Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab

(Established by Punjab Act No. 12 of 2006)

Bhadson Road, Sidhuwal, Punjab
(Accredited ‘A’ Grade by NAAC)

Project Submission
of
Political Science

for
B.A. LL.B. (Hons.)
Vth Semester
Session 2019-2020

Topic: The 1:30 AM Children: The Bangladesh Liberation War and India’s
Intervention

Submitted to: Mr. Saurav Sarmah

Submitted by: Arnav Srivastava

Roll No.: 17064
Group No.: 5
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
A. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 2

B. BACKGROUND OF THE LIBERATION WAR ............................................................. 4

B.1. “URDU, AND ONLY URDU”: THE LANGUAGE CONTRSOVERSY .................................... 4

B.2. DISPARITIES IN BUDGETARY SPENDING REGION WISE................................................ 5

B.3. OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT ........................................................................................... 5

C. ANALYSING THE “WHY” ............................................................................................... 7

C.1. ENGLISH SCHOOL SOLIDARISM .................................................................................... 7

C.1.1. SOLIDARISM AND THE COMMON VALUE SYSTEM ..................................................... 7

C.1.2. THE IDEA OF A HUMANITARIAN WAR....................................................................... 9

C.2. OFFENSIVE STRUCTURAL REALISM ............................................................................ 10

D. ROLE OF INDIRA GANDHI: PERSONAL, POLITICAL, AND DIPLOMATIC

INITIATIVES ........................................................................................................................ 12

E. ROLE OF INDIA IN RECOGNITION OF BANGLADESH AS AN INDEPENDENT

STATE .................................................................................................................................... 13

F. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 14

G. BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................. 15

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 A. INTRODUCTION

The Bangladesh Liberation War, in the 1970’s, was a chapter in South Asian history of
significant importance that not only redefined the geographical layout of the region, but also
birthed an independent, sovereign nation. The formation of Bangladesh is considered as an
important event in world history and international diplomacy, especially attracting attention
due to India’s leading role in the war for independence.1 An analysis through the international
relations perspective yields important lessons into India’s trend of evolving foreign
diplomacy and also reveals an academic affiliation with English school Solidarism.
Bangladesh is tied with India by civilizational, cultural, social and economic bonds. The two
nations share a common history, linguistic and cultural heritage. 2 India’s intervention and
subsequent victory in the conflict also sparked the dawn of a new era of non-alignment where
the bipolarised world of the Cold War appeared all of a sudden to be more multipolar and
hierarchical than previously thought. The liberation war was sparked by the Bengali
nationalist ascendancy in the early ‘70s, which took a full charge around the time of the
genocide of Bangladeshi citizens in 1971.3 The biggest catalyst in the war was the Operation
Searchlight, performed on 25 March 1971 by the West Pakistan military, following routine
patterns of “systematic elimination of nationalist Bengali civilians, students, intelligentsia,
religious minorities and armed personnel”.4
The liberation of Bangladesh was achieved through a nine-month long war, in which all
patriotic people of the country contributed from their respective positions. The war started as
a spontaneous resistance against genocide by the Pakistan army, but soon assumed the
character of an organised war of attrition for the liberation of Bangladesh. It was essentially a
people’s war, which was epitomised by the army of freedom fighters known as Mukti Bahini
(MB) in Bangladesh. The war finally ended with the defeat of the Pakistanis by the joint
forces of MB and the Indian Army, which got involved in the war at the last moment.5 The
aftereffects of the war are even felt in today’s times. The millions that were displaced
because of the war live without a place of permanent residence. The already frosty
relationship shared by India and Pakistan is as tense as it has been and forms part of the

1
Drong Andrio, India’s Role in the Emergence of Bangladesh as an Independent State, 16 R.I.R. 736, 739
(2016).
2
Id., at 748.
3
RAVI KALIA, PAKISTAN: FROM THE RHETORIC OF DEMOCRACY TO THE RISE OF MILITANCY 168, (Rutledge,
2012).
4
Ahmed Jamal, Mukti Bahini and the Libertion War of Bangladesh: A Review of Conflicting Views, 30 ASIAN
AFFAIRS 6, 11-12 (2008).
5
Id., at 20.

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South Asian rivalry that has seen its ups and downs.
This project evaluates India’s intervention, what caused it, and the rather personal nature of
the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s involvement with the war. Section A is introductory
and verses the reader with the general overview and layout of the war. Section B specifically
deals with the background in which the war raged, also including internal and external factors
affecting the movement. Section C analyses the “why” question that have been the subject of
copious amounts of academic opinions and conflicting views. Special emphasis has been
placed on highlighting the theoretical jurisprudence of the solidarism school of thought that
Indian foreign policy has been often associated with. Section D will deal with the exclusive
interjection by Indira Gandhi and why India’s formidable territorial and naval armies were
successful in elapsing Pakistani armies in the war.
The puzzling question of why India declined to rationalize its entrance to the Bangladesh
Liberation War of 1971 as a humanitarian intervention has not been exclusively dealt with,
but has been touched upon as a matter of contention.6 The matter has quoted controversy and
still does from many international quarters. Regardless, India’s intervention in the war is an
‘integral and significant part of Bangladesh’s history’7 and can’t be overlooked, especially
given the fearsome power of the Pakistani military back in the day.
One thing that can’t be denied, though, is that the war changed the geopolitical landscape of
South Asia, as Bangladesh now occupies the seventh spot in the world’s most opulous
countries list. Due to complex regional alliances, the war was a major episode in Cold War
tensions involving the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.
The majority of member states in the United Nations recognised Bangladesh as a sovereign
nation in 1972.8

6
Daniel C. Park, India’s Intervention in East Pakistan: A Humanitarian Intervention or an Act of National
Interest?, 1 SYNERGY J.C.A.S., February 2016.
7
R. Islam, Secessionist Self-Determination: Some Lessons from Katanga, Biafra and Bangladesh, 22
JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH 211, 216 (1985).
8
G. W. CHOUDHURY, THE LAST DAYS OF UNITED PAKISTAN 180-185, (Bloomington: Indiana, 1974).

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 B. BACKGROUND OF THE LIBERATION WAR

The entire saga started with the elections held in East Pakistan (formerly) in December 1970.
The landslide victory for the Muijbur Rahman led Awami League saw the emrgence of the
political party as the largest in the Pakistani National Assembly with 167 seats out of a total
of 313.9 As was the tight control that military exercised over the political life in Pakistan, a
popular resistance was launched to trample down on the newly elected majoritarian party.
Rahman was finally arrested by the army in dramatic fashion, and proclaimed independence
for East Pakistan before being taken away. Among his final words to the public at large
before the movement tilted to full scale, Rahman asked his people to continue the fight ‘till
the last Pakistani army’ was driven away from Bangladesh.10

B.1. “Urdu, and only Urdu”: The Language Contrsoversy

One of the main bases for division between the Hindus and Muslims, which also became an
integral part of the ‘Two Nation Theory’, was that of language. It was Mohd. Ali Jinnah who
gave the famous quote, “Urdu and only Urdu”11 to gauge public attention and convince the
Muslim majority of their apparent incompatibility with the Hindu masses. The Muslim self-
determination movement, popularized in the 1920’s by Muslim literary scholars like Mohd.
Iqbal, made Urdu the prominent language of the entire community, a trend that catched on
after the formation of Pakistan. However, Urdu was historically the dominant spoken tongue
only in the north, central, and western region of the subcontinent; whereas the primary
language in East Bengal was the native language of Bengali, one of the two most easterly
branches of the Indo-European languages.12 The move to not recognize the language as a
federal one along with Urdu and English was seen as an attempt to ‘supress the culture of the
eastern wing’. 21 February is remembered today as the Language Movement Day in
Bangladesh, owing to the harrowing incidents on the day in 1951, when unprovoked police
firing caused numerous casualties of protesting civilians and students. Later, in memory of
the deaths in 1952, UNESCO declared 21 February as International Mother Language Day in
November 1999.

9
MUHAMMAD NURUL QUADIR, INDEPENDENCE OF BANGLADESH IN 266 DAYS 461, (Mukto Publishers, 2004).
10
Musaev Panichkin, The military conflict in 1971 between India and Pakistan: the National Tragedy of
Pakistan & relations with Afghanistan, 10 FUNDAMENTAL’NYEISSLEDOVANIYA 1608, 1607-10 (2013).
11
NANCY HORNEBERGER & SANDRA MCKAY, SOCIOLINGUISTICS AND LANGUAGE EDUCATION 158,
(Multilingual Matters ed., 2010).
12
ANNE NORHONA, MILITARY INTERVENTION AND SECESSION IN SOUTH ASIA: THE CASES OF BANGLADESH, SRI
LANKA, KASHMIR, AND PUNJAB 25, (2007).

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B.2. Disparities in Budgetary Spending Region Wise

One of the foremost issues that plagued the population at large in East Pakistan was that of
the comparatively abysmal budget allocated for the region. The above statistics point towards
a deep-rooted problem in the economic allocation of resources between the two regions.
Along with the reduced budget, the East region failed to attract any significant foreign
capital, owing to the low numbers of native businessmen in East Pakistan, substantial labour
unrest and a tense political environment. The Pakistani state's economic outlook was geared
towards urban industry, which was not compatible with East Pakistan's mainly agrarian
economy.13 The overall detrimental effect on East Pakistan’s economy was something that
not only affected the nation on a macro level, but also disrupted the lives of the citizens on a
micro level.

B.3. Operation Searchlight

The Bengali independence movement was in the ascendancy during the late ‘60s and early
‘70s. Growing apprehensive of this growing discontentment with the status quo, the Pakistani
military decided to take a violent recourse and affected a planned pacification drill,
codenamed ‘Operation Searchlight’, by taking control of the major cities on 26 March, and
then eliminating all opposition, political or military.14 The devastating effects of the operation
were imminently obvious and form the main substance of the 1971 Bangladesh Genocide.
American political scientist Rudolph Rummel puts total deaths at 1.5 million.15 \

13
WILLEM VAN SCHENDEL, A HISTORY OF BANGLADESH 136, (Cambridge University ed., 2009).
14
SIDDIQ SALIKI, WITNESS TO SURRENDER 63, (2007).
15
RUDOLPH RUMMEL, “Chapter 8: Statistics of Pakistan's Democide Estimates, Calculations, And Sources”, in
STATISTICS OF DEMOCIDE: GENOCIDE AND MASS MURDER SINCE 1900 544, (1998). A paragraph from the book

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One of the most shocking instances of this discriminate and bigotry attitude was quoted in an
Asian Times report. The relevant excerpt has been reproduced below.

“At a meeting of the military top brass, Yahya Khan declared: "Kill 3 million of
them and the rest will eat out of our hands." Accordingly, on the night of 25
March, the Pakistani Army launched Operation Searchlight to "crush" Bengali
resistance in which Bengali members of military services were disarmed and
killed, students and the intelligentsia systematically liquidated and able-bodied
Bengali males just picked up and gunned down”.16
The media attention was also one of the reasons that India finally decided to intervene.
According to a BBC report that was published in 2011, compiled by Mark Dummett, Indira
Gandhi decided to intervene in the war reading an article by Anthony Mascarenhas, a
Pakistani born English journalist, published on 13 June 1971.17 An excerpt from the report
reads: “There is little doubt that Mascarenhas' reportage played its part in ending the war. It
helped turn world opinion against Pakistan and encouraged India to play a decisive role",
with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi herself stating that Mascarenhas' article has led her
“to prepare the ground for India's armed intervention”. The chilling opening from the article
published by Mascarehnas, regarded as one of the most influential pieces in South Asian
journalism is reproduced below.

“Abdul Bari had run out of luck. Like thousands of other people in East Bengal,
he had made the mistake - the fatal mistake - of running within sight of a
Pakistani patrol. He was 24 years old, a slight man surrounded by soldiers. He
was trembling because he was about to be shot”.
A slew of arrests of the top brass of the Awami League pushed the movement and resentment
against the Pakistani army further.

reads as: “They also planned to indiscriminately murder hundreds of thousands of its Hindus and drive the rest
into India. ... This despicable and cutthroat plan was outright genocide”.
16
Debashish Chowdhary, Indians are Bastards anyway, ASIAN TIMES, 23 June, 2005.
17
Mark Dummett, Bangladesh war: The article that changed history, BBC NEWS, 16 December, 2011.

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 C. ANALYSING THE “WHY”

Many academicians have seen India’s intervention as a reinforcement of the common value
system carried on through centuries that have evolved through years of foreign diplomacy.
Numerous number of theories have analysed the reasons that motivated India to do so but this
project shall focus on only two. The analysis in this section will focus on the ‘humanitarian’
incentive to wage a ‘just war’.

C.1. English School Solidarism

The first method through which India’s decision to enter the conflict will be put into
perspective is through a very prominent branch of the English School, Solidarism. In its
essence, Solidarism believes that “international society is connected by human values that go
beyond states”. In other words, the connecting thread between two distinct nationals of a
country is the likeness in conscience.18 This then becomes the basis for elucidating theoretical
aspects on the notion of international ‘humanitarian war’, supported by many solidarists.19
The classical approach, thus, to interpreting the common value system and solidarism cannot
eschew the already enshrined doctrine in the English school of thought to review and
consider conflicts and different juxtaposed perspectives prevailing on the topic.

C.1.1. Solidarism and the Common Value System

From a solidarist perspective, international society is bound by values. One of the most
important ones according to R.J Vincent is human rights, which he defines as “the rights that
everyone has, and everyone equally, by virtue of their very humanity”.20 It is by virtue of
such pre-existing values that modern nation-states derive the authority to intervene.21 In this
particular case, India’s intervention could not attain justification from the international arena
in these terms. Its tacit support for the East Pakistani rebellion was only apparent around
early December in the year 1970 after West Pakistan’s air raids forced it to react militarily.
Still, from a solidarist perspective, a number of reasons can be picked out to support India’s
move. The geo-political carving of the Indian subcontinent remained very recent and though
different nationalisms had led to the creation of three autonomous states, the different
populations still retained a sense of community with their fellow neighbours, not least
because of having suffered under the common yoke of the British Empire. One of the biggest

18
T. DUNNE, ET. AL., The English School, in IR THEORIES 6, (OUP, 2007).
19
A. Roberts, Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights, 69 International Affairs 434, 429-
49 (1993).
20
NJ Wheeler, Agency, Humanitarianism and Intervention, 18 IPSR 3-4, (1997).
21
Id., at 9.

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factors in convincing India to join the war was the brutal and unprovoked attack on the vast
Hindu population and its districts before the macabre slaughtering of the Bengali
intelligentsia by the hands of the Pakistani army.
One of the most surprising omissions during the war was the involvement of the ever-present
media. Its power to sway public opinion for or against a war is well documented in history.22
And even though eventually it would go on to become one of the potent factors for India’s
intervention, at the time all media had been banned and screened from the atrocities. As it
were, the news did, however, made its way through to the nearly 60,000 refugees who were
crossing the border daily.23 The now infamous ‘Blood Telegram’ emanating from the US
consulate in Dhaka also accounted this for. American diplomats accounted for the vague and
detached US policy on the issue, and commented about the government’s

“failure to denounce the suppression of democracy. [The US] government has

failed to denounce atrocities[…]ironically at a time when the USSR sent
President Yahya a message defending democracy, condemning arrest of leader
of democratically elected majority party (incidentally pro-west) and calling for
end to repressive measures and bloodshed.”24
While it is undisputed that both Pakistani and Indian leaders had the same culutural political
upbringing during the British Raj, having become habitual and sincere to a set of principles in
governance and public life, one of the prime differences leading India’s intervention was
system of values on which it saw itself to have been created, and those of which its citizens
were proud. Modern India was created to represent “the pluralism, diversity, multi ethnicity
and tolerance of the former Mughal Empire”. 25
Probably the most fundamental difference between the two nations is their religious
ideologies. While Pakistan converted to an Islamic Republic around the year 1956, India
enshrined secularism in its Constitution and embraced religious tolerance. The wounds of
1947 prompted solidarists to view India’s intervention as motivated by a human rights
perspective. The fact India was founded on values and its citizens’ awareness that these
values did not stop at their borders may have strongly incited its then Prime Minister, Indira
Gandi, and its generals to act unilaterally. The East’s aspirations of getting help from two of
the biggest powers in the world, the USSR or the US, were trampled upon by the former’s

22
Supra, note 20.
23
O. Marwah, India’s Military Intervention in East Pakistan, 1971-1972, 13 Modern Asian Studies 561, 549-80
(1979).
24
The U.S. Consulate, Dissent from U.S. Policy Toward East Pakistan aka. “The Blood Telegram”, April 4
1971, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
25
H. Haqqani, Violence Against Politics, The Nation, 30 August 2006.

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disinterest and the latter’s clear ‘tilt’ for the West administration. USA called for consecutive
issuances of enforcement of the West’s sovereignty in light of India’s determined advance on
4 and 6 December.26 Again, solidarists oppose this attitude in that “The notion of common
humanity/human solidarity is diametrically opposed to the statist paradigm which is
predicated on the contention that state leaders and citizens do not have moral responsibilities
or obligations to aid those beyond their borders.”27

C.1.2. The Idea of a Humanitarian War

Instances where the concept of a war that is humanitarian are justified are “where states are
massively threatening the security of their citizens, or where they have collapsed into
lawlessness and civil strife, the duty of moral guardianship requires state leaders to spend
treasure and shed blood in the name of human solidarity.”28. Dunne explains that

“If the balance of power was essential to preserve the liberty of states (an
argument the English school shared with classical realists) then status quo
powers must be prepared to intervene forcefully to check the growing power of
a state that threatened the general balance.”
The Indian troops not only helped end the war and potentially save millions of Bangladeshi
lives, but also helped restore the damage and establish a new country, withdrawing
completely from the territory by March of 1972, just four months after the war ended. It is
believed that humanitarian interventions have to fulfil a certain number of conditions on the
timescale to be considered so. The work of the Indian Engineering Corps to rebuild East
Pakistan’s destroyed infrastructure contributed to justifying a ‘selfless’ or ‘just’ war.29
The Indian government took it upon themselves to help train the Mukti Bahini, the local
Bengali militias, and also in extension protected the Government in exile well before the first
signs of direct warfare.30 Only through a break of the status quo in the balance of power can a
humanitarian war be justified. By waging a humanitarian war, India stood to gain through the
pride of its own people, through the confidence they had that their country stood for human
values. It also gained the gratefulness of an emerging new nation and recognition by the
international society. Finally, it gained in breaking the status quo in the balance of power, as
its enemy was internationally shamed for its atrocities and proved the war justified.31

26
A.M. Muhith, The Glorious Victory Day 1998, The Independent, December 16, 1998.
27
Supra, note 19, at 3.
28
Supra, note 23, at 5.
29
Supra, note 18, at 6.
30
B. Parekh, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention, 18 International Political Science Reviews 7, 8, (1997).
31
G.H. Snyder, Mearsheimer’s World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay, 27
I.S.S. 26, 17-39 (2002).

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C.2. Offensive Structural Realism

Rooted in Structural Realist thought that “power is a means to survival in global anarchy,
offensive structural realism takes the idea a step further in that States contend on the
international stage to become hegemons”. This school of thought is one of the most tractable
systems of foreign action, often including questions of security dilemmas and the risk of
exposing more in an unstable system of nation states. The East Pakistani conflict is a typical
example of a prisoner’s dilemma in offensive neorealism.32
India is surrounded by Pakistan geographically on both sides. On the premise that both were
contending to become regional hegemons, the former could not have anticipated the latter’s
move. In attacking the East, the West mistakenly weakened its own position and
compromised the tactical advantage it held over India, who did not have all the attributes to
become the regional hegemon, “lacking its own independent military infrastructure and was
forced to buy weapons from the USSR”.33 India’s attack first policy, thus, was a consequence
of Pakistan’s unpredictability and military prowess. This pattern and particular instance can
lead to label India in this scenario as a revisionist state (a state that wants to change (or
revise) the ‘rules of the game’ to achieve its own hegemonic ambitions). Pakistan meanwhile
could have been seen to operate ‘bandwagoning’ as a policy, allying with China to weigh
against its more powerful neighbour and abetting US regional ambitions. By helping East
Pakistan attain its own independence, India dealt a fatal blow to its only regional contender.
It debilitated Pakistan monetarily, topographically, militarily and demographically, altogether
antagonistically influencing Pakistan's idle power. Besides, the arranging of the contention
was a hostile auxiliary pragmatist's optimal situation as Pakistan's military was overstretched,
flying the vast majority of its aviation based armed forces through China from West to East
and having a minor nearness of non-Bengali Infantry in the district. The two other battling
hegemons on a worldwide level were additionally weakened. China was kept from mediating
for Pakistan and professing to ensure Pakistan's power by the choice of the date of the
assault. By early December, the Himalayas are blocked weatherwise. The US then again was
likewise vanquished without hazard. They had given indications through the sending of a
naval force armada from Singapore of planning obstruction, if not immediate, clash with
India, who reacted by compelling the contention to an exceptionally tight timespan (under
about fourteen days) and by destroying Chittagong’s deep-sea port facilities.

32
Supra, note 18, at 15.
33
Supra, note 31, at 30.

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The frame of mind of the US was regular of a local, and trying worldwide, hegemon who
won't ever acknowledge the ascent of 'peer contenders' without assaulting first. Through the
formation of an autonomous Bangladesh and the splitting of Pakistan, India demonstrated to
be the sole territorial hegemon picking up security in the east by the making of a partner (and
the vanishing of a foe) and furthermore in the west by the debilitating of inert and military
power. India was in this manner obliged to break business as usual to protect itself against its
companion rival's opponent desire. A few creators have even fought that India's inspirations
for doing battle were mainly budgetary, however security concerns have a more grounded
case to support them.

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 D. ROLE OF INDIRA GANDHI: PERSONAL, POLITICAL, AND
DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES

The personal, political and diplomatic role of the former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
in the Bangladesh’s Liberation War in 1971 is inseparable from the country’s history.34 Mrs.
Gandhi’s travel from the US to the Western sphere (Belgium, German, France, and Great
Britain) started with a view to create world public opinion and gain support. Richard Nixon,
the US President at the time, labelled India as aggressors and even decreed the States troops
deployed in Vietnam to assist the Pakistani army in its military operations. India’s relations
with the Soviet Union have always been that of reciprocity and solidarity. This prompted
Mrs. Gandhi to look for alternatives in terms of support and led to the signing of a twenty-
year treaty of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union on 9 August 1971. This
move stunned the USA high command, who were taken by surprise due to Mrs. Gandhi’s
shock move to seek support from the Soviets, while also serving India’s purpose of avoiding
Chinese intervention in the conflict. This was further reflected in the statements made by the
General Secretary of the Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, who assured that if “the US or
China attacked India, the Soviet Union would take severe counter measures”. 35 The
statements deterred China, an ally of Pakistan, from giving active military support to Pakistan
in the battlefield and had to content with providing moral support to Pakistan, due to its
diplomatic incapability to advance troops to the borders. Indira Gandhi, being determined to
protect the interest of Bengalis, launched a diplomatic offensive efforts in the early autumn of
1971 touring Europe, and was successful in getting both the United Kingdom and France to
break with the United States, and block pro-Pakistan directives in the United Nations
Security Council.36 Indira Gandhi addressed to the India League, London October 31, 1971,
which is evidence of her strong support, and concern for the people of Bangladesh and its
independence. Under the leadership of Indira Gandhi all out supports were given by India to
the struggling people of the East Pakistan (Bangladesh) during the liberation war.

34
PTA, Bangladesh Salutes Indira Gandhi, The Hindu, July 25 2011.
35
Supra, note 9, at 377.
36
Supra, note 9, at 287.

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 E. ROLE OF INDIA IN RECOGNITION OF BANGLADESH AS AN
INDEPENDENT STATE

The subject of acknowledgment was correlative to the introduction of a country. From the
outset, the obligation of acknowledgment went ahead the shoulder of India. 'Bangladesh's
Recognition' turned into an indispensable piece of India's interior governmental issues. The
Indian ideological groups, different expert associations, social associations and the regular
man of India needed that India ought to perceive first. The decision Congress Party was
additionally for perceiving Bangladesh as a country yet it needed to occur at a suitable time.
The current pragmatic circumstance constrained India to be wary with respect to the
acknowledgment issue. Indian government was watchful on provincial and universal
legislative issues just as on global law and its belongings. Bangladesh accomplished every
one of the conditions to be perceived as per the International law by law. Be that as it may, so
as to get acknowledgment, it needed to hold up till sixth December, 1971. The interest for
acknowledgment of Bangladesh transformed into a national issue inside Indian governmental
issues since the part of the bargain December for nine long a very long time In the light of
International law and the arrangement of occurrences in Bangladesh during Liberation war, it
tends to be said that before sixth December Bangladesh got suggested acknowledgment. First
in Kolkata and later in Delhi, Bangladesh Mission authoritatively coordinated work routines,
which can be acknowledged as Indian Government's true acknowledgment. Other than this
after the Indo-Soviet fellowship bargain, the East European nations took an inspirational
disposition towards Bangladesh issue. The investment of Abddus Samad Azad (Former
Foreign Minister) in Budapest International Seminar as Mujibnagar government's delegate,
Bangladesh had acknowledgment in East Europe. In Delhi, a three-day International
Conference on Bangladesh occurred where 150 agents speaking to 24 nations partook. On
twentieth September, for the meeting, an intrigue was made to every one of the
administrations of the world to perceive Bangladesh as a free country and to quit helping
West Pakistan with any sort of military guide. In a goals of the meeting it was said that,
universal network ought to perceive the Bangladesh individuals' political battle as a National
Struggle for Freedom. From the earliest starting point Mujibnagar government was dynamic
because of India's acknowledgment. The Indian government alongside private associations at
different levels was officially or casually connected with the arrangement making assortment
of Mujibnagar government and different activities to impact the popular supposition for
Bangladesh.

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 F. CONCLUSION

The inspirations for India's mediation in this unpredictable clash can be said to be
exceptionally differing however we fight that both of our hypothetical perspectives are the
most likely situations. The bipolarity of world legislative issues at the time implied that in
choosing to mediate, India will undoubtedly 'irritate' another countries partnerships. The
exceptionally disarranged nature of the neutral development likewise implied that India was
'separated from everyone else' on the worldwide stage in confronting any of the incredible
forces. The Bangladesh Freedom War has turned into a significant milestone in International
Relations, not just for the Indian subcontinent. To be sure, India's today undoubted control
and worldwide impact would not sparkle so splendid had she not 'substantiated herself' in a
really global clash (and in such manner we mean worldwide rather just Pakistan-India). We
find in the solidarist contention an in all respects likely impetus for India's intercession.
Despite the fact that it is impossible India's activities were absolutely uninvolved and for a
more noteworthy philanthropic reason in the political range's motivating forces, we consider
it to be very conceivable to have been coordinated towards the country's populace where it
found a extremely positive reverberation. During an era of interior difficulty, for example,
during Indira Ghandi's standard, giving Indians motivation to be glad for their nation's
strength on the global scene was a significant P.R. battle to trigger.
To finish up, India's job in the Independence of Bangladesh was a remarkable history. Its
commitment was all the more a facilitator than a maker. It was a war mutually won by India
what's more, the individuals of East Pakistan (Bangladesh). Under the authority of Indira
Gandhi, the legislature and the individuals of India did uncommon penances for the
individuals of Bangladesh. 3,000,000 individuals needed to shed their blood and 300,000
ladies needed to forfeit their guiltlessness by the Pakistani fighters and their colleagues.
Individuals of Bangladesh can't overlook that the Government and the individuals of India
stood unequivocally by them. The backing and help of India is interesting throughout the
entire existence of the world. The introduction of Bangladesh came in all actuality with
India's help and thoughtful supervision of the USSR.

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 G. BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS REFERRED:
• ANNE NORHONA, MILITARY INTERVENTION AND SECESSION IN SOUTH ASIA: THE
CASES OF BANGLADESH, SRI LANKA, KASHMIR, AND PUNJAB 25, (2007).
• G. W. CHOUDHURY, THE LAST DAYS OF UNITED PAKISTAN 180-185, (Bloomington:
Indiana, 1974).
• MUHAMMAD NURUL QUADIR, INDEPENDENCE OF BANGLADESH IN 266 DAYS 461,
(Mukto Publishers, 2004).
• NANCY HORNEBERGER & SANDRA MCKAY, SOCIOLINGUISTICS AND LANGUAGE
EDUCATION 158, (Multilingual Matters ed., 2010).
• RAVI KALIA, PAKISTAN: FROM THE RHETORIC OF DEMOCRACY TO THE RISE OF

MILITANCY 168, (Rutledge, 2012).

• RUDOLPH RUMMEL, “Chapter 8: Statistics of Pakistan's Democide Estimates,
Calculations, And Sources”, in STATISTICS OF DEMOCIDE: GENOCIDE AND MASS
MURDER SINCE 1900 544, (1998).
• SIDDIQ SALIKI, WITNESS TO SURRENDER 63, (2007).
• T. DUNNE, ET. AL., The English School, in IR THEORIES 6, (OUP, 2007).
• WILLEM VAN SCHENDEL, A HISTORY OF BANGLADESH 136, (Cambridge University
ed., 2009).

ARTICLES REFERRED:
• Ahmed Jamal, Mukti Bahini and the Libertion War of Bangladesh: A Review of
Conflicting Views, 30 ASIAN AFFAIRS 6, 11-12 (2008).
• B. Parekh, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention, 18 International Political Science
Reviews 7, 8, (1997).
• Daniel C. Park, India’s Intervention in East Pakistan: A Humanitarian Intervention or
an Act of National Interest?, 1 SYNERGY J.C.A.S., February 2016.
• Drong Andrio, India’s Role in the Emergence of Bangladesh as an Independent State,
16 R.I.R. 736, 739 (2016).
• G.H. Snyder, Mearsheimer’s World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security:
A Review Essay, 27 I.S.S. 26, 17-39 (2002).

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 • Musaev Panichkin, The military conflict in 1971 between India and Pakistan: the
National Tragedy of Pakistan & relations with Afghanistan, 10
FUNDAMENTAL’NYEISSLEDOVANIYA 1608, 1607-10 (2013).
• NJ Wheeler, Agency, Humanitarianism and Intervention, 18 IPSR 3-4, (1997).
• O. Marwah, India’s Military Intervention in East Pakistan, 1971-1972, 13 Modern
Asian Studies 561, 549-80 (1979).
• R. Islam, Secessionist Self-Determination: Some Lessons from Katanga, Biafra and
Bangladesh, 22 JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH 211, 216 (1985
• Roberts, Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights, 69
International Affairs 434, 429-49 (1993).

NEWS PAPER ARTICLES CITED:

• A.M. Muhith, The Glorious Victory Day 1998, The Independent, December 16, 1998.
• Debashish Chowdhary, Indians are Bastards anyway, ASIAN TIMES, 23 June, 2005.
• H. Haqqani, Violence Against Politics, The Nation, 30 August 2006.
• Mark Dummett, Bangladesh war: The article that changed history, BBC NEWS, 16
December, 2011
• PTA, Bangladesh Salutes Indira Gandhi, The Hindu, July 25 2011.
• The U.S. Consulate, Dissent from U.S. Policy Toward East Pakistan aka. “The Blood
Telegram”, April 4 1971, Dhaka, Bangladesh

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