental
phenomenology. This suggests that his earlier writings were not phenomenological
in this later transcendental sense, and, if phenomenology is a transcendental science,
were perhaps not phenomenological at all.
Kant, who begins a priori, does not have to account for it. Husserl’s
difficulty lies in understanding the transition from the a posteriori to the a priori
as something other than a regulative idea. This difficulty is identified by Merleau-
Ponty in his reference to the reduction as an infinite task, which, since it can only
be a regulative idea, cannot be completed, hence cannot be constitutive (see, for
discussion, Natanson 1974). If the completed reduction is a precondition for
transcendental phenomenology, then it is difficult to see how presuppositionless
science as Husserl understands it is possible.
Constitution is another difficult but crucial Husserlian concept. According to
Kant, the subject constructs the objects of experience and knowledge. Hegel thinks
cognition depends on the a posteriori construction of cognitive objects within
consciousness. Husserl’s view of ‘constitution’, his term for idealist epistemic
constructivism, is unclear. The Husserlian concept of constitution is linked to a
representational approach to Kant. Hegel rejects the Kantian representationalism
which Husserl apparently espouses. In Ideas I and thereafter, that is after the
discovery of the transcendental reduction, Husserl invokes ‘transcendental idealism’
in pointing toward a limited affinity with Kant. At this point Husserl follows the
Kantian distinction between what is constituted in consciousness, objects of
experience and knowledge, and the mind-independent real world.
Husserl accepts the traditional goal of philosophy to be a rigorous science while
rejecting historicism and relativism. He seeks to make out the alleged parallel between
the transcendental plane and what he later came to call the life-world, or between
transcendental psychology and psychology. He describes ‘constitution’ in a long series
of writings, including the Philosophy of Arithmetic, Ideas I, Cartesian Meditations, and two
posthumously published books, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology and Experience and Judgment. In Ideas I, he contends, in refuting subjective
idealism—a view he ascribes to Berkeley—that all reality exists through the
dispensing of meaning (I: §55, 152–54). Husserl considers the subject, or
consciousness, to be self-contained and absolute, dependent on nothing. He seems
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 Hegel and Husserl

to hold that the spatio-temporal world only is for a subject as what is intended
(§49, 136–39). He apparently believes that there is a mind-independent external
world with which we come into contact and which we know insofar as it is
‘constituted’ in our consciousness through the intention, or way in which
consciousness is directed toward its object. Husserl’s central point is that the
object is not constructed by the subject, but rather is constituted as an object for
the subject.
This relatively simple point seems to have been swallowed up in the
secondary literature on Husserl. All observers agree that Husserl’s concept of
constitution is close to the heart of his position, but the proper interpretation of
this Husserlian concept remains unclear. According to Fink, the meaning of
‘transcendental constitution’ fluctuates between the formation of sense of
something already constituted and creation (Fink 1952: 78). Sokolowski believes
that ‘reality requires consciousness in order to be “real”’ (Sokolowski 1970: 196).
Spiegelberg holds that Husserl never settles on a single meaning of ‘constitution’
(Spiegelberg 1982: 130–31, 706–8). For Heidegger, ‘constitution’ does not mean
producing or making, but rather letting something be seen (Heidegger 1992: 71).
Moran points to different claims in different Husserlian texts, including the
Kantian idea that objects for consciousness are ‘built up’ through a combination
of the contents of sensory intuition and the application of categories which is
stressed in Cartesian Meditations (Moran 2000: 164–66). Welton claims that
constitutive phenomenology ‘schematizes the structural formations making
phenomenal fields possible according to transcendental space’ (Welton 2000: 254).
Mohanty suggests that constitution is the two-fold process of the intentional
act consisting in the constitution of a noematic sense and then, on that basis,
the overlapping noemata of objects (Mohanty 1997: 91–92). His useful
suggestion can be paraphrased as the idea that mind-independent objects only
become objects for us through the progressive elaboration of an intention, or
directedness towards (something), which, in this way, comes to be for us.
In a word, for Husserl constitution and intentionality are correlative concepts,
since what is intended is in fact constituted by us (see Kohák 1978: 120–25).
In short, Husserl’s theory of constitution is an account not of the construction
but the constitution of the intentional object.

VI. Forms of Husserlian phenomenology

Husserl’s breakthrough to phenomenology occurred in the midst of the ongoing

dispute about psychologism to which he strongly contributed. His defense of
anti-psychologism through a multi-dimensional attack on psychologism was
directed against psychologistic thinkers, including certain Kantians, and even
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 Tom Rockmore

against Kant himself. Yet Husserl clearly belongs in the Kantian camp
with respect to many themes, including, as noted, his anti-psychologism and
his anti-historicism.
Husserl’s initial and later forms of phenomenology are divided by the
phenomenological reduction. Husserl’s initial form of phenomenology is
paradoxically both closer to as well as further from Kant’s critical philosophy than
its later development. In the Logical Investigations, Husserl links phenomenology
to intuition in separating his theory from Kant’s. The title of volume 2 of the
Logical Investigations—Investigations into Phenomenology and the Theory of Knowledge—points
toward phenomenology as the way into epistemology. In the introduction, Husserl
forges a link between phenomenology and epistemology. He focuses here on the
connection between ‘objective theory of knowledge’ and ‘the pure phenomenology
of the experiences of thinking and knowing’. He grounds his phenomenological
approach to theory of knowledge in essentialism. By ‘phenomenology’ he means at
this early point ‘experiences [Erlebnisse] intuitively seizable and analyzable in
the generality of their essence, not experiences empirically perceived and treated as
real facts …’ (Husserl 1970: vol. 2, 166).
Husserl later came to regard his initial position as problematic. He took
steps to correct it in ways many of his followers found increasingly problematic,
while clearly insisting on a phenomenological solution to the problem of
knowledge. After The Idea of Phenomenology (1907), he remained committed to the
phenomenological reduction, which he continued to work out in the important
programmatic article, Philosophy as Rigorous Science (1911) and in Ideas I (1913),
while further developing a phenomenological theory of knowledge based on a
solution to psychologism. At this point he focused on supposed correspondence
between immanent consciousness and transcendent objects (see, for discussion,
Husserl 1990).
The transition from descriptive to transcendental forms of phenomenology
is the crucial step to Husserl’s mature position. In Ideas I, that is after the
discovery of the reduction, Husserl understands phenomenology as ‘the science
of the essence of consciousness’, which he studies from the first-person
perspective in terms of intentionality (I: 33ff.). Here Husserl studies objects in the
life world, whose existence is naively assumed, but which is supposedly bracketed
through the phenomenological reduction. In later writings, Husserl builds on his
shift to transcendental idealism in continuing to work out his phenomenological
theory. Husserl’s position later develops in many ways but arguably does not
basically change. Since this is not a full study of Husserl, suffice it to say that his
later writings expand the version of the position based on the transcendental
reduction that he initially expounds in Ideas I while addressing a series of related
difficulties, some of which have been noted above, including the crucial problem
of completing the reduction.
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 Hegel and Husserl

VII. Hegelian and Husserlian phenomenology

Kant’s position has been interpreted in two main ways—as either representational in
that the subject depends on the object, or as constructivist in that the object depends
on the subject. In a representational reading, the critical philosophy proposes an
account of cognition based on the representation of a mind-independent, real object.
A representational interpretation of the critical philosophy depicts it as in effect
solving the ancient problem of metaphysical realism. This problem has been on the
epistemic agenda at least since Parmenides, who at the dawn of the Western tradition
suggested the identity of thought and being. On a constructivist reading, on the
other hand, the critical philosophy describes the subject’s construction of the
mind-dependent cognitive object, which it experiences and knows.
Kant’s view influences Hegel and Husserl differently. A simple way to put
the point is that Hegel adopts a version of Kantian constructivism, an approach
mediated through such intervening thinkers as Fichte and, to a lesser extent,
Schelling. But in reacting to Kant and others, Husserl forges a conception of
constitution, or the epistemic representation of what is in independence of us.
According to the critical philosophy, because the subject constructs the
object a priori, at the point of cognition subject and object coincide. Hegelian
constructivism is based on the interrelation between theories about the contents
of consciousness. Hegel thinks that cognitive subjects carry out a posteriori
construction of cognitive objects dependent on theories about them. Epistemic
theory requires that the subject of the view and the view of its object be
cognitively identical. If a difference arises between cognitive theory and cognitive
object, then the theory as well as its epistemic object both change.
In the Herz letter (of 21 February 1772), Kant suggests an approach to the
problem of knowledge based on an analysis of the relation of representations to
mind-independent external objects. In this approach, representations in the mind
relate to mind-external objects outside it. Hegelian phenomenology depends on
overcoming the difference between phenomena and theories about them in
reaching cognitive identity.
Hegel’s constructivist approach to cognition is perhaps less difficult to grasp
than Husserlian phenomenology. In reacting to Kant then, later, to Descartes and
others, Husserl seems to accept a representational approach to cognition.
In restating a version of Kantian representationalism, Husserl follows Bolzano’s
distinction between subjective and objective representations (Bolzano 1972). His
insistence on objective representation points as early as the Logical Investigations to a
triple distinction between logic, which concerns objective ideas; psychology, which
concerns subjective ideas; and phenomenology, which concerns the objective mental
contents, as specified by the appropriate phenomenological method, in subjective
acts of consciousness. Beginning in Ideas I, Husserl distinguishes between noesis and
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 Tom Rockmore

noema, the intentional content or internal structure of mental acts, to express the
distinction and correlation between the intentional structure of consciousness, its
directedness as it were, on the one hand, and its ideal content, or the object as
intended, on the other.
Husserl often insists on the scientific character of transcendental phenomen-
ology. His epistemic ambition is evident in his insistence on presuppositionlessness,
originary beginnings, rigour and the rejection of historicism, naturalism and
skepticism in favor of transcendental idealism. But once Descartes regresses to the
ego cogito, it is unclear how to return to the world. This difficulty recurs in Husserl.
It must be explained how to reach the intended cognitive object, or that to which the
contents of consciousness refer. Through the reduction, Husserl brackets
the existence of the intentional object, hence the existence of the natural world.
His strategy lies in claiming a parallel between transcendental psychology and
ordinary psychology, between the contents of consciousness examined on the
transcendental plane and the mind-independent external world as supposedly given
in the natural attitude. If this is correct then, for Husserl to cash out the
epistemological claim of transcendental phenomenology, he must solve the enigma
of Kant’s representational approach to knowledge.

Conclusion: Hegel, Husserl and epistemic phenomenology

In this article I have sought, through a non-Husserlian, widened approach to

phenomenology, to clarify the relation between Hegel’s and Husserl’s
phenomenological approaches to cognition. The widely known Husserlian claim
to begin phenomenology is doubly unsatisfactory: first, it fails to account for the
different pre-reductive and later reductive phases of Husserl’s position, which,
according to his own criteria, are either already or no longer phenomenology.
And, second, that claim fails to acknowledge that in different ways
phenomenology, or the approach to cognition through phenomena, goes all
the way back to the Greek tradition.
Kant is both a transcendental idealist and a cognitive constructivist. Hegel
and Husserl defend opposing interpretations of the critical philosophy. Husserl
builds on the critical philosophy understood as a representational analysis of
cognition, in short the epistemic approach to an already constituted cognitive
object, which in this way becomes an intentional, properly phenomenological
object for us. Hegel, who like Kant rejects epistemic representationalism,
reformulates the latter’s a priori constructivist approach in terms of the
construction and cognition of an a posteriori cognitive object. It remains to be
seen whether Kantian representationalism, which the author of the critical
philosophy rejects in favour of constructivism, can be defended against Kant.
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 Hegel and Husserl

It might be objected that, if one assumes that Husserl was aware of, but
not convinced by, the early Greek discussion of phainomena, then what is at stake
is a mere preference for a non-Husserlian rather than a Husserlian definition
of ‘phenomenology’. Yet philosophy is not independent of but rather dependent
on, and hence can be usefully understood through, the philosophical tradition.
If later theories build on their predecessors, then a wider view of phenomenology
helps to understand that and how different thinkers contribute to a general
approach, which, despite contrary claims, has its roots in the ancient
Greek tradition. In this respect a wider, more inclusive understanding of
phenomenology, which in no way impugns or otherwise diminishes the interest
of Husserlian contributions to phenomenology, is—despite Husserlian claims to
the contrary—clearly preferable.

Tom Rockmore
Peking University, China
[email protected]

Notes

1
Grondin contrasts Husserl’s and Heidegger’s approach to phenomenology, which he sees
as nearly unrelated, as follows: ‘Only the term “phenomenology” was common to Husserl
and Heidegger … . Whereas Husserl represented a phenomenology of consciousness, strongly
reminiscent of idealism and modeled on pure, ideal, virtually Euclidean science, Heidegger
proclaimed a phenomenology of historical Dasein that swept Husserl’s phenomenology of
consciousness clean away’ (Grondin 2003: 97).
2
Husserl, who regards phenomenology as a science, says: ‘die [this science—T.R.] ich de facto
in die Geschichte eingeführt habe’ (Husserl 1954: 440).
3
Husserl presumably means that the epistemological debate running throughout modern
philosophy culminates in his position, which finally solves the problem.
Abbreviations:
CPR: Kant, I. (1998), Critique of Pure Reason, trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
I: Husserl, E. (1962), Ideas. General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson.
New York: Collier Books.
PhG: Hegel, G. W. F. (1977), Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller. New York: Oxford
University Press.
4
‘However much Hegel insists on the validity of his method and his doctrine, still his system
lacks a critique of reason, which is the foremost prerequisite for being scientific in philosophy.
In this connection is clear that this philosophy, like romantic philosophy in general, acted in the

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 Tom Rockmore

years that followed either to weaken or to adulterate the impulse toward the constitution of
rigorous philosophical science’ (Husserl 1965: 76–77).
5
‘Man hat gesagt, 1933 ist Hegel gestorben; im Gegenteil: er hat erst angefangen zu leben’,
according to Martin Heidegger in his seminars on Hegel: über den Staat, Wintersemester 1934–5,
cited in Faye (2007: 457).
6
A similar view has been developed by Derrida. See also Husserl (1974: 58n). For a
further instance of the French tendency to consider Hegel and Heidegger together, see
Souche-Dagues (1990).
7
See also Kosok (2003: 316–32).
8
See the letter to Johann Heinrich Lambert of September 2, 1770, in Kant (1999: 108).
9
One of the very few contributions to the debate about Hegelian phenomenology concerns his
conception of the book and not his conception of phenomenological cognition. See Forster (1998).
10
See, for an exhaustive study, Kusch (1995).
11
Husserl notes, for instance, in Cartesian Meditations §10 that Descartes fails to arrive at
phenomena, hence, falls short of phenomenology. See Husserl (1999: §10, 23–24).

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