G.R. No.

L-433 March 2, 1949

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GAUDENCIO ROBLE, defendant-appellant.
Gonzalo D. David for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Jaime de los Angeles for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
Charged with treason on three counts, the defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death by the First Division of the People's Court sitting in Tacloban, Leyte. The correctness of the penalty is the sole question put in issue in this appeal.
The information alleges:
1. On or about March 20, 1944, in the municipality of Dalaguete, province of Cebu, Philippines with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military forces said accused being a member of the Philippines Constabulary did then and there wilfully unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably lead guide and accompany 10 other member of the pro-Japanese constabulary all armed like the accused and did apprehend and arrest Paulino Osorio for having helped the guerrillas and of being the Father of two guerrilla men; that the herein accused after maltreating said
Paulino Osorio did detain him in the municipal jail of Dalaguete; that in the same date the accused and his companions did apprehend Melchor Campomanes and 7 other person who were also tortured for being guerrillas supporters and sympathizers and the accused herein with his firearm did shoot
Melchor Campomanes killing him instantly;
2. Sometime during the month of March 1944 in the municipality of Dalaguete Province of Cebu, Philippines with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military forces said accused being a soldier of the Philippines Constabulary did then and there wilfully,
feloniously and treasonably lead guide and accompany a patrol of 13 constabulary soldiers and did arrest and apprehend Fortunato Linares for being guerrillas and or guerrilla supporters; that said accused did tie and torture the aforesaid person and cut a portion of their ears, the tortures being so severe
especially with respect to Antolin Rodriguez who effectively died as a result of said tortures administered by the accused.
3. On or about May 18, 1944, in Cebu City Philippines with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military forces, said accused being a soldier of the Philippines Constabulary did then and there wilfully, unlawfully feloniously and treasonable accompany a
group of Constabulary soldiers all armed, to Mambaling and other parts of Cebu City and did apprehend Eleuterio Padilla, a former USAFFE soldier for being a guerrilla, and there herein accused and his companions did tie and torture said Eleuterio Padilla detain him at the Constabulary Headquarters for
several days after which he was taken out and mercilessly killed on May 26, 1944 by said accused.
The court held that the facts alleged in the information is a complex crime of treason with murders with the result that the penalty provided for the most serious offense was to be imposed on its maximum degree. Viewing the case from the standpoint of modifying circumstances the court believed that the same result
obtained. It opined that the killing were murders qualified by treachery and aggravated by the circumstances of evident premeditation superior strength cruelty and an armed band.
We think this is error. The torture and murders set forth in the information are merged in and formed part of treason. They were in this case the overt acts which besides traitorous intention supplied a vital ingredient in the crime. Emotional or intellectual attachment and sympathy with the foe unaccompanied by the
giving of aid and comfort is not treason. The defendant would not be guilty of treason if he had not committed the atrocities in question.
On the question of the applicability of the aggravating circumstances which impelled the court against its sentiment to give the defendant the extreme penalty we only have to refer to People vs. Racaza (82 Phil., 623) in which this question was discussed and decided. There we said:
The trial court found the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation superior strength treachery and employment of means for adding ignominy to the natural effects of the crime.
The first three circumstances are by their nature inherent in the offense of treason and may not taken to aggravate the penalty. Adherence and the giving of aid and comfort to the enemy is in many cases as in this a long continued process requiring for the successful consummation of the traitor's purpose,
fixed, reflective and persistent determination and planning.
So are superior strength and treachery included in the crime of treason. Treachery is merged in superior strength; and to overcome the opposition and wipe out resistance movements which was Racaza's purpose in collaboration with the enemy the use of a large force and equipment was necessary. The
enemy to whom the accused adhered was itself the personification of brute superior force and it was this superior force which enabled him to overrun the country and for a time subdue its inhabitants by his brutal rule. The law does not expect the enemy and its adherents to meet their foes only on even
terms according to he romantic traditions of chivalry.
But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of strength to commit acts unnecessary to the commission of treason. There is no incompatibility between treason and decent, human treatment of prisoners, Rapes, wanton robbery for personal grain and other forms of cruelties are condemned and the
perpetration of these will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrong to the main criminal objective under paragraphs 17 and 21 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The atrocities above mentioned of which the appellant is beyond doubt
guilty fall within the terms of the above paragraphs.
For the very reason that premeditation treachery and use of superior strength are absorbed inn treason characterized by killings, the killing themselves and other accompanying crime should be taken into consideration for measuring the degree and gravity of criminal responsibility irrespective of the
manner in which they were committed. Were not this the rule treason the highest crime known to law would confer on its perpetrator advantage that are denied simple murderer. To avoid such incongruity and injustice the penalty in treason will be adapted within the range provided in the Revised Penal
Code to the danger and harm and to which the culprit has exposed his country and his people and to the wrongs and injuries that resulted from his deeds. The letter and pervading spirit of the Revised Penal Code adjust penalties to the perversity of the mind that conceived and carried the crime into
execution. Where the system of graduating penalties by the prescribed standards is inapplicable as in the case of homicides connection with treason the method of analogies to fit the punishment with the enormity of the offense may be summoned to the service of justice and consistency and in the
furtherance of the law's aims.
Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case we believe that the appellants spontaneous plea of guilty is sufficient to entitle him to a penalty below the maximum. The appealed decision is therefore modified and the sentence reduced to reclusion perpetua with the legal accessories and costs.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones and Reyes, JJ., concur.

83 Phil. 194

REYES, J.:
We are called upon in this case to review the sentence of death and a fine of P20,000 imposed by the People's Court upon the appellant, who was charged with treason but convicted of what the said court terms "complex crime of treason with murder, robbery, and rape."

The conviction is based on defendant's plea of guilty to a complaint which, as amended, contains the following counts:

"1. That on or about and during the period comprised between March, 1943 and May 3, 1945, in the city of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan, and its. Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he
did give aid and comfort to said enemy, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably join and become a member of the so-called "Philippine Constabulary," an enemy-sponsored military organization, knowing fully well that the aims and purposes of said organization are, among others, to extend
every aid and cooperation with said enemy in the prosecution ofher war efforts against the United States of America and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and during the period aforesaid, as a member of said enemy-sponsored Philippine Constabulary, the said accused, further adhering to the enemy, with
treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to them did go out on numerous patrols in company with Japanese soldiers in search of guerrillas and other elements resisting said enemy in the Philippines.

"2. That on or about and during the period comprised between December 1, 1943 and May 3, 1945, in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire, of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give,
as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, in violation of his allegiance and fidelity to the United States of America and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably join the Japanese Military Police otherwise known as the Kempei-Tai under the command
of a T. Yushida, performing the functions and duties of an informer, spy and chief undercover man of the Cebu district of said military police and did, during the period aforesaid, in various places in the Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, in furtherance of his adherence to said enemy,
with "treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to them, did, in company with other members of the Japanese Military Police, go out on patrols to apprehend guerrillas as they did apprehend, capture and torture guerrillas, loot civilians and otherwise commit acts of atrocities in furtherance of the hostile
designs of the enemy and to weaken the cause of the United States of America in the Philippines.
"3. That sometime in June, 1944, in various places in the province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy,
in his capacity as a member of the enemy-sponsored constabulary attached to the Japanese Military Police and a guide of the Japanese Army, jointly and in cooperation with soldiers of the Japanese Imperial Army, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably conduct and carry out a so-called
mopping up operation for the purpose of suppressing guerrillas and other elements engaged in resistance against said enemy, and as a reault thereof, ten guerrillas were killed.

"4. That on or about and during the period comprised between September, 1944 and November, 1944, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to
give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably help in the construction of air raid shelters for the protection of Japanese soldiers against Allied air raids and did help in the acquisition of, as he did acquire food supplies for the enemy in preparation
against the expected landing of American forces.

"5. That on or about August 18, 1944, in the municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to the said enemy, in company with
Japanese Military soldiers of the Japanese Military Police and other Filipino enemy spies, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest, maltreat and otherwise torture Primitivo Cansancio in an effort to force the latter to disclose the whereabouts of Lt. Antonio Karedo, a guerrilla officer, and
to cause said Primitivo Cansancio to confess his guerrilla activities.

"6. That on or about December 7, 1944, in the municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and
comfort to said enemy, in company with a patrol of Japanese soldiers of the Japanese Military Police and other enemy spies and informers, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Francisco Larrobia and did kick said Francisco Larrobia, strike him on the face and head
with a pistol and subsequently bayoneting and killing said Francisco Larrobia on the suspicion that he was a guerrilla.

"7. That on or about September 6, 1944, in the municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, and the treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort
to the said enemy, in his capacity as chief undercover man for the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, in company with Japanese soldiers and Santiago Bernaba, another Japanese spy, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest Numeriano Bellesa on suspicion of being a guerrilla,
thereafter taking said Numeriano Bellesa to Inayawan, Cebu, City, and thereat herein accused did investigate said Numeriano Bellesa about the latter's firearms in order to help said enemy in gathering up arms in furtherance of their hostile designs, and did strike said Numeriano Bellesa on the face and body and
otherwise maltreat him in the course of said investigation.

"8. That on or about August 18, 1944, in sitio Tubod, municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to
said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, and in company with Japanese soldiers of the Japanese Military Police, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Cipriano Trazona, and did
investigate the latter as to the whereabouts of guerrillas especially Nicolas Adlawan, food procurement Officer of the guerrillas, and upon his denial of knowledge of said whereabouts, herein accused did torture said Cipriano Trazona by hanging the latter by the arms so that his body dangled down, striking his
stomach, and head with an empty bottle, inflicting wounds on his head and finally, striking his mouth with a flashlight splitting said Cipriano Trazona's lower lips.

"9. That on or about October 2, 1944, in the municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Imperial Japanese Government and her armed forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to
said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy in the employ of the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, in company with other informers said Military Police, did, then and there, apprehend and arrest Albina Alpez and accused herein did wilfully and treasonably investigate said Albina
Alpez as to the whereabouts of her husband, Ponciano Alpez, a guerrilla, attached to the 2nd Division, Cebu Area Command, and when said Albina Alpez denied knowledge of her aforesaid husband's whereabouts, herein accused did slap, kick and throw her to the ground, hang her by the arms, strike her on the
breast with his revolver, threaten her with a dagger pointed at her throat and otherwise maltreat and torture said Albina Alpez.

"10. That on or about December 25, 1944, in the municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and
comfort to said enemy, in company with five Japanese soldiers and fourteen agents of the Japanese Military Police, otherwise known as the Kempei-Tai, and in his capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police for the Cebu District did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Victoriano Primacio and one Juan Unadia on suspicion of being guerrillas and said accused did box, beat, slap and strike said Victoriano Primacio and Juan Unadia with his rifle several times, and did turn over, said Victoriano Primacio and Juan Unadia to the
Japanese Military. Police on the ground that said persons were guerrillas and, as a result of which said Victoriano Primacio and Juan Unadia have not been heard of ever since then.

"11. That on or about January 27, 1944, at sitio Tacba, Cebu City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan, and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in
his capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably shoot and kill Lt. Miguel Dacallos, a USAFFE officer, in furtherance of the hostile designs of said enemy.

"12. That on or about September 6, 1944, at sitio San Isidro, municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused Cucufate Adlawan, in furtherance of his adherence, to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to
give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, and in company with Japanese soldiers, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest one Jose Murillo on suspicion that the
latter was a guerrilla.

"13. That on or about November 13, 1944 in the city of, Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Basilia Arong and did take the latter to headquarters of the Japanese Military Police and thereat, herein accused did question and investigate said Basilia Arong as to the whereabouts of her husband, Pedro C. Arong and one Bohol,
suspected by the enemy pf guerrilla activities, and when said Basilia Arong denied knowledge of their whereabouts, herein accused did hang said Basilia Arong by her arms, strip her of her clothing, severely beat her and otherwise torture her, finally forcing said Basilia Arong to sign a letter addressed to her aforesaid
husband, Pedro Arong, asking the latter to report to the Japanese Kempei-Tai headquarters and when said Pedro C. Arong did report to said headquarters in compliance of said letter, he has not been seen ever since.

"14. That on or about August 10, 1944, at sitio Gapas, Gapas Island, in the Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid and comfort
to said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy of the Japanese Military. Police of Cebu District and in company with Japanese Kempei-Tai informers and spies, did, then and there, wilfully unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest Pedro Cabanada and did question
the latter as to the whereabouts of Alejandrino Ciriaco, a guerilla Intelligence operative, and, in the course of said investigation, the accused did hang said Pedro Cabanada by his arms, strike him with clubs, and an iron pipe thereby inflicting several wounds on his head for the latter's refusal to divulge said guerrilla
whereabouts.

"15. That on or about June 2, 1944, in sitio Basac, Mambaling, in the city of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said
enemy, acting in his capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy in the employ of the Japanese Military Police of the Cebu, District, in company with two Japanese soldiers and three other Japanese informers and spies, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably apprehend and arrest
Marciano Alejandrino, Carlos Numera, and Jose Rada, killing said Marciano Alejandrino, and Carlos Numera, and wounding said Jose Rada on the charge that said persons had contact with guerrillas.

"16. That on or about October 8, 1943, in the municipality of Tisa, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the accused Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said
enemy, acting in his capacity as an informer and spy of said enemy, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably shoot and kill Bernado Laborte, a guerrilla soldier for the latter's guerrilla activities and resistance to said enemy.
"17. That sometime in the months of April, 1944, in different places in the Province of Cebu, Philippines, particularly in the area comprised between Tubano and Minglanilla, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan, and its Imperial Japanese
Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, as a member of the enemy-sponsored constabulary and as informer and spy of the Japanese Army, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably join and take part in the general mopping up operation
conducted by the Japanese Army under the command of Sergeant T. YUSHIDA, particularly in the areas of Tubonok to Minglanilla, for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and other elements engaged in resisting said enemy.

"18. That on or about August 19, 1944, in the municipality of Cordoba, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to
said enemy, acting in his capacity as chief informer and spy under the employ of the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, in company with the members of said Japanese Military Police under the command of Sergeat T. Yushida of the Japanese Army, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably arrest, maltreat and torture Martin Francisco and did expose the latter's wife and some Filipino girls naked, raping them, and, did steal and carry away the following articles belonging to said Martin Francisco:

2 diamond, rings, a ring and one wrist watch

P500 in Cebu Emergency and Currency Notes
P1,858 in Japanese Military Notes
3 pairs white pants
2 out shirts
2 pairs shoes
1 buntal hat
1 wedding ring
on suspicion that said Martin Francisco was a guerrilla.

"19. That sometime in 1944, at sitio Cabadiangan, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire, of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid aid corflfort to said enemy, acting
as an informer to the enemy and in company with soldiers of the Japanese Army, did then anld there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably conduct and carry out a raid for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and, as a result of which, Governor Hilario Abellana of Cebu then in hiding from said enemy, was
captured.

"20. That on or about February 12, 1944, in the city of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his
capacity as chief undercover man, informer and spy of the Japanese Military Police, Cebu District, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably beat and strike Vicente Padilla with a baseball bat, hang said Vicente Padilla by the arms, and otherwise torture him in an effort to extract confession of
the latter's connection with guerrillas.

"21. That on or about July 19, 1944, at Cebu City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting as chief informer
and spy of the Japanese Military Police Cebu District, in company with Japanese soldiers and other agents of the Japanese Military Police otherwise known as the Kempei-Tai, did, then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest Bartolome Rosal, Antonio de la Serna, and Braulio Padilla and did tie up the
hands of said persons, severely inflicting wounds on them, on suspicion of being guerrillas and as consequence of said maltreatment and torture, Braulio Padilla died a few days thereafter.

"23. That on or about December 20, 1944, in the city of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan, and its Imperial Japanese Forces, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in his
capacity as chief informer, spy and undercover man of the Japanese Military Police of the Cebu District, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest at the point of his gun, Paulita Delgado and 'John Doe' her husband, on suspicion that said persons were cooperating and helping the
guerrillas and did thereafter bring said Paulita Delgado and her husband to the Kempei-Tai headquarters and once thereat, herein accused did torture them by hanging them by their arms and did otherwise maltreat them.

"24. That sometime in September, 1944, at Pasil Market, Cebu City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court the accused, Cucufate Adlawan, adhering to the enemy, the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese Army, with treasonable intent to give, as he did give aid and comfort to said enemy, acting in
his capacity as member of the enemy-sponsored Philippine Constabulary attached to the Japanese Military Police, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably kill Dionisio Abatol, a guerrilla, for his activities and resistance to the said enemy."
By his plea of guilty appellant admits having committed the treasonous acts alleged in the information. But he now pleads for a modification of the sentence, contending that the lower court erred:

"1. In not taking into consideration, as mitigating circumstances, the following facts: (1) voluntary surrender; (2) the fact that the accused has been and is being utilized as witness by the CIC in cases against Japanese soldiers under trial by the military commission; and (3) the fact that the accused helped and saved
the lives of many civilians and soldiers from death in the hands of the Japanese;

"2. In making as a matter of set-off the plea of guilty entered by the defendant-appellant on the strength of the assurance that no death penalty would be imposed upon him;

"3. In considering, as aggravating circumstances, treachery, abuse of superiority, and unnecessary cruelty;

"4. In holding that the crime committed by the accused is a complex crime of treason with murder, rape and robbery;

"5. In sentencing the accused to death and to pay a fine of P20,000."

Taking up first the fourth alleged error, we find merit in the contention that appellant should not have been convicted of the so-called "complex crime of treason with murder, robbery, and rape." The killings, robbery, and raping mentioned in the information are therein alleged not as specific offenses but as mere
elements of the crime of treason for which the accused is being prosecuted. Being merged in and identified with the general charge, they can not be used in combination with treason to increase the penalty under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Prieto,[1] L-399, January 29, 1948.) Appellant should,
therefore, be held guilty of treason only.

Appellant's claim of voluntary surrender has not been satisfactorily proved. On the other hand, his admission that he was "taken" from the house of his mother by an agent of the CIC, is proof that he was in fact arrested. Where there has been actual arrest the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be
invoked (People vs. Conwi,[2] 40 Off. Gaz. [14th Supp.], No. 23, p. 166; People vs. Siojo, 61 Phil. 307.)

The meritorious acts which appellant claims to have performed in aid of the CIC and his countrymen have not been established by satisfactory proof and may not in any event be considered as mitigating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code.

There is nothing to the claim that appellant entered a plea of guilty on the assurance that he would not be sentenced to death. The claim is not supported by proof. On the other hand, it is denied by both the prosecution and the trial court, the latter stating in its order denying appellant's motion for reconsideration that
"No responsible judge can or would advance his opinion in connection with the decision to be rendered in any case before he has properly deliberated on the merits of the same."
There is, however, merit in the contention that the aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength should not have been considered. These circumstances are "by their nature, inherent in the offense of treason and may not be taken to aggravate the penalty." (People vs. Racaza, 82 Phil., 623.)
But the facts alleged in the information show that appellant, in committing the crime of treason, deliberately augmented the wrong by being unnecessarily cruel to captured guerrilla suspects, subjecting them to barbarous forms of torture and finally putting them to death, and, as appears in count No. 18, he also chose
to add ignominy to his treasonous act in arresting and maltreating a guerrilla suspect by stripping his wife of her clothes and then abusing her together with other Filipino girls. Clearly shown as they are by the allegations of the complaint and deemed admitted by appellant's plea of guilty, these two aggravating
circumstances of unnecessary cruelty and ignominy may be appreciated against him. As this Court said in the case of People vs. Racaza, supra.

"But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of strength to commit acts unnecessary to the commission of treason. There is no incompatibility between treason and decent, human treatment of prisoners. Rapes, wanton robbery for personal gain, and other forms of cruelties are condemned and their perpetration
will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrongs to the main criminal objective under paragraphs 17 and 21 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The atrocities above mentioned, of which the appellant is beyond doubt guilty, fall within the terms of the
above paragraphs.

"For the very reason that premeditation, treachery and use of superior strength are absorbed in treason characterized by killings, the killings themselves and other accompanying crimes should be taken into consideration for measuring the degree and gravity of criminal responsibility irrespective of the manner in which
they were committed. Were not this the rule, treason, the highest crime known to law, would confer on its perpetrators advantages that are denied simple murderers. To avoid such incongruity and injustice, the penalty in treason will be adapted, within the range provided in the Revised Penal Code, to the danger and
harm to which the culprit has exposed his country and his people and to the wrongs and injuries that resulted from his deed. The letter and pervading spirit of the Revised Penal Code adjust penalties to the perversity of the mind that conceived and carried the crime into execution. Where the system of graduating
penalties by the prescribed standards is inapplicable, as in the case of homicides connected with treason, the method of analogies to fit the punishment with the enormity of the offense may be summoned to the service of justice and consistency and in furtherance of the law's aims."
The penalty prescribed for the crime of treason reclusion temporal to death and a fine of not to exceed P20,000. Giving the appellant the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession of guilt, but appreciating against him the aggravating circumstances of ignominy and unnecessary cruelty, the said
penalty should be imposed in its maximum. But since five members of this Court are opposed to the imposition of the death penalty in this case, the appellant can only be sentenced to reclusion perpetua and a fine of P20,000.

Wherefore, the judgment below is modified in the sense that the appellant is declared guilty of treason and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P20,000, with costs in this instance de oficio.

Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason, and Montemayor, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-319. March 28, 1946.]

GO TIAN SEK SANTOS, Petitioner, v. ERIBERTO MISA, Director of Prisons, Respondent.

Mariano Trinidad for Petitioner.

First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor De los Angeles for Respondent.

SYLLABUS
1. HABEAS CORPUS; DETENTION UNDER COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 682; ESPIONAGE; CITIZENSHIP, IMMATERIAL. — The foreign status of a political detainee does not exclude him ipso facto from the scope of the provisions of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, because he may be prosecuted for
espionage, a crime not conditioned by the citizenship of the offender, and considered as an offense against national security.

DECISION

BENGZON, J.:

The petitioner avers he is a Chinese citizen apprehended in February, 1945, by the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States Army, turned over last September, to the Commonwealth Government, and since then detained by the respondent as a political prisoner. Such detention, he claims, is illegal, because he
has not been charged before, not convicted by, the judge of a competent court, and because he may not be confined under Act. No. 682, as he owes allegiance neither to the United States nor to the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

The Solicitor General, for the respondent, admits the detention, for active collaboration with the Japanese, doubts the allegation of citizenship, and maintains that, conceding arguendo petitioner’s alienage, he may be charged for espionage, a crime against national security wherein allegiance is immaterial, and may,
therefore, be held in custody under Commonwealth Act No. 682.

As the record stands, the petitioner must be deemed a Chinese subject. The commitment order No. 291 issued by the United States Army authorities describes him as such. But it does not follow that he is entitled to liberty now. But it does not follow that he is entitled to liberty now. He is included among those
contemplated by Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, which reads partly:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Upon delivery by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Philippines of the persons detained by him as political prisoners, to Commonwealth Government, the Office of Special Prosecutors shall receive all records, documents, exhibits and such other things as the Government of the
United States may have turned over in connection with and/or affecting said political prisoners, examine the aforesaid records, documents, exhibits, etc., and take, as speedily as possible, such action as may be proper: Provided, however, . . . And, provided, further, That, in the interest of public security, the provisions
of article one hundred twenty-five of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be deemed, as they are hereby, suspended, insofar as the aforesaid political prisoners are concerned , until the filing of the corresponding information with the People’s Court, but the period of suspension shall not be more than six (6)
months from the formal delivery of said political prisoners by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Philippines to the Commonwealth Government.

His foreign status does not exclude him ipso facto from the scope of the provisions. As stated by the Solicitor General, he might be prosecuted for espionage, (Commonwealth Act. No. 616) a crime not conditioned by citizenship of the offender, and considered as an offense against national security.

The contentions advanced during the oral argument, challenging the validity of said section 19, Commonwealth Act. No. 682, upon constitutional grounds must be overruled, in view of our decision in Laurel v. Director of Prisons (p. 372, ante), copy of which will be furnished to petitioner by the clerk of this court. The
petition is denied, with costs.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Jaranilla, Feria, De Joya, Pablo, Hilado, and Briones, J.J., concur.

Paras, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

We concur with the majority’s pronouncement to the effect that petitioner is not excluded from the group of persons contemplated by section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, notwithstanding his foreign status as a Chinese subject. We also agree that, if there are facts and evidence to justify it, he might be
prosecuted for espionage, or any other crime not conditioned by the citizenship of the offender. But we disagree as to the denial of the petition, it appearing that the petitioner is being deprived of his personal liberty without any due and legal process of law, and as to this question, we refer to the stand we have taken in
our dissenting opinion in case G.R. No. L-200. Laurel v. Director of Prisons (p. 372, ante), the contentions therein we reiterate here.

G.R. No. L-430 July 30, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO M. ABAD (alias PAQUITO), defendant-appellant.
Alejo Labrador for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Jaime de los Angeles for appellee.
PERFECTO, J.:
In a decision penned by Judge Angel S. Gamboa, concurred in by Judges Jose Bernabe and Emilio Rilloraza, all of them of the People's Court, accused Francisco Abad was found guilty of the complex crime of treason with homicide and sentenced to death, to pay a fine of P15,000, to indemnify the heirs of Osias
Salvador in the amount of P2,000, and to pay costs.
The information charges appellant of the crime of treason as defined and penalized under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code by giving aid and comfort to the Empire of Japan and the Japanese Imperial Forces during the period comprised between December 24, 1943, and September 26, 1944, as follows:
1. That on or about the 24th day of December, 1943, in the municipality and province aforesaid, Francisco Abad (alias Paquito) the accused herein, serving as an informer and spy of the Japanese Army, did then and there, join participate in a raid conducted by about fifteen Japanese soldiers of the
Military Police at the house of Magno Ibarra, and did then and there apprehended the said Magno Ibarra, charging him of possession of a revolver which had been previously surrendered by Magno Ibarra to the Japanese that Magno Ibarra still had the revolver, the latter was confined in the Japanese
garrison.
2. That on or about March 11, 1944, in the same municipality and province aforesaid, the said Francisco Abad (alias Paquito), as such informer of the Japanese Army, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably, for more than two months, of one Mr. Francisco, whose first name is still unknown, for
having remarked that the Americans would soon return many places in the Philippines had already been retaken.
3. That on or about September 28, 1944, in the municipality of Camiling, Province of Tarlac, the herein accused, as such informer of the Japanese Army, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably force, coerce, and compel Osias Salvador and his two brothers Epifanio Salvador and
Liberto Salvador to go, as they did to go to the Japanese garrison where the said Osias Salvador and his two brothers, at the instance of the herein accused in his presence, were tortured as guerrilla suspects, and although Epifanio and Liberto Salvador managed later to escape from imprisonment, the
said Osias Salvador was unable to do so and died from the tortures and injuries inflicted upon him.
4. That on or about November 12, 1844 and on the occasion of a stage show held in the said municipality of Camiling, Province of Tarlac, the herein accused, taking advantage of his connection and influence as informer and spy of the Japanese Army, did then and there unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously
hand over one Francisco Donato to the Japanese soldiers who slapped and kicked the said Francisco Donato, for an incident in which the accused was entirely to blame in that the said accused annoyed Flora Esteban, wife of Francisco Donato, by throwing sugar cane butts at her.
The lower court found the accused guilty on the first three counts.
Nine errors are assigned in appellant's brief.
The first question raised by appellant is that the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty on the first count, notwithstanding the fact only one witness testified to the overt act alleged therein.
Two witnesses were called by the prosecution to prove the first count, Magno Ibarra and his wife, Isabel. The latter testified that when appellant, accompanied by his brother and Japanese soldiers, went to their home, demanding the surrender of a revolver of her husband, the husband was out supervising the harvest
of their palay, and the latter happened to learn of the incident by information from the wife. Magno could not, therefore, corroborate his wife as to the latter's testimony concerning appellant's coming to their house.
The testimony of Magno Ibarra as to what happened to him in the garrison, where he was told by appellant to produce his revolver, is not corroborated by his wife nor by anybody else.
The Solicitor General advances the theory that where the overt act is simple, continuous and composite, made up of, or proved by several circumstances, and passing through stages, it is not necessary that there should be two witnesses to each circumstance at each stage. The theory is not well taken. The two-
witness rule must be adhered to as to each and everyone of all the external manifestations of the overt act in issue. Appellant's going to the Ibarra house, in search of the revolver, is a single overt act, distinct and independent from appellant's overt act in requiring Magno Ibarra, when the latter went to the garrison, to
produce his revolver. Although both overt acts are inter-related. it would be too much to strain the imagination if they should be identified as a single act or even as different manifestations, phases, or stage of the same overt act. The searching of the revolver in the Ibarra house is one thing and the requiring to produce
the revolver in the garrison, another. Although both acts may logically be presumed to have answered the same purpose, that of confiscating Ibarra's revolver, the singleness of purpose is not enough to make one of two acts.
The lower court erred consequently in not pronouncing that the first count of the information was not proven.
Whether accused caused the arrest and incarceration of Fausto Francisco, as alleged in the second count of the information, is the next question raised in appellant's brief.
In the afternoon of March 10, 1944, while conversing with a group of about ten persons, Francisco, who had just arrived from Manila, stated that the Americans were coming nearer to the Philippines and, on noticing a Japanese plane flying over them, added that in the very near future they will see American planes
flying over the Philippines. The accused was among those present in the group. Jose Tamurrada and Adriano Reyes were also among them. At night of the same day Francisco attended the dance held in the auditorium of Palimbo, Camiling, on the occasion of the barrio fiesta. A group of Japanese soldiers,
accompanied by appellant and his brother Mariano, arrived. Appellant pointed at Francisco saying, "That is the man;" whereupon, Francisco was arrested and was imprisoned for almost two and a half months, during which time he was subjected to torture and made to undergo hard labor for being an American
propagandist. These facts were testified by several witnesses for the prosecution.
Appellant, who has resorted to an alibi as defense, made an almost exhaustive analysis of the declarations of the witnesses for the prosecution in a forceful effort to discredit them. A careful reading of said declarations leads us to the conclusion that they deserved credibility and by them it was proved beyond all
reasonable doubt that appellant was present in the group which in the afternoon heard Fausto Francisco make statements in favor of the Americans and that he caused the arrest of Francisco in the auditorium by appointing him to the Japanese soldiers who arrived with him at the place.
Among the arguments in appellant's brief relating to the second count in question, the one in which appellant alleges that no one has ever heard that, after the afternoon statements of Fausto Francisco, appellant went to the Japanese garrison and informed the Japanese soldiers thereof, appears to be stronger. In
fact, there is no evidence as to what the appellant did during the time intervening between when appellant heard Francisco's afternoon statements and when appellant went at night to the auditorium to have Francisco arrested by the Japanese soldiers accompanying him and his brother Mariano. But the natural
relationship between the two incidents makes unnecessary any evidence as to appellant's conduct and actions during the intervening period. Besides, it is not alleged in the information that it was appellant who denounced Francisco to the Japanese for the afternoon statements in question, and even if we should
disregard any connection between the afternoon incident in which appellant heard Francisco's statements and the incident in which Francisco was arrested, and, furthermore, even if we go to the extent of disregarding completely the first incident, the fact that appellant caused the arrest of Francisco at the auditorium
night dance, by pointing him as the man sought for to the Japanese soldiers who accompanied him and his brother Mariano, in itself alone is sufficient to find him guilty of adherence to the Japanese enemies and of giving them aid in the attainment of their was purposes, among them the suppression of American or
anti-Japanese propaganda.
Upon this our conclusion, appellant's insistence that there were well-known Japanese spies, instead of him, who must have given the tip to the Japanese as to Francisco's statements, is of no consequence.
The next question raised by appellant is the third count of the information upon which the appellant's brief dealt in three assignment of errors, 3, 4, and 5.
Liberato Salvador testified that in 1944 he was a member of Major Ramsey's Guerrilla, which he joined on March 5, 1942, he having been formerly in the Recruiting Division of the Philippine Army. On September 28, 1944, he went to Camiling with his brother Osias to find out the strength of the Japanese garrison
stationed there, and to said effect "we brought along with us five gallons of coconut oil just pretending to sell it in the public market in order that we cannot be detected by the spies of our enemy, the Japanese." Then they saw the accused "who was about five meters away from us." Felix Abad asked for a ride back to
Mangatarem. While Osias was talking with Felix, the accused "winked his eye and then, immediately, Magdalera drew his revolver and pointed at me. He winked with a motion indicating that I was to be captures. My brother Osias approached me. We were asked to raise our hands." Because Liberato protested that
he was not making any trouble and at first did not raise his hands, Magdalera said: "No you are a member of the guerrillas, you are fighting against the Japanese." Then Epifanio Salvador approached his brother Liberato and told him: "Raise your hands because he is a spy of the Japanese," referring to Cristoper
Magdalera. Then Felix Abad suggested to Magdalera that the Salvador brothers be brought to the Japanese garrison, 25 meters away from the market. The incident took place at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon. At the garrison "we were tied up against the wall of the building. At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon were
given water to drink (about five or six gallons) and maltreated. They hung me and tied in the wrist with the rope around my neck. They hung me with my toes barely touching the floor. Then they boxed me and beat me with a baseball bat until I was unconscious. I did not regain consciousness until they stuck a lighted
cigarette in my face at about 8 o'clock already in the evening."
When he regained consciousness, he heard his brothers shouting for help and groaning. Witness was about six meters away from them, but he has not seen them being tortured because "we were brought again to the porch and tied our neck in the same way they tied us before, with our hands tied at the back. At
about 4 o'clock in the morning of the 29th, my brother Epifanio Salvador, who was sitting side by side with Osias Salvador, who was sitting side by side with Osias Salvador, was able to untie his rope and then, all of a sudden Epifanio left us. The sentry who was just sitting in front of us with a rifle at fixed bayonet was
sleeping. When the sentry was awakened he asked: "`Where is your brother Epifanio Salvador?' I answered the sentry: `I do not know.' Then, at first he was planning to release us to look for our brother Epifanio. We consented to be released, but the sentry changed his mind and got another big rope with which he
whipped us again right and left. Then they went to our house, the house of Epifanio, and looked for him. And when they were not able to locate him they got my sister-in-law Inocencia Manson de Salvador and she was also questioned as to where was my brother Epifanio, and tied up her hands as they have done to
us. After that, Osias Salvador and myself were brought to the room just behind the one we were tied up and they got an electric wire and tied us again, but putting on a bench and the bench was too short that the legs of my brother Osias was on top. We were tied and then rolled with the wire from my head up to the
head of my brother, aside from tying us from neck to leg. We talked, my brother and I, to escape if we can. After ten minutes, a Japanese entered the garrison and he had a bamboo with which whenever we asked for water and food they beat us. They question us: `Where is the machine gun you are hiding? You are
hiding six machine guns and automatic rifles; where are the rifles and revolvers? Where are the Americans now?' That was done to us many times. At about 5 o'clock in the afternoon one of the Japanese came to us and cut our hair and said: `Kayo dalawa patay mamayang gabi.' We answered: `Ngayon na.' The
Japanese said: `No, tonight.' Then in my struggle to remove the rope around my leg I was able to untie it without my knowledge. One of the Japanese entered to find out what we were doing, but he did not inspect me and left again. Although my hands were bleeding, with my courage to live still I grabbed the electric
wire and cut it trough continuously doing this (witness showing the act of twisting something with his fingers), and unbound myself. When the sentry entered, I allowed the electric wire to be placed as it was. Then it was 6 o'clock (on September 29) from the bells of the church. My brother Osias said: `I can not escape,
I am weak. My face is bleeding. I cannot walk. If you are untied, the thing for you is to live, if you can run for your life. Never mind for me. If I am dead, never mind. Now we are fighting our common enemy, the Japanese. I want you to find out what will be the result of this war.' Then he kicked me, because I was untied
already up to the knee. I tried to remove the rope at his back, but he said: 'No, I can not run.' And he shouted: 'You better run for your life.' Then I saw one Japanese that heard that, and I jumped outside and when I fell to the ground I saw another Japanese watching and shouting words that I can not understand. I just
ran. Between the municipal building and the street there was a barbed wire fence and jumped it over and then passed to the rear of the municipal building, passing between the house of Mr. Javier and the Treasurer's and then to the bank of the river. I passed under the bamboo groves and I went to the house of my
friend (Gregorio Javier) and I was able to go up and then fell down weak." Osias was the commanding officer of the guerrilla unit in which Liberato was a second lieutenant and Epifanio, a volunteer without grade. Since then Liberato did not see Osias any more, but he was able to locate Epifanio in Bayambang,
Pangasinan.
The testimony of Liberato Salvador was substantially corroborated by Epifanio Salvador on all what happened from the afternoon of September 28,1944, when they were arrested in the market place up to about 4 o'clock in the morning of September 29, when Epifanio was able to untie himself and escape from the
Japanese garrison, passing in front of a sleeping sentry two meters away from where the Salvador brothers were tied.
Augusto Antonio testified that the accused told him that Osias Salvador was killed, bayoneted by a Japanese soldier, behind the elementary school building, near the closet, where the corpse was later buried. The information was given by the accuse in 1945 when the Japanese were still ruling.
Appellant endeavors to discredit Liberato and Epifanio Salvador's testimonies by trying to show the improbability for Liberato to have seen the accused making signs to Cristoper Magdalera for their arrest on the basis of the relative positions of witness and appellant and that Epifanio "apparently" was away and came
near the place where Liberato was being arrested only after Magdalera for their arrest on the basis of the relative positions of witness and appellant and that Epifanio "apparently" was away and came near the place where Liberato was being arrested only after Magdalera had pointed his pistol at his back.
The fact that, while he was going southwest, he had seen the accused in the northeast making the sign to Magdalera, is satisfactorily explained by Liberato by saying that "because a man wanted to by the Japanese begins to observe everything," and he had to observe "because I knew they were making signs," and
at that time the accused was "in the left side," and with respect to Epifanio, appellant's surmise that he was "apparently away" appears to without basis if it is recalled that it was Epifanio who advised Liberato to hold up his hands, when Liberato was refusing to do it, by saying, in allusion to Magdalera, "he is a
Japanese spy."
Appellant maintains also that it must have been Felix Abad whom the witnesses for the prosecution saw winking his eyes at Magdalera for the latter to arrest the Salvador brothers and not Francisco Abad. But the theory cannot be maintained upon the positive and unequivocal testimonies of Liberto and Epifanio
pointing the accused as the one who made the sign. Appellant's insistence to put the blame on Felix Abad, by trying to show that it was he and not the accused who made the sign, even if accepted, will not relieve appellant of all responsibility, because, according to the witnesses for the prosecution, he went along
with his brothers Mariano and Felix and Cristoper Magdalera in bringing the Salvador brothers to the Japanese garrison where they were delivered by the accused himself, and it was Francisco Abad who told the Japanese "that we were guerrillas."
In the sixth assignment of error appellant complains that the lower court admitted evidence of supposed treasonable acts of appellant but which are not specifically alleged in any of the counts of the information.
Appellant points specifically to the testimony of Agustin de la Cruz, to the effect that in the moth of October, 1944, at around 11 o'clock, while witness and others were around a gambling table, appellant came unnoticed with six Japanese soldiers and demanded of those in the gathering the information of the
whereabouts of Lt. Riparip and Sgt. Juan Asuncion, both of the guerrilla army, and that sometime in November, 1944, on the occasion of the shooting of Eustaquio Domingo, the accused was in the Japanese garrison while the Japanese soldiers proceeded to the site of the shooting, gathered all the males found
thereabouts, bringing one of them, Benjamin Aremajo, to the garrison to be later dragged to the plaza where he was beaten up, facts which were declared proven by the lower court.
The assignment is well taken as the above facts are not alleged in any of the four counts of the information. The fact that accused is described therein as an informer is not enough, because the description is a conclusion made by the author of the information based on the facts specifically alleged in the four counts.
The information alleged that the accused "adhered to and served as an informer of the enemy, . . . giving them aid and comfort in the following manner, to wit:", — and then follow the four counts.
Furthermore, even if the word "informer" in the information should justify the admission of the evidence in question, the lower court erred in finding the facts proved when the testimony of Agustin de la Cruz about them has not been corroborated by any other witness, thus violating the two-witness rule in treason cases.
Appellant assigned as the seventh error of the trial court in finding him as an informer "on mere assertions of witnesses to that effect without supporting treasonable acts and in making findings of fact not supported by any evidence at all" and makes the complaint, specifically, in relation with the following
pronouncement in the appealed decision:
. . . The accused acted and served as an informer and spy for and in the aid of the Japanese army in Camiling, directing his espionage activities or detecting and gathering informations about the activities of members of the guerilla organizations, of persons maintaining or providing for the support thereof
and of persons possessing firearms or in any other manner connected with the underground resistance movements against the Japanese and spying on the movements of those persons who cherish the return to the Philippines of the Americans, . . .. Proofs adduced by the prosecution of the fact that the
accused had been acting as an informer and spy for and in the aid of the Japanese are highly convincing. One after another the various witnesses for the prosecution has pointed his accusing finger at the accused to have been an informer and spy of the Japanese army. . . .
The pronouncement appears to be based on the testimonies of Publio Dumaual, Rafael Guillermo, and Agustin de la Cruz, each one of whom testified about facts not alleged in any of the counts of the information, and their testimonies on said facts appear not to be corroborated by another witness, as required by the
two-witness rule. The assignment of error is well taken.
Appellant complains in his eight assignment of error that the court failed to take into account two mitigating circumstances: the fact that the Abad family was persecuted by guerrillas, the persecution ending in the killing of Lino Abad Pine and Antonio Abad, father and brother, respectively, of the accused, and,
appellant's age.
On September 26, 1942, a group of around thirty guerrillas took the Abad family to the barrio of Ketegan. On October 17, Lino Abad Pine and Antonio Abad were brought to the schoolhouse, and from that time on they were never seen alive again. On January, 1943, the family was released minus the above
mentioned two members, and they proceeded to Camiling where Mariano Abad, the eldest son, was living, as explained by his widowed mother, "to whom I could look after the support inasmuch as he is my living eldest son. He was with the Japs because that was the last resort for him to do inasmuch as if he did not
do that he would have been killed by the guerrillas."
These facts cannot be considered to mitigate appellant's guilt as they are not of a similar nature or analogous to those mentioned in article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant's age can be considered. He was born on October 20, 1924, and when he committed the acts alleged in counts two and three, the latter on September 28, 1944, he was not yet 20 years old. The fact that his eldest brother, Mariano, was the liaison officer of the Japanese and another elder brother, Felix, was
also in the service of the Japanese, coupled by the fact that, as stated by his widowed mother, the accused had to depend on Mariano for his support, the same as the other members of the family, are circumstances from which, in view of appellant's immature age, did not allow him the freedom of initiative and action
which should be expected of a person who is aware of the full consequences and responsibility for his acts. The circumstances of this case justify crediting appellant with a mitigating circumstance of similar nature to that of number 2 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
Although we hold appellant as one of those responsible for the arrest of the Salvador brothers, we do not agree with the lower court in finding him responsible also for the death of Osias Salvador, as according to the evidence, it was the escape of Epifanio, and later the escape of Liberato, which must have enraged
the Japanese to the extent of killing Osias Salvador, who, were not so weak, had the same chance as his brothers to escape. If his brothers did not escape, there is no ground to presume that Osias would have been killed by the Japanese if we take into consideration that, after almost two and a half months of
confinement, the Japanese allowed Fausto Francisco to be released. There is absolutely no evidence that appellant was present or had anything to do with the killing of Osias Salvador.
Upon the conclusion we arrived at, it is not necessary to deal with the ninth assignment of error in appellant's brief.
Finding the accused guilty of the crime of treason as punished by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code with the attendance of one mitigating circumstance, as provided in number 2 of article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, with the modification of the lower court's decision, we sentence him to 14 years, 8 months, and
1 day of reclusion temporal and to pay a fine of P5,000 and the costs.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 1352. March 29, 1905. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. APOLONIO CABALLEROS, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

Hipolito Magsalin, for Appellants.

Solicitor-General Araneta, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS
1. COERCION. — Held upon the evidence that the defendant Baculi was exempt from responsibility under article 8, paragraph 9 of the Penal Code.

2. EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION. — Extrajudicial confessions not made voluntarily can not be received in evidence. (Act No. 619, sec. 4.)

3. FAILURE TO REPORT A CRIME. — Failure to report to the authorities the commission of a crime is not an offense punished by the Penal Code.

DECISION

MAPA, J. :

The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Cebu to the penalty of seven years of presidio mayor as accessories after the fact in the crime of assassination or murder perpetrated on the persons of the American school-teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France, John E. Wells, and Ernest
Eger, because, without having taken part in the said crime as principals or as accomplices, they took part in the burial of the corpses of the victim in order to conceal the crime.

The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards Roberto Baculi, although he confessed to having assisted in the burial of the corpses, it appears that he did so because he was compelled to do so by the murderers of the four teachers. And not only does the defendant affirm this, but he is
corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by the way, is a witness for the prosecution. This witness says he was present when the Americans were killed; that Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group who killed the Americans, but that he was in a banana plantation on his property
gathering some bananas; that when he heard the shots he began to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of the band; that the latter called to him and striking him the butts of their guns they forced him to bury the corpses.

The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason of irresistible force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under such circumstances when he executed the acts which are charged against him.

As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that he took any part in any way in the execution of the crime with which he has been charged; there is conclusive proof to the contrary, since Baculi, as well as on of the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly declare that he,
Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor was he even in the place of occurrence when the burial took place. The confession of his supposed liability and guilt, made before an official of the division of information of the Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the latter states when
testifying as a witness, can not be considered as legal proof, because the same witness says that Roberto Baculi was the only one of the defendants who made a confession to him voluntarily. It appears besides, from the statements of another witness for the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that the confession of
Apolonio Caballeros was made through the promise made to him and to the other defendants that nothing would be done to them. Confessions which do not appear to have been made freely and voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or promise of pardon, can not be accepted as proof on a trial. (Sec. 4 Act No. 619 of
the Philippine Commission.)

The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the crime, which seems to be one of the motives for the conviction and which the court below takes into consideration in his judgment, is not punished by the Penal Code and therefore that can not render the defendants criminally liable
according to law.

By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, we acquit the defendants, appellants, with the costs de oficio in both instances. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias "Bimbo" were charged with violation of PD No. 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for having on 27 June 1993, while armed with a firearm and a bladed weapon, acting in conspiracy with one another, by means of
violence and intimidation, wilfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and inflicted physical injuries on Eugene Pilapil and Juan Pilapil Jr. who were then fishing in the seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu, and seized their fishing boat, to their damage and prejudice. 1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both accused Emiliano Catantan y Tayong and Jose Macven Ursal alias "Bimbo" guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. 2 Of the duo only Emiliano Catantan appealed.
In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of piracy as the facts proved only constitute grave coercion defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code and not piracy under PD No. 532.
The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of 27 June 1993, the Pilapil brothers Eugene, 21, and Juan Jr., 18, were fishing in the sea some 3 kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu. Suddenly, another boat caught up with them. One of them, later identified as the accused
Emiliano Catantan, boarded the pumpboat of the Pilapils and leveled his gun at Eugene. With his gun, Catantan struck Eugene on the left cheekbone and ordered him and Juan Jr. to "dapa." 3 Then Catantan told Ursal to follow him to the pumpboat of the Pilapils. There they hogtied Eugene, forced him to lie down at
the bottom of the boat, covered him with a tarpaulin up to his neck, stepped on him and ordered Juan Jr. to ferry them to Daan Tabogon. They left behind the other pumpboat which the accused had earlier used together with its passengers one of whom was visibly tied.
Noting that they were already far out into the sea, Eugene reminded Catantan that they were now off-course but Catantan told Eugene to keep quiet or he would be killed. Later, the engine conked out and Juan Jr. was directed to row the boat. Eugene asked to be set free so he could help but was not allowed; he was
threatened with bodily harm instead.
Meanwhile Juan Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as they went farther out into the open sea the engine stalled again. This time Eugene was allowed to assist his brother. Eugene's hands were set free but his legs were tied to the outrigger. At the point of a tres cantos 4 held by Ursal, Eugene helped row the boat.
As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another boat. Catantan asked whose boat that was and the Pilapils told him that it was operated by a certain Juanito and that its engine was new. Upon learning this, Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers to approach the boat cautioning them however not to move or say
anything.
On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded the "new" pumpboat. Once aboard he ordered the operator Juanito to take them to Mungaz, another town of Cebu. When Juanito tried to beg-off by saying that he would still pull up his net and harvest his catch, Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You
choose between the two, or I will kill you." 5 Juanito, obviously terrified, immediately obeyed and Ursal hopped in from the other pumpboat and joined Catantan.
But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat, its outrigger caught the front part of the pumpboat of the Pilapils so he kicked hard its prow; it broke. The jolt threw Eugene into the sea and he landed on the water headlong. Juan Jr. then untied his brother's legs and the two swam together clinging to their boat.
Fortunately another pumpboat passed by and towed them safely ashore.
Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of the complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons
or force upon things, committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided." And a vessel is construed in Sec. 2, par. (b), of the same decree
as "any vessel or watercraft used for transport of passengers and cargo from one place to another through Philippine waters. It shall include all kinds and types of vessels or boats used in fishing (underscoring supplied).
On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by "any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong."
Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is essential that there be an attack on or seizure of a vessel. He claims that he and his companion did not attack or seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil brothers by using force or intimidation but merely boarded the boat, and it was only when they
were already on board that they used force to compel the Pilapils to take them to some other place. Appellant also insists that he and Ursal had no intention of permanently taking possession or depriving complainants of their boat. As a matter of fact, when they saw another pumpboat they ordered the brothers right
away to approach that boat so they could leave the Pilapils behind in their boat. Accordingly, appellant claims, he simply committed grave coercion and not piracy.
We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such
compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. The testimony of Eugene, one of the victims, shows that the appellant actually seized the vessel through force and intimidation. The direct testimony of Eugene is significant and enlightening -
Q: Now, while you and your younger brother were fishing at the seawaters of Tabogon at that time, was there anything unusual that happened?
A: Yes.
Q: Will you please tell the Court what that was?
A: While we were fishing at Tabogon another pumpboat arrived and the passengers of that pumpboat boarded our pumpboat.
Q: Now, that pumpboat which you said approached you, how many were riding in that pumpboat?
A: Four.
Q: When you said the passengers of that pumpboat boarded your pumpboat, how did they do that?
A: They approached somewhat suddenly and came aboard the pumpboat (underscoring supplied).
Q: How many suddenly came aboard your pumpboat?
A: Only one.
Q: What did that person do when he came aboard your pumpboat?
A: When he boarded our pumpboat he aimed his revolver at us (underscoring supplied).
Q: By the way, when he aimed his revolver to you, did he say anything to you?
xxxx
A: He said, "dapa," which means lie down (underscoring supplied).
COURT:
Q: To whom did he aim that revolver?
A: He aimed the revolver on me.
TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ:
Q: What else did he do?
A: Then he ordered his companion to come aboard the pumpboat.
Q: What did he do with his revolver?
A: He struck my face with the revolver, hitting the lower portion of my left eye.
Q: Now, after you were struck with the revolver, what did these persons do?
A: We were ordered to take them to a certain place.
Q: To what place did he order you to go?
A: To Daan Tabogon. 6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave coercion would be to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine waters was seized by the accused by means of violence against or intimidation of persons. As Eugene Pilapil testified, the accused suddenly approached them and
boarded their pumpboat and Catantan aimed his revolver at them as he ordered complaining witness Eugene Pilapil to "dapa"or lie down with face downwards, and then struck his face with a revolver, hitting the lower portion of his left eye, after which, Catantan told his victims at gun point to take them to Daan
Tabogon.
The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. The sudden appearance of another pumpboat with four passengers, all strangers to them, easily intimidated the Pilapil brothers that they were impelled to submit in complete surrender to the marauders. The moment Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he
had full control of his victims. The sight of a drawn revolver in his hand drove them to submission. Hence the issuance of PD No. 532 designed to avert situations like the case at bar and discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters. Thus we cite the succeeding "whereas" clauses of the decree -
Whereas, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still committing acts of depredations upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the
economic and social progress of the people;
Whereas, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries; and,
Whereas, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such acts of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people.
The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only means of livelihood is fishing in sea waters. They brave the natural elements and contend with the unknown forces of the sea to bring home a bountiful harvest. It is on these small fishermen that the townspeople depend for the daily bread. To impede their livelihood
would be to deprive them of their very subsistence, and the likes of the accused within the purview of PD No. 532 are the obstacle to the "economic, social, educational and community progress of the people." Had it not been for the chance passing of another pumpboat, the fate of the Pilapil brothers, left alone
helpless in a floundering, meandering outrigger with a broken prow and a conked-out engine in open sea, could not be ascertained.
While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of depriving the Pilapils permanently of their boat, proof of which they left behind the brothers with their boat, the truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned the Pilapils only because their pumpboat broke down and it was necessary to transfer to another pumpboat
that would take them back to their lair. Unfortunately for the pirates their "new" pumpboat ran out of gas so they were apprehended by the police soon after the Pilapils reported the matter to the local authorities.
The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not produced in evidence cannot exculpate him from the crime. The fact remains, and we state it again, that Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized through force and intimidation the pumpboat of the Pilapils while the latter were fishing in
Philippine waters.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the conviction of accused-appellant EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG for the crime of piracy penalized under PD No. 532 and sentencing him accordingly to reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-57292 February 18, 1986
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULAIDE SIYOH, OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI, accused-appellants.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance of Basilan, Judge Jainal D. Rasul as ponente, imposing the death penalty.
In Criminal Case No. 318 of the aforesaid court, JULAIDE SIYOH, OMARKAYAM KIRAM, NAMLI INDANAN and ANDAW JAMAHALI were accused of qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated murder said to have been committed according to the information as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of July, 1979, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz., at Mataja Is., Municipality of Lantawan, Province of Basilan, Philippines, the above named accused, being strangers and without lawful authority, armed with firearms and taking advantage of
their superior strength, conspiring and confederating together, aiding and assisting one with the other, with intent to gain and by the use of violence or intimidation against persons and force upon things, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, fire their guns into the air and stop
the pumpboat wherein Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and Antonio de Guzman were riding, traveling at that time from the island of Baluk-Baluk towards Pilas, boarded the said pumpboat and take, steal and carry away all their cash money, wrist watches, stereo sets,
merchandise and other personal belongings amounting to the total amount of P 18,342.00, Philippine Currency; that the said accused, on the occasion of the crime herein above-described, taking advantage that the said victims were at their mercy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, ordered them to jump into the water, whereupon, the said accused, fired their guns at them which caused the death of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and wounding one Antonio de Guzman; thus the accused have performed all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of Qualified Piracy with Quadruple Murder, but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reasons of causes in dependent of their will, that is, said Antonio de Guzman was able to swim to the shore and hid himself, and due to the timely medical
assistance rendered to said victim, Antonio de Guzman which prevented his death. (Expediente, pp. 1-2.)
An order of arrest was issued against all of the accused but only Julaide Siyoh and Omar-kayam Kiram were apprehended. (Id, p. 8.)
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion.
WHEREFORE, in view of the fore going considerations, this Court finds the accused Omar-kayam Kiram and Julaide Siyoh guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Piracy with Triple Murder and Frustrated Murder as defined and penalized under the provision of Presidential
Decree No. 532, and hereby sentences each one of them to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. However, considering the provision of Section 106 of the Code of Mindanao and Sulu, the illiteracy or ignorance or extreme poverty of the accused who are members of the cultural minorities,
under a regime of so called compassionate society, a commutation to life imprisonment is recommended. (Id, p. 130.)
In their appeal, Siyoh and Kiram make only one assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OMAR-KAYAM KIRAM AND JULAIDE SIYOH HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (Brief, p. 8.)
The People's version of the facts is as follows:
Alberto Aurea was a businessman engaged in selling dry goods at the Larmitan Public Market, in the province of Basilan (pp. 2-3, tsn). On July 7, 1979 and on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen, Rodolfo de Castro and Anastacio de Guzman received goods from his store
consisting of mosquito nets, blankets, wrist watch sets and stereophono with total value of P15,000 more or less (pp. 4-6, tsn). The goods were received under an agreement that they would be sold by the above-named persons and thereafter they would pay the value of said goods to Aurea
and keep part of the profits for themselves. However these people neither paid the value of the goods to Aurea nor returned the goods to him (pp. 6-7, tsn). On July 15, 1979, Aurea was informed by Antonio de Guzman that his group was held up near Baluk- Baluk Island and that his
companions were hacked (p. 8, tsn). On July 16, 1979, the bodies of Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo Hiolen and Anastacio de Guzman were brought by the PC seaborne patrol to Isabela, Basilan (pp. 17-18, 29, tsn). Only Antonio de Guzman survived the incident that caused the death of his
companions.
It appears that on July 10, 1979, Antonio de Guzman together with his friends who were also travelling merchants like him, were on their way to Pilas Island, Province of Basilan, to sell the goods they received from Alberto Aurea. The goods they brought with them had a total value of
P18,000.00 (pp- 36-37, tsn). They left for Pilas Island at 2:00 p.m. of July 10, 1979 on a pumpboat. They took their dinner and slept that night in the house of Omar-kayam Kiram at Pilas Island (pp. 37-38, tsn).
The following day, July 11, 1979, de Guzman's group, together with Kiram and Julaide Siyoh, started selling their goods, They were able to sell goods worth P 3,500.00. On July 12, 1979, the group, again accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh, went to sell their goods at another place, Sangbay,
where they sold goods worth P 12,000.00 (pp. 40-42, tsn). They returned to Pilas Island at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and again slept at Kiram's house. However that night Kiram did not sleep in his house, and upon inquiry the following day when Antonio de Guzman saw him, Kiram told the
former that he slept at the house of Siyoh.
On that day, July 13, 1979, the group of Antonio de Guzman went to Baluk-Baluk, a place suggested by Kiram. They were able to sell goods worth P3,000.00 (pp. 43-46, tsn). They returned to Pilas Island for the night but Kiram did not sleep with them (p. 47, tsn).
The following day, July 14, 1979, the group again went to Baluk-Baluk accompanied by Kiram and Siyoh (pp. 48, 50 t.s.n), They used the pumpboat of Kiram. Kiram and Siyoh were at that time armed with 'barongs'. They arrived at Baluk-Baluk at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and upon
arrival at the place Kiram and Siyoh going ahead of the group went to a house about 15 meters away from the place where the group was selling its goods (pp. 50-53, tsn). Kiram and Siyoh were seen by the group talking with two persons whose faces the group saw but could not recognize
(pp. 53-54, tsn). After selling their goods, the members of the group, together with Kiram and Siyoh, prepared to return to Pilas Island. They rode on a pumpboat where Siyoh positioned himself at the front while Kiram operated the engine. On the way to Pilas Island, Antonio de Guzman saw
another pumpboat painted red and green about 200 meters away from their pumpboat (pp. 55, tsn). Shortly after" Kiram turned off the engine of their pumpboat. Thereafter two shots were fired from the other pumpboat as it moved towards them (pp. 57-58, tsn). There were two persons on the
other pumpboat who were armed with armantes. De Guzman recognized them to be the same persons he saw Kiram conversing with in a house at Baluk-Baluk Island. When the boat came close to them, Kiram threw a rope to the other pumpboat which towed de Guzman's pumpboat towards
Mataja Island. On the way to Mataja Island, Antonio de Guzman and his companions were divested of their money and their goods by Kiram (pp. 59-61, tsn). Thereafter Kiram and his companions ordered the group of de Guzman to undress. Taking fancy on the pants of Antonio de Guzman,
Kiram put it on. With everybody undressed, Kiram said 'It was good to kill all of you'. After that remark, Siyoh hacked Danilo Hiolen while Kiram hacked Rodolfo de Castro. Antonio de Guzman jumped into the water. As he was swimming away from the pumpboat, the two companions of Kiram
fired at him, injuring his back (pp. 62-65, tsn). But he was able to reach a mangrove where he stayed till nightfall. When he left the mangrove, he saw the dead bodies of Anastacio de Guzman, Danilo Hiolen and Rodolfo de Castro. He was picked up by a fishing boat and brought to the
Philippine Army station at Maluso where he received first aid treatment. Later he was brought to the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan province (pp. 66-68, tsn).
On July 15, 1979, while waiting for the dead bodies of his companions at the wharf, de Guzman saw Siyoh and Kiram. He pointed them out to the PC and the two were arrested before they could run. When arrested, Kiram was wearing the pants he took from de Guzman and de Guzman had
to ask Pat. Bayabas at the Provincial Jail to get back his pants from Kiram (pp. 69-72, tsn).
Antonio de Guzman was physically examined at the J.S. Alano Memorial Hospital at Isabela, Basilan and findings showed: 'gunshot wound, scapular area, bilateral, tangenital' (Exh. C, prosecution). (pp. 134-136, tsn). Dr. Jaime M. Junio, Provincial Health Officer of Basilan, examined the dead
bodies of Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen and issued the corresponding death certificates (Exhs. D and E, prosecution). (pp. 137-138; 140-141, tsn). (Brief, pp. 5-11.)
As can be seen from the lone assignment of error, the issue is the credibility of witnesses. Who should be believed Antonio de Guzman who was the lone prosecution eye-witness or Siyoh and Kiram the accused-appellants who claims that they were also the victims of the crime? The trial court which had the
opportunity of observing the demeanor of the witnesses and how they testified assigned credibility to the former and an examination of the record does not reveal any fact or circumstance of weight and influence which was overlooked or the significance of which was misinterpreted as would justify a reversal of the trial
court's determination. Additionally, the following claims of the appellants are not convincing:
1. That if they were the culprits they could have easily robbed their victims at the Kiram house or on any of the occasions when they were travelling together. Suffice it to say that robbing the victims at Kiram's house would make Kiram and his family immediately suspect and robbing the victims before they had sold all
their goods would be premature. However, robbing and killing the victims while at sea and after they had sold all their goods was both timely and provided safety from prying eyes.
2. That the accused immediately reported the incident to the PC. The record does not support this assertion. For as the prosecution stated: "It is of important consequence to mention that the witness presented by the defense are all from Pilas Island and friends of the accused. They claimed to be members of
retrieving team for the dead bodies but no PC soldiers were ever presented to attest this fact. The defense may counter why the prosecution also failed to present the Maluso Police Daily Event book? This matter has been brought by Antonio not to the attention of the PC or Police but to an army detachment. The
Army is known to have no docket book, so why take the pain in locating the army soldiers with whom the report was made? (Memorandum, p. 7.) And Judge Rasul also makes this observation: "..., this Court is puzzled, assuming the version of the defense to be true, why the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman as
having been allegedly helped by the accused testified against them. Indeed, no evidence was presented and nothing can be inferred from the evidence of the defense so far presented showing reason why the lone survivor should pervert the truth or fabricate or manufacture such heinous crime as qualified piracy with
triple murders and frustrated murder? The point which makes us doubt the version of the defense is the role taken by the PC to whom the report was allegedly made by the accused immediately after the commission of the offense. Instead of helping the accused, the PC law enforcement agency in Isabela, perhaps not
crediting the report of the accused or believing in the version of the report made by the lone survivor Antonio de Guzman, acted consistently with the latter's report and placed the accused under detention for investigation." (Expediente, pp. 127-128.)
3. That the affidavits of Dolores de Guzman, wife of the deceased Anastacio de Guzman, and Primitiva de Castro, wife of the deceased Rodolfo de Castro, state that Antonio de Guzman informed them shortly after the incident that their husbands were killed by the companions of Siyoh and Kiram. The thrust of the
appellants' claim, therefore, is that Namli Indanan and Andaw Jamahali were the killers and not the former. But this claim is baseless in the face of the proven conspiracy among the accused for as Judge Rasul has stated:
It is believed that conspiracy as alleged in the information is sufficiently proved in this case. In fact the following facts appear to have been established to show clearly conspiracy: A) On July 14, 1979, while peddling, the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman noticed that near the window of a
dilapidated house, both accused were talking to two (2) armed strange-looking men at Baluk-Baluk Island; B) When the pumpboat was chased and overtaken, the survivor-witness Tony de Guzman recognized their captors to be the same two (2) armed strangers to whom the two accused
talked in Baluk- Baluk Island near the dilapidated house; C) The two accused, without order from the two armed strangers transferred the unsold goods to the captors' banca; D) That Tony de Guzman and companion peddlers were divested of their jewelries and cash and undressed while the
two accused remained unharmed or not molested. These concerted actions on their part prove conspiracy and make them equally liable for the same crime (People vs. Pedro, 16 SCRA 57; People vs. lndic 10 SCRA 130). The convergence of the will of the conspirators in the scheming and
execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation of all of them the act of any of them (People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA, 759). (Id., pp. 128-129.)
4. That there is no evidence Anastacio de Guzman was killed together with Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen because his remains were never recovered. There is no reason to suppose that Anastacio de Guzman is still alive or that he died in a manner different from his companions. The incident took place on July
14, 1979 and when the trial court decided the case on June 8, 1981 Anastacio de Guzman was still missing. But the number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. P.D. No. 532 considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, as a special
complex crime punishable by death regardless of the number of victims.
5. That the death certificates are vague as to the nature of the injuries sustained by the victims; were they hacked wounds or gunshot wounds? The cause of death stated for Rodolfo de Castro and Danilo Hiolen is: "Hemorrhage due to hacked wounds, possible gunshot wounds." (Exhs. D and E.) The cause is
consistent with the testimony of Antonio de Guzman that the victims were hacked; that the appellants were armed with "barongs" while Indanan and Jamahali were armed with armalites.
WHEREFORE, finding the decision under review to be in accord with both the facts and the law, it is affirmed with the following modifications: (a) for lack of necessary votes the penalty imposed shall be reclusion perpetua; and (b) each of the appellants shall pay in solidum to the heirs of each of the deceased
indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00. No special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of
twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the
evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and
brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship
and privation, were succored violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged
was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment was rendered finding the two
defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half
part of the costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio. By a process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is again done in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in
the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign
state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force. Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.
 4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who, according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the
laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new
government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the Instructions of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as
continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were
before the occupations. This enlightened practice is so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. (Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to
Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so, considering that
the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations. (U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the necessary ancillary legislation,
provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution and the
members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal conception under the law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are
mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a limited meaning, which
would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to article 154. There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the
abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the
same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not
necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but is not unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance with
provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall be
fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both instances. So
ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of
twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the
evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and
brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship
and privation, were succored violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged
was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment was rendered finding the two
defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half
part of the costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio. By a process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is again done in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in
the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign
state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force. Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who, according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the
laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new
government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the Instructions of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as
continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were
before the occupations. This enlightened practice is so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. (Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to
Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so, considering that
the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations. (U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the necessary ancillary legislation,
provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution and the
members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal conception under the law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are
mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a limited meaning, which
would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to article 154. There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the
abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the
same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not
necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but is not unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance with
provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall be
fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both instances. So
ordered.

G.R. No. 111709 August 30, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.
MELO, J.:
This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the Court for sometime. It was reassigned, together with other similar cases, to undersigned ponente in pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001.
In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600 barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value of P40,426,793,87, was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay
Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on, Second Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded, with the use of an aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The
pirates, including accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took complete control of the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew members to paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T
Tabangao" on the front and rear portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was then painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the
ship was undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded negative results. On March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of
Singapore and cruised around the area presumably to await another vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines on March 14, 1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it remained at sea.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18 nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant
Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving the cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both vessels leaving the area, was completed on March 30, 1991.
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed the transfer of cargo to "Navi Pride."
On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel remained at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in three batches with the stern warning not to report the incident to government authorities for a period of two days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would
be killed. The first batch was fetched from the shoreline by a newly painted passenger jeep driven by accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio Changco, who brought them to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of the crew in proceeding to their respective homes. The second
batch was fetched by accused-appellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991 and were brought to different places in Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew, called the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the incident. The crew members were brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The incident was also reported to the National Bureau of Investigation
where the officers and members of the crew executed sworn statements regarding the incident.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:
a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were present at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of surveillance, accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI headquarters in Manila.
b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at Aguinaldo Hi-way by NBI agents as the latter were pursuing the mastermind, who managed to evade arrest.
c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at the lobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.
On October 24, 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed against accused-appellants, as follows:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN HIONG, and nine (9) other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No. 532), committed as follows:
That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991, both dates inclusive, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, then manning a motor launch and armed with high powered guns, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board and seize while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with petroleum products, together with the complement and crew members, employing
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, then direct the vessel to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded and thereafter returned to the Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the aforesaid law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)
This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila. Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon ensued.
Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some inconsistencies in their testimony as to where they were on March 1, 1991, maintained the defense of denial, and disputed the charge, as well as the transfer of any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." All of them claimed having their
own respective sources of livelihood. Their story is to the effect that on March 2, 1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a red speedboat with Captain Edilberto Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached the seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from the three if they wanted to work in a
vessel. They were told that the work was light and that each worker was to be paid P3,000.00 a month with additional compensation if they worked beyond that period. They agreed even though they had no sea-going experience. On board, they cooked, cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran errands for the
officers. They denied having gone to Singapore, claiming that the vessel only went to Batangas. Upon arrival thereat in the morning of March 21, 1991, they were paid P1,000.00 each as salary for nineteen days of work, and were told that the balance would be remitted to their addresses. There was neither receipt nor
contracts of employment signed by the parties.
Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he was at home sleeping on April 10, 1991. He testified that he is the younger brother of Emilio Changco, Jr.
Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence that he studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, and later completed the course as a "Master" of a vessel, working as such for two years on board a vessel. He was employed at Navi Marine Services,
Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain. The company was engaged in the business of trading petroleum, including shipoil, bunker lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and international markets. It owned four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."
On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio Changco and his cohorts, Hiong's name was listed in the company's letter to the Mercantile Section of the Maritime Department of the Singapore government as the radio telephone operator on board the vessel "Ching Ma."
The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker, who offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore dollars. After the company paid over one-half of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan, the latter, together with Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent
of the firm, proceeded to the high seas on board "Navi Pride" but failed to locate the contact vessel.
The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong, upon his return on board the vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the contact vessel to be designated by Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered to ascertain the quantity and
quality of the oil and was given the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore Dollars for the purchase. Hiong, together with Paul Gan, and the surveyor William Yao, on board "Navi Pride" sailed toward a vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T Galilee" would be making the transfer. Although no inspection of "Navi
Pride" was made by the port authorities before departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a port clearance upon submission of General Declaration and crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and the brokers were not in the crew list submitted and did not pass through the immigration. The General
Declaration falsely reflected that the vessel carried 11,900 tons.
On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The brokers then told the Captain of the vessel to ship-side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer of the oil transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of "M/T Galilee," called "Captain Bobby" (who later turned out to be Emilio
Changco). Hiong claimed that he did not ask for the full name of Changco nor did he ask for the latter's personal card.
Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the "Navi Pride" and took samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared the survey report which "Captain Bobby" signed under the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong then handed the payment to Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon arrival at
Singapore in the morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the quantity and quality of the cargo to the company.
Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased by the firm " from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride." The same procedure as in the first transfer was observed. This time, Hiong was told that that there were food and drinks, including beer, purchased by the company for the crew of "M/T
Galilee. The transfer took ten hours and was completed on March 30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full for the transfer.
On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four vessels and wanted to offer its cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was asked to act as a broker or ship agent for the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines to discuss the matter with Emilio Changco, who laid out the details
of the new transfer, this time with "M/T Polaris" as contact vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel was scheduled to arrive at the port of Batangas that weekend. After being billeted at Alpha Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under the name "SONNY CSH." A person by the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO,"
who later turned out to be Emilio Changco himself, also checked in at Alpha Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, Hiong found out that the vessel was not arriving. Hiong was thereafter arrested by NBI agents.
After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered by this Court finding the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the crime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of
Presidential Decree No. 532 and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime. Under Section 3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the principals of said crime is mandatory death. However, considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the Court cannot impose the death penalty, the
accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of the law. The accused Cheong San Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to Article 52 of
the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return to the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the accused can no longer return the same, the said
accused are hereby ordered to remit, jointly and severally, to said corporation the value thereof in the amount of P11,240,000.00, Philippine Currency, with interests thereon, at the rate of 6% per annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is paid in full. All the accused including Cheong San Hiong
are hereby ordered to return to the Caltex Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao", or if the accused can no longer return the said cargo to said corporation, all the accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly and severally, to the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo in the amount of
P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in full. After the accused Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be deported to Singapore.
All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the National Bureau of Investigation and the City Jail of Manila during the pendency of this case provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail of Manila and the National
Bureau of Investigation. With costs against all the accused.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)
The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-appellants may be summarized as follows:
Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Andres C. Infante, Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco
Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that the trial court erred in allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken during the time they were being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby depriving them of their constitutional right to procedural due process.
In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his appearance as counsel for all of them. However, in the course of the proceedings, or on February 11, 1992, the trial court discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a member of the Philippine Bar. This was after Mr. Posadas had presented and
examined seven witnesses for the accused.
Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco uniformly contend that during the custodial investigation, they were subjected to physical violence; were forced to sign statements without being given the opportunity to read the contents of the same; were denied assistance of counsel, and were not
informed of their rights, in violation of their constitutional rights.
Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of qualified piracy. They allege that the pirates were outnumbered by the crew who totaled 22 and who were not guarded at all times. The crew, so these accused-
appellants conclude, could have overpowered the alleged pirates.
Cheong San Hiong
In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated the crime committed by him; (2) the trial court erred in declaring that the burden is lodged on him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had no knowledge that Emilio Changco and his cohorts attacked and seized the "M/T
Tabangao" and/or that the cargo of the vessel was stolen or the subject of theft or robbery or piracy; (3) the trial court erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of qualified piracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law of 1974); (4) the trial court erred in
convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial court erred in making factual conclusions without evidence
on record to prove the same and which in fact are contrary to the evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred in convicting him as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 when he was charged as a principal by direct participation under said decree, thus violating his constitutional right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do not prove any participation on his part in the commission of the crime of qualified piracy. He further argues that he had not in any way participated in the seajacking of "M/T Tabangao" and in committing the crime of qualified piracy, and that
he was not aware that the vessel and its cargo were pirated.
As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the information with qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers to Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he was convicted for acts done outside Philippine waters or territory. For the State to
have criminal jurisdiction, the act must have been committed within its territory.
We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.
The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the legal effects and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer represented accused-appellants during the trial?; (2) what are the legal effects and implications of the absence of counsel during the custodial investigation?; (3) did the trial court
err in finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants committed the crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No. 7659 obliterate the crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5) can accused-appellant Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he
was not charged as such and when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside Philippine waters and territory?
On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) was executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when they were represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient
representation during the trial as covered by the due process clause shall only be valid if made with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-appellants, as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that said accused-appellants were apprised of the nature and legal
consequences of the subject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. They also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court (tsn, February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59).
It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himself in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on the fact that a layman is not versed on the
technicalities of trial. However, it is also provided by law that "[r]ights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law." (Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines). Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds
that "[u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel." By analogy, but without prejudice to the sanctions imposed by law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that the rights
of accused-appellants were sufficiently and properly protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of the record will show that he knew the technical rules of procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial, considering that it was
unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona fidelawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680 [1988]).
However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial investigation may not be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:
SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]) which gave birth to the so-called Miranda doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any questioning during custodial investigation, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he gives may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution even adds the more stringent requirement that the waiver must be in writing
and made in the presence of counsel.
Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of the accused-appellants make them invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the Miranda rights was not even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the aforestated Section 12 sets forth the so-called "fruit from the poisonous tree
doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also
inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case, the uncounselled
extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants, without a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence against them.
However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is sufficient evidence to convict accused-appellants with moral certainty. We agree with the sound deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits "U" and "UU") and accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. did
conspire and confederate to commit the crime charged. In the words of then trial judge, now Justice Romeo J. Callejo of the Court of Appeals —
. . . The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less, who identified and pointed to the said Accused as among those who attacked and seized, the "M/T Tabangao" on March 2, 1991, at about 6:30 o'clock in the afternoon, off
Lubang Island, Mindoro, with its cargo, and brought the said vessel, with its cargo, and the officers and crew of the vessel, in the vicinity of Horsebough Lighthouse, about sixty-six nautical miles off the shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to the Accused Cheong San Hiong upon which the cargo was
discharged from the "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride" for the price of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on March 29, and 30, 1991. . .
xxx xxx xxx
The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" were on board the vessel with the Accused and their cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April 10, 1991 or for more than one (1) month. There can be no scintilla of doubt in the mind of the Court that the officers and crew of the vessel
could and did see and identify the seajackers and their leader. In fact, immediately after the Accused were taken into custody by the operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation, Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba and Isaias Wervas executed their "Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and
pointed to and identified the said Accused as some of the pirates.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three (3) Accused admitted to the Court that they, in fact, boarded the said vessel in the evening of March 2, 1991 and remained on board when the vessel sailed to its destination, which turned out to be off the port of Singapore.
(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)
We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of denial is not supported by any hard evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight is given to the categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than to the accused's plain denial of participation in the commission
of the crime (People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently desperate tale that they were hired by three complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate Christian Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-
appellants were conversing with one another along the seashore at Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to work on board the "M/T Tabangao" which was then anchored off-shore. And readily, said accused-appellants agreed to work as cooks and handymen for an indefinite period of time without even saying
goodbye to their families, without even knowing their destination or the details of their voyage, without the personal effects needed for a long voyage at sea. Such evidence is incredible and clearly not in accord with human experience. As pointed out by the trial court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon, Second Mate
Torralba, and their companion "had to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and venture in a completely unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5) cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."
Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on May 14 and 17, he was at his place of work and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his house in Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally and inherently a weak defense, much more so when uncorroborated by other
witnesses (People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that it is easy to fabricate and concoct, and difficult to disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce clear and convincing evidence that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically impossible for him to have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco
not only failed to do this, he was likewise unable to prove that he was in his place of work on the dates aforestated.
It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest respect, for trial courts have an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a certain witness is telling the truth (People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).
We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of execution; he need not even
take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are times when conspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and collective
effort to achieve a common criminal design.
We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to attack and seize the "M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was to fetch the master and the members of the crew from the shoreline
of Calatagan, Batangas after the transfer, and bring them to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew and the officers of the vessel with money for their fare and food provisions on their way home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco need not be present at the time of the attack and
seizure of "M/T Tabangao" since he performed his task in view of an objective common to all other accused-appellants.
Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one another. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco is the younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia Shipping Lines. Cecilio worked for his brother in said corporation. Their
residences are approximately six or seven kilometers away from each other. Their families are close. Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other hand, has known Cecilio since their parents were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. Accused-appellant Loyola's wife is a relative of the Changco brothers by
affinity. Besides, Loyola and Emilio Changco had both been accused in a seajacking case regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel coils and plates off Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio Changco (aka Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while Loyola at that time remained at large.
As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be convicted of piracy in Philippine waters as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No. 7659 (effective January 1, 1994), which amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal
Code, has impliedly superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He reasons out that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because both Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in Philippine waters. He
maintains that in order to reconcile the two laws, the word "any person" mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree No. 532 must be omitted such that Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to offenders who are members of the complement or to passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No. 7659
shall apply to offenders who are neither members of the complement or passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage of the law.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:
ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. — The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its
equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or passengers.
(Italics supplied.)
Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (January 1, 1994), reads:
ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize
the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or passengers.
(Italics ours)
On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — The following shall mean and be understood, as follows:
d. Piracy. — Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things,
committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided (Italics supplied).
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to
include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the
complement or not, any person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of
the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this
reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were
committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of
the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law,
Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless
of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him on the ground that he was convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 even though he was charged as a principal by direct
participation under Section 2 of said law?
The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:
(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that he induced Emilio Changco and his group in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (c) and that his act was indispensable in the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its
cargo. Nevertheless, the trial court found that accused-appellant Hiong's participation was indisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in the disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which provides:
SECTION 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway robbery brigandage. — Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the movement of police or other peace officers of the
government, or acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of the principal officers and be
punished in accordance with Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
The ruling of the trial court is within well-settled jurisprudence that if there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the participation of an individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved in
favor of lesser responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).
Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which presumes that any person who does any of the acts provided in said section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. In the case at bar, accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the
legal presumption that he knowingly abetted or aided in the commission of piracy, received property taken by such pirates and derived benefit therefrom.
The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of the stolen cargo by personally directing its transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi Pride". He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the
quality and verified the quantity of the petroleum products, connived with Navi Marine Services personnel in falsifying the General Declarations and Crew List to ensure that the illegal transfer went through, undetected by Singapore Port Authorities, and supplied, the pirates with food, beer, and other provisions for their
maintenance while in port (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 133-134).
We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and Departure) and Crew List was accomplished and utilized by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi Marine Services personnel in the execution of their scheme to avert detection by Singapore Port Authorities. Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong not
falsified said entries, the Singapore Port Authorities could have easily discovered the illegal activities that took place and this would have resulted in his arrest and prosecution in Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride" could not have been effected.
We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in detail accused-appellant Hiong's role in the disposition of the pirated goods summarized as follows: that on March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos boarded the "Navi Pride," one of the vessels of the Navi Marine, to rendezvous with the
"M/T Galilee"; that the firm submitted the crew list of the vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record) to the port authorities, excluding the name of Hiong; that the "General Declaration" (for departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off port of Singapore (Exhibits "HH" and "8-A CSH", Record) falsely stated that the vessel was
scheduled to depart at 2200 (10 o'clock in the evening), that there were no passengers on board, and the purpose of the voyage was for "cargo operation" and that the vessel was to unload and transfer 1,900 tons of cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel from "M/T Galilee" with Emilio Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby
a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at the helm, the surveyor prepared the "Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record) stating that the cargo transferred to the "Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross cubic meters; that although Hiong was not the Master of the vessel, he affixed his signature on the "Certificate" above the word
"Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH", Record); that he then paid P150,000.00 but did not require any receipt for the amount; that Emilio Changco also did not issue one; and that in the requisite "General Declaration" upon its arrival at Singapore on March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A CSH",
Record), it was made to falsely appear that the "Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on the high seas during said voyage when in fact it acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric tons of diesel oil. The second transfer transpired with the same irregularities as discussed above. It was likewise supervised by
accused-appellant Cheong from his end while Emilio Changco supervised the transfer from his end.
Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders of his superiors and that he has no knowledge of the illegality of the source of the cargo.
First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the source and nature of the cargo since he himself received the same from "M/T Tabangao". Second, considering that he is a highly educated mariner, he should have avoided any participation in the cargo transfer given the very suspicious
circumstances under which it was acquired. He failed to show a single piece of deed or bill of sale or even a purchase order or any contract of sale for the purchase by the firm; he never bothered to ask for and scrutinize the papers and documentation relative to the "M/T Galilee"; he did not even verify the identity of
Captain Robert Castillo whom he met for the first time nor did he check the source of the cargo; he knew that the transfer took place 66 nautical miles off Singapore in the dead of the night which a marine vessel of his firm did not ordinarily do; it was also the first time Navi Marine transacted with Paul Gan involving a
large sum of money without any receipt issued therefor; he was not even aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean national and thus safe to deal with. It should also be noted that the value of the cargo was P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than US$1,000,000.00 (computed at P30.00 to $1, the exchange rate at that
time). Manifestly, the cargo was sold for less than one-half of its value. Accused-appellant Hiong should have been aware of this irregularity. Nobody in his right mind would go to far away Singapore, spend much time and money for transportation — only to sell at the aforestated price if it were legitimate sale involved.
This, in addition to the act of falsifying records, clearly shows that accused-appellant Hiong was well aware that the cargo that his firm was acquiring was purloined.
Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following the orders of his superiors." An individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful
(Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only of Philippine, but of international law. Such violation was committed on board a Philippine-operated vessel. Moreover, the means used by Hiong in carrying out
said order was equally unlawful. He misled port and immigration authorities, falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to consummate said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself, and the trial court was convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate Port Captain. These circumstances show that he
must have realized the nature and the implications of the order of Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have refused to follow orders to conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of the cargo to the "Navi Pride." He did not do so, for which reason, he must now suffer the consequences of his actions.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-496 December 31, 1902

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellant,
vs.
WILLIAM FOWLER, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Assistant Attorney-General Constantino, for appellant.
William Lane O'Neill, for appellees.

TORRES, J.:
The two defendants have been accused of the theft of sixteen bottles of champagne of the value of $20, on the 12th August, 1901, while on board the transport Lawton, then navigating the high seas, which said bottles of champagne formed part of the cargo of the said vessel and were the property of Julian Lindsay,
and which were taken lucri causa, and with the intent to appropriate the same, without violence or intimidation, and without the consent of the owner, against the statute in the case made and provided.
The accused having been brought before the court, the prosecuting attorney being present on behalf of the Government, counsel for the defendants presented a demurrer, alleging that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction to try the crime charged, inasmuch as it appeared from the information that the
crime was committed on the high seas, and not in the city of Manila, or within the territory comprising the Bay of Manila, or upon the seas within the 3-mile limit to which the jurisdiction of the court extends, and asked, upon these grounds, that the case be dismissed.
This contention was opposed by the prosecuting attorney, who alleged that the court has original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty exceeds six month's imprisonment, or a fine of over $100; that, in accordance with the orders of the Military Governor and the Civil Commission admiralty jurisdiction
over all crimes committed on board vessel flying the flag of the United States has been vested in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. Among other laws and orders he cited the order of August 14, 1898, and Acts Nos. 76 and 186 of the United States Civil Commission. He argued that the President of the
United States had unquestionable authority to authorize the commanding general and the Civil Commission to establish a judicial system with authority to take cognizance of maritime and admiralty causes, citing a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in support of this doctrine, which was applicable to
this Archipelago, which is now analogous to the status of some of the States of the Union during the Mexican war and the war of secession.
The judge, however, by an order of the 14th of September, 1901, held that the court was without jurisdiction to try the accused for the theft alleged to have been committed on the high seas, sustained the demurrer, and ordered the discharge of the defendants, with the costs to the Government. Against this order the
prosecuting attorney appealed, and the case was brought before this court.
This case deals with a theft committed on board a transport while navigating the high seas. Act No. 136 of the organic law, as well as Act No. 186 passed by the Civil Commission, and which repealed the former law, Act No. 76, do not expressly confer jurisdiction or authority upon this court to take cognizance of all
crimes committed on board vessels on the high seas. While the provisions of the law are clear and precise with respect to civil admiralty or maritime cases, this is not true with respect to criminal cases. If any doubt could arise concerning the true meaning of the law applicable to the case, Act No. 400 effectively
dissipates such doubts.
This law, which is an addition to Act No. 136, by which the courts of justice of the Philippine Islands were organized, in article 1 adds to article 56, consisting of seven paragraphs, another paragraph numbered 8, which reads as follows: "Of all crimes and offenses committed on the high seas or beyond the jurisdiction
of any country, or within any of the navigable waters of the Philippine Archipelago, on board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands in accordance with the laws thereof." The purpose of this law was to define the jurisdiction of the courts of First Instance in criminal cases for
crimes committed on board vessels registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands. The transport Lawton not being a vessel of this class, our courts are without jurisdiction to take cognizance of a crime committed on board the same.
Upon these grounds we consider that the order appealed should be affirmed, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Smith, Willard, Mapa, and Ladd, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.
Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.
 RESOLUTION
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition for habeas corpusfiled by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the
crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of
sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic:
(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and
temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429;
Secretary of State Webster Report to the President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526);
Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to
the occupier, as we have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular
government (which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of
sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes
temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war, "although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of our
times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the
inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests;
Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was suspended in Castine, set forth in the decision in the case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs.
Director of Prisons, supra, in connection with the question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de factotherein and its power to promulgate rules and laws in the occupied territory, must have been based, either on the theory adopted subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that
the military occupation of an enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case, the word "sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the legitimate government and is not
transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting said government thereof; and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to the suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague
Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be applied to the present case;
Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military government established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be
considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives as above described, and does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign
country owes to his own government or sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason
against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would
necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso factoacquire the citizenship thereof since he has enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original
citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own;
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague
Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted
legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public order, such
as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because
they can not be committed against the latter (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were also inoperative
as against the ousted government for the latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the
occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation;
Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government and
may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the
Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience (Peralta vs.Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these limitations
are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those which, though continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or not
in force and binding upon said inhabitants;
Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort,
the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is
evident that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular government or
sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor;
Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the
Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not aid them in their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the
whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty — such theory would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing
the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide;
(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the United States, exercised through their
authorized representative, the Congress and the President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the Philippines established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides
according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the Government
or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this constitution;
Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only by the Legislative Department or Congress of
the United States in approving the Independence Law above quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the declaration that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but also by the Executive Department of the United
States; that the late President Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, "As I stated on August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now the status as a government of other independent nations — in fact all the attributes of complete and
respected nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, among them in the case of Jones vs. United States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is "a purely
political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of the country.
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which provides that pending the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All citizens of the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States", was one of the few limitations of the sovereignty of
the Filipino people retained by the United States, but these limitations do not away or are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that the people of each State of the Union preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of the United States conferred upon the latter by the States;
that just as to reason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and
that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our
Constitution provides that "The government established by this constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall
thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines";
 This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to deny the petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be stated in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and
Hontiveros dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion.

G.R. No. L-433 March 2, 1949

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GAUDENCIO ROBLE, defendant-appellant.
Gonzalo D. David for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Jaime de los Angeles for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
Charged with treason on three counts, the defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death by the First Division of the People's Court sitting in Tacloban, Leyte. The correctness of the penalty is the sole question put in issue in this appeal.
The information alleges:
1. On or about March 20, 1944, in the municipality of Dalaguete, province of Cebu, Philippines with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military forces said accused being a member of the Philippines Constabulary did then and there wilfully unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably lead guide and accompany 10 other member of the pro-Japanese constabulary all armed like the accused and did apprehend and arrest Paulino Osorio for having helped the guerrillas and of being the Father of two guerrilla men; that the herein accused after maltreating said
Paulino Osorio did detain him in the municipal jail of Dalaguete; that in the same date the accused and his companions did apprehend Melchor Campomanes and 7 other person who were also tortured for being guerrillas supporters and sympathizers and the accused herein with his firearm did shoot
Melchor Campomanes killing him instantly;
2. Sometime during the month of March 1944 in the municipality of Dalaguete Province of Cebu, Philippines with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military forces said accused being a soldier of the Philippines Constabulary did then and there wilfully,
feloniously and treasonably lead guide and accompany a patrol of 13 constabulary soldiers and did arrest and apprehend Fortunato Linares for being guerrillas and or guerrilla supporters; that said accused did tie and torture the aforesaid person and cut a portion of their ears, the tortures being so severe
especially with respect to Antolin Rodriguez who effectively died as a result of said tortures administered by the accused.
3. On or about May 18, 1944, in Cebu City Philippines with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military forces, said accused being a soldier of the Philippines Constabulary did then and there wilfully, unlawfully feloniously and treasonable accompany a
group of Constabulary soldiers all armed, to Mambaling and other parts of Cebu City and did apprehend Eleuterio Padilla, a former USAFFE soldier for being a guerrilla, and there herein accused and his companions did tie and torture said Eleuterio Padilla detain him at the Constabulary Headquarters for
several days after which he was taken out and mercilessly killed on May 26, 1944 by said accused.
The court held that the facts alleged in the information is a complex crime of treason with murders with the result that the penalty provided for the most serious offense was to be imposed on its maximum degree. Viewing the case from the standpoint of modifying circumstances the court believed that the same result
obtained. It opined that the killing were murders qualified by treachery and aggravated by the circumstances of evident premeditation superior strength cruelty and an armed band.
We think this is error. The torture and murders set forth in the information are merged in and formed part of treason. They were in this case the overt acts which besides traitorous intention supplied a vital ingredient in the crime. Emotional or intellectual attachment and sympathy with the foe unaccompanied by the
giving of aid and comfort is not treason. The defendant would not be guilty of treason if he had not committed the atrocities in question.
On the question of the applicability of the aggravating circumstances which impelled the court against its sentiment to give the defendant the extreme penalty we only have to refer to People vs. Racaza (82 Phil., 623) in which this question was discussed and decided. There we said:
The trial court found the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation superior strength treachery and employment of means for adding ignominy to the natural effects of the crime.
The first three circumstances are by their nature inherent in the offense of treason and may not taken to aggravate the penalty. Adherence and the giving of aid and comfort to the enemy is in many cases as in this a long continued process requiring for the successful consummation of the traitor's purpose,
fixed, reflective and persistent determination and planning.
So are superior strength and treachery included in the crime of treason. Treachery is merged in superior strength; and to overcome the opposition and wipe out resistance movements which was Racaza's purpose in collaboration with the enemy the use of a large force and equipment was necessary. The
enemy to whom the accused adhered was itself the personification of brute superior force and it was this superior force which enabled him to overrun the country and for a time subdue its inhabitants by his brutal rule. The law does not expect the enemy and its adherents to meet their foes only on even
terms according to he romantic traditions of chivalry.
But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of strength to commit acts unnecessary to the commission of treason. There is no incompatibility between treason and decent, human treatment of prisoners, Rapes, wanton robbery for personal grain and other forms of cruelties are condemned and the
perpetration of these will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrong to the main criminal objective under paragraphs 17 and 21 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The atrocities above mentioned of which the appellant is beyond doubt
guilty fall within the terms of the above paragraphs.
For the very reason that premeditation treachery and use of superior strength are absorbed inn treason characterized by killings, the killing themselves and other accompanying crime should be taken into consideration for measuring the degree and gravity of criminal responsibility irrespective of the
manner in which they were committed. Were not this the rule treason the highest crime known to law would confer on its perpetrator advantage that are denied simple murderer. To avoid such incongruity and injustice the penalty in treason will be adapted within the range provided in the Revised Penal
Code to the danger and harm and to which the culprit has exposed his country and his people and to the wrongs and injuries that resulted from his deeds. The letter and pervading spirit of the Revised Penal Code adjust penalties to the perversity of the mind that conceived and carried the crime into
execution. Where the system of graduating penalties by the prescribed standards is inapplicable as in the case of homicides connection with treason the method of analogies to fit the punishment with the enormity of the offense may be summoned to the service of justice and consistency and in the
furtherance of the law's aims.
Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case we believe that the appellants spontaneous plea of guilty is sufficient to entitle him to a penalty below the maximum. The appealed decision is therefore modified and the sentence reduced to reclusion perpetua with the legal accessories and costs.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones and Reyes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-985 January 23, 1948

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DIONISIO AGONCILLO, defendant-appellant.
Macario Nicolas for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Federico V. Sian for appellee.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the People's Court finding the appellant, Dionisio Agoncillo, guilty of treason and sentencing him to suffer fifteen years of reclusion temporal and to pay a fine of two thousand pesos and the costs.
According to the information, from February, 1944, to March, 1945, in Cebu City and its environs, the appellant (1) "did consistently and continuously traffic in war materials and sold them to the enemy," and (2) "did join and serve the enemy as informer, agent, and spy." The People's Court held that the second count
was not proven, and the appealed judgment of conviction is predicated solely on the first count.
Under the theory of the prosecution, appellant's adherence to the enemy is inferable from the following alleged facts: (a) In the afternoon of September 20, 1944, while the appellant was taking a bath in the house of his neighbor Rufina Cepeda, the latter's cousin (Olimpio Do), who knew how to read Chinese,
examined appellant's clothes and found therein appellant's identification card written in Japanese and Chinese characters tending to show that the appellant was a Japanese undercover. (b) In January 1945, after a trip to Bohol, Rufina Cepeda told the appellant that there were guerrillas in Bohol and that Japanese
notes were no longer accepted in said place. In the evening of the next day, Rufina Cepeda was arrested by the Japanese and their undercovers and asked about things she saw in Bohol. Rufina was detained for three days. After her release, the appellant came to her house and got some chickens for the
consumption of the Japanese who arrested her. A Japanese also used to sleep once in a while in appellant's house.
Upon the other hand, appellant's alleged overt acts of giving aid and comfort to the enemy are summarized in the brief for Government as follows: In the middle of April, 1944, the appellant sold about 300 kilos of alum crystals, at three pesos a kilo, to the Keribo, a construction company operated by the Japanese
Army. Two or three weeks thereafter, he sold to the same entity some 100 pieces of water pipes, the price of which was not known. About the third week of December, 1944, the appellant was seen on Jones Avenue helping push a handcart full of truck and auto tires, batteries and spare parts into the intermediate and
high school premises then used by the Japanese Army as a motor pool.
Regardless of the writer's view on suspension of political laws and change of sovereignty as heretofore expressed, the Court is of the opinion that the overt acts imputed to the appellant have not been duly proven. With respect to the sale of 300 kilos of alum crystals, the testimony of the prosecution witness Lorenzo
Barria to the effect that the price was P3 a kilo, is not corroborated by any other witness. With respect to the alleged sale of 100 pieces of water pipes, counsel for the appellee admits that the price thereof was not known. An essential part of the overt act charged in the information was therefore lacking. No pretense
was made that the appellant donated the articles in question. The alleged delivery of truck and auto tires, batteries and spare parts can be disregarded. The only detail that may at most be considered established by the prosecution refers to the fact that the appellant helped in pushing a handcart loaded with such
articles, and the evidence is even uncertain in one respect, namely that the cart was brought either to the intermediate school premises or the high school building. Indeed it was acknowledged by the lower court that the witnesses for the Government did not know how the appellant disposed of the articles loaded in
the cart.
Even supposing, however, that the appellant had really sold for a definite price alum crystals and water pipes, the same did not per se constitute treason. As said articles or materials were not exclusively for war purposes, their sale did not necessarily carry an intention on the part of the vendor to adhere to the enemy.
The theory of the prosecution is that the sale was treasonable in view of the other proven acts showing appellant's adherence to the enemy. It appears, however, that the alleged acts of adherence performed by the appellant took place after the overt act in question. It is not unlikely that at the time the appellant made
the sale, his motive was purely personal gain, uninfluenced by any benefit inuring to the enemy. Where two probabilities arise from the evidence, the one compatible with the presumption of innocence will be adopted. (People vs. Agpangan, G.R. No. L-778, October 10, 1947.)
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs de oficio. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-369 March 13, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CARMELITO VICTORIA, defendant-appellant.
Luis Atienza Bijis for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Bautista for appellee.
PERFECTO, J.:
Sentenced to the supreme penalty of death and to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and costs, Carmelito Victoria comes to us to seek for the reversal of the decision of the People's Court.
He is accused of treason in an information which reads as follows:
The undersigned Special Prosecutor accuses Carmelito Victoria alias Carlito Victoria, Carling Victoria, Carlos Victoria of the crime of treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows:
That during the period compromised between March, 1942 to December, 1944, more specifically on or about the dates hereinbelow mentioned, in the different places hereunder stated, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accussed not being a foreigner but a Filipino citizen owing
allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of his said duty of allegiance, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably did knowingly adhere to their enemy, the Empire of Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, with which the United States
and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were then at war, giving to said enemy aid and/or comfort, in the following manner, to wit:
1. That on or about October 6, 1944, the accused, a member of the Intelligence Unit attached to the Kempei Tai in Lucena, Tayabas, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, joined an armed enemy patrol composed of about eight spies and a Japanese soldier,
which went to the house of Federico Unson in the barrio of Malaking Labak Bocohan, Lucena, Tayabas, and accused Federico Unson of hiding guerrillas; that said patrol was arresting said Federico Unson when some guerrillas appeared and killed one of the spies and the patrol left; that said accused
directed several men in the patrol in picking up the dead spy and carrying him away; and that, in the afternoon of the same day, the same party of spies, including the accused and eight members of the Japanese Military Police, went again to the house of Federico Unson and did feloniously, willfully,
unlawfully and treasonably arrest him, together with Isaias Perez and Ruben Godoy, who happened to be at the house; that with their hands bound, the three were tortured and then taken along by said patrol after setting fire on the house of Federico Unson and that of Isaias Perez were found lying nearby
with numerous bayonet wounds; and that Ruben Godoy was taken to the Japanese garrison in Lucena, Tayabas, and there killed.
2. That on or about December 21, 1944, the accused, accompanied by other Japanese spies, Pedro Raviñera, Jose Bondoc, Jacinto Pineda, Alberto Calawit, Bernardo Santiago, and others who were all armed, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the
house of Jose Unson, in Lucena, Tayabas, and arrested said Jose Unson and brought him to the Japanese garrison on the charge that he had a short wave radio; that he was furnishing radio information to the guerrillas and at the same time supporting them; that said Unson was released on the same
day, but on the next day he was again arrested and brought to the Japanese garrison at Lucena, Tayabas; that said Jose Unson never returned.
3. That on or about February 10, 1945, the accused, in company with Jacinto Pineda, Leonardo Coronel, Jose Bondoc, Abelardo Calawit, and Pedro Raviñera, all members of the Intelligence Unit of the Kempei Tai, were all armed, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give said enemy aid and
comfort, went to the house of Felixberto Romulo in San Pablo, Laguna, placed him under arrest as a guerrilla suspect, and turned him over to the Japanese Military Police who on that occasion were concealing themselves near the house of Romulo; and that, since the arrest of said Romulo, nothing was
heard of him.
4. That on or about December 21, 1944, at about 5 o'clock in the morning, the accused, accompanied by two Japanese Military Police and two undercover operatives, for the purpose of giving and with the intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the house of Hermogenes Calauag in Lucena,
Tayabas, and apprehended said Hermogenes Calauag; that said two Japanese Military Police and the accused conducted a search of the house and afterwards brought Calauag to the Japanese garrison where he was subjected to inhuman torture on the charge being pro-American and adviser of the
Hunters ROTC Guerrillas.
5. That on or about March 9, 1944, at about 5 o'clock in the morning, the accused then acting as an informer of the Japanese Kempei Tai, with intent to aid said enemy, did wilfully, feloniously and treasonably cause the Japanese Military police to arrest and apprehended Antonio San Agustin, a guerrilla
officer, who was thereupon brought to Fort Santiago and there torture and unlawfully detained up to September 20, 1944.
6. That on or about June, 1944, the accused accompanied by an armed group of undercover operatives, for the purpose of giving and with intent to give said enemy aid and comfort, went to the house of Melecio Labalan, Sr., and arrested and brought him to the Japanese garrison in Lucena, Tayabas,
where he was tortured on the charge of being a guerrilla.
7. That on or about February, 1945, the accused, a member of the Ganap, a pro-Japanese party, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably joined the Makapili organization designed to support the Imperial Japanese Forces in levying war against their enemies; that he took military training from the
Japanese and bore arms and joined the enemy forces as a Makapili soldier, taking orders from the Japanese; that he participated in the raid and burning of the barrio of Bautista, San Pablo, Laguna, upon orders of the Japanese; that he carried ammunitions and foodstuffs for the Japanese Army from
Bautista to the mountains of Susong Dalaga and Mt. Malipuño, Laguna; that he performed sentry duty for the Japanese Army in Mount Malipuño, where he was stationed with Japanese and other Makapili soldiers.
That the commission of the above-mentioned acts was attended by the aggravating circumstances of treachery, the aid of armed persons to insure or afford impunity, and deliberately augmenting the crimes by causing other wrongs not necessary in the commission thereof.
Upon the testimonies of Mrs. Federico Unson, Jr. and Dolores Kalakasan, the lower court found that the mutilated corpses of Federico Unson, Jr. and of Isaias Perez were found rotting in the vicinity of the houses of the victims which were burned and looted by the same hands, on the day following the arrest, effected
by the accused in the company of a Japanese soldier and several spies of the enemy. The body of Unson which was still tied to a tree showed that it had been disemboweled by several bayonet thrusts and the corpse of Perez appeared ankleless and mutilated. Ruben Godoy, who was arrested at the same times as
Unson and Perez, since he was imprisoned in the garrison of the Japanese kempei, was never heard of. Appellant's testimony to the fact that, although admitting his presence in the previous morning raid, he did not come along with party that conducted the afternoon raid in which the actual arrest of Unson, Perez and
Godoy took place, was not given by the lower court enough weight to prevail over that of the prosecuting witnesses, thus finding the accused guilty on the first count.
With respect to the second count, the lower court states that the accused admitted having taken part in the raid of the house of Jose Unson and in the latter's arrest, but claims that he tried to save Unson, only the latter was accepted by the lower court, in view of appellant's behaviour as recalled by witnesses
Mercedes Unson, Alejandro Unson, and Eugenio Ramon Unson. The last that was seen of Jose Unson, was his skull as exhumed in a school yard in Lukban, several months after the arrest, the exhumation having been effected with the aid of those who claimed to have seen how his life was ended. These facts relate
to the second count.
With respect to the third count, upon the declarations of Elena Romulo and Enriqueta Alviar, the lower court found that on February 10, 1945, in the company of Japanese kempei and Filipino spies, the accused raided the house of Felixberto Romulo in San Pablo and arrested him as alleged guerrilla. The accused
simply alleged in his defense the alibi that on said date he was in Gagalañgin, Manila.
In regard to the fourth count, the accused alleged that he was merely asked by the Japanese kempei to accompany them in the raid on Hermogenes Caluag's house and admitted that he was present throughout the investigation and torture of Caluag who, according to the accused himself, was tied suspended in the
air for fully twenty minutes, but the lower court did not accept this defense, considering it rather as corroborative of the facts alleged in the information and proved by the witnesses for the prosecution.
Appellant's participation in the arrest of Melecio Labalan, alleged in the sixth count, according to the lower court, has been abundantly established, disbelieving appellant's feigned ignorance of the arrest because appellant himself testified that he promised to see what he could do about Labalan and accepted three
chickens from the latter's wife which he gave to the interpreter at the kempei office.
Counts five and seven were not proven.
Upon the record, it appears that the lower court's conclusions on the overt acts alleged in counts one, two, three, four, and six of the information are fully supported by the evidence. A perusal of appellant's brief alone, in taken. It is highly significant that, although appellant's brief compromises one hundred thirty printed
pages, it failed completely to point out any specific error in the conclusions of fact of the lower court, counsel limiting himself into raising legal questions, maintaining that the penalty imposed is unjustified, and that the acts committed by the accused do not constitute treason but ordinary crimes against the victimized
persons.
Admitting that appellant's conduct during the Japanese occupation has not been impeccable, counsel wants us to consider what the accused did in behalf of the guerrillas in mitigation of his criminal responsibility, and that the purpose of a penalty, not being to satisfy public vengeance, but to attain the correction of the
guilty person, such purpose will not be attained with appellant's death as decreed by the lower court.
Appellant tried to show in his testimony that he was not a spy; that he joined the Japanese in their raids only because he was forced to do so; that in the instances he had to go to the Japanese garrison he did it either in obedience to a summon of his friend Captain Yuki or to intercede in behalf of some prisoners; that
he remained in Lucena heeding the advice of Sor Constancia, who appealed to him not to go to the mountains so he may continue helping those who were detained by the Japanese; and that in October 1943, he was arrested by the Japanese for aiding the guerrillas, and that he was released only after he had been
made to promise to indicate who the guerrillas were but, notwithstanding the involuntary promise exacted from him, he did not cause the arrest of any guerrilla. Even if we accept this testimony of appellant it cannot overthrow the clear, positive, and straightforward declarations of the witnesses, for the prosecution.
Appellant's claim that he, too, was a guerrilla, had helped the resistance movement, and in fact, succeeded in interceding for some Filipino prisoners, does not relieve him from criminal responsibility for the acts he had committed as alleged in the counts in the information which were declared proven by the People's
Court.
The performance of righteous action, no matter how meritorious they may be, is not, as correctly stated by the Solicitor General, a justifying, exempting, or mitigating circumstance in the commission of wrongs, and although appellant had saved the lives of a thousand and one persons, if he had caused the killing of a
single human being to give aid and comfort to the enemy, he is, nonetheless, a traitor. It was already said that: "For whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all" (James 2:10).
We do not find any merit in appellant's allegations that the acts committed by him are not punishable as treason and that the People's Court who tried him had no jurisdiction, they being merely upshots of the wrong theory of suspended allegiance and sovereignty.
Although this Court is unanimous in finding appellant guilty of treason as found by the lower court, there is disagreement as to the penalty that should be imposed, because, while nine of the ten members taking part in the decision of this case voted for the affirmance of the death penalty imposed by the lower court,
the writer of this opinion takes the position that the penalty the accused deserves is that of reclusion perpetua, the medium penalty provided by law.
The Solicitor General recommends the imposition of the supreme penalty of death in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information as follows:
That the commission of the above-mentioned acts was attended by the aggravating circumstances of treachery, the aid of armed persons to insure or afford impunity, and deliberately augmenting the crimes by causing other wrongs not necessary in the commission thereof.
The majority are of the opinion that these circumstances should be considered as aggravating, while the undersigned maintains that in appellant's case, the circumstances in question are essential elements of the treason he has committed. The crime is of such a nature that it may be committed by one single act, by a
series of acts, or by several series thereof, not only in a single time, but in different times, it being a continuous crimes as was held by this Court in Guinto vs. Veluz (77 Phil., 801), so much so that there are some accused of treason for just one count and there are others for several counts, their number not changing
the nature of the offense committed.
For all the foregoing, there being no unanimity of all the members of this Court in the imposition of the death penalty, the People's Court's decision is modified, and appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P15,000 and costs.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
FERIA, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority (except Mr. Justice Perfecto) that find the appellant guilty of the crime of treason as alleged in the information, that is, with two aggravating circumstances. Among the atrocities committed by the appellant and companions stand, in bold relief, those testified to by Mrs. Federico Unson, Jr., and
Dolores Calacasan and related in the same decision of this Court, to the effect that Federico Unson, Jr., was crucified against and tied to a tree, and then disemboweled with bayonet thrusts; and that Isaias Perez's body was mutilated with his ankles severed from the trunk and thrown around the place where the crime
was committed. And I dissent from the dissenting vote of the writer of the decision, Mr. Justice Perfecto, which prevented the imposition by this Court of the death penalty imposed upon the appellant by the lower court.
The killing of the victim was unquestionably attended by treachery, that is, by means, method or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly to insure its execution without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make, and by a deliberate augment of the wrong done by the
offense by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission. But the writer of the opinion says:
The majority are of the opinion that these circumstances should be considered as aggravating, while the undersigned maintains that in appellant's case, the circumstances in question are essential elements of the treason he has committed. The crime is of such a nature that it may be committed by one
single act, by a series of acts, or by several series thereof, not only in a single time, but in different times, it being a continuous crime as was held by this Court in Guinto vs. Veluz (77 Phil., 801), so much so that there are some accused of treason for just one count and there are others for several counts,
their number not changing the nature of the offense committed.
The reason or ground on which the dissenter bases his conclusion that the aggravating circumstances above specified cannot be taken into consideration in the present case, is clearly wrong. Said aggravating circumstances have nothing to do with the integral elements of the crime of treason as charged and
committed by the appellant. The fact that the crime of treason may be committed by a single overt act or a series of overt acts, committed at one and the same time or at different times, does not, by any means, make those circumstances essential elements of the offense committed by the appellant. Said
circumstances were not even inherent in or included by the law in defining the crime of treason. The words "treason" as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code is completely different and independent from "treachery" as an aggravating circumstance provided for in the same Code.
The crime of treason is committed by a citizen, not by merely adhering to the enemy and giving the latter aid and comfort in abstract, but by committing one or more overt acts which constitute aid and comfort to the enemy to which the traitor adheres; and evidently, the commission of such overt act as the killing of the
victim in aid of the enemy may be attended by the aggravating circumstances above specified, for they were not necessary in order to give aid and comfort to the enemy. Of course, if one of the aggravating circumstances provided by law is inherent or included in the overt acts charged as in aid or comfort of the
enemy, it cannot be taken into consideration as aggravating circumstance attending the commission of that particular crime of treason.