KATELC
TITLE: BELGICA VS. OCHOA
GR NO. 208566 DATE: November 19 2013
PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE J. TOPIC: PDAF
FACTS OF THE CASE:
● Pork Barrel refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely
or primarily to bring money to a representative's district.In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” has been
commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature, although its usage
would evolve in reference to certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential
Social Fund.
● The Malampaya Funds was a special fund created under PD 910 issued by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos for the development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. The Presidential Social
Fund is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCORthrough which
the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget.
● In 1996, an anonymous source later identified as Former Marikina City Romeo Candazo revealed that huge
sums of government money went into the pockets of legislators as kickbacks. in 2004, several concerned
citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of any pertinent
evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of
unscrupulous Members of Congress, the petition was dismissed.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
● In July 2013, NBI began its probe into allegations that “the government has been defrauded of some P10
Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various
government agencies for scores of ghost projects.” The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six
whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (stands for Janet Lim Napoles) had facilitated the
swindling of billions of pesos from the public coffers for “ghost projects” using no fewer than 20 dummy non-
government organizations for an entire decade.
● In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released a report revealing substantial irregularities in the
disbursement and utilization of PDAF by the Congressmen during the Arroyo administration. As for the
'Presidential Pork Barrel', whistle-blowers alleged that "at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of
the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a
dummy NGO.
● Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, before the
Court are consolidated petitions, taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System and a petition for a cease and desist order be issued restraining the
release of the funds to the members of Congress.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE/S:
WON the PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional for violating
the principle of local autonomy under the constitutional provisions. YES
HOLDING
The Supreme Court declared that the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and its predecessor, the
Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) are unconstitutional.
The issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are within its province to resolve.
A political question refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the
wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded
the Court to act upon. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to
exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith under the expanded concept of judicial
power under Section1, Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution
The Supreme Court declared the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional on the following grounds:
(a) Separation of Powers. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, legislators have been authorized to participate in “the
various operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities”
and the “regulation and release of funds”in violation of the separation of powers. From the moment the law becomes
effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation
or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
(B)Non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate is lodged in Congress and must be exercised
only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Insofar as the 2013 PDAF
Article has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from
which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has violated the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power;
(c) Checks and balances. Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article
would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding
source allotted for multiple purposes of spending. This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual
amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a
discernible item which may be subject to the President’s power of item veto. Insofar as it has created a system of
budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of
presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto items
(d) Public Accountability. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are
vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate.
Also, this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders them
susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
(e) Political dynasty. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing due to the
qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.
(f) Local autonomy. The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without
taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. As a result, a district
representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-
flung rural province which would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the former. This concept of legislator
control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs).
Insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite
the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy.
LASTLY, The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of
PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya
Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for
any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview
of the law. Hence, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for
energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad
classification of “priority infrastructure development projects”, it has transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
notes, if any:
● The Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner
by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the
respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members.
● The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds: (a) Congressional Pork
Barrel-- a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized
into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through various post-
enactment measures and/or practices. (b) Presidential Pork Barrel-- a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund
which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. Constitutionality of the Congressional
Pork Barrel 22. The Supreme Court declared that the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and its
predecessor, the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) are unconstitutional.
