“In The Name of Allah”

THE SOUL-BODY PROBLEM IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL

PSYCHOLOGY OF MULLĀ SADRĀ (1571-1640)
AND IBN SĪNĀ (980-1037 (
Abstract

This project will partly compare the approaches and ideas of two pioneers in Islamic
philosophy to the soul-body problem: the philosophical psychology of Mullā adrā
(adr al-Muta'allihīn Shīrāzī 975-1050/1571-1640) and that of Ibn Sīnā (370-428/980-
1037). Investigating the issue of the soul-body problem in the works of Mulla Sadra
compared with those of Ibn Sīnā, we need firstly to gain a general perspective of their
respective approaches to psychology. Such a perspective should help us to arrive at a more
precise understanding of what each has contributed in this area and their differences.
Although psychology occupied a vital role in Ibn Sina School of philosophy and his
theories in this regard were of great importance in the history of Islamic thought, some
major differences nevertheless separate his psychological doctrines from those of Mulla
Sadra that appeared in the post-Ibn Sina period. These differences are significant even if
we admit that Ibn Sina writings were not merely an imitation of the Aristotelian tradition.
His ideas, indeed, provided the ground for the later developments of the Iranian mystical
philosophy or gnosis ('irfān). This transformation of falsafah is rooted in the philosophical
investigation of the soul, or perhaps in the implications that psychological doctrines have
1
yielded for all areas of philosophical inquiry.

Psychology of Mulla Sadra and Ibn Sina (Characteristics)

Mulla Sadra and Ibn Sina differ from one another in a way that each established his own
type of school of philosophical psychology. While Ibn Sina following Aristotle,
considered the science of the soul (‘ilm al-nafs) as a part of natural philosophy, Mulla
Sadra placed it under metaphysics, complementary to the science of the origins of the

1
Robert E. Hall, "Some Relationships between Ibn Sina's Psychology, Other branches of His
Thought, and Islamic teachings," Journal for the History of Arabic Science, ( Aleppo: University
of Aleppo, 1979), vol. 3, pp. 46-47.
 1
things. This specific metaphysical world-view led him to view the universe as an

ordered whole. In this unified world-view, he considered everything in terms of its

metaphysical origin. This might be also why he never reduced the human soul to a
collection of mental states or mental processes, as some modern psychologists have done.
Instead, he traces the metaphysical roots of everything, establishing a doctrine in terms of
which he investigates metaphysical characteristics such as creation, immateriality and

1
immortality. Although Mulla Sadra put forth this new formulation by emphasizing the

physical origin of the soul, which would seem to be a more properly discussed in natural
philosophy, this position was due to the fact that our philosopher believed that ‘ilm al-
nafs is, in fact, a preliminary step toward knowing God and being aware of what will
happen in the other world as far as the gathering (1ashr) of individual souls and bodies is

1
concerned. These goals would be achievable if we considered the soul as a being that

survives and leads us to God both in its generation (1udūth) and its survival (baqā').

Ibn Sina in some of his writings believed that the term "soul" does not refer to the
substance of the soul as such, but to the soul as it relates to the body and governs it.
Considering it as something which bears a relationship to matter and, consequently, to
movement, he takes the body to be an element in the soul's definition and says, following

1
Aristotle, that the soul is the form or the first perfection of the body. In this sense,

1
Seyyed Hossein Nasr, " Sadr a-Din Shirazi ( Mulla Sadra )," A History of Muslim Philosophy,
edited by M. M. Sharif, (Pakistan, 1966), Vol. 2, p. 953.

1
Muammad Abdul Haq, " The Psychology of Mulla Sadra," Journal of the Islamic Research
Institute, (Karachi, 1970), vol. 9, p. 173.

1
Mulla Sadra, Risālah'-i Si Al, edited by Hossein Nasr, (Tehran: Tehran University, 1979), p.
13.
 1
therefore, the most appropriate place for discussing the soul is natural philosophy.

Nevertheless in another attempt he states that although the soul is the form or the first
perfection of the natural body, it is an incorporeal substance that emanates from the world

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of intellects.

Rejecting Ibn Sina apparent self-contradiction and modifying the Aristotelian

definition of the soul as well, Mulla Sadra states that when the soul comes into existence
it is nothing other than something which relates to the body and will only change

1
substantially when it passes through substantial motion. At the same time, Sadra also

mentions that my emphasis on the soul's related mode of existence at its early stage dose

1
not imply Ibn Sina idea that the soul is a rational concept and not a substantive one. So

there will not be any unknown substance for the soul separated from its relation to the
body at its early existence. However, he insists that no one is able to discover the soul's

1
Unlike the above-mentioned argument, in his al-Risālah al-A11awiyyah Fī Amr al-Ma'ād Ibn
Sina emphasizes that the word "ana" which reflects the soul refers to something beyond the body
or any part of it. See al-Risālah al-A11awiyyah Fī Amr al-Ma'ād, edited by Sulaymān Dunyā,
(Cairo, 1949), pp. 94-95.

1
Ibn Sina, Kitāb al-Nafs Min Ajzā' Kitāb al-Shifā', edited by Fazlur Rahmān, ( London: Oxford
University, 1959), p. 10-11.

1
Ibn Sina, "Risālah Fī al-1udūd, " Tis‘ Rasā'il fī al-1ikmat wa al-Ţabī‘iyyāt, edited by 1asan
‘Āī, (Beirut: Dr Qbis, 1986), pp. 69-70.

1
Sadr al-Din Muhammad al-Shirazi, al-Asfār al-Arba‘ah, (Qum: Kitābfurūshī-i Muţafawi,
1378 A. H), vol. 8, al-safar al-rābi', al-bāb al-awwal, chapter 1, pp. 9-11.

1
Ibid., pp. 12-13. See also Fazlur Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla Sadra, (Albany: State
University of New York, 1975), pp. 196-97.
essence (dhāt); all we can relate, in fact, are various facts about its faculties and the lower

11
mental and intellectual levels (quwā wa manāzilihā al-nafsiyyah wa al-`aqliyyah).

Mulla Sadra also departs from Ibn Sina on some other psychological points, such
as the eternity and createdness of the soul, the immateriality (tajarrud) of the imaginative

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power, and the effective role of the soul in relation to its faculties, through which it

11
exists in all its uniqueness (al-nafs fī wa1datihā kull al-quwā). It is necessary to

mention that even though Mulla Sadra's psychology covers a vast terrain, including the
vegetative and animal souls, we have limited ourselves in this study to the case of the
human soul.

11
Ibid., al-bāb al-sādis, chapter 2, p. 310.

11
Going beyond Ibn Sina and other previous Muslim philosophers who followed Aristotle in
attributing immateriality only to universal intellect, Mulla Sadra asserted that the faculty of
imagination is also a given immortal and independent existent. Regarding this doctrine, he
followed certain Sufi and Hermetic teachings that established an opposite school of thought vis-à-
vis the Peripatetics. For more information refer to the M.A. dissertation written by M. J. Zarean
entitled as Sensory and Imaginary Perception according to Mulla Sadra, (Montreal: Institute of
Islamic Studies, 1994).

11
Sayyid Abu al-1asan Qazwīnī, "The Life of Sadr al-Muta'llihin Shirazi and...," Ydnāmah'-i
Mulla Sadra, (Tehran: Tehran University, 1340 A. H.), p. 4.
Different Terminology
Speaking of the soul and the mind, philosophers have traditionally proposed two basic
orientations. Some believe that mind and soul are the same, others that mind is a part of
the soul. A third group proposes that the mind and the soul are entirely different and what,
in fact, exists is mind characterized by intellect and will. While philosophers have
insisted on the existence of the soul as something which can survive after the death of the
body independently or, better to say, without a corporeal body, modern defenders of the
notion of the mind maintain the existence of the mind as something which is not

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immortal, but characterized by intellect and will. According to the latter, the human

mind is primarily the capacity to acquire intellectual abilities. Therefore, it is a capacity,

not an activity. They argued that babies have minds even though they have not yet
exhibited intellectual activities. In other words, infants possess a basic ability to acquire

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new abilities.

Beyond these views, some have gone further to state that no satisfactory account
of our concept of the mind can be really offered. As Shaffer explains:

The only thing that we know of each person is a series of mental changes, mental states,
and mental processes. Because of the inability to say what a mind is, many philosophers
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prefer to speak not of minds as such, but simply of mental properties or mental events.

11
Teichman, The Mind and the Soul, op. cit., pp. 1-2. See also Kenny, The Metaphysics of
Mind, op. cit., p. 18.

11
Kenny, The Metaphysics of Mind, op. cit., p. 20.

11
Shaffer, "Mind-Body Problem," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, op. cit., p. 337.
 Many modern psychologists have taken this line of thinking as the very basis of
their field.

Trying to define rū1 or nafs, some Muslim philosophers, on the other hand, have
stated that no one can obtain or know the exact nature of rū1 even if one is sure that there

11
is, indeed, something like rū1.

According to D.B. Macdonald, rū1 in Arabic is a primary noun that has become
broadly equivalent in meaning to the Latin spiritus, or "breath", "wind", "spirit". From
one end, it may even be related back to the most primitive folklore and, from the other
end, it is closely linked, as in the Islamic use of the word "spirit," to the entire history of
philosophy. In the course of its journey between these two extremes, the meaning of the
term has been alternatively used in all theology and philosophy, from metaphysics to

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so-called superstitions.

In purely philosophical tradition, soul or nafs is sometimes considered as a form

(ūrah) or perfection (kamāl) or power (quwwah), implying the principle of affections
and acts (mabda` al-āthār wa al-af`āl). All these terms depend on certain considerations.
If we regard it as the source of actions and effects in relation to the body, the soul is

11
Muhammad A‘lā Ibn ‘Alī al-Fārūqī al-Tihānawī, Itilā1āt al-Funn, (Beirut: al-Maktabah al-
Islamiyyah, 1966), Vol. 3-4, p. 18.

11
D. B. Macdonald, "The Development of the Idea of Spirit in Islam," Acta Orientalia (1931) ,
p. 307.
 11
called quwwa. However, it could be the form of matter that carries it or something

11
which completes matter and causes it to be actualized.

Switching to the technical meaning of the soul according to Ibn Sina school of thought,
let us first present his point of view on the soul's definition. In al-Najāt it seems that he

11
simply accepts the Aristotelian definition of the soul and insists on the intellectual

11
aspects such as thinking, inference, and the perception of universals. He considers the

soul as the first perfection (kamālun awwal) of the natural body. However, he departs
from Aristotle when he emphasizes the difference between perfection and form.
Perfection according to Aristotle is equal to form (ūrah), which cannot stand by itself,
while Ibn Sina believes that perfection and form are not interchangeable. Each form is
equal to perfection but each perfection is not a form. Using Aristotle's metaphor of the

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ship's captain to explain the difference, Ibn Sina states that the captain is a kind of

11
It should be noticed that quwwah has different meanings in philosophical texts, but is used in
the above-mentioned discussion referring to the soul as the source or basis of effects and the
actions (mabd` al-thār wa al-af‘āl).

11
Mulla Sadra, al-Asfār, vol. 8, op. cit., al-safar al-rābi', al-bāb al-awwal, chapter 1, pp. 7-9.

11
According to Aristotle, "soul is the first actuality (or the first entelechy) of a natural body
having in it the capacity of life", See Aristotle, De Anima, (London: Oxford University, 1950,
1955), translated by J. A. Smith under Ross editorship, Book II, 1, 412a.

11
Ibn Sina, al-Najāt, edited by Abd al-Rahmān Umayarah (Beirut: Dār al-Jayl, 1992), vol. 2, p.
196.

11
Aristotle, De Anima, op. cit., Book II, I, 413a.
perfection for the ship but is not its form. In the case of the soul, too, we must state that a
transcendent perfection (Kamālun mufāriq) is neither the form of matter nor is it located

11
in it.

On closer examination, one may note a certain inconsistency in Ibn Sina words.
On the one hand, he states that the soul is the first perfection of the body, which
necessitates admitting the idea of being form. For, "first perfection" is something that
causes matter to be actualized. Therefore, its relation to the body cannot resemble that of
a captain to a ship, which are two independent existents. No one considers the captain as
the "first perfection" of the ship. On the other hand, he considers the soul as a
transcendent perfection (kamālun mufāriq), which is in fact the final not the first
perfection of the body. This excludes the proposed definition.

Ibn Sina sometimes defines the soul by referring to its functions. In al-Shifā', he
introduces the human soul as the source of nutrition, growth, sensation, motion, and
intellection (madar al-ghadhā', al-numuww, al-i1sās, al-1arakah, wa al-ta'aqqul).

11
These two said definitions are Aristotelian. In another attempt, Ibn Sina tries to

combine Aristotle's position on one hand, and Plato's on the other hand. He states
accordingly that although the soul is the form or the first perfection of the natural body, it

11
is an incorporeal substance that emanates from the world of intellects.

11
Ibn Sina, al-Shifā', (Qum: al-Najafī al-Mar‘ashī pub., 1983), vol. 2, al-Ţabī‘iyyāt, al-fann al-
sādis,al-maqālah al-'ūlā, p. 7.

11
Aristotle, De Anima, op. cit., Book II, 1, 412a.

11
Ibn Sina, "Risālah fī al-1udd" Tis‘ Rasā'il fī al-1ikmat wa al-Ţabī‘iyyāt, edited by 1asan ‘Āsī,
(Beirut: Dār Qābis, 1986), pp. 69-70.
 Though Mulla Sadra quotes passages in his al-Asfār indicating that according to

11
the philosophers, nafs is nothing other than what is related to the body and which

functions as a source of intellectual acts and universal perceptions, in his Mafātī1 , he

states that all definitions of the soul which are presented by them as being essential
definition are, in fact, nominal definitions (1add bi1asab-i al-'ism) because nafs is in its

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reality one of God's immaterial lights (nūrun min anwār al-Allāh al-ma`nawiyyah). In

order to remove this ambiguity, Mulla Sadra declares that the human soul has a unique
existence which is continuously in essential motion and does not have any static essence
or particular stage of existence like other existents located in the natural, psychical and
intellectual realms. Consequently, it would be very hard to perceive its essence as it is.
All we say about the soul can only indicate the levels of its existence in relation to the
body and refer to its accidents of perception and motion ('awāri1 al-idrākiyyah wa

11
al-ta1rkiyyah). Therefore, philosophers usually define "nafs" as the first perfection

(kamālun awwal) of the body. This definition simply reflects a kind of relation (i1āfah)
existing between the soul and the body, whereas the soul is indeed a substance (jawhar).
It is like when we define a builder (bannā') as a person who constructs buildings, which

11
defines him as a builder not qua human being.

11
Mulla Sadra, al-Asfār, vol. 8, op. cit., al-safar al-rābi', al-bāb al-awwal, chapter 1, pp. 9-11.

11
Mulla Sadra, Mafātī1 al-Ghayb, commented by Mullā Ali Nūrī, edited by Mu1ammad
Khāwjawī, (Tehran, 1984), p. 514.

11
Ibid., p. 310.

11
Sadr al-Dīn Mu1ammad Ibn Ibrāhīm al-Shīrāzī (Mullā adrā), al-Mabda' Wa al-Ma‘ād,
edited by Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtīyānī, (Tehran, 1976), pp. 232-33.
 One may note a kind of contradiction between this account and what he offers in
his al-Asfār that clearly shows that Mulla Sadra considers the soul at its very early
existence as something relating to the body without having any other transcendent

11
essence.

Again, in an attempt to define nafs (soul), Mulla Sadra asserts that each active
power (quwwah fā'iliyyah) capable of causing different effects is called nafs. This
definition refers to the soul as an active power. The soul's simple essence (dhātihā
al-basīţah), on the other hand, has another definition that cannot be dealt with in natural
science, he says.

In Mulla Sadra writings, one can barely tell that he explicitly distinguishes
between nafs and rū1. Although he often applies nafs to refer to that which is related to
the body, he also sometimes uses rū1 as an alternative. In his ‘Arshiyyah, he uses rū1 to

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refer to something he calls nafs in other works. The Distinction is perhaps clearer when

Mulla Sadra adds suffixes to the term "rū1". He distinguishes between vaporous spirit
(al-rū1 al-bukhāri) and immaterial spirit (al-rū1 al-mujarrad) in his writings. The former,
according to him, is a subtle, hot body (jism 1ārr laţīf) that is made up of four tempers
(akhlāţ arba'ah) which carries perceptual powers and runs in the body. The latter, on the
other hand, has an incorporeal existence that can only be known by perfect men through
the intuition (binūrin ashraf min al-'aql). Al-rū1 al-bukhārī could be investigated in

11
Mulla Sadra, al-Asfār, vol. 8, op. cit., al-safar al-rābi', al-bāb al-awwal, chapter 1, pp. 11-12.

11
Sadr al-Mut'allihīn Shirazi, ‘Arshiyyah, edited and translated by Ghulām 1usayn Āhanī,
(Isfahan: Kitābfurūshī-i Shahriyār, 1341 A. H.), p. 235. In the same page he uses the term "rū1" to
refer to the highest level of the soul's development, and in another passage he uses the term to
refer to the lowest stage of the soul's existence that is related to the body and is interchangeable
with the term "nafs". This synonymy is found in Sadra's discussion in his Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-
Karīm, edited by Mu1ammad Khāwjawī, (Qum: Intishārāt-i Bīdār, 1982), vol. 7, p. 58.
natural science through experiment and deduction with the view to maintaining body’s

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health. Al-rū1 al-mujarrad must be known through intuition as a way of knowing God.

There is one case in which Mulla Sadra maintains that rū1 and nafs are two levels
of the soul. Comparing the soul's levels to those of the Qur'ān's meanings, Mulla Sadra
enumerates seven degrees of existence for the soul. These degrees are the following:
nature (ţabī'ah), soul (nafs), intellect ('aql), spirit (rū1), secret (sirr), hidden secret

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(khafī), and the most hidden state (akhfā) which is that of perfect union with God.

According to this point of view, nafs and rū1 are not two independent things, but rather
two levels of one reality that unfolds through substantial motion.

As we noticed one can hardly arrive at a clear understanding of the terms. The
whole terminological ambiguity is, of course, related to the history of these terms. There
are at least four different layers to be distinguished, and each has its own ambiguity:

a) Qur'ānic application (nafs, rū1 with very different meanings according to

various contexts).

b) Mystical usage (basically as in the Qur'ān).

c) Medical meanings (rū1 may be used as referring to blood, life, etc.).

d) Philosophical notion (rū1 means psyche, particularly rational soul <al-nafs

al-nāţiqah.>

11
Mulla Sadra, al-Mabda' wa al-Ma‘ād, op. cit., pp. 250-54.

11
Mulla Sadra, Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-Karīm, op. cit., vol. 7, p. 23. See also Seyyed Hossein Nasr,
"Sadr al-Din Shirazi," A History of Muslim Philosophy, edited by M. M. Sharif, (Karachi, 1983),
vol. 2, pp. 955-56. Nasr here states that according to a famous hadîth of the Prophet Muammad,
accepted by Sh`as and Sunnis alike, the Qur'n has seven levels of meaning the last known only to
God.
The duality of the soul and the body
Basic to any investigation of the soul-body relationship is the idea that man consists of
two distinct things, namely, the soul and the body. Mulla Sadra and Ibn Sina discussed
this duality in similar ways, sometimes overlapping the discussion on the immateriality of
the soul. The evidence presented by Mulla Sadra for the distinction between the soul and
the body may be categorized into two main groups. He sometimes employs introspection
as a way of helping the person to realize that there is something other than his body.
Otherwise he uses conceptual analysis to indicate that the soul has a distinct existence.

As an example of the first group, he mentions self-consciousness, which all

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individuals experience in all states. One can easily see that both Ibn Sina and Mulla

Sadra assert the existence of this kind of knowledge about the self (dhāt), whether in
sleep, drunkenness or unconsciousness. According to Mulla Sadra, even during sleep,
drunkenness (al-sukr), and unconsciousness (al-ighmā') no one forgets himself. Now, if
the soul were nothing other than either the whole body or a part of it, it would, in fact, be
forgotten, for, we know that we sometimes forget our body in its entirety or some part of
it. Moreover, for most people, the internal parts of the body -like the heart and brain- are
known only through instruction (al-ta'līm) or dissection (tashrī1). Therefore, by contrast,

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the soul is something of which we are always aware.

11
Ibn Sina, al-Ishārāt, op. cit., al-namat al-thālith, vol. 2, p. 320 & al-Shifā', op. cit., al-
Tabī`iyyāt, al-fann al-sādis, al-maqālah al-'1l1, al-fasl al-awwal, p. 13. & al-maqālah al-
khāmisah, al-fasl al-sb1bi1, pp. 225-26.

11
Mulla Sadra, al-Mabda' wa al-Ma11d, op. cit., pp. 294-95. See also al-Shaw1hid al-
Rub1biyyah, edited by Jal1l al-D1n 1shtiy1n1, ( Mashhad, 1346 A.H.), pp. 211, 212.
 Trying to clarify the distinction between the soul and the body, Ibn Sina offers an

11
interesting argument that E. Gilson calls that of the "Flying Man/Homme Volant".

While his other arguments are mostly borrowed from the previous Peripatetics, Ibn Sina

11
himself puts this one together. Ibn Sina in this argument asks each individual to go

through introspection and to concentrate on himself by supposing that he is just created,

equipped with a healthy intellect and neither his body nor any part of it will attract his
attention. In this state he forgets everything but himself. This knowledge reflects
something that is not his body. A well-organized form of this argument is offered in Kitāb

11
al-Shifā'.

In the third part (al-namaţ al-thālith) of his al-Ishārāt, Ibn Sina states that the
existence of the soul and its perception are self-evident and need no proof. It is the first

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and clearest knowledge that one can have. So, he starts to offer his proof in order to

draw our attention (tanbīh) and then comes to the conclusion that this kind of knowledge

11
E. Gilson, "Avicenne," Archives D'histoire Doctrinale et Littraire, du Moyen age, T. IV, 1929,
p. 41.

11
In Farabi's Kit1b al-Jam1 Baina Ra'yay al-1ak1main, 4th ed.,(Beirut: D1r al-Mashriq, 1985), a
similar argument is attributed to Aristotle, although its real author was Plotinus in his Enneads
through the Theology. Plotinus applied introspection to draw attention to the soul, while the body
and both its external and internal parts are forgotten. According to this argument, it is impossible
to know the soul except when we unite with the intellectual world. See al-Farabi, Kit1b al-Jam1,
op. cit., p. 109.

11
Ibn Sina, al-Shif1', al-1ab11iyy1t, al-fann al-s1dis, al-maqlah al-'1l1, al-fa1l al-awwal, p. 13. &
al-maqlah al-kh1misah, al-fa1l al-s1bi1, op. cit., pp. 225-26.

11
Ibn Sina, al-Ish1r1t, vol. 2, op. cit., al-nama1 al-th1lith, p. 320.
cannot be achieved through any essential definition ( 1add), description (rasm) or proof

11
(burhān). As a final word, he adds:

Here I am and I know myself even if I do not have any knowledge about my hand or my
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foot or any other of bodily limb being internal or external.

Since the idea of dualism provides the basis for any further discussion about the
soul-body relationship, Ibn Sina like his predecessors devoted much space in order to
deal properly with this issue. In one of his treatises devoted to the human soul, he offers
another argument, based on the knowledge that each person has about his unique
personality throughout his life. He points out that although the body is in a continuous
process of change, each individual at every moment has the same understanding of
himself as the one he had as a child. This uniqueness that helps us to remember our early

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childhood reflects the existence of something else beside the changeable body. One

11
Ibn Sina al-Ish1r1t, vol. 2, op. cit., al-nama1 al-th1lith, p. 320.

11
Ibn Sīnā, Kit1b al-Nafs, edited by Fazlur Rahman, op. cit., p. 255.

11
Ibn Sina, "Ris1lah f1 Marifat al-Nafs al-N1tiqah,” Ibn S1n1 wa al-Nafs al-Bashariyyah, op. cit.,
p. 31. It should be added that the authenticity of this treatise strongly doubted by J. P. Michot in
his book La destine de L'homme Selon Avicenne, p. XXIX-XX. However, the idea is attributed
to him based on his other writings. Prof. H. Landolt mentions that according to F. Rz this
argument has been initially dealt with by Ghaz1l1 with the conclusion that "essence of man"
(1aq1qat-i 1dam1) is not identical with his body. See H. Landolt, Ghaz1l1 and
"Religionswissenschaft", some notes on the Mishk1t al-Anw1r, (Bern: Peter Long, 1991), p. 69, F.
N. 205.

The idea of a stable and unique personality, which is the characteristic of our spiritual realm has
also been proposed by two modern psychologists, namely, Bergson and William James. See
Khulayf, op. cit., p. 106. He quotes from Ibr1him Madk1r, F1 al-Falsafah al-Islmiyyah, pp. 172
& 194. See also al-Bayr Nasry, op. cit., p. 18.
may suppose that both Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra have probably relied on this form of
evidence, on introspection and knowledge by presence, hoping to trigger an awareness of
ourselves through a concentration on the "self", which happens to be beyond even of our
mental forms. Following Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra, S. M. H. Ţabāţabā’ī says that we all
have a permanent and correct understanding of ourselves throughout the life, but we

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perhaps make a mistake when we want to interpret or conceptualize it.

According to M. T. Misbah Yazdi, It should be mentioned that although the self-

knowledge may be acquired by each person who is able to concentrate on his ego, it has
different levels of lucidity which develops along with the development of the soul itself.
Therefore, in its initial appearance, it would be almost unconscious or possess a very low
level of lucidity. Even after years it may not be much clearer or, at least, not clearly
interpreted by the mind. Often it is mistaken for the body. Whenever the soul becomes
more perfect or acquires a higher level of immateriality, self-knowledge becomes clearer,
until it perceives itself as an entirely transcendent being. But only a few people who
have reached the highest level of spiritual development acquire this kind of knowledge.
Most require other types of evidence before they can acquire self-conscious knowledge of

11
themselves.

11
Sayyid Muammad Husayn Tabatba'i, al-M1z1n F1 Tafs1r al-Qur'1n, (Tehran: D1r al-Kutub
al-Isl1miyyah, 1970), vol. 6, p. 200. It must be emphasized that Suhraward had specially
elaborated this point in his various writings. He insisted that since self-knowledge is a type of
direct knowledge, which is acquired without any mental intermediary, it will be absolutely true.
See Shih1b al-D1n Ya1y1 ibn 1abash al-Suhraward1, "K. al-Talw111t", Majm1'ah f1 al-1ikmah
al-Il1hiyyah, ed. H. Corbin (Ist1nb1l: ma1ba'ah al-Ma'1rif, 1945 ), vol. 1, pp. 70-72. & "1ikmat
al-Ishr1q", Majm1'ah'-i Mu1annaft-i Shaykh-i Ishr1q , ed. H. Corbin, (Tehran: Institut Franco-
Iranien, Académie Iranienne de Philosophie, 1331s./1952), vol. 2, pp. 110-112.

11
Muammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi, 1m1zish-i Falsafah (Tehran: S1zman-i Tabl1ght-i Isl1mi, 1989),
vol. 2, p. 154.
 However, it remains unclear how we can be aware of ourselves in the cases of
unconsciousness, drunkenness or sleep. The assertion is conceivable only when we are
healthy and conscious.

Supporting Mulla Sadra's idea regarding the presence of self-knowledge even in

the case of unconsciousness or drunkenness, Tabataba’i states that what one may say after
each of those two unusual situations is that he is not aware of what has happened for him
during that period or better to say he is not able to remember it, but he cannot say that he
did not have any knowledge of himself when he was drunk or unconscious. We have
heard of some people, who suffered from unconsciousness or drunkenness, that they had

11
experiences such as what we may have in our usual dreams during sleep.

In his al-Asfār, Mulla Sadra adduces more arguments that may be categorized as
samples of the second group. Here he follows Peripatetic tradition by listing the soul's
functions and analyzing their relation to the soul. The soul is said to be an active power
that causes various voluntary effects, such as intellect, sensation, motion, feeding,
growth, reproduction. He argues that these kinds of effect can neither be derived from
matter nor from physical form, not even from the whole body as a combination of matter
and corporeal form. This is because matter, on the one hand, is a pure receptivity
(qābiliyyah ma11ah) having no function or effect. Form, on the other hand, cannot be
considered as a source of these effects, since it is common to all bodies (ajsām), although
we observe these effects emanating from some types of bodies. So, there must be another
source beyond the body, in order to explain those effects we see in some bodies. This

11
Tabataba'i, al-M1z1n, vol. 6, p. 192.
 11
source is what we call the soul (nafs). The evidence here presented is similar to what

11
Ibn Sina offers in Kitāb al-Shifā', and is borrowed from Plato and Aristotle.

In his explanation concerning the distinction between the soul and the body,
Mulla Sadra sometimes refers to the capacity of the soul and the body to acquire forms
and to deal with them independently. Following Ibn Sina and Suhrawardiī, he maintains
that the body can bear only one form or quality at a time; and, if it looses a quality, it
cannot regain it without an external cause. But the soul can independently preserve,
remember and reproduce any intelligible form at any time. It is like a board containing

11
various sciences and knowledge of innumerable objects. He also argues that man is

capable of conceiving universals and intelligible forms that cannot be formed in the body.
This is because the body is infinitely divisible, whereas an intelligible form is

11
indivisible.

11
Mulla Sadra, al-Asf1r, vol. 8, op. cit., al-safar al-r1bi', al-b1b al-awwal, chapter 1, p. 6.

11
Ibn Sina, al-Shif1', op. cit., al-1ab11iyy1t, al-fann al-s1dis, al-maqlah al-'1l1, al-fa1l al-awwal,
p. 5.

11
Mulla Sadra, al-Shaw1hid al-Rub1biyyah, op. cit., pp. 213, 214. See also Mu1ammad `Abdul
Haq, " The Psychology of Mulla Sadra," Journal of the Islamic Research Institute, (Karachi:
1970), vol. 9, p. 177.

11
Ya1y1 ibn 1abash Shih1badd1n Suhraward1, "Partu N1ma", Majm1`ah'-i 1s1r-i F1rs1-i Shaykh-i
Ishr1q, Ed. S. H. Nasr, (Tehran: Institut Franco-Iranien, Académie Iranienne de Philosophie,
1348s./1970), vol. 3, .pp. 24-25. See also Mulla Sadra, al-Asf1r, op. cit., vol. 8, al-safar al-r1bi',
al-b1b al-s1dis, chapter 1, pp. 260-64.
 Continuing his argument, Mulla Sadra maintains that another evidence for the
duality of the soul and the body is their "opposite directions" in the process of
development. While continuous and intense intellectual activities eventually lead the
body to weakness, which may end in death and dissolution, they produce mental
perfection and intellectual maturity. It is evident that it would be impossible for the same
thing to be the cause of both the perfection and the destruction of a thing at the same

11
time. Therefore, the soul or the mind is something other than the body.

This is similar to what is offered in the classical argument in the Peripatetic

tradition. They argue that intensive sense-perception eventually weakens the body, while

11
intellectual activity brings the mind to maturity.

In spite of his eagerness to prove a clear duality of the soul and the body, Mulla
Sadra attempts to show that an intimate and metaphysical link exists between them. He
goes so far as to assert that the body and the soul are two levels of one existent. The body
is the state or stage (martabah) of hardness and heaviness for that being, whereas the soul
constitutes a degree of lightness and subtlety. Here, one may ask how these two distinct
existents come to be so intimately linked together. Leaving it unanswered, saying that it is
a divine secret, Mulla Sadra nevertheless gives an example. He states that just as the
material of the wick gets ready to accept fire and then gradually becomes red and bright
until it becomes luminous and burning, so the human sperm gets physically ready to
accept the rational soul, which is a spark from heaven and then develops until it unites

11
Ibid., p. 295. Criticizing this evidence, Mulla Sadra adds that what is, indeed, impossible is
that one cause creates both perfection and dissolution in the same thing and at the same time.
However, one may think of the possibility of a cause that leads to the occurrence of perfection
and dissolution in one thing but at two different times or based on two different considerations.

11
Aristotle, De Anima, op. cit., Book III, 3, 429a, line 30 & 429b, line 4.
 11
with the active intellect. As we shall see, Mulla Sadra attempts to demonstrate that

although the soul is an immaterial being, and quite distinct from the body, its creation is
based on a corporeal origination.

11
Mulla Sadra, al-W1rid1t al-Qalbiyyah F1 Ma1rifat al-Rub1biyyah, edited by Ahmad Shaf111h1,
(Tehran: Iranian Academy of Philosophy, 1979), pp. 85-86. See also al-Asf1r, vol. 8, op. cit., al-
safar al-r1bi', al-b1b al-th1lith, chapter 13, p. 148.
Soul-Body Relationship
In the previous section, we investigated whether or not there was something incorporeal
beside the body, considering what Mulla Sadra and Ibn Sina have put forward in this
regard. In the present section, we will first deal with the issue whether the soul has an
eternal pre-existence (qadīm), or whether it is created in time (1ādith) just like the body.
If it is said to be a created existence, one may ask again whether the soul joins the body
as a physical thing, which then changes into an incorporeal existent, or it joins the body
as a created but incorporeal thing. We must deal with these issues before we can
determine what were the basic philosophical foundations of soul-body relationship in the
psychology of Mulla Sadra.

By way of an introduction into these questions, we may briefly consider a

classification of all the doctrines concerning the soul's eternity and createdness into four
groups, which has been proposed by the 19th century philosopher and mystic Mulla Hādī
Sabzawārī.

According to his classification, a group of theologians held the idea that the soul
is always corporeal (jismānī) both in its createdness (1udūth) and its persistence (baqā').
Peripatetics (Mashshā'iīn), the second group, took the opposite stand stating that the soul
is immaterial in both its createdness and immortality (1udūth wa baqā'). But this
immateriality belongs only to its essence, since it needs to be united with the body in
order to perform its functions and to perfect itself. Connection with the body, they assert,
is in the form of a relation (ta‘alluq) not imprint (inţibā`), so that the soul is immaterial

11
even when it relates to the body. The third group consists of mystics, followed by

11
By mystics he probably means Ibn 1Arab1 and R1m1 and all who followed their school of
thought. As an example Sabzaw1r1 cites a poem from al-Shaykh Far1d al-D1n 1A111r:

1111 11 1111 111 1111 111 111 1111 11 1111 111 1111 111 1 11

In this line 1A111r considers the body as an organ for the soul and the soul as a part of the whole.
Mulla Sadra, who maintained that the soul is physical only in its createdness, but changes
gradually into immaterial quiddity after it has been created in the body. The fourth group
took a view opposite to Mulla Sadra's, stating that some souls were immaterial upon
creation and were related to the body, but became corporeal after they joined with the
body. Metempsychosists (a1āb al-tanāsukh) hold that when the soul relates to the
body, it will be deeply affected by the body. They also say that through its relation to the
body, the soul becomes corporeal (jismānī), not the body (jism) itself, because there is a
big difference between being corporeal (jismānī) and being a body (jism). Even though
Sabziwārī concurred in general with Mulla Sadra, it seems that he tended to believe in the
idea of the fourth group, adding further that this is what all investigators believed in

11
(hādhā shay'un yaqūlu bihī al-kull min ahl al-ta1qīq).

According to Mulla Sadra, the debate on the eternity and createdness of the soul
goes back to Plato and Aristotle's period. Plato upheld the idea of its eternity, whereas

11
Aristotle believed in its createdness. He himself refutes the idea of eternity with a

number of arguments. For example, he declares that it is impossible for the soul to be
eternal, since then it must pre-exist either in form of the soul or the intellect (‘aql). If it
pre-exists in the form of the soul, it must be inactive (mu‘aţţal) waiting to connect to a

11
1mul1 Shaykh Mu1ammad Taq1, Durar al-Faw1'id, Ta'lqat 'al1 Shar1 al-Man11mah li
al-Sabzaw1r1, (Tehran: Markaz Nashr al-Kit1b, 1378/), pp. 342-44. See also 1asanz1dah `1mul1,
1Uy1nu Mas1'il al-Nafs, (Tehran: Intish1r1t-i Am1r Kab1r, 1371s./1992), p. 229. He quotes from
Sabzaw1r1, Ta1lîqt Al1 Ghurar al-Far'id, al-1ab1 al-1ajar1 al-a1l1, (al-1ab' al-n11i1r), p. 298.

11
Mulla Sadra, Maf1t11 al-Ghayb, Commented by Mull1 Ali N1r1, (Tehran, 1984), p. 536.
 11
body. If it rather pre-exists as an intellect, how can it bear any new accident when it is

11
actual, without having any potentiality. The problem, according to Mulla Sadra, starts

when we believe that the soul pre-exists in the same manner as it is related to the body.
The soul before joining with the body would be a pure immaterial and actual existent that
possesses immediately all it can attain. Therefore, it would have no potentiality to be
actualized in cooperation with the body. If it is an eternal and thus perfect being, how is it
possible for a perfect being to become contaminated by corporeal powers and instruments

11
which are vegetative or animal and imperfect?!

The other problem is that of plurality. Here, he just maintains that the pure
immaterial thing cannot be more than one, since it does not have any individuating

11
matter. Like Ibn Sina, Mulla Sadra argues that if the soul existed before the body, then

there would have to be either a plurality of souls or one soul. A plurality of souls is
impossible. For in their prior existence these souls are immaterial and since matter is the

11
individuating principle, these souls cannot be many. But the supposition of the pre-

11
It is noteworthy that the soul philosophically refers to something that is related to the body in
order to govern it. So, if it pre-exists without dealing with the body, it will be inactive (mu'a11al).
See Mulla Sadra, al-Asf1r, vol. 8, op. cit., al-safar al-r1bi', al-b1b al-s1bi', chapter 2, p. 332.

11
Mulla Sadra, al-Mabda' wa al-Ma`âd, op. cit., p. 313. See also al-Shawâhid, op. cit., p. 233.

11
Mulla Sadra, al-Asf1r, vol. 8, op. cit., al-safar al-r1bi', al-b1b al-s1bi', chapter 2, pp. 330-31.

11
Ibn Sina, al-Ris1lah al-A11awiyyah f1 Amr al-Ma11d, edited by Sulaym1n Duny1, (Cairo, 1949),
p. 88-91. & Ibn Sina, A1w1l al-Nafs, edited by F. Ahw1ni, (Cairo, 1952), pp. 96-97. See also
Michael E. Marmura, "Avicenna and the Problem of the Infinite Number of Souls", Mediaeval
Studies, (Toronto: Pontifical Institute Of Mediaeval Studies, 1960), vol. 22, p. 234.
existence of one soul is equally impossible. For then the soul of an individual like Ali
would be identical with the soul of an individual like ‚asan. This is absurd. Nor can it
become many after having been one, for the soul is not divisible. If, then, in the supposed
prior existence there can be neither a plurality of souls nor one soul, the prior existence of
the soul to the body is impossible. The soul cannot exist before the body but must exist
with body. Mulla Sadra also insists that if we believe that the soul is an eternal and
immaterial substance, we must also believe that a material being came out of the
combination of an immaterial and a material thing. It would also be absurd. In his
al-Asfār he argues:

The soul is the entelechy (completion, tamām) of the body, [which means that] a perfect
corporeal species comes out of the connection of the bodily matter and the soul. But it is
impossible (to see) a natural material species emerges from the connection of a material
and an immaterial being. Then, if the consequent is wasted, the antecedent is wasted, too.
Accordingly it is clear that as far as the soul's individual existence is concerned, its
association with the body and its disposal in it is an essential affair for the soul ( amrun
dhātiyyun lahā). Hence, the soul's relation to the body is its constituting differentia
(muqawwimah lahā). However, it does not imply that the soul is a type of correlation (min
bāb al-mu1āf) or it is out of the definition of substantiality ( 1add al-jawhariyyah). Rather it
implies that the soul is out of the definition of intellectuality ( 1add al-'aqliyyah).

So, the soul must be a material form in its initial existence as it becomes
associated with the body. This is the point, as we shall see, at which Mulla Sadra departs
from Ibn Sina's position and proposes that being a material form and relating to the body
is essential for the soul. Therefore, the soul cannot possess first its own immaterial
essence, and then relate to the body. In its early existence, the soul must be a physical

11
Refuting the idea of plurality, Mulla Sadra argues that plurality derives either from form
(al-11rah) or from matter (al-m1ddah), or from the agent (al-f11il), or from the final goal
(al-gh1yah). None of these possibilities pertain to the existence of the soul before joining with a
body. The soul's form is its essence, which is one and not many. Its matter is the body, which of
course is absent before it has joined with the soul. What produces it is the active intellect, also
one. The final goal is in God, who is undoubtedly one. Therefore, there will be no justification for
plurality of the soul. See al-Mabda' wa al-Ma11d, op. cit., pp. 310-11.
 11
form, because it joins matter in order to actualize it. It should thus be consistent with

the quiddity of matter, which is the same as its form. So, when matter is corporeal, its
form also must be corporeal. However, this form has the capacity of becoming an

11
intellectual form.

Although Mulla Sadra makes serious efforts to refute the idea of eternity of the
soul, he adds that what he is seeking to refute is the eternity of the soul's existence before
the body, as a proper and independent existence when it joins with the body. The soul has
another type of existence, God's knowledge, and is as eternal as His knowledge is

11
eternal. The only reasonable possibility of existence for the soul before the body is to

be sought in God's knowledge, which, of course, cannot be an independent and a proper

existent as it is with the body. And this doctrine, he says, may be what Plato (or more
precisely Neo-Platonists) and his predecessors had intended by the divine archetypes (al-

11
muthul al-ilāhiyyah) or intellectual forms (al-uwar al-’aqliyyah) This kind of

existence, he says, does not have any problematic consequences and is a quite basic of

11
Based on Aristotelian theory of form-matter, actuality of all corporeal beings is due to their
form. Since the soul is also form of the body, it actualizes the body.

11
Mulla Sadra, al-Asf1r (al-1ikmah al-Muta11liyah F1 al-Asf1r al-Aqliyyah al-'Arba1ah), (Beirut:
D1r I1y1' al-Tur1th al-1Arab1, 1990), vol. 3, al-safar al-awwal, al-mar1alah al'1shirah, chapter 8,
pp. 330-31. See also 1Arshiyyah, p. 241. It is worth mentioning that the book al-Asf1r is entitled
in its new edition as al-1ikmah al-Muta11liyah F1 al-Asf1r al-Aqliyyah al-'Arba1ah. However the
editions are the same.

11
Mulla Sadra, Mafti1 al-Ghayb, op. cit., p. 536.

11
Mulla Sadra, al-Asf1r, vol. 8, op. cit., al-safar al-r1bi', al-b1b al-s1bi', chapter 2, pp. 331-32.
 11
Im1miyyah philosophers. Since each perfect cause cannot be separated from its effect,

the soul as an effect exists for its cause before the body as its cause does. So when the
cause exists, it contains the perfection of its effects.

One may, however, argue that this type of being is not the soul as such. It is
indeed its cause (active intellect or any other immaterial cause) and its immediate
perfection. What depends on the body does not have this form of existence. When the
soul emanates from its cause in order to acquire new kinds of perfection, it relates to the
body as the soul that is distinguishable from its cause. One can easily distinguish between

11
these two types of levels of existence. Under one consideration, the soul has a separate

or incorporeal existence (al-wujūd al-mufāriq), but under another it is a relative existence

11
(al-wujūd al-ta‘alluqī).

One harsh attack could be addressed to both Mulla Sadra, who upheld a particular
type of eternity, and all who believed in the soul's eternity as such. If the soul existed
before the body through a separate existence, why does it become related to the body and
appear in a lower mode of existence? On this question, Mulla Sadra quotes from Shaykh
al-Ishrāq in his 1 ikmat al-Ishrāq where he had previously asked how it was possible for
an existent being in the "world of lights" to relate to bodies in "world of darkness"? No
one can imagine any change that might occur in the world of immateriality. In addition,
one may ask what justifies the relation of a soul to a particular body. Why does a soul

11
become related to this body but not to another?

11
Mulla Sadra, 1Arshiyyah, op. cit., p. 239.

11
Mulla Sadra, al-Asf1r, vol. 8, op. cit., al-safar al-r1bi', al-b1b al-s1bi', chapter 3, pp. 346-47.

11
Ibid., p. 366.
 Explaining the soul's emanation from the realm of intellects, Mulla Sadra states
that what may be said about the connection of the soul to the active intellect after death
can also be asserted about the emanation of the soul. It is also worth mentioning, he says,
that even though the soul has a higher type of existence when it is in the intellectual
realm, there still remains some goodness (khayrāt) and perfections which can be acquired

11
only when the soul become associated to the body. Moreover, Mulla Sadra can answer

that the emanation of the soul from its cause is not, in fact, a change. There is neither

11
increase nor decrease in the case of emanation. It may be argued that if "existent"

beings in the intellectual realm are purely perfect beings then why should they seek to
acquire new perfections. However, it may be proposed that they are perfect beings in
terms of the perfections of that realm. There may remain other perfections that could be
attainable only by entering into a new world using the body.

But Mulla Sadra still has to respond to some further questions concerning his
theory about the eternity of the soul. According to him, the eternity of the soul is its
presence before its cause. So, what indeed is eternal is its cause, not the soul as such. But
could it be asserted that souls before and after association with the body do not have an
independent existence and are equal to the intellects themselves? Mulla Sadra believes
that the soul in its upward travel unites with the active intellect. This union requires a
kind of duality between the soul and active intellect; otherwise there will not be any
connection. If Mulla Sadra believes that unification of the soul with active intellect is the
very essence of the connective (‘ayn al-rabţ) between the cause and effect, one can say
that the latter always exists even when the soul becomes related to the body and is

11
Ibid., p. 353.

11
Ibid., p. 353-55 & 358-59.

11
Ibid., al-safar al-r1bi', al-b1b al-s1bi', chapter 6, p. 396.
limited neither to a particular realm nor to any kind of soul. All souls being either devilish
(shayţānī) or godly (ra1mānī) must be related to their cause. But Mulla Sadra states that
only divine souls can be related to the active intellect. Moreover, it would be reasonable
if, after death, the soul changes into an independent intellect like its cause. But if it unites
with its cause, it would be like its existence before the body. In this case, the creation of
the soul must be meaningless. Whereas the intellects (‘uqūl) before and after the relation
to the body are permanent, the souls are created with the body and will be corrupted by it.
In conclusion, the soul may exist before the body as perfection with its cause, but will be
an independent being like its cause after death and this ought to be the true meaning of
unification with active intellect.