DAVID REYES (Substituted by Victoria R. Fabella) vs.

JOSE LIM, CHUY CHENG

KENG and HARRISON LUMBER, INC.
G.R. No. 134241
August 11, 2003

FACTS:

David Reyes filed before the trial court a complaint for annulment of contract and
damages against Jose Lim, Chuy Cheng Keng and Harrison Lumber, Inc. regarding their contract
to sell a parcel of land. In the interim of the case, Lim prayed in open court that Reyes be ordered
to deposit the P10 million down payment since Reyes already sold the subject land to another
buyer. Reyes questioned the order since deposit is not one of the provisional remedies available
under the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Can the Court issue the order in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction?

RULING:

YES. The trial court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may validly order the deposit
of the P10 million down payment in court. The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in
this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution. Equity jurisdiction aims to do
complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special
circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of its statutory or legal jurisdiction. Equity is
the principle by which substantial justice may be attained in cases where the prescribed or
customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate.

The application of equity always involves a balancing of the equities in a particular case,
a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The equities weigh heavily in favor of
Lim, who paid the P10 million down payment in good faith only to discover later that Reyes had
subsequently sold the Property to another buyer.
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. vs. HON. LUDIVICO D. ARCIAGA, TAURINO
SINGSON AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
March 16,1987
FACTS:

On August 24, 1960 Taurino Singson from Cabugao Ilocos Sur suffered multiple serious
physical injuries when the Philippine Rabbit bus crashed against an acaciatree at La union
causing him to file a complaint for contractual tort against the latter. The defendant alleged that
the collision was accidental. The trial then was set on December 23,1965 but upon the motion of
both counsels, it was postponed and moved to February 3 and 4 1966. Then, on October 6,1966
the Court noted that no pre-trial has ever been conducted so both parties were ordered to agree
for a compromise agreement at the office of Philippine Rabbit in Tarlac. The trial was again
postponed to November 14,1966 and then transferred again on January 20,1967 upon the petition
filed by counsel for Phil.Rabbit and moved again to April 29,1967. During the scheduled trial on
April 29,1967, only the defendant was present on the said date. So, the court dismissed the case
for non-appearance of the plaintiff.

On July 6,1967 (61 days from receipt of dismissal)Plaintiff Taurino Singson filed a petition for
Relief with an affidavit alleging that he went to the trial but due to engine trouble, he arrived late.
The lower court grant plaintiff’s petition for relief. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. filed a
motion for reconsideration but the lower court denied the motion. Afterwhich Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. again filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus for
preliminary injunction in the Court of Appeals but C.A denied the motion. The company moved
for reconsideration but it was also denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of Appeals erred in not holding that the 60-day period provided in
Sec.38 of the rules of court is mandatory and non-extendible.

RULING:
According to Sec.3 of Rule 38 of the rules of court, a petition provided for in either of the
preceding sections of this rule must be verified, filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of
the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than 6 months after such
judgment or order was entered or said proceeding was taken. The petition for relief was filed 61
days from receipt of the notice of dismissal or one day late. The records show that counsel for
private respondent learned of the dismissal on the same day. The records further shows
that counsel for private respondent did not move for reconsideration of the order of dismissal,
nor for new trial, neither to appeal,thereby allowing the decision to be final and executory.

No one can invoke equity as a ground for reopening a case if an express provision of law exists
which the remedy can be invoked. The rule is “equity follows the law” this means that there are
instances wherein a court gives remedy, where the law gives none ; but if where a particular
remedy is given by the law and that remedy is bounded and circumscribed by particular rules, it
would not be proper for the court to take it up where the law leaves it and extend it further than
the law allows. Thus, the legal maxim “equity aids the vigilant,not those who slumber on their
rights” is applicable to this case.
 SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 174689 | October 22, 2007

FACTS:

Rommel Silverio filed a petition for the change of his gender and first name in his birth
certificate to facilitate his marriage with his fiancé. A year before, Silverio has underwent sex re-
assignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. In his petition, he wants to change his first name from
“Rommel” to “Mely.”

ISSUE:

Should the court allow the change of name?

RULING:

No. The SC said that considering that there is no law recognizing sex re-assignment, the
determination of a person’s sex at the time of birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. It held
that “while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil
registry for that reason. There is no special law in the country governing sex reassignment and its
effect. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.”

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that “[n]o judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law.” However, it is
not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or
interpret the law, not to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for
legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are
statute-based.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN
G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

FACTS:

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, of Siniloan, Laguna; such
that, her name be changed to “Jeff” and her gender to “male”.

She was born in January 13, 1981, and was registered as female, having the name “Jennifer
Cagandahan”. While growing up, she was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperpplasia
(CAH), a condition where the person thus afflicted possesses both male and female
characteristics. She was also diagnosed to have clitoral hypertrophy, small ovaries, no breast, and
menstrual development. She alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and
emotion, she has become a male person.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the correction of entries in her birth certificate be granted.

RULING:

Yes. The court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The Court views that where
a person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, having reached the age of maturity, with good reason thinks of
his/her sex. The respondent here thinks of himself as a male considering that his body produces
high levels of male hormones. There is preponderant biological support for considering him as a
male.
 DIRECTOR OF PRISONS v ANG CHO KIO
G.R. No. L-30001, June 23, 1970

FACTS:

Ang Cho Kio was convicted of various offenses and was granted conditional pardon in 1959. He
was never to return to the Philippines. In violation of his pardon, he returned in 1966 under the
name "Ang Ming Huy". However, he was identified by an inspector of the Immigration Bureau.
Thus, he was arrested. The Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, ordered him
recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence that were imposed on him,
for having violated the conditioned of his pardon.

He filed a petition for habeas corpus which the CFI of Rizal denied. The CA affirmed the
decision but made a recommendation that Ang may be allowed to leave the country on the first
available transportation abroad.

The Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration praying for the deletion of the
recommendation. The Solicitor General maintains that the recommendation is not a part of the
decision and was uncalled for; that it gives the decision a political complexion, because courts
are not empowered to make such a recommendation, nor is it inherent or incidental in the
exercise of judicial powers. He also contends that allowing convicted aliens to leave the country
is an act of the state exercises solely in the discretion of the Chief Executive. It is urged that the
act of sending an undesirable alien out of the country is political in character, and the courts
should not interfere with, nor attempt to influence, the political acts of the President.

ISSUE:

Can the CA make recommendations?

RULING:

The recommendatory power of the courts in this jurisdiction are limited to those expressly
provided in the law — and such law is the provision of Section 5 of the Revised Penal Code as
follows:

Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is
not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act
should be made the subject of penal legislation. In the same way the court shall submit to the
Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice such statement as may be deemed proper,
without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of
this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration
the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense. Certainly, the recommendation in the
majority opinion of the special division of the CA, now in question, is not authorized under the
aforequoted provision of Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code. The CA was not called upon to
review any sentence that was imposed on Ang Cho Kio. It was simply called upon to determine
whether Ang Cho Kio was illegally confined, or not, in the insular penitentiary under the
Director of Prisons.

It was improper for the CA justices to make a recommendation that would suggest a
modification or a correction of the act of the Chief Executive. The matter of whether an alien
who violated the laws in this country may remain or be deported is a political question that
should be left entirely to the Chief Executive to decide. Under the principle of separation of
powers, it is not within the province of the judiciary to express an opinion, or express a
suggestion, that would reflect on the wisdom or propriety of the action of the Chief Executive on
matters purely political in nature.

After all, courts are not concerned with the wisdom or morality of laws, but only in the
interpretation and application of the law. We believe that judges should refrain from expressing
irrelevant opinions in their decisions which may only reflect unfavorably upon their competence
and the propriety of their judicial actuations.
 CUDIA v. PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY
G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015

FACTS:

Cadet 1 CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA. On November 14,
2013, CL cadets had a lesson examination on Operations Research under Dr. Costales as the 4 th
period. Five days after, Professor Juanita Berong of the 5th period class issued a Delinquency
Report (DR) against Cudia because he was late for two (2) minutes in his Eng 412 class. Two
days later, Cudia received his DR. He explained and reasoned out that: "I came directly from
OR432 Class. We were dismissed a bit late by our instructor Sir." He was meted a punishment to
which he addressed his Request for Reconsideration of Meted Punishment. Several days passed,
Cudia was informed that he was reported to HC for violation of the Honor Code. The HC
constituted a team to conduct a preliminary investigation on the reported honor violation of
Cudia. The result of the investigation was 8-1 in favor of a guilty verdict. The Cadet Review
Appeals Board conducted a review of the case. It denied the appeal of Cudia. This ruling was
affirmed by the AFP Chief of Staff. But on the other hand, the CHR found in favor of Cudia.
PMA averred that CHR’s findings are at best recommendatory. Cudia filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the Supreme Court. PMA opposed the said
petition as it argued that the same is not proper as a matter of policy and that the court should
avoid interfering with military matters.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Cudia’s petitions is proper.
2. Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its findings.

RULING:

1. Mandamus is not proper

Mandamus will not prosper in this case. Cudia’s prayer that PMA should be compelled to
reinstate him as well as to give him his supposed academic awards is not proper. The Courts,
even the Supreme Court, cannot compel PMA tqo do so because the act of restoring Cudia’s
rights and entitlements as a cadet as well as his awards is a discretionary act. Mandamus cannot
be availed against an official or government agency, in this case PMA, whose duty requires the
exercise of discretion or judgment.

II. Yes. It is within PMA’s right to academic freedom to decide whether or not a cadet is still
worthy to be part of the institution. Thus, PMA did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was accorded due process. In this case, the investigation of
Cudia’s Honor Code violation followed the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the
PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report submitted by his TO. He was then given the
opportunity to explain the report against him. He was informed about his options and the entire
process that the case would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately followed after
he replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating team
submitted a written report together with its recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC
qthereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations.
DOMINADOR L. TARUC, WILBERTO DACERA, NICANOR GALANIDA, RENERIO
CANTA, JERRY CANTA, CORDENCIO CONSIGNA, SUSANO ALCALA, LEONARDO
DIZON, SALVADOR GELSANO AND BENITO LAUG v BISHOP PORFIRIO B. DE LA
CRUZ, REV. FR. RUSTOM FLORANO AND DELFIN BORDAS
G.R. No. 144801. March 10, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On June 28, 1993,
Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine
Independent Church. Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a
complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the
Regional Trial Court.They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done
without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a violation of religious rights in this case.

RULING:

No. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a

matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the
performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of
religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations. “Civil Courts will not
interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or
property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have
jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church property.”
Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present case.
 RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS v THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003

FACTS:
SEC. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective
official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding
in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of RA 9006 entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free,
Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Elections Practices, insofar as it
repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of
Section 26(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject
which should be in expressed in its title.

The inclusion of Sec 14 repealing Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in RA 9006 constitutes a
proscribed rider. The Sec 14 of RA 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of
media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices. Sec 67 of the
OEC imposes a limitation of officials who run for office other than the one they are holding in a
permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the
certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Sec 67 of the OEC is thus not embraced in the title, nor
germane to the subject matter of RA 9006.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.

RULING:
No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its
contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title
is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content. The purported dissimilarity of Section
67 of the Code and the Section 14 of the RA 9006 does not violate "one subject-one title rule."
This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain
any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such
subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.

Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced
in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and
prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of
the legislators and the public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not
apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Code as the same was amply and comprehensively
deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners as members of the House
of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes.
Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
 SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, et al. vs. REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO ENRIQUEZ, et al.,
G.R. Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226120 & 226294, November 8, 2016

FACTS:

During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R.
Duterte publicly announced that he would allow the burial former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani ("LNMB"). Duterte won the May 9, 2016 elections. On August
7, 2016, Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to AFP Chief of Staff
General Ricardo R. Visaya regarding the interment of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at
the Libingan ng Mga Bayani.

On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued a directive to the Philippine
Army on the Funeral Honors and Service for President Marcos. Dissatisfied with the foregoing
issuance, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and Petition for Mandamus
and Prohibition with the Court.

ISSUE:

Is the interment of the remains if former President Marcos in the LNMB a political question?

RULING:

The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos
interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy. In the
excercise of his powers under the Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987 to allow the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain devoted for national
military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy
based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness. There being no taint
of grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion, as discussed below, President Duterte's decision
on that political question is outside the ambit of judicial review.
 MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO v SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al.,
G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014

FACTS:

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy.

In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the
said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of
Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On
January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a
brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground
on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of
Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or
oil.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the
provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental,
Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUE:

Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian.

RULING:

The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy
who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or
omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was
committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction
of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by
the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State
immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents
Swift, Rice and Robling.

During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the
conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No.
10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article
31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that
while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag
State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to
comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the
latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, PETITIONER, VS. ANIANO DESIERTO

G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 02, 2001

FACTS:

It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal
gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on
December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious
allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January
16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging
evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the
entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote
against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at
EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.
On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
“constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the
crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap,
after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his
term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties
of his office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the President enjoys immunity from suit.

RULING:

No. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and
graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which
carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting
president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal
acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of
public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
 NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ v GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. NO. 191805, NOVEMBER 15, 2011

FACTS:

On December 7, Rodriguez filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of
Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of
Documents and Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009. The petition was filed against
former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj.
Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina,
Calog, George Palacpac, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.

Respondents contend that Rodriguez is a double agent, and had been working as their
informant/infiltrator in the fight against NPA rebels. Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
through the solicitor-general, insisted on her immunity from suits (by virtue of her position as
president). Supreme Court granted the writs after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged the
abduction and torture of Rodriguez by members of the Philippine Army. SC directed the Court of
Appeals to hear the petition.

CA ruled in favor of Rodriguez and found Ibrado, Versoza, Bangit, Ochoa, Tolentino, Santos, De
Vera and Matutina liable for his abduction and torture. As to Calog and Palacpac, the case was
dismissed for lack of merit. On President Arroyo, the case was dismissed on account of her
immunity from suits.

ISSUE:

Whether or not President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent by virtue of her presidential
immunity from suit

RULING
CA’s rationale does not stand anymore since the presidential immunity from suits only applies
during her incumbency. “Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to
court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond.”

A non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the
latter’s tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that courts should look with disfavor upon the
presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the
vindication of a right.

It is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield
herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo
proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.
 DIDIPIO EARTH-SAVERS MULTI-PURPOSE ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED
(DESAMA) v ELISEA GOZUN
G.R. No. 157882, March 30, 2006

FACTS:

In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign companies
when it comes to either technical or financial large scale exploration or mining. In 1995, Ramos
signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed an FTAA
with Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company. The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to
explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino and N. Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio. After the passage
of the law, DENR rolled out its implementing RRs. Didipio petitioned to have the law and the
RR to be annulled as it is unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of property. In
seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional,
petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40
which they claim allow the unlawful and unjust “taking” of private property for private purpose
in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandating that private
property shall not be taken except for public use and the corresponding payment of just
compensation. They assert that public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property and
allow taking of land without payment of just compensation.

ISSUE:

What are the requisites of judicial review?

RULING:

A justiciable controversy is defined as a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court of law
through the application of a law. Thus, courts have no judicial power to review cases involving
political questions and as a rule, will desist from taking cognizance of speculative or hypothetical
cases, advisory opinions and cases that have become moot. The Constitution is quite explicit on
this matter. It provides that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. Pursuant to
this constitutional mandate, courts, through the power of judicial review, are to entertain only
real disputes between conflicting parties through the application of law. For the courts to
exercise the power of judicial review, the following must be extant (1) there must be an actual
case calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and
(3) the person challenging must have the standing.
 THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF BARANGAY DON MARIANO MARCOS,
MUNICIPALITY OF BAYOMBONG PROVINCE OF NUEVA VISCAYA represented by
BARANGAY KAGAWAD JOSE CENEN SANTOS, MARIO BACUD, WALTER
FRANCISCO, ROSITA SEBASTIAN, LAURETA CABAUATAN, CECILIA ALINDAYU
and MELY SIMANGAN vs PUNONG BARANGAY SEVERINO MARTINEZ
G.R. No. 170626, March 3, 2008

FACTS:

Martinez was administratively charged with Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption by petitioner
through the filing of a verified complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan as the disciplining
authority over elective barangay officials pursuant to Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code. The Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision which
imposed upon Martinez the penalty of removal from office. The Decision was conveyed to the
Municipal Mayor of Bayombong, Nueva Ecija, Severino Bagasao, for its implementation.
Municial Mayor Bagasao issued a Memorandum, wherein he stated that the Sanggunaing Bayan
is not empowered to order Martinezs removal from service. However, the Decision remains valid
until reversed and must be executed by him. For the meantime, he ordered the indefinite
suspension of Martinez since the period of appeal had not yet lapsed.

Martinez filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with a prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction before the trial court against petitioner, the Sangguniang Bayan
and Mayor Bagasao questioning the validity of the Decision of the Sangguniang Bayan. The
trial court issued an Order declaring the Decision of the Sangguniang Bayan and the
Memorandum of Mayor Bagasao void. It maintained that the proper courts, and not the
petitioner, are empowered to remove an elective local official from office, in accordance with
Section 60 of the Local Government Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez, an elective local official, from
office

RULING:

Although Martinez’s term as Punong Baranggay expired upon the holding of the Synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections and, thus, rendering this petition moot and
academic, the Court settled the legal question that is capable of repetition yet evading review.

No. Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred upon the courts the power to remove
elective local officials from office:
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions.An elective local official may be disciplined,
suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds:

An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order
of the proper court.
 During the deliberations of the Senate on the Local Government Code, the legislative intent
to confine to the courts, i.e., regional trial courts, the Sandiganbayan and the appellate courts,
jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of elective local officials was evident.

In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., the Court en banc categorically ruled that the Office of the
President is without any power to remove elected officials, since the power is exclusively vested
in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local
Government Code.
 SENATE v ERMITA
G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:

The Committee of the Senate whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of
the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment
Group. The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the
contract covering the North Rail Project.

The President issued E.O. 464, which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.
The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In accordance
with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional
provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all
heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent
of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.

Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it has a vital interest in the resolution of the
issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material injury, as it has
already sustained the same with its continued enforcement since it directly interferes with and
impedes the valid exercise of the Senate’s powers and functions and conceals information of
great public interest and concern, filed its petition for certiorari and prohibition and prays that
E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Is the Senate of the Philippines the proper party to assail EO 464?

RULING:

Yes. The Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent
public decision-making in a democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation is not
disputed. E.O. 464, however, allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access
information that is crucial to law-making. Verily, the Senate, including its individual members,
has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to
assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any
official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
 ROBLE ARRASTRE, INC. v HON. ALTAGRACIA VILLAFLOR and THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 128509 August 22, 2006

FACTS:

On 27 January 1994, petitioner filed with respondent mayor an application for the renewal of its
Business Permit No. 276. However, the same was denied. Aggrieved by the denial, petitioner
filed with the RTC, a Petition for Mandamus raising the primary ground that the refusal to issue
the business license sought for was a neglect to perform an act which the law enjoins her to do,
by virtue of the office she occupies. On 16 May 1994, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition,
contending that subsequent to the filing of the Petition for Mandamus with the RTC, it was
granted by the PPA a five-year contract to provide cargo handling and other related services at
the Port of Hilongos, Leyte, effective 1 March 1994.

The RTC ruled that the refusal of respondent mayor to approve petitioner’s application for
renewal of the business permit was not based on law nor upon her discretion. On the other hand,
the CA ruled that the power of the local chief executive to issue licenses and permits entails the
exercise of official discretion, hence, mandamus will not lie.

ISSUE:

Will the mootness of the petition prevent the court from deciding the case?

RULING:

No. It would seem that the main prayer of the complaint, that is, to compel the respondent mayor
to issue a business license for the year 1994, by the passage of time during which this case pends,
had already become moot and academic. A new application is necessary for the year 1995 and
the year 1996 which is about to end. And in the grant or denial of such application for business
permits or licenses, the respondent mayor must examine closely the circumstances prevailing and
again use her discretion in the exercise of her official function. Accordingly, the issue at hand is
already academic and it is well established that courts will not adjudicate moot cases nor hear a
case when the object sought is not attainable and it will decline jurisdiction over moot cases
which must involve only actual interests.

Indeed, Courts will not determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be
granted. It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question
as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be
enforced. However, we are constrained to render judgment herein pursuant to our symbolic
function of educating the bench and the bar. For another, this case comes within the rule that
courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is "capable of repetition yet
evading review.

The Court has long declared in Dueas, Jr. v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,[6] that
the HRET was acting well within the rules when it ordered the continuation of revision of
ballots. Petitioner cannot resurrect his claims, which had been finally adjudged unmeritorious by
this Court, through the present petition. Thus, the fact that the HRET went on with the revision
of ballots in 75% of the counter-protested precincts cannot be considered as grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the electoral tribunal.
 RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS v. SECRETARY ANGELO REYES
G.R. No. 180771/ 181527, April 21, 2015

FACTS:

The Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into GSEC-102
with JAPEX, a 100% owned Japanese firm. This contract involved geological and geophysical
studies, as well as oil and gas sampling of the Tañon Strait. This was then formally converted
into SC-46 for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a block
covering approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait.
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the
project. Since the well was to be drilled in the 1988 declared protected seascape of Aloguinsan
and Pinamungajan, JAPEX agreed to comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment
requirements pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586. Thereafter, the EMB granted an ECC to
the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. Months
later, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near
Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province.
As such, in their consolidated petitions, petitioners are asking that the respondents be
enjoined from implementing SC-46 for, among others, violation of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUES:
1) Do the petitioners “Resident Mammals” have locus standi?
2) Is SC-14 Constitutional?

RULING:

1) YES.
Recently, the Supreme Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before
courts for violations of our environmental laws. The Rules enable litigants enforcing
environmental rights to file their cases as citizen suits. It liberalizes standing for all cases filed
enforcing environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on
the principle that humans are stewards of nature. The terminology of the text reflects the doctrine
first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn.
Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure "may be
retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and will
not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is
no vested rights in rules of procedure."
As such, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been
eliminated by the Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit
to enforce our environmental laws.
2) NO. The lack of the requisites that the President be a signatory to SC-46, and that Congress be
notified of such contract, renders it null and void.
 Based on Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the following are
the safeguards enumerated in La Bugal Case, in entering into service contracts or agreements
involving technical or financial assistance:
x
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these
requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set
standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity
in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before
an agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times
over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress
to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely
objections, if any.
x
SC-46 appears to have been entered into and signed only by the DOE through its then
Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to the said constitutional requirement. Moreover, it was
neither shown nor alleged that Congress was subsequently notified of the execution of such
contract.
The argument that since the DOE is the alter ego of the President, that the former’s acts
are deemed the latter’s acts, is unavailing as the requirement that the President herself enter into
these kinds of contracts is embodied not just in any ordinary statute, but in the Constitution itself.
These service contracts involving the exploitation, development, and utilization of our natural
resources are of paramount interest to the present and future generations. Hence, safeguards were
put in place to insure that the guidelines set by law are meticulously observed and likewise to
eradicate the corruption that may easily penetrate departments and agencies by ensuring that the
President has authorized or approved of these service contracts herself. Even under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 87, it is required that the Petroleum Board, now the DOE,
obtain the President's approval for the execution of any contract under said statute. Even if one is
to relax the requirement in La Bugal to harmonize the 1987 Constitution with the aforementioned
provision of Presidential Decree No. 87, it must be shown that the government agency or
subordinate official has been authorized by the President to enter into such service contract for
the government. Otherwise, it should be at least shown that the President subsequently approved
of such contract explicitly. None of these circumstances is evident in the case at bar. Hence,
adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, the SC finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void for
noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.
 ATTY. ROLANDO S. JAVIER, ET AL. v COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 97795, February 16, 2004

FACTS:

Pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 539, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Rural
Progress Administration, filed an application for the expropriation of the Gonzales Estate. The
trial court rendered in favor of the government. On October 29, 1960, the tenants filed a
Complaint before the then Court of First Instance to compel the Republic, through the Philippine
Housing and Homesite Corporation (PHHC), to sell the property only to the occupants-tenants of
the Gonzales Estate. On August 29, 1986, the Regional Trial Court Branch 120 issued a Final
Joint Order granting the motions of the heirs of Gregorio Bajamonde to restore the lands to them
. On December 28, 1988, the trial court issued another order for the execution of its joint order
evicting the employees of the GAUF and its faculty members from the property. The Gregorio
Araneta University Foundation (GAUF) filed a case, which was raffled to Branch 126, for
injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and issuance of a preliminary injunction.
Branch 126 issued writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the Atty. Javier and Bajamonde heirs
from proceeding with the demolition of the houses, improvements and all kinds of infrastructures

ISSUE:

Is the order of Branch 126 granting the plea of a party for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction which impedes, interferes with and/or frustrates the enforcement of an order of Branch
120 a violation of judicial stability?

RULING:

Yes. The settled rule is that no court has the power to interfere by injunction, with the judgment,
decrees or orders of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction, having equal power to grant
the relief sought by injunction. Pursuant to the policy of judicial stability, the judgment or order
of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be interfered with by any court of concurrent
jurisdiction, for the simple reason that the power to open, modify or validate a judgment or order
is not only powered by, but is restricted to the court in which the judgment or order is rendered.
As gleaned from the material averments of the petition, Javier et al. sought relief therein on their
assertion that, by issuing a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the eviction of the GAUF
from the property of the petitioners, the respondent RTC Branch 126 judge violated the policy of
judicial stability because Branch 120 of the RTC, which is a co-equal branch. By issuing the said
writ of preliminary injunction, the respondent judge interfered with the orders of a co-equal and
coordinate court.
 SPS. TRINIDAD S. ESTONINA AND PAULINO ESTONINA v COURT OF APPEALS,
ET AL.
G.R. No. 111547, January 27, 1997

FACTS:

Trinidad Estonina filed a case against Consuelo Garcia in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Manila and applied for a writ of preliminary attachment over a parcel of land registered in the
name of Santiago Garcia, Consuelo’s husband. Thereafter, the children of Santiago sold their
shares over the land to spouses Celso Atayan and Nilda Hicban. Subsequent to a favorable
decision obtained by Trinidad, the parcel of land was sold at a public auction where Trinidad was
the highest bidder. The spouses Atayan filed a complaint for annulment of sheriff's sale and
transfer certificate of title with damages before Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Santa Cruz, Laguna. The RTC held that what could be attached by the spouses Estonina and later
levied on execution and sold at public auction was only Consuelo Garcia's rights and interests
which is fifty five per cent (55%) of the property. Thus, the RTC ordered the Register of Deeds
of the Province of Laguna, to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of Trinidad and
issue another one, also in her name stating therein that said person is the owner of the property
therein covered to the extent of 55% pro indiviso, and the remaining 45% belongs to the heirs of
Santiago Garcia pro indiviso.

ISSUE:

Is the judgment rendered by the RTC violative of the doctrine of judicial stability?

RULING:

No. The filing by the spouses Atayan of an independent action with the court other than the one
which issued the writ of execution is proper as they were strangers to original case between
Trinidad and Consuelo. Such an independent action cannot be considered as an encroachment
upon the jurisdiction of a co-equal and coordinate court. While it is true that property in custody
of the law may not be interfered with, without the permission of the proper court, this rule is
confined to cases where the property belongs to the defendant or one in which the defendant has
proprietary interests. But when the Sheriff, acting beyond the bounds of his office seizes a
stranger's property, the rule does not apply and interference with his custody is not interference
with another court's custody.