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CIVIL LAW BAR EXAM ANSWERS: FAMILY CODE

Section 1 0f P.D. NO. 755 states:

Section 1. Declaration of National Policy – It is hereby declared that the policy of the State
is to provide readily available credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential rates,
that this policy can be expeditiously and efficiently realized by the imple mentation of the
“Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of the Coconut
Farmers’ executed by the Philippine Coconut Authority, the terms of which’ Agreement’
are hereby incorporated by reference;xxx”

A copy of the Agreement was not attached to the Presidential Decree.

P.D. No: 755 was published in the Official Gazette but the text of the Agreement described
in Section 1 was not published. Can the Agreement in question be accorded the status of
a law? Explain. (5%)

B) when the obligation does not constitute a loan or forbearance of

money. (2.5%)

Consider the issuance of BSP-MB Circular No. 799, which became effective on July 1,
2013.

SUGGESTED ANSWER

(A) When the obligation is breached and it consists in the payment of a sum of money
like a loan or forbearance of money, in the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall
be the legal rate of 6% per annum (Article 2209 of the Civil Code), which was increased
to 12% per NB Circular No. 905 (Series of 1982), to be computed from default. The twelve
percent 12% per annum legal interest shall apply only until June 30, 2013. From July 1,
2013, the new rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be the prevailing rate of interest
when applicable (Nacar V. Gallery. Frames, G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703
SCRA 439, applying BSP -MB Circular No. 799).

(NOTE: It is suggested that credit also be given in the event that the examinees cite
Tañada v. Tuvera to support the conclusion that publication is unnecessary in the case
of interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, as the language of
the problem may be interpreted by the examinees to refer only to mere guidelines or
directory matters]. The examinee should be given credit if he mentions that the actual
base for computing the interest due on the loan or forbearance of money, goods or credit
is the amount of the loans, forbearance, plus whatever interest is stipulated in writing;
otherwise no interest may be charged for using the money (Art. 1956 of the Civil Code)].

(B) The interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of
the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be established
with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable
certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extra-
judicially, but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the
demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the
court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been
reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in
any case, be on the amount finally adjudged (Nacar v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871,
August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439).

III
Romeo and Juliet, both Filipinos, got married. After a few years, Juliet got word from her
mother that she can go to the United States for naturalization. Juliet promised she will be
back the moment she becomes an American. After sometime, Romeo learned from a
friend that Juliet already became a U.S. citizen and even divorced him to marry a wealthy
American businessman. Romeo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court praying
that an order be issued authorizing him to remarry pursuant to Article 26 of the Family
Code. Decide the petition with reasons: (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

if the time of Juliet’s acquisition of U.S. citizenship preceded the time when she obtained
the divorce decree, then the divorce decree can be given effect in the Philippines, and
consequently, Romeo will be capaci tated to remarry under Philippine law. On the other
hand, if Juliet obtained the divorce decree before she acquired U.S. citizenship, then the
foreign divorce decree cannot be recognized by Philippine courts. Article 26, paragraph
2 of the Family Code provides that where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating himor her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
rerriarry under Philippine law. In Republic v. Orbecido (G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005,
472 SCRA 114), the Supreme Court ruled that Article 26, paragraph 2 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The reckoning point is not their citizenship at the
time of celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time the divorce decree is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him/ her to remarry.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER

The petition should not be granted. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law
of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien
spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice
of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other evidentiary facts, both the divorce
decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law
on evidence (Republic v. Orbecido, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114).
In this case, no evidence was adduced to prove the divorce between Romeo and Juliet
and the validity of the same under U.S. law.

Leo married Lina and they begot a son. After the birth of their child, Lina exhibited unusual
behavior and started to neglect her son; she frequently went out with her friends and
gambled in casinos. Lina later had extra-marital affairs with several men and eventually
abandoned Leo and their son. Leo was able to talk to the psychiatrist of Lina who told him
that Lina suffers from dementia praecox, a form of psychosis where the afflicted person
is prone to commit homicidal attacks, Leo was once stabbed by Lina but fortunately he
only suffered minor injuries, Will a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed with
the court prosper? Explain. (5%)

(A) Will Dorothy’s suit prosper? Decide with reasons. (2.5%)

(B) Suppose Dorothy was jobless and did not contribute money to the acquisition of the
lot and her efforts consisted mainly in the care and maintenance of the family and
household, is her consent to the sale a prerequisite to its validity? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER

(A) Yes, Dorothy’s suit will prosper, unless the buyer is a buyer in good faith and for value.
The rule of co-ownership governs the property relationship in a union without marriage
between a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry.each other. Article 14 of the
Family Code is specifically applicable. Under this article, neither party can encumber or
dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation
and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation, thus, Bernard may not validly dispose of the lot without the consent of
Dorothy as the lot was acquired through their work during their cohabitation.

(NOTE: it is suggested that some credit be given to examinees who reason that Article
147 does not apply because under the facts given, Dorothy and Bernard were not living
together as husband and wife.]

(B) Yes, if Dorothy was jobless and did not contribute money to the acquisition of the lot,
her consent is still a prerequisite to the validity of the sale. Under the same article, a party
who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and the household. In this case,
although the money used to buy the lot was solely from Bernard, Dorothy’s care and
maintenance of the family and household are deemed contributions in the acquisition of
the lot. Article 147, 2nd paragraph is applicable, as the lot is deemed owned in common
by the common-law spouses in equal shares as the same was acquired during their
cohabitation, without prejudice to the rights of a buyer in good faith and for value.

VI.

Pedro bought a parcel of land described as Cadastral. Lot No. 123 and the title was issued
to his name. Juan also bought a lot in the same place, which is described as Cadastral
Lot No. 124. Pedro hired a geodetic engineer to determine the actual location of Lot No.
123 but for some reason, the engineer pointed to Lot No. 124 by mistake. Pedro hired a
contractor to construct his house and the latter put up a sign stating the name of the owner
of the project and the construction permit number. It took more than a year before the
house was constructed. When Pedro was already residing in his house, Juan told him to
remove his house because it was built on his (Juan’s) lot.

Juan filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and prayed that the house be removed
because Pedro is a builder in bad faith. Pedro filed his Answer with Counterclaim that he
is entitled to the payment of the value of the house plus damages because he is a builder
in good faith and that Juan is guilty of estoppel and laches.

(A) If Pedro is a builder in good faith, what are the rights given to Juan under the law?
Explain. (2.5%)
(B) If Pedro is a builder in bad faith, what are the rights given to Juan under the law?
Explain. (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

(A) If Pedro is a builder in good faith and Juan is an owner in good faith, Juan has the
right to appropriate as his own the house after payment of indemnity provided for in
Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code, which are the necessary and useful expenses. As
to useful expenses, juan has the option to either refund the amount of the expenses, or
pay the increase in value which the land may have acquired by reason thereof.
Alternatively, under Article 448 of the Civil Code, Juan has the right to oblige Pedro to
pay the price of the land. However, Pedro cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the house. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if
Juan does not choose to appropriate the house after proper indemnity. It is the owner of
the land who is authorized to exercise the options under Article 448 because his right is
older and by principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.

If Pedro is a builder in good faith and Juan is an owner in bad faith because Juan knew
that Pedro was building on his lot and did not oppose it (Article 453 par. 2), and Article
454 in relation to Article 447 of the Civil Code applies. Juan shall pay the value of the
house and is also liable for reparation of damages; however, Pedro also has the right to
remove or demolish the house and ask for damages.

(B) If Pedro is a builder in bad faith and Juan is an owner in good faith, Juan has three
options. He may appropriate the improvements without indemnity under Article 449 of the
Civil Code, or demand the demolition of the house in order to replace things to their former
condition at Pedro’s expense under Article 450; or compel Pedro to pay the price of the
land. In addition to these options, Juan is also entitled to damages from Pedro. If Pedro
is a builder in bad faith and Juan is an owner in bad faith, it shall be as if both of them
were in good faith (Article 453, New Civil Code).

VII

Benjamin is the owner of a titled lot which is bounded on the north by the Maragondon
River. An alluvial deposit of two (2) hectares was added to the registered area. Daniel
took possession of the portion formed by accretion and claims that he has been in open,
continuous and undisturbed possession of said portion since 1923 as shown by a tax
declaration. In 1958, Benjamin filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and contends that
the alluvium belongs to him as the riparian owner and that since the allu viurn is, by law,
part and parcel of the registered property, the same may be considered as registered
property, Decide the case and explain. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER
i will decide in favor of Daniel and dismiss the action to quiet title filed by Benjamin, Under
Article 457 of the Civil Code, the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. The
accretion however, does not automatically become registered land. It must be brought
under the Torrens system of registration by Benjamin, the reparian owner. Since he did
not, the then increment, not being registered land, was open to acqui sition through
prescription by third persons, like Daniel (Grande v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-17652,
June 30, 1962,5 SCRA 524; Cureg v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No, 73465,
September 7, 1989, 177 SCRA 313).

VIII

Joven and Juliana are the owners of a 30-hectare plantation in Cotabato, covered by a
title. One day, a group of armed men forcibly entered their house and, at gun point, forced
them to sign a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Romeo. Romeo got the title from them
and they were ejected from the house and threatened not to come back or else they will
be killed. The spouses went to Manila and resided there for more than 35 years. They
never went back to Cotabato for fear of their lives. Word came to them that peace and
order have been restored in their former place of residence and they decided to reclaim
their land for the benefit of their grandchildren: Joven and Juliana filed a suit for
reconveyance of their property. This was opposed by the grandson of Romeo to whom
the title was eventually transferred, on the ground of laches and prescription. Decide the
case and rule on the defenses of laches and prescription. Explain your answer. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

The right of the registered owners, Joven and Juliana, to file suit to recover their property,
is not barred by prescription. Under Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529, no title to registered
land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession. Proof of possession by the owner in an action for reconveyance is
immaterial and inconsequential. The right to recover possession is equally
imprescriptible since possession is a mere consequence of ownership
(Republic v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 185091, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 443). The right of
joven and Juliana to recover is not barred by laches, either. Laches deals with
unreasonable delay in filing the action. The owners’ delay, if any, cannot be construed as
deliberate and intentional. They were simply coerced out of Cotabato and threatened with
death if they returned, and, thus, could not have filed the action.

Butch got a loan from Hagibis Corporation (Hagibis), but he defaulted in the payment. A
case for collection of a sum of money was filed against him. As a defense, Butch claims
that there was already an arrangement with Hagibis on the payment of the loan. To
implement the same, Butch already surrendered five (5) service utility vehicles (SUVS) to
the company for it to sell, and the proceeds to be credited to the loan as payment. Was the
obligation of Buich extinguished by reason of dacion en pago upon the surrender of the
SUVs? Decide and explain.(5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the obligation of Butch to Hagibis was not extinguished by the mere surrender of the
SUV’s to the latter. Dation in payment whereby prop erty is alienated to the creditor in
satisfaction of a debt in money, shall be governed by the law of sales. (Article 1245).
In dacion en pago, as a special mode of payment, the debtor offers another thing to the
creditor who accepts it as equivalent of payment of an outstanding debt. The undertaking
really partakes in one sense of the nature of sale, that is, the creditor is really buying the
thing or property of the debtor, payment for which is to be charged against the debtor’s
debt. As such, the essential elements of a contractofsale, namely; consent, object certain,
and cause or consideration must be present. In dacion en pago there is in reality an
objective novation of the obligation where the thing offered as an accepted equivalent of
the performance of an obligation is considered as the object of the contract of sale, while
the debt is considered as the purchase price. In any case, common consent is an
essential prerequisite, be it sale or innovation to have the effect of totally extinguishing
the debt or obligation (Filinvest Credit Corporation v, Philippine Acetylene Company, inc.,
G.R. No. L-50449 January 30, 1982). There being no mention in the facts that Hagibis
has given its consent to accept the SUVs as equivalent payment, the obligation of Butch
is not thereby extinguished by mere delivery of the SUVS.

Jerico, the project owner, entered into a Construction Contract with Ivan for the latter to
construct his house. Jojo executed a Surety undertaking to guarantee the performance
of the work by Ivan, Jerico and Ivan later entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) revising the work schedule of ivan and the subcontractors. The MOA stated that
all the stipulations of the original contract not in conflict with said agreement shall remain
valid and legally effective. Jojo filed a suit to declare him relieved of his undertaking as a
result of the MOA because of the change in the work schedule. Jerico claims there is no
novation of the Construction Contract Decide the case and explain. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

I will decide in favor of Jerico as there is no novation of the Construction Contract.

Novation is never presumed, and may only take place when the following are present: (1)
a previous valid obligation; (2) the agreement of all the parties to the new contract; (3) the
extinguishment of the old contract; and (4) validity of the new one. There must be consent
of all the parties to the substitution, resulting in the extinction of the old obligation and the
creation of a new valid one. In this case, the revision of the work schedule of Ivan and the
subcontractors is not shown to be so substantial as to extinguish the old contract, and
there was also no irreconcilable incompatibility between the old and new obligations. It
has also been held in jurisprudence that a surety may only be relieved of his undertaking
if there is a material change in the principal contract and such would make the obligation
of the surety onerous. The principal contract subject of the Surety agreement still exists,
and Jojo is still bound as a surety.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER

I will decide against Jerico. The provisions of the Civil Code (CC) on Guarantee, other
than the benefit of excussion (Article 2059 (2) CC), are applicable and available to the
surety because a surety is a guarantor who binds himself solidarily (Article 2047 2nd
par.CC). The Supreme Court has held that there is no reason why the provisions of Article
2079 would not apply to a surety (Autocorp Group v. Intra Strata Assurance Corporation,
G.R. No. 166662, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 250). Article 2079 of the Civil Code provides
that an extension granted to the debtor by the creditor without the consent of the guarantor
extinguishes the guaranty. The changes in the work schedule amount to an extension
granted to the debtor without the consent of the surety. Hence, Jojo‘s obligation as a
surety is extinguished. If the change of work schedule, on the other hand, shortens the
time of completion of the project, it will amount to a novation. The old obligation, where
Jojo was obligated as a surety is extinguished relatively as to him, leaving Ivan as still
bound.

Ellen entrusted her title over the lot where she is residing to Patrick, her nephew, for
safekeeping because of her poor eyesight. Patrick, a gambler, prepared a Special Power
of Attorney empowering him to mortgage the lot. Ellen’s signature was forged. With the
help of Julia who represented herself as Ellen; Mega Bank granted a loan to Patrick
secured by a mortgage on Ellen’s lot. Due to non-payment, Mega Bank foreclosed the
mortgage and was declared the highest bidder. Title was later registered in the name of
the bank. When Ellen was notified that she should vacate the premises, she filed a
complaint to nullify the loan with mortgage, the auction sale and the title of Mega Bank on
the ground that the bank is not a mortgagee in good faith. Decide the case with reasons.
(5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

I will decide in favor of Ellen. Banks, their business being impressed with public interest,
are expected to exercise more care and prudence than private individuals in their
dealings, even those involving registered lands. The highest degree of diligence is
expected, and high standards of integ rity and performance are even required of it.

A mortgagee – usually, can rely on what appears on the certificate of title presented by
the mortgagor and an innocent mortgagee is not expected to conduct an exhaustive
investigation on the history of the mortgagor’s title. This rule is, however, strictly applied
against banking institutions. Mega Bank cannot be considered a mortgagee in good faith
as it failed to inspect the disputed property when offered to it as security for the loan,
which could have led it to discover the forged Special Power of Attorney.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER

I will decide in favor of Ellen, the victim of a forged document, Section 52 of P.D. No.
1529.provides that after the entry of a decree of registration, any subsequent registration
procured by a forged deed shall.be null and void, even if accompanied by the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title. In this case, the registered owner, Ellen, did not lose her title,
and neither did the mortgagee, Mega Bank, acquire any right to the property (Joaquin V.
Madrid, G.R. No* L-13551, January 30, 1960, 106 Phil. 1060). The bank was defrauded
because it believed the imposter who had, without authority, gained possession of Ellen’s
certificate of title, and who then forged her signature to the deed of mortgage (De Lara v.
Ayroso, G.R. No. L-6122, May 31, 1954, 95 Phil, 185). It is not a mortgagee in good faith.

XII

On March 13, 2008, Ariel entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale (DAS) with Noel where
the former sold his titled lot in Quezon City with an area of three hundred (300) square
meters to the latter for the price of P300, 000.00. The prevailing market value of the lot
was P3,000.00 per square meter. On March 20, 2008, they executed another “Agreement
to Buy Back/Redeem Property” where Ariel was given an option to repurchase the
property on or before March 20, 2010 for the same price. Ariel, however, remained in
actual possession of the lot. Since Noel did not pay the taxes, Ariel paid the real property
taxes to avoid a delinquency sale. On March 21, 2010, Ariel sent a letter to Noel, attaching
thereto a manager’s check for P300,000.00 manifesting that he is redeeming the property.
Noel rejected the redemption claiming that the DAS was a true and valid sale representing
the true intent of the parties. Ariel filed a suit for the nullification of the DAS or the
reformation of said agreement to that of a loan with Real Estate Mortgage. He claims the
DAS and the redemption agreement constitute an equitable mortgage. Noel however
claims it is a valid sale with pacto de retro and Ariel clearly failed to redeem the property.
As the RTC judge, decide the case with reasons. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

I will decide in favor of Ariel and allow the reformation of the agreement. The DAS and
the redemption agreement constitute an equitable mortgage and Ariel may ask for the
reformation of the agreement to that of a Loan with Real Estate Mortgage as allowed by
Article 1605 of the Civil Code (CC). The circumstances clearly show that the agreement
is an equitable mortgage, such as the: a) price of the lot was inadequate since it was only
sold at P300,000 when the prevailing market value of such was P900,000;
b) the vendor, Ariel, remained in actual possession of the property after the purported
sale; and c) Ariel was the one who paid the real property taxes. Under the circumstances,
a presumption arises under Article 1602 C.C. that what was really executed was an
equitable mortgage. Moreover, Article 1603 C.C. provides that in case of doubt, a contract
purporting to be a sale with right to repurchase shall be construed as an equitable
mortgage.

XIII

Peter, a resident of Cebu City, sent through Reliable Pera Padala (RPP) the amount of
P20,000.00 to his daughter, Paula, for the payment of her tuition fee. Paula went to an
RPP branch but was informed that there was no money remitted to her name. Peter
inquired from RPP and was informed that there was a computer glitch and the money
was credited to another person. Peter and Paula sued RPP for actual damages, moral
damages and exemplary damages. The trial court ruled that there was no proof of pecu
niary loss to the plaintiffs but awarded moral damages of. P20,000.00 and exemplary
damages of P5,000.00. On appeal, RPP questioned the award of moral and exemplary
damages. Is the trial court correct in awarding moral and exemplary damages? Explain.
(5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

No, the trial court is not correct in awarding moral and exemplary damages. The damages
in this case are prayed for based on the breach of contract committed by RPP in failing
to deliver the sum of money to Paula. Under the provisions of the Civil Code, in breach of
contract, moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith or was
guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his
contractual obligation. In the same fashion, to warrant the award of exemplary damages,
the wrongful act must be accomplished by bad faith, and an award of damages would be
allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent
manner (Article 2232 of the Civil Code)

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty
through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. In this case,
however, RPP’s breach was due to a computer glitch which at most can be considered
as negligence on its part, but definitely does not constitute bad faith or fraud as would
warrant the award of moral and exemplary damages.

XIV

On February 28, 1998, Arthur filed an application for registration of title of a lot in Ternate,
Cavite before the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite under Section 48(6) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141) for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Section
48(b) of CA 147 requires possession counted from June 12, 1945. Arthur presented
testimonial and documentary evidence that his possession and that of his predecessors-
in interest started in 1936. The lot was declared alienable and disposable (A and D) in
1993 based on a PENRO certification and a certified true copy of the original classification
made by the DENR Secretary. The government opposed the application on the ground
that the lot was certified A and D only in 1993 while the application was instituted only in
1998. Arthur’s possession of five (5) years from the date of declaration does not comply
with the 30-year period required under CA 141. Should the possession of Arthur be
reckoned from the date when the lot was declared A and D or from the date of actual
possession of the applicant? Explain. (5%)

if the trial court finds that there was gross negligence on the part of RPP, the award of
moral damages and exemplary damages would be proper. RPP merely alleged that the
failure to remit the money to Paula was caused by a computer glitch, büt’this bare
assertion does not preclude the possi bility that the trial court found gross negligence
(equivalent to bad faith) on the part of RPP Under Article 2220 of the Civil Code, moral
damages may be awarded in cases of breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith. Likewise, Article 2232 provides that the court may award
exemplary damages in contracts if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner.

SUGGESTED ANSWER

Arthur’s possession should be reckoned from the date of his actual possession, by himself
and his predecessors-in-interest, since 1936. Under Section 48(b) of CA. 141, as
amended by PD No. 1973, the length of the requisite possession was changed from
possession for “thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the applications to
possession “since June 12, 1945 or earlier”. But possession is different from
classification. As held in Malabanan v. Republic (G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587
SCRA . 172), it is only necessary that the land be already classified as A and D “at the
time the application for registration is filed” to make public the release of the property for
alienation or disposition. But the possession of Arthur even prior to the classification of
the land as A and D shall be counted in determining the period of possession.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER

Arthur’s possession should be reckoned from the date the Ternate lot was declared
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In Zarate v. Director of Lands (G.R.
No. 131501, July 14, 2004), the Supreme Court, citing the case of Bracewell v. CA (G.R.
No. 107427, January 25, 2000), ruled that ‘possession of the property prior to the
classification thereof as alienable or disposable, cannot be credited as part of the thirty
(30) year required under Section 48(b) of CA No. 341, as amended. in Heirs
of Malabanan v. Republic (G.R. No. 179987, September 3, 2010), the Supreme Court
explained that the possession of Arthur should be reckoned only from the date lots A and
D were declared as alienable and disposable by the State and not from the date of actual
possession:Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act’used the words “lands of the public
domain” or “alien able and disposable lands of the public domain” to clearly signify that
lands otherwise classified; j.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and sands of
patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What
the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase “alienable and
disposable” further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of
the public domain. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for
registration must have been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in
order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the
presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act (Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013).

The basis of the 30 year open continuous and notorious possession in the concept of
owner of A and D land is extraordinary acquisitive prescription of immovable property,
Lands classified as forest, mineral, and national parks are properties of public dominion
which cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription.

Peter and Paul entered into a Contract to Sell whereby Peter, the lot owner, agreed to
sell to Paul his lot on November 6, 2016 for the price of P1,000,000.00 to be paid at the
residence of Peter in Makati City at 1:00 p.m. If the full price is paid in cash at the specified
time and place, then Peter will execute a Deed of Absolute Sale and deliver the title to
Paul. On November 6, 2016, Paul did not show up and was not heard of from that date
on. In view of the nonperformance by Paul of his obligation, Peter sent a letter to Paul
that he is expressly and extra-judicially declaring the Contract to Sell rescinded and of no
legal and binding effect. Peter further stated that failure on the part of Paul to contest the
rescission within thirty (30) days from receipt of said letter shall mean that the latter
agreed to the rescission.

Paul did not reply to this letter for five (5) years. Thus, Peter decided to sell his lot to
Henry in 2021. After hearing that Henry bought the lot, Paul now questions the sale of the
lot to Henry and files a complaint for nullification of the sale.

(A) Is the exercise by Peter of his power to rescind extra-judicially the Contract to Sell the
proper and legal way of rescinding said contract? Explain. (2.5%)

(B) in case Paul made a down payment pursuant to a stipulation in the Contract to Sell,
what is the legal remedy of Peter? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER
(A) As a general rule, the power to rescind an obligation must be invoked judicially and
cannot be exercised solely on a party’s own judgment that the other has committed a
breach of the obligation. This is so because rescission of a contract will not be permitted
for a slight or casual breach, but only for such substantial and fundamental violations as
would defeat the very object of the parties in making the agreement. However, rescission
as a remedy for breach is applicable only to an obligation which is extant. Be it noted that
the contract between the parties.is a contract to sell and not a contract of sale and in a
contract to sell, there is a reservation of ownership on the part of the seller and his
obligation to convey title will only arise upon full payment of the purchase price.
Nonetheless, Peter may validly cancel the contract to sell (Olivarez v. Castillo, G.R. No.
196251, July 9, 2014).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER

(A) (1) Yes, Peter validly rescinded the contract to sell his lot to Paul for the latter’s failure
to comply with his prestation to pay P1,000,000.00 on November 6, 2016 at 1:00.p.m. at
the residence of Peter so that Peter will execute the Deed of Absolute Sale: The

rescission is actually the resolution of the reciprocal obligation (2) in UP v. De los Angeles
(G.R. No. L-28602, September 29, 1970, 35 SCRA 102), the Supreme Court ruled that
the injured party may consider the contract as rescinded and act accordingly, even
without prior court action. His unilateral determination however, is provisional, since the
other party may challenge it by suing him in court. It is then the court which will finally
determine if the rescission should be set aside or affirmed.

SUGGESTED ANSWER

(B) If. Paul made a down payment, Peter may still cancel the contract because in a
contract to sell, the seller does not yet agree to transfer ownership to the buyer. The non-
payment of the price in a contract to sell is not a breach for which the remedy of rescission
may be availed of, but rather it is considered as a failure to comply with a positive suspen
şive condition which will prevent the obligation of the seller to convey title from acquiring
obligatory force (Ursal v. Court of Appeals. G.R. No. 142411, October 14, 2005, 473
SCRA 52, citing Chua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144881, October 16, 2003, 401
SCRA 54).

XVI

Don Ricardo had 2 legitimate children-Tomas and Tristan. Tristan has 3 children.
Meanwhile, Tomas had a relationship with Nancy, who was also single and had the legal
capacity to marry. Nancy became pregnant and gave birth to Tomas, Jr. After the birth of
Tomas, Jr., his father, Tomas, died. Later, Don Ricardo died without a will and Tristan
opposed the motion of Tomas, Jr. to be declared an heir of the deceased since he is an
illegitimate child. Tomas, Jr.countered that Article 992 of the Civil Code is unconstitutional
for violation of the equal protection of the laws. He explained that an illegitimate child of
an illegitimate parent is allowed to inherit under Articles 902,982 and 990 of the Civil Code
while he-an illegitimate child of a legitimate father-cannot. Civil Law commentator Arturo
Tolentino opined that Article 992 created an absurdity and committed an injustice
because while the illegitimate descendant of an illegitimate child can represent, the
illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child cannot. Decide the case and explain. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

I will deny the motion of Tomas, Jr. to be declared as an heir of the deceased. Tomas jr.,
being an illegitimate child of the deceased legitimate son, Tomas, cannot inherit ab
intestate from the deceased, Don Ricardo, because of the iron curtain rule under Article
992 of the Civil Code. Tomas cannot argue that Article 992 is violative of the equal
protection clause because equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed (Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957, 101 Phil: 7755). It,
however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification.

XVII

Macario bought a titled lot from Ramon, got the title and took possession of the lot. Since
Macario did not have the money to pay the taxes, fees and registration expenses, he was
not able to register the Deed of Absolute Sale. Upon advice, he merely executed an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim and had it annotated at the back of the title. A few years after,
he received a Notice of Levy on Attachment and Writ of Execution.in favor of Alex. The
notice, writ and certificate of sale were annotated at the back of the title still in Ramon’s
name. Alex contends that since the Affidavit of Adverse Claim is effective only for 30 days
from the date of its registration, then its validity has expired. Macario posits that the
annotation of his adverse claim is notice to the whole world of his purchase of the lot in
question. Who has the superior right over the disputed property–Macario or Alex?
Explain.(5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

Macario is preferred since the registration of his adverse claim was made ahead of the
notice of levy and writ of execution in favor of Alex. Macario’s adverse claim, coupled with
the fact that he was in possession of the disputed property, are circumstances which
should have put Alex on constructive notice that the property being offered to him had
already been sold to another (Ching v. Enrile, G.R. No. 156076, September 17, 2008).
The contention that the adverse claim is effective only for 30 years is puerite. in Sajonas
v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 102377, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 79), the Court held that
the adverse claim does not ipso facto lose its validity since an independent action is still
necessary to render it ineffective. Until then, the adverse claim shall continue as a prior
lien on the property.

XVIII

Dr. Jack, a surgeon, holds clinic at the St. Vincent’s Hospital and pays rent to the hospital.
The fees of Dr. Jack are paid directly to him by the patient or through the cashier of the
hospital. The hospital publicly displays in the lobby the names and specializations of the
doctors associated or accredited by it, including that of Dr. Jack. Marta engaged the
services of Dr. Jack because of recurring stomach pain. It was diagnosed that she is
suffering from cancer and had to be operated on. Before the operation, she was asked
to sign a “consent for hospital care,” which reads.

“Permission is hereby given to the medical, nursing and laboratory staff of the St.
Vincent’s Hospital to perform such procedures and to administer such medications and
treatments as may be deemed necessary or advisable by the physicians of this hospital
for and during the confinement.”

After the surgery, the attending nurses reported that two (2) sponges were missing. Later,
Marta died due to complications brought about by the sponges that were left in her
stomach. The husband of Marta sued the hospital and Dr. Jack for damages arising from
negligence in the medical procedure. The hospital raised the defense that Dr. Jack is not
its employee as it did not hire Dr. Jack nor pay him any salary or compensation. It has
absolutely no control over the medical services and treatment being provided by Dr. Jack.
Dr. Jack even signed an agreement that he holds the hospital free and harmless from any
liability arising from his medical practice in the hospital.

Is St. Vincent’s Hospital liable for the negligence of Dr. Jack? Explain your answer. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

Yes, St. Vincent’s Hospital is liable. In the case of Professional Services v. Agana (G.R.
No.126297, January 31, 2007, 513 SCRA 478), the Supreme Court heid that the hospital
is liable to the Aganas, not under the principle of respondeat superior for lack of evidence
of an employer-employee rela tionship with Dr. Ampil but under the principle of ostensible
agency for the negligence of Dr. Ampil and, pro hac vice, under the principle of corporate
negligence for its failure to perform its duties as a hospital. .

While it is true that there was insufficient evidence that St. Vincent’s Hospital exercised
the power of control or wielded such power over the means and the details of the specific
process by which Dr. Jack applied his skills in Marta’s treatment, there is ample evidence
that St. Vincent’s Hospital held out to the patient, Marta, thatDr. Jack was its agent
(principle of ostensible agency). The two factors that determine apparent authority are
present: (1) the hospital’s implied manifestation to the patient which led the latter to
conclude that the doctor was the hospital’s agent; and (2) the patient’s reliance upon the
conduct of the hospital and the doctor, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.

The corporate negligence ascribed to St. Vincent’s Hospital is different from the medical
negligence attributed to Dr. Jack. The duties of the hospital are distinct from those of the
doctor-consultant practicing within its premises in relation to the patient; hence, the failure
of St. Vincent’s Hospital to fulfill its duties as a hospital corporation gave rise to a direct
liability to Marta distinct from that of Dr. Jack.

XIX

Brad and Angelina had a secret marriage before a pastor whose office is located in
Arroceros Street, City of Manila. They paid money to the pastor who took care of all the
documentation. When Angelina wanted to go to the U.S., she found out that there was no
marriage license issued to them before their marriage. Since their marriage was
solemnized in 1995 after the effectivity of the Family Code, Angelina filed a petition for
judicial declaration of

(A) Decide the case and explain. (2.5%)

(B) In case the marriage was solemnized in 1980 before the effectivity of the Family Code,
is it required that a judicial petition be filed to declare the marriage null and void? Explain.
(2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

(A) I will grant the petition for judicial declaration of nullity of Brad and Angelina’s marriage
on the ground that there is a lack of a marriage license. Article 3 of the Family Code
provides that one of the formal requisites of marriage is a valid marriage license and
Article 4 of the same Code states that absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, in Abbas v. Abbas (G.R. No. 183896, January 30,
2013, 689 SCRA 646), the Supreme Court declared the marriage as void ab
initio because there is proof of lack of record of marriage license.

The certification by the Civil Registrar of Manila that, after a diligent and exhaustive
search, the alleged marriage license indicated in the marriage certificate does not appear
in the records and cannot be found proves that the marriage of Brad and Angelina was
solemnized without the requisite marriage license and is therefore void ab initio. The
absence of the marriage license was certified to by the local civil registrar who is the
official custodian of these documents and who is in the best position to certify as to the
existence of these records. Also, there is a presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duty (Republic v. CA and Castro, G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994, 236
SCRA 257).

(B) No, it is not required that a judicial petition be filed to declare the marriage null and
void when said marriage was solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. As
stated in the cases of People V. Mendoza (G.R. No. L-5877, September 28, 1954, 95
Phil. 845), and People v. Aragon (G.R. No. L-10016, February 28, 1957, 100 Phil. 1033),
the old rule is that where a marriage is illegal and void from its performance, no judicial
petition is necessary to establish its invalidity.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER

(B) Irrespective of when the marriage took place, other than for

purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute

nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy
or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of
the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such
need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is
other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code.connotes that such final judgment need to
be obtained only for purpose of remarriage (Ablaza v. Republic, G.R. No. 158298, August
11, 2010, 628 SCRA 27).

Princess married:Roberto and bore a son, Onofre. Roberto died in a plane crash Princess
later married Märk and they also had a son-Pepito. Onofre donated to Pepito, his half-
brother, a lot in Makati City worth p3,000,000.00. Pepito succumbed to an illness and died
intestate. The tot: given to Pepito by Onofre was inherited by his father, Mark. Mark also
died intestate. Lonely, Princess followed Mark to the life beyond. The claimants: to the
subject lot emerged-jojo, the father of Princess; Victor, the father of Mark; and Jerico, the
father of Roberto.

Who among the three (3) ascendants is entitled to the lot? Explain. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER

Jojo, Princess’s father, is entitled to the lot: This is a clear case of reserva troncal. The
Origin is Onofre. The Prepositus is Pepito. The mode of transmission from Onofre to
Pepito is donation (hence by gratuitous title), The Reservista is Mark, who acquired it from
his descendant (son) Pepito by legitime and intestacy (hence, by operation of law). The
Reservatario is Princess, a relative of the Prepositus Pepito within the third degree and
who belonged to the line of origin (the maternal line). Line of origin is the maternal line
because Onofre (the Origin) and Pepito. (the Prepositus) are maternal half-blood siblings.
When Mark (Reservista) died, the property passed to Princess as sole. reservatario, thus
extinguishing the reserva troncal. Upon Princess’s death, the property was transmitted
ab intestato to her father Jojo. Transmission to Jojo is by the ordinary rules of compulsory
and intestate succession, not by reserva troncal, because the reserva was extinguished
upon the transmission of the property to Princess, this making Princess the absolute
owner subject to no reserva.

Emancipation (1993)

Julio and Lea, both 18 years old, were sweethearts. At a party at the house of a mutual
friend. Lea met Jake, also 18 years old, who showed interest in her. Lea seemed to
entertain Jake because she danced with him many times. In a fit of jealousy, Julio shot
Jake with his father’s 38 caliber revolver which, before going to the party he was able to
get from the unlocked drawer inside his father’s bedroom. Jake died as a result of the
lone gunshot wound he sustained. His parents sued Julio’s parents for damages arising
from quasi-delict. At the time of the incident, Julio was 18 years old living with his parents.
Julio’s parents moved to dismiss the complaint against them claiming that since Julio was
already of majority age, they were no longer liable for his acts.

1) Should the motion to dismiss be granted? Why?

2) What is the liability of Julio’s parents to Jake’s parents? Explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1) No, the Motion to Dismiss should not be granted. Article 236 of the Family Code as
amended by Republic Act 6809, provides in the third paragraph that “nothing in this Code
shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians
for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third
paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code”.

2) The liability of Julio’s parents to Jake’s parents arises from quasi-delict (Arts. 2176
and 2180 Civil Code) and shall cover specifically the following:

a) P50,000.00 for the death of the son;

b) such amount as would correspond to lost earning capacity; and

c) moral damages.

Family Code; Retroactive Application; Vested Rights (2000)

On April 15, 1980, Rene and Angelina were married to each other without a marriage
settlement. In 1985, they acquired a parcel of land in Quezon City. On June 1, 1990, when
Angelina was away in Baguio, Rene sold the said lot to Marcelo. Is the sale void or
voidable?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The sale is void. Since the sale was executed in 1990, the Family Code is the law
applicable. Under Article 124 of the FC, the sale of a conjugal property by a spouse
without the consent of the other is void.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

The sale is voidable. The provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively but only
if such application will not impair vested rights. When Rene and Angelina got married in
1980, the law that governed their property relations was the New Civil Code. Under the
NCC, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Heirs of Felipe v. Aldon, 100 SCRA 628
and reiterated in Heirs of Ayuste v. Malabonga, G.R. No. 118784, 2 September
1999, the sale executed by the husband
without the consent of the wife is voidable. The husband has already acquired a vested
right on the voidable nature of dispositions made without the consent of the wife. Hence,
Article 124 of the Family Code which makes the sale void does not apply.

Family Home; Dwelling House (1994)

In 1991, Victor established judicially out of conjugal property, a family home in Manila
worth P200.000.00 and extrajudicially a second family home in Tagaytay worth
P50.000.00. Victor leased the family home in Manila to a foreigner. Victor and his family
transferred to another house of his in Pasig.

Can the two family homes be the subject of execution on a judgment against Victor’s wife
for non-payment of the purchase in 1992 of household appliances?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The two (2) so-called family homes can be the subject of execution. Neither of the abodes
are considered family homes because for purposes of availing the benefits under the
Family Code, there can only be one (1) family home which is defined as the “dwelling
house” where the husband and the wife and their family actually “reside” and the land on
which it is situated. (Arts. 152 and 161, Family Code)

Family; Constitutional Mandates; Divorce (1991)

A. How does the 1987 Constitution strengthen the family as an Institution?

B. Do the Constitutional policy on the family and the provision that marriage is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State bar Congress from enacting
a law allowing divorce in the Philippines?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A. Sec, 2, Article II of the Constitution provides that: The State recognizes the sanctity
of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth
for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government.

Section I, Article XV, further provides that: The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote
its total development.

(Note: The Committee recommends that a citation of either one of the provisions be
credited as a complete answer).

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

B, No, the Constitutional policy, as well as the supporting provision, does not amount to
a prohibition to Congress to enact a law on divorce. The Constitution only meant to help
the marriage endure, to “strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development.”

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

B. Yes. Congress is barred from enacting a law allowing divorce, since Section 2 of
Article XV provides: “Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.” Since marriage is
“Inviolable”, it cannot be dissolved by an absolute divorce.

Marriage; Annulment; Effects; Requisites Before Marriage (1990)

The marriage of H and W was annulled by the competent court. Upon finality of the
judgment of nullity. H began looking for his prospective second mate. He fell in love with
a sexy woman S who wanted to be married as soon as possible, i.e., after a few months
of courtship. As a young lawyer, you were consulted by H,

(a) How soon can H be joined in lawful wedlock to his girlfriend S? Under existing laws,
are there certain requisites that must be complied with before he can remarry? What
advice would you give H?
(b) Suppose that children were born from the union of H and W, what would be the
status of said children? Explain your answer.

(c) If the subsequent marriage of H to S was contracted before compliance

with the statutory condition for its validity, what are the rights of the children of the first
marriage (i.e., of H and W) and of the children of the subsequent marriage (of H and S)?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) H, or either spouse for that matter, can marry again after complying with the provisions
of Article 52 of the Family Code, namely, there must be a partition and distribution, of
the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children’s presumptive
legitimes which should be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of
property. H should be so advised.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: for (a)

The following are the requisites prescribed by law and I advice H to comply with them,
namely:

1) If either spouse contracted the marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net
profits of the community property : or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in
favor of the common children or, if there
are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a
previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;

2) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid except that if the donee
contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by
operation of law;

3) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be
disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession;

4) If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith all donations by
reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are
revoked by operation of law.

5) The judgment of annulment of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes shall
be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registers of property, (Articles 53, 52,
43, 44, Family Code).

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) The children born from the union of H and W would be legitimate children if conceived
or born before the decree of annulment of the marriage (under Art. 45 of the Family Code)
has become final and executory (Art. 54, Family Code).

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(c) The children of the first marriage shall be considered

legitimate children if conceived or born before the Judgment of annulment of the
marriage of H and W has become final and executory. Children conceived or born of the
subsequent marriage shall likewise be legitimate even if the marriage of H and S be null
and void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 52 of the Family Code (Article
53, Family Code).

As legitimate children, they have the following rights;

a) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother in conformity with the provisio
ns of the Civil Code on Surnames;

b) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their
brothers and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support; and

c) To be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights granted to them

by the Civil Code (Article 174, Family Code).

Marriage; Annulment; Grounds (1991)

One of the grounds for annulment of marriage is that either party, at the time of their m
arriage was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease, found to be serious and
appears incurable. Two (2) years after their marriage, which took place on 10 October
1988, Bethel discovered that her husband James has a sexually-transmissible disease
which he contracted even prior to their marriage although James did not know it himself
until he was examined two [2) years later when a child was already born to them. Bethel
sues James for annulment of their marriage. James opposes the annulment on the
ground that he did not even know that he had such a disease so that there was no fraud
or bad faith on his part. Decide.

B. Suppose that both parties at the time of their marriage were similarly afflicted with
sexually-transmissible diseases, serious and incurable, and both knew of their respective
infirmities, can Bethel or James sue for annulment of their marriage?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A. The marriage can be annulled, because good faith is not a defense when the ground
is based upon sexually- transmissible disease on the part of either party.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B. Yes, the marriage can still be annulled because the fact that both of them are afflicted
with sexually-transmissible diseases does not efface or nullity the ground.

Alternative Answer:

B. No, the marriage can no longer be annulled, because the fact that both were afflicted
and that both knew of their respective infirmities constitutes a waiver of that ground.

Marriage; Annulment; Judicial Declaration (1993)

Maria and Luis, both Filipinos, were married by a Catholic priest in Lourdes Church,
Quezon City in 1976, Luis was drunk on the day of his wedding. In fact, he slumped at
the altar soon after the ceremony. After marriage, Luis never had a steady job because
he was drunk most of the time. Finally, he could not get employed at all because of
drunkenness. Hence, it was Maria who had to earn a living to support herself and her
child begotten with Luis. In 1986, Maria filed a petition in the church matrimonial court in
Quezon City to annul her marriage with Luis on the ground of psychological incapacity to
comply with his marital obligation. Her petition was granted by the church matrimonial
court.

1) Can Maria now get married legally to another man under Philippine laws after he
r marriage to Luis was annulled by the church matrimonial court? Explain.

2) What must Maria do to enable her to get married lawfully to another man under
Philippine laws?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1) No, Maria cannot validly contract a subsequent marriage without a court declaration
of nullity of the first marriage. The law does not recognize the church declaration of nullity
of a marriage.

2) To enable Maria to get married lawfully to another man. she must obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of the prior marriage under Article 36 Family Code.

Marriage; Annulment; Legal Separation; Prescription of Actions (1996)

2) Bert and Baby were married to each other on December 23, 1988. Six months later,
she discovered that he was a drug addict. Efforts to have him rehabilitated were
unsuccessful. Can Baby ask for annulment of marriage, or legal separation?
Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, Baby cannot ask for annulment of her marriage or for legal separation because both
these actions had already prescribed.
While concealment of drug addiction existing at the time of marriage constitutes fraud
under Art. 46 of the FC which makes the marriage voidable under Art. 45 of the FC, the
action must, however, be brought within 5 years from the discovery thereof under Article
47 (3) , FC, Since the drug addiction of Bert was discovered by Baby in
June 1989, the action had already prescribed in June of 1994.

Although drug addiction is a ground for legal separation under Art. 55(5) and Art. 57 of
the FC requires that the action must be brought within 5 years from the occurrence of the
cause. Since Bert had been a drug addict from the time of the celebration of the marriage,
the action for legal separation must have been brought not later than 23 December
1993. Hence, Baby cannot, now, bring the action for legal separation.

Marriage; Annulment; Proper Party (1990)

D and G, age 20 and 19, respectively, and both single,

eloped and got married to each other without parental consent in the case of G, a
teenaged student of an exclusive college for girls. Three years later, her parents wanted
to seek judicial annulment on that ground. You were consulted and asked to prepare the
proper complaint. What advice would you give G’s parents? Explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

G himself should file the complaint under Article 45 of the

Family Code, and no longer the parents because G is already 22 years of age.

Marriage; Annulment; Proper Party (1995)

Yvette was found to be positive for HIV virus, considered sexually transmissible, serious
and incurable. Her boyfriend Joseph was aware of her condition and yet married her.
After two (2) years of cohabiting with Yvette, and in his belief that she would probably
never be able to bear him a healthy child, Joseph now wants to have his marriage with
Yvette annulled. Yvette opposes the suit contending that
Joseph is estopped from seeking annulment of their marriage since he knew even
before their marriage that she was afflicted with HIV virus.

Can the action of Joseph for annulment of his marriage

with Yvette prosper? Discuss fully.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, Joseph knew that Yvette was HIV positive at the time of the marriage. He is, therefore,
not an injured party. The FC gives the right to annul the marriage only to an injured party.
[Art. 47 (5), FC]

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The action for annulment can prosper because the prescriptive period of five (5) years
has not yet lapsed. [Art. 45 (6), FC].

Marriage; Divorce Decree; Void Marriages (1992)

In 1989, Maris, a Filipino citizen, married her boss Johnson, an American citizen, in Tokyo
in a wedding ceremony celebrated according to Japanese laws. One year later, Johnson
returned to his native Nevada, and he validly obtained in that state an absolute divorce
from his wife Maris.

After Maris received the final judgment of divorce, she married her childhood
sweetheart Pedro, also a Filipino citizen, in a religious ceremony in Cebu City, celebrated
according to the formalities of Philippine law. Pedro later left for the United States and
became naturalized as an American citizen. Maris followed Pedro to the United
States, and after a serious quarrel, Marts filed a suit and obtained a divorce decree issued
by the court in the state of Maryland.

Maris then returned to the Philippines and in a civil ceremony celebrated in Cebu City
according to the formalities of Philippine law, she married her former classmate Vincent
likewise a Filipino citizen.

b) Was the marriage of Maris and Pedro valid when

celebrated? Is their marriage still valid existing now? Reasons.

c) Was the marriage of Marts and Vincent valid when celebrated? Is their marriage
still validly existing now? Reasons.

d) At this point in time, who is the lawful husband of Marts? Reasons.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(b) The marriage of Maris and Pedro was valid when celebrated because the divorce
validly obtained by Johnson in Manila capacitated Maris to marry Pedro. The marriage of
Maris and Pedro is still validly existing, because the marriage has not been validly
dissolved by the Maryland divorce [Art. 26, Family Code).

(c) The marriage of Maris and Vincent is void ab initio

because it is a bigamous marriage contracted by Maris during the subsistence of her
marriage with Pedro (Art 25 and 41, Family Code).

The marriage of Maris and Vincent does not validly exist

because Article 26 does not apply. Pedro was not a foreigner at the time of his
marriage with marts and the divorce abroad (in Maryland) was initiated and obtained not
by the alien spouse, but by the Filipino spouse. Hence, the
Maryland divorce did not capacitate Marts to marry Vincent.
(d) At this point in time, Pedro is still the lawful husband of Maris because their valid
marriage has not been dissolved by any valid cause (Art. 26. Family Code)

Marriage; Divorce Decrees; Filiation of Children (2005)

In 1985, Sonny and Lulu, both Filipino citizens, were married in the Philippines. In
1987, they separated, and Sonny went to Canada, where he obtained a divorce in the
same year. He then married another Filipina, Auring, in Canada on January 1,1988.
They had two sons, James and John. In 1990, after failing to hear from Sonny, Lulu
married Tirso, by whom she had a daughter, Verna. In 1991, Sonny visited the Philippines
where he succumbed to heart attack.

a) Discuss the effect of the divorce obtained by Sonny and Lulu in Canada.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The divorce is not valid. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce. Philippine
courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two (2) Filipinos cannot be dissolved by a
divorce obtained abroad. (Garcia v. Redo, G.R. No. 138322, October 2,2001).
Philippine laws apply to Sonny and Lulu. Under Article 15 of the New Civil Code, laws
relating to family rights and duties, status, and capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines wherever they may be. Thus, the marriage of Sonny and Lulu
is still valid and subsisting.

b) Explain the status of marriage between Sonny and Auring.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Since the decree of divorce obtained by Lulu and Sony in Canada is not recognized here
in the Philippines, the marriage between Sonny and Auring is void. (Art. 35, Family
Code) Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall
be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in the cases of absence or where the
prior marriage was dissolved or
annulled. (Ninal v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000)The marriage of Sonny
and Auring does not fall within the exception.

c) Explain the status of the marriage between Lulu and Tirso.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The marriage of Lulu and Tirso is also void. Mere absence of the spouse does not give
rise to a right of the present spouse to remarry. Article 41 of the Family Code provides for
a valid bigamous marriage only where a spouse has been
absent for four consecutive years before the second marriage and the present
spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead. (Republic v.
Nolasco, G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993)
d) Explain the respective filiation of James, John and Verna.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

James, John and Verna are illegitimate children since their parents are not validly
married. Under Article 165 of the Family Code, children conceived and born outside a
valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code.

e) Who are the heirs of Sonny? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Sonny’s heirs include James, John, and Lulu. Article 887 of the Civil Code provides that
the compulsory heirs of the deceased are among others, his widow and his illegitimate
children. The widow referred to in Article 887 is the legal wife of the deceased. Lulu is
still a compulsory heir of Sonny because the divorce obtained by Sonny in Canada
cannot be recognized in the Philippines. The legitime of
each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
(Art. 176, Family Code)

Marriage; Divorce Decrees; Filipino Spouses becoming Alien (1996)

Flor and Virgillo were married to each other in Roxas City

in 198O. In 1984, Flor was offered a teaching Job in Canada, which she accepted.
In 1989, she applied for and was granted Canadian citizenship. The following year, she
sued for divorce from Virgilio in a Canadian court. After Virgilio was served with summons,
the Canadian court tried the case and decreed the divorce. Shortly thereafter, Flor
married a Canadian.

Can Virgilio marry again in the Philippines? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, Virgilio cannot validly remarry. His case is not covered by Article 26 of the Family
Code, For said Article to be applicable, the spouse who filed for divorce must be a
foreigner at the time of the marriage. Since both of them were Filipinos at the time of the
marriage, the divorce obtained by Flor did not capacitate Virgilio to remarry. The fact that
Flor was already an alien at the time she obtained the divorce does not give Virgilio the
capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:

a) Yes, Virgilio can validly remarry. Art. 26 of the FC, merely States the alien spouse
without taking into consideration his or her nationality at the time of the marriage. While
his case is not covered by the letter of Article 26 FC, it is, however, covered by the spirit
of said Article, the injustice to the Filipino spouse sought to be cured by said Article is
present in this case. (Department of Justice Opinion No. 134 Series of 1993).

b) Although the marriage originally involved Filipino citizens, it eventually became a

marriage between an alien and a Filipino after Flor became a Canadian citizen. Thus, the
divorce decree was one obtained by an alien spouse
married to a Filipino. Although nothing is said about whether such divorce did
capacitate Flor to remarry, that fact may as well be assumed since the problem states
that she married a Canadian shortly after obtaining the divorce. Hence, Virgillo can marry
again under Philippine law, pursuant to Art. 26. FC which applies because Flor was
already an alien at the time of the divorce.

Marriage; Divorce Decrees; Filipino Spouses becoming Alien (1999)

Ben and Eva were both Filipino citizens at the time of their marriage in 1967, When their
marriage turned sour, Ben went to a small country in Europe, got himself naturalized
there, and then divorced Eva in accordance with the law of that country, Later, he returned
to the Philippines with his new wife.

Eva now wants to know what action or actions she can file against Ben. She also wants
to know if she can likewise marry again. What advice can you give her?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Considering that Art. 26 (2nd par.) contemplates a divorce between a foreigner and a
Filipino, who had such respective nationalities at the time of their marriage, the divorce in
Europe will not capacitate the Filipino wife to remarry. The advice we can give her is either
to file a petition for legal separation, on the ground of sexual infidelity and of contracting
a bigamous marriage abroad, or to file a petition to dissolve the conjugal partnership or
absolute community of property as the case maybe.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Eva may file an action for legal separation on the grounds of sexual infidelity of her
husband and the contracting by her husband of a bigamous marriage abroad.

She may remarry. While a strict interpretation of Article 26 of the Family Code would
capacitate a Filipino spouse to remarry only when the other spouse was a foreigner at the
time of the marriage, the DOJ has issued an opinion (Opinion 134 s. of 1993) that the
same injustice sought to be cured by Article 26 is present in the case of spouses who
were both Filipino at the time of the marriage but one became an alien subsequently.
Said injustice is the anomaly of Eva remaining married to her husband who is no longer
married to her. Hence, said Opinion makes Article 26 applicable to her case and the
divorce obtained abroad by her former Filipino husband would capacitate her to
remarry. To contract a subsequent marriage, all she needs to do is present to the civil
registrar the decree of divorce when she applies for a marriage license under Article 13
of the Family Code.

Marriage; Donations by Reason of Marriage; Effect of Declaration of Nullity

(1996)

1) On the occasion of Digna’s marriage to George, her father gave her a donation
propter nuptias of a car. Subsequently, the marriage was annulled because of the
psychological immaturity of George.

May Digna’s father revoke the donation and get back the car? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, Digna’s father may not revoke the donation because

Digna was not in bad faith, applying Art. 86 (3) of the Family Code.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

a) Yes, the donation is revocable. Since the ground for the annulment of the marriage is
the psychological immaturity of George, the judgment was in the nature of a declaration
of nullity under Art. 36 of the FC and, therefore, the donation may be revoked under Art.
86( 1) of the FC for the reason that the marriage has been judicially declared void ab
initio.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

b) No, the donation cannot be revoked. The law provides that a donation by reason of
marriage may be revoked by the donor if among other cases, the marriage is judicially
declared void ab initio [par. (1) Art. 86. Family Code], or when the marriage is annulled
and the donee acted in bad faith [par. (3), Id.]. Since the problem states that the
marriage was annulled and there is no intimation of bad faith on the part of the donee
Digna, the conclusion is that the donor cannot revoke the donation.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

c) Yes, the donation can be revoked. The ground used in dissolving the marriage was the
psychological immaturity of George, which is not a ground for annulment of marriage. If
this term is equated with psychological incapacity as used in Art. 36 of the Family Code,
then it is a ground for declaration of nullity of the marriage. Consequently, par. (1) of Art.
86, FC, is the applicable law. Since Art. 86 of the FC makes no qualification as to who
furnished the ground or who was in bad faith in connection with the nullification of the
marriage, the conclusion is that Digna’s father may revoke the donation and get back the
car.
Marriage; Grounds; Declaration of Nullity: Annulment: Legal Separation:
Separation of Property (2003)

Which of the following remedies, i.e., (a) declaration of nullity of marriage, (b)
annulment of marriage, (c) legal separation, and/or (d) separation of property, can an
aggrieved spouse avail himself/herself of-

(i) If the wife discovers after the marriage that her husband has “AIDS”.

(ii) If the wife goes (to) abroad to work as a nurse and refuses to come home after the
expiration of her three-year contract there.

(iii) If the husband discovers after the marriage that his wife has been a prostitute before
they got married.

(iv) If the husband has a serious affair with his secretary and refuses to stop
notwithstanding advice from relatives and friends.

(v) If the husband beats up his wife every time he comes home drunk.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(i) Since AIDS is a serious and incurable sexually- transmissible disease, the
wife may file an action for annulment of the marriage on this ground whether such fact
was concealed or not from the wife, provided that the
disease was present at the time of the marriage. The
marriage is voidable even though the husband was not aware that he had the
disease at the time of marriage.

(ii) If the wife refuses to come home for three (3)

months from the expiration of her contract, she is presumed to have abandoned
the husband and he may file an action for judicial separation of property. If the refusal
continues for more than one year from the expiration of her contract, the husband may
file the action for legal separation under Art. 55 (10) of the Family Code on the
ground of abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for
more than one year. The wife is deemed to have abandoned the husband when she
leaves the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning (Article 101, FC). The
intention not to return cannot be presumed during the 30year period of her contract.

(iii) If the husband discovers after the marriage that his wife was a prostitute before
they got married, he has no remedy. No misrepresentation or deceit as to character,
health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute fraud as legal ground for an action for the
annulment of marriage (Article 46 FC).

(iv) The wife may file an action for legal separation. The husband’s sexual infidelity
is a ground for legal separation 9Article 55, FC). She may also file an action for judicial
separation of property for failure of her husband to comply with his martial duty of fidelity
(Article 135 (4), 101, FC).

(v) The wife may file an action for legal separation on the ground of repeated
physical violence on her person (Article 55 (1), FC). She may also file an action for
judicial separation of property for failure of the husband to comply with his marital duty
of mutual respect (Article 135 (4), Article 101, FC). She may also file an action
for declaration of nullity of the marriage if the husband’s behavior constitute
psychological incapacity existing at the time of the celebration of marriage.

Marriage; Grounds; Nullity; Annulment; Legal Separation (1997)

Under what conditions, respectively, may drug addiction be a ground, if at all, (a) for a
declaration of nullity of marriage, (b) for an annulment of the marriage contract, and (c)
for legal separation between the spouses?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) Declaration of nullity of marriage:

1) The drug addiction must amount to psychological incapacity to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage;

2) It must be antecedent (existing at the time of marriage), grave and incurable:

3) The case must be filed before August 1, 1998.

Because if they got married before August 3, 1998, it must be filed before August 1,
1998.

(b) Annulment of the Marriage Contract:

1) The drug addiction must be concealed;

2) It must exist at the time of marriage;

3) There should be no cohabitation with full knowledge of the drug addiction;

4) The case is filed within five (5) years from discovery.

(c) Legal Separation:

1) There should be no condonation or consent to the drug addiction;

2) The action must be filed within five (5) years from the occurrence of the cause.
3) Drug addiction arises during the marriage and not at the time of marriage.

Marriage; Legal Separation; Declaration of Nullity (2002)

If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occu

r only during the marriage, would this constitute grounds for a declaration of nullity or
for legal separation, or would they render the marriage voidable?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

In accordance with law, if drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or

homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they:

a) Will not constitute as ground for declaration of nullity (Art. 36, Family Code);

b) Will constitute as grounds for legal separation (Art. 56, FC) and

c) will not constitute as grounds to render the marriage voidable (Art.45and 46, FC)

Marriage; Legal Separation; Grounds; Prescriptive Period (1994)

Rosa and Ariel were married in the Catholic Church of Tarlac, Tarlac on January 5.
1988. In 1990, Ariel went to Saudi Arabia to work. There, after being converted into Islam,
Ariel married Mystica, Rosa learned of the second marriage of Ariel on January 1, 1992
when Ariel returned to the Philippines with Mystica. Rosa filed an action for legal
separation on February 5, 1994,

1) Does Rosa have legal grounds to ask for legal separation?

2) Has the action prescribed?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1) a) Yes, the abandonment of Rosa by Ariel for more than one (1) year is a ground for
legal separation unless upon returning to the Philippines, Rosa agrees to cohabit with
Ariel which is allowed under the Muslim Code. In this case, there is condonation.

b) Yes. The contracting of a subsequent bigamous marriage whether in the Philippines

or abroad is a ground for legal separation under Article 55(7) of the Family Code. Whether
the second marriage is valid or not, Ariel having converted into Islam, is immaterial.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

2) No. Under Article 57 of the Family Code, the aggrieved spouse must file the
action within five (5) years from the occurrence of the cause. The subsequent marriage
of Ariel could not have occurred earlier than 1990, the time he went to Saudi Arabia.
Hence, Rosa has until 1995 to bring the action under the Family Code.

Marriage; Legal Separation; Mutual guilt (2006)

Saul, a married man, had an adulterous relation with Tessie. In one of the trysts, Saul’s
wife, Cecile, caught them in flagrante. Armed with a gun, Cecile shot Saul in a fit of
extreme jealousy, nearly killing him. Four (4) years after the incident, Saul filed an action
for legal separation against Cecile on the ground that she attempted to kill him.

(1) If you were Saul’s counsel, how will you argue his case?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

As the counsel of Saul, I will argue that an attempt by the wife against the life of the
husband is one of the grounds enumerated by the Family Code for legal separation and
there is no need for criminal conviction for the ground to be invoked (Art. 55, par. 9, Family
Code).

(2) If you were the lawyer of Cecile, what will be your defense?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

As the counsel of Cecile, I will invoke the adultery of Saul. Mutual guilt is a ground for the
dismissal of an action for legal separation (Art. 56, par. 4, Family Code). The rule is
anchored on a well-established principle that one must come to court with clean
hands.

(3) If you were the judge, how will you decide the case?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

If I were the judge, I will dismiss the action on the ground of mutual guilt of the parties.
The Philippine Constitution protects marriage as an inviolable social institution (Art.
XV, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution). An action for legal
separation involves public interest and no such decree should be issued if any legal
obstacle thereto appears on record. This is in line with the policy that in case of doubt, the
court shall uphold the validity and sanctity of marriage (Brown v. Yambao, G.R. No. L-
10699, October 18, 1957).

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Marriage; Non-Bigamous Marriages (2006)

Marvin, a Filipino, and Shelley, an American, both residents of California, decided to get
married in their local parish. Two years after their marriage, Shelley obtained a divorce in
California. While in Boracay, Marvin met Manel, a Filipina, who was vacationing there.
Marvin fell in love with her. After a brief courtship and complying with all the requirements,
they got married in Hongkong to avoid publicity, it being Marvin’s second marriage. Is his
marriage to Manel valid? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes. The marriage will not fall under Art. 35(4) of the Family Code on bigamous
marriages, provided that Shelley obtained an absolute divorce, capacitating her to
remarry under her national law. Consequently, the marriage between Marvin and Manel
may be valid as long as it was solemnized and valid in accordance with the laws of
Hongkong [Art. 26, paragraphs 1 and 2, Family Code].

Marriage; Property Relations; Void Marriages (1991)

In June 1985, James married Mary. In September 1988, he also married Ophelia with
whom he begot two (2) children, A and B. In July 1989, Mary died. In July 1990, he married
Shirley and abandoned Ophelia, During their union. James and Ophelia acquired a
residential lot worth P300,000.00.

Ophelia sues James for bigamy and prays that his marriage with Shirley be declared null
and void. James, on the other hand, claims that since his marriage to Ophelia was
contracted during the existence of his marriage with Mary, the former is not binding upon
him, the same being void ab initio he further claims that his marriage to Shirley is valid
and binding as he was already legally capacitated at the time he married her.

a) Is the contention of James correct?

b) What property Relations governed the union of James and Ophelia?

c) Is the estate of Mary entitled to a share in the residential lot acquired by

James and Ophelia?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. Yes. His marriage to Ophelia is void ab initio because of
his subsisting prior marriage to Mary. His marriage to Shirley, after Mary’s death, is
valid and binding.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

A. No. The contention of James is not correct.

Art. 40, Family Code, provides that the “absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.” It can be said, therefore, that the marriage of James to Shirley
is void since his previous marriage to Ophelia, although itself void, had not yet been
judicially declared void,

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

A. No. The contention of James is not correct. He cannot set up as a defense his
own criminal act or wrongdoing.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

B. The provisions of Art 148 of the Family Code, shall govern: Art. 148. In cases of
cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the
absence, of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

C. It should be distinguished when the property was acquired.

• If it was acquired before Mary’s death, the estate of Mary is entitled to 1/2 of the
share of James.

• If it was acquired after Mary’s death, there will be no share at all for the estate of
Mary.

Marriage; Psychological Incapacity (1996)

On April 15, 1983, Jose, an engineer, and Marina, a nurse, were married to each other in
a civil ceremony in Boac, Marinduque. Six months after their marriage, Jose was
employed in an oil refinery in Saudi Arabia for a period of three years. When he returned
to the Philippines, Marina was no longer living in their house, but in Zamboanga City,
working in a hospital. He asked her to come home, but she refused to do so, unless he
agreed not to work overseas anymore because she cannot stand living alone. He could
not agree as in fact, he had signed another three year contract. When he returned in
1989, he could not locate Marina anymore. In 1992, Jose filed an action served by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Marina did not file any answer, a
possible collusion between the parties was ruled out by the Public Prosecutor. Trial was
conducted and Marina neither appeared nor presented evidence in her favor.

If you were the judge, will you grant the annulment. Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

As judge, I will not grant the annulment. The facts do not show any taint of personality
disorder on the part of the wife Marina so as to lend substance to her husband’s averment
of psychological incapacity within the meaning of Art 36 of the Family Code.
In Santos vs. CA (240 SCRA 20), this particular ground for nullity of marriage was held
to be limited only to the most serious cases of personality disorders (clearly
demonstrative of utter sensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. Marina’s refusal to come home to her husband unless he agreed not to work
overseas, far from being indicative of an insensitivity to the meaning of marriage, or of a
personality disorder, actually shows a sensitive awareness on her part of the marital duty
to live together as husband and wife. Mere refusal to rejoin her husband when he did not
accept the condition imposed by her does not furnish any basis for concluding that she
was suffering from psychological incapacity to discharge the essential marital obligations.

Mere intention to live apart does not fall under Art. 36, FC.
Furthermore, there is no proof that the alleged psychological incapacity existed at the
time of the marriage.

Marriage; Psychological Incapacity (2006)

Gemma filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Arnell on the
ground of psychological incapacity. She alleged that after 2 months of their marriage,
Arnell showed signs of disinterest in her, neglected her and went abroad. He returned to
the Philippines after 3 years but did not even get in touch with her. Worse, they met
several times in social functions but he snubbed her. When she got sick, he did not visit
her even if he knew of her confinement in the hospital. Meanwhile, Arnell met an accident
which disabled him from reporting for work and earning a living to support himself.

Will Gemma’s suit prosper? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, Gemma’s suit will not prosper. Even if taken as true, the grounds, singly or
collectively, do not constitute “psychological incapacity.” In Santos v. CA, G.R. No.
112019, January 4, 1995, the Supreme Court clearly explained that
“psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability” (Ferraris v. Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006;
Choa v. Choa, G.R. No. 143376, November 26, 2002). The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability to
perform one’s marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect, difficulty or much less,
ill will. Moreover, as ruled in Republic v. Molina, G.R. No.108763, February 13,1997, it
is essential that the husband is capable of meeting his marital responsibilities due to
psychological and not physical
illness (Antonio v.Reyes, G.R.No.155800, March 10,2006; Republic v. Quintero-
Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004). Furthermore, the condition complained of did
not exist at the time of the celebration of marriage.

Marriage; Psychological Incapacity (2006)

Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall be void. Choose the spouse listed below who is psychologically
incapacitated. Explain.

a) Nagger

b) Gay or Lesbian

c) Congenital sexual pervert

d) Gambler e) Alcoholic

SUGGESTED ANSWER: The best answers are B and C. To be sure, the existence and
concealment of these conditions at the inception of marriage renders the marriage
contract voidable (Art. 46, Family Code). They may serve as indicia of psychological
incapacity, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder (Santos v. CA, G.R. No.
112019, Jan. 4, 1995). Hence, if the condition of homosexuality, lesbianism or
sexual perversion, existing at the inception of the marriage, is of such a degree as to
prevent any form of sexual intimacy, any of them may qualify as a ground for
psychological incapacity. The law provides that the husband and wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code). The mandate
is actually the spontaneous, mutual affection between the spouses. In the natural order it
is sexual intimacy which brings the spouses wholeness and
oneness (Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA, G.R.No.119190, January 16,1997).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

None of them are necessarily psychologically incapacitated. Being a nagger, etc. are at
best only physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity. More than just
showing the manifestations of incapacity, the petitioner must show that the
respondent is incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage
and that it is also essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to
some psychological, not physical illness (Republic v. Quintero-
Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

A congenital sexual pervert may be psychologically incapaci- tated if his perversion

incapacitates him from discharging his marital obligations. For instance, if his perversion
is of such a nature as to preclude any normal sexual activity with his spouse.

Marriage; Requisites (1995)

Isidro and Irma, Filipinos, both 18 years of age, were

passengers of Flight No. 317 of Oriental Airlines. The plane they boarded was of Phili
ppine registry. While en route from Manila to Greece some passengers hijacked the
plane, held the chief pilot hostage at the cockpit and ordered him to fly instead to Libya.
During the hijacking Isidro suffered a heart attack and was on the verge of death. Since
Irma was already eight months pregnant by Isidro, she pleaded to the hijackers to allow
the assistant pilot to solemnize her
marriage with Isidro. Soon after the marriage, Isidro expired. As the plane landed in
Libya Irma gave birth. However, the baby died a few minutes after complete delivery.

Back in the Philippines Irma immediately filed a claim for inheritance. The parents of
Isidro opposed her claim contending that the marriage between her and Isidro was void
ab initio on the following grounds: (a) they had not given their consent to the marriage of
their son; (b) there was no marriage license; (c) the solemnizing officer had no authority
to perform the marriage; and, (d) the solemnizing officer did not file an affidavit of marriage
with the proper civil registrar.

1. Resolve each of the contentions ([a] to [d]) raised by the parents of Isidro. Discuss fully.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1. (a) The fact that the parents of Isidro and of Irma did not give their consent to the
marriage did not make the marriage void ab initio. The marriage is merely voidable under
Art 45 of the FC.

(b) Absence of marriage license did not make the marriage void ab initio. Since the
marriage was solemnized in articulo mortis, it was exempt from the license requirement
under Art. 31 of the FC.

(c) On the assumption that the assistant pilot was acting for and in behalf of the airplane
chief who was under disability, and by reason of the extraordinary and exceptional
circumstances of the case [ie. hostage situation), the marriage was solemnized by
an authorized officer under Art. 7 (3) and Art. 31. of the FC.
(d) Failure of the solemnizing officer to file the affidavit of marriage did not affect the
validity of the marriage. It is merely an irregularity which may subject the solemnizing
officer to sanctions.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Considering that the solemnizing officer has no authority to

perform the marriage because under Art. 7 the law
authorizes only the airplane chief, the marriage is void, hence, a, c, and d are
immaterial.

Marriage; Requisites (1999)

What is the status of the following marriages and why?

(a) A marriage between two 19-year olds without parental consent,

(b) A marriage between two 21-year olds without parental advice.

(d) A marriage between two Filipinos in Hongkong before a notary public.

(e) A marriage solemnized by a town mayor three towns away from his jurisdiction.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) The marriage is voidable. The consent of the parties to the marriage was defective.
Being below 21 years old, the consent of the parties is not full without the consent of their
parents. The consent of the parents of the parties to the marriage is indispensable for its
validity.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(b) Between 21-year olds, the marriage is valid despite the absence of parental
advice, because such absence is merely an irregularity affecting a formal requisite i.e.,
the marriage license and does not affect the validity of the
marriage itself. This is without prejudice to the civil, criminal, or administrative liability
of the party responsible therefor.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(c) By reason of public policy, the marriage between Filipino first cousins is void [Art.
38, par. (1), Family Code], and the fact that it is considered a valid marriage in a foreign
country in this case, Spain— does not validate it, being an exception to the general rule
in Art. 96 of said Code which accords validity to all marriage solemnized outside the
Philippine x x x and valid there as such.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

The marriage it void. Under Article 96 of the Family Code, a marriage valid where
celebrated is valid in the Philippines except those marriages enumerated in said Article
which marriages will remain void even though valid where solemnized. The marriage
between first cousins is one of those marriages enumerated therein, hence, it is void even
though valid in Spain where it was celebrated.

By reason of Art. 15 in relation to Article 38 of the Civil Code, which applies to Filipinos
wherever they are, the marriage is void.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(d) It depends. If the marriage before the notary public is valid under Hongkong Law,
the marriage is valid in the Philippines. Otherwise, the marriage that is invalid in
Hongkong will be invalid in the Philippines.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

If the two Filipinos believed in good faith that the Notary

Public is authorized to solemnize marriage, then the marriage is valid.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(e) Under the Local Government Code, a town mayor may validly solemnize a marriage
but said law is silent as to the territorial limits for the exercise by a town mayor of such
authority. However, by analogy, with the authority of members of the Judiciary to
solemnize a marriage, it would seem that the mayor did not have the requisite authority
to solemnize a marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction. Hence, the marriage is void,
unless it was contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the mayor
had the legal authority to solemnize this particular marriage (Art 35, par 2 Family Code).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

The marriage is valid. Under the Local Government Code, the authority of a mayor to
solemnize marriages is not restricted within his municipality implying that he has the
authority even outside the territory thereof. Hence, the
marriage he solemnized outside his municipality is valid. And even assuming that his
authority is restricted within his municipality, such marriage will nevertheless, be valid
because solemnizing the marriage outside said municipality
is a mere irregularity applying by analogy the case of Navarro v. Domagtoy, 259
SCRA 129. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the celebration by a judge of a
marriage outside the jurisdiction of his court is a mere irregularity that did not affect the
validity of the marriage notwithstanding Article 7 of the Family Code which provides
that an incumbent member of the judiciary is authorized to solemnize marriages only
within the court’s jurisdiction.

Marriage; Requisites; Marriage License (1996)

On Valentine’s Day 1996, Ellas and Fely, both single and 25 years of age, went to the
city hall where they sought out a fixer to help them obtain a quickie marriage. For a fee,
the fixer produced an ante-dated marriage license for them, Issued by the Civil Registrar
of a small remote municipality. He then brought them to a licensed minister in a restaurant
behind the city hall, and the latter solemnized their marriage right there and then.

1) Is their marriage valid, void or voidable? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The marriage is valid. The irregularity in the issuance of a valid license does not adversely
affect the validity of the marriage. The marriage license is valid because it was in fact
issued by a Civil Registrar (Arts. 3 and 4. FC).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

It depends. If both or one of the parties was a member of the religious sect of the
solemnizing officer, the marriage is valid. If none of the parties is a member of the sect
and both of them were aware of the fact, the marriage is void. They cannot claim good
faith in believing that the solemnizing officer was authorized because the scope of the
authority of the solemnizing officer is a matter of law. If, however, one of the parties
believed in good faith that the other was a member of the sect, then the marriage is
valid under Article 35 (2), FC. In that case, the party in good faith is acting under a mistake
of fact, not a mistake of law,

2) Would your answer be the same if it should turn out that the marriage license was
spurious? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the answer would not be the same. The marriage would be void because of the
absence of a formal requisite. In such a case, there was actually no valid marriage license.

Marriage; Requisites; Marriage License (2002)

On May 1, 1978 Facundo married Petra, by whom he had a son Sotero. Petra died on
July 1, 1996, while Facundo died
on January 1, 2002. Before his demise, Facundo had married, on July 1, 2002,
Quercia. Having lived together as husband and wife since July 1, 1990, Facundo and
Quercia did not secure a marriage license but executed the requisite affidavit for the
purpose.

To ensure that his inheritance rights are not adversely affected by his father second
marriage, Sotero now brings a suit to seek a declaration of the nullity of the marriage of
Facundo and Quercia, grounded on the absence of a valid marriage license. Quercia
contends that there was no need for a marriage license in view for her having lived
continuously with Facundo for five years before their marriage and that has Sotero has
no legal personality to seek a declaration of nullity of the marriage since Facundo is now
deceased.

A. Is the marriage of Facundo and Quercia valid despite the absence of a

marriage license? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A. The marriage with Quercia is void. The exemption from the requirement of a
marriage license under Art, 34, Family Code, requires that the man and woman must
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other during those five years. The cohabitation of Facundo and
Quercia for six years from 1990 to July 1, 1996 when Petra died was one with a legal
impediment hence, not in compliance with the requirement of law. On other hand, the
cohabitation thereafter until the marriage on July 1, 2000, although free from legal
impediment, did not meet the 5-year cohabitation requirement.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

The marriage of Facundo and Quercia is VALID. The second marriage was solemnized
on July 1, 2000, when the Family code was already affective. The family code took effect
on August 3, 1988. Under the Family Code, no marriage license is required if the parties
have been cohabiting for the period of five years and there is no legal impediment. There
must no legal impediment only at the time of the solemnization of the marriage, and not
the whole five years period. This is clearly the intent of the code framers (see Minutes of
the 150th joint Civil Code of the Family Law Committees held on August 9, 1986).
Also in Manzano v. Sanchez, AM No. MT-00-129, March 8, 2001, the
Supreme Court said that, as one of the requisites for the exception to apply, there must
be no legal impediment at the time of the marriage. The Supreme Court did not say that
the legal impediment must exist all throughout the five-year period.

This is different from the case of Nināl v. Bayadog, (328 SCRA 122 [2000]). In the said
case, the situation occurred during the Relations of the new Civil Code where Article 76
thereof clearly provides that during the five-year cohabitation, the parties must be
unmarried. This is not so anymore in the Family Code. The Change in the Family Code
is significant. If the second marriage occurred before the effectivity of the Family Code,
the answer would that be that the marriage is void.
B. Does Sotero have the personality to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage,
especially now that Facundo is already deceased? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

B. A void marriage may be questioned by any interested party in any proceeding where
the resolution of the issue is material. Being a compulsory heir, Soterro has the
personality to question the validity of the marriage of Facundo and Quercia. Otherwise,
his participation in the estate on Facundo would be affected. (Ninãl
v.Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 [2000] ).

Marriage; Requisites; Solemnizing Officers (1994)

1} The complete publication of the Family Code was made on August 4, 1987. On
September 4, 1987, Junior Cruz and Gemma Reyes were married before a municipal
mayor. Was the marriage valid?

2) Suppose the couple got married on September 1, 1994 at the Manila Hotel before the
Philippine Consul General to Hongkong, who was on vacation in Manila. The couple
executed an affidavit consenting to the celebration of the marriage at the Manila Hotel. Is
the marriage valid?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1) a) Yes, the marriage is valid. The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. At
the time of the marriage on September 4, 1987, municipal mayors were empowered to
solemnize marriage under the Civil Code of 1950.

2) a) The marriage is not valid. Consuls and vice-consuls are empowered to solemnize
marriages between Philippine citizens abroad in the consular office of the foreign country
to which they were assigned and have no power to solemnize marriage on
Philippine soil.

b) A Philippine consul is authorized by law to solemnize marriages abroad between

Filipino citizens. He has no authority to solemnize a marriage in the Philippines.
Consequently, the marriage in question is void, unless either or both of the contracting
parties believed in good faith that the consul general had authority to solemnize their
marriage in which case the marriage is valid.

Marriage; Requisites; Void Marriage (1993)

A and B, both 18 years old, were sweethearts studying in Manila. On August 3, 1988,
while in first year college, they eloped. They stayed in the house of a mutual friend in town
X, where they were able to obtain a marriage license. On August 30, 1988, their marriage
was solemnized by the town mayor of X in his office. Thereafter, they returned to Manila
and continued to live separately in their respective boarding houses, concealing from their
parents, who were living in the province what they had done. In 1992, after
graduation from college, A and B decided to break their relation and parted ways. Both
went home to their respective towns to live and work.

1) Was the marriage of A and B solemnized on August

30, 1988 by the town mayor of X in his office a valid marriage? Explain your answer.

2) Can either or both of them contract marriage with another person without committing
bigamy? Explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1) The marriage of A and B is void because the solemnizing officer had no legal authority
to solemnize the marriage. But if either or both parties believed in good faith that the
solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so, the marriage is voidable because the
marriage between the parties, both below 21 years of age, was solemnized without the
consent of the parents. (Art. 35, par. (2) and Art. 45 par. (1), Family Code)

2) Either or both of the parties cannot contract marriage in the Philippines with another
person without committing bigamy, unless there is compliance with the requirements of
Article 52 Family Code, namely: there must be a judgment of annulment or absolute nullity
of the marriage, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the
delivery of their children’s presumptive legitimes, which shall be recorded in the
appropriate Civil Registry and Registry of Property, otherwise the same shall not affect
third persons and the subsequent marriage shall be null and void. (Arts. 52 and 53, Family
Code)

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

2) Yes, they can. The subsequent marriage contracted by one of the parties will not give
rise to bigamy even in the absence of a court declaration of nullity of the first
marriage. The subsistence of a prior valid marriage is an indispensable element of the
crime of bigamy. The prior court declaration of nullity of the first marriage is required by
the Family Code only for the purpose of the validity of the subsequent marriage, not as
an element of the crime of bigamy.

Marriage; Void Marriages (2004)

A. BONI and ANNE met while working overseas. They became sweethearts and got
engaged to be married on New Year’s Eve aboard a cruise ship in the Caribbean. They
took the proper license to marry in New York City, where there is a Filipino consulate. But
as planned the wedding ceremony was officiated by the captain of the Norwegian-
registered vessel in a private suite among selected friends.

Back in Manila, Anne discovered that Boni had been married in Bacolod City 5 years
earlier but divorced in Oslo only last year. His first wife was also a Filipina but now based
in Sweden. Boni himself is a resident of Norway where he and Anne plan to live
permanently.

Anne retains your services to advise her on whether her marriage to Boni is valid under
Philippine law? Is there anything else she should do under the circumstances?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

If Boni is still a Filipino citizen, his legal capacity is governed by Philippine Law (Art.
15 Civil Code). Under Philippine Law, his marriage to Anne is void because of a prior
existing marriage which was not dissolved by the divorce decreed in Oslo. Divorce
obtained abroad by a Filipino is not recognized.

If Boni was no longer a Filipino citizen, the divorce is valid. Hence, his marriage to Anne
is valid if celebrated in accordance with the law of the place where it was
celebrated. Since the marriage was celebrated aboard a vessel of Norwegian
registry, Norwegian law applies. If the Ship Captain has authority to solemnize the
marriage aboard his ship, the marriage is valid and shall be recognized in the Philippines.

As to the second question, if Boni is still a Filipino, Anne can file an action for declaration
of nullity of her marriage to him.

Marriage; Void Marriages (2006)

Gigi and Ric, Catholics, got married when they were 18 years old. Their marriage was
solemnized on August 2, 1989 by Ric’s uncle, a Baptist Minister, in Calamba, Laguna. He
overlooked the fact that his license to solemnize marriage expired the month before and
that the parties do not belong to his congregation. After 5 years of married life and blessed
with 2 children, the spouses developed irreconcilable differences, so they parted ways.

While separated, Ric fell in love with Juliet, a 16 year-old sophomore in a local college
and a Seventh-Day Adventist. They decided to get married with the consent of Juliet’s
parents. She presented to him a birth certificate showing she is 18 years old. Ric never
doubted her age much less the authenticity of her birth certificate. They got married in a
Catholic church in Manila. A year after, Juliet gave birth to twins, Aissa and Aretha.

(1) What is the status of the marriage between Gigi and Ric – valid, voidable or void?
Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Even if the Minister’s license expired, the marriage is valid if either or both Gigi ang
Ric beleived in good faith that he had the legal authority to solemnize marriage. While the
authority of the solemnizing officer is a formal requisite of marriage, and at least one of
the parties must belong to the solemnizing officer’s church, the law provides that the good
faith of the parties cures the defect in the lack of authority of the solemnizing
officer (Art.35, par.2, Family Code; Sempio-
Diy, p.34; Rabuya, The Law on Persons and Family Relations, p. 208).

The absence of parental consent despite their having married at the age of 18 is
deemed cured by their continued cohabitation beyond the age of 21. At this point, their
marriage is valid (See Art. 45, Family Code).

(2) What is the status of marriage betwwen Ric and Juliet – valid, voidable or void?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The marriage between Juliet and Ric is void. First of all, the marriage is a bigamous
marriage not falling under Article 41 [Art. 35(4)Family Code], A subsisting
marriage constitutes a legal impediment to remarriage. Secondly, Juliet is below
eighteen years of age. The marriage is void even if consented to by her parents [Art.
35(1), Family Code]. The fact that Ric was not aware of her real age is immaterial.

(3) Suppose Ric himself produced the falsified birth certificate to persuade Juliet to marry
him despite her minority and assured her that everything is in order. He did not divulge to
her his prior marriage with Gigi. What action, if any, can Juliet take against him? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Juliet can file an action for the declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground that he
willfully caused loss or injury to her in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy [Art. 21, New Civil Code]. She may also bring criminal actions for
seduction, falsification, illegal marriage and bigamy against Ric.

(4) If you were the counsel of Gigi, what actions will you take to enforce and protect her
interests? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

I would file an action to declare the marriage between Juliet and Ric null and void ab initio
and for Ric’s share in the co-ownership of that marriage to be forfeited in favor and
considered part of the absolute community in the marriage between Gigi and Ric [Arts.
148 & 147, Family Code]. I would also file an action for damages against Ric on
the grounds that his acts constitute an abuse of right and they are contrary to law and
morals, causing damages to Gigi (See Arts 19, 20, 21, New Civil Code).

Marriage; Void Marriages; Psychological Incapacity (2002)

A. Give a brief definition or explanation of the term “psychological incapacity” as a

ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage.
B. If existing at the inception of marriage, would the state of being of unsound mind
or the concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism
be considered indicia of psychological incapacity? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A. “PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY” is a mental disorder of the most serious type

showing the incapability of one or both spouses to comply the essential marital obligations
of love, respect, cohabitation, mutual help and support, trust and commitment. It must be
characterized by Juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability and its root causes must
be clinically identified or examined. (Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20 [1995]).

B. In the case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995), the Supreme Court
held that being of unsound mind, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality may be indicia of psychological incapacity, depending on the degree of
severity of the disorder. However, the concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality is a ground of annulment of marriage.

Parental Authority; Child under 7 years of age (2006)

Under Article 213 of the Family Code, no child under 7 years of age shall be separated
from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

(1) Explain the rationale of this provision.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The rationale of the 2nd paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code is to avoid the
tragedy of a mother who sees her baby torn away from her. It is said that the maternal
affection and care during the early years of the child are generally needed by the child
more than paternal care (Hontiveros v. IAC, G.R. No. 64982, October 23, 1984;
Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Volume One, pp.
718-719). The general rule is that a child below 7 years old shall not be separated from
his mother due to his basic need for her loving
care (Espiritu v. C.A., G.R. No. 115640, March 15,1995).

(2) Give at least 3 examples of “compelling reasons” which justify the taking away f
rom the mother’s custody of her child under 7 years of age.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

a. The mother is insane (Sempio-Diy, Hand

book on the Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 296-297);

b. The mother is sick with a disease that is communicable and might endanger the
health and life of the child;
c. The mother has been maltreating the child;

d. The mother is engaged in prostitution;

e. The mother is engaged in adulterous relationship;

f. The mother is a drug addict;

g. The mother is a habitual drunk or an alcoholic;

h. The mother is in jail or serving sentence.

Parental Authority; Special Parental Authority; Liability of Teachers (2003)

If during class hours, while the teacher was chatting with other teachers in the school
corridor, a 7 year old male pupil stabs the eye of another boy with a ball pen during a
fight, causing permanent blindness to the victim, who could be
liable for damages for the boy’s injury: the teacher, the school authorities, or the
guilty boy’s parents? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The school, its administrators, and teachers have special parental authority and
responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody
(Article 218, FC). They are principally and solidarily liable for the damages caused by the
acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor unless they exercised the proper
diligence required under the circumstances (Article 219, FC). In the problem, the
TEACHER and the SCHOOL AUTHORITIES are liable for the blindness of the victim,
because the student who cause it was under their special parental authority and they
were negligent. They were negligent because they were chatting in the corridor during
the class period when the stabbing incident occurred. The incident could have been
prevented had the teacher been
inside the classroom at that time. The guilty boy’s PARENTS are subsidiarily
liable under Article 219 of the Family Code.

Parental Authority; Substitute vs.Special (2004)

Distinguish briefly but clearly between: Substitute parental authority and special parental
authority.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

In substitute parental authority, the parents lose their parental authority in favor of the
substitute who acquires it to the exclusion of the parents.
In special parental authority, the parents or anyone
exercising parental authority does not lose parental authority. Those who are
charged with special parental authority exercise such authority only during the time that
the child is in their custody or supervision.

Substitute parental authority displaces parental authority while special parental authority
concurs with parental authority.

Paternity & Filiation (1999)

(a) Two (2) months after the death of her husband who was shot by unknown criminal
elements on his way home from office, Rose married her childhood boyfriend, and seven
(7) months after said marriage, she delivered a baby. In the absence of any evidence
from Rose as to who is her child’s father, what status does the law give to said child?
Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) The child is legitimate of the second marriage under Article 168(2) of the Family
Code which provides that a “child born after one hundred eighty days following the
celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during
such marriage, even though it be born within three hundred days after the termination of
the former marriage.”

Paternity & Filiation; Proofs (1999)

(b) Nestor is the illegitimate son of Dr. Perez. When Dr. Perez died, Nestor intervened
in the settlement of his father’s estate, claiming that he is the illegitimate son of said
deceased, but the legitimate family of Dr. Perez is denying Nestor’s claim. What evidence
or evidences should Nestor present so that he may receive his rightful share in his
father’s estate? (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(b) To be able to inherit, the illegitimate filiation of Nestor must have been admitted
by his father in any of the following:

(1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register,

(2) a final judgment,

(3) a public document signed by the father, or

(4) a private handwritten document signed by the lather (Article 175 in relation to Article
172 of the Family Code).
Paternity & Filiation; Artificial Insemination; Formalities (2006)

Ed and Beth have been married for 20 years without children. Desirous to have a
baby, they consulted Dr. Jun Canlas, a , prominent medical specialist on human fertility.
He advised Beth to undergo artificial insemination. It was found that Ed’s sperm count
was inadequate to induce pregnancy Hence, the couple looked for a willing donor. Andy
the brother of Ed, readily consented to donate his sperm. After a series of test, Andy’s
sperm was medically introduced into Beth’s ovary. She became pregnant and 9 months
later, gave birth to a baby boy, named Alvin.

(1) Who is the Father of Alvin? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Andy is the biological father of Alvin being the source of the sperm. Andy is the legal
father of Alvin because there was neither consent nor ratification to the artificial
insemination. Under the law, children conceived by artificial
insemination are legitimate children of the spouses, provided, that both of them
authorized or ratified the insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by
both of them before the birth of the child (Art. 164, Family Code).

(2) What are the requirements, if any, in order for Ed to establish his paternity over
Alvin?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The following are the requirements for Ed to establish his paternity over Alvin:

a. The artificial insemination has been authorized or ratified by the spouses in

a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child; and

b. The written instrument is recorded in the civil registry together with the birth
certificate of the child (Art. 164, 2nd paragraph, Family Code).

Paternity & Filiation; Common-Law Union (2004)

A. RN and DM, without any impediment to marry each other, had been living together
without benefit of church blessings. Their common-law union resulted in the birth of
ZMN. Two years later, they got married in a civil ceremony. Could ZMN be
legitimated? Reason.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

ZMN was legitimated by the subsequent marriage of RN and DM because at the time he
was conceived, RN and DM could have validly married each other. Under the Family
Code children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
former’s conception, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other are
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of the parents.

Paternity & Filiation; Proofs; Limitations; Adopted Child (1995)

Abraham died intestate on 7 January 1994 survived by his

son Braulio. Abraham’s older son Carlos died on 14 February 1990.

Danilo who claims to be an adulterous child of Carlos intervenes in the proceedi

ngs for the settlement of the estate of Abraham in representation of Carlos. Danilo was
legally adopted on 17 March 1970 by Carlos with the consent of the ” latter’s wife.

1. Under the Family Code, how may an illegitimate filiation be proved? Explain.

2. As lawyer for Danilo, do you have to prove Danilo’s illegitimate filiation? Explain.

3. Can Danilo inherit from Abraham in representation of his father Carlos? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1. Under Art. 172 in relation to Art. 173 andArt. 175 of

the FC, the filiation of illegitimate children may be establishedin the same way and by the
same evidence as legitimate children. Art. 172 provides that the filiation of legitimate
children is established by any of the following: (1) the record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a final Judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the
absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open
and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

2. No. Since Danilo has already been adopted by Carlos, he ceased to be an

illegitimate child. An adopted child acquires all the rights of a legitimate child under Art,
189 of the FC.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

3. No, he cannot. Danilo cannot represent Carlos as the latter’s adopted child in the
inheritance of Abraham because adoption did not make Danilo a legitimate grandchild of
Abraham. Adoption is personal between Carlos and Danilo. He cannot also represent
Carlos as the latter’s illegitimate child because in such case he is barred by Art. 992 of
the NCC from inheriting from his illegitimate grandfather Abraham.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
An adopted child’s successional rights do not include the right to represent his deceased
adopter in the inheritance of the latter’s legitimate parent, in view of Art. 973 which
provides that in order that representation may take place, the representative must himself
be capable of succeeding the decedent. Adoption by itself did not render Danilo an
heir of the adopter’s legitimate parent. Neither does his being a grandchild of
Abraham render him an heir of the latter because as an illegitimate child of Carlos, who
was a legitimate child of Abraham, Danilo is incapable of succeeding Abraham under Art.
992 of the Code.

Paternity & Filiation; Recognition of Illegitimate Child (2005)

Steve was married to Linda, with whom he had a daughter, Tintin. Steve fathered a son
with Dina, his secretary of 20
years, whom Dina named Joey, born on September 20, 1981. Joey’s birth certificate
did not indicate the father’s name. Steve died on August 13, 1993, while Linda died on
December 3, 1993, leaving their legitimate daughter, Tintin, as sole heir. On May 16,
1994, Dina filed a case on behalf of Joey, praying that the latter be declared an
acknowledged illegitimate son of Steve and that Joey be given his share in Steve’s estate,
which is now being solely held by Tintin. Tintin put up the defense that an action for
recognition shall only be filed during the lifetime of the presumed parents and that
the exceptions under Article 285 of the Civil Code do not apply to him since the said article
has been repealed by the Family Code. In any case, according to Tintin, Joey’s birth
certificate does not show that Steve is his father.

a) Does Joey have a cause of action against Tin tin for recognition and partition?
Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, Joey does not have a cause of action against Tintin for recognition and partition.
Under Article 175 of the Family
Code, as a general rule, an action for compulsory

recognition of an illegitimate child can be brought at any time during the lifetime of the
child. However, if the action is based on “open and continuous possession of the status
of an illegitimate child, the same can be filed during the lifetime of the putative father.”

In the present case, the action for compulsory recognition was filed by Joey’s mother,
Dina, on May 16,1994, after the death of Steve, the putative father. The action will prosper
if Joey can present his birth certificate that bears the signature of his putative father.
However, the facts clearly state that the birth certificate of Joey did not indicate the father’s
name. A birth certificate not signed by the alleged father cannot be taken as a record of
birth to prove recognition of the child, nor can said birth certificate be taken as a
recognition in a public instrument (Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 39537, March
19, 1985). Consequently, the action filed by Joey’s mother has already prescribed.
b) Are the defenses set up by Tin tin tenable? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the defenses of Tintin are tenable.

In Tayag v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 95229, June 9,1992), a complaint to compel
recognition of an illegitimate child was brought before effectivity of the Family Code by
the mother of a minor child based on “open and continuous possession of the status of
an illegitimate child.” The Supreme Court held that the right of action of the minor child
has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code
and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The ruling
in Tayag v. Court of Appeals finds no application in the instant case. Although the child
was born before the effectivity of the Family Code, the complaint was filed after its
effectivity. Hence, Article 175 of the Family Code should apply and not Article 285 of the
Civil Code.

c) Supposing that Joey died during the pendency of the action, should the action be
dismissed? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

If Joey died during the pendency of the action, the action should still be dismissed
because the right of Joey or his heirs to file the action has already prescribed. (Art. 175,
Family Code)

Paternity &Filiation; Rights of Legitimate Children (1990)

B and G (college students, both single and not disqualified to marry each other) had a
romantic affair, G was seven months in the family way as of the graduation of B. Right
after graduation B went home to Cebu City. Unknown to G, B had a commitment to C (his
childhood sweetheart) to marry her after getting his college degree. Two weeks after B
marriage in Cebu City, G gave birth to a son E in Metro Manila.

After ten years of married life in Cebu, B became a widower by the sudden death of C in
a plane crash. Out of the union of B and C, two children, X and Y were born. Unknown to
C while on weekend trips to Manila during the last 5 years of their marriage, B invariably
visited G and lived at her residence and as a result of which, they renewed their
relationship. A baby girl F was born to B and G two years before the death of C. Bringing
his family later to Manila, B finally married G. Recently. G died.

What are the rights of B’s four children: X and Y of his first marriage; and E and F, his
children with G? Explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under the facts stated, X and Y are legitimate children of B and C. E is the legitimate
children of B and G. E is the legitimated child of B&G. F is the illegitimate child of B and
C. As legitimate children of B and C, X and Y have the following rights:

1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions
of the Civil Code on Surnames;

2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants,

and in proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in- conformity with the provisions of the
Family Code on Support; and

3) To be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights granted to them by the
Civil Code. (Article 174, Family Code).

E is the legitimated child of B and G. Under Art. 177 of the Family Code, only children
conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of
the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be
legitimated. E will have the same rights as X and Y.

F is the illegitimate child of B and G. F has the right to use the surname of G, her mother,
and is entitled to support as well as the legitime consisting of 1/2 of that of each of X, Y
and E. (Article 176, Family Code)

Presumptive Legitime (1999)

What do you understand by “presumptive legitime”, in what case or cases must the parent
deliver such legitime to the children, and what are the legal effects in each case if the
parent fails to do so?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

PRESUMPTIVE LEGITIME is not defined in the law. Its definition must have been taken
from Act 2710, the Old Divorce Law, which required the delivery to the legitimate children
of “the equivalent of what would have been due to them as their legal portion if said
spouse had died intestate immediately after the dissolution of the community of
property.” As used in the Family Code, presumptive legitime is understood as the
equivalent of the legitimate children’s legitimes assuming that the spouses had died
immediately after the dissolution of the community of property.

Presumptive legitime is required to be delivered to the common children of the spouses

when the marriage is annulled or declared void ab initio and possibly, when the conjugal
partnership or absolute community is dissolved as in the case of legal separation. Failure
of the parents to deliver the presumptive legitime will make their subsequent marriage
null and void under Article 53 of the Family Code.
Property Relations; Absolute Community (1994)

Paulita left the conjugal home because of the excessive drinking of her husband, Alberto.
Paulita, out of her own endeavor, was able to buy a parcel of land which she was
able to register under her name with the addendum “widow.” She also acquired
stocks in a listed corporation registered in her name. Paulita sold the parcel of land to
Rafael, who first examined the original of the transfer certificate of title.

1) Has Alberto the right to share in the shares of stock acquired by Paulita?

2) Can Alberto recover the land from Rafael?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1. a) Yes. The Family Code provides that all property

acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be absolute
community property unless the contrary is proved.

b) Yes. The shares are presumed to be absolute community property having been
acquired during the marriage despite the fact that those shares were registered only in
her name. Alberto’s right to claim his share will only arise, however, at dissolution.

c) The presumption is still that the shares of stock are owned in common. Hence, they
will form part of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership depending on what
the property Relations is.

d) Since Paulita acquired the shares of stock by onerous title during the marriage, these
are part of the conjugal or absolute community property, as the case maybe (depending
on whether the marriage was celebrated prior to. or after, the effectivity of the Family
Code). Her physical separation from her husband did not dissolve the community of
property. Hence, the husband has a right to share in the shares of stock.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

2) a) Under a community of property, whether absolute or relative, the disposition of

property belonging to such community is void if done by just one spouse without the
consent of the other or authority of the proper court. However, the land was registered in
the name of Paulita as “widow”. Hence, the buyer has the right to rely upon what appears
in the record of the Register of Deeds and should, consequently, be protected. Alberto
cannot recover the land from Rafael but would have the right of recourse against his wife

b) The parcel of land is absolute community property having been acquired during
the marriage and through Paulita’s industry despite the registration being only in the name
of Paulita. The land being community property, its sale to Rafael without the consent of
Alberto is void. However, since the land is registered in the name of Paulita as widow,
there is nothing in the title which would raise a suspicion for Rafael to make inquiry. He,
therefore, is an innocent purchaser for value from whom the land may no longer be
recovered.

c) No. Rafael is an innocent purchaser in good faith who, upon relying on the correctness
of the certificate of title, acquires rights which are to be protected by the courts.

Under the established principles of land registration law, the presumption is that the
transferee of registered land is not aware of any defect in the title of the property he
purchased. (See Tojonera v. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 467).Moreover, the person
dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of its certificate of title and
the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of
the property. [Director of Lands v. Abache, et al. 73 Phil. 606).No strong
considerations of public policy have been presented which would lead the Court to
reverse the established and sound doctrine that the buyer in good faith of a registered
parcel of land does not have to look beyond the Torrens Title and search for any hidden
defect or inchoate right which may later invalidate or diminish his right to what he
purchased. (Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 189 SCRA 271)

d) The parcel of land is absolute community property having been acquired during
the marriage and through Paulita’s industry despite registration only in the name of
Paulita. The land being community property, its sale to Rafael without the consent
of Alberto is void.

Property Relations; Ante Nuptial Agreement (1995)

Suppose Tirso and Tessie were married on 2 August 1988 without executing any ante
nuptial agreement. One year after their marriage, Tirso while supervising the clearing
of Tessie’s inherited land upon the latter’s request, accidentally found the treasure not in
the new river bed but on the property of Tessie. To whom shall the treasure belong?
Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Since Tirso and Tessie were married before the effectivity of the Family Code, their
property relation is governed by conjugal partnership of gains. Under Art. 54 of the Civil
Code, the share of the hidden treasure which the law awards to the finder or the proprietor
belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains. The one-half share pertaining to Tessie as
owner of the land, and the one-half share pertaining to Tirso as finder of the treasure,
belong to the conjugal partnership of gains.

Property Relations; Conjugal Partnership of Gains (1998)

In 1970, Bob and Issa got married without executing a marriage settlement. In 1975, Bob
inherited from his father a residential lot upon which, in 1981, he constructed a two- room
bungalow with savings from his own earnings. At that time, the lot was worth P800.000.00
while the house, when finished cost P600,000.00. In 1989 Bob died, survived only by his
wife, Issa and his mother, Sofia. Assuming that the relative values of both assets
remained at the same proportion:

1. State whether Sofia can rightfully claim that the house and lot are not conjugal but
exclusive property of her deceased son.

2. Will your answer be the same if Bob died before August 3, 1988?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1. Since Bob and Sofia got married In 1970, then the law that governs is the New Civil
Code (Persons), in which case, the property relations that should be applied as regards
the property of the spouses is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership
of gains (Article 119, Civil Code). By conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and the
wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from
their work or Industry (Article 142, Civil Code). In this instance, the lot inherited by Bob
in 1975 is his own separate property, he having acquired the
same by lucrative title (par. 2, Art. 148, Civil Code). However, the house constructed
from his own savings in 1981 during the subsistence of his marriage with Issa is conjugal
property and not exclusive property in accordance with the principle of “reverse
accession” provided for in Art. 158, Civil Code.

ANOTHER ANSWER:

1. Sofia, being her deceased son’s legal heir concurring with his surviving spouse
(Arts. 985, 986 and 997, Civil Code), may rightfully claim that the house and lot are not
conjugal but belong to the hereditary estate of Bob. The value of the land being more than
the cost of the improvement (Art. 120, Family Code).

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

2. Yes, the answer would still be the same. Since Bob and Issa contracted their
marriage way back in 1970, then the property relations that will govern is still the relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains (Article 119, Civil Code). It will not matter if
Bob died before or after August 3. 1988 (effectivity date of the Family Code], what matters
is the date when the marriage was contracted. As Bob and Issa contracted their marriage
way back in 1970. the property relation that governs them is still the conjugal partnership
of gains. (Art. 158, Civil Code)

ANOTHER ANSWER:

2. If Bob died be fore August 3, 1988. which is the date the Family Code took effect,
the answer will not be the same. Art. 158. Civil Code, would then apply. The land would
then be deemed conjugal, along with the house, since conjugal funds were used in
constructing it. The husband’s estate would be entitled to a reimbursement of the value
of the land from conjugal partnership funds.

Property Relations; Marriage Settlement; Conjugal Partnership of Gains (2005)

Gabby and Mila got married at Lourdes Church in Quezon City on July 10, 1990. Pri
or thereto, they executed a marriage settlement whereby they agreed on the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains. The marriage settlement was registered in the Register of
Deeds of Manila, where Mila is a resident. In 1992, they jointly acquired a residential
house and lot, as well as a condominium unit in Makati. In 1995,
they decided to change their property relations to the regime of complete separation
of property. Mila consented, as she was then engaged in a lucrative business. The
spouses then signed a private document dissolving their conjugal partnership and
agreeing on a complete separation of property.

Thereafter, Gabby acquired a mansion in Baguio City, and a 5-hectare agricultural land
in Oriental Mindoro, which he registered exclusively in his name.

In the year 2000, Mila’s business venture failed, and her creditors sued her for
P10,000,000.00. After obtaining a favorable judgment, the creditors sought to execute on
the spouses’ house and lot and condominium unit, as well as Gabby’s mansion and
agricultural land.

a) Discuss the status of the first and the amended marriage settlements.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The marriage settlement between Gabby and Mila adopting the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains still subsists. It is not dissolved by the mere agreement of the spouses
during the marriage. It is clear from Article 134 of the Family Code that in the absence of
an express declaration in the marriage settlement, the separation of property between the
spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order.

b) Discuss the effects of the said settlements on the properties acquired by the spouses.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The regime of conjugal partnership of gains governs the properties acquired by the
spouses. All the properties acquired by the spouses after the marriage belong to the
conjugal partnership. Under Article 116 of the Family Code, even if Gabby registered the
mansion and 5-hectare agricultural land exclusively in his name, still they are presumed
to be conjugal properties, unless the contrary is proved.

c) What properties answerable for Mila’s obligations? Explain.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Since all the properties are conjugal, they can be held answerable for Mila’s obligation if
the obligation redounded to the benefit of the family. (Art. 121 [3], Family Code)
However, the burden of proof lies with the creditor claiming against the
properties (Ayala Investment v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118305, February 12,
1998, reiterated in Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank v. Dailo, G.R. No. 153802,
March 11, 2005).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Except for the residential house which is the family home, all other properties of Gabby
and Mila may be held answerable for Mila’s obligation. Since the said properties are
conjugal in nature, they can be held liable for debts and obligations contracted during the
marriage to the extent that the family was benefited or where the debts were contracted
by both spouses, or by one of them, with the consent of the other.

A family home is a dwelling place of a person and his family. It confers upon a family
the right to enjoy such property, which must remain with the person constituting it as a
family home and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in special
cases. (Taneo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.No.108532, March 9,1999)

Property Relations; Marriage Settlements (1991)

Bar Candidates Patricio Mahigugmaon and Rowena Amor decided to marry each other
before the last day of the 1991

Bar Examinations. They agreed to execute a Marriage

Settlement. Rowena herself prepared the document in her own handwriting. They agreed
on the following: (1) a conjugal partnership of gains; (2) each donates to the other fifty
percent (50%) of his/her present property, (3) Rowena shall administer the conjugal
partnership property; and (4) neither may bring an action for the annulment or
declaration of nullity of their marriage. Both signed the agreement in the presence of two
(2) witnesses. They did not, however, acknowledge it before a notary public.

A. As to form, is the Marriage Settlement valid? May it be registered in the registry of

property? If not, what steps must be taken to make it registerable?

B. Are the stipulations valid?

C. If the Marriage Settlement is valid as to form and the above stipulations are likewise
valid, does it now follow that said Marriage Settlement is valid and enforceable?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A. Yes, it is valid as to form because it is in writing.

No, it cannot be registered in the registry of property because it is not a public
document. To make it registerable, it must be reformed and has to be notarized.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

B. Stipulations (1) and (3) are valid because they are not
contrary to law. Stipulation (4) is void because it is contrary to law. Stipulation
(2) is valid up to 1/5 of their respective present properties but void as to the excess (Art 84,
Family Code).

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

C. No. on September 15, 1991, the marriage settlement is not yet valid and enforceable
until the celebration of the marriage, to take place before the last day of the 1991 bar
Examinations.

Property Relations; Marriage Settlements (1995)

On 10 September 1988 Kevin, a 26-

year old businessman, married Karla, a winsome lass of 18. Without the knowle
dge of their parents or legal guardians, Kevin and Karla entered into an ante-nuptial
contract the day before their marriage stipulating that conjugal partnership of gains shall
govern their marriage. At the time of their marriage
Kevin’s estate was worth 50 Million while Karla’s was valued at 2 Million.

A month after their marriage Kevin died in a freak helicopter accident. He left no
will, no debts, no obligations. Surviving Kevin, aside from Karla, are his only relatives: his
brother Luis and first cousin Lilia.

1) What property Relations governed the marriage of Kevin and Karla? Explain.

2) Determine the value of the estate of Kevin,

3) Who are Kevin’s heirs?

4) How much is each of Kevin’s heirs entitled to inherit?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1. Since the marriage settlement was entered into without the consent and without the
participation of the parents (they did not sign the document), the marriage settlement is
invalid applying Art. 78, F.C. which provides that a minor who according to law may
contract marriage may also enter into marriage settlements but they shall be valid only if
the person who may give consent to the marriage are made parties to the agreement.
(Karla was still a minor at the time the marriage settlement was executed in September
1988 because the law, R.A. 6809, reducing the age of majority
to 18 years took effect on 18 December 1989). The marriage settlement being void, the
property Relations governing the marriage is, therefore, absolute community of
property, under Art. 75 of the FC.

2. All the properties which Kevin and Karla owned at the time of marriage became
community property which shall be divided equally between them at dissolution. Since
Kevin owned 50 Million and Karla. 2 Million, at the time of the marriage, 52 Million
constituted their community property. Upon the death of Kevin, the community was
dissolved and half of the 52 Million or 26 Million is his share in the community. This 26
Million therefore is his estate.

3. Karla and Luis are the Intestate heirs of Kevin.

4. They are entitled to share the estate equally under Article 1001 of the NCC.
Therefore, Karla gets 13 Million and Luis gets 13 Million.

Property Relations; Obligations; Benefit of the Family (2000)

As finance officer of K and Co., Victorino arranged a loan of P5 Million from PNB for the
corporation. However, he was required by the bank to sign a Continuing Surety
Agreement to secure the repayment of the loan. The corporation failed to pay the loan,
and the bank obtained a judgment against it and Victorino, jointly and severally. To
enforce the judgment, the sheriff levied on a farm owned by the conjugal partnership of
Victorino and his wife Elsa. Is the levy proper or not?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The levy is not proper there being no showing that the surety agreement executed by the
husband redounded to the benefit of the family. An obligation contracted by the husband
alone is chargeable against the conjugal partnership only when it was contracted for the
benefit of the family. When the obligation was contracted on behalf of the family business
the law presumes that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the family. However,
when the obligation was to guarantee the debt of a third party, as in the problem,
the obligation is presumed for the benefit of the third party, not the family. Hence, for the
obligation under the surety agreement to be chargeable against the partnership
it must be proven that the family was benefited and that the benefit was a direct result of
such agreement, (Ayala Investment v. Ching, 286 SCRA 272)

Property Relations; Unions without Marriage (1992)

In 1989, Rico, then a widower forty (40) years of age, cohabited with Cora, a
widow thirty (30) years of age. While living together, they acquired from their combined
earnings a parcel of riceland.

After Rico and Cora separated, Rico lived together

with Mabel, a maiden sixteen (16) years of age. While living together, Rico was
a salaried employee and Mabel kept house for Rico and did full-time household chores
for him. During their cohabitation, a parcel of coconut land was acquired by Rico from
his savings.

After living together for one (1) year, Rico and Mabel separated. Rico then met and
married Letty, a single woman twenty-six (26) years of age. During the marriage of Rico
and Letty, Letty bought a mango orchard out of her own personal earnings.

a) Who would own the riceland, and what property relations governs the
ownership? Explain.

b) Who would own the coconut land, and what property relations governs the
ownership? Explain.

c) Who would own the mango orchard, and what property relations governs the
ownership? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) Rico and Cora are the co-owners of the riceland. The Relations is that of co-ownership
(Art. 147, Family Code, first paragraph).

(Optional Addendum: However, after Rico’s marriage to Letty, the half of interest of Rico
in the rice land will then become absolute community property of Rico and Letty.)

(b) Rico is the exclusive owner of the coconut land. The Relations is a sole/single
proprietorship (Art. 148. Family Code, first paragraph is applicable, and not Art. 147
Family Code).

(Optional Addendum: However, after Rico’s marriage to Letty, the coconut land of Rico
will then become absolute community property of Rico and Letty.)

(c) Rico and Letty are the co-owners. The Relations is the Absolute Community of
Property (Arts, 75, 90 and 9l, Family Code).

Property Relations; Unions without Marriage (1997)

Luis and Rizza, both 26 years of age and single, live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, Luis is gainfully employed, Rizza is
not employed, stays at home, and takes charge of the household chores.

After living together for a little over twenty years, Luis was able to save from his salary
earnings during that period the amount of P200,000.00 presently deposited in a bank. A
house and lot worth P500,000.00 was recently purchased for the same amount by the
couple. Of the P500.000.00 used by the common-law spouses to purchase the property,
P200.000.00 had come from the sale of palay harvested from the hacienda owned
by Luis and P300,000.00 from the rentals of a building belonging to Rizza. In fine, the
sum of P500.000.00 had been part of the fruits received during the period of cohabitation
from their separate property, a car
worth P100.000.00. being used by the common-law spouses, was donated Just
months ago to Rizza by her parents.

Luis and Rizza now decide to terminate their cohabitation, and they ask you to give them
your legal advice on the following:

(a) How, under the law should the bank deposit of P200,000.00 the house and lot
valued at P500.000.00 and the car worth P100.000.00 be allocated to them?

(b) What would your answer be (to the above question) had Luis and Rizza been living
together all the time, ie., since twenty years ago, under a valid marriage?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

a) Art. 147 of the Family Code provides in part that when a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries
shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the rules of co- ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their Joint efforts, worker Industry, and shall
be owned by them in equal shares. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Thus:

1) the wages and salaries of Luis in the amount of

P200,000.00 shall be divided equally between Luis and Rizza.

2) the house and lot valued at P500.000.00 having been acquired by both of them
through work or industry shall be divided between them in proportion to their respective
contribution, in consonance with the rules on co-ownership. Hence, Luis gets 2\5 while
Rizza gets 3/5 of P500.000.00.

3) the car worth P100,000.00 shall be exclusively owned

by Rizza, the same having been donated to her by her parents.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(b) The property relations between Luis and Rizza, their marriage having been celebrated
20 years ago (under the Civil Code) shall be governed by the conjugal partnership of
gains, under which the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds,
products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either
or both spouses through their efforts or by chance, and upon dissolution of the marriage
or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouse shall be
divided equally between them (Art. 142. Civil Code). Thus:

1) The salary of Luis deposited in the bank in the amount of P200.000.00 and the
house and lot valued at P500,000.00 shall be divided equally between Luis and Rizza.

2) However, the car worth P100.000,00 donated to Rizza by her parents shall be
considered to her own paraphernal property, having been acquired by lucrative title (par.
2, Art. 148, Civil Code).

Property Relations; Unions without Marriage (2000)

For five years since 1989, Tony, a bank Vice-president, and Susan, an entertainer, lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage although they were
capacitated to many each other. Since Tony’s salary was more than enough for their
needs, Susan stopped working and merely “kept house”. During that period, Tony was
able to buy a lot and house in a plush subdivision. However, after five years, Tony and
Susan decided to separate.

a) Who will be entitled to the house and lot?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Tony and Susan are entitled to the house and lot as co- owners in equal shares. Under
Article 147 of the Family Code, when a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife, the property
acquired during their cohabitation are presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares. This is true even
though the efforts of one of them consisted merely in his or her care and maintenance of
the family and of the household.

b) Would it make any difference if Tony could not marry Susan because he was previously
married to Alice from whom he is legally separated?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, it would make a difference. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, when the parties
to the cohabitation could not marry each other because of an impediment, only those
properties acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or Industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. The efforts of one of the parties in maintaining the family and
household are not considered adequate contribution in the acquisition of the properties.
Since Susan did not contribute to the acquisition of the house and lot, she has no share
therein. If Tony cohabited with Susan after his legal separation from Alice, the house and
lot is his exclusive property. If he cohabited with Susan before his legal separation from
Alice, the house and lot belongs to his community or partnership with Alice.

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CIVIL LAW BAR EXAM ANSWERS: FAMILY CODE

Section 1 0f P.D. NO. 755 states:

A copy of the Agreement was not attached to the Presidential Decree.

B) when the obligation does not constitute a loan or forbearance of

(A) Will Dorothy’s suit prosper? Decide with reasons. (2.5%)

I will decide in favor of Jerico as there is no novation of the Construction Contract.

(A) Decide the case and explain. (2.5%)

purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute

1) Should the motion to dismiss be granted? Why?

a) P50,000.00 for the death of the son;

b) such amount as would correspond to lost earning capacity; and

Family Code; Retroactive Application; Vested Rights (2000)

Family Home; Dwelling House (1994)

Family; Constitutional Mandates; Divorce (1991)

Marriage; Annulment; Effects; Requisites Before Marriage (1990)

(c) If the subsequent marriage of H to S was contracted before compliance

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: for (a)

(c) The children of the first marriage shall be considered

As legitimate children, they have the following rights;

c) To be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights granted to them

Marriage; Annulment; Grounds (1991)

Marriage; Annulment; Judicial Declaration (1993)

Marriage; Annulment; Legal Separation; Prescription of Actions (1996)

Marriage; Annulment; Proper Party (1990)

D and G, age 20 and 19, respectively, and both single,

G himself should file the complaint under Article 45 of the

Marriage; Annulment; Proper Party (1995)

Can the action of Joseph for annulment of his marriage

Marriage; Divorce Decree; Void Marriages (1992)

b) Was the marriage of Maris and Pedro valid when

d) At this point in time, who is the lawful husband of Marts? Reasons.

(c) The marriage of Maris and Vincent is void ab initio

The marriage of Maris and Vincent does not validly exist

Marriage; Divorce Decrees; Filiation of Children (2005)

b) Explain the status of marriage between Sonny and Auring.

c) Explain the status of the marriage between Lulu and Tirso.

e) Who are the heirs of Sonny? Explain.

Marriage; Divorce Decrees; Filipino Spouses becoming Alien (1996)

Flor and Virgillo were married to each other in Roxas City

Can Virgilio marry again in the Philippines? Explain.

b) Although the marriage originally involved Filipino citizens, it eventually became a

Marriage; Divorce Decrees; Filipino Spouses becoming Alien (1999)

Marriage; Donations by Reason of Marriage; Effect of Declaration of Nullity

No, Digna’s father may not revoke the donation because

(ii) If the wife refuses to come home for three (3)

Marriage; Grounds; Nullity; Annulment; Legal Separation (1997)

(a) Declaration of nullity of marriage:

2) It must be antecedent (existing at the time of marriage), grave and incurable:

3) The case must be filed before August 1, 1998.

(b) Annulment of the Marriage Contract:

1) The drug addiction must be concealed;

2) It must exist at the time of marriage;

3) There should be no cohabitation with full knowledge of the drug addiction;

4) The case is filed within five (5) years from discovery.

(c) Legal Separation:

1) There should be no condonation or consent to the drug addiction;

Marriage; Legal Separation; Declaration of Nullity (2002)

If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occu

In accordance with law, if drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or

Marriage; Legal Separation; Grounds; Prescriptive Period (1994)

1) Does Rosa have legal grounds to ask for legal separation?

2) Has the action prescribed?

b) Yes. The contracting of a subsequent bigamous marriage whether in the Philippines

Marriage; Legal Separation; Mutual guilt (2006)

 Cnn news world

Marriage; Non-Bigamous Marriages (2006)

Marriage; Property Relations; Void Marriages (1991)

a) Is the contention of James correct?

b) What property Relations governed the union of James and Ophelia?

c) Is the estate of Mary entitled to a share in the residential lot acquired by

A. No. The contention of James is not correct.

C. It should be distinguished when the property was acquired.

Marriage; Psychological Incapacity (1996)

Marriage; Psychological Incapacity (2006)

Will Gemma’s suit prosper? Explain.

Marriage; Psychological Incapacity (2006)