VAWC Cases

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 199522 June 22, 2015

RICKY DINAMLING, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the Decision1 dated August 11, 2011 and Resolution2 dated November 25, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 32912, which affirmed with modification the conviction of petitioner for
violation of Section 5(i), in relation to Section 6(f) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9262, otherwise known as
the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 .

The facts of the case follow.

On the night of March 14, 2007,petitioner Ricky Dinamling and a friend came from a drinking session
and went to the boarding house of AAA.3 At that time, Dinamling and the woman AAA were in an
ongoing five-year relationship and they had two common children (then aged four and two years
old). Dinamling and his friend arrived as AAA was putting the two children to bed. Suddenly,
Dinamling started to evict AAA and the children, ordering AAA to pack her things in a trash bag and
a carton box for ducklings. His reason for the eviction was that she was allegedly using the place as
a "whore house" wherein she "brought (her) partners." AAA initially did not want to leave as she
could not carry the children and their things, but she left when Dinamling threw a baby's feeding
bottle outside the house, causing it to break. She then went to the house of BBB and requested the
latter to fetch her children. When BBB and another friend went for the children, Dinamling already
had left with the older child and only the baby was left. The baby was brought by the friends back to
AAA. In the past, there were similar incidents that happened between Dinamling and AAA.
Dinamling would hit AAA's head, pull her hair and kick her. When AAA went to the police, she was
merely told that it was a family problem that could be talked over. Dinamling was, at that time, a
policeman himself.4

Six days later, or on March 20, 2007, at around 9:00 p.m., another incident occurred. AAA was at the
house of CCC when Dinamling arrived. He shouted and counted down for AAA to come out. When
she came out, Dinamling punched her at the left ear, which subsequently bled. When AAA asked
him why he kept on following her when she already had left him, Dinamling shouted her family name
and told her she was "good-for-nothing." AAA left for the barangay captain's house, but Dinamling
caught up with her and kicked her until she fell to the ground. On the road, Dinamling pulled down
AAA's pants and panty and shouted at her while people looked on. Dinamling then threw the pants
and panty back at AAA and shouted her family name. Dinamling, then intoxicated, left on a
motorcycle.5 AAA stayed at her friend's home until she felt some back pain in the next morning. She
found out she was bleeding and about to miscarry so she was immediately brought to the hospital.
There, she was told that she was 19 weeks pregnant and had an incomplete abortion. She was
hospitalized for four days. Dinamling visited her but showed no remorse over his acts.6

As a result of the above incidents, petitioner Ricky Dinamling was charged in two (2) criminal
Informations in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for violation of Section 5(i), in relation to Section
6(f)7 of RA No. 9262. The two Informations against him read:

Criminal Case No. 1701:

That on or about the evening of March 14, 2007, at XXX, Ifugao, the above-named accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inflict psychological violence upon AAA, a woman with
whom he has two common children, resulting to mental and emotional anguish and public ridicule or
humiliation by repeated verbal and emotional abuse consisting of several bad and insulting
utterances directed against the victim and a feeding bottle being thrown against the latter in anger.

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the offense being attended by the special qualifying aggravating
circumstance of the victim being pregnant at the time.

Criminal Case No. 1702:

That on or about the evening of March 20, 2007 at XXX, Ifugao, the above-named accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inflict psychological violence upon AAA, a woman with
whom he has two common children, resulting to mental and emotional anguish and public ridicule or
humiliation by boxing the victim on the head, kicking her at the back and removing her pant(sic) and
panty (sic).

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the offense being attended by the special qualifying aggravating
circumstance of the victim being pregnant at the time.

Upon arraignment, Dinamling pleaded Not Guilty to both charges. Thereafter, the cases were tried
jointly.8

For the prosecution, AAA, her mother DDD and Dr. Mae Codamon Diaz testified. For the accused,
only petitioner testified for and in his own defense. His defense was denial and alibi, claiming that he
was on duty at the town's police station at the time that the offenses were committed.9

After trial, the RTC rendered its decision on August 4, 2009 finding Dinamling guilty of both charges.
For Criminal Case No. 1701, the court sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of from ten (10) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor.10 For Criminal Case No. 1702, the court
ordered him to suffer imprisonment of from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of
prision mayor in its maximum period.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision in Criminal Case No. 1701 was affirmed and the one
in Criminal Case No. 1702 was affirmed with the modification on the penalty, by applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, such that Dinamling was sentenced to imprisonment of nine (9) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years of prision mayor,
as maximum.

Hence, the present petition.

The petition assails the findings of the Court of Appeals for allegedly disregarding his defenses of
denial and alibi as well as in discounting the supposedly exculpatory nature of a part of a
prosecution witness' testimony. Allegedly, the witness, Dr. Diaz, testified that she was unsure if the
abortion was a result of the mauling that AAA suffered or could have been caused by an infection or
other factors.11

This Court resolves to deny the petition for lack of merit, but will modify some of the penalties
imposed by the appellate court.

The petition raises issues that call for an examination of the factual findings of the trial court and the
appellate court. As a general rule, under Rule 45, no questions of fact but only questions of law may
be raised in a petition for review brought before this Court.12 Time and again, the Court has
consistently declared that questions of facts are beyond the pale of a petition for review.13 Factual
findings of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the appellate courts, are generally binding on
this Court.14

But there are recognized exceptions to the rule that questions of fact may not be entertained by this
Court in a petition for review, to wit:

(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;

(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or

conjectures; (3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;

(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and
such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts;

(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion;

(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on
which they are based; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record,15

None of the above-mentioned exceptions, however, are cited by the petitioner as a ground to grant
his petition. But even assuming arguendo, and in the interest of substantial justice, that any of the
exceptions above were indeed invoked, as the petition alleges that the appellate court failed to give
weight to petitioner's defenses of denial and alibi as well as to his stance that the testimony of Dr.
Diaz exculpates him from the crime, this Court, upon a close examination of the case records, still
found no error in the appellate court's finding of guilt in petitioner.
On its face, there is no reason to doubt the veracity and truthfulness of the victim AAA's evidence. In
particular, AAA's testimony narrating the specific incidents which gave rise to the charges was clear,
categorical and straightforward and, therefore, worthy of credence. Herein below are excerpts of her
testimony:

Q. Specifically inviting your attention to that incident in the evening of March 14, 2007, could you
please tell the court what transpired?

A. In the evening of March 14, 2007, somewhere around seven or eight o'clock in the evening, I was
letting my kids sleep (w)hen (Dinamling) came with a friend. They had a drinking spree and x x x he
started to evict us from that boarding house because according to him, I (was) using that boarding
house as a whore house (by) bringing in partners, et cetera to that boarding house. That (was) why
he was letting us out of it. And he even told me that if I (had) no travelling bag, I (could) use the
basura (garbage) bag outside and I (could) use the carton where he placed the ducklings to pack our
things and leave the place. That night, I (did) not know how to carry them out and I was waiting for
him to stop talking and leave but he never left us up to the time he threw the feeding bottle of my
baby outside that caused it to break and that was also the time I decided to go to the house of BBB
because it is the place where my landlady (was) staying.

xxxx

Q. You mentioned of a feeding bottle.

A. He threw it outside, Sir.

Q. How did you feel as regards these actuations of the accused that evening?

A. That is worst. He was inflicting pain (on) me but that time it was directed (at an) innocent
individual and that is very painful.

Q. Personally, did you feel distressed or stressed or fearful at the time the accused was acting that
way?

A. When he started acting that way, I fear(ed) he would again inflict those pain (on) us.

Q. So when you went to the house of BBB, what happened next?

A. x x x He (BBB) went to fetch the kids and came home with one of the kids but to my dismay, even
the milk of my baby was not there any more; that night because it was around 11:00 o'clock, we had
to use the feeding bottle of BBB's son together with the milk because when they went to fetch the
kids, the milk was gone.

Q. Was the incident on March 14, 2007 the first time or it happened (sic) previously?

A. It happened previously. Those were the time(s) that (I was) prompted to go back home and to my
relatives for protection but he (came, followed) us where we (went).

Q. In those previous incidents before March 14, 2007, what did he do, if any?

A. There are times he did that in public. He usually starts hitting my head, pulls my hair kicks me and
there was a time I went to the police station but they said that (it) is some kind of family problem that
we could talk xxx over and so it was left that way. I thought leaving him would be the best thing to do
but he kept on following us.16

xxxx

Q. I am inviting your attention to that incident of March 20, 2007. Will you please tell the court what
happened that late afternoon or early evening?

A. I was at the house of CCC waiting for a friend because of what happened on March 14, 2007
when we left the boarding house.

xxxx

Q. What transpired thereat, when you were at that place?

A. After sometime, around 9 o'clock, (Dinamling) came and shouted words that (on) final count, (I)
should be out of that place.

Q. And what else happened?

A. After shouting, he boxed me at the left ear.

Q. What transpired next?

A. (T)hen I felt there was blood in my ear. I followed him outside and I inquired (as to) why he (kept
on) following us when we (already) left the boarding house and then he started shouting at me,
shouting my family name, x x x x that I (was) good for nothing and that I (could) sue him (in) court
and he (would) pay me. So I said "I thought when we already left, you were at peace with yourself
already." When I was going down, going to the barangay captain's house, he followed me. When I
tried to go back, he kicked me. He pulled my pants down and pulled even my panty and he said x x x
he (did) that to me because I was worthless.

Q. (At) what particular spot did the accused pull down your pants and your panty?

A. Front of CCC.

Q. What was that spot, road or backyard?

A. Road.

Q. Could you describe the place? Were there houses nearby, that road, that spot where he pulled
down your pants and panty?

A. There is a small store and people were looking at us. There are houses above and then one of
them told me he saw but he is afraid to come out.

Q. Was it already dark (at) that time?

A. Dark but then there was a street light near the residence.
Q. Was it still early evening?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. About what time?

A. Around 9 o'clock.

Q. After pulling down your pants and your panty along that road, what else happened?

A. He threw my pants and panty back tome and he left shouting at me, my family name. It is very
hurting because my family (had) nothing to do with this.

xxxx

Q. And what happened the following day?

A. I stayed at my friend's house then at 5:00 o'clock early morning of March 21, there was pain at my
back. That night when he kicked me, there was pain at my back. I said I (would) just go tomorrow for
medication but I did not reach the day because I was bleeding. When I went to the bathroom, there
(was) blood so I said I think I am going to abort. There (was) blood already so I decided to go to bath
before I (went) to the hospital but when I went to take a bath, I already had profuse bleeding so they
(had) to carry me with the use of a blanket to the hospital.17

AAA also stated that the baby that she claims was aborted would have been her third child with
Dinamling. She also testified about always being afraid of Dinamling, even fearing the sound of his
motorcycle as that signalled that she or her children would be abused. She previously filed with the
police a complaint for physical injuries but nothing came of it. Later, she learned from Dinamling that
he had been discharged as a policeman.18

The trial court specifically ascribed credibility on the said testimony of AAA which the Court of
Appeals has affirmed. Under such circumstances, this Court has little option but to accord said
findings with great respect, if not finality. The findings off act of the trial court, as regards the
credibility of a witness, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals and supported by the evidence on
record are accorded finality.19

In addition to AAA's testimony, her mother DDD also testified that her daughter was "like a corpse"
because of Dinamling's maltreatment. DDD narrated the history of maltreatment of her daughter,
including the times that she saw her with "bluish spots" and when AAA had a miscarriage from all the
boxing and kicking that she had received from Dinamling.20 She knew that Dinamling was a married
man when he had his relationship with AAA21 and she knew for a fact that Dinamling did not live with
AAA and the children because he always went home to his own wife.22

The above testimonies suffice to establish the elements of the crime as defined in Section 5(i) of RA
No. 9262 and as alleged in the two Informations filed against petitioner. The provision of the law
states:

Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor children or access to the woman's child/children.

From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of RA No. 9262, the elements of the
crime are derived as follows:

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;23

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the
offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender
has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or
illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;24

(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and

(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the
children or similar such acts or omissions.25

As for the first case, Criminal Case No. 1701, filed against petitioner Dinamling, the elements have
been proven and duly established. It is undisputed that AAA, as the victim, is a woman who was
then in a five-year ongoing relationship with petitioner Dinamling. At that time, AAA and Dinamling
had two common children. AAA was often in fear of petitioner due to the latter's physical and verbal
abuse. In the evening of March 14, 2007, an incident occurred in which she and her children were
actually evicted by Dinamling from a boarding house. Dinamling, in the presence of his own friend
and the children, accused AAA of using the boarding house as a "whore-house" and alleged that
AAA brought sexual partners in that place. Dinamling further humiliated AAA by telling her to pack
her clothes in a trash bag and in a carton box used to pack ducklings. He then threw a baby bottle
outside and broke it. This forced AAA to hastily leave even without her children. Dinamling also left
and took with him the elder child and left the baby behind. AAA had to ask for her friends to fetch the
children but the latter found only the baby. According to AAA and her mother DDD, that incident was
not an isolated one, as similar incidents had happened previously.

As for the second case, Criminal Case No. 1702, the crime's elements were likewise proven. In
addition to the first two elements of the victim being a woman and in a relationship with the offender,
the prosecution was able to prove another incident of mental or emotional anguish through public
ridicule or humiliation when it showed Dinamling acting in the following manner: a) by calling and
counting down on AAA for the latter to come out of the house where she was staying;

b) by punching AAA at the left ear upon seeing her;

c) by shouting AAA's family name and calling her "good-for-nothing;"

d) by saying that AAA could sue him but he would just pay her;

e) by kicking AAA to the ground and then pulling off her pants and underwear (panty) and
calling her worthless;

f) by throwing the pants and panty back at AAA while shouting AAA's family name as he left.
All such acts were committed while in full view and hearing of the public, highlighting the public
ridicule and humiliation done on AAA and causing her mental and emotional pain. AAA's suffering is
so much that even the sound of petitioner's motorcycle would put fear in her.

All the above, as established during trial, lead to no other conclusion than the commission of the
crime as prescribed in the law.

It matters not that no other eyewitness corroborated AAA's testimony of the actual incidents. The
testimony of the complainant as a lone witness to the actual perpetration of the act, as long as it is
credible, suffices to establish the guilt of the accused because evidence is weighed and not
counted.26 If, in criminal cases of rape27 or homicide,28 the positive, categorical and credible testimony
of a lone witness is deemed enough to support a conviction, then, in the case at bar, involving a
case of violation of Section 5(i) of RA No. 9262, this Court shall treat in the same manner the
testimony of a single but credible witness for the prosecution. Especially if the testimony bears the
earmarks of truth and sincerity and was delivered spontaneously, naturally and in a straightforward
manner, corroborative testimony is not needed to support a conviction.29

It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted
on victims who are women and children. Other forms of psychological violence, as well as physical,
sexual and economic violence, are addressed and penalized in other sub-parts of Section 5.

The law defines psychological violence as follows:

Section 3(a)

xxxx

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional
suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to
property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes
causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of
the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive
injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.

Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional
anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator,
while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended
party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof
of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish
mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such
experiences are personal to this party.30 All of this was complied with in the case at bar. In the face of
the strong and credible testimony of AAA, petitioner Dinamling relies on a defense of denial and
alibi. On the nights of March 14 and 20, 2007, he claimed that he was on duty at XXX Police
Station.31 He denied seeing AAA on those dates.32 However, on cross examination, he admitted that it
takes only two to three minutes to go from the police station to AAA's boarding house.33

Denial and alibi, as defenses of an accused in a criminal case, have been consistently held as
inherently weak34 and which, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over
the positive declarations of the victim.35 In general, a plea of denial and alibi is not given much weight
relative to the affirmative testimony of the offended party.36 The only exception to this rule is where
there is no effective identification, or where the identification of the accused has been fatally tainted
by irregularity and attendant inconsistencies.37

In the case at bar, nothing in Dinamling's defense overcomes the clear, straightforward, unequivocal
and positive declarations of AAA. For one, the positive identification of Dinamling as the perpetrator
is not an issue. It is not disputed that he and AAA knew each other very well as, in fact, they were at
that time carrying on a five-year relationship which had borne two common children.

Then, as for alibi, such a defense would prosper only if the accused was able to prove that not only
was heat some other place when the crime was committed, but also that he could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime, or in its immediate vicinity, during its
commission.38 Using such standards, Dinamling's alibi holds no water. Not only was his alleged
location at the time of commission, that is, the XXX Police Station where he was on duty, in the
same municipality as the crimes' place of commission, Dinamling himself also admited that this
police station is just "two to three minutes" away from AAA's boarding house. Where the accused
admits that he was in the same municipality as the place where the offense occurred, it cannot be
said that it was physically impossible for him to have committed the crime, and his defense of alibi
cannot prosper.39

Therefore, the trial and appellate courts correctly found petitioner Dinamling guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and such conviction must be upheld. To reiterate, the denial of the accused is a
negative assertion that is weaker than the affirmative testimony of the victim.40 It almost has no
probative value and may be further discarded in the absence of any evidence of ill motives on the
part of the witness to impute so grave a wrong against the accused.41 As for alibi, it is not given
weight if the accused failed to demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been
physically present at the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity when the crime was
committed.42

But petitioner Dinamling also harps on the allegedly exculpatory testimony of Dr. Diaz, the substance
of which allegedly frees him from responsibility for the incomplete abortion of AAA's unborn child.

By way of background, a witness, who is an officer of the Ifugao Provincial Hospital, brought a copy
of a medical certificate issued by a Dr. Johan Baguilat stating that:

a) AAA was hospitalized at the said hospital from March 21 to March 24, 2007;

b) AAA had an incomplete abortion secondary to the mauling, and;

c) AAA had anemia, contusion, hematoma and abrasion of the left elbow.43

The witness testified that she herself typed the medical certificate and had it signed by Dr.
Baguilat.44 Dr. Baguilat, however, was unable to testify, due to the alleged distance of the court from
his current place of work.45 Instead of Dr. Baguilat, it was Dr. Mae Codamon-Diaz, an obstetrician-
gynecologist of the Ifugao Provincial Hospital, who testified that the medical certificate indicated that
AAA was pregnant, but that her incomplete abortion might or might not have been caused by her
"mauling."46 Dr. Diaz added that the anemia was caused by profuse bleeding, while the contusion
and hematoma were caused by a fall, trauma, blow or impact to the patient's body.47 When cross-
examined, Dr. Diaz stated that other possible causes of abortion include infection of the reproductive
organ or urinary tract infection and intake of strong medicines, while another cause of anemia is
malnutrition.48
Petitioner Dinamling's position is that such testimony of Dr. Diaz, which expresses an uncertainty as
to whether the mauling of AAA caused her abortion, exculpates him from the crime.

The Court disagrees. Petitioner barks up the wrong tree because the fact of AAA's physical injuries
from the mauling, including her abortion, do not constitute an element of the crime with which he is
charged. Such injuries are likewise not alleged in the two informations against him. Therefore, the
testimony of Dr. Diaz or any physician as to the fact or existence of such physical injuries is not
indispensable to petitioner's conviction or acquittal. Simply put, AAA's physical condition is not an
element of the crime that petitioner was charged with, hence, proof of the same is, strictly speaking,
unnecessary.

In fact, neither the physical injuries suffered by the victim nor the actual physical violence done by
the perpetrator are necessary to prove the essential elements of the crime as defined in Section 5(i)
of RA 9262. The only exception is, as in the case at bar, when the physical violence done by the
accused is alleged to have caused the mental and emotional suffering; in which case, such acts of
physical violence must be proven. In this instance, the physical violence was a means of causing
mental or emotional suffering. As such, whether or not it led to actual bodily injury, the physical
violence translates to psychological violence since its main effect was on the victim's mental or
emotional well-being. In the case at bar, petitioner Dinamling's acts of publicly punching, kicking and
stripping AAA of her pants and underwear, although obvious acts of physical violence, are also
instances of psychological violence since it was alleged and proven that they resulted in AAA's
public ridicule and humiliation and mental or emotional distress. The clear, unrebutted testimony of
the victim AAA, as to the physical violence done on her as well as to the mental and emotional
suffering she experienced as a result thereof, suffices to prove such facts.

The victim's resulting actual bodily injuries are immaterial unless such injuries are also alleged to
have led to her mental or emotional anguish. There was no such allegation in the information in the
case at bar. Thus, proof of physical injuries is not needed for conviction. Likewise, proof of the
absence thereof or lack of proof of such injuries would not lead to an acquittal. Physical violence or
physical injuries, in isolation, are not elements of this particular crime.

As earlier discussed, the focus of this particular criminal act is the causation of non-physical
suffering, that is, mental or emotional distress, or even anxiety and social shame or dishonor on the
offended party, and not of direct bodily harm or property damage which are covered by the other
subsections of the law's provision. The use of physical violence, whether or not it causes physical or
property harm to the victim, falls under Section 5(i) only if it is alleged and proven to have caused
mental or emotional anguish. Likewise, the physical injuries suffered are similarly covered only if
they lead to such psychological harm. Otherwise, physical violence or injuries, with no allegation of
mental or emotional harm, are punishable under the other provisions of the law.

As to the alleged miscarriage or incomplete abortion, the allegedly exculpatory testimony of Dr. Diaz,
or even the complete disregard of any evidence surrounding such fact does not lead to petitioner
Dinamling's acquittal. Like the physical injuries that was discussed above, the fact of AAA's
miscarriage or incomplete abortion is not essential to proving the elements of the crime, unless it is
alleged to have caused mental or emotional suffering. It is not among the crime's elements. In fact, it
is not abortion but the mere fact of pregnancy of the victim at the time of commission which is an
aggravating circumstance, not an element, of the offense. Section 6 of RA 9262 reads:

SECTION 6. Penalties.- The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5
hereof shall be punished according to the following rules:

xxxx
(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor.

If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in the presence of her
child, the penalty to be applied shall be the maximum period of penalty prescribed in the section.

In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One
hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) but not more than three hundred thousand pesos
(₱300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall
report compliance to the court.49

For this crime, pregnancy or the presence of the woman's child are aggravating circumstances which
increase the imposable penalty, thus, they must be alleged and proven with competent evidence for
the penalty to be properly imposed.50

It is true that the fact of AAA's incomplete abortion or miscarriage does not establish any of the
crime's elements, as indeed the information itself did not allege the same. However, from the fact of
miscarriage one may logically derive the fact of AAA's pregnancy, which is an aggravating
circumstance for the crime and which is alleged as such in the information. The pregnancy is proven
by AAA's unrebutted testimony as well as by the medical certificate that she presented in the course
of such testimony to show that she was indeed hospitalized and suffered an "incomplete abortion
secondary to the mauling."

Although petitioner Dinamling, up to this stage of the case, denies having caused the incomplete
abortion or miscarriage, he does not deny the fact of pregnancy itself. He did not present
contradictory evidence during trial to controvert the prosecution's assertions and proof of pregnancy.
The pregnancy was never put in issue during trial and on appeal. Neither is the same in question in
this petition. Therefore, it may be safely concluded that the fact of AAA's pregnancy has been
established and it may be taken account of and considered as a circumstance that aggravates
Dinamling's criminal liability.

Therefore, given such finding, this Court will now accordingly modify the penalties imposed by the
trial court and appellate court.51

As for Criminal Case No. 1701, no mitigating and only one (1) aggravating circumstance attends the
crime. Although it was stated during trial that the offense was committed in the presence of AAA's
1âwphi1

children, such fact was not alleged in the information and therefore will not be taken into
consideration.52 Nighttime, though alleged, is not considered aggravating because it neither
facilitated the commission of the offense nor was it shown to have been purposely sought by the
offender.53 The fact of AAA's pregnancy during the crime's commission, however, has been alleged
and established. This single circumstance aggravates the accused's liability and automatically raises
his penalty to the maximum period of the penalty prescribed, per Section 6 of RA 9262 and also
Article 64(3) of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, petitioner Dinamling should be sentenced to a
maximum penalty that is derived from prision mayor in its maximum period, which is imprisonment of
ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,54 the
minimum penalty should come from the penalty one degree lower than prision mayor which is prision
correccional, whose range is from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.55 Therefore, this
Court modifies the trial court's Order dated September 17, 2009,56 which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, and imposes on petitioner Dinamling an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eleven (11) years of
prision mayor as maximum. The trial court's order for petitioner to pay a fine of one hundred
thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) and to undergo psychological counseling, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, is upheld.
As for Criminal Case No. 1702, there is likewise no mitigating and only one (1) aggravating
circumstance. Again, the single circumstance of pregnancy aggravates the accused's liability and
automatically raises his penalty to the maximum period of the penalty prescribed, per Section 6 of
RA No. 9262 and Article 64(3) of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the penalty imposed by the
Court of Appeals are to be modified. The maximum penalty should be derived from prision mayor in
its maximum period, which, again, is imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years. And again, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum should be derived from
the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correccional. Therefore, the new penalty to be
imposed shall be imprisonment of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to twelve (12)
years of prision mayor as maximum. The rest of the penalties, like the imposition on the petitioner of
a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) and the order for him to undergo psychological
counseling, as upheld by the appellate court, are hereby affirmed.

Both Criminal Case Nos. 1701 and 1702 involve the same offense as defined in RA 9262 and are
punishable by the same range of penalties as prescribed in the said law. However, due to the
greater ignominy of the acts done by the accused in Criminal Case No. 1702, the minimum and
maximum lengths of the sentence imposed should therefore be greater than in Criminal Case No.
1701.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for failure of petitioner to show any
reversible error in the assailed CA decision. The assailed Decision dated August 11, 2011 and
Resolution dated November 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 32912, are hereby
AFFIRMED and MODIFIED only as to the penalties imposed, to wit:

1) in Criminal Case No. 1701, petitioner Ricky Dinamling is ORDERED to serve an

indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional as minimum to eleven (11) years of prision mayor as maximum. He is,
likewise, ORDERED to PAY a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) and to
undergo psychological counseling;

2) in Criminal Case No. 1702, petitioner Ricky Dinamling is hereby ORDERED to serve an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of six ( 6) years of prision correccional as minimum
to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum. He is also ORDERED to PAY a fine of
one hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) and to undergo psychological counseling.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ***

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 193960 January 7, 2013

KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO, Petitioner,

vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY
ITS PRESIDING JUDGE MA. ANGELICA T. PARAS-QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA); AND ABC,1 Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The Court will not read into Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 a provision that would render it toothless in
the pursuit of the declared policy of the State to protect women and children from violence and
threats to their personal safety and security.

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Orders dated September 13,
20102 and October 5, 20103 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in Criminal
Case No. 09-5210 which denied petitioner’s Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
with Motion to Quash the Information.

The Facts

Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of Angeles City,
Branch 59, in an Information which states:

That on or about the 13th day of July, 2009, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the boyfriend of the
complainant, x x x did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use personal violence on
the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching complainant’s back, shoulder and left eye, thereby
demeaning and degrading the complainant’s intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, in
violation of Section 5(a) of the Republic Act 9262.4

After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found probable cause and consequently, issued a
warrant of arrest against petitioner on November 19, 2009. The latter posted a cash bond for his
provisional liberty and on August 12, 2010, filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause with Motion to Quash the Information. Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged
incident on July 13, 2009, he was no longer in a dating relationship with private respondent; hence,
RA 9262 was inapplicable.

In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended prior to
the subject incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought payment of the money she had
lent to petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then inquired from petitioner if he was responsible
for spreading rumors about her which he admitted. Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner
causing the latter to inflict on her the physical injuries alleged in the Information.
 The RTC Ruling

The RTC denied petitioner’s motion. It did not consider material the fact that the parties’ dating
relationship had ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since the parties had admitted a prior
dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical injuries constituted an act of violence against
women and their children as defined in Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262.

Issues

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues: 1) whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the
offense; 2) whether RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that will favor the accused; and 3)
whether the Information alleging a fact contrary to what has been admitted should be quashed.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical injuries to private respondent is not covered
by RA 9262 because its proximate cause was not their dating relationship. Instead, he claims that
the offense committed was only slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code which falls
under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.

The Court is not persuaded.

Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their children"
refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or
with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm
or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x.

The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be
considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed
against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender’s wife, former wife, or with whom he has
or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is
likely to result in physical harm or suffering.

In Ang v. Court of Appeals,5 the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence against
women through harassment, to wit:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of

harassment against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.6

Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a
consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence,
applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the
courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the
offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial
whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or
present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm
was committed. Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give
credence to petitioner's assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating
relationship.

Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of lenity7 because there
is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction. While the degree of physical
harm under RA 9262 and Article 2668 of the Revised Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient
justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative intent is to
purposely impose a more severe sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm
women with whom they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the
end in view of promoting the protection of women and children.

Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of the crime, such
as: a dating relationship between the petitioner and the private respondent; the act of violence
committed by the petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to private respondent, the offense is
covered by RA 9262 which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of the
said law which reads:

SEC. 7. Venue – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the
absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant.

Finally, the Court finds the Order9 of the RTC, giving the prosecutor a period of two (2) days to
amend the Information to reflect the cessation of the dating relationship between the petitioner and
the offended party, to be in accord with Sec. 4 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.- If the motion to quash is based on an alleged

defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that
an amendment be made. 1âwphi 1

Furthermore, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that an information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his
plea. In the present case, the accused petitioner has not yet been arraigned, hence, the RTC was
correct in directing the amendment of the Information and in denying the motion to quash the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated September 13, 2010 and October 5,
2010 of the Regional Trial Court ( RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 09-5210
are AF.FI RM ED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court is LIFTED and the RTC is
directed to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 09-5210.

SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D.BRION MARIANO C. DELCASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 201043 June 16, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Armed Forces of the Philippines

Finance Center (AFPFC), Petitioner,
vs.
DAISY R. YAHON, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to nullify and set
aside the Decision1 dated November 29, 2011 and Resolution2 dated March 9, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) Mindanao Station in CA-G.R. SP No. 02953-MIN. The CA affirmed the orders and
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 22 granting temporary
and permanent protection orders, and denying the motion to lift the said temporary protection order
(TPO).

Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) filed a petition for the issuance of protection order under the provisions
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,3 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004," against her husband, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon (S/Sgt. Yahon), an enlisted
personnel of the Philippine Army who retired in January 2006. Respondent and S/Sgt. Yahon were
married on June 8, 2003. The couple did not have any child but respondent has a daughter with her
previous live-in partner.

On September 28, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, as follows:

Finding the herein petition for the Issuance of Protection Order to be sufficient in form and substance
and to prevent great and irreparable injury to the petitioner, a TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER
is forthwith issued to respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON directing him to do the following
acts:

1. Respondent is enjoined from threatening to commit or committing further acts of physical

abuse and violence against the petitioner;

2. To stay away at a distance of at least 500 meters from petitioner, her residence or her
place of work;

3. To refrain from harassing, annoying, intimidating, contacting or communicating with

petitioner; 4. Respondent is prohibited from using or possessing any firearm or deadly
weapon on occasions not related to his job;

5. To provide reasonable financial spousal support to the petitioner.

The Local Police Officers and the Barangay Officials through the Chairman in the area where the
petitioner and respondent live at Poblacion, Claveria, Misamis Oriental and Bobuntogan, Jasaan,
Misamis Oriental are directed to respond to any request for assistance from the petitioner for the
implementation of this order. They are also directed to accompany the petitioner to their conjugal
abode at Purok 2, Bobuntogan, Jasaan, Misamis Oriental to get her personal belongings in order to
insure the safety of the petitioner.

The Deputy Sheriff of this Court is ordered to immediately serve the Temporary Protection Order
(TPO) upon the respondent personally and to seek and obtain the assistance of law enforcement
agents, if needed, for purposes of effecting the smooth implementation of this order.

In the meantime, let copy of this order and petition be served upon the respondent for him to file an
OPPOSITION within a period of five (5) days from receipt hereof and let a Preliminary Conference
and hearing on the merits be set on October 17, 2006 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.

To insure that petitioner can receive a fair share of respondent’s retirement and other benefits, the
following agencies thru their heads are directed to WITHHOLD any retirement, pension and other
benefits of respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON, a member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines assigned at 4ID, Camp Evangelista, Patag, Cagayan de Oro City until further orders from
the court:

1. Commanding General/Officer of the Finance Center of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;

2. The Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;

3. The Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City.

VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW.

IF THE RESPONDENT APPEARS WITHOUT COUNSEL ON THE DATE OF THE

PRELIMINARYCONFERENCE AND HEARING ON THE MERITS OF THE ISSUANCE OF A
PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER, THE COURT SHALL NOT RESCHEDULE OR POSTPONE
THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND HEARING BUT SHALL APPOINT A LAWYER FOR THE
RESPONDENT AND IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH THE SAID HEARING.

IF THE RESPONDENT FAILS TO APPEAR ON THE DATE OF THE PRELIMINARY

CONFERENCE AND HEARING ON THE MERITS DESPITE PROPER NOTICE, THE COURT
SHALL ALLOW EX-PARTE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE BY THE PETITIONER AND RENDER
JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD. NO
DELEGATION OF THE RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE SHALL BE ALLOWED.

SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis supplied.)

S/Sgt. Yahon, having been personally served with copy of the TPO, appeared during the scheduled
pre-trial but informed the court that he did not yet have a counsel and requested for time to hire his
own counsel. However, he did not hire a counsel nor file an opposition or answer to the petition.
Because of his failure to appear in the subsequent hearings of the case, the RTC allowed the ex-
parte presentation of evidence to determine the necessity of issuance of a Permanent Protection
Order (PPO).
Meanwhile, as prayed for by respondent who manifested that S/Sgt. Yahon deliberately refused to
give her spousal support as directed in the TPO (she claimed that she had no source of livelihood
since he had told her to resign from her job and concentrate on keeping their house), the RTC
issued another order directing S/Sgt. Yahon to give respondent spousal support in the amount of
₱4,000.00 per month and fifty percent (50%) of his retirement benefits which shall be automatically
deducted and given directly to respondent.5

In her testimony, respondent also said that S/Sgt. Yahon never complied with the TPO as he
continued making threats and inflicting physical abuse on her person, and failed to give her spousal
support as ordered by the court.

On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision,6 as follows:

After careful review and scrutiny of the evidence presented in this case, this court finds that there is
a need to permanently protect the applicant, Daisy R. Yahon from further acts of violence that might
be committed by respondent against her. Evidences showed that respondent who was a member of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines assigned at the Headquarters 4ID Camp Evangelista, Cagayan
de Oro City had been repeatedly inflicting physical, verbal, emotional and economic abuse and
violence upon the petitioner. Respondent in several instances had slapped, mauled and punched
petitioner causing her physical harm. Exhibits G and D are medical certificates showing physical
injuries suffered by petitioner inflicted by the respondent at instances of their marital altercations.
Respondent at the height of his anger often poked a gun on petitioner and threatened to massacre
her and her child causing them to flee for their lives and sought refuge from other people. He had
demanded sex from petitioner at an unreasonable time when she was sick and chilling and when
refused poked a gun at her. Several police blotters were offered as evidence by petitioner
documenting the incidents when she was subjected to respondent’s ill temper and ill treatment.
Verbally, petitioner was not spared from respondent’s abuses by shouting at her that he was wishing
she would die and he would celebrate if it happens and by calling and sending her threatening text
messages. These incidents had caused petitioner great psychological trauma causing her [to] fear
for her life and these forced her to seek refuge from the court for protection. Economically, petitioner
was also deprived by respondent of her spousal support despite order of the court directing him to
give a monthly support of Php4,000.00. In view of the foregoing, this court finds a need to protect the
life of the petitioner not only physically but also emotionally and psychologically.

Based on the evidence presented, both oral and documentary, and there being no controverting
evidence presented by respondent, this Court finds that the applicant has established her case by
preponderance of evidence.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition, thus,
pursuant to Sec. 30 of A.M. No. 04-10-1-SC, let a PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER be issued
immediately and respondent, S/Sgt. CHARLES A.YAHON is ordered to give to petitioner, DAISY R.
YAHON the amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (Php4,000.00) per month by way of spousal
support.

Pursuant to the order of the court dated February 6, 2007, respondent, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon is
directed to give it to petitioner 50% of whatever retirement benefits and other claims that may be due
or released to him from the government and the said share of petitioner shall be automatically
deducted from respondent’s benefits and claims and be given directly to the petitioner, Daisy R.
Yahon.

Let copy of this decision be sent to the Commanding General/Officer of Finance Center of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City; the Management of RSBS, Camp
Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City and the Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan de
Oro City for their guidance and strict compliance.

SO ORDERED.7 (Emphasis supplied.)

Herein petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC), assisted by the Office of
the Judge Advocate General (OTJAG), AFP, filed before the RTC a Manifestation and Motion (To
Lift Temporary Protection Order Against the AFP)8 dated November 10, 2008. Stating that it was
making a limited and special appearance, petitioner manifested that on August 29, 2008, it furnished
the AFP Pension and Gratuity Management Center (PGMC) copy of the TPO for appropriate action.
The PGMC, on September 2, 2008, requested the Chief, AFPFC the temporary withholding of the
thirty-six (36) Months Lump Sum (MLS) due to S/Sgt. Yahon. Thereafter, on October 29, 2008,
PGMC forwarded a letter to the Chief of Staff, AFP for the OTJAG for appropriate action on the TPO,
and requesting for legal opinion as to the propriety of releasing the 36 MLS of S/Sgt. Yahon.
Petitioner informed the RTC that S/Sgt. Yahon’s check representing his 36 MLS had been
processed and is ready for payment by the AFPFC, but to date said check has not been claimed by
respondent.

Petitioner further asserted that while it has initially discharged its obligation under the TPO, the RTC
had not acquired jurisdiction over the military institution due to lack of summons, and hence the
AFPFC cannot be bound by the said court order. Additionally, petitioner contended that the AFPFC
is not a party-in-interest and is a complete stranger to the proceedings before the RTC on the
issuance of TPO/PPO. Not being impleaded in the case, petitioner lamented that it was not afforded
due process and it was thus improper to issue execution against the AFPFC. Consequently,
petitioner emphasized its position that the AFPFC cannot be directed to comply with the TPO without
violating its right to procedural due process.

In its Order9 dated December 17, 2008, the RTC denied the aforesaid motion for having been filed
out of time. It noted that the September 28, 2006 TPO and July 23, 2007 Decision granting
Permanent Protection Order (PPO) to respondent had long become final and executory.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied under the RTC’s Order10 dated March 6,
2009.

On May 27, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA praying for the nullification of
the aforesaid orders and decision insofar as it directs the AFPFC to automatically deduct from S/Sgt.
Yahon’s retirement and pension benefits and directly give the same to respondent as spousal
support, allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Respondent filed her Comment with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction, manifesting that
there is no information as to whether S/Sgt. Yahon already received his retirement benefit and that
the latter has repeatedly violated the TPO, particularly on the provision of spousal support.

After due hearing, the CA‘s Twenty-Second Division issued a Resolution11 granting respondent’s
application, viz:

Upon perusal of the respective pleadings filed by the parties, the Court finds meritorious private
respondent’s application for the issuance of an injunctive relief. While the 36-month lump sum
retirement benefits of S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon has already been given to him, yet as admitted by
petitioner itself, the monthly pension after the mentioned retirement benefits has not yet been
released to him. It appears that the release of such pension could render ineffectual the eventual
ruling of the Court in this Petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION issue enjoining the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center, its employees, agents, representatives, and any all
persons acting on its behalf, from releasing the remaining pension that may be due to S/Sgt. Charles
A. Yahon.

SO ORDERED.12

By Decision dated November 29, 2011, the CA denied the petition for certiorari and affirmed the
assailed orders and decision of the RTC. The CA likewise denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

In this petition, the question of law presented is whether petitioner military institution may be ordered
to automatically deduct a percentage from the retirement benefits of its enlisted personnel, and to
give the same directly to the latter’s lawful wife as spousal support in compliance with a protection
order issued by the RTC pursuant to R.A. No. 9262.

A protection order is an order issued by the court to prevent further acts of violence against women
and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary relief. Its
purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily
life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.13 The protection orders
issued by the court may be a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) or a Permanent Protection Order
(PPO), while a protection order that may be issued by the barangay shall be known as a Barangay
Protection Order (BPO).14

Section 8 of R.A. No. 9262 enumerates the reliefs that may be included in the TPO, PPO or BPO, to
wit:

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or

through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;

(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or

otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;

(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the petitioner, regardless
of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the petitioner,
or permanently where no property rights are violated, and if respondent must remove
personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to
accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until respondent has gathered his
things and escort respondent from the residence;

(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and any designated family or
household member at a distance specified by the court, and to stay away from the residence,
school, place of employment, or any specified place frequented by the petitioner and any
designated family or household member;

(e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and other essential
personal effects, regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law enforcement
officer to accompany the petitioner to the residence of the parties to ensure that the
petitioner is safely restored to the possession of the automobile and other essential personal
effects, or to supervise the petitioner’s or respondent’s removal of personal belongings;
 (f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the petitioner;

(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled to
legal support. Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an appropriate
percentage of the income or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the
respondent's employer for the same to be automatically remitted directly to the woman.
Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance of support to the woman
and/or her child without justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his employer liable
for indirect contempt of court;

(h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any firearm or deadly
weapon and order him to surrender the same to the court for appropriate disposition by the
court, including revocation of license and disqualification to apply for any license to use or
possess a firearm. If the offender is a law enforcement agent, the court shall order the
offender to surrender his firearm and shall direct the appropriate authority to investigate on
the offender and take appropriate action on matter;

(i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted, including, but not limited
to, property damage, medical expenses, child care expenses and loss of income;

(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner temporary shelter and
other social services that the petitioner may need; and

(k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary to protect and
provide for the safety of the petitioner and any designated family or household member,
provided petitioner and any designated family or household member consents to such relief.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner argues that it cannot comply with the RTC’s directive for the automatic deduction of 50%
from S/Sgt. Yahon’s retirement benefits and pension to be given directly to respondent, as it
contravenes an explicit mandate under the law governing the retirement and separation of military
personnel.

The assailed provision is found in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1638,15 which states: Section 31.
The benefits authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be subject to
attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall they be assigned,
ceded, or conveyed to any third person: Provided, That if a retired or separated officer or enlisted
man who is entitled to any benefit under this Decree has unsettled money and/or property
accountabilities incurred while in the active service, not more than fifty per centum of the pension
gratuity or other payment due such officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this Decree may be
withheld and be applied to settle such accountabilities. (Emphasis supplied.)

A similar provision is found in R.A. No. 8291, otherwise known as the "Government Service
Insurance System Act of 1997," which reads:

SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien -- x x x

xxxx

The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies
corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment,
execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative
bodies including Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the
members, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his
exercise or performance of his official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with
his position or work except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the
GSIS.

In Sarmiento v. Intermediate Appellate Court,16 we held that a court order directing the Philippine
National Bank to refrain from releasing to petitioner all his retirement benefits and to deliver one-half
of such monetary benefits to plaintiff as the latter’s conjugal share is illegal and improper, as it
violates Section 26 of CA 186 (old GSIS Law) which exempts retirement benefits from execution.

The foregoing exemptions have been incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, which governs execution of judgments and court orders. Section 13 of Rule 39
enumerates those properties which are exempt from execution:

SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution.– Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:

xxxx

(l) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such support, or any pension
or gratuity from the Government;(Emphasis supplied.)

It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later
enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will.17 Statutes must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.18 However, if several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to the
later enactment. The later law is the latest expression of the legislative will.19

We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as laying
down an exception to the general rule above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt from
execution. The law itself declares that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of the
income or salary of the respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically remitted directly to
the woman "[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary."

Petitioner further contends that the directive under the TPO to segregate a portion of S/Sgt. Yahon’s
retirement benefits was illegal because said moneys remain as public funds, citing the case of
Pacific Products v. Ong.20 In that case, this Court sustained the CA when it held that the garnishment
of the amount of ₱10,500 payable to BML Trading and Supply while it was still in the possession of
the Bureau of Telecommunications was illegal and therefore, null and void. The CA therein relied on
the previous rulings in Director of Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion21 and Avendano v. Alikpala,
et al.22 wherein this Court declared null and void the garnishment of the salaries of government
employees.

Citing the two aforementioned cases, we thus declared in Pacific Products:

A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers,
although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in
the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty may not be
sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers
to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that
moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the
Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a
specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every
consideration of public policy forbids it.23

We disagree.

Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term "employer," which includes in its coverage the
military institution, S/Sgt. Yahon’s employer. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all employers, whether private or government.

It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and child support, is a support enforcement
legislation. In the United States, provisions of the Child Support Enforcement Act24 allow
1âwphi 1

garnishment of certain federal funds where the intended recipient has failed to satisfy a legal
obligation of child support. As these provisions were designed "to avoid sovereign immunity
problems" and provide that "moneys payable by the Government to any individual are subject to
child support enforcement proceedings," the law is clearly intended to "create a limited waiver of
sovereign immunity so that state courts could issue valid orders directed against Government
agencies attaching funds in their possession."25

This Court has already ruled that R.A. No. 9262 is constitutional and does not violate the equal
protection clause. In Garcia v. Drilon26 the issue of constitutionality was raised by a husband after the
latter failed to obtain an injunction from the CA to enjoin the implementation of a protection order
issued against him by the RTC. We ruled that R.A. No. 9262 rests on real substantial distinctions
which justify the classification under the law: the unequal power relationship between women and
men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread
bias and prejudice against women.

We further held in Garcia that the classification is germane to the purpose of the law, viz:

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to
address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as
follows:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.– It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and
children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect
the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and
children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.27

Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child support specifically address one form of
violence committed against women – economic abuse.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent
which includes, but is not limited to the following:
 1. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other
spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the
Family Code;

2. Deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and
enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;

3. Destroying household property;

4. Controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money
or properties.28

The relief provided in Section 8(g) thus fulfills the objective of restoring the dignity of women who are
victims of domestic violence and provide them continued protection against threats to their personal
safety and security.

"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is
afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to
safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing
acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award
temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction
by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."29

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated November 29, 2011 and
Resolution dated March 9, 2012 of the Court of Appeals Mindanao Station in CA-G.R. SP No.
02953-MIN are AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
 SECOND DIVISION

March 8, 2017

G.R. No. 188400

MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE, Petitioner

vs
RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR., Respondent

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Psychological incapacity is a mental illness that leads to an inability to comply with or comprehend
essential marital obligations.

This resolves the Petition for Review1 filed by Maria Teresa B. Tani- De La Fuente (Maria Teresa)
assailing the Court of Appeals Decision2 and Resolution3 dated August 29, 2008 and May 25, 2009,
respectively, in CA- G.R. CV. No. 76243, which reversed the Decision4 dated August 14, 2002 of
Branch 107 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q- 99-37829.

Petitioner Maria Teresa and respondent Rodolfo De La Fuente, Jr. (Rodolfo) first met when they
were students at the University of Sto. Tomas. Soon thereafter, they became sweethearts.5

After graduating from college, Maria Teresa found work at the University of Sto. Tomas Treasurer's
Office.6 Meanwhile, Rodolfo, who was unable to finish his college degree, found continued
employment at his family's printing press business.7

While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert and
was prone to jealousy.8 She also observed that Rodolfo appeared to have no ambition in life and felt
insecure of his siblings, who excelled in their studies and careers.9

On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa and Rodolfo got married in Mandaluyong City. They had two
children: Maria Katharyn, who was born on May 23, 1985, and Maria Kimberly, who was born on
April 6, 1986.10

Rodolfo's attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life. He was jealous of everyone who
talked to Maria Teresa, and would even skip work at his family's printing press to stalk
her.11 Rodolfo's jealousy was so severe that he once poked a gun at his own 15-year old cousin who
was staying at their house because he suspected his cousin of being Maria Teresa's lover.12
In addition, Rodolfo treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave. They would have sex four (4) or five (5)
times a day.13 At times, Rodolfo would fetch Maria Teresa from her office during her lunch break, just
so they could have sex.14 During sexual intercourse, Rodolfo would either tie her to the bed or poke
her with things.15 Rodolfo also suggested that they invite a third person with them while having sex,
or for Maria Teresa to have sex with another man in Rodolfo's presence.16 Rodolfo's suggestions
made Maria Teresa feel molested and maltreated.17 Whenever Maria Teresa refused Rodolfo's
advances or suggestions, he would get angry and they would quarrel.18

Maria Teresa sought the advice of a doctor, a lawyer, and a priest, as well as any person she
thought could help her and Rodolfo.19 Maria Teresa also suggested that she and Rodolfo undergo
marriage counselling, but Rodolfo refused and deemed it as mere "kalokohan".20

Sometime in 1986, the couple quarrelled because Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa was having
an affair.21 In the heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa's head. Maria Teresa,
with their two (2) daughters in tow, left Rodolfo and their conjugal home after the gunpoking incident.
Maria Teresa never saw Rodolfo again after that, and she supported their children by herself.22

On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage23 before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was initially archived because Rodolfo failed to file a
responsive pleading.24 Maria Teresa moved for the revival of the Petition.25 The trial court granted the
motion and referred the case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for collusion
investigation.26 Assistant City Prosecutor Jocelyn S. Reyes found no collusion and recommended the
trial of the case on the merits.27

Despite notice, Rodolfo failed to attend the scheduled pre-trial conference.28 The pre-trial conference
was declared closed and terminated, and Maria Teresa was allowed to present her evidence.29

Aside from Maria Teresa, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, was presented as
an expert witness.30 Dr. Lopez testified that he conducted an in-depth interview with Maria Teresa to
gather information on her family background and her marital life with Rodolfo, and subjected her to a
battery of psychological tests.31 Dr. Lopez also interviewed Rodolfo's best friend.32

After subjecting Maria Teresa to interviews and tests, Dr. Lopez concluded that Maria Teresa was
not suffering from any severe mental disorder and had no indication of any organic or functional
impairment.33 Although Dr. Lopez found that Maria Teresa had an emotionally disturbed personality,
he opined that this was not severe enough to constitute psychological incapacity.34

Dr. Lopez affirmed that he sent Rodolfo a letter of invitation through registered mail.35 After two (2)
months, Rodolfo contacted Dr. Lopez and said, "Doctor, ano ba ang pakialam niyo sa amin, hindi
niyo naman ako kilala." Dr. Lopez explained that he only wanted to hear Rodolfo's side of the story,
but Rodolfo replied with, "[I]nuulit ko doktor, wala kayong pakialam sa akin."36

Dr. Lopez diagnosed Rodolfo with "paranoid personality disorder manifested by [Rodolfo's]
damaging behavior like reckless driving and extreme jealousy; his being distrustful and suspicious;
his severe doubts and distrust of friends and relatives of [Maria Teresa]; his being irresponsible and
lack of remorse; his resistance to treatment; and his emotional coldness and severe immaturity."37

Dr. Lopez stated that Rodolfo's disorder was one of the severe forms of personality disorder, even
more severe than the other personality disorders like borderline and narcissistic personality
disorders.38 Dr. Lopez explained that Rodolfo's personality disorder was most probably caused by a
pathogenic parental model.39 Rodolfo's family background showed that his father was a psychiatric
patient, and Rodolfo might have developed psychic contamination called double insanity, a symptom
similar to his father's.40 Dr. Lopez further claimed that Rodolfo's disorder was serious and incurable
because of his severe paranoia.41

Dr. Lopez recommended that Maria Teresa and Rodolfo's marriage be annulled due to Rodolfo's
incapacity to perform his marital obligations.42

Summons was served upon Rodolfo but he did not file any responsive leading.43 He likewise did not
appear during the pre-trial conference.44 He was given a specific date to present evidence but he still
failed to appear.45 he trial court eventually deemed his non-appearance as a waiver of his right to
present evidence.46

On June 26, 2002, the trial court directed the Office of the Solicitor General to submit its comment on
Maria Teresa's formal offer of evidence.47 The Office of the Solicitor General was also directed to
submit its certification.48 The Office of the Solicitor General, however, failed to comply with the trial
court's orders; thus, the case was submitted for decision without the certification and comment from
the Office of the Solicitor General.49

On August 14, 2002, the trial court promulgated its Decision50 granting the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage.

While Dr. Lopez was not able to personally examine Rodolfo, the trial court gave credence to his
findings as they were based on information gathered from credible informants. The trial court held
that the marriage between Maria Teresa and Rodolfo should be declared null and void because
"[Rodolfo's] psychological incapacity [was] grave, serious and incurable."51 The dispositive portion of
the trial court's decision reads:

WHEREFORE IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:

(1) Declaring the marriage of petitioner, MARIA TERESA B. TANI DE LA FUENTE to respondent,
RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR. null and void on the ground of respondent's psychological
incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Their conjugal partnership (sic) property
relations is hereby dissolved. There being no mention of properties acquired by the parties, no
pronouncement as to its liquidation and partition is hereby made;

(2) Their children, Maria Katharyn and Maria Kimberly, both surnamed De la Fuente shall remain
legitimate. They shall remain in the custody of the petitioner.

(3) Both parties must support their children. There being no evidence presented as to the capability
of the respondent to give support, no pronouncement is hereby made in the meantime;

(4) Henceforth, the petitioner shall be known by her maiden name, TANI.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars of Quezon City and Mandaluyong
City where the marriage was celebrated upon the finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.52 (Emphasis in the original)

On August 20, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration.53 The
Office of the Solicitor General explained that it was unable to submit the required certification
because it had no copies of the transcripts of stenographic notes.54 It was also unable to inform the
trial court of its lack of transcripts due to the volume of cases it was handling.55
On September 13, 2002, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, with the dispositive
portion reading:

WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General is hereby deemed moot and academic.

This Court would like to call the attention of the Office of the Solicitor General that this case was filed
on June 3, 1999 and there should be no more delay in the disposition of the case.56

The Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals.57 It argued that the
trial court erred a) in deciding the case without the required certification from the Office of the
Solicitor General,58 and b) in giving credence to Dr. Lopez's conclusion of Rodolfo's severe
personality disorder. It held that Dr. Lopez's finding was based on insufficient data and did not follow
the standards set forth in the Molina case.59

The Court of Appeals granted60 the Office of the Solicitor General's appeal.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the testimony of Dr. Lopez was unreliable for being hearsay, thus,
the trial court should not have given it weight.61 The Court of Appeals also disagreed with Dr. Lopez's
finding that Rodolfo's behavior descended from psychological illness contemplated under Article 36
of the Family Code.62

In addition, the Court of Appeals emphasized that Maria Teresa's admission that she married
Rodolfo with the belief that he would change, and that they were in a relationship for five (5) years
before getting married, showed that they were in good terms during the early part of their marriage. It
also negated her claim that Rodolfo's psychological defect existed at the time of the celebration of
their marriage, and that it deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage.63 The
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED AUGUST 14, 2002 is REVERSED and the petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.64 (Emphasis in the original)

Maria Teresa moved for reconsideration65 but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution66 dated May 25, 2009.

On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.67

Petitioner argued that based on current jurisprudence, trial courts had a wider discretion on whether
expert opinion was needed to prove psychological incapacity.68 Petitioner further argued that for as
long as the trial court had basis in concluding that psychological incapacity existed, such conclusion
should be upheld.69

Rodolfo filed a Comment70 stating that he was not opposing Maria Teresa's Petition since "[h]e firmly
believes that there is in fact no more sense in adjudging him and petitioner as married."71

The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment,72 agreed that a physician was not required to
declare a person psychologically incapacitated but emphasized that the evidence presented must be
able to adequately prove the presence of a psychological condition. The Office of the Solicitor
General maintained that Maria Teresa was unable to sufficiently prove Rodolfo's alleged
psychological incapacity.73

The Office of the Solicitor General pointed out that Dr. Lopez's psychological report stated that his
assessment was based on interviews he made with petitioner and two (2) of the parties' common
friends. However, Dr. Lopez did not name the two (2) common friends in the report.74 Furthermore,
during trial Dr. Lopez testified that he only interviewed petitioner and Rodolfo's best friend, not two
(2) friends as indicated in his report.75 The Office of the Solicitor General insisted that the finding of
Rodolfo's psychological incapacity should be dismissed as hearsay as it was based solely on
information given by petitioner to Dr. Lopez.76

The only issue raised for the resolution of this Court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying
the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage because petitioner's evidence was insufficient to
prove that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations.

The Petition is granted.

The 1995 case of Santos v. Court of Appeals77 was the first case that attempted to lay down the
standards for determining psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Santos declared that "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."78 Furthermore, the incapacity "should refer to no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage[.]"79

Two (2) years later, Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,80 provided the guidelines to be followed
when interpreting and applying Article 36 of the Family Code:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear
that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally - subject to our law
on evidence - what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church - while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other - shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.81 (Emphasis in the original)
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that there was sufficient compliance
with Molina to warrant the nullity of petitioner's marriage with respondent. Petitioner was able to
discharge the burden of proof that respondent suffered from psychological incapacity.

The Court of Appeals chided the lower court for giving undue weight to the testimony of Dr. Lopez
since he had no chance to personally conduct a thorough study and analysis of respondent's mental
and psychological condition. The Court of Appeals cited Republic v. Dagdag,82 where this Court held
that "the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and
sufficiently proven by experts."83 The Court of Appeals then ruled that "[o]bviously, this requirement is
not deemed complied with where no psychiatrist or medical doctor testifies on the alleged
psychological incapacity of one party."84

The Court of Appeals is mistaken.

Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes85 states that the non-examination of one of the parties will not
automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or
psychologist, since "marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The
totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and
genuinely witnessed mainly by the other."86

Marcos v. Marcos87 emphasizes that Molina does not require a physician to examine a person and
declare him/her to be psychologically incapacitated. What matters is that the totality of evidence
presented establishes the party's psychological condition.88

Dr. Lopez's testimony, as corroborated by petitioner, sufficiently proved that respondent suffered
from psychological incapacity. Respondent's paranoid personality disorder made him distrustful and
prone to extreme jealousy and acts of depravity, incapacitating him to fully comprehend and assume
the essential obligations of marriage. As the trial court found:

Dr. Lopez testified that he arrived at his conclusion of respondent' [s] personality by taking into
consideration the psychological impression and conclusion he gathered from the analysis of the
different behaviors he manifested during the time that he and petitioner were living together.
According to him, under the Diagnostic Statistical Manual, he found the respondent to be suffering
from a paranoid personality disorder manifested by the respondent's damaging behavior like
reckless driving and extreme jealousy; his being distrustful and suspicious; his severe doubts and
distrust of friends and relatives of the petitioner; his being irresponsible and lack of remorse; his
resistance to treatment; and his emotional coldness and severe immaturity. He also testified that this
kind of disorder is actually one of the severe forms of personality disorder even more severe than
the other personality disorders like the borderline and narcissistic personality disorders.

As to the root cause, [h]e explained that this must have been caused by a pathogenic parental
model. As he investigated the family background of the respondent, Dr. Lopez discovered that his
father was a psychiatric patient such that the respondent developed a similar symptom or psychic
contamination which is called double insanity. This, according to Dr. Lopez is usually developed
among close family members, bestfriends (sic), sweethearts and even couples who are close to one
another; that people close to one another get psychically contaminated; that surprisingly, the
symptom that the father manifested is the same as those of the respondent. The said disorder
started during respondent's late childhood years and developed in his early adolescent years.

He further testified that this disorder is very severe, serious and incurable because of the severe
paranoia of the patient; that patients with this kind of personality disorder could never accept that
there is something wrong with them and if ever forced to seek treatment, they would rather engage
in an intellectual battle with the therapist rather than cooperate with them.

Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's personality disorder, he is incapacitated to

perform his marital obligations of giving love, respect, and support to the petitioner. He recommends
1âwphi1

that the marriage be annulled.89 (Emphasis supplied)

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the ultimate task of decision-making, must
give due regard to expert opinion on the psychological and mental disposition of the parties.90

The root cause of respondent's paranoid personality disorder was hereditary in nature as his own
father suffered from a similar disorder. Dr. Lopez stated that respondent's own psychological
disorder probably started during his late childhood years and developed in his early adolescent
years. Dr. Lopez explained that respondent's psychological incapacity to perform his marital
obligations was likely caused by growing up with a pathogenic parental model.

The juridical antecedence of respondent's psychological incapacity was also sufficiently proven
during trial. Petitioner attested that she noticed respondent's jealousy even before their marriage,
and that he would often follow her to make sure that she did not talk to anyone or cheat on
him.91 She believed that he would change after they got married;92 however, this did not happen.
Respondent's jealousy and paranoia were so extreme and severe that these caused him to poke a
gun at petitioner's head.93

The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity were likewise discussed by Dr.
Lopez. He vouched that a person with paranoid personality disorder would refuse to admit that there
was something wrong and that there was a need for treatment. This was corroborated by petitioner
when she stated that respondent repeatedly refused treatment. Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a
priest, and a doctor, and suggested couples counselling to respondent; however, respondent
refused all of her attempts at seeking professional help. Respondent also refused to be examined by
Dr. Lopez.

Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." In this case, petitioner and respondent
may have lived together, but the facts narrated by petitioner show that respondent failed to, or could
not, comply with the obligations expected of him as a husband. He was even apathetic that petitioner
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage.

This Court also noticed respondent's repeated acts of harassment towards petitioner, which show
his need to intimidate and dominate her, a classic case of coercive control. At first, respondent only
inflicted nonphysical forms of mistreatment on petitioner by alienating her from her family and friends
due to his jealousy, and stalking her due to his paranoia. However, his jealousy soon escalated into
physical violence when, on separate instances, he poked a gun at his teenage cousin, and at
petitioner.

Coercive control is a form of psychological abuse, which refers to a pattern of behavior meant to
dominate a partner through different tactics such as physical and sexual violence, threats, emotional
insults, and economic deprivation.94 Although not specifically named, coercive control as a form of
psychological abuse or harm has been recognized in Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Children Act of 2004:

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. -As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by
any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person
has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of
such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is
not limited to, the following acts:

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional
suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to
property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes
causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of
the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive
injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.

Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and isolating his
wife from her family and friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of his
depravity, and utter lack of comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. It would be of
utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that petitioner should remain married to respondent. After she
had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family, respondent simply refused to believe that
there was anything wrong in their marriage. This shows that respondent truly could not comprehend
and perform his marital obligations. This fact is persuasive enough for this Court to believe that
respondent's mental illness is incurable.

In granting the petition and declaring void the marriage of Maria Teresa and Rodolfo, this Court
reiterates the pronouncement we made in an opinion in Mallilin v. Jamesolamin:95

Our choices of intimate partners define us - inherent ironically in our individuality. Consequently,
when the law speaks of the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage governed by law, this
refers to responsibility to children, property relations, disqualifications, privileges, and other matters
limited to ensuring the stability of society. The state's interest should not amount to unwarranted
1âwphi1

intrusions into individual liberties.

Since the State's interest must be toward the stability of society, the notion of psychological
incapacity should not only be based on a medical or psychological disorder, but should consist of the
inability to comply with essential marital obligations such that public interest is imperiled.96

Lastly, this Court takes note of Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu Te's observation that a straitjacket application
of the Molina guidelines "has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral
insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very
foundation of their families, our basic social institutions."97 Ironically, the ultimate effect of such
stringent application of the Molina guidelines is the perversion of the family unit, the very institution
that our laws are meant to protect.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The marriage of Maria Teresa Tani-
De La Fuente and Rodolfo De La Fuente is declared NULL and VOID. The Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated August 29, 2008 and May 25, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV. No.
76243 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated August 14, 2002 of Branch 107,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-37829 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

Source: Lawphil.net