People of the Philippines vs Gerardo Sazon, alias INSIK

GR. No. 89684 September 18, 1990

FACTS:
Ernesto Romualdez was confronted by Sazon for circulating a rumor that Sazon and his companions
were engaged in stealing, upon confrontation however, Romualdez boxed Sazon and threatened to kill
him. 2 days later, Sazon and his cousin followed Romualdez after seeing the latter pass by. Sazon again
confronted Romualdez, and Romualdez allegedly provoked Sazon to just shoot. To which Sazon shot
Romualdez dead.

ISSUE: WON Sazon was justified in killing Romualdez because there was provocation

Held: No. The alleged provocation of Romualdez was insufficient to justify Sazon's actions. Furthermore,
there was evident premeditation when Sazon and his cousin followed the victim in an attempt to
overpower him

From <http://seaofdigests.blogspot.com/2016/10/people-of-philippines-vs-gerardo-sazon.html>

LACSON v. CA, PEOPLE

G.R. No. L-46485, 21 November 1979

FACTS:
Norman Lacson, Jimmy Pitalio, Carlos Tan and Enrique Masacote were neighbors. In the birthday party of
Tan’s son in their house, while they were eating and drinking in the yard, Tan told Pitalio that the
laborers of Lacson were leaving their work and asked him to find out whether the Pitalio could get the
balance of his unpaid wages from Lacson. Pitalio went to Lacson’s residence, kicked open the gate of
appellant’s residence, and forced his way inside the yard. Lacson and his wife had just arrived and were
alighting from their car when Pitalio, under the influence of liquor, confronted Mrs. Lacson and asked
her to produce their truck driver named Serafica, saying, “Pag hindi mo siya hinarap sa akin ay may
mangyayari. ”Lacson remonstrated with Pitalio to abide by the law. This enraged Pitalio who replied,
“Ano ang batas, ito ang batas!” attacked Lacson with a knife. Taking the Magnum .22 caliber pistol of his
wife from her handbag, the appellant then fired it once at Pitalio’s chest.
Thereafter Mrs. Lacson brought Pitalio to the hospital. Pitalio’s confinement in the lasted for 10 days but
the medical certificate issued unto him stated that his injury would incapacitate him for more than 30
days.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT Lacson is entitled to acquittal on the ground of complete self-defense.

RULING:
Yes. Lacson should be acquitted under the theory of self-defense.
Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code:
Article 11. Justifying Circumstances. —The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of suffcient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
xxx
This Court explained the meaning of reasonable means employed thus: “That there is reasonable
necessity of the means employed by herein appellant to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression cannot
seriously be disputed. Reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material
commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational
equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as principal factors the emergency, the imminent
danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than the reason, that moves or
impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests
upon the imminent danger of such injury. The Court stated in the case of People vs. Lara, in emergencies
of this kind, human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct
of self- preservation; and when it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is
the duty of the courts to sanction the act and hold the act irresponsible in law for the consequences.”
In the instant case, there was an imminent danger to the lives of the petitioner and of his wife from
unlawful attack of an enraged, drunken, and armed Pitalio. The gun in the bag of his wife, who was
beside him, afforded the petitioner the only reasonable means to ward off the attack.
Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to acquittal on the ground of complete self-defense.
From <https://findingdara.wordpress.com/2017/10/27/case-digest-lacson-v-ca/>

People vs. Moral SCRA 474 [No. L-31139] (Oct. 12, 1984)
Facts:
Teodora Case descended from their second floor apartment to answer a call of nature at their backyard.
He was followed by the accused Renato Moral, who without any provocation, stabbed the decease
saying: “ Yayariin kita”; that when Teodoro tried to escape by running away, he was pursued by Renato
Moral and Alexander Moral who took turns in stabbing him, as a result of which, he fell to the ground.
Teodoro was lying prostrate on the ground, Abraham Antonio hit him on the head with a bottle and a
stone. Not to be outdone, Leopoldo Pedrigosa also hit the victim on various parts of his body with a
stone, and that it was only when Renato Moral said:” Bagsak na iyan. Patay na iyan” that they stopped.
Teodoro died and the State charged Renato Moral, as principal, and Leopoldo Pedrigosa and Abraham
Antonio, as accomplices, of the crime of murder committed.

Issue: Whether or not accused Abraham Antonio can invoke defense of stranger

Held:
The defense of Abraham Antonio that he acted in defense of stranger is untenable. There was no
unlawful aggression on the part of deceased Teodoro Case since it was the accused Renato Moral who
stabbed the deceased without any provocation and, hence, the aggressor. There was also no reasonable
necessity of the means employed since the deceased was unarmed at the time, and was already lying
prostrate on the ground and bleeding from his wounds inflicted upon him by Alexander Moral and
Renato Moral when the accused Abraham Antonio hit him with a stone. Accordingly, the accused
Abraham Antonio cannot be said to have legally acted in defense of a stranger when he hit the deceased
with a stone.

In order to invoke defense of strangers, the accused must prove unlawful aggression on the part of the
person injured or killed by the accused; that there was a reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel the aggression; and that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment,
or other evil motive.
From: https://www.scribd.com/document/102265427/Crim-law

People v Norma Hernandez

FACTS:
 Vivencio Lascano, 19 y/o, started courting appellant, Maria Norma Hernandez and after months of
courtship, appellant finally accepted Vivencio. On the same date, she asked him to bring his parents
over her home so that they could talk about their marriage.
 When Vivencio and his parents went to her house, they brought chickens and goats and they agreed
to buy a wedding dress, 2 vestidas, shoes, P20 for the sponsors and to repair the uncle’s roof.
 While the celebration was going on, appellant was nowhere to be found. Vivencio and his parents
waited but she never showed up thus causing them great shame and humiliation.
 Norma Hernandez averred that Vivencio was really courting her but that she wasn’t really in love with
him. Her parents tried to persuade her to accept the proposal and that she only accepted it out of
obedience to her parents and the uncle’s insistence.
 Before Vivencio’s parents came to their home, she already counselled them not to bring the chickens
and that they should not regret whatever may happen later.
 Appellant said she felt torture because she wasn’t honestly in love with Vivencio and so she decided
to leave home as last recourse to prevent the marriage.
 Appellant’s parents also corroborated her testimony.
 RTC convicted her of serious slander by deed because she purposely and deliberately fled to prevent
celebration of marriage. Thus, she appealed.

HELD:
 Court reversed the RTC judgment and acquitted the appellant.

RATIO:
 Malice, one of the essential requisites of slander hasn’t been proven. There is no malice in the act of
the appellant changing her mind. She was merely exercising her right not to give her consent the
marriage after mature consideration.
 Furthermore, there were no strained relations existing between the complainant & appellant before
the incident. There always existed good relations between them for they were neighbours so it cannot
be sustained that appellant was motivated by spite or ill-will in deliberately frustrating the marriage.
 Appellant has the privilege to reconsider her previous commitment to marry and it would be utterly
inconsistent to convict her for slander by deed simply because she desisted in continuing with the
marriage. If she would be liable then that would be tantamount to compelling her to go into a marriage
without her free consent.
 Appellant had the right to avoid to herself the evil of going through a loveless marriage. (Art. 11 par.4,
RPC)

From <https://maroon5partnersandassociates.wordpress.com/2012/06/01/people-v-norma-hernandez-
1959/>

PEOPLE v. DELIMA [46 Phil. 738 (1922)]

Facts: Lorenzo Napoleon escaped from jail. Poiiceman Felipe Delima found him in the house of Jorge
Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance. Delima ordered his surrender but
Napoleon answered with a stroke of his lance. The policeman dodged it, fired his revolver but didn’t hit
Napoleon. The criminal tried to ran away, not throwing his weapon; the policeman shot him dead.
Delima was tried and convicted for homicide; he appealed.

Held: The SC ruled that Delima must be acquitted. The court held that the killing was done in
performance of a duty. Napoleon was under the obligation to surrender and his disobedience with a
weapon compelled Delima to kill him. The action was justified by the circumstances.

From:
https://www.scribd.com/doc/59768254/Case-Digest

People v Lagata
FACTS:
 The accused, Ignacio Lagata, a provincial guard of Catbalogan, Samar, was in charge of 6 prisoners
(Jesus, Tipace, Eusebio, Mariano, Labong & Abria) assigned to work in the capitol plaza of Samar.
 Lagata ordered the prisoners to go to the nursery to pick up gabi. Not long afterwards, they were
called to assemble. Epifanio Labong was missing so Lagata ordered the 5 remaining prisoners to go look
for him.
 Eusebio Abria said that while they were gathering gabi, he heard 3 shots. He was wounded by the
2nd one. They were already assembled by the 1st shot and that he did not see Tipace being shot. He
said he ran away because he was afraid that he might be shot again and that his companions were also
probably scared and that is why they ran.
 Another prisoner, Mariano Ibañez stated that Epifanio Labong did not answer their call so Ignacio
Lagata ordered to go look for him in the mountain. He said that Abria went to the camote plantation
and found footprints and called on Lagata to inform him about the footprints. When Abria told Lagata of
the flattened grass and that he was unable to look for Labong, Ignacio Lagata fired at him and he was hit
on his left arm. Abria told Lagata he was wounded and in turn, Lagata told them to assemble. Once they
were assembled, Lagata cocked his gun and shot Ceferino Tipace. Mariano said that when he saw Tipace
was shot, he ran away because he also could have been shot.
 Eustaquio Galet, another detainee, received good treatment from Lagata though his testimony
corroborated those of the other prisoners.
 Pedro Mayuga, chief of Samar Provincial Hospital & Gilberto Rosales, Sanitary Division president,
verified the gunshot wound and that the death of Tipace resulted therein.
 Ignacio Lagata, however, said that he fired his gun because the prisoners were running far from him
when he already ordered them to stop. He said that he would be the one in jail if a prisoner escaped
under his custody. Furthermore, he would be discharged from duty like the others. He was hopeless
already. Moreover, the picking up of gabi was not part of the prisoner’s work.

HELD:
 Court ruled that Lagata should be sentenced for homicide and serious physical injuries.
 Appellant was entitled to the benefit of mitigating circumstance of incomplete justifying
circumstance. (Art.11par.5, RPC)

RATIO:
 It was clear that Lagata had absolutely no reason to fire at Tipace. The record does not show that
Tipace was bent on committing any act of aggression or that he attempted to escape.
 According to Lagata himself, Tipace was running towards and around him. How could anyone
intending to escape run towards and around the very guard one was supposed to escape from?
 Even if Lagata sincerely believed that he acted in the performance of his duties, the circumstances
show that there was no necessity for him to fire directly against the prisoners as to wound them
seriously and even kill one of them.
 While custodians should take care for prisoners not to escape, only ABSOLUTE NECESSITY would
authorize them to fire against them.

From <https://maroon5partnersandassociates.wordpress.com/2012/06/01/people-vs-lagata-1949/>

People V Lachica
FACTS:
In the morning of March 28, 1971, Dominador Aguilar, also a prisoner in the New Bilibid Prisons, was
stabbed inside his cell in Dormitory 1-C. He died instantly. Accused Lachica admitted to stabbing the
victim.

Lachica invoked self-defense and gave his version of the incident thus: At 10:00 in the morning of March
28, 1971, he went to Dormitory I-C to watch a television show of a horse race program being telecast at
the time. While betting with the inmates of Dormitory I-C, an altercation arose between him and Aguilar.
As one word led to another, Aguilar threatened accused with the words, "Baka hindi ka na makalabas
nang buhay dito sa Dormitory I-C. "Because he suspected that the deceased would kill him, and rather
than wait to be assaulted, he beat Aguilar to the attack by suddenly stabbing him.

ISSUE:
WON the accused may invoke self-defense on the basis of deceased's threats

HELD:
NO. Unlawful aggression is the primordial element of self defense. For the right to exist, it is necessary
that the accused be attacked, or at least be threatened with an attack in an immediate and imminent
manner, such as brandishing a knife with which to stab or pointing a gun to the accused. But when the
commission of an act is in response to a mere threat or menacing posture of an unarmed victim, as in
the case at bar the defense cannot be invoked.

From the facts testified to by the accused, it cannot be reasonably concluded that the deceased had the
least intention of inflicting harm on the accused. In fact the latter did not receive any injury at all
because neither the victim nor any of his companions was armed at the time the intimidating words
were uttered.

PEOPLE v SANCHEZ et al

FACTS:
Accused Sanchez was with his co-accused when he confronted the deceased about the latter's
accusations that he was a thief. The deceased Miranda then replied that it was the truth. After more
exchange of words, Sanchez stabbed Miranda and was charged with the murder of Miranda. Witnesses
for the prosecution testified as to the actions of the co-accused during the incident.

Accused Sanchez invoked self-defense. His co-accused stated that they were only bystanders at that
time, and were not involved in the killing of the victim.

ISSUE:
1. WON sanchez may invoke self-defense
2. WON his co-accused were conspirators

HELD:
1. NO.
Where the accused has admitted that he is the author of the death of the deceased, it is incumbent
upon the appellant, in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove this justifying circumstance (self-defense)
claimed by him, to the satisfaction of the court. To do so, he must rely on the strength of his own
evidence, and not on the weakness of the prosecution.

The evidence on records does not show unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Rather, it was
appellant Sanchez who was the unlawful aggressor. He confronted the victim on the provincial road
wherein, after a heated argument, he stabbed the victim. Even if the response of the victim to the query
of Sanchez regarding the theft of fish and wood might have hurt the pride of Sanchez, the trial court
correctly observed that "such petty question of pride does not justify the wounding and killing of Hilario
Miranda." Hence, the invocation of self-defense by Sanchez must fail.

Moreover, the conduct of the appellant Sanchez is not consistent with one who killed in self-defense.
The accused's flight from the scene of the crime is a strong indication of guilt.

2. YES. Appellants were convicted of murder on the theory of conspiracy. It is well-settled that
conspiracy exist when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not to rest on direct evidence, as the same
may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with
respect to the commission of the offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met
together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the
details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out. The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof
that the accused acted in concert, each of them doing his part to fulfill the common design to kill the
victim. In such case, the act of one becomes the act of all, and each of the accused will thereby be
deemed equally guilty of the crime committed. The proof of conspiracy is perhaps most frequently made
by the evidence of a chain of circumstances.

It is true that conspiracy, like the crime itself, must be proven beyond reasonable doubt and one's mere
presence in the crime scene does not make an accused a conspirator. However, the co-accused were not
merely present in the crime scene, they directly participated in the criminal design of the appellant
Sanchez by their concerted acts. Indeed, for collective responsibility among the herein accused to be
established it is not necessary or essential that there be a previous plan or agreement to commit the
assault; it is sufficient that at the time of aggression all the accused by their acts manifested a common
intent or desire to attack the victim, so that the act of one accused became the act of all

OLBINAR vs CA
FACTS:
Romeo Cahilog & Fernando Jimenez was physically assaulting Emiliano Olbinar. His wife, defendant
Olbinar, having no knowledge of what transpired prior, quickly acted to rescue her husband and retailed
for her husband with bolo. -thereby injuring Fernando. She was charged with the crime of serious
physical injuries. She invoked defense of relative as defense. The Court held that the means employed by
Procerfina to prevent or repel the aggression against her husband were not reasonably necessary and
hence, she was convicted.

ISSUE:
WON there was defense of relative when accused injured Fernando with a bolo

HELD:
YES.
The Court is satisfied that Procerfina had acted in justifiable defense of her husband.1âwphi1 In the
situation in which she had found herself, she was justified in believing that her husband was the victim of
an unlawful aggression by two (2) men, who had gotten the better of him and had already succeeded in
bloodying his face and dropping him to the ground; she had no way of knowing if her husband had given
provocation for the attack; she herself had not given any such provocation; and the means employed by
her were not in the premises unreasonable considering that without any weapon, she was no match for
either of the assailants, much less both of them.

Under the circumstances, she obviously felt the compelling urgency for swift action to stop the assault
on her prostrate husband, and there was nothing else she could do towards this end except to try to hit
out at his attackers. She must have been near panic. She had no time to think. She had to act, and act
quickly. The circumstances certainly afforded her no time to investigate the nature of her husband's
injuries, determine if he was in danger of death, analyze the situation and ascertain what would be the
most reasonable mode by which with her bolo she could stop her husband's mauling—whether she
should use the flat, not the sharp edge of the weapon, should first announce that she had a bolo and
would use it if they did not cease in their nefarious acts, etc.

PEOPLE vs CAGALINGAN
FACTS:
Accused-appelant Jovito Cagalingan was seen to be laughing while grappling for possession of a basket
of crabs with deceased Joemar Deson. In order to gain advantage over Jovito to secure the possession of
the basket, Joemar held the throat of Jovito with his right hand. Jovito however was able to remove the
hand of Joemar and went at the back of the latter. Co-accused Alfredo Cagalingan and Victor Romina
rushed to the scene, when the former's wife shouted that Jovito was being attacked. Armed with bolo,
Alfredo stabbed Joemar. Jovito did likewise with his knife. Victor also joined and stabbed the victim with
his knife. The victim died. The three were charged and convicted with the murder of Deson.

Alfredo contended that he killed Deson in defense of relative. He argued that there was unlawful
aggression on the part of the deceased because the latter was strangulating Jovito Cagalingan when he
was stabbed by Alfredo Cagalingan.

ISSUE:
WON there was unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased

HELD:
A witness stated that the deceased Joemar Desor and the appellant Jovito Cagalingan were laughing and
joking as they were grappling for the possession of the basket of crabs which Joemar Desor wanted to
get from Jovito Cagalingan. For unlawful aggression to be present, there must be a real danger to life or
personal safety. Here, there was no danger to the life of Jovito Cagalingan as they (Jovito and Joemar)
were in a frolicsome mood.

Besides, it would appear that the deceased was unarmed at the time and sustained five (5) stab wounds
in different parts of his body, which indicates that the act (stabbing) was not in defense of a relative but
a determined effort to kill the deceased.