SOCIAL POLICY AND ECONOMY OF BRAZIL

INTRODUCTION

Brazil is internationally recognized as one of the countries with the highest social inequalities.
Despite this, the country reports declining rates of income inequality since democratization at the
end of the 1980s. The Gini coefficient dropped from 0.636 in 1989 to 0.594 in 1999. The 2000s
were marked by a further and considerably more pronounced decrease of the Gini coefficient to
0.530 in 2012. Despite the fact that the country is still characterized by remarkable inequalities, the
recent Brazilian development moves opposite to the international trend of rising inequalities (OECD
2011).

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Brazil abolished slavery only in 1888. Former slaves were denied access to land and thus the chance
for self-sufficiency. They were therefore forced to sell their labour and often did so to their former
owners at prices below the subsistence level (Novy 2001b: 91). Relationships based on personal
dependencies between the slaves and their “masters” shaped the political landscape and also
affected the rest of the population, albeit in a weaker fashion. The ever present power of the local
patriarch was only limited by his personal dependency to the Royal Court. Therefore, Faoro (2001)
described the Brazilian State as “patrimonial” based on Weber (1980: 580 et seqq.). Authority was
characterized by personal dependencies instead of impersonal bureaucratically regulated social
rights.
Social policy began under these circumstances and, in the beginning, could only be attributed to the
tradition of philanthropy. Voluntary welfare provisions from slave owners and big landowners or
religious organizations shaped this further. Social rights did not exist. The needy were dependent on
their benefactors and had to prove themselves thankful and loyal. Apart from the slow and
fragmented construction of a public school system, there was practically no state-run social policy,
let alone social rights, until the 1920s (Pochmann 2007: 86 et seq.). Since then, patrimonial
authority influenced Brazil and was only decisively modified in 1930 through a military coup and
the following seizure of power by Getúlio Vargas, who could build an alliance with the emerging
industrial bourgeoisie (against the big landowners who were dominant until then).
The new regime implemented a “modernisation from above” (Becker/Egler 1992; Fiori 1995). After
the collapse in exports in the course of the world economic crisis, the government prioritised the
domestic development. The state pushed for industrialisation and introduced far-reaching socio-
structural changes. As a result, a relevant fraction of an industrial bourgeoisie emerged while a
socially relevant industrial proletariat developed (Cardoso/Faletto 1976: 94 et seq.). The industrial
workers, who mostly migrated from Europe, were commonly organised in unions and influenced by
socialism, anarchism or communism. They demanded higher wages and better working conditions,
which they could reinforce through strikes. To prevent the possible endangerment of the regime2,
the government integrated the industrial proletariat through the provision of workers’ rights.

Social welfare benefits such as the provision of housing or facilities for education and health care
services were – in continuity with the previous stage – initially provided by employers. But in the
1930s, a distinct tendency towards the nationalisation of these provisions became apparent. Apart
from the threat the industrial proletariat posed, the pressure from industrialists to socialise the costs
of reproduction3 was a decisive factor. In the course of this development, the tax basis of the
Brazilian state increased and minimum wages, which the State defined (introduced in 1940),
became gradually more important. Those social rights only applied to the formally employed –
mostly male – urban, industrial proletariat while the informally employed and agricultural labourers
(the overwhelming majority of the wage-dependent population as well as the majority of women)
were excluded (Pochmann 2007: 90). The most important concessions for the industrial workforce
were achieved via workers’ rights starting in 1943 (Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho - CLT).

Brazil’s Distributional Regime after Democratisation

The Constitution of 1988 altered the trajectory of the Brazilian distributional regime. One of its key
social policy achievements was the establishment of minimum standards of "social security" (cf.
Delgado et al. 2009). This concept originated in Great Britain under Beveridge in the 1940s and was
taken on by the International Labour Oganisation (ILO) in 1952. In Brazil, it was seen as a counter-
concept to the Bismarckian “social insurance” model, enabling the institutionalisation of a
universalistic welfare regime: Education, pension and health care benefits as well as social transfers
were universally available to all citizens in urban and rural areas. For the first time, the rural
population was included into the welfare system, which has mainly been institutionalised via cash
transfers. The Brazilian path to include the poor was different to the development of social welfare
in Africa, which implemented a land reform in order to enable large groups of people, especially the
poor, to care for their own reproduction (Seekings 2008: 26f.). In Brazil, the reform commission
rejected the proposition for a land reform, despite popular support. Inclusion of the poor was
therefore not done by enabling them to provide for their own subsistence, but by making social
policies universally available. Contrary to social rights, workers’ rights were not much expanded
compared to the laws of the 1940s (cf. Pochmann 2008b).
The constitution can be viewed as an expression of a political equilibrium (or stalemate) between
progressive and conservative forces. The presence of social issues can be interpreted as a
consequence of the “cultural hegemony” the left obtained and fortified during the military
dictatorship. The Workers’ Party (PT) can be recognised as the most important political channel of
progressive forces in these times, when it opted for radical transformation of society and its class
relations (Amaral 2003; Oliveira 2006: 36; Singer 2012: 88ff.). Paradoxically, political support for
the PT came mainly from upper income groups from the wealthier regions of the country (South,
Southeast), while the majority of the poor supported conservative political parties, as the majority of
the poor were afraid that radical change could negatively affect them (Singer 2009; 2012).

Many movements behind the impeachment campaign (Movimento pela Ética na Política) formed an
important national social movement against hunger and misery (Ação da Cidadania contra a Fome,
a Miséria e pela Vida) in 1993. This further strengthened the national anti- poverty consensus. The
next elected (after a brief interim period by Itamar Franco) president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso,
directly represented the political stalemate between progressive and conservative people. The
former leftist academic was politically backed by the conservatives. Neoliberal reforms and the
fortification of poverty reduction strategies characterised his governments between 1995 and 2002
(Singer 2012).

The universal social policy was designed to benefit as many people as possible and simultaneously
was implemented democratically. To achieve this, the government established decentralized local
councils each representing a different sector of social policies (conselhos setoriais) and integrated
them as respective decision-making bodies into the constitution. These councils demonstrated a
comprehensive amount of democratization for a state that was markedly patrimonial and
authoritarian. At the same time, minimum investment requirements for education and health care
institutions were embedded into the constitution via quotas. These widespread social reforms were
even more remarkable than the international trend towards a neoliberal program of retrenchment or
a conservative restructuring of social policy. In contrast to this, the Brazilian constitution clearly
moved towards a more egalitarian system, where previously excluded people were included. For
example, the universal Unified Health Care System (SUS – Sistema Único de Saúde) abandoned the
insurance- based health care system based on occupational status.. Also, the constitution introduced
a public minimum pension for agricultural labourers in the amount of the statutory minimum wage
that was not dependent on contributions. Investments also increased for basic education during the
administration of Cardoso, so that illiteracy declined from 18 percent in 1990 to 11.8 percent in
2002 (IPEA) as access to public schools improved dramatically. Those examples clearly show there
was a general universalisation of social policy. Obligations tended to shift from the family to the
state, especially concerning the hitherto excluded poor. These tendencies marked an important
departure from the “conservative-informal” characteristics of the regime.

Contrary to the focus on social rights, which was laid out in the constitution, the philanthropic
tradition of Brazil’s social system was revived via political programs under Cardoso. The
consequences of these policies on social inequalities were, on the one hand, the decline in extreme
poverty and the improvement of corresponding indicators such as illiteracy rates, which caused the
positive development of the Human Development Index. On the other hand, employment
circumstances eroded – the informal sector grew from 53.6 percent in 1992 to 55.5 percent in 2002
and unemployment increased in the same period from 6.4 to 9.2 percent (ILO 2009: 2, Tab. 1). The
functional distribution of income changed to the disadvantage of wage earners – the share of wages
and salaries in total income decreased from 45.4 percent in 1990 to 36.1 percent in 2002 (Vernengo
2007: 87). The Gini coefficient stagnated on a high level and remained between 0.602 in 1996 and
0.589 in 2002 (IPEA).
The collection of reforms in social policy towards “targeting” and poverty reduction via neoliberal
economic policy reforms in the “Cardoso era” is described as “inclusive liberalism”, where liberal
economic policy was accompanied by targeted measures of poverty reduction which were mainly
implemented in cooperation with “socially responsible” corporations. The focus to integrate the
poorest more into society and to encourage greater political participation remained in place even
though Universalist tendencies were subverted. The key features of the socio-political reforms such
as the right to health care in the general health care system (Sistema Único de Saúde – SUS)
remained unaffected in spite of continuous problems of lacking investments as described above.
Consequently, Dagnino (2002) described this period as a “perverse mix between a participatory
project which was constructed since the 1980s around the expansion of Cidadania and the
deepening of democracy, and the project of a minimal state which relieves itself of its role as
guarantor of rights” (Dagnino 2002: 288 et seq.; Transl. BL).

PT-LED GOVERNMENTS OF LULA AND DILMA ROUSSEFF BEGINNING IN

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva won the presidential elections and governed between 2003 and 2010. The
next president, Dilma Rousseff has been his designated successor and roughly followed into the
footsteps of Lula’s agenda.

Expanding Cash Transfers as Cornerstone in Social Policies

When Lula took office in 2003, he made clear that the main task of the government would be the
eradication of hunger. Initially the programme Fome Zero (zero hunger) was centre-stage, focussing
mainly on cooperation with private actors. Soon the focus shifted to the expansion and to a better
coordination of the “inherited” conditional cash transfer programs within the program Bolsa
Família (family allowance, cf. Hall 2006). The program came to be the cornerstone of Lula’s first
term (Hunter/Power 2007; Singer 2009; 2012). Bolsa Família has been inspired by municipal cash
transfer programs in Brasília, Campinas, Riberão Preto, and Santos. The local governments in those
cities implemented similar cash transfer programs for poor families in 1995 (Silva e Silva et al.
2007: 48ff.). In regards to the coverage these programs differed from the social grants introduced by
the constitution – poor families instead of only the elderly and disabled people were the target
group. Also institutional requirements changed. For example, grants were subject to conditions in
form of medical and/or school attendance of the children and payments received were
much lower than the minimum salary, the benchmark for the benefits introduced directly by the
constitution.
On the national scale, a debate on a “minimal citizens’ income” was raised by senator Supplicy
(2001) during the 1990s. In 2001, the Cardoso government introduced the first conditional cash
transfer programs on a national scale (Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentação), which transformed the
former municipal programs into national programs. When the condition of school (Bolsa Escola) or
medical attendance of their children was met, poor families were granted a small amount per child.
Furthermore, the state subsidies for gas were replaced by modest cash transfers to the needy
(Auxílio Gás) in 2002. Lula’s administration unified these programs into Bolsa Família and
extended its coverage and its amounts transferred, both per recipient and overall. The program
functions as income substitution or supplementation for poor families with variable amounts,
depending on the number of children and their income situation.

In accordance with Brazilian laws, Bolsa Família is paid to the “head of the family”, which is
predominantly female by definition. Therefore, women have a bigger budget at their disposal,
which is seen as a source of empowerment. Simultaneously, this reinforces the gender role of the
“caring mother”, as Bolsa Família has been reported to raise the “reservation wage” for women.
Most analysts tend to stress the empowering effects, while giving less emphasis on the detrimental
effects on gender roles (Suárez et al. 2006; Tavares 2010).
Bolsa Família is generally considered to be a very successful program for poverty reduction
(Seekings 2012).

Political forces, discourse, and welfare policies

Rising prices of commodities benefitted the respective industries, which are still important to the
Brazilian economy. Between 2004 and 2008, the gross domestic product grew comparably fast
(between 3.16 percent in 2005 and 6.09 percent in 2007). The main beneficiaries of economic
success were the poor, which generated a virtuous circle through the amplification of mass
production. This led to the expansion of the (lower) middle classes, while the incomes of the upper
middle classes stagnated (Pochmann 2012).
The times since Brazil’s democratisation have been marked by the consolidation of an “anti-poverty
consensus”, the main difference between the 1990s and the 2000s was the declining importance of
“inclusive liberalism”, which is still an important discourse in politics and society, while a social-
democrat interpretation of “developmental welfare” enjoyed rising popularity. This was favoured
by the economic conjuncture permitting relative gains by the poor without absolute redistribution.
In times of more troublesome economic development, this strategy will hardly be viable anymore
(Sicsú 2013).

Concluding Reflections

Summing up, recent reforms of the Brazilian distributional regime led to a further decline of the
“conservative-informal” characteristics (Barrientos 2004). The traditional workerist focus has been
challenged by pauperist reforms, which have hardly any agrarian focus (Seekings 2008), as plans
for land reform have been stagnating since the beginning of the 1990s (Fernandes 2010). Instead, an
interesting dynamic can be observed. Pauperist reforms have been working against the highly
exclusionary tendencies, inherent in the conservatism of Brazil’s workerist distributional regime.
During the 1990s, the pauperist focus was accompanied by decreasing universalism, as large parts
of the middle classes were fleeing from the public into the private system. Nevertheless, the
inclusion of the marginalized can be viewed as a universalising tendency, albeit not in the tradition
of the European social-democracy – as outlined by Esping-Andersen (1990; cf. Mkandawire 2005),
but rather as an inclusion of the hitherto excluded parts of the population. Thereby, coverage of
social policies has been largely expanded. Whether this form of inclusion will strengthen solidarity
between the middle classes and the lately included groups remains to be seen.
The 2000s were marked by diminishing inequalities. The main impact factors were better
employment conditions for the poorer segments of the population and a remarkable expansion of
cash transfers. In the Brazilian case, this expansion was accompanied by a slight diminish in social
services and infrastructure until 2005. This trend corresponds to neoliberal concepts of social
policies (Friedman/Friedman 2002) and can be characterised as a “monetarisation” of social
policies (Fischer/Leubolt 2012). From 2006 onwards, the trend towards “monetarisation” has been
reversed, as investments in social services and infrastructure have been raised considerably. The
overall strategy shifted from “inclusive liberalism” to “developmental welfare”, where the reduction
of inequalities through state-induced measures is viewed as an important factor to elevate
consumption levels and thereby boost economic growth (Leubolt 2013a).

BRAZIL’S ECONOMY

The Brazilian economy has gone through a significant transformation during the past decade.
Following nearly a quarter-century with very little growth in per capita GDP, there was a major
change beginning in 2004. GDP per person (adjusted for inflation) grew at a rate of 2.5 percent
annually from 2003-2014, more than three times faster than the 0.8 percent annual growth of the
prior government (1995-2002). This growth rate was achieved in spite of the 2008-09 global
financial crisis, which pushed Brazil into recession in 2009; and this comparison includes the
slowdown of the past few years.
The past decade also saw new trends in the reduction of poverty and inequality. These pronounced
positive changes were the result of the growth of income and employment, as well as the expansion
of government social spending and programs. These factors along with large increases in the real
minimum wage and in formal sector employment helped to increase the bargaining power of
workers.
Since the Workers’ Party came to power with President Lula taking office in 2003, poverty has
been reduced by over 55 percent, from 35.8 percent of the population to 15.9 percent in 2012.
Extreme poverty has been reduced by 65 percent, from 15.2 percent to 5.3 percent over the same
time period. Over the last decade, 31.5 million Brazilians were lifted out of poverty and, of that
number, over 16 million out of extreme poverty.
There were also large changes in how the gains from economic growth were distributed, as
compared with the prior decade. For example, the top 10 percent of households received more than
half of all income gains between 1993-2002, but this fell to about one-third for 2003-2012. The
biggest gainers were the 40 percent below the median: they nearly doubled their share of income
gains from 11.3 to 21.1 percent.
Increased economic growth was the main contributor to Brazil’s reduction of poverty and inequality
over the past decade. But government programs also played an important role.
In 2003 the Brazilian government introduced the Bolsa Familia program, building on a previous
conditional cash-transfer program. Since 2003, expenditures on Bolsa Familia in real (inflation-
adjusted) Reais increased from 4.8 billion to 20.7 billion, moving from 0.2 percent of GDP to 0.5
percent of GDP. The focus is on helping the extremely poor, and the program remains well targeted.

The Brazilian Economy in Transition: Macroeconomic Policy, Labor and

As the expenditures on Bolsa Familia have increased, so has the number of individuals covered by
the program. From 2003 to 2012 the number of people covered by Bolsa Familia benefits increased
from 16.2 million to 57.8 million. As a percent of the population, coverage increased from below 9
percent in 2003 to nearly 29 percent in 2012.
For those in extreme poverty in 2011, Bolsa Familia represented over 60 percent of their income,
compared to just 10.5 percent in 2003 when the program was first instituted; for the poor, the
increase is from 3.1 percent to 17.6 percent of their income.
For the central government, social spending has consistently increased since 2003, rising from 13
percent of GDP to over 16 percent in 2011, the last year for which data is available. Given that
annual GDP growth during this period was nearly twice as fast as during the prior 25 years, this is a
large increase in spending as compared with past governments.

Macroeconomic Policy

From 2010 to 2011, world GDP growth fell and the growth of world trade fell even more sharply.
As a result of these external changes, the real value of Brazil’s exports grew by only 4.5 percent in
2011 and 0.5 percent in 2012, as compared to 11.5 percent in 2010. This had a significant effect on
economic growth.
At the same time, government macroeconomic policy began to slow the economy in 2010, with a
series of interest rate hikes in April, which took policy rates from 8.75 in March 2010 to 12.50 in
July 2011. The government also instituted “macroprudential measures” which slowed the growth of
credit.
In April 2013, the Central Bank initiated another cycle of raising interest rates that lasted one year.
Government officials noted at the time that “monetary policy as well as fiscal policies are being
tightened despite the fact that growth recovery has only recently begun.” What followed was
negative growth in the third quarter of 2013, and a recession in the first half of 2014.
These monetary policy responses indicate that the Central Bank has sometimes been too willing to
sacrifice economic growth in order to push inflation down, even when the inflation comes from
external sources (e.g. commodity prices in 2011); and when slowing the economy does little or
nothing to reduce inflation, as has been the case in recent years.
Brazil took significant steps toward developing an industrial policy during the past decade.
Disbursements from the BNDES (Brazil’s National Development Bank) increased from 2.2 percent
The Brazilian Economy in Transition: Macroeconomic Policy, Labor and Inequality 2
of GDP in 2005, to nearly 4 percent in 2013. In total, priority sectors for Brazil’s industrial policy
received about 80 percent of BNDES’s disbursements between 2006 and 2012.
The Labor Market

Both unemployment and informality – the percentage of workers in the informal sector – have
decreased considerably over the past decade. Unemployment peaked at 13.0 percent in 2003 and
has declined pretty steadily, except for some temporary upticks during recession, to 5.0 percent
today – a historic low.
The percentage of workers employed in the informal sector has fallen sharply from 22.5 in
December 2003 to 13.3 percent in August 2014. This shift toward formal sector employment is
important for protections such as pensions, sickness and disability benefits, paid annual leave, and
regulation of working hours. Workers in the formal sector can also get access to credit cards.
For 2003-2014, the real minimum wage increased in Brazil by 76.2 percent. This was a major
contributor to the decline in inequality over the past decade.
Between 2000 and 2012, unemployment insurance coverage increased by 99 percent.
The rise of real wages was also very important over the past decade. Since 2003 average real wages
have grown by 34 percent. It is important to note that this real wage growth was maintained even
after the economy began to slow in 2011. This indicates that there may have been an institutional
change in the bargaining power of workers in Brazil, which could continue to contribute to reducing
inequality in the future.
A number of analysts today see the recent wage growth as a threat to the economy because it is the
source of too much inflationary pressure. In this view, the labor market is “too tight,” and monetary
policy should be tightened until wage growth is brought down as a result of higher unemployment.
However, as the data in this report indicate, there is still slack in the labor market despite continued
low headline unemployment numbers. Neither monetary nor fiscal tightening makes sense as a tool
to reduce inflation in these circumstances; unless they induce a serious, prolonged recession or
depression, these policies are unlikely to reduce inflation by weakening the labor market.

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