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Case Digests in PFR ARt 1 26 Monteclar

This case involved a company policy that prohibited employees from marrying coworkers. The company fired three employees who married other coworkers, citing this policy. The employees filed cases claiming they were unjustly terminated. While the lower courts initially ruled for the company, the Court of Appeals ultimately found the policy to be invalid. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the company failed to demonstrate how the marriages would negatively impact operations or productivity. The policy was based merely on unfounded fears and stereotypes about married coworkers. Without valid justification, the company could not restrict the employees' right to marry and security of tenure through such a discriminatory policy.

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100% found this document useful (2 votes)
304 views44 pages

Case Digests in PFR ARt 1 26 Monteclar

This case involved a company policy that prohibited employees from marrying coworkers. The company fired three employees who married other coworkers, citing this policy. The employees filed cases claiming they were unjustly terminated. While the lower courts initially ruled for the company, the Court of Appeals ultimately found the policy to be invalid. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the company failed to demonstrate how the marriages would negatively impact operations or productivity. The policy was based merely on unfounded fears and stereotypes about married coworkers. Without valid justification, the company could not restrict the employees' right to marry and security of tenure through such a discriminatory policy.

Uploaded by

Jae Lee
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Modequillo v.

Breva
GR. No. 86355, 31 May 1990

FACTS:

The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at PoblacionMalalag, Davao del Sur on July
1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at
DalagbongBulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latter’s name. A motion to quash
was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built since
1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that
the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated. With
regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the transfer in his
favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The
residential house in the present case became a family home by operation of law under Article 153.

ISSUE:

WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home in as much as it does not fall under the
exemption from execution.

RULING:

No. The subject property is deemed to be a family home but it does not fall under the exemption
from execution of the money judgment aforecited.

Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that “the provisions of this Chapter shall also
govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable.” It does not mean that
Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences
are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred
before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences
at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state
that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.

The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the
vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by
the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988. Therefore, this case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the
Family Code.

As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on whatever
rights the petitioner may have on the land.

* Case digest by Cherrie Mae E. Aguila-Granada, LLB-1, Andres Bonifacio Law School, SY 2017-2018
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN
GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna
a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B.
Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that
Jennifer Cagandahan is sufferingfrom Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare
medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics.
Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her
petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is
suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael
Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine
General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is female but
because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally,
thus has organs of both male and female.” The lower court decided in her favor but the
Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same
was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did
not implead the local civil registrar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be changed.

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the
case, the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.”
The Supreme Court made use of the availale evidence presented in court including the
fact that private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by
the doctor that Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen),
which is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.”

The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and
(2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court
respects the respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life
is already difficult for the ordinary person. The Court added that a change of name is not
a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and
the consequences that will follow.
Silverio v. Republic

October 22, 2007 (GR. No. 174689)

PARTIES:

petitioner: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio

respondent: Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:

On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely”
and his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his
sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and acts
like a female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is consonance with the
principle of justice and equality.

The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that there is
no law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a reconsideration but was
denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.

HELD:

No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the name is
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually used; or if the
change will avoid confusion. The petitioner’s basis of the change of his name is that he intends his first
name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court says that
his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate
as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. The Court denied the petition.
Star Paper Corporation vs. Simbol 487 SCRA 228

FACTS: Petitioner was the employer of the respondents. Under the policy of Star Paper the employees are:
1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has a relative, up to the 3rd degree of
relationship, already employed by the company. In case of two of our employees (singles, one male and
another female) developed a friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then decided
to get married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above. Respondents Comia and
Simbol both got married to their fellow employees. Estrella on the other hand had a relationship with a co-
employee resulting to her pregnancy on the belief that such was separated. The respondents allege that
they were forced to resign as a result of the implementation of the said assailed company policy.
The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ruled in favor of petitioner. The decision was appealed to the Court of
Appeals which reversed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether the prohibition to marry in the contract of employment is valid

HELD: It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were found fit for
the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the
marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking
Section, could be detrimental to its business operations. Neither did petitioners explain how this detriment
will happen in the case of Wilfreda Comia, then a Production Helper in the Selecting Department, who
married Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter-machine. The policy is premised on the mere fear that
employees married to each other will be less efficient. If we uphold the questioned rule without valid
justification, the employer can create policies based on an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at
the expense of an employee’s right to security of tenure.
Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a co-employee, but they
are free to marry persons other than co-employees. The questioned policy may not facially violate Article
136 of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the
only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit
disproportionate, effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the
questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee’s right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based
upon stereotypes of married persons working together in one company.
Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot
benefit the petitioners. The protection given to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we
cannot prudently draw inferences from the legislature’s silence that married persons are not protected
under our Constitution and declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype. Thus, for failure of
petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule that the questioned
policy is an invalid exercise of management prerogative. Corollary, the issue as to whether respondents
Simbol and Comia resigned voluntarily has become moot and academic.
In the case of Estrella, the petitioner failed to adduce proof to justify her dismissal. Hence, the Court ruled
that it was illegal.

Petition was denied.


Duncan Assoc. of Detailman-PTGWO vs. Glaxo Wellcome Phils., Inc. G.R. No. 162994, Sept. 17, 2004

FACTS:

Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. 24, 1995. Contract of employment signed
by Tecson stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by the existing company rules; to
disclose to management any existing future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or
employees with competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a
prossible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. Company's Code of Employee Conduct provides
the same with stipulation that management may transfer the employee to another department in a non-
counterchecking position or preparation for employment outside of the company after 6 months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte area and
entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy, an employee of Astra, Glaxo's competition. Before getting
married, Tecson's District Manager reminded him several times of the conflict of interest but marriage took
place in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson's superiors informed him of conflict of intrest. Tecson asked for
time to comply with the condition (that either he or Betsy resign from their respective positions). Unable to
comply with condition, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area.
After his request against transfer was denied, Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance Committee
and while pending, he continued to act as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte
sales area. On Nov. 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo's policy was
valid...

ISSUE: Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying
employees of any competitor company is valid

RULING: On Equal Protection

Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies, and other
confidential programs and information from competitors. The prohibition against pesonal or marital
relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo's employees is reasonable under the
circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. That
Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interest cannot be denied.

It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state
or those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of US Supreme Court
decisions that the equal protection clause erects to shield against merely privately conduct, however,
discriminatory or wrongful.

The company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with the policy.
Indeed the application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard
for the lot of the employee.

On Constructive Dismissal

Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued


employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is demotion in rank, or diminution
in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the
employee. None of these conditions are present in the instant case.
ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996

Ponente: J. Mendoza

Facts:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her
from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and
private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took
157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,
greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and
papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence;

Held:

(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is
the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition
in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse
while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to
share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to
the other.

The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.


Castillo v Castillo G.R. No. 189607, April 18, 2016

Facts:
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6
January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato). On 28 May 2001,
Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage
to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista. Respondent opposed the Petition,
and contended that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured any license
therefor, and neither of them was a member of the denomination to which the solemnizing officer
belonged.
RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on the ground
that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC said that the fact that
Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her
marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. CA reversed and set aside the RTC's
Decision and Order and upheld the validity of the parties' marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said
that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect at the time the
marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code. Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code
does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.

Issue: W/N judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.

Ruling: NO, under the Civil Code. Petition is DENIED. The Court held that the subsequent marriage of
Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence
of a marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio
before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil
Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only
serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
Ratio:
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in effect
at the time of its celebration. In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages
was the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in
1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using the provisions under the Civil Code
on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80, 81, 82, and 83 (first paragraph); and those on voidable
marriages are Articles 83 (second paragraph), 85 and 86.
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL,
ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000

Facts:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was shot by Pepito resulting
in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog
got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident

After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito
to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under
the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s
successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are
not among the persons who could file an action for annulment of marriage under Article 47 of the Family
Code.

Issues:

(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and wife for at least five years exempts
them from obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of
the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time
of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead

Ruling:

(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years
without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of cohabitation
as “husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the
union. In other words, the five-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the
date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. The five-year period should be the years immediately before the day the marriage and it should
be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the five years, and continuity—that is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year cohabitation period
is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to
have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully
with their spouse.

(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid.
REX M. TUPAL v. JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO, AM No. MTJ-14-1842, 2014-02-24
Facts:
Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint against Judge Remegio V.
Rojo
Judge Remegio V. Rojo presides Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental. Judge Rojo allegedly solemnized marriages without the required marriage license. He
instead notarized affidavits of cohabitation[2] and issued them to... the contracting parties.[3] He
notarized these affidavits on the day of the parties' marriage.[4] These "package marriages" are
allegedly common in Bacolod City.
nine affidavits of cohabitation all notarized by Judge Rojo. All affidavits were notarized on the day of
the contracting parties' marriages.
contained the following jurat:
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this [date] at Bacolod City, Philippines.
(sgd.)
HON. REMEGIO V. ROJO
Judge[7]
Judge Rojo allegedly violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of
cohabitation without affixing his judicial seal on the affidavits. He also did not require the parties to
present their competent pieces of evidence of... identity as required by law.
Judge Rojo commented on the complaint.[11] He argued that Rex was only harassing him. Rex is the
father of Frialyn Tupal. Frialyn has a pending perjury case in Branch 5 for allegedly making false
statements in her affidavit of cohabitation.
Judge Rojo did not deny notarizing the affidavits of cohabitation. He argued that notarizing affidavits
of cohabitation was connected with his official functions and duties as a judge.[13] The Guidelines on
the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of... the Judiciary[14] does not prohibit judges from
notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize.
Thus, Judge Rojo did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also argued that he did not violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He is a judge, not a
notary public. Thus, he was not required to affix a notarial seal on the affidavits he notarized.[16]
Judge Rojo argued that he need not notarize the affidavits with the parties presenting their competent
pieces of evidence of identity. Since he interviewed the parties as to the contents of their affidavits,
he personally knew them to be the same persons who executed the... affidavit.
Judge Rojo alleged that other judges in Bacolod City and Talisay City also notarized affidavits of
cohabitation of parties whose marriage they solemnized.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Judge Rojo be fined P9,000.00 and sternly
warned that repeating the same offense will be dealt with... more severely.
Issues:
whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance of
the law.
Ruling:
This court finds Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross ignorance
of the law. Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as notaries public. However, they
may do so only in their ex officio capacities.
They may also act as notaries public ex officio only if lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their
courts' territorial jurisdiction.
If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years and have no legal
impediment to marry, they are exempt from the marriage license requirement.[29] Instead, the parties
must present an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to... before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths.[30] The judge, as solemnizing officer, must personally examine the affidavit of cohabitation as
to the parties having lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and the absence of
any... legal impediment to marry each other.[31] The judge must also execute a sworn statement that
he personally ascertained the parties' qualifications to marry and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, the
person who notarizes the contracting parties' affidavit of cohabitation cannot be the judge who will
solemnize the parties' marriage.
As a solemnizing officer, the judge's only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine
whether the parties have indeed lived together for at least five years without legal impediment to
marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize the parties'... affidavit of
cohabitation.
Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with the judge's official function and
duty to solemnize marriages. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to
examine the parties' requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer... notarized the affidavit of
cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the affidavit's statements before performing
the marriage ceremony. Should there be any irregularity or false statements in the affidavit of
cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be expected to... admit that he solemnized the marriage despite
the irregularity or false allegation.
Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of cohabitation of the parties whose marriage they will
solemnize. Affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with their official function and duty
to solemnize marriages.
An affidavit of cohabitation remains a private document until notarized. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document, "[rendering the document] admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity."[35] The affidavit of... cohabitation, even if it serves a "public
purpose," remains a private document until notarized.
Thus, when Judge Rojo notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he notarized nine private documents.
Circular No. 1-90's purpose is not limited to documents used to transact "legal conveyancing business."
So long as a judge notarizes a document not connected with his official functions and duties, he
violates Circular No. 1-90.
Also, Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public
are lacking in Bacolod City. Failure to certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in the
municipality or circuit of the judge's court constitutes violation of
Circular No. 1-90.
That other judges have notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriages they solemnized
does not make the practice legal. Violations of laws are not excused by practice to the contrary.
Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice prohibits a notary public from notarizing documents if the signatory is
not personally known to him.
In all the nine affidavits of cohabitation Judge Rojo notarized, he only stated that the parties
subscribed and swore to their affidavits before him. Judge Rojo did not state that the parties were
personally known to him or that the parties presented their competent pieces of... evidence of
identity. Thus, Judge Rojo violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
That the parties appeared before Judge Rojo and that he interviewed them do not make the parties
personally known to him. The parties are supposed to appear in person to subscribe to their affidavits.
To personally know the parties, the notary public must at least be acquainted... with them.[45]
Interviewing the contracting parties does not make the parties personally known to the notary public.
Judge Rojo argued that he notarized the affidavits of cohabitation in good faith.
The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires notaries public to personally know the signatory to the
document they will... notarize or require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity.
These are basic legal principles and procedure Judge Rojo violated. Failure to comply with these basic
requirements nine times is not good faith.
Judge Remegio V. Rojo... is SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE without salary and other benefits for SIX (6)
MONTHS.
Principles:
Municipal trial court judges cannot notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they
will solemnize.
JAIME O. SEVILLA vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS G.R. No. 167684.July 31, 2006.

Facts:

Jaime O. Sevilla, herein petitioner, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Carmelita
N. Cardenas, herein respondent, for their marriage was vitiated by machination, duress, and intimidation
employed by the respondents Carmelita and her father. He was forced to sign a marriage contract with
Carmelita Cardenas before a minister of the Gospel, Rev. Cirilo D Gonzales. Moreover, he alleged that
there was no marriage license presented before the solemnizing officer as certified by the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Manila. Actually, it was certified 3 times on the following dates: March
11, September 20, 1994 and July 25, 2000 that marriage license no. 2770792 was nowhere to be found.
On the other hand, the respondent, Carmelita N. Cardenas refuted these allegations of Jaime and claims
that they were first civilly married on May 19, 1969 and thereafter married at a church on May 31, 1969 at
Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both were alleged to be recorded in Local Civil Registrar
and NSO. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her for
25 years.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati City declared the nullity of marriage of the parties based on the
petitioner’s allegations that no marriage license was presented before a solemnizing officer. And that
without the said marriage license, being one of the formal requisites of marriage, the marriage is void
from the beginning. This was based on the 3 certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar Manila that
marriage license number 220792 was fictitious.

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of the trail court
in favor of the marriage, because the Local Civil Registrar failed to locate the said license with due effort
as testified by certain Perlita Mercader because the former Local Civil registrar had already retired. The
petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of Appeals. thus, this case
was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the certification made by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan that Marriage License No.
2770792, as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties, sufficient to declare the marriage void from
the beginning

Held:

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty. The absence of logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage
License No. 2770792. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we can
not easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years
producing two offsprings, now adult themselves. Thus, the instant petition was denied.
Alcantara vs Alcantara G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against respondent Rosita A.
Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and Rosita, without securing the required marriage
license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage
for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain priest. They got
married on the same day. They went through another marriage ceremony in a church in Tondo, Manila,
on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license.
In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. In her Answer, Rosita asserted the validity of their
marriage and maintained that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from
the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. She alleged that Restituto has a mistress with whom
he has three children and that Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution
for concubinage. After hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the
decision. Restituto appealed. He submitted that at the precise time that his marriage with the Rosita was
celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall
and dealt with a “fixer” who arranged everything for them.
He and Rosita did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage
license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the Rosita was a resident of the place.

The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the
certification states that “Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara
and Miss Rosita Almario” but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license
number.

ISSUE:

Was the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio?

HELD:

No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio. To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the
parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage
license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.
The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage
license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a
license was in fact issued to the parties herein. This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct
of official business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the
validity of his marriage.

Issuance of a marriage license despite the fact that the fact that neither of the parties are residents of the
city or municipality which issued the same is a mere irregularity that does not affect the validity of the
marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party
or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
As to the discrepancy in the marriage license number, the court held that it is not impossible to assume
that the same is a mere a typographical error. It does not detract from the conclusion regarding the
existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
Alcantara v. Alcantara
G.R. No. 167746, 28 August 2007

FACTS:

Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against respondent Rosita A.
Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required
marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could
arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a
certain priest. They got married on the same day. They went through another marriage ceremony in
a church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the
parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite,
appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they
never went to Carmona to apply for a license. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives.
Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and
ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file.

Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and maintained that there was a marriage license
issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite.
Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children. Petitioner only filed the annulment of their
marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. After hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition
for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an absence of marriage license that would render the marriage between
petitioner and respondent void ab initio?

RULING:

No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested.

To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to
the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a
marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of
Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to
whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further
validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. This certification enjoys the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license
was done in the regular conduct of official business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on the absence
of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage.
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that
neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no
sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a
city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage
license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for
publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage.An
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner — which they appeared before a “fixer” who arranged
everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain priest — will not strengthen
his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony
will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. Moreover, the solemnizing officer is
not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued
by the local civil registrar. All solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued
by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official
has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.

Article 53 of the Civil Code which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties’
states:

Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and


(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage
since all the elements in Article 53 are present in the case at bar.

* Case digest by Daisy Mae O. Tambolero, LLB-1, Andres Bonifacio Law School, SY 2017-2018
Raquel Kho v. Republic of the PH
GR 187462

June 1, 2016

Facts:

Petitioner’s parents summoned a clerk to arrange necessary papers on one


afternoon of May 31, 1972 for the intended marriage of parties herein on the midnight as to
exclude the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony. They were only able to fulfill
such ceremony at 3AM of June 1, 1972 for reason that there was a public dance held in
town plaza that was adjacent to the church and such dance only finished at 2AM. Due to the
shortness of period, said clerk was not able to secure them a marriage license. RTC declared
their marriage null and void. CA reversed it stating that the marriage was valid and
subsisting.

Issue: W/N CA erred to give due credence to petitioner’s evidence which


established the absence or lack of marriage license when the marriage was
solemnized.

Held:

Marriage is void. Art 58 and Art 80 (3) of the Civil Code explicitly provides that no
marriage shall be solemnized without a license first issued by the LCR (Art. 58). Marriage
performed without the corresponding marriage license is void (Art. 80 (3)). Court favors
petitioner.
Sps. Salgado v. Luis Anson
GR 204494

Facts:

Luis Anson is the husband of Severina de Asis-Anson. They had 1 daughter, Maria
Luisa and she was wed to Gaston Maya. Severina had an older daughter to a previous
relationship, Jo ann Diaz and she was also wed to Gerard Salgado. Luis and Severina
acquired several real properties and according to him, since there was no marriage
settlement, the properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. But without his knowledge
and consent, Severina executed 3 Unilateral Deeds of Sale transferring then properties in
favor of Jo ann. When Severina died, Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judcial
Settlement of Estate Deceased Severina adjudicating herself as the sole heir. Due to these
acts, Luis filed a complaint for the annulment of these Deeds against Sps Salgado and Sps
Maya. The latter countered that they were not aware of any marriage between Luis and
their mother Severina but they knew they cohabited as common-law couple and that after
their cohabitation, Luis went to the US and married one Teresita. And due to Partition
Agreement that divided their properties without court intervention, both Sps claim that the
properties herewith are separate and exclusive properties of Severina.

Issue: W/N marriage between Severina and Luis is valid and the subject
lands as conjugal partnership

Held:

Court finds that their marriage is void ab initio for lack of marriage license. Luis
asserted that their marriage was an exceptional one but he failed to justify the lack of
marriage license. He admitted that they did not seek to apply for it. The Partition agreement
is valid. Valdez v RTC Quezon City held that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
by the provisions of Art 147 or Art 148 as the case may be, of the Family Code. Also,
attesting that his marriage with Severina was subsisting and valid, he knowingly contracted
to a subsequent marriage abroad, and the Court finds such suspicious and fraudulent
thereby tainting his credibility.
Madridejo v. De Leon

Facts

Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had but one child, Domingo de Leon. The wife and
son survived Eulogio de Leon, who died in the year 1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived
with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. The registry of births of the municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, shows that
on June 1, 1917, a child was born to Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, which was named Melecio
Madridejo, the necessary data being furnished by Pedro Madridejo. On June 17, 1917, a 24-day old child
of Siniloan, Laguna, as a son of Flaviana Perez, no mention being made of the father. On July 8, 1920,
Flaviana Perez, being at death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of age, by
the parish priest of Siniloan. She died on the following day, July 9, 1920, leaving Domingo de Leon, her
son by Eulogio de Leon, and the plaintiff-appellee Melecio Madridejo, as well as her alleged second
husband, Pedro Madridejo. Domingo de Leon died on the 2nd of May, 1928. Lower Court ruled that the
marriage of Madridejo and Perez was valid and the Melecio Madridejo was legitmated by that marriage.
Appellant (Gonzalo de leon) contends that trial court erred in declaring that the marriage in question was
valid and that Pedro Madridejo was legitimated by that marriage.

Issues

Whether or not the marriage of Flaviana Perez to Pedro Madridejo is valid

Whether or not the marriage subsequently legitimated Melecio Madridejo

HELD
With regard to the first assignment of error, the mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna, who
married Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential
requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the
marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.

In the second issue, it is evident that Melecio Madridejo has not been acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo
and Flaviana Perez, either voluntarily or by compulsion, before or after their marriage, and therefore said
marriage did not legitimate him.
TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ,
respondent.
G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990.

Facts:

On Sept. 27, 1988, respondent-brothers Vargas(es) filed a petition for habeas corpus
against Eugenio for forcibly taking Vitaliana (respondents’ sister)from her residence in
1987 and confined by the former in his palacial residence in Misamis Oriental. The
respondent-brothers, however, were not knowledgeable of Vitaliana’s death on August
28, 1988 due to heart failure, prior to their filing of the writ of habeas corpus. Hence,
Eugenio did not release the body of Vitaliana claiming that the writ of habeas corpus is
invalid because it was filed after the death of Vitaliana. the respondent-brothers claimed
that there was no existing marital relationship between Eugenio and Vitaliana and
therefore they have the custody over the body of the latter. The RTC said that since there
was no surviving spouse or children of Vitaliana and that petitioner was merely a common
law spouse , her brothers and sisters have the custody. Also, it was held that Eugenio was
legally married to another woman.

Issue:

Whether the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana be given to her full blood brothers and
sisters or her common law spouse.

Ruling:

The Philippines do not recognize common law marriages. And even if it was recognized,
the co-ownership requires that the man and the woman must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. In this case, Eugenio was legally married to another
woman, which bars him from being legally capacitated to contract marriages. Thye Civil
Code of the Philippines defines “spouse” as a lawfully wedded spouse not including
common law spouses. Hence, the custody of Vitaliana’s body is given to her brothers and
sisters.
Morigo v. People
G.R. No. 145226, 6 February 2004

FACTS:

Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but after
receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got
married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in
Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a
complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony.
Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil
case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming
that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage
in good faith.

ISSUE:

Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his
second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.

RULING:

No. considering that the first marriage was void ab initio makes Morigo acquitted in the Bigamy case.

As provided by Art. 3, part 3 of the Family Code “A marriage ceremony which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration
that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age”. “The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void
ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article
45.” As provided by Art. 4. Given these 2 articles, Morigo’s first marriage is considered void ab initio.

Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a
marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when
he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted
in the case filed.

* Case digest by Desmarc G. Malate, LLB-1, Andres Bonifacio Law School, SY 2017-2018
MERCEDITA MATA ARANES vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO April 11, 2002.

Facts:

On Feb 17, 2000, Judge Salvador Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur, solemnized the marriage of Mercedita Mata Arañes and Dominador B. Orobia without the
requisite marriage license at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction. When
Orobia died, the petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast properties” of Orobia was not recognized, because
the marriage was a null. She also cannot claim the pension of her husband who is a retired Commodore
of the Philippine Navy.

Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.

In his Comment, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15
February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. He was assured that all the
documents were complete, thus he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala. However, on 17
February 2000, he acceded to the request of Arroyo that he solemnize the marriage in Nabua because
Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan. Before starting the
ceremony he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, thus he refused
to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas
of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to
solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. The Civil Registrar General and the Local Registrar of
Nabua, Camarines Sur has no records of the marriage. On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance
of respondent judge so the latter could communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. The LCR informed the judge that they cannot
issue the same due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.

Issue:

Whether or not the Judge erred in solemnizing the marriage outside his jurisdiction and without the
requisite marriage license.

Ruling:
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial court judges
and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by
the Supreme Court. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are
complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction,
there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect
the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, may not amount to
gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but
nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage. Respondent judge should also be
faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. Marriage which preceded the
issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render
valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage
license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not
possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge
acted in gross ignorance of the law.
PEOPLE v. ARTURO LARA Y ORBISTA, GR No. 199877, 2012-08-13
Facts:
Decision[2] dated October 1, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),... Pasig City, Branch
268, finding Arturo Lara (Lara) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
Issues:
whether the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and Manacob in the police line-up is
inadmissible because Lara stood therein without the assistance of counsel;... whether
Lara's supposedly illegal arrest may be raised for the first time on appeal for the purpose of
nullifying his conviction;
Ruling:
Principles:
It is a shopworn doctrine that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise the objection is deemed waived.
illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error.
Any objection to the arrest or acquisition... of jurisdiction over the person of the accused
must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.
The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation
begins and being made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of
custodial investigation.
This is because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the...
investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is
interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up.
JUVY N. COSCA v. HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR A.M. No. MTJ-92-721. September 30, 1994.

Facts:

Complainants Juvy n. Cosca, Edmund B. Eralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are
Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Cler II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy
are respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.

In administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein
respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2)
falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4)
non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6)
requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities.

Complainants alleged that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite marriage
licenses. Thus, the following couples were able o get married by the simple expedient of paying the
marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license. In addition, respondent
judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason
being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was
usually several days after the ceremony. The marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil
registrar. It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the
month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void; that
respondents likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but
the Notarial Registrar will show that there were notarized during that month; and that respondents
reported a notarial fee of only P 18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected P 20.00
therefore and failed to account for the difference.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondent are guilty of violating the provision of Article 4 of the Family Code.

Held:
On the charge regarding illegal marriages, the Family Code patiently provides that the formal requisites of
marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein.
Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential requisites shall generally render the
marriage void ab initio and that, while and irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of
the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.

The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages, and
what the court provides for pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to
their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that priests or ministers of any religious
denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony
shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law.This is of course, within the
province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
CASE DIGEST: NAVARRO V. DOMAGTOY A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996.

Facts:

On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the marriage between Gaspar A. Tagadan and
Arlyn F. Borga despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. It is also
alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma D. del
Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. in relation to the charges against him,
respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar
Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife , and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied in
the affidavit issued by the Municipal trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan
and his wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, he
maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7,
paragraph I of the Family code which states that: “Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction”; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in
question.

Issue:

Whether or not the acts of Judge Domagtoy exhibits gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law.

Held:

In the first allegation, Gaspar Tagdan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first
wife’s presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Penaranda. Whether
wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint
affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and
therefore void, marriage.

In as much as respondent judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he
was also not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8
and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again
demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law

Because of the respondent’s failure to apply the legal principles applicable in these cases, the Court finds
respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law because of this he is suspended for a period of
six months.
January 27, 1959
G.R. No. L-11598
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelee,
vs.
FEDERIC BUSTAMANTE, defendant-appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Atty. Eduardo C. Abaya for appellee.
Ramon S. Milo for appellant.

FACTS:
1. Federico Bustamante was charged and convicted of the crime of bigamy in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan.
2. The records disclose that defendant-appellant Bustamante was united in wedlock to one Maria Perez on
August 9, 1954, before the Justice of Peace of Binaloan, Pangasinan, a little over a year late, or on
September 16, 195, he contracted a second marriage with Demetria I. Tibayan, solemnized before Vice-
Mayor Francisco B. Nato of Mapandan, Pangasinan, who was then acting as mayor of the said municipality,
while the first marriage was still subsisting.
3. The defendant contended that there could not have been a second marriage to speak of, as Nato was
merely acting as mayor when he celebrated the same, hence, without authority of law to do so. He lays
stress on the distinction between “Acting Mayor” and “Vice Mayor acting as Mayor”, urging that while the
former may solemnize marriages, the latter could not.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the second marriage was valid.
2. Whether or not the Vice Mayor has the authority to solemnize the second marriage.

HELD:

Yes, the marriage was valid and Vice Mayor Federico Nato, acting as mayor, has the authority to solemnize
the marriage. As acting mayor, he discharges all duties and wields the power appurtenant to said
office. This instance does not involve a question of title to the office, but the performance of the functions
thereunto appertaining by one who is admitted to be temporarily vested with it. The case even concedes
and recognizes the powers and duties of the Mayor to devolve upon the Vice Mayor whenever the latter is
in an acting capacity. The word “acting,” when preceding the title of an office connotes merely the
temporary character as nature of the same.
Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete

G.R. No. L-40098, 29 August 1975

FACTS:

Private respondent Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, who was a partner
in the commercial partnership, glory commercial company with Antonio Lim Tanhu and Alfonso Ng Sua’’.
Defendants Antonio Lim Tan Hu, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua, Lim Teck Chuan, and Eng Chong Leonardo,
through fraud and conspiracy, took actual and active management of the partnership and although tee
Hoon Lim Po Chuan was the manager of glory commercial company, defendants managed to use the
funds of the partnership to purchase lands and building in the cities of Cebu, Lapu-Lapu, Mandaue, and
the municipalities of Talisay and Minglanilla. She alleged in her complaint that at the time of death of Tee
Hoon Lim Po Chuan, the defendants, without liquidation, continued the business of glory commercial
company, by purportedly organizing a corporation known as the glory commercial company, incorporated
and sometime in the month of November, 1967, defendants, particularly Antonio Lim Tan Hu, by means
of fraud deceit, and misrepresentations did then and there , induce and convince her to execute a
quitclaim of all her rights and interests, in the assets of the partnership of glory commercial company.

Thereafter, in the year 1968-69, the defendants who had earlier promised to liquidate the aforesaid
properties and assets in favor, among others of plaintiff and until the middle of the year 1970 when the
plaintiff formally demanded from the defendants the accounting of real and personal properties of glory
commercial company, defendants refused and stated that they would not give the share of the plaintiff.

ISSUE:

Whether Tan Put has right over the liquidated properties of the partnership

RULING:

Tan has a right over the liquidated properties of partnership. The supreme court hold that there is no
alternative but to hold that plaintiff Tan Put’s allegation that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan
has not been satisfactorily established and that, on the contrary, the evidence on record convincingly
shows that her relation with said deceased was that of common-law wife. Moreover, the Supreme Court
said that the lower courts committed an error by awarding 1/3 of the partnership properties to Tan
because there has been no liquidation proceedings yet.

Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other as
husband and wife “shall be set forth in an instrument” signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses
and the person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an
authentic copy of the marriage contract. While a marriage may also be proved by other competent
evidence, the absence of the contract must first be satisfactory explained. Surely, the certification of the
person who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible evidence of such marriage unless proof of
loss of the contract or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented to the court.
In the case at bar, the purported certification issued by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Philippine Independent
Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore, competent evidence, there being absolutely no showing as to
unavailability of the marriage contract and, indeed, as to the authenticity of the signature of said certifies,
the jurat allegedly signed by a second assistant provincial fiscal not being authorized by law, since it is
not part of the functions of his office. Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did not testify, the same is
hearsay. As regards the testimony of the plaintiff herself on the same point and that of her witness
Antonio Nuñez, there can be no question that they are both self-serving and of very little evidently value,
it having been disclosed at the trial that plaintiff has already assigned all her rights in this case to said
Nuñez, thereby making him the real party in interest here and, therefore, naturally as biased as herself.

* Case digest by Aileen B. Buenafe, LLB-1, Andres Bonifacio Law School, SY 2017-2018
Perido v.Perido, 63 SCRA 97

FACTS: Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime. His first wife
was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot 3 children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio
married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had 5 children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo.
Lucio died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943. Margarita is the only living child of the first
marriage. The children and grandchildren of the first marriage and second marriage filed a case regarding
the partition of the properties of Lucio Perido. Margarita et al asserted that the children and grandchildren
of the second marriage were illegitimate.

ISSUE: W/N the children and grandchildren of the second marriage of Lucio Perido were legitimate,
entitling them for the partition of lands

HELD: Yes. A person who was not at the marriage ceremony cannot testify as an eyewitness that the
marriage did not take place. In the absence of proof that marriage did not take place a man and a woman
living together as husband and wife are presumed married.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED
JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA.
DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, petitioners, v.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 155733. January 27, 2006.

Facts:

On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado, the sister of Josefa, filed a Petition on Letters of
Administration of the estate of deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia
(died 1972 and 1974 respectively). Such letter was opposed by Marciana Rustia, a sister of
Guillermo, claiming that they should be the beneficiaries of the estate. The trial court then
allowed Guillerma Rustia, a legitimate child of Guillermo, to intervene in the case as she
claimed that she possessed the status of an acknowledged legitimate natural child, hence,
she should be the sole heir of the estate. Later, Luisa Delgado said that the spouses were
living together without marriage. Luisa Delgado died and was substituted dela Rosa
(herein petitioner) in this case. The RTC appointed dela Rosa as the administrator of the
estates of the deceased.

Issue:

Whether or not dela Rosa should be the sole administrator of the estate noting that Josefa
and
Guillermo did not contract marriage.

Ruling:

The Court held, through the testimonies of the witnesses, that marriage between Josefa
and Guillermo never occurred. Although it is presumed that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage, such testimonies shall prevail. Since, no marriage had occurred between the
two, the estate must be settled in different proceedings. Therefore, dela Rosa cannot be
appointed as the sole administrator of the estate of the deceased.
Pugeda v. Trias

Nature of the Case: Motion for Reconsideration

Doctrine: Upon the issuance of the certificate of sale to the husband of a lot of the Friar Lands, said lot
ipso facto forms part of the conjugal properties of the husband and wife and this status remains unaltered
even after his death and the subsequent transfer of the land in the name of the widow or by the setting
aside of the trial court's decision holding said property as conjugal by the Court of Appeals based on
newly discovered evidence.

Facts: Movants argued that, (1) the lots purchased by Miguel Trias under the operation of the Friar Lands
Act which at the time of his death were not yet fully paid and were subsequently transferred in the name
of the widow who paid the balance out of the proceeds of the fruits of said lands and thereafter the title
was issued in her name, belong to her as her exclusive paraphernal property not conjugal;

(2) that the decision of the trial court was set aside by the Court of Appeals; and
(3) that the lots were never partitioned as conjugal assets of spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer.
Movants cited the case of Arayata vs. Joya, et al., 51 Phil. 654. The Supreme Court denied the motion
and declared the decision as final.

Ruling:

Upon the issuance of the certificate of sale to the husband of a lot of the Friar Lands, said lot ipso facto
forms part of the conjugal properties of the husband and wife and this status remains unaltered even after
his death and the subsequent transfer of the land in the name of the widow or by the setting aside of the
trial court's decision holding said property as conjugal by the Court of Appeals based on newly discovered
evidence. The doctrine in the Arayata vs. Joya, et al. case refers to the superior right of the widow
recognized in Section 16 of Act 1120 (Friar Lands Act) over transfers made by the husband without the
approval of the Director of Lands; hence, not applicable in the instant case. Adjudication may be made
pro indiviso in a project of partition without the need of actual division or partition of the properties among
the heirs.
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000.

Facts:

On November 15, 1973 Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy got married at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in
Quezon City. After some time, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Two children were born out of the
marriage. Frederick, their son went to his father’s residence. Filipina filed for legal separation. The Trial
Court dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains and granted the custody of their children to her.

Later on, Filipina was punched at the different parts of her body and was even choked by him when she
started spanking their son when the latter ignored her while she was talking to him.

The Trial Court convicted him for slight physical injuries only. A new action for legal separation was
granted by repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity. Filipina then filed for the declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage citing psychological incapacity.

The Trial Court and Appellate Court denied her petition. On her petition to this Court, she assailed for the
first time that there was no marriage license during their marriage.

Issues:

1) Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for
lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and

2) Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage
celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.

Ruling:

The date of celebration of their marriage on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and
private respondent. The pieces of evidence on record showed that on the day of the marriage ceremony,
there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the
marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered
6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in
Carmona.
The marriage license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place
on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a
marriage license. Under Article 80 of the Civil Code. those solemnized without a marriage license, save
marriages of exceptional character, are void ab initio. This is clearly applicable in this case.
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain the
Court. It is mooted by the conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack
of a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.
In a recent landmark ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (GR 221029, April
24, 2018), the Supreme Court held that a foreign divorce secured by a Filipino is also considered valid in
the Philippines, even if it is the Filipino spouse who files for divorce abroad. With 10 Justices in favor, 3
Dissenting (Associate Justices del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa) 1 Abstaining (Justice Jardeleza,
then solicitor general) and former Chief Justice Sereno on leave, the Supreme Court affirmed the
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) Tenth Division that reversed a Dagupan Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Decision, which ruled that “the kind of divorce recognized here in the Philippines are those validly
obtained by the alien spouse abroad, not by the Filipino spouse pursuant to Article 26 of the Family
Code.”

Petitioner was a certain Marelyn Tanedo Manalo who was married to a Japanese national, Minoru
Yoshino. Manalo (not her Japanese husband) filed for and was granted divorce in Japan sometime in
2011. Manalo filed with a Dagupan RTC to have her Japanese divorce recognized in the Philippines. The
RTC denied her Petition, which was subsequently reversed by the CA in 2014. The CA recognized the
foreign divorce and ruled that Manalo had the right to remarry. The Supreme Court affirmed this CA
Decision.

Excerpts from the Majority Decision penned by Justice Diosdado M. Peralta are herein quoted.

“Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.” Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires
that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien
spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does
not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute xxx .”
“The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country
where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure
to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free
to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce
proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien
spouse to remarry will have the same result: The Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or
wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as
a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision
should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect
of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operation of the latter’s national law.

“On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated foreign
divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the
same rights and obligations in an alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not
for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their
wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference of
whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue
favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other. x x x”
“To be sure, a good number of the Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any
attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals and traditions
that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their nature of permanence, inviolability
and solidarity. However, none of our laws should be based on any religious law, doctrine or teaching;
otherwise, the separation of Church and State will be violated.”

In a separate Concurring Opinion, Justice Marvic Leonen, underscored the reality that it is the Filipino
wife who is prejudiced if Article 26 of our Family Code is given “an interpretation which capacitates and
empowers the Japanese husband the option to divorce and how such choice has effects in our country
while, at the same time, disallowing the Filipina wife from being able to do the same simply because she
is a Filipina.”

“That interpretation may be unconstitutional. Article II, Section 14 of our Constitution provides:

Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men.

“This constitutional fiat advances the notion of gender equality from its passive formulation in Article III,
Section 1 to its more active orientation.

Indeed, our laws were never intended for the Filipino to be at a disadvantage. In the words of Justice
Leonen, “to say that one spouse may divorce and the other may not contribute to patriarchy. It fosters an
unequal relationship prone to abuse in such intimate relationship. The law is far from rigid. It should
passionately guarantee equality.”
I fully agree with Justice Leonen and the majority opinion of Justice Peralta. But still, no amount of judicial
activism can be a real substitute for an Absolute Divorce Law that has long been advocated by countless
suffering wives chained to the shackles of loveless marriages with philandering and abusive husbands!

x x x."
Republic vs. Orbecido

GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly,
respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his
wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed
with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Article
26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino
citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry
under Philippine law.
Lavadia vs Heirs of Luna

FACTS:

ATTY. Juan Lucas LUNA, a practicing lawyer at that time when he was living with his first wife, herein
intervenor-appellant Eugenia After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA
eventually agreed to live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to
which end, they entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to
dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property. On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained
a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First
Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. ATTY. LUNA
contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned
to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987. ATTY. LUNA organized a new law
firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing
partner On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora
Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium unit) but
the same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated that the interest of
ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and
headed another law firm with

Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruz

and used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until the death
of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 19 After the death of ATTY. JUAN

The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the existence of the marriage
between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since they had no children,
SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of ¾
pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½ share in the said properties plus her ½ share in the net estate of

ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will
and testament; and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her
share in the subject properties. The complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the ¾
portion of the subject properties;that the same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on the
condominium unit pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be appointed to
preserve ad administer the subject properties;and

that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorney’s feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD. RTC

ISSUE: WON THE DIVORCE DECREE OF ATTY LUNA AND EUGENIA WAS VALID?

HELD: NO, The 1st Marriage Subsiste


d. Both were Filipinos, Married in the Philippines. The law in force of at the time was the Spanish Civil
Code which adopted the nationality rule. And continued by The Civil Code. In effect, Philippine laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad. Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws
governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of
Atty. Luna residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and
benefit of the residents of a locality.
GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO v. REDERICK A. RECIO G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001

FACTS:

Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a
decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On June
26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen and was married again to petitioner Grace Garcia-
Recio, a Filipina on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license,
respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.” Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent
lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her. On his Answer,
Rederick contended that his first marriage was validly dissolved; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
Grace.

On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the declaration of
nullity was pending , respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney,
Australia because the “marriage had irretrievably broken down.”

The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Rederick and Grace Recio dissolved on the ground
that the Australian divorce had ended the marriage of the couple thus there was no more marital union to
nullify or annul.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.

2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner

RULING:

1st issue: The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce decree of respondent’s
marriage to Samson is insufficient. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. Furthermore, the divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an
authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance
with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

2nd issue: Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:


“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party
has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorrecce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on
this matter.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence. The
Court mentioned that they cannot grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and
void because of the question on latter’s legal capacity to marry.
Noveras v Noveras GR No 188289

Facts: David and Leticia Noveras are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines.
They have 2 children, Jerome and Jena. Leticia states that sometime in 2003, David abandoned his family
to live with his mistress. Further, she states that David executed an affidavit where he renounced all his
rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties in the Philippines. After learning of the extra-marital
affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce before the Superior Court of California. Upon issuance of the judicial
decree of divorce in June 2005, the US properties were awarded to Leticia. Leticia then filed a petition for
judicial separation of conjugal property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. The RTC regarded the petition for
judicial separation of conjugal property as a petition for liquidation of property since the spouses marriage
has already been dissolved.
It classified their property relation as absolute community because they did not execute a marriage
settlement before their marriage ceremony. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine
of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of the
US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their national law. The court awarded the properties in
the Philippines to David, subject to the payment of the children’s legitimes. Upon Leticia’s appeal to the
CA, the CA ruled that the Philippine properties be divided equally between the spouses and that both should
pay their children P520k. David argues that the Court should have recognized the California judgment that
awarded him the Philippine properties and that allowing Leticia to share in the PH properties is tantamount
to unjust enrichment considering she already owns all the US properties.

Issues 1.Whether the marriage between David and Leticia has been dissolved

2.Whether the filing of the judicial separation of property is proper


Held: 1. No. the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of marriage
between the parties. Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority
or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody thereof. Such publication must be authenticated by a seal of a consular official. Section
25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
evidence, the attestation must state that the copy is a correct copy of the original. The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer. Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented
in evidence. The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on
divorce were not presented. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are
still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.

2.Yes. Art 135 of the Family Code provides that: Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient
cause for judicial separation of property: xxxx (6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been
separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. Separation in fact for one
year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled in the trial court’s decision
because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute community of
properties. The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated
for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not
been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David decided
to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David
has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha
Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of
Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form. Third and more significantly, they
had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005. Having established that Leticia
and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute
community of property should be granted.
FE D. QUITA, petitioner, VS. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA
DANDAN, respondents
December 22, 1998

Facts:

Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May
18, 1941. No children were born out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner
obtained a final judgment of divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16, 1972,
Arturo died leaving no will. On August 31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with
the RTC for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor
of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the
surviving spouse of Arturo Dandan and the surviving children, all surnamed Padlan,
opposed the petition. The RTC expressed that the marriage between Antonio and
petitioner subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972, that the marriage existed between
private respondent and Arturo was clearly void since it was celebrated during the
existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. The Court of Appeals remanded the case
to the trial court for further proceedings.

Issues:

1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?

2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent?

Held:

If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the decedent
because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner
herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their respective
hereditary shares.

Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being a bigamous marriage
considered void ab inito under Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil Code renders her not a
surviving spouse.

The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case is affirmed.
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

vs.

HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Image result for marriage divorceFacts:

Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a
citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and established their residence in
the Philippines. They begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively. But
the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982 and the petitioner had remarried also in
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

On July 8, 1983, Richard Upton filed a suit against petitioner, asking that Alice Van Dorn be ordered to
render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila and be declared with right to manage the conjugal
property.

Issue:

Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in
the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

Held:
As to Richard Upton, the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. Owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. The divorce is likewise valid as to the petitioner.

As such, pursuant to his national law, private respondent Richard Upton is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue Alice Van Dorn to exercise control over conjugal assets. He
was bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he did not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, v. HON. CORONA IBAY-
SOMERA, HON LUIS C. VICTOR AND ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING,
respondents.
G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989.

Facts:

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil (Filipino citizen) and


respondent and respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, German national, were married at
Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together in Malate, Manila and had a child,
Isabella Pilapil Geiling.

The private respondent initiated divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. The
local court in Germany promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouse.

On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in
Manila.

After the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed the complaint for
adultery before the prosecutor of Manila alleging that the petitioner had an affair William
Chia and Jesus Chua while they were still married.

Petitioner filed a petition with the Justice Secretary asking to set aside the cases filed
against her and be dismissed. Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and
to suspend further proceedings. Justice Secretary Ordoñez issued a resolution directing
to move for the dismissal of the complaints against petitioner.

Issue:

Is the action tenable?

Ruling:

Yes. The crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be
prosecuted except upon sworn written filed by the offended spouse. Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time
of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. This is logical consequence since the
raison d’etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party
had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal
case. It is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the
action be definitely established and, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of
the time he initiates the action. Thus, the divorce decree is valid not only in his country,
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned – in view
of the nationality principle under the Civil Code on the matter of civil status of persons.
Private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to
commence the adultery case. The criminal case filed against petitioner is dismissed.
Bayot v. Court of Appeals G.R. No.155635, 7 November 2008

FACTS:

On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married in Muntinlupa. They
had a child name Alix, born in November 27, 1982 in California. In February 22, 1996, Rebecca
initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic, which resulted to judgment ordering the
dissolution of the marriage and the distribution of conjugal properties

After obtaining a Department of Justice affirmation of her Filipino citizenship, she then filed a
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente’s alleged psychological
incapacity, seeking for distribution of conjugal properties and support.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that
the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.

RTC denied Vicente’s motion to dismiss but CA reversed lower court’s decision. According to the
CA, RTC ought to have granted Vicente’s motion to dismiss, since the marriage between the
spouses is already dissolved when the divorce decree was granted since Rebecca was an American
citizen when she applied for the decree.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.

RULING:

Yes, the divorce is valid.

Article 26 (2) of the Civil Code states that: “Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have the capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.”

Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen and remains to
be one, being born to American parents in Guam, an American territory which follows the principle of
jus soli granting American citizenship to those who are born there. She was, and still may be, a
holder of American passport. She had consistently professed, asserted and represented herself as
an American citizen, as shown in her marriage certificate, in Alix’s birth certificate, when she secured
divorce in Dominican Republic.

Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of
America, a country which allows divorce. The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as
a Filipino citizen by affirmation of the DOJ Secretary does not invalidate the foreign divorce secured
by Rebecca as an American citizen in 1996. In determining whether or not a divorce is secured
abroad would come within the jurisdiction of the country’s policy against absolute divorce, the
reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.

* Case digest by Kristine Camille B. Gahuman , LLB-1, Andres Bonifacio Law School, SY 2017-2018

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