Fire

Protection
13. l Planning resistant barriers in otherwise vulnera-
Among the many responsibilities placed ble buildings. 1

upon the architect by society, and more par• c. Precautions against perforations of ap•
. proved and required ba_rriers.
ticularly by his license to practice, is the pro•
d. Exits and fire tower stairs.
tection against loss of life by fire. The preser•
e. Protection against fires caused by de•
vation of the structure and its contents against
fective electrical systems.
fire damage or destruction, though secondary
f. Protection against fires caused by
in importance is, nonetheless, of serious con•
lightning.
cern to owners and others having a financial
g. Detection and alarm systems.
interest in property. The experience of mu•
h. Standpipe and hose systems within and
nicipal fire departments, volunteer fire com•
near buildings.
panies, and of the insurance companies who
1. Automatic sprinkler systems.
pay for loss of life and property is an invalu•
J· Automatic smoke and heat venting.
able aid to designers of new buildings. The
k. Smoke and heat shafts.
National Fire Protection Association, of which
I. Control of air-conditioning ducts.
the American Institute of Architects is one of
m. Communication in high-rise buildings.
the organization members, maintains a com•
n. Elevator control.
prehensive and constantly improved set of
o. Fire command station in high-rise
standards for use in planning to reduce fire
buildings.'-
hazards and in designing equipment for fire
fighting. Acceptance of their rec~mmencla• Of the above l.S i terns, those that relate to
tions by the writers of builcUng codes and by electricity, signal systems, and elevators will
practicing architects has done much to reduce be found in Parts 5, 7, and 8, respectively
fire losses. (they include items e, f, g, m, n, and o).
Althouzh0
the inclusion cf fire-fighting
equipment in buildings is always des~rnble a.nd
increasinslv mandatory, good practice begins 13.2 High-Rise Fire Safety
with the ci:sign of the structure. This is neces•
In terms of the rate of actual fatalities due
sarily affected by the permitted buildin_g. den•
to fire, high-rise structures have not been the
sity in the locality and by the Harnrnability of
nation's greatest killer. Yet, as the life of any
the building and its expected contents. Some
one human being is of infinite value, it has
of the materials and equipment that must be been our challenge in the past decade to assess
considered are:
in retrospect our earlier performance in the
a. Fire resistance of the selected structural design of these structures. Beginnin~ ab?ut
type and material and the contents of ] 970, the many unexpected high-rise fires
the building. have rmde this challenge inescapable. Large
b. Limitations of volumes within fire- cities responded promptly to the need for

483
;... ;_.,r.. .·- ...
 484 FIRE SAFETY

research. In one city, the New York City Rand tions of modern techno~i,,v,v a.re
Institute' published in September 1975, Fire pletely immune o fat aJ. fires . u1· mC1111
Prot fio'l aJtd Local vemment: an Ernlrw• people to accep1.
To some extent. a usetu way
tion of Policy-R lated Research. By permis•
the high-rise problem is to de 1 ~ a HYiki<t,,.,,
sion of the parent or~ nization and publisher
building in terms of fire prote
of the report, The Rand Corporation of Santa definition evolved at the May ~ I
Monica, California, we present an excerpt tional Conference on Fiire Saf.ety , ' ·g•
from the 268-page document. It describes the Buildings (U.S. General Se<Vt~es "'""
fire incidents that are the cause of our concern tion, 1971a). which charactenzetl a
and some of the inadequacies that caused or building as one that was:
aggravated the fires. 1. Too tall to be completely a~
fire-fighting equipment tram· e grc; d_
This problem occurs an~!;fe fr 6
,, HIGH-RISE FIRE SAFETY 12 stories. but usualty 8.' stones.
r . . High-rise buildings present a variety of
depending upon the reach aetlal ~
der eQuipment avail.abe. 1
unique problems, and it should not be sur• the fire must be fought mte..... -n.. above
prising that fire safety is one of them. A num•
these levels.
ber of recent fires in tall buildings, some quite 2. Too :all to make complete evac alio ot
,, spectacular, have caught the attention of the
.. public and of public officials. With that atten•
occupants feasible. This oco. rs a abcut
25 stories, where complete evacua.
tion came concern: A large percentage of would take five minutes theoretically
urban residents spend much of their time in about 50 to 150 percent lonqer an
tall apartment houses, offices. hotels, hospi• in reality. It r:neans that pco · · n
tals, and schools. More recently, the suburbs
·•••' .
' have increasingly experienced the high-rise
safety and life support for the occupams
must be made within the oo· ing.
building, and their fire departments are nei• 3. Tall enough to make possible chimney
ther trained nor equipped for operations in tall or stack effects for air and smoke

~·.
I buildings. This is to some extent true
The real problem of high-rise fire safety ings, but it becomes especia o•
l• must be put into perspective. On the one nounced in buildings about 8 sto ies
hand. high-ris~ fatalities account for a mini• high. This means that provisio st be
scule fraction of the 12,000 fire deaths per made for the control of air o - d
.f year in the United States. On the other hand. products of combustion .
the potential for major disaster is staggering
when one considers that the estimated Modern design and construction methodS
130,000 occupants and visitors in one day at have been accused of increasing e fire az•
New York City's World Trade Center exceeds ards in high-rise buildings since World War 11.
the total population of Albany, New York. A largely because of the feeling that ere were
number of psychological factors are at work fewer fires in the first high-rise struc res b 1
. also. The thought that these imposing crea- between the two wortd wars. Whether they are
responsible for increased hazards.
design and construction have certai
rise to changes in th'! types of fire pro e
sne New York City Rand Institute is a nonprofit encountered:
research institution founded. as its Articles of Incorpora•
I ' tion state, "... prtm.nly to conduct programs of scien• • Light construction methods do ot oner
i- · ~ . tific raean:b and study, and provide reports and reeom• the same inherent protection hat otdel
menditions relevant to the operations. planning or
plaster or concrete provided.
admiDistratioa of the City of New York... The Institute • Nonintegrally constructed· 11oors and
wu established iD 1969 by the City of New York and~
r
,,·
'!··
1'
.
•.
Rand Corpontlon as a center for the cootinuing applica•
tioD ol tdmti&c and analytic tecluUques to problems of
walls may separate under heal distorti0°·
providing· paths for fire and smoke.
Wbaa 1iie and local govemment. It is governed by a
Baud of Trustees appointed jointly by New York City • False ceilings containing electrical and
aDd The Rand .Corporatioo. various other building ser'fices
provide
'.
: 1 -1
 Flr·e Protection 485
hidden locations where fires can start brought under control; by then, it had killed
and propagate. three persons. injured 20 more, and caused
• PunclHhrough installations of telephone about $2-1 /2 million damage. The contents of
and other services provide holes that vio• the 7,500 square-foot compartment in which
late designed structural integrity. the fire originated were destroyed, and beams
• Central air conditioning systems can act were distorted because of the failure of
as a passage and distribution system for sprayed asbestos · protection. Employees
smoke. using an elevator to descend were rescued by
• Use of plastics for trim and covering of firemen when their elevator stopped at the fire
interior structure creates the potential for floor; three workmen died when their elevator
smoke and toxic fumes. also stopped at the fire floor somewhat later.
• Furniture styling and materials change Smoke spread quickly to the 4th flopr. to the
the nature of the fire load in terms of 11th floor air-conditioning outlets, up to the
ignitability, fuel, and smoke potential. 8th floor in the stair tower, into the central
core above the 22nd floor, and again up to the
Th• Cause of the Concern: The Recent Fires 33rd floor in the stairwell.
The flurry of activity regarding the high-rise These fires resulted in investigations, tests.
fire problem was, to some extent. instigated by and code revisions for tall office buildings in
tw0 fatal fires in New York City office build• New York. In Chicago, however the effort
ings; both were new buildings, not yet fully concentrated on, but was not limited to, resi•
occupied. dential high-rise fires: Two of its most serious
high-rise fires occurred in the Hawthorne
One New York Plaza (New York). In August House and in the Conrad Hilton Hotel.
• 1970, a fire originating in a concealed ceiling
on the 33rd floor of this 50-story office build• Hawthorne House (Chicago). In January 1969,
ing raged for five hours before being brought a fire originating in the living room of a 36th
under control; by then, it had killed two per• floor apartment of this 39-story apartment
sons, injured 30 more, and caused about $1 O building took four lives. destroyed the kitchen
millk>n damage. The contents of the 33rd floor and living room of that apartment, and dam•
were completely demolished by the 1500° F aged several other apartments on the floor.
heat; the fire spread to the 34th floor by Firefighters were first hindered in reaching the
meansof various service openings through the fire by evacuees using the elevators to es•
floor, and then to the 35th floor through air• cape, later by a "blowtorch" effect (wind en•
conditioning duct openings. Structural beams tering the broken windows in the fire apart•
were bent on two of the floors; the sprayed ment caused the corridor to fill with flames
'
asbestos had falien off in some places and intense heat, and smoke).
been removed in others to accommodate par•
titions and services. Smoke ·spread to most Conrad Hilton Hotel (Chicago). In January
lloors through the air return fans-the supply 1970, a fire that started in a pile of chairs in
fans were shut down by smoke detectors• the 9t~ floor elevator lobby of this 25-story
Mth concentration sufficient to require evac• hotel-its 2,600 rooms make it one of the
Uation. Two men died and a third was severely world's largest-took two lives and injured 36
injured when the doors of the elevator they persons; the dead and most of the injured
had taken to the fire floor would not close were deaf and unable to hear alarms and
lgain; a group of firefighters were trapped instructions. About $100,000 damage oc•
Untir they chopped their way out of the eleva• curred, mostly in the corridors.
tor they were taking to the fire floor but that More spectacular and frightening in their
ltaUed at the 4th floor.
Impact were recent fires in tall buildings in
other parts of the world, the most notable
979 Third Avenue (New York). In December being two fires in buildings in Sao Paulo,
1970,
a fire that originated from cutting torch Brazil.
•i>arks on the 5th floor of this 47-atory office
:nd . display building-the Carpet Center Andraus Building CS•o Paulo). In February
. · Uild1ng-burned for 35 minutes before being 1972, a fire originating in a storage well out-
I Ii . .
411
['. I· I
FIA SAF rrv
j •
I .

ind th l w,

A REVIEW OF THE
NEW YORK CITY FIRE SAFETY
TESTS & LAW
Fir in high rise buildings has been a widely
discuS$ttd topic among design protessionats.
owners. and In the press ever since a series of
fir s occurred in buildings previously consid·
Bui/ mg (S o Paulo . In
14. fire st rted in window air
erea "fire safe .. To arcutete some basic in.
formation on the subject. Syska & Hennessy
n •ti n r n th 1 th floor of this 25-story
published an issue of the Technical Letter in
ce txJ1lding and rag d for 1 hour and 40
September 1970 entitled "Mechanical and
nu es bef r burning itself out: of the 601 Electrical Aspects of Fire Protection in Large
p in !he tower t the time the fire
But/dings .:' This Letter discussed the stages in
started, 119 died. 300 more were injured. and
the development of a fire. the building systems
da age was over $3 million, including all
which are vital during a fire. the problems of
contents of the offices from the 12th floor up. partial occupancy. fire prevention, building
Of lhe de.ad, 90 died on the roof waiting to be
code requirements. possible additional safety
rescued by helicopters that could not land.
measures. and possible future developments.
and •O jumped-to their death. 30 of these after
The urgency of the problem generated a
he fire was out. In this incident the only stair•
number of investigative groups, and a second
way was unenclosed. there were large
Technical Letter. in January 1972, discussed
amounts ot combustible materials, and fire
the appointment of the Mayor's Committee on
protection facilities were lacking. Early reports
Fire Safety in High Rise Office Buildings, in
indicated the presence of large amounts of LP
New York City in February 1971; the Federal
g.a distributed throughout the building, but
. Government General Services Admi:':istration
; later reports made no mention of this.
Conference in April 1971; and the Citv of Chi·
In boll of these fires: the structural fea•
tur-. Id of fire protection, and presence of cago Conference in May 1971. After a brief
re,~iew of the two conferences, the Lutter de•
LP gas Md other combustibles are unlike
tailed the case history of the Mayor's commit•
lituationa In the United States. This is also
tee and summarized the recommendations
true of the fire in the 13-story Taiyo Depart•
included in its report of November 15 1971.
ment Slol9 6n Kumamoto, Japan In November
This Technical Letter reviews the re~ults of
1173. In wNch 103 persons died and 119 were
lnJuted; and the fire in the 21-story Tae Yon tests under actual lira conditions sponsored
Kak HotM. In Seoul, Korea in December 1971, by the New York City M•Yor's Committee, and
eo
In wf*='t 113 ~ and were Injured. summarizes the provisions of the ''Fite Safety
Requirements and Controls.. law which re·
suited from the Committee's inVMtlfations.

Source. Syaka & H•nnesay, TecltrtiQJ (' ter. Vol.

13.3 .mp.llill Tlltl and the Law 23, No. 1, May 1973. Copyright @ S~ & Hen•
n111y, Inc., 1973.
ID Iba Qty ol New York, the Mayor's Com·
. mittee spomored actual flr•salety tests. These
tests were a.guide to a new city fire llw, Local Ntw York Fire Testa
Law No. S. By permission of Syska & Hen• Sln~e a number of questlo.ns concer.~thg the
nesy, &gineen, their TedmlcalIA~ is re- fea11bHity of pressurizing stairwells vi . unr~
 Fire Protection 487

solved, the Committee arranged for a testing of and elimination of combustibles from
program under actual fire conditions, utilizing plenums.
the Port of New York Authority's 22 story Smoke and/or other products of com•
office building at 30 Church Street which was
bustion will activate elevator electronic
scheduled for demolition. The Polytechnic touch buttons (see Syska & Hennessy
institute of Brooklyn conducted the tests publication "Elevator Operation Under
under contract with the City. The Insurance Fire Conditions").
industry provided additional financial support As a result of these tests, continued dis•
and advice; the National Bureau of Standards cussions within the Committee, and subse•
furnished instrumentation and manpower: and quent City Council Committee hearings, the
industry furnished equipment. This remark• original Committee recommendations fNere
able- cooperative effort was organized, fi• modified and Local Law No. 5, "Fire Safety
nanced, and completed in the short period of Requirements and Controls"b was passed by
four months. the City Council on December 22, 1972, and
The tests were directed primarily to the approved by the Mayor on January 18, 1973. A
feasibility of pressurizing stairs in high rise summary of the law's provisions follows:
office buildings as a means of maintaining
smoke free conditions to permit safe evacua• •Copies of the report. entitled "Fire Tests. Analy•
tion of occupants and as an aid to fire fighters. ses and Evaluation of Stair Pressurization and Ex•
-: A few measurements were also made with haust in High-Rise Ottice Buildings," are available
!. regard to the exhausting of smoke and other from Professor Paul R. DeCicco. Polytechnic Insti•
products of combustion from the fire area, tute of Brooklyn, 333 Jay Street, Brooklyn, New York
using a stairwell to simulate a smoke shaft: 11201.
... and observations were made in connection -Avatlabte from The City Record. 31 Chambers
with the spread of smoke and heat through Street, New York. New York 10007.
ducts and ceiling plenums.
Preliminary tests were conducted with sup•
ply and exhaust units operating. These were Summary of New York Fire Safety Law
followed by more tests using cold smoke. Fi• For All Office Buildings Occupied by 100 Per•
nally four tests were run at three different sons Above or Below Street Level or More
locations on the 7th and 10th floors using Than a Total of 500 Persons in the Entire
smoke and heat generated by large scale Building:
fires. Temperature, pressure, oxygen, carbon
monoxide, and smoke measurements were Fire Safety Plan
made. 1. Plan for fire drill and evacuation proce•
The report of these tests- concludes that: dures, including appointment of Fire
Safety Director, fire brigade and floor
• Pressurization of stairwells is feasible. wardens.
• Smoke exhaust systems can remove 2. Signs required at elevators and stairs.
smoke and heat from fire areas without
For Buildings 100 Feet or More in Height:
excess temperatures in exhaust shaft.
• Maximum temperatures and pressures
Fire Stair Doors
can be reached within four minutes of
Ignition. Doors to interior stairs shall not be locked
• Maintenance of air supply and return can except:
increase temperature, pressure, rate arid 1. On street floor to prevent access to
extent of fire growth, as well as spread of stairs.
smoke, gases, and heat. 2. On stair side if every four stories or less
• Fire-fighter controlled means of ventila• door is openable. '
tion is essential. 3. Where failsafe electric door lock, acti•
• Rapid spreading of toxic concentrations vated by any detector, is provided.
of gases can take place through ducts
Class E Fire Alarm System
an~ ceiling plenums.
• Attention must be given to fire stopping
~'·r-· 1. Combination fire alarm signal system
'
,,~.
--
 consisting of interior fire alarm and tioning system.)
two-way voice communications system 1 Areas to be compartmented by one hou
· es not t exc~dr
(direct wire, radio, or carrier current). separations, ·into spac o
with at least one station per floor. Acti• 7500 square feet. .
vation of alarm station will identify its 2. Sub-division of area may ~dee1dncreasedto
floor location at the Fire Command Sta• 15,000 square feet. provi . such area
tion, mechanical control center, and t~e is completely protected with space de.
regularty assigned location of the fire tectors.
safety director, sound alarm, and auto• 3. Where total area exceeds 1 o'.ooo square
maticalty notify Fire Department. feet, at least one fire separation shall be
2. Fire Command Station, located in lobby two hour rated and creat~ areas of ref.
of building containing the following:
4. ~n9:~isting office buildings, ~xisting one
a. Communication Capability (two-way
hour separations may be a_ccepted in
voice) between Fire Command Sta•
lieu of the two hour separation.
tion ,and:
• Floor Warden Stations Smoke and Heat Control .
• Mechanical Control Center (Applies to buildings served by multi-floor air
• Elevators and Elevator Machine conditioning system.) ·
Rooms 1 _ Smoke shaft to exhaust heat and smoke
• Air Handling Control Rooms to outdoors.
b. Audi~le Alarm· Signal and means to 2. Existing buildings may provide pr_essuri•
silence. zation of all interior enclosed stairs (ex•
c. Visual display system to indicate acti• cept fire tower) in lieu. of smoke shaft.
vation location by floor. 3. Systems to be activated automatically
d. Means to control sounding devices upon activation of any detectors.
on any floor or throughout building.
Elevators
e. Means to transmit Fire Alarm to Fire
Department. 1. Elevators serving fire floor to be recalled
t. Display lamps indicating on/off of air and retained at terminal floor by activa•
handling systems, unless provided in tion of landing detectors or Command
Mechanical Control Center. Station Control.
g. Means _to test display lamps, alarms 2. Three elevators servicing each floor
and connection to Fire Department. shall be equipped with firemen's service.
h. Individual manual operation of each 3. Interlock wiring for elevator hoistway
air ~upply and each return or exhaust doors will be required to be resistant to
system unless provided in the Me• high temperatures.
chanical Control Center and in the
Sprinklers
room containing the affected fans.
1. Show rooms Gxceeding 7500 square
Detectors feet, located more than 40 feet above
1. On each Elevator Landing. Activation grade, shall be sprinklered. Use of do•
ahaJI stop all fans, activate smoke ex• mestic water permitted.
haust or stair pressurization fans, return 2. Sprinklers may be designed in accord·
affected elevators to terminal landing, ance with new NFPA standards (Chap·
and automatically sound alarm and no• ter 8 of NFPA No. 13) which permits
tify Fire Department. Hydraulic pipe sizing. Use of Fire Stand
~At the return air shafts at each floor. Pipe is permitted.
Activation same aa above except for 3. Special provisions permit the following
elevators. exemptions, when floor is CO'mp!ately
sprinklered.
Compartmentatlori
(Applies to floors located more than 40 feet • Compartmentation.
above grade &;erved by multl-floor air condl- • Smoke shaft and stair presau~tion.
 Fire Protection 489

• Detectors on each elevator landing. 13.4 Owner/Builder Reaction

rouP E Buildings, Less Than 100 Feet in New York City's Local Law No. 5, "Fire
'11,;ght: Safety Requirements and Controls" was signed
1. Two-wayvoice Communication System, by the mayor in ]t£Uary of 1973. Applying
from Fire Command Station to: essentially to high-rise buildings, it was a re•
sponse to the problems posed by the frighten•
• Warden Station each floor.
• Mechanical Control Center. ing, fatal, and destructive fires of the early
1970s (see the report of the New York City
2. Means to transmit fire alarm to Fire De• Rand Institute, and Syska & Hennessy's, fech•
partment.
nical Letter, both cited above). In spite of the
wish of owners and builders to conform in the
Extensionsof the Law interest of life safety, the tremendous cost of
Although the law was limited to ottice build• changes in existing buildings promises to make
. 1ngs. many of its findings are applicable to full adherence to the law a lengthy process .
. other types of high rise buildings. The Mayor Concerning new buildings, The New York
, has ordered that applicable measures be ex- Times, February 25, 1973, quotes the opinion
tended to hotels, apartment buildings, schools of an architect:
· and universities, and hospitals, as examples. ·
· The Committee is now studying appropriate "I'd say that probably every high-rise office build•
legislation. Owners of buildings not covered ing now being designed in the city will have the
by the law should seriously consider imple• sprinklers," commented Richard Roth Jr., an arch•
menting relevant recommendations at this itect active in the office field. "It's just not practi•
time in order to provide appropriate fire pro• cal to plan a building with the floor-space require•
tection for their occupants regardless of pres• ment in the new code ...
ent legal requirements.
Implementation of the law should result in a The contention, of course, is the option
significant reduction in the severity of fires
stated in Item 3 of the "Sprinklers" section of
and consequently in fewer injuries and deaths
ef and less property damage. How rapidly this is
the law (page 488) permitting the exemption ·
~ achievedwill depend upon the cooperation of of compartmentation, smoke shaft, and stair
... , .. the owners of existing buildings. The law pro• pressurization and detectors on each elevator
vides for periods of three to fifteen years forlanding when a floor is completely sprink•
compliance, depending upon the specific re• lered. For a long time now, we have seen the
quirements. increase of open "landscape't-typs office floors
Although prompt action is important, own• with few or no partitions. It would seem likely
ers of existing buildings should proceed care• that the choice might often be for sprinklers
fully since necessary alteration requirements that would obviate "compartments" enclosed
depend to a great degree on the systems now by fire walls and self-closing fire doors.
- in each building. The law provides that alter•
The adaptation of existing buildings to the
natesystems be accepted if judged equivalent
to those prescribed by law. Thus, each exist•
law would undoubtedly require that the cost
ing building Is an Individual case requiring an of changes be passed on in amortized fashion
Individual engineering study to ensure that the to tenants. In the period of transition, the time
owner gets the maximum degree of protection allowed for adherence, which varies from 3 to
for minimum cost and minimum disturbance to 15 years depending on the item, is a reason•
tenants. able demand. There are over 800 such existing
buildings in New York City that do not com•
Extra copies of this and other Technical Letters ply. For more than half of them, working
are available. Written permission must be obtained drawings and applications have already been
to rtprOduce any part of this Technical Letter.
~ease direct all correspondence to Catny Ramsey, filed to begin some of the changes.
y,'flka & Hennessy, Inc., 11 O West 50 Street, New Some sources have estimated the cost of
· Ork, New York 10020. sprin1dering existing buildings to be about $1