History

ILHAN NIAZ
INTRODUCTION AND THEMATIC OVERVIEW THE INITIAL CHALLENGES OF STATE-BUILDING
Since its independence from the United Kingdom and partition IN PAKISTAN, 1947–53
from India in August 1947, Pakistan’s historical trajectory has Table 1: Governors-General of Pakistan
been marked by five major themes. First, political and institu-
Mohammad Ali Jinnah . . . . . . 1 . 5 Aug. 1947–11 Sept. 1948
tional instability have led to periodic oscillation between Khawaja Nazimuddin . . . . . . .11 Sept. 1948–17 Oct. 1951
civilian and military rule and thus prevented Pakistan from Malik Ghulam Muhammad . . . . . . 17 Oct. 1951–7 Aug. 1955
achieving a stable and legitimate political order. Second, amid 7 Aug. 1955–23 March 1956 (24 March 1956–27 Oct.
the alternation of civilian governments, military regimes, and Iskander Mirza . . . . . . . . . 1958 as President)
different political systems, Pakistan’s administrative institu-
tions and the manner in which power is exercised by the state
Table 2: Prime Ministers of Pakistan, 1947–58
have become more arbitrary, dysfunctional and ultimately
ineffective, leading to a condition of civilian deinstitutionaliza- Liaquat Ali Khan . . . . . . . . . 15 Aug. 1947–16 Oct. 1951
tion and a persistent crisis of governance. Third, Pakistan has Khawaja Nazimuddin . . . . . . .17 Oct. 1951–17 April 1953
Muhammad Ali Bogra . . . . . . 1
. 7 April 1953–12 Aug. 1955
been an underachiever in terms of socioeconomic performance Chaudhry Muhammad Ali . . . . . 1
. 2 Aug. 1955–12 Sept. 1956
among post-colonial states, unable to develop as a developed Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy . . . . .12 Sept. 1956–17 Oct. 1957
industrialized state, or manage proper investment in human Ibrahim Ismail Chundrigar . . . . . . 17 Oct.–16 Dec. 1957
resource development, periods of high gross domestic product Feroz Khan Noon . . . . . . . . . 16 Dec. 1957–7 Oct. 1958
(GDP) growth notwithstanding. Fourth, perceiving itself to be
South Asia has traditionally alternated between imperial
at mortal risk from India, Pakistan has sought to amass
order and warring states. For much of the region’s history,
military strength and the capacity to project asymmetrical warring states have proliferated, while, for relatively brief
warfare, wedding itself to a national security and foreign policy interludes, imperial regimes have been able to exercise
outlook that is dominated by consideration of India and the supreme hegemony, if not always direct territorial control.
perceived threats it poses, and which prioritizes hard power. The territories that came to comprise Pakistan were the
Fifth, Pakistan’s state and society have steadily moved away historic, geographic and demographic, peripheries of South
from the epistemological basis for modern national identity Asia, and had gradually been brought under British para-
and social order, and instead embraced Islamic theocentricism, mount suzerainty between 1757 and 1858. West Pakistan (as
thereby narrowing the scope for what, by Western standards at modern-day Pakistan was known upon independence in 1947,
least, constitute rational political discourse, scientific progress to distinguish it from East Pakistan, which subsequently
and the protection of human rights, while empowering major- seceded to become the independent state of Bangladesh) was
itarian and sectarian communalism, which has led in many carved out of the turbulent frontier marches of the Raj, large
parts of which were never fully pacified and were perceived as
cases to conflict.
Taken together, the five themes underpinning Pakistan’s vulnerable to foreign invasion and subversion. These fears
were not idle fantasies as, between 1000 CE and 1800, at least
history have combined to make the country what it is today.
70 major invasions of the trans-Indus region had taken place,
Despite being the Muslim world’s only nuclear power, and the as well as innumerable smaller raids and rebellions. The
world’s 24th largest economy (measured in purchasing power British had annexed some of these territories late in their
parity), Pakistan has one of the lowest rates of enrolment of imperial expansion (Sindh 1843; Punjab 1849) and ruled much
school-age children in the world, and only two Pakistani of the territory by reaching settlements with local potentates.
universities have ever made it to any of the major global At the opposite end of the Raj (as the British Empire in India
rankings of the top 500 learning institutions. Pakistan has a was colloquially known) was East Bengal, which served as an
large proportion of youth relative to its population (estimated impoverished rural hinterland that furnished Calcutta (now
to total 199.1 million in mid-2017), but its sluggish productivity Kolkata) with raw materials and British India with its greatest
and lacklustre recent economic performance threaten to turn a monuments to imperial callousness, particularly the Great
demographic dividend into disaster. Pakistan’s politics have Bengal Famines that heralded the onset and sunset of the Raj
remained doggedly pluralistic, in spite of periodic military (1769–70; 1943–44).
Throughout South Asian imperial history, keeping control of
takeovers and religious extremism, but even during periods of
Bengal and its teeming population had been a major concern
democracy the armed forces have enjoyed hyper-autonomy and for those invested in the maintenance of paramount power. The
exercised a veto over all key areas of national policy. The British also found retaining control of Bengal a great challenge
freedom to criticize politicians is widely exercised in Pakistan, and it was from there that both Indian composite nationalism
but free speech apparently evaporates on matters pertaining to and Muslim nationalism would emerge. From the Muslim
the armed forces and religion, and is often restricted on issues nationalist perspective, the British had succeeded the Mughal
such as labour rights, women’s rights and sexual identity. The dynasty, and the administrative and political unity imposed by
Pakistani structure of selective pluralism operates alongside a the colonial Raj ought not to be confused with national unity.
large non-governmental organization sector, an expanding The end of the Raj would require a transfer of power to the
media, growing internet and telecommunications connectivity, regions marked by communal majorities either in the form of a
and a significant if qualitatively uncompetitive higher educa- loose confederation (the so-called Cabinet Mission Plan pro-
tion sector. posed by a delegation sent to India by the British Government
In historical terms, Pakistan’s evolution as a polity has been in 1946, which proposed the maintenance of Indian unity upon
fundamentally affected by the pre-colonial and colonial past, as independence) or in the form of two (or more) independent
states whereby the Muslim-majority areas would constitute
well as the responses of state élites to the challenges of state-
Pakistan. The demand for Pakistan received overwhelming
building generated by the freedom movement and the Partition support in the 1946 elections, which saw the All-India Muslim
of the British Empire in India. Understanding how the trau- League carry more than 80% of the Muslim vote. When the
matic events of Pakistan’s first decade influenced the fateful Indian National Congress reneged on its commitment to the
choices made by the last generation of British Indian, and the Cabinet Mission Plan, the Muslim League resorted to Direct
first generation of Pakistani, leaders is the subject of the next Action in Calcutta, triggering the opening scene of large-scale
two sections. communal violence that escalated by mid-1947 into a peoples’
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war of imperial succession, compelling the British to ‘Partition However, building up the military was not going to be
and Quit’ sooner rather than later. sustainable without economic growth and industrialization.
The emergence of Pakistan thus unfolded in a manner The new country, ignoring the views of its British financial
different from most other cases of decolonization where an adviser, moved swiftly to develop a policy framework for
existing colony changed status and rulers. In Pakistan’s case, industrialization, and systematically redeployed the assets
the maps had to be redrawn in light of communal and electoral left behind by Hindu and Sikh businessmen and landlords to
realities, a massive exchange of population estimated at 14 kickstart economic development and create a specifically
million individuals took place, and the new state was plunged Pakistani commercial class. This was accompanied by the
into diplomatic and military conflict with its Indian counter- commencement of central economic planning in 1948, and by
part almost immediately after independence from the UK was the following year some 200 federally funded projects were at
achieved on 14 August 1947. For Pakistan, nearly every aspect different stages of approval and implementation. The basic
of statehood and society had to be set up from scratch. Karachi approach adopted was that the state would furnish capital and
was made the temporary capital of Pakistan; civil and military incentives to help develop the private sector, which would lead
personnel who had sworn allegiance to the new state of the economic growth process, in contrast to the socialist
Pakistan and foresworn loyalty to India were evacuated by approach adopted by neighbouring India. A critical aspect of
land, air and sea as quickly as possible, and military prepared- the Pakistani economic growth policy was that it did not seek to
ness was made a priority. The expectation that Pakistan might bring about land reforms in West Pakistan, but rather sought
collapse under the strain appeared reasonable, given that in to co-opt the landlords, while in East Bengal, where popular
1947 there were only several dozen Muslim civil servants in the dynamics were different, the hated Permanent Settlement of
All-India Services who opted to serve Pakistan, and only 1793, which fixed the level of revenue to be raised from the
around 600 Muslim military officers, of whom only a handful land, enormously in favour of the British colonizers, was
were of any seniority. Fewer than 50 civil servants were abolished in 1951.
believed to have had experience at policymaking levels. This Pakistan’s founders thus set the country two ambitious
small cohort of administrative officers had to run a country goals. One was the accumulation of sufficient military strength
divided into two wings separated by 1,600 km of Indian to impose a balance of power in South Asia on a far larger
territory. Furthermore, a dispute arose with dividing the adversary (India). The other was to sustain rapid economic
financial assets (and foreign debt), which was resolved only growth with the objective of achieving industrialization. In
at the insistence of India’s independence leader Mahatma institutional terms, these goals required the strengthening of
Gandhi, who overruled independent India’s first premier the military, the civilian bureaucracy, and creating a new
Jawarhalal Nehru, who had wanted to resolve the Kashmir business and industrial élite. Materially, however, it was clear
question before awarding Pakistan any funds, lest it be used to that Pakistan did not have the resources to simultaneously
purchase armaments to be used against India. In addition, engage in military competition with India and make the
India did not give Pakistan its allocated share of military necessary investments in industrialization. This meant that
equipment that had been earmarked for the newly formed Pakistan would need external support, and in the context of the
Pakistani armed forces. emerging Cold War between the USA and the Union of Soviet
The scale of the communal disturbances was greater for Socialist Republics (USSR) in the late 1940s and early 1950s,
Pakistan than for India. Some six million non-Muslims left the Western bloc was the most promising source of military,
economic and technical assistance. Pakistan’s leaders had
West Pakistan, with a population of some 30 million in 1947,
little interest in US Cold War objectives, but had the sense
while seven million Muslim refugees sought sanctuary in the
to play along with the growing paranoia in Washington, DC
new state, having fled from India, during 1947–48. Those who
and draw benefit from India’s neutral foreign policy, which left
left West Pakistan represented many members of the business
Pakistan as the only valuable South Asian piece on the US side
élite and middle class, which was drawn from the Hindu and of the chessboard. Pakistan’s tilt to the West would thus be a
Sikh communities, while those who came to Pakistan were by conscious product of its grand strategy vis-à-vis India, and
and large uneducated peasants. The outbreak of armed conflict sustained by apparently credible fears that the Indian leader-
with India from October 1947 over the disposal of the princely ship had not accepted the communal verdict of 1946–47 as
state of Jammu and Kashmir, combined with profound frus- final, and still held out hopes for a single Indian nation
tration with the boundary commission award for Punjab, undivided by religion, ethnicity or caste.
which resulted in major irrigation headworks used by Pakistan While embarking on this strategy, the ruling party in
falling under Indian control on the other side of the border, Pakistan (the Muslim League) faced mounting challenges to
meant that Pakistan’s founders felt besieged on all sides and its internal cohesion. Jinnah’s death in September 1948 and
had only hard choices to make, which, in turn, would help set Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination in October 1951 removed the
Pakistan’s historical trajectory, and undermine smooth devel- only two leaders of genuinely national stature from the poli-
opment into a successful state. tical scene. The splintering of the Muslim League into rival
The overriding priority was building the armed forces, factions was evident soon after Jinnah’s death, and reflected in
developing military infrastructure along the border with India, Liaquat Ali Khan’s tendency to equate political dissent with
and administrative consolidation. Mohammad Ali Jinnah and disloyalty to the state. The Muslim League leadership, setting
Liaquat Ali Khan, the founding Governor-General and Prime aside Jinnah’s advice, decided to introduce the Objectives
Minister, respectively, adopted a state-building strategy Resolution in March 1949. This resolution spelled out that
centred on allocating two-thirds of Pakistan’s budgetary Pakistan would be a state in which all laws would be made in
resources to the military. These resources were generated by conformity with the Koran and the traditions of the Prophet
the centralization of revenue collection in 1948 and by use of Muhammad. It was done in order to rally support for the
the Rs 550m. worth of abandoned property left by fleeing non- Government on the basis of Islamic identity, and marked a
Muslims. In order to dispense with the British presence in the fundamental epistemological break from the state secularism
armed forces, the Government opted for rapid nationalization of British India. This move also generated confusion among
of the military, which aimed to replace all British army officers non-Muslims, who were about 20% of the population of East
retained after 1947 with Pakistani ones by January 1951. The Bengal, and led many religious conservatives, who had
premier chaired the Defence Committee of Cabinet, held the opposed the creation of Pakistan, to project themselves as
defence portfolio, and personally handled the appointments the authentic guardians of the ‘Islamic’ ideology of the new
and promotions of military officers under the nationalization state. In practical terms the resolution did not speed up
policy. The heavy resource allocations would swiftly turn the constitution-making, and in October 1951 the Constituent
military into Pakistan’s most formidable institution, while the Assembly was still discussing basic principles after having
policy of rapidly promoting Pakistanis to senior positions sat for over four years. The political leadership further de-
would lead to the collapse of the British Indian policy of legitimized itself by resorting to administrative interference in
insulation of the army from politics, leading to the Rawalpindi the 1951 provincial elections in Punjab where, according to
Conspiracy of 1951, the first, albeit unsuccessful, attempt at a official estimates, the results of 50 seats were affected in favour
military coup. of the ruling party.
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The combination of delay in constitution-making, the grow- establish equal parliamentary representation for each wing,
ing clout of the civil service and military, and dismay in state with East Bengal renamed East Pakistan, and a 40% quota for
élite circles that the politicians were relying on religion to civil service recruitment for East Pakistanis. These changes
perpetuate themselves in power, and, in doing so, raising were rapidly effected in 1955 and a new constitution was
expectations that could not be reasonably fulfilled, produced moved through the Second Constituent Assembly in haste,
a rift between the political and bureaucratic leadership. Paki- taking effect on 23 March 1956, which is celebrated annually as
stan’s Secretary to the Ministry of the Interior bluntly warned Pakistan Day.
premier Khawaja Nazimuddin in March 1952 that if the On the foreign policy front, the regime moved to secure an
politicians did not stop treating the state like a personal estate alliance with the United States and thus consummate the
while engaging in dangerous games with religious fundamen- courtship that had begun under Jinnah. The formal alliance
talists, Pakistan would risk degenerating into primitive con- was signed on 19 May 1954 as the Mutual Defense Assistance
ditions. The expected explosion came in March 1953 with the Agreement. Pakistan would receive as a consequence of this
outbreak of sectarian violence against the Ahmadiyya Muslim agreement almost US $1,000m. of military equipment,
community in Punjab. This led to the imposition of martial law enabling Pakistan to raise a new armoured division, equip
in Lahore for two months, the dismissal of the Punjab Govern- six squadrons with US jet fighters, add 12 warships to its navy,
ment, and, on 17 April, the ouster of the Prime Minister. The modernize its military communications system, and train its
figure at the heart of these successful intrigues against Paki- armed forces to a high standard. This assistance reinforced the
stan’s politicians was the Governor-General, Malik Ghulam pattern of governance and national strategy adopted during
Muhammad, a former civil servant who, with the support of the lean years of 1947–55, when Pakistan survived while
like-minded civilian and military officers and judges, would lay relying almost exclusively on its own resources.
the foundations of a bureaucratic governing corporation that Managing politicians and democracy was an altogether
would rule Pakistan until March 1969. different challenge. The possibility of a combined opposition
to the regime was keenly felt and the forcible merger of the four
provinces in the western wing into the so-called ‘One Unit’ in
THE GOVERNING CORPORATION: CIVIL-MILITARY West Pakistan (in order to achieve something approaching
BUREAUCRATIC RULE, 1953–58 parity with the more highly populated eastern wing) had the
The civil-military bureaucratic regime that seized power in effect of galvanizing sub-national movements, which found
April 1953 was determined to engineer efficient solutions to the themselves denied even a provincial identity. President Iskan-
challenges faced by Pakistan. Led by the governor-general, the der Mirza was convinced that his chance of staying in power in
regime enjoyed the full support of General Ayub Khan who the event of fresh national elections was less than 10%. Mirza
had, in January 1951, become the first Pakistani commander- manoeuvered his way through four prime ministers (including
in-chief of the Pakistan Armed Forces. The challenges identi- Chaudhry Muhammad Ali from the Muslim League, and H. S.
fied by the regime were the need to break the constitution- Suhrawardy of the Awami League) and in September 1956 he
making deadlock, solving the representative problems that founded and became Chairman of the Republican Party, which
arose from Pakistan’s geographic and demographic profile, split from the Muslim League due to disagreements over
sealing the emerging mutual defence deal with the USA (which matters of republicanism and conservatism. When Mirza’s
was formalized by treaty in 1954), and managing the appear- last Prime Minister under the 1956 Constitution, Feroz
ance of multi-party democracy. Khan Noon, broke with him and attempted to bring about a
Insofar as the constitutional deadlock was concerned, the revival of the Muslim League, the situation reached a crisis
first Constituent Assembly had sat in October 1947 but did not point. Seeking and securing the support of Gen. Ayub Khan
seem to be moving beyond debating basic principles, even as (who was still commander-in-chief of the army, having made
1952 progressed. The Constituent Assembly was widely himself indispensible) in order to stage a coup d’état, Mirza
believed to be delaying the process in order to extend its own abrogated the constitution on 7 October 1958. Gen. Ayub Khan
life. Indeed, it did not seem to have trouble passing laws, 46 of was appointed Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA), and
which were passed and implemented even without the assent the avowed aim of the coupmakers was to establish a form of
of the governor-general. Elected on the basis of limited fran- democracy ‘suitable to the genius’ of Pakistan’s people. As an
chise, and having sat for over five years, the democratic interim measure, the ordinary provisions of the abrogated
legitimacy of the Constituent Assembly was doubtful. The constitution were to remain in effect and the civilian courts
governor-general resolved to take matters into his own hands would administer martial law regulations under the super-
and on 27 October 1954 dissolved the Assembly. This was vision of the CMLA. Mirza appeared to think that he could
challenged in the Sindh Chief Court where the verdict came in carry on as before, draft a new constitution to his liking, and
favour of the Constituent Assembly. The central Government then remain President after it was approved. The military,
appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, where Chief however, was by this time tired of playing second fiddle to
Justice Muhammad Munir creatively applied the doctrine of civilian and military bureaucrats-turned-politicians, and ten-
individual necessity to the governor-general’s actions and sions between the President and his chief enforcer rose rapidly.
declared in favour of the dissolution. This paved the way for On 27 October 1958 Mirza was overthrown by the army and
a new Constituent Assembly to be convened, with a former civil exiled to the UK. With this change Pakistan came under direct
servant, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, appointed as Prime Min- army rule and the equilibrium within the governing powers
ister to push through a new constitution. This meant that shifted in favour of its military component.
bureaucratic minds would at last be able to devise rational
solutions to the problems that vexed the politicians.
Much of this vexation stemmed from Pakistan’s territorial THE AYUB KHAN ERA, 1958–69
and population distribution. West Pakistan, with about 45% of The Ayub Khan era is often viewed as Pakistan’s most success-
the population, accounted for 85% of Pakistan’s territory. West ful and promising, with the benefit of hindsight. During this
Pakistan was further divided into different types of entities. time, Pakistani GDP more than doubled. A massive re-engi-
There were four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, North-West Fron- neering of the Indus basin, made feasible by the settlement of
tier Province—NWFP—and Balochistan), Federally Adminis- the waters dispute with India on fair terms, commenced. The
tered Tribal Areas (FATA), Provincially Administered Tribal so-called Green Revolution in agriculture began under the
Areas, the Baluchistan States Union, the princely states of Ayub Khan regime, greatly helped by technical advice and
Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Swat, Dir and Chitral, Pakistan’s support from the USA. Pakistan surged ahead on the indus-
portion of the disputed territory of Kashmir (called Azad or trial front and had become the largest manufacturing country
‘Free’ Jammu and Kashmir—AJK), and the Capital Territory in the Muslim world by 1965. Contrary to the populist critique
(Karachi). While West Pakistan had 14 major sub-units, East that argued that the poor were getting poorer under Ayub amid
Bengal, with 55% of the national population and 15% of the the emergence of a new class of industrialists, the poorest fifth
territory, was a single province with one dominant ethnicity of the population saw their share of the national wealth
and language. The solution adopted was to turn West Pakistan increase from 6% to 8%—a critical gain that was reversed
minus AJK into a single province with its capital at Lahore, during the subsequent period of experimentation with social-
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ism and a command economy under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto centre collected an estimated 85%–92% of all taxes. This meant
(President 1971–73, Prime Minister 1973–77). The moderni- that provincial governments needed expanded federal fund-
zation of Pakistan’s armed forces created a formidable con- ing. The centre set up the so-called federal divisible pool (now
centration of military strength in West Pakistan, threatening known as the National Financial Commission award) from
northern India and causing chronic concern among Indian which provinces would get funds. The trouble was that as East
élites ever since. Pakistan’s friendly relations with the People’s Bengal/East Pakistan had 55% of the population and gener-
Republic of China, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, ated about the same proportion of tax receipts, the provinces/
Sri Lanka and the Western bloc translated into a level of One Unit (after 1955) in West Pakistan, clamoured for more
diplomatic clout never to be subsequently equalled. Internally, investment on the basis of factors other than population. The
the Ayub Khan regime saw itself as a modernizing dictatorship sense of economic injustice in East Pakistan was understand-
that would firmly deal with both communist and religious able as the province accounted for more than half of state
fundamentalist opposition. Politically conservative, but revenues, but 80% of state expenditure was made in West
socially liberal and economically pragmatic, the Ayub Khan Pakistan. Although East Pakistanis came to comprise a
era is wistfully remembered as a time when Pakistan was a greater portion of the CSP (around 35% by 1965), their pre-
‘normal’ country, open and inviting to foreigners, equipped sence in the armed forces was less than 10%, and they were
with all the modern trappings of the West (nightclubs, casinos, generally excluded from decision-making in Ayub Khan
bars, liberated women), and a strong state apparatus appar- regime. There were some senior civil servants, like A. G. N.
ently capable of maintaining order and delivering progress. In Kazi, who took issue with the way in which East Pakistan was
1959 Ayub Khan laid the foundations of Pakistan’s new capital, being treated and advocated the restoration of provincial
Islamabad, and in 1961 the Muslim Family Laws were powers of taxation and the scaling down of the divisible pool
amended, to the horror of religious conservatives, to allow (in 1962), but such voices were ignored. The fact was that the
women the right to seek divorce, while the institutional governing corporation derived much of its power from the
foundations of the country’s atomic power (and latterly weap- centralization of finances and administration, and while the
ons) programme would be greatly expanded with the construc- emergency situation of 1948 had long passed, as had financial
tion of heavy water production facilities in 1962 and the stringency thanks to inflows from the West, the regime con-
training of 600 Pakistani researchers in different branches tinued to proceed on inertial momentum. A major source of the
of nuclear science in the late 1960s. Ayub Khan appeared imbalance between resource allocation was due to defence
convinced that the people would respond favourably to his expenditure, which were being incurred in accordance with a
benevolent despotism, which allowed for some political parti- strategic doctrine so immature that it is almost inconceivable
cipation at the local government level through the election of that it was articulated and implemented by an otherwise
80,000 Basic Democrats, who, in turn, constituted the Elec- professional military.
toral College for the presidency under the 1962 Constitution. In terms of military doctrine, the Ayub Khan era saw the
Ayub Khan’s paternalism and performance did not, however, consolidation of the perspective that the defence of East
impress or convince his critics and opponents. That the dicta- Pakistan lay in the West. What this meant was that Pakistan
tor’s family became one of the 22 wealthiest in Pakistan even could deter Indian aggression against East Pakistan by con-
though they were of middle-class origin, rather than landed centrating its numerically inferior military in West Pakistan.
feudal stock, raised questions that the regime could not This would give Pakistan the option of invading India in the
answer. Serious political difficulties dogged the regime and North if it attacked Pakistan in the East. As a consequence of
the bureaucratic thinking that dominated it was poorly the availability of US equipment and training facilities, the
equipped to respond to political manoeuvring. Unlike many Pakistani military grew steadily more confident in its ability to
of his contemporary autocrats, Ayub Khan did not have the inflict a defeat on India in a limited war. India’s poor showing in
stomach for systematic and sustained violent repression of his the 1962 border war with China and its uninspiring perfor-
enemies, which may well have prolonged his stay in power. mance in the Rann of Kutch incident with India in 1965, turned
Ayub Khan’s regime depended heavily on the support of the this confidence into hubris. Ayub was of the view that ‘Hindu
Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) component of the higher morale’ would collapse after a few operational blows had
bureaucracy for governance. The CSP adjusted quickly to its landed on India. Pakistan’s decision to attempt to destabilize
role as the junior partner of the military ruler and was used by Indian-held Kashmir and fight a limited war that would end in
Ayub to manage the political system. This would lead to a victory and decide the dispute in Pakistan’s favour, did not
situation where the CSP was identified as an extension of the even contemplate what would happen if India decided to strike
regime and its dominance of the bureaucratic structure would across the international border. When that attack took place in
lead to polarization within the apparatus, as other services and September 1965 Pakistan was caught by surprise and fought
specialists chafed under the control of a single cadre. This India to an unsustainable stalemate where logistical unpre-
external identification and internal polarization would con- paredness meant that prolongation of the conflict could have
tribute greatly to the backlash against the civil service that spelled strategic disaster. The India-Pakistan talks brokered
began when Ayub was forced from power in 1969. The CSP by the USSR led to the Tashkent Declaration in early 1966,
pursued centralization of decision-making and enjoyed a near which reaffirmed the status quo, causing some confusion in
monopoly of top positions in the central bureaucracy (90%), a Pakistan where the war had been portrayed as a great victory.
sizeable majority of key positions at the provincial level (70%), Above all, the 1965 war demonstrated the folly of the prevalent
and an equal number of important positions at the district/field military doctrine. West Pakistan was barely able to defend
level (50%). While competent administrators, the civil servants itself and were it not for considerable bumbling on the Indian
made for poor politicians and were largely unwilling to part side and tactical brilliance at the lower levels of the Pakistani
with the policy of administrative and fiscal centralization to military, a complete military defeat could easily have been the
which they owed much of their power. This left the Ayub result. Some officers, such as Maj.-Gen. Rao Farman Ali,
regime extremely vulnerable to opposition from ethnic nation- argued that the old doctrine had to be abandoned and a
alists in East Pakistan and in parts of West Pakistan, as well as completely new scheme of defence worked out—one that would
to left-wing populists who decried the élitism of the regime’s give East Pakistan the ability to defend itself. These views
economic policies. The convergence of these two trends in the would be ignored and the old doctrine continued to hold sway
Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman posed a serious until it met its end with the secession of East Pakistan.
risk to the federation by 1966, and the emergence of the Islamic The regime’s truculence towards India in 1965 was not
Socialist Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) in 1967, led by Zulfiqar inevitable. In fact, the greatest success of the Ayub era was
Ali Bhutto, Ayub Khan’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Indus Waters Treaty signed with India in 1960. Brokered
heralded the advent of a new generation of politicians and and guaranteed by the World Bank, this treaty ensured that
politics. Pakistan secured 80% of the water flow of the Indus river
In 1948, as Pakistan fought for its existence, the Govern- system, while India received the right to exploit the three
ment centralized revenue collection and financial allocations. eastern tributaries. India also had to pay Pakistan US $140m.,
Prior to this, the provinces had collected a variety of taxes that which, along with World Bank funds and Pakistan’s own
accounted for 40%–45% of all revenues. After March 1948 the contribution, led to the creation of a $1,000m. financial
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resource that was used to develop the Indus basin. To this day, ment in Pakistan’s short history—the secession of East Paki-
the Ayub Khan-era water and power infrastructure form the stan.
backbone of Pakistan’s agricultural economy. Critically, the The new regime signalled the end of the governing corpora-
treaty represented a successful third-party mediation of an tion—the combination of senior civil and military officials who
India-Pakistan dispute. The treaty, moreover, could not be had ruled Pakistan since April 1953. Yahya Khan believed,
terminated. It could only be replaced or amended, by mutual unlike Ayub Khan, that the military ought to seize direct
consent, and it has survived military conflicts in 1965, 1971, administrative power and sideline the unpopular CSP. The
1999 and multiple skirmishes and periods of high tension. result was that all decision-making power was concentrated in
The downfall of the Ayub Khan regime would arise from its the CMLA Secretariat headed by a lieutenant-general aided by
limited understanding of politics. In late 1964 the opposition two brigadiers, with junior officers appointed to co-ordinate
parties joined forces and fielded Fatima Jinnah, the sister of directly with ministries. A purge of some 300 civil servants was
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, as their presidential candidate. The carried out and these moves ensured that the regime was freed
election was held in February 1965 and entailed a vote by the from professional administrative interference (but also exper-
80,000 Basic Democrats–40,000 from each wing. The Ayub tise).
Khan regime used the state machinery to restrict campaigning Yahya Khan moved to undo the political legacy of the
to only 30 days, with official campaigning limited to the governing corporation through measures designed to win
electors. By most accounts, Fatima Jinnah, revered as the him popularity. The ‘One Unit’ structure in West Pakistan
Madr-i-Millat (Mother of the Nation), and invoking Jinnah’s was phased out and although not all the pre-1955 units were
person and prestige, was the more popular of the two candi- restored, the four major provinces of Punjab, Sindh, the North-
dates. Ayub Khan’s victory in the election was unconvincing West Frontier Province (NWFP until 2010, now known as
and demonstrated how little public support he actually had. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), and Balochistan, assumed their pre-
28,800 of the electors voted for Fatima Jinnah, while 51,200 sent form. Yahya Khan also did away with inter-wing repre-
voted for Ayub Khan. The CSP was mobilized to deliver sentative parity and announced fresh elections for December
favourable results from the rural areas of West Pakistan. It 1970 on the basis of universal adult franchise. Rather than
also demonstrated the inherent problem with Ayub Khan’s keeping the 1962 Constitution, or reverting to the 1956 Con-
desire for constitutional and political legitimacy through a stitution, Yahya Khan decided to have the new assembly act as
managed indirect democracy. Unlike the Shah of Iran or a Constituent Assembly and draft another constitution. The
President Suharto in Indonesia or the leaders of various system of Basic Democracy was discontinued, and under the
communist regimes, Ayub Khan did not preside over an revised allocation of National Assembly seats, East Pakistan
intrusive and brutal police state, and his British Indian would get 169 seats and West Pakistan 144, with 300 contested
training and personal temperament militated against turning seats, and the remaining 13 seats reserved for women. Yahya
Pakistan into that kind of state. Khan also conceded in his Legal Framework Order (LFO) that
The surprisingly strong performance of Fatima Jinnah in a a simple majority would be required to approve constitutional
blatantly rigged election showed up the fragility of the Ayub provisions, rather than the traditional practice of two-thirds.
Khan regime and soon led to multiple challenges. The most Going into the elections, Yahya Khan was convinced that the
serious came from the Awami League, which, in 1966 articu- result would lead to a badly fractured assembly unable to take
lated its Six Point programme and launched an eponymous decisions and approve a new constitution within the 120 days
movement to achieve it. The points were that: i) Pakistan ought stipulated in the LFO. This outcome would give Yahya Khan
to be a parliamentary democracy with universal adult fran- and his generals three options. First, a divided parliament
chise; ii) only defence and foreign affairs would be handled by would allow the regime to cobble together a coalition of the
the centre; iii) East/West Pakistan would have separate inter- willing to formulate a constitution to its liking. Second, if the
convertible currencies with a Reserve Bank established in first outcome did not materialize, then Yahya Khan could
Dhaka, the capital city of East Pakistan; iv) powers of taxation dissolve the assembly and call fresh elections after an unspe-
ought to be devolved to the provinces; v) the foreign exchange cified interval. And third, martial law could be rigorously
earnings of the two wings would be kept separate; and vi) East applied at any time and the political process upended. Yahya
Pakistan required a proper military/paramilitary force for its Khan, in other words, had no intention of handing over power
defence and the naval headquarters ought to be shifted to its and was convinced that a political situation comparable to the
territory. With East Pakistan in ferment, West Pakistan mid-1950s would play out, eventually leaving him in a position
politics also experienced major change with the founding of of control. This kind of thinking meant that the regime did not
the PPP in November 1967. Although closer to the military on take even elementary military precautions to stave off popular
some issues compared to the Awami League, the PPP was anti- reaction to its machinations. It remained supremely confident
Ayub Khan and sought the downfall of his regime, falsely and even allowed genuinely open and free campaigning to take
accusing it of a ‘secret agreement’ at the end of the 1965 war place, believing that the outcome was inevitably going to go its
that betrayed Pakistan’s interests. The growth of opposition in way.
both wings meant that by 1968, as Ayub Khan sought to The actual results went completely against the regime’s
celebrate a ‘Decade of Development’, the political situation projections. The Awami League concentrated its resources in
was spinning out of control. Student protests in major cities, East Pakistan and turned the campaign into a referendum on
unrest over the perceived economic inequity of the regime’s the Six Point plan. The PPP concentrated its strength in West
policies, questions about Ayub’s declining health, and loss of Pakistan and turned the campaign into a referendum on the
support for the Government within the armed forces, all perceived inequities of the Ayub Khan era, promising in its
contributed to the evaporation of the Government’s authority. place Islamic Socialism with bread, clothing and shelter for all.
Initially, Ayub Khan thought it better to negotiate, but by mid- These were the first national elections to be held in Pakistan on
March 1969 it was clear that the army chief, Gen. Yahya Khan, the basis of universal adult franchise, and turnout was 63%.
was no longer supporting the President. Rather than risk The Awami League got nearly 40% of the popular vote and
further bloodshed and realizing that he could not govern swept East Pakistan, winning 160 seats, while in West Paki-
without the political backing of the armed forces, Ayub stan the PPP secured 19% of the popular vote and got 81 seats.
Khan resigned on 25 March, transferring power to the army The regime had not contemplated a political outcome that was
chief and in the process placing Pakistan under martial law. decisive in both wings. Rather than the range of options he had
fantasized about prior to the elections, Yahya Khan now
effectively had two equally stark choices. One was to convene
THE BREAK-UP OF PAKISTAN, 1969–71 the National Assembly, allow the Awami League to form a
Yahya Khan’s assumption of power in March 1969 led to the government, and, as it commanded a simple majority, approve
expectation that a transition to democracy would take place. a constitution consistent with the Six Point programme. The
The new ruler projected himself as a professional soldier with other was to renege on the regime’s commitments and plunge
no interest in politics beyond ensuring fresh elections and a Pakistan into civil war.
transfer of power to elected representatives. Yahya Khan’s Unwilling to hand power to the Awami League, fearing
brief reign would bring about the most catastrophic develop- India’s intelligence penetration of East Pakistan, and egged
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PAKISTAN History

on by hawkish West Pakistani politicians like Zufliqar Ali as a result of Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to the Chinese
Bhutto, who saw no point in joining an assembly where the PPP capital, Beijing, via Pakistan in July 1971, as the National
could play no effective role, Yahya Khan opted to delay the Security Adviser to US President Richard Nixon. This would
convening of the new parliament and impose preconditions. As set the stage for Nixon’s official visit to China in February
it became clear that the regime was not going to keep its 1972—the ‘week that changed the world’ in a very substantive
promises, the Awami League’s position hardened and it pre- sense. Pakistan’s role in this opening was the major factor
pared to seize control of the East Pakistan Government behind Nixon’s tilt towards Pakistan during the East Pakistan
through a popular revolt. Rather than defusing the situation crisis. Using its influence to help bring about the normalization
or trying to buy time, Yahya Khan ordered a military crack- of relations between the world’s most powerful (the USA) and
down in East Pakistan on 25 March 1971. most populous (China) nations has stood Pakistan in good
The decision to launch a crackdown was in some ways an stead. For while the US approach to relations with Pakistan
arbitrary one taken without serious professional consideration remained mercurial and transactional, the Chinese resolved to
of the consequences. It belied Yahya Khan’s claim to being a retain and deepen their connection to Pakistan at every level.
competent military officer. The East Pakistan Rifles, a para- As Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai remarked to Kissinger with
military formation recruited locally, rebelled and murdered all regard to Pakistan: ‘One does not break a bridge after crossing
700 of its West Pakistani non-commissioned officers. This it.’
meant that there were barely 10,000 loyal troops left in East
Pakistan by 28 March 1971. Nobody at military general head-
quarters had worked out a proper plan for keeping control of THE FIRST PPP GOVERNMENT, DECEMBER 1971–
East Pakistan or otherwise defending it. The old shibboleth JULY 1977
that the defence of the East lay in the West had, in spite of being
Table 3: Pakistan Presidents (Heads of State) since 1973, excluding
demonstrated as false in 1965, remained the strategic and temporary appointments
operational doctrine. It was only after the military crackdown
had begun that orders were given for two divisions (35,000 Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry . . . . . . . 1
. 4 Aug. 1973–16 Sept. 1978
soldiers) to be airlifted to Dhaka. The airlift was conducted via Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq . . . . . . 1
. 6 Sept. 1978–17 Aug. 1988
Sri Lanka and in civilian aircraft. Consequently, the forces Ghulam Ishaq Khan . . . . . . . .17 Aug. 1988–18 July 1993
deployed had to leave behind their heavy equipment. With Farooq Leghari . . . . . . . . . 14 Nov. 1993–2 Dec. 1997
barely 45,000 lightly armed soldiers to control a seething Muhammad Rafiq Tarar . . . . . . . 1 Jan. 1998–20 June 2001
Pervez Musharraf . . . . . . . . . 20 June 2001–8 Aug. 2008
population of over 60 million, the military situation in East Asif Ali Zardari . . . . . . . . . 9 Sept. 2008–8 Sept. 2013
Pakistan was hopeless. The military, now reinforced, managed Mamnoon Hussain . . . . . . . . 9 Sept. 2013–
to restore order in the major cities by May 1971, but control of
the countryside was fragile and with the Awami League With the secession of East Pakistan and Yahya Khan’s
waging an India-backed insurgency, a political solution was ouster, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and the PPP assumed control of
the only way out. By this time the Pakistani leadership was the government. The new Government would first exercise
also convinced that an Indian invasion was imminent and that authority as an interim martial law administration from
India would seize territory in East Pakistan and declare an 20 December 1971 to 14 August 1973 and after that time as
independent Bangladesh. This thinking meant that Lt-Gen. A. a constitutional parliamentary government until 5 July 1977.
A. K. Niazi, Pakistan’s commander in the eastern theatre, had Bhutto would serve as President and CMLA during the first
developed a militarily unorthodox plan of holding territory phase and Prime Minister during the second.
through static defences. There was, in fact, no independent On the external front the new Government had to immedi-
defence capability in East Pakistan and this assessment of ately address ending hostilities with India, secure the repa-
Indian plans would prove wrong. Rather than attempting to triation of 93,000 Pakistani PoWs, and work towards
quickly seize some territory, the Indian leadership, well normalization of relations with Bangladesh. Bhutto clearly
advised by its military, decided to wait and carry out a well- understood that Pakistan’s attempt to create and maintain a
prepared circumvention that would target Dhaka. Meanwhile, balance of power in South Asia through conventional means
the refugee crisis generated international outrage and served had failed. Rather than accept India’s hegemony, however,
to isolate Pakistan. The conclusion of an Indo-Soviet treaty of Bhutto was determined to buy time through diplomacy while
friendship in August 1971 further upped the ante. India finally embarking upon a nuclear weapons programme—Pakistan
struck in mid-November by probing Pakistan’s defences in the vowed to succeed on this front even it had to endure hardships
East. Pakistani commanders requested permission to fall back to achieve its goal.
but were ordered to hold territory. This was the beginning of an To the new Government’s credit it successfully negotiated
Indian offensive that would erupt into open warfare in both the Simla Agreement with India (July 1972), which was
wings on 4 December. Niazi’s plans fell apart within days and sufficiently vague and allowed both states to claim that their
by 12 December Indian weapons fire could be heard in Dhaka. view of the Kashmir dispute had been endorsed. By August
Intriguingly, Niazi had about 30,000 men under his command 1973, Pakistan had successfully negotiated for the return of its
in Dhaka and besieging the city would not be an easy prospect. PoWs from India and shielded those accused by Bangladesh of
Rather than fighting it out, Niazi decided to surrender. On war crimes, with the transfer completed by July 1974. Mean-
16 December Niazi signed the surrender document: 45,000 while, at the Organization of Islamic Conference summit in
Pakistan armed forces personnel and 48,000 Pakistani civi- Lahore in February 1974 Mujibur Rahman was invited to
lians became prisoners of war (PoW), the fate of pro-Pakistani attend, and Pakistan formally recognized Bangladesh. Bhutto
elements in what was now Bangladesh was sealed, and would also take steps to deepen Pakistan’s relationship with
Jinnah’s Pakistan as it had been created at Partition ceased China, especially in terms of military co-operation and infra-
to exist. Yahya Khan had presided over the liquidation of the structure development. A major project that had been initiated
governing corporation, the Ayub Khan regime, the 1962 Con- under the Ayub Khan regime, the 1,300 km-long National
stitution, the ‘One Unit’ model, and the very territorial integ- Highway 35, popularly known as the Karakorum Highway,
rity of Pakistan. And yet, even after all this, Yahya Khan was underwent rapid development during the PPP administration,
unwilling to part with power until the threat of mutiny by although it was not completed until 1979. This provided China
junior officers openly outraged by what had transpired on the and Pakistan with a direct overland link. The deepening of
military’s watch forced him to step down. India had, for its part, relations with China contrasted with the difficult relationship
succeeded in using military force to bring about a change in the with the USA, especially after the Indian nuclear test of 1974
United Nations (UN)-recognized boundaries of another state created concerns that Pakistan would follow suit. Since the
and, in so doing, ‘cut Pakistan down to size’. passage of the 1976 Symington amendment to the US Foreign
Despite its role in bringing about one of the greatest military Assistance Act of 1961, Pakistan had to face increased pressure
and political catastrophes in the history of Muslims in South regarding its nuclear programme.
Asia, there was one matter where the Yahya Khan regime Internally, the new Government embarked upon a pro-
played a constructive role. This was the facilitation of an gramme of consolidating power and reducing or co-opting
opening between the USA and communist China, which began potential sources of opposition. The civil service, the industrial
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PAKISTAN History

and business classes, and the military, were the key elements nationalized banks and industries as parking places for sur-
from which the PPP perceived a serious threat. The plan was to plus military officers. The military budget rose from
cut down the pillars of the old regime and to bind the state Rs 3,000m, in 1972 to Rs 8,000m. by 1976 and schemes to
apparatus, the economy and the military, to a political patron- provide land to military personnel were expanded. The mili-
age complex centred on the ruling party. By doing so, Bhutto tary’s welfare foundations flourished under the patronage
hoped to overwhelm any serious opposition to his rule and stay economy established by the PPP. The army’s Fauji Foundation,
in power indefinitely, with periodic elections to sanctify this for instance, saw its assets grow from Rs 152m. in 1970 to more
continuity in power. Given the arbitrariness that this approach than Rs 2,000m. rupees by 1982, with 29 major industrial
would entail, Bhutto decided to use his powers as CMLA to projects under its control. The Government’s deployment of the
strike the first blows against what he believed to be the actual military in Balochistan to crush opposition in 1973 would also
or potential enemies of his Government. set the stage for its rehabilitation as a fighting force in the eyes
The purge of the civilian apparatus began in December 1971 of the public, rapidly replenishing its political capital from the
and in its first week the chairmen of the Pakistan Industrial low point of December 1971.
Development Corporation, and National Press Trust, the Bhutto’s undermining of civilian administrative and eco-
managing directors of the National Shipping Group and nomic capacity and strengthening of the military was accom-
Progressive Papers, and the senior editor of Pakistan Times panied by measures that made the adoption of a new
were all sacked. All the dismissals were carried out under constitution in 1973 almost meaningless. The military
martial law orders. Bhutto then directed Vaqar Ahmed, the regime-era Defence of Pakistan Rules remained in effect, the
Secretary to the Cabinet, to prepare names of civil servants for code of Criminal Procedure was amended to allow for direct
dismissal or demotion en masse under Martial Law Regulation registration of cases without preliminary examination by a
114. When Ahmed tried to pressure the heads of administra- magistrate, citizens lost legal protection against mala fide
tive departments to submit names, a mere 27 names were arrest in April 1974, and strenuous efforts were made to buy
yielded. The Special Police Establishment yielded 88 names. the support of the legal fraternity through grants of plots of
The finance minister submitted 106 names, and Ahmed added land. The use of religion as an instrument of shoring up
245 names on his own initiative. Senior PPP leaders were also political support led to the establishment of a federal ministry
asked to add names to the list and on 12 March 1972 some 2,000 for religious affairs, the declaration of Ahmedis as non-Muslim
officials learnt from the evening broadcast that they had been by constitutional amendment (1974), and, as the Government
dismissed or demoted. On 18 March some 500 provincial faced mounting opposition, prohibitions on alcohol, gambling
services officers met the same fate. Then on 18 April a total and horse racing were also introduced.
of 24 judges were removed, while two days later eight officers of The inability of the Government to adhere to any consistent
the Intelligence Bureau were dismissed. These purges were principle beyond a tactical need for self-aggrandizement paved
followed by the Lateral Entry Scheme, through which the the way for its downfall. Two developments were critical in this
political leadership could make direct appointments, circum- respect. One was that in 1976, the army chief, Gen. Tikka
venting the normal competitive recruitment procedures. At the Khan, was due to retire and Bhutto wanted to replace him with
officer and senior subordinate levels, 5,476 such inductions a pliant and politically reliable officer. In March of that year
were made, with some 2,800 in federal institutions and the rest Bhutto decided to appoint Lt-Gen. Zia-ul-Haq as Tikka Khan’s
at the provincial level. These purges and political inductions successor. This meant that Zia superseded six more senior
were designed to reduce the autonomy and prestige of the lieutenant-generals. The second critical development was the
civilian bureaucracy, while the 1973 Civil Service Act and conduct of the next general elections. These were scheduled for
Public Service Commissions Act gutted the statutory auton- March 1977 and, in October 1976 a clear message was sent to
omy and rigour of the services. the civilian bureaucracy through the purge of 170 officers.
The business and industrial classes also felt Bhutto’s ire. The What was expected was blind loyalty to the Government and
new Government adopted a confiscatory policy of nationaliza- another purge was planned for immediately after the elections.
tion and Pakistan’s banking, shipping, insurance, large-scale The opposition parties formed the Pakistan National Alliance
manufacturing, while missionary schools were brought under (PNA) to contest the elections. Nobody seriously expected the
state ownership. By the mid-1970s even small and medium- PNA to win the elections and the PPP had no cause for concern
sized enterprises faced nationalization, private investment that it would lose its majority. The polling day and post-poll
declined dramatically, and the newly nationalized entities as rigging that took place, much of it by terrified civil adminis-
well as older state corporations were soon too bloated with trators, produced a result where the PPP won 155 seats and the
political appointees to perform efficiently. As the state sector combined opposition only 36 seats in a reduced 216-member
was turned into the major source of employment generation, national assembly. This resulted in mass agitation against the
deficits soared and by 1977 revenues stood at about half of Government, with the authorities resorting to repression as
expenditures, with fiscal deficits as a proportion of GDP in the well as offers of negotiation to defuse the challenge. In April
double-digits. The gaps were made good through printing 1977 the Government imposed martial law in Karachi and
currency and borrowing, which fuelled inflation that hurt Lahore and the political crisis deepened. Calls for the army to
the poorest Pakistanis the most. The poorest quintile saw its intervene grew and while Zia was a relatively reluctant coup-
share of the national wealth fall back to 6%, the pre-Ayub Khan maker, the growing consensus among his colleagues convinced
level, while Pakistan’s industrial revolution stalled, never to be him to strike. In July the military staged a coup, codenamed
effectively revived, and a permanent crisis of productivity and Operation Fair Play, which toppled the Government, and
competitiveness now permeated the entire economy. Some- installed Zia as the CMLA. Zia promised fresh elections in
what ironically for a government that claimed socialism to be 90 days. These 90 days would turn into 11 years and end only
its economic policy, the five-year planning process was aban- with Zia’s death in an unexplained air crash in August 1988.
doned and replaced by an ad hoc one-year planning approach.
The Government’s approach towards the military was dif-
ferent from the outright aggression demonstrated towards the THE ZIA-UL-HAQ MILITARY REGIME, 1977–88
civil service and businessmen. The first tack of the strategy was The Zia regime represents the longest spell of military rule in
to buy the military’s support by increasing its funding, giving it Pakistan’s history. It left an enduring legacy in terms of
a share of nationalized industries, grants of land, and privi- Islamization and firmly set Pakistan on the path of growing
leges. The second tack was to create a new paramilitary religious extremism and internal violence. Having come to
Praetorian guard, called the Federal Security Force (FSF) power promising free and fair elections, Zia reneged on his
that would be personally loyal to Bhutto and deter coup pledge in October 1977, and placed Bhutto on trial for con-
attempts. By late 1976, the FSF had 18,500 men under spiracy to commit murder. Found guilty by a split 4-3 verdict in
arms, 750 vehicles, its own radio wireless network, and heavy the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Bhutto was executed in April
weapons; tanks had been purchased for it but their entry into 1979. During the trial Zia formally assumed the presidency
service was delayed due to high operating costs. On the and in October he banned political parties, applied martial law
patronage side of the equation, the Government would employ with renewed rigour, and placed elections permanently on
3,000 former military men in the FSF and also use the hold. Zia realized that his best chance of acquiring legitimacy
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PAKISTAN History

was through accelerating the process of Islamization begun by Senate, to succeed to the presidency. The new President
Bhutto. Zia thus introduced Islamic penal provisions via the ordered fresh national and provincial elections for November,
Hudud Ordinance (1979), decreed the creation of a Federal with political parties allowed to contest the polls. Muhammad
Shariat Court (1980), expanded the role of the Council of Nawaz Sharif, leading the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) as
Islamic Ideology, ordered state collection of Islamic alms part of the Islamic Democratic Alliance, represented Zia’s
deduction (zakat), and directed banks to introduce interest- legacy, while Benazir Bhutto led the PPP. Unknown at the
free shari‘a-compliant practices. time to these rival scions, a decade of instability lay ahead that
Zia’s Islamization coincided with the Soviet invasion of would end in a return to military rule.
Afghanistan (December 1979). This transformed Zia from an
international pariah to the leader of a frontline state in the
Cold War. Zia deftly exploited the resulting leverage by EXPERIMENTS WITH DEMOCRACY, 1988–99
initially dismissing an offer of US $400m. in aid from the The 11 years from November 1988 to October 1999 saw four
Administration of US President Jimmy Carter as ’peanuts’, general elections in which the PML and PPP competed against
and securing, in 1981, a much better deal from the newly each other directly and as the heads of rival alliances. In 1990
installed Ronald Reagan administration. This entailed a US and 1996 the President dismissed elected governments by
commitment of over $7,000m. in military and economic aid exercising authority under Article 58 2(B) of the Zia-modified
over the next decade. Critically, US acquiescence in the face of Constitution. In 1993 the President attempted to dismiss the
Pakistani efforts to develop nuclear weapons capability meant PML Government but was halted by the Supreme Court, only
that by the mid-1980s Pakistan had acquired enough of a to have the army chief, Gen. Waheed Kakar, intervene and
capability for a recessed (or non-weaponized) deterrent vis-à- force both President and Prime Minister to resign. The Gov-
vis India. The 1985 Pressler Amendment, designed to hamper ernment elected in February 1997 would be overthrown in a
US aid to Pakistan, was effectively brushed aside by the US military coup in October 1999, which brought the then army
Executive Branch, pending settlement of the war in Afghani- chief, Gen, Pervez Musharraf, to power. The election outcomes
stan. There Zia sought to prolong the Soviet intervention, for this period at the national level, exclusive of nominated
something Pakistan could do as the primary channel through seats, are provided in the table below:
which US and allied assistance reached the anti-communist Table 4: National Assembly seats at elections (of a total of 207), 1988–
armed opposition (mujahideen). The costs to Pakistan of the 99
war in its neighbourhood were none the less considerable.
Hosting three million Afghan refugees, the rapid spread of 16 Nov.
heroin addiction owing to the drugs trade that accompanied 1988 24 Oct. 1990 6 Oct. 1993 3 Feb. 1997
PML . . . . . . 56 106 73 137
the insurgency, the growth of religious extremist networks, PPP . . . . . . 94 44 89 18
violent sectarian conflicts, and the flooding of the country with Voter turnout . . . . 44% 46% 40% 36%
millions of small arms, were just some of the more pernicious
consequences. Neither party would complete its regular tenure and both
Zia’s ability to prolong his rule was also due to the patronage sought to do everything possible to derail the other’s govern-
left at his disposal by the PPP Government. Nationalization ment. Accusations of corruption, maladministration and nepo-
had left the regime in control of tens of thousands of industrial tism were thrown at each other by each side, and over 8,000
and commercial units. Selective privatization of these assets cases of alleged corruption would be registered during this
allowed Zia to bind the business community, agricultural period, including more than 180 against Benazir Bhutto’s
entrepreneurs, and industrialists, to his will and legacy. The husband, Asif Ali Zardari. The muck-raking had the effect of
rise of the Sharif family was a significant example of this alienating the majority of people from the political process,
process, while the accumulation of vast fortunes from the leading to low voter turnout and growing apathy towards the
Afghan war greatly augmented the economic profile of an fate of democracy. The dynastic structure of the PML, which
entire generation of senior military officers. By some esti- was dominated by the Sharif family, and the PPP, dominated
mates, some US $80,000m. worth of land would be converted by the Bhutto family, prevented both parties from functioning
into real estate by the military during the Zia regime. The along modern lines. The impression was that Pakistan politics
militarization of the economy, the Islamization of society, and had degenerated into struggle for patronage and plunder
the nuclearization of Pakistan, remain key drivers of Paki- between two rival fiefdoms.
stan’s history to the present day. Democratically elected governments also had to face two
On the political front, Zia enjoyed the support of the religious major constraints. One was that the military controlled foreign
right and anti-PPP businessmen, farmers and industrialists. policy, defence, had the most powerful intelligence arm, and
In order to introduce a measure of representation, Zia intro- exercised a veto on financial allocations. The other was that US
duced elected Local Bodies that operated on a non-party basis. military aid to Pakistan was terminated in 1990, while civilian
In 1984 Zia decided to hold a national referendum that asked aid evaporated after 1993, on account of the Pakistani nuclear
citizens to vote for or against ‘the preservation of the Islamic weapons programme. Reduced aid inflows, instability in the
ideology of Pakistan’ and the process of Islamization. A ‘Yes’ Middle East, growing international isolation, and political
vote would translate into another five years for Zia. Although uncertainty, meant that Pakistan had to repeatedly turn to
actual turnout was perhaps less than 10%, the regime claimed the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and borrowed to keep
62% turnout with 97.7% votes in favour of his proposal. This its economy afloat. External debt soared from US $12,000m. in
gave Zia a mandate to amend the 1973 Constitution via the 1988 to nearly $40,000m. by 1999. With annual GDP growth
Eighth Amendment, hold non-party elections for national and falling below 3% by 1997, the prospect of default loomed.
provincial assemblies, and appoint a Prime Minister (Muham- The West had calculated that hurting Pakistan economically
mad Khan Junejo). Premier Junejo, Zia expected, would be would slow down its nuclear programme, while cutting off
little more than a cipher. Instead, Junejo used the spectre of a arms exports to Pakistan would hurt the military and make it
PPP revival under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s daughter, Benazir more amenable to coming into the Non-Proliferation Treaty/
Bhutto, to pressurize Zia into concessions. In December 1985 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty fold. In fact, the sanctions and
martial law was lifted, along with the ban on political parties. isolation had precisely the opposite effect. Perceiving the West
Junejo also incensed Zia by lobbying for ending the war in to be an unreliable and transactional partner, Pakistani
Afghanistan as soon as possible. The rupture over the Geneva civilian and military élites agreed on the need to proceed
process caused Zia to dismiss Junejo under Article 58 2(B) of with the nuclear programme as the only reliable guarantee
the amended constitution in May 1988. Zia appeared isolated of national security and survival. By depriving the Pakistani
and was embittered by what he saw was growing US-Soviet military of advanced US equipment, the conventional arms
collusion as the Cold War wound down. With the PPP regaining balance increasingly favoured India, which, in turn, made
popularity, Zia’s political options were narrowing when his nuclear weapons even more necessary for Pakistan. The fail-
plane went down in an as yet unexplained crash near Baha- ure of the West’s approach towards Pakistan became evident in
walpur, in Punjab in August. Zia’s death paved the way for the May 1998 when India conducted five nuclear tests. Pakistan
former civil servant Ghulam Ishaq Khan, then Chairman of the lost little time in using this opportunity to impose strategic
8 www.europaworld.com
PAKISTAN History

parity on India, and, at the end of the same month conducted gain traction in the Pakistani military. If Pakistan were to
six nuclear tests, both thereby becoming declared nuclear launch a limited military operation in Kashmir after carrying
weapons states. The additional sanctions imposed on Pakistan out nuclear tests, India, it was hypothesized, would be unable
meant little to the Government, which responded by freezing to attack across the international boundary for fear of trigger-
its foreign currency account (worth US $11,600m.) and impos- ing Pakistan’s use of its nuclear deterrent. This would force
ing an artificial exchange rate. India to fight a limited war at a time and place of Pakistan’s
An important characteristic of the 1988–99 period was that choosing, blunting the conventional imbalance that worked in
the Prime Minister was considered the junior partner in a India’s favour. The limited military conflict would also inter-
troika that included the army chief and the President. Of the nationalize the Kashmir dispute and possibly lead to third-
three the army chief was, should he choose to assert himself, party mediation to break the deadlock. It was this line of
the most powerful. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan learned this thinking that led to the Kargil War of mid-1999, in which
when after attempting and failing to dismiss the PML Govern- Pakistan seized the high ground in the Kargil sector of Indian-
ment in 1993, he and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif were both administered Kashmir, and fought a fierce if limited war as
shown the door by the military. Premature dismissals, how- India sought to recover territory.
ever, had one benefit for the PML and PPP, as both framed a Things did not go as Pakistan’s military planners had
narrative that blamed their failures in government on the expected. Pakistan was quickly perceived as the aggressor in
inability to complete tenures. the conflict. India was able to paint Pakistan as an irrespon-
The second PML Government, on account of its two-thirds sible nuclear weapons state, attempting to use the atomic
majority in the National Assembly, sought to end the troika threat to alter territorial control at the expense of another
and establish the Prime Minister as the supreme executive nuclear weapons state. Caught by surprise, and profoundly
authority. The ‘heavy mandate’ enabled the PML to repeal embarrassed, given recent peace overtures, India had no choice
Article 58 2(B) of the Eighth Amendment, forcing out the but to order India’s military to fight until all the heights seized
incumbent President and replacing him with a family retainer by Pakistan were returned to Indian control. As the fighting
of the Sharif’s (Rafique Ahmed Tarar). The Supreme Court raged and casualties mounted on both sides, international
would be cut down to size through a combination of legal and pressure focused on Pakistan and sought to compel it to
mob tactics that saw the Court’s premises overrun by PML disengage. Moreover, by the end of June 1999 it was becoming
supporters. The Government cracked down on critical news evident that Pakistan would not be able to hold on to its
media and publications, and held the opposition to an extreme positions in the Kargil sector through the summer. Premier
form of accountability and scrutiny, overseen by Senator Nawaz Sharif was in an impossible position. If he claimed that
Saifur Rehman. The Prime Minister was fortunate in that the operation was carried out by his handpicked and only
the army chief, Gen. Jehangir Karamat, was disinclined to recently appointed army chief without his foreknowledge and
interfere in the operations of government. Having succeeded approval, the Government would come across as hopelessly
Gen. Waheed Kakar in January 1996, Karamat focused on the weak. If, on the other hand, the Prime Minister owned the
military’s internal matters. This good fortune ended in October operation, his peace overtures to India and the Lahore Summit
1998, when Gen. Karamat, lecturing at the Naval War College, would constitute a level of duplicity unusual even by India-
stated that it would be beneficial for Pakistan if there were a Pakistan standards. On 4 July US President Bill Clinton
National Security Council, where the military command and hosted Nawaz Sharif as part of efforts to broker a cessation
political leadership could formally discuss defence issues. The of hostilities. These efforts had become more frantic as fears of
Prime Minister’s displeasure with these remarks became escalation into nuclear war grew. In exchange for the US
known and Karamat tendered his resignation. Not content agreeing to take an interest in the process initiated in Lahore
with having a neutral and professional army chief, Nawaz earlier that year, Pakistan agreed to withdraw its forces to the
Sharif decided that this was the opportune moment to make a Line of Control (LoC), which separated Pakistan-controlled
patronage appointment and bring the military into line. Kashmir from the Indian-administered part. By this time more
Nawaz Sharif decided to appoint Gen. Pervez Musharraf to than a thousand Indian and Pakistani soldiers had lost their
succeed Karamat. Musharraf, to the Prime Minister’s think- lives since the outbreak of the Kargil violence, with twice that
ing, would make a suitable replacement, as he came from a number wounded, and the risk of either military overreacting
family of Urdu-speaking migrants and so lacked a natural out of frustration was all too real.
constituency in the Pakistani military, in which the majority of The 4 July 1999 agreement had immense domestic fallout in
the officers and soldiers were from Punjab or the NWFP. Pakistan. Relations between Nawaz and Musharraf deterio-
Musharraf would thus make a weak army chief, one beholden rated. The Prime Minister wanted to replace the army chief as
to the Prime Minister for his appointment. In thinking along soon as possible and was working out a plan whereby such a
these lines, Nawaz Sharif misunderstood the professional move might be carried out. Gen. Musharraf, for his part, was
coherence of the Pakistani military and the adherence of the aware of what was going on in the Prime Minister’s camp and
armed services to the unity of command. It was a decision that was preparing for a ‘counter’ coup as soon as the Government
the Prime Minister soon regretted as Gen. Musharraf proved to tried to remove him from his position. When, on 12 October,
be an aggressive commander with little regard for the civilian Nawaz Sharif took advantage of the army chief’s visit to Sri
leadership. While the Prime Minister was trying to improve Lanka to dismiss him while his plane was on the way back to
relations with India, going so far as to offer to sell it electricity Karachi, the military swiftly and bloodlessly seized control of
and hosting his Indian counterpart for the Lahore Summit of key government installations. Musharraf’s plane was allowed
February 1999, the new army chief was preparing an auda- to land and by midnight the Prime Minister was in army
cious military operation in Kashmir. custody. Pakistan’s fourth spell of military rule had begun.
Since 1989 Indian-administered Kashmir had been in revolt
against rule from New Delhi. Military and paramilitary
responses by the Indian Government had radicalized parts THE MUSHARRAF MILITARY REGIME, 1999–2008
of the local Muslim population amid reports of brutal treat- The new regime established by Gen. Musharraf would embark
ment at the hands of Indian soldiers, and created insurgency upon the first serious attempt at modernization since the end of
conditions. India accused Pakistan of fomenting discord and the Ayub Khan era. It would also try to normalize relations
terrorism, while Pakistan accused India of state terrorism and with India, and come close to reaching an agreement by March
violating the Kashmiri’s right to self-determination enshrined 2007. Pakistan’s enlistment in the US-led military action that
in UN Security Council resolutions that India had triggered by followed the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade
complaining to the UN in January 1948. The killing of tens of Center and the Pentagon in the USA, would end the country’s
thousands of Kashmiris since 1989 notwithstanding, the world diplomatic isolation, while also forcing a violent reckoning with
had, in Pakistani eyes at least, ignored Indian repression. religious militants that rages to the present day. Musharraf’s
Pakistan could not overtly come to the military aid of the liberalization of the media, allocation of expanded reservation
Kashmiris as that would likely trigger Indian retaliation of seats for women in representative bodies (33% in local
across the international border, as had happened in 1965. government, and 60 seats in the National Assembly), amend-
But after the nuclear tests of May 1998, a new idea started to ment to the Hudud Laws introduced by Zia, attempts to modify
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PAKISTAN History

the Blasphemy Law to render it less liable to abuse, opening of with Indian newspaper editors, the overture and the meeting
the economy, and Pakistan’s telecoms revolution, all stand out were indicative of the approach the new Pakistani leader
as major achievements, as do reforms in higher education and would bring to normalization efforts.
governance. The real turnaround for the Musharraf regime began after
As with earlier military rulers, Musharraf’s first priority was the terrorist attacks on the USA in September 2001. Pakistan
consolidation of power and gaining a semblance of constitu- immediately came under intense pressure to assist the USA
tional legitimacy. Leaving the incumbent President Rafiq against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which had pro-
Tarar in place, Musharraf proclaimed himself the Chief Execu- vided the Islamist group al-Qa‘ida and its leader Osama bin
tive. A state of emergency was proclaimed and all legislative Laden with sanctuary. The Taliban were perceived to be
assemblies dissolved. A Provisional Constitutional Order Pakistan’s proxies in the brutal war in Afghanistan that
granted formal cover to these steps. At the same time, Mush- continued to rage in relative obscurity after the Soviet with-
arraf decided against declaring martial law and making drawal. By late 2001 the Taliban had nearly completed their
himself CMLA. No restrictions were imposed on the media conquest of Afghanistan—only a few enclaves of resistance
and the press enjoyed unprecedented freedom. Exploiting remained and the austere Islamists cracked down hard on
public perceptions of corruption on the part of politicians, warlords and drugs barons with such ruthlessness that the
Musharraf created the National Accountability Bureau and area of territory cultivated for poppies in order to harvest
began a well-publicized campaign of going after alleged robber opium shrank from 91,000 ha in 1999 to less than 8,000 ha by
barons. Nawaz Sharif was convicted on terrorism charges for May 2001, with opium production collapsing by more than
attempted hijacking of the Karachi-bound flight that was 90%. These successes were offset by the Taliban regime’s
temporarily prevented from landing on 12 October 1999. The Saudi-style repression of minorities and women, without,
former premier was also found guilty of corruption. Saudi however, the oil and diplomatic flexibility that would allow
Arabia interceded on Nawaz Sharif’s behalf and Musharraf the West to look the other way. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the
was persuaded to allow his former boss to leave Pakistan, and United Arab Emirates, were the only three countries that
Saudi Arabia duly guaranteed that Nawaz Sharif would not recognized the Taliban regime. All pleaded with Mullah Omar,
enter public life in Pakistan for at least 10 years. Sharif’s exile the reclusive Taliban supreme commander (Amir), to hand
began in December 2000, although he quickly backtracked on over bin Laden and his cohorts to the US authorities. After all,
his promise not to get involved in politics by joining Benazir the tribal code of honour that protected asylum seekers also
Bhutto in the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy, allowed that protection to be rescinded if the refugee in
formed shortly after Musharraf’s coup. By this time, however, question perpetrated aggression against a third party. This
the PML and PPP were in disarray and the Supreme Court had Mullah Omar refused to do, and Musharraf realized that there
granted legal cover to Musharraf’s coup, citing the doctrine of was not enough time to work out a diplomatic solution. Thus
necessity first used in 1955. Musharraf indicated Pakistan’s willingness to support the
A core component of Musharraf’s agenda was reform of the USA in its war against the Taliban and al-Qa‘ida—but for a
governance and administrative structure. In order to work out price.
proposals a National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) was estab- The USA, in exchange for Pakistan’s co-operation, would lift
lished. Working with international donors and civil society, the all sanctions on the country. Military and economic aid would
NRB came up with the Devolution Plan. The objective of the be resumed. International creditors would delay their demand
plan was to enable the army to hold sway directly over the local
for repayments, which by this time had almost pushed Paki-
administration, and reduce the power of the civil service élite.
stan into default. Pakistan’s international isolation would end
This was to be accomplished by creating elected local govern-
and a more permanent commitment would be forthcoming
ments with indirectly elected chairpersons or mayors (nazims).
from the USA. Pakistani diplomats lost no time in observing
Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq had introduced local government
schemes, but where Musharraf differed was that he placed the that had the USA remained engaged with Afghanistan after
local administration under the indirectly elected nazims, the Soviet withdrawal, and not taken such a hard line against
phased out the executive magistracy, and introduced a new Pakistan, the catastrophic attacks perpetrated by al-Qa‘ida
Police Order (2002) that made the police independent of the could well have been averted. Practically all the Pakistani
civil service. Through a federal ministry for local government, demands were met. US $12,500m. in debt repayment was
the centre directly controlled financial transfers to the new rescheduled, $600m. of budgetary support was immediately
representative bodies (‘grassroots democracy’). The local placed at Pakistan’s disposal, with additional funds for the
bodies could thus be managed by the centre, circumventing social sector ($150 m.) and military training ($50m.), an
the provincial tier and allowing for greater administrative increase in the textile quota (worth $145m.), a $1,000m.
centralization. Musharraf also approved a massive pay write-off of bilateral Pakistani debt owed to the USA (out of
increase for the judiciary and a significant hike for academics. $3,000m.), access to US Export-Import Bank credits, and by
At the beginning of his rule, Musharraf relied upon a the end of September 2001, the USA had waived all sanctions
technocratic cabinet, which took a number of important initia- on Pakistan. Japan, which had suspended all aid to Pakistan
tives. Funds were secured from the IMF, a comprehensive after its nuclear tests, was persuaded to resume grant assis-
programme of liberalization in the media and telecom sectors tance and transferred $300m. as anti-terrorism support in
was initiated, the banking system was opened up to foreign 2001 and 2002 (loans in Japanese yen would resume in 2005).
competition, consumer finance emerged in Pakistan, massive Japan and other US allies would also help Pakistan rebuild
investments in the higher education sector under a long-term after a powerful earthquake devastated Kashmir in October
expansion plan were made or committed, an effort was made to 2005 and left over 70,000 dead. Donors pledged nearly
amend the Blasphemy Law, and Musharraf publicly berated $6,000m. for the reconstruction effort. The USA also began
religious conservatives for their role in damaging Pakistan’s the process of declaring Pakistan a Major non-NATO Ally
international image. Musharraf also made determined over- (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), which was confirmed
tures to India. As the architect of the Kargil Operation, with Congressional approval in June 2004, and the USA also
Musharraf’s anti-India credentials were impeccable. And, as resumed military exports to the Musharraf regime. These
the army chief of Pakistan he had exercised a veto over earlier steps meant that India’s efforts to equate acts of terrorism
normalization efforts. By the same token, if he were to take perpetrated on Indian soil by forces allegedly backed by
steps towards normalization it would be difficult for the Pakistan, with acts perpetrated by al-Qa‘ida and the Taliban
military to go against him. One hitch that needed to be against the USA and its allies, came to nought. Even after India
addressed was Musharraf’s status as head of state or head of mobilized its army along the border with Pakistan in retalia-
government. Musharraf decided to resolve the confusion by tion for a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in Decem-
ousting the President in what amounted to a second coup. ber 2001, leading to a year- long stand-off between the two
Musharraf also committed to holding fresh elections in October countries, Pakistan and the USA continued to move closer.
2002. While the India-Pakistan Agra Summit (July 2001) did Musharraf’s nuclear sabre-rattling also demonstrated the
not result in a joint declaration, due in part to Musharraf futility of the Indian mobilization and the absence of opera-
unnecessarily upstaging his hosts during a breakfast meeting tional options, short of all-out war for India.
10 www.europaworld.com
PAKISTAN History

Unlike Zia, Musharraf kept his promises regarding the created three million internal refugees, and inflicted an esti-
holding of elections. Like Zia, Musharraf took the precaution mated US $120,000m. of damage on the economy. Al-Qa‘ida
of carrying out a referendum in April 2002 that declared him sympathizers in FATA coalesced into the Tehrik-e-Taliban
President for another five years, and, through the LFO, carried Pakistan (the so-called Pakistani Taliban—TTP) by the end of
out unilateral amendments to the Constitution (29 in all). 2007, while Islamabad experienced a siege in July of that year
These amendments greatly strengthened the presidency at the when students and faculty of the ultra-conservative Lal Masjid
expense of parliament and the Prime Minister, and would (Red Mosque) and its affiliated seminaries ran riot, tried to
allow Musharraf to continue to govern the country after the impose Islamic law, and threatened to overthrow the Govern-
elections and dissolve the assemblies if he felt the need to do so. ment. The military operation to secure the Red Mosque led to at
Military pressure had by this time led the PML to fracture into least 100 fatalities, while other crackdowns led to reprisals
a pro-Musharraf Quaid-i-Azam group (PML—Q), as opposed to from Islamist militants, and by the end of 2007 Pakistan faced
the bloc that had been founded by Nawaz Sharif in 1993, the escalating terrorist violence. Musharraf’s efforts to regulate
PML—Nawaz (PML—N). Intense efforts were under way to and reform religious seminaries floundered in the face of
create a forward bloc within the PPP, while six major religious opposition from clerics and the MMA.
parties joined together in the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA). As Musharraf grappled with warmaking at home and peace-
Under the revised laws, only university graduates could con- making abroad, the PML—N and PPP got together and agreed
test elections, and in a house of 342 seats, 272 would be directly to a common minimum programme called the Charter of
elected and the remainder nominated on the basis of how well Democracy, signed in May 2006. Under the Charter, the
each party did at the polls, in a form of proportional repre- signatories agreed to work to restore the 1973 Constitution
sentation. The 2002 election was won by the PML—Q, which and end military rule in Pakistan. They also agreed to a
secured 126 of the directly elected seats. The PPP took 81 seats stability pact whereby the agitation politics and appeals to
and the MMA 63. The PML—N won just 19. From Musharraf’s extra-parliamentary forces to undermine governments would
perspective, the election results had, therefore, produced a be eschewed. This move did not draw that much attention in
manageable and fragmented Assembly. Zafarullah Khan 2006, but in March 2007 Musharraf committed the most
Jamali, a PML—Q leader from Balochistan, was appointed serious mistake of his rule. Iftikhar Chaudhry, the Chief
as Prime Minister. Justice of the Supreme Court, had taken to exercising the
Musharraf had thus far managed to take major initiatives apex court’s original jurisdiction and obstructing the executive
without significant resistance. His policy on terrorism, which on policy matters (including privatization of Pakistan Steel
was to co-operate with the USA in combating al-Qa‘ida, pre- Mills) and internal security (such as locating missing persons
serve the existence of the Afghan Taliban, and willingness to and establishing the reasons for their disappearance). The
engage with India on the ‘core issue’ of Kashmir, alienated issue of missing persons had gained media attention in 2006
hardliners within the security establishment. Musharraf was after the Pakistani military launched an operation against the
seen as too Westernized and too pro-USA, as well as too eager to Bugti tribe in Balochistan, sparking a wider insurgency that
negotiate with India. At the same time, as US frustration in was still under way by mid-2017. The Chief Justice was
Afghanistan mounted, and the Iraq quagmire set in after the particularly vulnerable to allegations of wrongdoing, as he
US invasion of 2003, Pakistan was repeatedly pressurized to had apparently organized for his son to assume a senior role at
‘do more’ against militants inhabiting the Afghanistan-Paki- the Federal Investigation Agency, as well as training at the
stan borderland. Faced with these competitive pressures, prestigious Police Academy, apparently without the proper
Musharraf attempted to play all sides, a strategy that reflected qualifications. Musharraf decided to render the Chief Justice
the complexity of the situation but was cast as duplicity by an ‘non-functional’ and placed him in protective custody. This
increasingly sceptical and frustrated Western media and sparked a Lawyers’ Movement for the restoration of the
policy élite. Musharraf’s balancing act started to come undone deposed Chief Justice and months of agitation and protests
in December 2003. That month Musharraf survived two into which the PML—N and PPP threw their cadres. By July
assassination attempts. The first involved a bomb that failed 2007 the first round of this conflict was over, with Chaudhry
to detonate as his motorcade passed it by. The second involved restored to his office.
two suicide attackers and killed 12 members of the President’s Restored in office, among the first decisions taken by Chief
entourage and wounded 40 others. Evidently, al-Qa‘ida and its Justice Chaudhry was to allow Nawaz Sharif back into Paki-
sympathizers in Pakistan were not pleased with Musharraf stan in August 2007. Meanwhile, Benazir Bhutto demanded
handing over more than 400 of their operatives to the USA, the withdrawal of corruption and criminal cases as part of a
while preaching ‘enlightened moderation’ to his public. Mush- reconciliation deal that would allow her to return to Pakistan
arraf responded to this situation with two major initiatives. and contest the next elections against the PML—N. Having
The first was to commit Pakistan to normalization with India, employed an anti-corruption platform for much of his time in
even if it meant bypassing institutional opposition. The other power, Musharraf chose the path of political expediency and on
was to send the Pakistani military into the borderlands with 5 October approved the National Reconciliation Ordinance
Afghanistan and root out the militants who had almost suc- (NRO). Under the NRO, over 8,000 cases instituted against
ceeded in killing Musharraf. politicians and their bureaucratic associates were withdrawn.
The 12th South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation These included over 180 cases against Benazir Bhutto’s hus-
Summit was due to be held in Islamabad in January 2004. band, Asif Ali Zardari. The next day Musharraf was elected
Leaving aside the multilateral platitudes, Musharraf reached President by the provincial and national assemblies for
out directly to the Indian premier. Their meeting led to the another five-year term. The PPP sat in the assemblies and
issuance of a joint statement in which Pakistan ‘reassured’ abstained from voting. The NRO was immediately challenged
India that it ‘will not permit any territory under Pakistan’s in the Supreme Court where the Chief Justice was expected to
control to be used to support terrorism in any manner’, and strike it down as unconstitutional. Musharraf struck first,
both agreed to commence a ‘composite dialogue’ from February declaring a state of emergency on 3 November, dismissing
with ‘all bilateral issues’ on the table. Over the next three Chaudhry, dissolving the national and provincial assemblies
years, India and Pakistan would come closer than ever before on 15 November, and stepping down as army chief on
to agreeing to a common framework and joint mechanism for 28 November. Musharraf was succeeded by Gen. Ashfaq
Kashmir and normalization of their bilateral relationship. Pervez Kayani, a former head of the Inter-Services Intelligence
While the India-Pakistan negotiations got underway, Mush- (ISI) agency. Musharraf lifted the state of emergency in
arraf ordered the Pakistani military into the FATA. In March December, and announced elections for February 2008.
the first of over a dozen Pakistani military operations would be The campaigning got off to a tragic start as, in late December
launched. Squeezed by the Pakistani military, the militants 2007 Benazir Bhutto was assassinated in Rawalpindi. Riots
turned their guns on Pakistani civilians, unleashing a wave of ensued in parts of Pakistan, leaving more than 40 people dead.
terrorist attacks that continue with greater or lesser intensity Benazir Bhutto’s widower, Asif Ali Zardari, took over de facto
to this day. Indeed, since 2001 Pakistan has experienced over control of the PPP while his and Benazir’s son, Bilawal Bhutto
17,500 terrorist attacks, which have killed an estimated 30,000 Zardari, became the titular head. The wave of sympathy for the
civilians, 7,000 security forces personnel and 30,000 militants, PPP helped propel it to first position in the 2008 general
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PAKISTAN History

elections, held on schedule in February, with the party taking 75% of Pakistanis supported the action against the Govern-
118 seats. The PML—N won 89 seats and the PML—Q 50 seats. ment, but less than one-third supported direct military rule
The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM—a predominately and 75% favoured an interim government of technocrats. The
Karachi-based party, representing Urdu speakers) secured 25 last 18 months of Musharraf’s rule had damaged the prestige of
seats and independents 30 seats. the armed forces. Kayani, like Zardari, was also uninterested
The PPP formed a coalition Government, which briefly in the formal aspect of authority. Instead, Kayani was content
included the PML—N. Although the PPP was not particularly to be the most powerful person in Pakistan, while extracting a
keen on removing Musharraf or restoring the deposed Chief high price for his relative neutrality towards the fate of the PPP
Justice on account of his antipathy to the NRO, by August 2008 Government, which granted him a second three-year tenure as
the two parties decided to impeach Musharraf. This led army chief in November 2010. Kayani and Zardari would also
Musharraf to resign and Zardari was elected President in strike the unlikeliest of partnerships against militancy and
September. terrorism. Under Musharraf, the military had used a combina-
tion of force and negotiations against militants. Hundreds of
pro-Government tribal and religious leaders were killed as a
PAKISTAN SINCE 2008 result of these deals, which typically left areas under militant
Table 5: Prime Ministers of Pakistan since 1973, excluding interim influence or control. This approach emboldened the militants
appointees and made 2008 (6,715 killed in terrorist attacks, including
2,155 civilians), 2009 (11,704 killed, including 2,324 civilians),
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto . . . . . . . . 14 Aug. 1973–5 July 1977
Muhammad Khan Junejo . . . . . 23. March 1985–May 29, 1988 and 2010 (7,435 killed, including 1,796 civilians) the bloodiest
Benazir Bhutto . 2 Dec.
. . 1988–6
. . Aug.
. .1990;
. and
. 19 Oct. 1993–5 Nov. 1996 years of terrorist violence in Pakistan’s history. By the end of
6 Nov. 1990–18 April 1993; 26 May–18 July 1993; 17 2008 the scenic Swat valley, some 360 km north of Islamabad,
Feb. 1997–12 Oct. 1999 had fallen to the TTP. In view of this development, the military
5 June 2013–28 July adopted a new approach. First, there would be no negotiations,
Nawaz Sharif . . . . . . . . . . 2017 although militants were welcome to surrender and those who
Zafarullah Khan Jamali . . . . . . .21 Nov. 2002–26 June 2004
Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain . . . . . . 30 June–20 Aug. 2004
laid down their arms would be treated mercifully. Second, the
Shaukat Aziz . . . . . . . . . .20 Aug. 2004–16 Nov. 2007 military would now go into militant-infested areas, clear the
Yousaf Raza Gilani . . . . . . . 25. March 2008–19 June 2012 territory, and then hold onto it by building permanent infra-
Raja Pervaiz Ashraf . . . . . . . 22. June 2012–25 March 2013 structure. Third, while officially condemning US drone strikes,
Shahid Khaqan Abbasi . . . . . . . 1 Aug. 2017– Pakistan and the USA would co-ordinate against high-value
targets while maintaining a public profile of mutual recrimi-
The ascent of Zardari to the presidency, with a PPP-led nation for domestic political reasons. And fourth, at some stage
coalition in power at the centre, marked another transition to the areas restored to Pakistani state control would be handed
democracy. Many of the principal actors were the same as in over to a rehabilitated civil administration. The first of these
the 1990s and the new Government’s basic challenge was to operations would be launched in May 2009 and successfully
perpetuate itself in power for the full five-year term. This restore the Swat valley to government control. Despite terrible
would not be an easy task, as serious challenges to its authority provocation, amid brutal terrorist attacks against innocent
loomed from the army, the judiciary, religious extremists, civilians, the PPP Government kept in place a moratorium on
foreign powers, and other political parties. Zardari would executions during its tenure, at Zardari’s personal insistence.
prove the ultimate political survivor and oversee Pakistan’s While the Zardari-Kayani duopoly converged on the issue of
first democratic transition from one elected government to militancy, there were serious differences on other issues and it
another. suited the military to not allow the Government to get too
A fundamental difference between Zardari and earlier civi- comfortable. The first major challenge was the crisis over the
lian and military rulers was that he had no interest in being restoration of deposed Chief Justice Chaudry. The PPP was not
seen to possess constitutional authority and formal political keen on having him back and dragged its feet on restoring him
power. Zardari initiated the process for reversing the changes to office. The PPP also attempted to dislodge the PML—N
introduced by Musharraf (formalized in the 17th Amendment) Government from Punjab on account of differences on this
and granting additional autonomy to provinces. These steps
issue. This led to a renewed threat of agitation and a possible
would result in the 18th Amendment (2010) and would convert
march on Islamabad by lawyers and the PML—N. At this stage
the President into a titular head of state with all executive
Kayani intervened and convinced the Government to restore
power vested in the Prime Minister and provincial Chief
Ministers. However, as the leader of the PPP, Zardari would Chaudhry to his position. By August 2009 the Supreme Court
order the Government to do as he wished before and after the had struck down the restrictions imposed on it by Musharraf
18th Amendment, and two premiers during this period (Yousaf and became implacable in its criticism and pursuit of the PPP
Raza Gilani and Raja Pervez Ashraf) remained ciphers, while Government. Central to this was that the Supreme Court
Zardari held the real power. The formal change would have no wanted the National Accountability Bureau (Pakistan’s anti-
impact on Zardari’s actual power over the PPP Government, corruption agency—NAB) to write to the Swiss authorities to
but it made for good optics and Zardari was able to claim that he revive an investigation into a major scandal that Zardari was
was the first leader in Pakistan’s history to voluntarily reduce alleged to be involved in, regarding embezzlement of illicit
his own authority. In seeking the presidency, Zardari had also funds received while Benazir Bhutto was in office, which had
played a deft legal move. The Pakistani President enjoys been directed to a secret bank account in Switzerland
sovereign immunity from prosecution. Admittedly, the Pre- (although the Swiss prosecutor responded by stating that, as
sident can be impeached, but cannot be subjected to the head of state, Zardari had immunity from prosecution in a
jurisdiction of an ordinary court of law while in office. This foreign country, and referred the case to the Pakistani autho-
meant that Zardari could not be brought to trial, even if the rities to pursue). Another notable episode was the Raymond
NRO was struck down and all 180 cases against him rein- Davis incident of January 2011. Davis, an official working for
stated. Conversely, the Prime Minister does not enjoy sover- the US Central Intelligence Agency, killed two reportedly
eign immunity and can be disqualified or prosecuted by the armed Pakistani men in Lahore leading to public outcry and
courts. demands that he be brought to justice. The USA asserted that
The most important relationship Zardari had to manage was Davis enjoyed immunity from prosecution as he was working
with the military. Gen. Kayani was under considerable pres- under the aegis of the US consulate in Lahore. Local officials
sure to act against the Government, which was widely per- claimed that the two men killed were from the ISI and that they
ceived to be corrupt and incompetent, but took no direct action. were following Davis, whom they suspected of espionage.
Kayani had a far more sophisticated understanding of politics Zardari and the military appeared to have worked together
than his gung-ho predecessor and realized that in the new to defuse the crisis by using Pakistan’s traditional Islamic
media and civil society landscape, overt military rule was not qisas and diyat laws, whereby victims of crimes or their heirs
practical, nor sustainable. Even when Musharraf had staged can forgive the accused or guilty party in exchange for material
the coup of October 1999, the polling agency Gallup found that compensation from the culprit. Eventually US $700,000 was
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PAKISTAN History

paid as compensation to the victims’ families, and Davis was and championed the cause of Asma Bibi, a Christian woman
returned to the USA. convicted of blasphemy, was a major setback. Two things made
In May 2011 the killing of bin Laden in Abbottabad, Khyber the assassination particularly chilling for politicians. One was
Pakhtunkhwa, by US special forces, sparked a fierce row that Taseer was killed by one of his own police guards, who was
between the civilian administration and military officials. promptly transformed into a national religious hero. The other
On the surface, the PPP and other parties rallied to the defence was that the guard did not belong to the TTP, but to the
of the armed forces and the ISI. However, uncomfortable mainstream Barelvi sub-sect of Sunni Islam, which has tradi-
questions remained. The fact was that bin Laden was living tionally been favourable to the state and opposed to the Taliban
in a large complex in Abbottabad, a small town that is home to and similar movements. In October 2012 the Taliban’s assas-
the Pakistan Military Academy, raised serious questions about sination attempt on Malala Yousafzai, a 15-year-old activist for
levels of connivance between local officials, and those who female education, further underscored the challenge to the
wished to protect the fugitive. Bin Laden’s family was with him Government from radicalization.
and US military officers and intelligence agents had tracked On the foreign affairs front, Zardari sought to revive the
him down independently of official Pakistani assistance. The India-Pakistan normalization process initiated by Musharraf.
Pakistani medical doctor who had helped the US identify bin Zardari stated that India did not pose a threat to Pakistan and
Laden’s body was promptly arrested. The public perception sought breakthroughs on trade as well as Kashmir. Here the
around the world was that Pakistan’s so-called ‘deep state’ had Government found itself assailed by a hawkish media. The
been caught red-handed, engaged in a profoundly deceptive military did not appear to have much interest in the matter
‘dual’ policy. Given that Pakistan had handed over more than either and viewed with growing alarm India’s role in Afghani-
400 al-Qa‘ida operatives during the Musharraf regime, holding stan and its alleged support for Balochistani separatists. The
on to bin Laden was confusing. The judicial commission that activities of spoilers—non-state actors who struck at India and
was formed to inquire into the matter (the Abbottabad Com- Pakistan—were particularly effective and prevented a serious
mission) pronounced in favour of serious incompetence at all resumption of dialogue. The Mumbai attacks of November
levels of government, which, under the circumstances, was the 2008 were an especially severe test of the new Government in
most benign verdict possible. Tensions over the fallout of the Islamabad, although New Delhi at least appeared to realize
raid to kill bin Laden would lead to the so-called Memogate that the PPP had nothing to do with the terrorists who had
controversy, which began in October 2011. A Financial Times perpetrated the attacks. Relations with the USA were often
article written by Mansoor Ijaz claimed that during the initial rocky, undermined by the killing of bin Laden and the NATO
confusion after the bin Laden raid, the Pakistan ambassador to attacks on two Pakistani military positions (the Salala Inci-
the USA (Hussain Haqqani, a political appointee) presented dent) along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border, which killed 28
Adm. Mike Mullen with a note seeking US support against a Pakistani soldiers in November 2011. The Salala Incident led
military coup and help in reining in the Pakistani army. These Pakistan to impose a blockade on NATO supply routes. Given
claims led to a prolonged media circus and political crisis in that Obama had ordered a so-called ‘surge’ in US forces in
which President Zardari, the PPP Government and the Pakis- Afghanistan, the decision to close the supply routes was
tani ambassador to the USA were all accused of treason. In difficult to deal with. Pakistan demanded an apology from
June 2012 the Supreme Court, which had formed a commission the USA and kept the supply routes closed until the US
to inquire into the matter, announced its verdict and confirmed
Administration finally apologized in July 2012. The USA for
that Haqqani had indeed passed on such messages. The
its part had taken to pressurizing Pakistan to ‘do more’ on the
Government had throughout this period denied that it had
military front but also offered Pakistan a five-year aid package
issued any such instructions. Kayani, for his part, was content
(the Kerry-Lugar Law) worth US $1,500m. a year. The actual
to let the crisis play out—the longer it continued, the weaker
the civilian administration became. Eventually, the military disbursements, however, fell far short, and were in the range of
settled for Haqqani’s resignation and de facto exile to the USA, $200m. annually, with much of that amount repatriated to the
rather than pressing for a trial on charges of treason. USA under various practices. The military reimbursements
The Supreme Court was a constant source of tension for the were just that—Pakistanis did not see Coalition Support Fund
PPP Government. In addition to taking pre-emptive action on a payments as aid as they only helped defray some of the expense
wide range of public interest matters, the issue of corruption of military operations carried out at the behest of the USA and
was wielded by the Chief Justice with great persistence to keep its allies. From Pakistan’s perspective the USA was insensitive
the Government off balance. Prime Minister Gilani refused to to the fact that the Pakistani military had taken back territory
write the letter to the Swiss authorities as the Supreme Court from radical Islamists while its population had made tremen-
wished. It did not help matters that NAB had estimated the dous sacrifices. The years 2011, 2012 and 2013 were the
daily cost of corruption to Pakistan at approximately bloodiest in terms of civilians killed (2,738, 3,007 and 3,001,
US $100m. (about Rs 11,000m.), or that after devastating respectively) by terrorist attacks in Pakistan. Zardari also
floods in August 2010 which killed some 2,000 people, the assiduously cultivated the Chinese—in his first year as Pre-
Government was roundly condemned for its insensitivity, sident he visited China four times and made it clear that in
incompetence and alleged dishonesty. The Supreme Court strategic terms China represented ‘the future of the world’.
declared the Prime Minister to be in contempt of court in On the internal political front, the PPP excelled at making
June 2012 and disqualified him from holding public office and deals. It allied with the PML—N against Musharraf and the
he was quickly replaced by Raja Pervez Ashraf. By now the PML—Q and in 2008 initially formed a ‘grand coalition’
PPP had gained a plurality (41 out of 104 seats) in the Senate Government of the two largest parties. Later, in 2011, the
and was less than one year away from the next elections PPP, finding itself abandoned by some its allies, joined forces
(scheduled for May 2013), while Zardari’s term as President with the PML—Q, which it had previously accused of being
would end in September 2013. After some delay, Prime Min- party to Benazir Bhutto’s assassination. The PPP also co-
ister Ashraf wrote the letter to the Swiss authorities, but operated with religious fundamentalist parties and ethnic
ensured that there was no follow-up. nationalist parties and was single-mindedly determined to
The challenge of religious extremism was one that hit the stay in power. When, in January 2013, Tahirul Qadri, a cleric
PPP particularly hard. As a centre-left party that claimed to with a large educational support network and a political
represent a more modern vision of Pakistan, the Government platform Pakistan Awami Tehreek (Pakistan’s People’s Move-
took a number of important steps, such as approving legisla- ment—PAT) decided to hold a sit-in Islamabad, demanding
tion against workplace sexual harassment, trying to promote that the constitutional provisions regarding the integrity of
religious tolerance, and questioning the need for the Blas- candidates and process be enforced, the PPP made no attempt
phemy Law. Zardari labelled religious extremism a ‘cancer’ to hinder him. Instead, it allowed him to sit (in a heated
that needed to be rooted out, and provided political cover to container) surrounded by his followers in the middle of Isla-
Kayani’s increasingly uncompromising approach towards mabad’s main commercial district. After a few days, the low
militants. This said, the assassination in January 2011 of temperatures did the job for the PPP Government and Qadri
the PPP’s appointed Governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer, was forced to call off his protest with only token guarantees
who was a major proponent of repeal of the Blasphemy Law that the relevant constitutional provisions would be enforced.
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PAKISTAN History

An important part of the PPP’s overall strategy was power- premier on 2 August, although Shahbaz Sharif, the Chief
sharing in the provinces. In Punjab, after March 2009, the Minister of Punjab and the brother of Nawaz, was considered
PML—N enjoyed free rein. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in 2010, a likely long-term successor, pending his assumption of a seat
an Awami National Party (ANP)-led Government held sway. in the National Assembly. The PTI’s campaign against the
In Balochistan a confederation of pro-Islamabad notables PML—N had several political benefits. First, even though
supported by the PPP formed the Government. While in Sindh, technically the PPP was leading the opposition in parliament,
the PPP held power in an uncomfortable coalition with the the PTI was the real opposition in the eyes of the public. Indeed,
MQM. With the exception of the erratic but energetic PML—N Pakistan’s parliamentarians barely attended to their legisla-
Government in Punjab, the ANP, PPP, MQM and assorted tive work and beyond a few formal occasions, even the one-
notables, were content to reign and plunder, leading to spiral- quarter attendance quorum routinely went unmet. Leaders
ling wastage of public funds and a collapse of public sector from other parties, including the PPP and PML—N, defected to
spending on development. Economic growth languished in the the PTI with enough frequency to give credence to Imran
range of 2%–4%, the energy crisis that had begun in 2007 Khan’s claims that his party represented the future of Pakis-
escalated to the point where major cities had electricity for no tani politics.
more than 12 hours a day and rural areas for 4–6 hours a day by While the PTI took up the mantle of opposing the Govern-
2012. No efforts were made towards reform or improvements of ment, the PML—N sought to distinguish itself from the PPP by
any kind in terms of the governance of the country, competi- delivering on energy, extremism, and the economy. With an
tiveness and productivity continued to fall, while the PML—N experienced economic team led by Ishaq Dar (finance) and
appeared to be colluding with the PPP with regard to taking the Ahsan Iqbal (planning), the Government moved to clear the
national Government to task for its performance as the leader circular debt that had crippled power generation by a special
of the opposition. Indeed, the PML—N was given the chair of adjustment in its very first budget. This had the effect of
the Public Accounts Committee and promptly directed its fire alleviating the energy shortages and gave the Government
towards old projects initiated by the Musharraf regime. time to build additional capacity and reform the sector. While
It is in this context of growing civilian governance break- the PML—N Government did succeed in reducing power cuts
down and socioeconomic crisis that an actual opposition party and building additional capacity, by 2017 the circular debt had
began to emerge as an alternative to the PPP and PML—N. reached levels higher than under the PPP Government
This was the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI—Pakistan Move- (US 5,000m., more than Rs 500,000m.) due to governance
ment for Justice), founded by the international cricketer- constraints. The PML—N Government also ramped up devel-
turned-philanthropist Imran Khan in 1996. Since its founding, opment spending, which had fallen to less than 10% of the
the PTI had languished on the margins of politics but it allocated amount by 2012/13. By 2017 the utilization of devel-
remained disciplined in its message that was built around opment funds had reached 60% of allocations as the Govern-
five key elements, foremost among them the eradication of ment focused on fewer, more visible projects, in order to
rampant corruption; a disengagement from excessively close minimize transaction costs. Another major achievement was
relations with the USA and Gulf states; and a restructuring of that Pakistan doubled its outlay on education to 4% of GDP
party politics away from the dominance of the political arena by (centre plus provinces) by 2017, although here, again, govern-
a handful of wealthy and influential dynastic landed families. ance constraints meant that enrolment rates remained static
By 2012 Imran Khan was attracting huge, enthusiastic and some 25m. Pakistani children did not attend school.
crowds, especially in urban areas. The PTI predicted that a In terms of its relationship with the military, the PML—N
political tsunami would wash away the old regime if the people had a predictably difficult time. One complication was that
turned out to vote and opted for the PTI, provided that the 2013 Musharraf had decided to return to Pakistan from self-imposed
elections were free and fair. These elections were held under exile in the UAE in March 2013 and launch his own political
the threat of terrorist attacks and an administration mired in party, only to be promptly arrested. Putting him on trial for
technical and personnel problems. At the elections, which duly carrying out a military coup would antagonize the armed
took place on 11 May 2013, the PML—N became the largest services and he was eventually allowed to proceed abroad
party, gaining 129 seats, while the PPP won just 37 seats. The into exile again in March 2016. Gen. Kayani’s retirement in
PTI took 27 seats and the MQM 19 seats. An important aspect November 2013 led to the appointment of Gen. Raheel Sharif
of this election, as compared to 2008, was that voter turnout (no relation to Nawaz Sharif) as his successor as army chief. As
increased from 44% to 55%, and indicated PTI success in with Kayani, Sharif steered clear of overt intervention in
mobilizing new voters. At the same time, the PTI did not politics and focused on the anti-militancy operations that he
have the kind of success it felt was its due, as the traditional had inherited. During the 2014 political crisis in Islamabad, as
voter base came out for the PML—N. Although the May 2013 coup rumours spread and an impression that the military
elections marked the first democratic transition from one wanted the PML—N out of power was being spread, the army
civilian government to another, the PML—N did not enjoy chief met with the Prime Minister and sorely disappointed
its victory for long. The PTI accused the PML—N of rigging the those seeking an early end to the PML—N Government. In
elections and embarked upon a relentless campaign to dis- December when TTP militants attacked the Army Public
credit the PML—N victory. This campaign would lead to School in Peshawar and massacred over 130 students and
marches and sit-ins in Islamabad (August–November 2014) staff, pressure on the Government to take strong action against
in which the PTI and Qadri’s PAT joined forces. The PAT also radicalism mounted. Gen. Sharif had already launched a major
sought justice for the Model Town Massacre in Lahore in June military operation in North Waziristan in the previous June.
2014, in which 14 of its workers had been killed by the Punjab The Government and opposition, after the Peshawar massacre
police and over 100 injured. The formation of a judicial approved a National Action Plan that created military courts to
commission ended the crisis and while it conceded that the dispose of terrorism-related cases for a two-year period. The
elections had been poorly managed, it maintained that there army chief built up an exceptional public profile and the
was no positive evidence of a PML—N conspiracy to manip- military’s help was sought by the Government for cracking
ulate the polls. Sharif came under renewed pressure from April down on violence in Karachi (which dropped by over 80% after
2016 after the Panama Papers leaks purported to reveal that the military became involved) to carrying out the population
Nawaz Sharif and his family had acquired luxury apartments census (which was finally under way in mid-2017 with the
in London, UK through offshore companies, and that their assistance of 200,000 troops), which was last held in 1998. As
level of wealth could not be accounted for through legitimate the army chief’s term of three-years drew to a close in Novem-
earnings from employment. The opposition took advantage of ber 2016, there was intense speculation as to whether he would
the suspicion that had fallen over Sharif and his party and receive an extension. As it happened, none was sought and
referred the case to the Supreme Court, which initially refused after completing a regular tenure Raheel Sharif retired (only to
to consider the matter, but eventually agreed to do so, and in court controversy as the military head of the Saudi-led military
July 2017 Nawaz Sharif was disqualified from office when all coalition of Arab and Asian Muslim countries, which pledged to
five judges ruled against him. Shahid Khaqan Abbasi of the fight Islamic State, among other terrorist groups). His succes-
PML—N, who had served as Minister of Petroleum and sor, Gen. Javed Bajwa, was soon confronted by a spike in
Natural Resources in the outgoing Cabinet, took office as terrorist violence after several years of decline that saw major
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PAKISTAN History

attacks in Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and challenges. Political order in Pakistan remains vulnerable to
Punjab. This led to the launch of a major army-led internal shocks and derailment. The structural imbalance generated by
security operation in February 2017, which, in its first 24 a civilian state apparatus that is often commanded by politi-
hours, killed some 100 alleged terrorists in different parts of cians apparently by whim, and an autonomous, highly profes-
the country. sional, and popular military continues to evolve in favour of the
On the foreign policy front, Nawaz Sharif’s efforts to restart latter. The emergence of a more assertive judiciary, media and
normalization with India came to naught through the pre- civil society make it harder for military coups but also leave
dictable actions of spoilers and the rise to power of Hindu inept and often compromised political leaders vulnerable to
nationalist premier Narendra Modi in India. Modi’s anti- criticism and exposure. The vulnerability of these leaders was
Pakistan rhetoric provided him with good publicity at home graphically exposed by the fall of Nawaz Sharif in July 2017,
and a determined effort was made to try and isolate Pakistan. when the Supreme Court disqualified him from office, after it
The Pakistani military, increasingly alarmed by Indian actions emerged that he and his family had embezzled public funds for
in Afghanistan and Balochistan, took a dim view of normal- their personal enrichment. While the PML—N retained con-
ization prospects with India. Moreover, the breakdown of the trol of government in the form of Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, who
ceasefire along the LoC, coupled with the eruption of anti-India was immediately sworn in as interim premier, with Nawaz’s
protests in Indian-administered Kashmir in July 2016, further brother Shahbaz positioned eventually to assume the role,
diminished prospects for normalization. Within Pakistan, the observers suggested that the balance of power was once again
controversy over a report in daily newspaper Dawn about a
swinging in the military’s favour, amid public impatience with
secret meeting in which civilian leaders had allegedly taken
a corrupt civilian political élite. A kind of political alternative to
the military to task for its relationship with radical Islamists,
led to a government inquiry, the resignation of the information the patronage-dynastic parties has emerged in the PTI, but its
minister, and the resignation of the Prime Minister’s Special appeal in the rural areas is limited and its message may not
Assistant for Foreign Affairs. have as much resonance outside of major urban centres—the
While relations with India remained crisis-prone, Pakistan general election of 2018 will demonstrate the exact extent of its
moved forward with an ambitious new programme tied to public appeal. There is a grave risk that if the electoral map is
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative. not readjusted in line with the 2017/18 census data and the
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, an agreement for 2018 elections are conducted on the basis of the old data (based
which was signed in 2014, initially envisaged over on the 1998 census) then a major disconnect between parlia-
US $46,000m. in Chinese state and private sector investment mentary representation and popular sentiment could emerge,
in Pakistan’s energy, infrastructure and agriculture sectors, paving the way for serious discord.
and would ensure a permanent Chinese maritime presence in The struggle against religious extremism is one that civilian
the Pakistani port cities of Gwadar and Karachi. China and actors other than the PPP and ANP and fringe elements in civil
Pakistan also stepped up military co-operation aimed at society and the media have yet to take up. Military operations
securing the inter-operability of their armed services. Mean- have brought down the level of violence but they cannot
while, declining terrorist violence at home, combined with a substitute for comprehensive social change through education
massive Chinese vote of confidence in Pakistan’s economic and social development. As the Quetta Commission report into
future, sent the local stock markets soaring, with Pakistan re- attacks in that city in August 2016 (which killed around 70
entering the MSCI Emerging Markets Index in early 2017. people at a hospital, and was claimed by groups including the
Pakistan also exited the IMF programme in 2016 and showed TTP and Islamic State) made clear, the civilian commitment to
substantial signs of economic revival, with annual GDP growth de-radicalization is weak and no systematic effort has been
rising above 5% in that year for the first time in a decade. This made to build civil administrative capacity over the past
improving trajectory did not, however, result in improved decade. The few positive developments, such as the passage
relations with the USA. Payments under the US’s Enhanced of laws against sexual harassment, domestic violence and
Partnership With Pakistan Act, which the US Congress honour killings, as well as the lifting of the ban on the online
approved in 2010, ended in 2013, and as violence declined in video website YouTube, are more than offset by continued
Pakistan it escalated in Afghanistan, with the by now routine persecution of religious minorities, the open functioning of
blame-game playing out in Washington, DC. Rather than proscribed organizations, the disappearance of liberal blog-
building a strong stable relationship with Pakistan, US policy- gers, and the ideologically driven killings, such as the lynching
makers (both Republican and Democrat) appeared committed of a student at a university in the north-western city of Mardan
to viewing their relationship with Islamabad through the lens by his classmates for allegedly holding blasphemous opinions.
of diminishing returns on their Afghan intervention. The Pakistan’s demography is likely to drive its politics and
election of Donald Trump to the US Presidency in November economics. At present, the territories that comprise Pakistan
2016 introduced a particularly unpredictable element in an are estimated to have a population of 199m. people in mid-
already difficult relationship. By mid-2017 Pakistan was 2017, compared to 32m. in 1951. By 2050 Pakistan may have as
undergoing a policy review in Washington, DC and, given many as 350m.–400m. people. The overwhelming majority is,
President Trump’s executive order issued earlier in the year, and will likely continue to be, poorly educated or uneducated,
which restricted immigration from Muslim countries affected
and forced to live in rural and urban slums in the context of
by terrorism, there was a real possibility that Pakistan’s major
dwindling natural resources. Whether or not Pakistan’s lea-
non-NATO ally status could be withdrawn.
ders will be able to evolve beyond the politics of personal
perpetuation and acquire the resolve and capacity for better
PAKISTAN AT 70 AND BEYOND governance will likely determine the country’s fate in the 21st
As Pakistan marks its 70th anniversary as an independent century. The next decade, in particular, will be critical to
state and enters its eighth decade, it faces many serious shaping the longer-term outcomes.

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