Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 2019, 12, 3–16

doi:10.1093/cjres/rsy037

Editorial

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The New Silk Roads: an introduction to China’s Belt
and Road Initiative

Steven Brakmana, Peter Frankopanb,c, Harry Garretsend and

Charles van Marrewijke
a
Department of International Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business, University
of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands, [email protected]
b
Department of Global History, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK, peter.frankopan@worc.
ox.ac.uk
c
Oxford Centre for Byzantine Research, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
d
Department of International Economics & Business, Faculty of Economics and Business,
University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands, [email protected]
e
Utrecht University School of Economics, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands,
[email protected]

Introduction: the speech and plan1 be sincere and good friends. To render each
other firm support on major issues concerning
In September 2013, President Xi Jinping
core interests such as sovereignty, territorial
of China delivered a speech at Nazarbayev
integrity, security and stability is the essence
University in Astana, Kazakhstan.2 He seemed
and an important part of China’s strategic
to be in a reflective mood: ‘Shaanxi, my home
partnership with Central Asian countries’.
province, is right at the starting point of the
This was essential, the Chinese leader said, in
ancient Silk Road’, he said. ‘Today, as I  stand order ‘to combat the ‘three forces’ of terrorism,
here and look back at that episode of history, separatism and extremism as well as drug
I  could almost hear the camel bells echoing trafficking and transnational organized crime’.
in the mountains and see the wisp of smoke Dealing with these was vital for the creation of
rising from the desert’. He valued Kazakhstan ‘a favourable environment for the economic
not just as a regional partner but with whom development and the well-being of the people in
China enjoyed a special relationship. ‘A near this region’.
neighbour is better than a distant relative’, Working more closely together, he said,
said Xi. would allow China and its neighbours to
It was important to maintain such friendships, ‘expand regional cooperation with a more
and build on them too. ‘We need to pass on our open mind and broader vision and achieve new
friendship from generation to generation,’ he glories together’. If they did so, China and the
noted, and ‘always be good neighbours living countries of Central Asia could seize ‘a golden
in harmony’. To do this, he went on, ‘we need opportunity’ to lay the basis for a new golden
to firmly support and trust each other and age. ‘To forge closer economic ties, deepen

© The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society.
All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: [email protected]
Brakman et al.

cooperation and expand development space of China’s foreign and economic policy, but it
in the Eurasian region’, Xi went on, ‘we should has been followed by large-scale actions and

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take an innovative approach and jointly build investments that seek—or purport to seek—to
an “economic belt along the Silk Road”’. re-galvanise relations between Beijing and its
Xi set out how this could be done. First, it neighbours in Asia.
was necessary ‘to improve road connectivity’, Although Xi had not mentioned anything
which would create ‘a major transportation other than over-land routes (see Figure  1),
route connecting the Pacific and the Baltic the strategy that rolled out of Beijing from
Sea’. Investing in ‘cross-border transportation the winter of 2013 onwards always referred
infrastructure’ and ‘a transportation network to two prongs: rather confusingly to English-
connecting East Asia, West Asia and South speaking ears, a ‘road’ over the sea linking
Asia’ would facilitate economic development regions together, and a ‘belt’ tying countries
and travel in the region. Additionally, it was to one another. Soon referred to as ‘One Belt,
important to ‘promote unimpeded trade’. One Road’, or by, external observers mainly, as
Removing trade barriers between them, the new Silk Road, the policy has now become
reducing the costs of doing business, increasing formally referred to as the Belt and Road
the velocity and scale of trade would result in Initiative (BRI).4
‘win-win progress in the region’. We use Xi’s 2013 speech at some length here,
‘China and Kazakhstan are friendly because it clearly sets out from the Chinese
neighbours as close as lips and teeth’, he (leader’s) perspective what the BRI entails
concluded. ‘Let us join hands to carry on our and how it came about. The fact that the BRI is
traditional friendship and build a bright future also referred to as the New Silk Road already
together’.3 Many politicians deliver speeches indicates that the BRI has a precedent which
that set out visions and promise actions. The raises the very important question whether
Xi speech was unusual, however, for the fact the BRI really marks a fundamental and
that not only did it mark a major re-orientation unique policy shift (Frankopan, 2015, 2018).

CP

CIP

NELB = New Eurasia Land Bridge CP = China Pakistan

CMR = China Mongolia Russia CIP = China Indochina Peninsula
CWC = China Central Asia West Asia BCIM = Bangladesh China India Myanmar

Figure 1.  The New Silk Road economic corridors.

4
 Introduction to China’s Belt and Road Initiative

This question is not only relevant to historians. The interest in the BRI is clearly not confined
Between the old and new Silk Road, China to ‘China watchers’ in academic or policy

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has been involved in other major transnational circles. The large and growing interest in the
infrastructure projects in modern times.5 BRI is clearly also motivated by the fact that
Understanding the causes and consequences the economic and political power of China is on
of the BRI might therefore be improved by the ascent and many people think that the 21st
looking at other transnational infrastructure century will be a ‘Chinese century’.6 To illustrate
cases in which China was or continues to be a this and also to justify the decision to spend the
leading participant. Besides the words of the current issue of this journal wholly on the BRI,
Chinese leader Xi, one would like to have solid Figure 2 visualises how since 1 AD the world’s
theoretical and empirical research that shows economic centre of gravity has shifted across
what the possible drivers and results of BRI the globe. The economic centre of gravity
are or will be. The focus of this current issue is moved away from China (and Asia as a whole)
therefore on China’s BRI. from the 17th century onwards.7 It is also clear

China

2018 2025
2000 2010
1950 1800
1980
1960 1900 1850 1600

1 AD

Figure 2.  The World’s economic centre of gravity.

Source: Based on The Economist (2018a); the economic centre of the globe is calculated using an average of a countries’
locations weighted by their GDP.

5
Brakman et al.

that right from the start of the 21st century the their hinterlands, and between neighbouring
economic centre of gravity has shifted back towns themselves, than it was across thousands

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(and quite rapidly so) towards Asia and hence of miles or between imperial rulers and their
China (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2015). capitals.
The seven papers in this issue each offer Nevertheless, the Silk Road label does
an interesting research perspective on the have a value in capturing the fact that despite
BRI. Before we turn to these papers, our the obvious deficiency and problems that
introduction first provides a brief historical the term raises, it helps explain the fact that
and factual background on BRI in the History goods (of which silk was one of many), ideas,
and basic BRI facts section. In the Economic languages, religions and even genes were
and geographical relevance of the BRI section, carried along corridors that really did span
we will provide some potential economic and the continents of Asia, Europe and Africa.
geographical relevance and background to the Moreover, it is possible to use the networks
‘New Silk Roads’. The section The papers in to chart the ways that global centres of power,
this issue concludes our introduction by briefly but also of science and literature, of culture
linking the BRI to the seven subsequent papers and the arts, shifted over time. One way or
that constitute this issue. another, the countries and peoples of the Silk
Road have played prominent roles not only
in local and regional history, but in broader,
History and basic BRI facts9
global terms too. They underpin study of
What is in a name? ‘global history’ in so far as they prompt us
From a historian’s point of view, the reference to think in terms of broader connections and
point made by Xi to the past is both revealing wider themes of the past.10
and instructive. The reference that Xi was In his 2013 Astana speech, Xi stated that
making in his Astana speech, repeated with the peoples and countries of the Silk Road
almost metronomic regularity since then, is had seen thousands of years of cooperation,
that the BRI is a 21st century re-incarnation despite ‘differences in race, belief and cultural
of the ancient Silk Road that connected the background’. There was some substance in this
Pacific coast of China to the Mediterranean statement, although it is worth noting that
2,000  years ago—if not earlier still. The term figures like Attila the Hun, Genghis Khan and
‘Silk Road’ is a modern invention, coined his heirs, Timur, Babur and others might be
by the German geographer Ferdinand von surprised at the suggestion that these worlds
Richthoften, to describe the networks that were always peaceful and harmonious—while
allowed the transmission of one precious the more recent past, with tumultuous events
commodity (silk) from Han dynasty China to in Syria, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan in the last
the Roman Empire. 30 years, set alongside the Great Leap Forward,
Like all labels, the name of the Silk Road is the Cultural Revolution, Partition in South
as clumsy as it is elegant. With its focus on small Asia, and the experiences of the Soviet Union
volume, high-value trade that was enjoyed only and the peoples of Central Asia, likewise
by the elite, the term can easily be understood to suggest that not everyone saw eye to eye all
suggest greater long-distance connectivity than the time.
demonstrated by the evidence. It also obscures What Xi meant in Astana in September
the fact that much of the exchange across Asia 2013, however, was something more subtle, for
in antiquity—and indeed since then—was the underlying message of his comments was
more intensive between individual towns and not just that the Silk Road had once been the

6
 Introduction to China’s Belt and Road Initiative

world’s central nervous system, but that he was BRI is a Chinese version of Trump’s call to
harking back to a time when it was the countries ‘Make America Great Again (MAGA)’.11

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of Asia that ruled the world in terms of their One obvious difference between the two
power and capabilities, their technological and comes from the resources that have been
scientific advances and their economic and poured into the BRI—and the fact that there
cultural dominance. The era he was evoking seems to be a coherent plan behind it that leads
was one where the world’s largest cities were back to the Politburo in Beijing. Superficially
Kaifeng (in eastern China) and Merv (in what is at least, both seem to be correct. According to
now Turkmenistan) and when leading scholars much-cited figures, almost $1 trillion has been
worked in Bukhara, Samarkand, Isfahan and committed to almost a thousand projects across
Xi’an (Hansen, 2012, Xinru, 2010). Asia since Xi delivered his speech in Astana
(State Council Information Office, 2015).
China power: past, present and future Many of these are connected to what appear
to be China’s strategic interests—namely
The 2013 announcement by Xi and the the construction of ports, pipelines, road and
subsequent adoption of a major new foreign railways that enable Chinese goods to get to
and economic policy was partly a sign of China’s new markets more quickly, and conversely, help
rise as a global superpower. But embedded in deliver necessities to China’s markets, above
its heart was also a re-conceptualisation of the all in the energy sector, where consumption is
past—one, that as it happens, has an obvious expected to treble by 2030.
resonance with other countries not only in On paper at least, the thinking behind
Central Asia but beyond as well. The BRI is a the plan seems not only joined-up and pre-
response to a rapidly changing world in the 21st planned but eminently sensible. While
century where the centre of gravity seems to be China’s population faces obvious and growing
shifting inexorably to the east—evidenced by problems as it ages and does not replace itself,
the rising share of global GDP of countries in its needs and desires are rising in proportion to
Asia and by China itself, whose economy has its rising spending power, greater aspirations
grown 10-fold since 2001 (Feigenbaum, 2018). and rapid growth rate. As a result, securing
The evocation of history and the harking energy and food supplies, on the one hand,
back to an era of apparent stability, prosperity while helping connect and invigorate new
and co-operation is noteworthy in what it markets for Chinese products, on the other
reveals about the desire and even the need to hand, is not hard to understand. In Pakistan
justify the present and future by referencing the and India alone, for example, penetration of
past. Having a model to replicate and revert to household goods such as refrigerators, air
plays a role in giving a context for major policy conditioning units and laptops, all of which
developments and in so doing, allows a wider are produced in bulk in China, is extremely
understanding that the policies themselves low. With a combined population of more than
are not revolutionary but rather reversions to one billion, helping countries in South Asia to
the norm. History provides examples of many develop infrastructure opens new possibilities
parallels to the narrative of justifying the return for Chinese companies to expand and maintain,
to a glorious past (regardless of how mythical or even quicken, the rate of growth that has
that past is). As it so happens, in the modern transformed the country over the last three
day, the most obvious counterpoint to the decades (Frankopan, 2018).
recreation of the Silk Road comes from China’s Moreover, while China has historically played
most global rival—the USA. In some ways, the a limited role in looking beyond its own borders

7
Brakman et al.

and in taking part in international development are ones that are termed such, even though
projects (either of its own or multi-laterally), it they look and are to all intents and purposes

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has gained considerable experience in recent straightforward financing and investment
decades with building infrastructure during decisions that can stand entirely independent
a period not only of rapid economic growth, of the BRI masterplan.
but also of urbanisation that has been the Then there is the fact that while geography
fastest in human history (see Brakman et  al., might not need to determine how we
2016). These have not just provided technical understand the places and regions that are
know-how of how and what to build, but part of the BRI, the inclusion of countries
also the ability to benchmark the impact of like Nigeria in West Africa, Bolivia in South
investments to measure the uplift they provide America and states in Central America and
in productivity. In this sense, the BRI might be the Caribbean like Panama and Antigua and
seen as an expansion of China’s own economic Barbuda surprise even those with the widest
transformation of the last 30 years and as much possible understanding of what the Silk Road
an export of a development model, albeit debt- of the past were.
driven, as it is for large-scale investment in If ascertaining the precise outlines of what
other countries. the BRI actually is can be tricky, then so too is
getting a true sense of the co-ordination behind
What is the BRI? the various plans that are on the drawing
There are, however, significant challenges when board or being implemented. While there
it comes to evaluating the BRI in detail. For may be joined up thinking and grand strategy
one thing, understanding what falls within the behind some elements, it is sometimes both
umbrella of the term itself is not always clear. easy and tempting to assume that there is a
There are now new Silk Roads for the Arctic coherent, deliberate and functional blueprint
and even for space exploration (Hillman, 2018). that explains each new element or every new
In one sense, it could be argued that this is development.
unproblematic: the original conceptualisation Beijing likes to talk of the inclusivity of the
of the Silk Road involved attempting to BRI, describing it as something that ‘originates
provide a loose framework that could capture from China, but belongs to the world’.
the exchange of multiple goods and products; According to government statements issued
expanding this to include networks that do in the state-controlled press, it is ‘the world’s
not conform to a specific or pre-determined biggest international cooperation platform and
geographic footprint allows considerable the most popular international public product’.
flexibility that can be helpful when looking at Its idealistic universalism meant that it helped
the past—when the significance of different inspire ‘the dreams of millions of people’, and to
commodities rose and fell, and when the bring hope to ‘every country and their citizens’.
identities (and physical locations) of buyers, Some have reacted sharply to such positive,
sellers and intermediaries changed over time. jaunty messages. ‘In a globalised world’, said
On the other hand, of course, the problems US Defence Secretary Jim Mattis in October
of defining what the BRI is, and what is, can 2017, ‘there are many belts and many roads, and
and should be included in it, is largely not no one nation should put itself in a position of
just subjective but highly ambiguous. Some dictating ‘one belt, one road’.12 A  few months
projects started well before President Xi’s later, he returned to this theme, adding that
Astana speech have ‘become’ BRI flagship not only are there ‘many belts and roads’ in
investments after the event. Other BRI projects the world, but that China’s efforts to suggest

8
 Introduction to China’s Belt and Road Initiative

otherwise were designed as a backdoor to commuter tracks—the building of desalination

allow the authorities in Beijing to ‘replicate plants and new port facilities, it is clear that the

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on the international stage their authoritarian prospect of working closely with China at a
domestic model’.13 time when alternatives for even much smaller
Resistance to the BRI has also been pointed scale investment from other sources are limited,
in India, with similar comments being issued is naturally extremely appealing.
by leading officials criticising the lead being In Pakistan, as with other countries where
taken by China to galvanise states across Asia China has pumped in large amounts of money,
and indeed beyond. Some of this must be the issue is not with the principle of debt, or even
understood in terms of geopolitical rivalry, and with the size of the debt. The problems come
also in the context of the fact that alternative first from the ability—or rather than inability—
models to help spur social and economic of the government to meet its obligations in the
development in countries like Pakistan and
event of overspend or in the event of under-
Iran are either limited or absent altogether.
utilisation. This puts pressure on the economic
The large reduction in aid from the USA to
resources of countries whose finances may
Islamabad in 2017–2018, for example (following
often already be strained—as in the case
a trend over previous years), means that there
of  Laos, Tajikistan or Tonga, for example. The
are few options other than to turn to Beijing
for support. fact that this can cause political instability as
well as an overwhelming debt burden means
that there are obvious concerns that far from
Potential problems
providing stability, the BRI provides the setting
The scale of the help that China is able to to create just the opposite.
give is significant. According to the Asian The second difficulty, however, concerns
Development Bank, countries across Asia the behaviour of the counter-party. Borrowing
alone require around $1.7 trillion per year in money and being charged interest for doing so
infrastructure investment to meet the needs is not in itself wrong. Clearly, doing so on terms
and demands of a population numbering
that are manageable is crucial—as one senior
around 4.5 billion that is both growing and
official in Islamabad noted in the summer of
becoming richer. The fact that state banks are
2018. Those who had negotiated with Beijing
able to finance large-scale projects with costs
‘didn’t do their homework correctly’, said
running into the hundreds of millions and
Abdul Razak Dawood, ‘so they gave away a lot’
often into the billions means that there are new
opportunities for governments keen to improve (Anderlini et al., 2018).
the quality of life for its citizens and reap the That is one side of the problem when debts
economic (as well as the political) benefits of go wrong. But the other, more important side is
helping upgrade, modernise or transform their the behaviour of the counter-party. In the event
countries (Asian Development Bank, 2017). of debt distress or default, everything depends
One obvious example comes from the on the willingness of the lender to restructure
China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), or even forgive some of or the entire loan—
a distinctly defined spur of the BRI (see also thereby either spreading out the pain or
Melecky et  al., this issue). With an initial $60 sharing it. At this stage in the evolution and
billion ear-marked for the first phase of CPEC, development of the BRI, the decisions taken
ploughed into a major improvement of the in individual cases are a cause for concern—in
energy grid with a series of large new power so far as they can be assumed to link back to
plants, new roads and railway lines—including major policy decisions in Beijing.

9
Brakman et al.

One obvious example that has become dramatically scaled back. These include a $17
much cited by observers and critics of the BRI billion high-speed railway linking Malaysia

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is the fate of Hambantota in Sri Lanka—a with Singapore, along with the construction
major new port facility and shipping terminal of three major pipelines—all of which are
built at a reported cost of $1.3 billion. Wildly being re-evaluated following a change of
over-optimistic projections about its use led government and concerns that the proposed
to default and desperate efforts by the Sri costs and terms were too onerous. In
Lankan government to put the situation right. Myanmar, the building of a new deep-water
Eventually, in the summer of 2017, a Chinese port at Kyauk Pyu was revised downwards
operating company was given a 99  year lease by 80% from a cost of $7.3 to $1.3 billion.
on the port, a move not surprisingly interpreted Or, as another example, there is the airport
in many quarters as neo-imperialism in all but at Freetown in Sierra Leone that was to be
name.
built for $400 million, but which was scrapped
following warnings from the World Bank and
The road ahead for BRI IMF that the debt level of the project was
How decisions are made in the future will unsustainable.
shape our understanding of the BRI—but The direction of the BRI in the short term
also of how we think about China itself. The will depend on how well projects and clusters
crucial question will be how Beijing reacts to of projects go. With concerns growing about
bad investment decisions, and above all to ones the dangers of debt-diplomacy and of states
where the outcome of bad investment decisions taking on too many financial obligations, it
offers the possibility for opportunistic seizure of will become increasingly important for Beijing
assets and locations that have a strategic value to be able to point to case studies which have
to China’s wider perspective and aspirations gone according to plan and have produced the
regionally as well as globally. expected impact (or better). Likewise, how the
There have been some signs that lessons are leadership in China reacts to progress, setbacks
being learned from the case of Hambantota,
and criticism will play an important role too
with President Xi announcing that debts
in shaping if, how and why the BRI adapts or
owed to China by some of Africa’s ‘least
develops a more rigid structure.
developed countries’ would be forgiven. While
Another important factor too is the wider
the details of this gesture have not yet been
geopolitical picture at the moment, at a time
made public, the separate fact that the terms
of a loan that was originally due to have been when the US administration of President
repaid over 10 years by Ethiopia for the train Trump is putting considerable pressure on the
line linking Addis Ababa with the coast was Chinese economy through the introduction
to be restructured and spread over 30  years, of trade tariffs. It is notable that in the
provides some awareness of the need to reach autumn of 2018, several scholars in China
accommodations, at least in some cases, and gave commentaries that were critical of the
at least under some contexts. Whether this country’s direction of travel. Amongst the
becomes regularised—and if so, where and opinions articulated were negative comments
how, is clearly important to follow in the near about China’s expansionist policies, of which
and mid-term future. BRI is a key component. It is never easy to tell
Some are not waiting to find out. In the what deeper tensions such sentiments point
course of 2018, several high-profile BRI to (or mask) within the leadership group in
projects were either suspended, cancelled or China—nor what impact they will have by way

10
 Introduction to China’s Belt and Road Initiative

or intensification or response from within the In light of the above historical, political
small but powerful group. and practical considerations as outlined in the

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The way that BRI evolves in the coming History and basic BRI facts section, we identify
years is linked to multiple moving parts— 30 non-Chinese Core New Silk Road (CNSR)
which makes long-term assessment difficult. countries in Table 1. Together with China, this
Nevertheless, the importance of trying to do represents the group of countries most directly
so in a systematic way is important precisely involved in the New Silk Roads projects. We
because of the fact that the shape of the 21st briefly analyse how these countries develop
century will depend on some of the major compared to the world regarding population
developments of which BRI is clearly a and real income in the new millennium.
significant part. Figure  3a illustrates that the population
share of the CNSR countries in the world total
is about stable (rising from 15.4% in 2001 to
Economic and geographical
15.5% in 2017), while that of China is declining
relevance of the BRI
(falling from 20.5% in 2001 to 18.4% in 2017).
The group of 30. . . The joint share in world population fell by 2
China’s National Development and Reform percentage-points.
Commission (NDRC) formally issued its Creating a comparable picture for income
Vision and Actions on Jointly Building the is a bit more complicated since we want
Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century to correct for price differences between
Maritime Silk Road in March 2015, two years countries at different levels of development
after Xi’s speech in Kazakhstan, as extensively and thus use the World Bank’s GNI PPP in
referred to above. This vision aims to connect constant 2011 international dollars. In the
Asia, Europe and Africa along five routes, benchmark year 2011 this information is
improve ports and routes for better maritime available for 28 CNSR countries (excluding
connections and strengthen collaboration to Syria and Palestine), but it is not available
create six international economic corridors for a varying range of these countries in the
(see Figure  1), namely (i) New Eurasia Land other years. Since including all countries for
Bridge, (ii) China–Mongolia–Russia, (iii) which information in a given year is available
China–West Asia–Central Asia, (iv) China– in the CNSR share would provide a biased
Pakistan, (v) China–Indochina Peninsula, and picture of dynamic developments in view of
(vi) Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar. It is the varying number of countries included, we
thus referred to either as the New Silk Roads only include the 19 CNSR countries for which
or the BRI. GNI PPP information is available for all years

Table 1.  Core New Silk Road (CNSR) countries, excluding China

Afghanistan Belarus Israel Laos Pakistan Thailand

Armenia Bhutan Jordan Malaysia Palestine Turkey
Azerbaijan Georgia Kazakhstan Mongolia Qatar Turkmenistan
Bahrain Iran Kuwait Myanmar Russia Uzbekistan
Bangladesh Iraq Kyrgyzstan Nepal Syria Viet Nam
Note: Shaded cells included in panel b of Figure 3; together these countries represent about 89% of CNSR total income in
2011 (when only information for Syria is missing).

11
Brakman et al.

24 a. Populaon 24 b. Real income

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20 China 20
China
16 CNSR 16

12 12 CNSR

8 8

4 4

0 0
2001 2006 2011 2016 2001 2006 2011 2016

Figure 3.  Population and income in China and CNSR; % world total, 2001–2017
Source: calculations based on World Development Indicators online; (a) for CNSR is based on 29 countries (excludes
Palestine); (b) for CNSR is based on 19 countries (see note to Table 1), income is GNI PPP in constant 2011 international
dollars.

from 2002 to 2016 (see the note to Table  1). between participating countries. This section
Together these countries account for about briefly analyses trade flows as the most
89% of total CNSR income in 2011. tangible of these flows which is easiest to
Figure  3b shows that the real income measure empirically. We base our discussion
developments are a stronger reverse version of on information from the International Trade
the population developments. The real income Center (intracen.org, a joint agency of the
share of the CNSR countries in the world total World Trade Center and the United Nations),
is slightly rising (from 10.1% in 2002 to 10.8% which provides bilateral country trade flows
in 2016), while that of China is rising much for the period 2001–2017. We focus on relative
faster (from 8.3% in 2002 to 17.6% in 2016). flows in percentage terms per year, which
The joint share of China and CNSR in world allows us to illustrate dynamic developments
real income thus rose by about 10 percentage- over time without the need to calculate real
points in this period. trade flows. We incorporate the development
To summarise our findings from Figure  3, of economic power in the New Silk Road
the joint economic power of China and the countries analysed in the previous section in
CNSR countries rises substantially in the new our discussion of trade flows, taking the world
millennium (by 10 percentage-points) despite as our benchmark.
a small decline in the population share (by 2 Figure  4 shows the relative importance of
percentage-points). These developments are trade flows towards (panel a) and from (panel
almost exclusively driven by China and not by b) the Core New Silk Road (CSNR) countries.
the CNSR countries. Trade flows with China have risen enormously
in this period. The share of China’s exports going
to CNSR countries rose by 8.2 percentage-
Trade flows and the BRI points (from 6.3% in 2001 to 14.5% in 2017),
The BRI focuses on the creation and while the share of China’s imports from these
importance of international connections countries rose by 4.1 percentage-points (from
and infrastructure projects to stimulate 10.7% in 2001 to 14.9% in 2017). Note that
investment, knowledge and trade flows right now (in 2017) the share of China’s exports

12
 Introduction to China’s Belt and Road Initiative

16 a. trade to CNSR 16 b. trade from CNSR

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14 14

12 12

10 10

8 8

6 6

4 4

Sep 2013

Sep 2013
2 2
year year
0 0
2001 2006 2011 2016 2001 2006 2011 2016

Figure 4.  Trade flows of CSNR countries, 2001–2017.

Source: Calculations based on intracen.org data; CNSR countries: see Table 1; (a) trade to CNSR from China (% China
exports) and World (% World trade, measured by imports); (b) trade from CNSR countries to China (% China import) or
World (% World trade, measured by exports).

with CNSR countries is about the same as 9.3% in 2017), which can be compared with
its share of imports (namely 14.5 versus 14.9 the 8.2 percentage-points for China. Similarly,
%), such that the sharper increase in China’s Figure 4b shows that the share of World trade
export flows with these countries since 2001 exported by CNSR countries rose by 3.1
should largely be seen as a catching-up process percentage-points (from 7.1% in 2001 to 10.3%
compared with its imports. in 2017), which can be compared with the 4.1
A standard empirical gravity equation percentage-points for China.
approach to bilateral international trade flows Figure  5 illustrates the development over
indicates that these flows are positively related time of these relative effects since 2001 for
to income levels of the involved countries and both China’s exports and imports. It shows that
negatively related to the distance between the China’s relative imports from CNSR countries
countries (as a measure of general interaction initially declined from 2002 to 2008 and since
costs). As discussed in the previous sub-section, then have returned to slightly above the 2001
the most important relative income changes in level by 2017. China’s relative exports to CNSR
the three groups of countries analysed (China, countries, on the other hand, have risen mostly
CNSR and ROW (rest of world)) is the rise during the period, but in particular from 2011 to
of China’s real income. Since CNSR countries 2014. Both in Figure 3 and in Figure 4 we show
are on average closer to China than ROW the timing of President Xi’s September 2013
countries, we expect CNSR countries to benefit speech. None of the panels in the figures indicates
disproportionately from China’s economic rise a significant break since then in terms of a rapidly
(see also Kohl (2019)). The way we analyse this rising importance of China–CNSR trade flows.
is by comparing developments between China
and CNSR with those of the rest of the world.
Figure 4a thus illustrates that the share of world The papers in this issue
trade imported into CNSR countries rose by Against the historical, economic and political
3.6 percentage-points (from 5.6% in 2001 to background of BRI as outlined above in our

13
Brakman et al.

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3

Sep 2013
0
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017

year

-3

Figure 5.  Cumulative relative effect of China trade with CNSR since 2001 (in %).
Source: Calculations based on intracen.org data; China export indicates cumulative change since 2001 of the share of China
exports to CNSR countries minus the cumulative change of World trade with those countries (see Figure 3a); similarly for
China import (see Figure 3b).

introduction, we can now position and briefly 2018). The contributions by Pomfret (2019)
introduce the various papers, seven in total, and Anastasiadou (2019) analyse in detail
that constitute the real core of the current issue whether and how the BRI can be seen as a
on BRI. demarcation or more a continuation of China’s
The issue kicks off with the paper by Melecky policy of investing in large-scale transnational
et al. (2019). Using the CPEC, a key part of the infrastructure projects. Both authors argue that
BRI, as their example, the authors develop a the BRI is best seen as a continuation in this
policy framework that can used to assess the respect. Pomfret (2019), in particular, shows how
economic, social or environmental impact of railway connections that make for the so-called
such large-scale infrastructure projects. Most China–Europe land bridge that precedes the
importantly, their simulation analysis for the BRI was a market driven (!) establishment of a
CPEC shows how the impact of these projects is railway connection between China and Europe,
probably rather heterogeneous across the people a development that was very important to the
and households involved. It is far from clear that economic rise of China and main determinant
the net benefits will be positive. This holds in of services-led international trade.
particular if not only economic aspects are taken Crucial in the BRI is that countries become
into account. In doing so, the paper provides connected in new ways. This will affect
not only a very useful methodology to evaluate international trade fundamentally. Using a
projects like BRI, it can also serve as an important state-of-the-art version of the gravity model
check on the ‘Big Words’ by politicians and policy for bilateral international trade flows, Kohl
makers that often go along with these projects. (2019) estimates the possible impact of BRI on
As we have already indicated, the BRI did international trade flows. The author estimates
not come out of the blue. China has a long the impact of the reduction of trade costs that
history with transnational infrastructure goes along with BRI on trade patterns with
projects that thus dates back to the days value-added trade data. These data highlight
of the ‘old Silk Roads’ (Frankopan, 2015, the importance of international supply chains.

14
 Introduction to China’s Belt and Road Initiative

The trade effects of BRI turn out to be The final paper in this issue by Dunford and Liu
asymmetric from both the supply and demand (2019) offers a Chinese perspective on BRI. Here

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perspective. The countries ‘at the end’ of the our issue on BRI comes full-circle as the authors
new Silk Road, the EU countries, benefit less use a wealth of (primarily) Chinese literature
than China itself or ‘in between’ countries like that documents the background of some of the
Russia. More importantly, the effects of BRI views expressed by Xi Jinping in his 2013 speech
on trade and welfare are probably larger than that marked the start of the BRI plan.
those resulting from (creating) new (regional)
free trade arrangements. The paper by Mao Endnotes
and He (2019) nicely complements the trade
model and analysis by Kohl (2019) because it
1
For more background on the origins of the BRI,
see Frankopan (2015, 2018) on which parts of this
focuses on the (export) specialisation patterns
section are based.
within China. Using a framework derived
from evolutionary economic geography, the
2
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic
of China Speech by HE Xi Jinping, President of the
authors show, for instance, for 334 Prefectures
People’s Republic of China, at Nazarbayev University,
during 2001–2013 how further regional export- 7 September 2013. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_
led growth might call for better external eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1078088.shtml.
connections, which provides a clear link to the 3
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic
possible impact of BRI on regional growth, in of China Speech by HE Xi Jinping, President of the
particular, for lagging regions. People’s Republic of China, at Nazarbayev University,
The impact and relevance of the BRI can thus 7 September 2013, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_
be understood by focussing on the infrastructure eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1078088.shtml
project itself or related projects/initiatives; see 4
A statement released by the Central Compilation
the papers by Pomfret (2019) and Anastasiadou and Translation Bureau of the People’s Republic of
(2019). Trade models then provide a very useful China and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
vehicle to understand the possible economic announced that the name of the programme should
consequences of BRI in terms of changes be rendered ‘the Belt and Road Initiative’ in English,
in trade and income, see Kohl (2019) and rather than ‘One Belt, One Road’. See Bērzina-
Xiyan and He (2019). But as the lead article Čerenkova (2016).
by Melecky et  al. (2019) convincingly argues, 5
The Tazara railway linking Dar-es Salaam in
the impact of initiatives like the BRI is multi- Tanzania with Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia provides
faceted. The last two papers are a reminder one good example. See Altorfer-Ong (2009).
of this fact. Van der Wende and Kirby (2019) 6
See for example Rachman (2018), Brands (2018)
analyse whether and how the BRI may alter and Economist (2018b).
the global landscape for higher education and 7
There is an extensive literature on the causes and
thereby for spatial differences in the allocation effects of this shift. Above all here, see Pommeranz
of human capital. The BRI thus not only changes (2000).
the global economic power balance in favour of 8
Parts of History and basic BRI facts section are
China, it also increases the economic relevance based on Frankopan (2015, 2018).
of the countries that are most closely linked or 9
This is the central theme of Frankopan (2015).
part of the BRI (see our data on the 30 CSNR One obvious difference between BRI and MAGA,
10

countries above). This will not only have trade however, is that the former is aimed at international
consequences for these countries, but it will also expansion and cooperation whereas the latter is
strengthen the position of locations that profit aimed more at isolationism and competition between
as a central place or hub for higher education. nation states.

15
Brakman et al.

US Senate Committee on Armed Services, ‘Political

11
Frankopan, P. (2015) The Silk Roads: A New History
and Security Situation in Afghanistan’, 3 October of the World. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

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2017. Frankopan, P. (2018) The New Silk Roads. The Present
and Future of the World. London: Bloomsbury
Department of Defense, ‘Remarks by Secretary
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Hillman,  J.E. (2018) How Big is China’s Belt and
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