A.C. No.

7023 March 30, 2006

BUN SIONG YAO, Complainant,

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On November 11, 2004, a complaint-affidavit1 was filed against Atty. Leonardo A. Aurelio by Bun Siong Yao
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking for his disbarment for alleged violations of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

The complainant alleged that since 1987 he retained the services of respondent as his personal lawyer; that
respondent is a stockholder and the retained counsel of Solar Farms & Livelihood Corporation and Solar
Textile Finishing Corporation of which complainant is a majority stockholder; that complainant purchased
several parcels of land using his personal funds but were registered in the name of the corporations upon the
advice of respondent; that respondent, who was also the brother in-law of complainant’s wife, had in 1999 a
disagreement with the latter and thereafter respondent demanded the return of his investment in the
corporations but when complainant refused to pay, he filed eight charges for estafa and falsification of
commercial documents against the complainant and his wife and the other officers of the corporation; that
respondent also filed a complaint against complainant for alleged non-compliance with the reportorial
requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong City and another complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon City for alleged
violation of Section 75 of the Corporation Code; that respondent also filed a similar complaint before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan.

Complainant alleged that the series of suits filed against him and his wife is a form of harassment and
constitutes an abuse of the confidential information which respondent obtained by virtue of his employment as
counsel. Complainant argued that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests when he filed several
suits not only against the complainant and the other officers of the corporation, but also against the two
corporations of which he is both a stockholder and retained counsel.

Respondent claimed that he handled several labor cases in behalf of Solar Textile Finishing Corporation; that
the funds used to purchase several parcels of land were not the personal funds of complainant but pertain to
Solar Farms & Livelihood Corporation; that since 1999 he was no longer the counsel for complainant or Solar
Textile Finishing Corporation; that he never used any confidential information in pursuing the criminal cases he
filed but only used those information which he obtained by virtue of his being a stockholder.

He further alleged that his requests for copies of the financial statements were ignored by the complainant and
his wife hence he was constrained to file criminal complaints for estafa thru concealment of documents; that
when he was furnished copies of the financial statements, he discovered that several parcels of land were not
included in the balance sheet of the corporations; that the financial statements indicated that the corporations
suffered losses when in fact it paid cash dividends to its stockholders, hence, he filed additional complaints for
falsification of commercial documents and violation of reportorial requirements of the SEC.

On July 19, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner2 submitted a Report and Recommendation3 finding that from
1987 up to 1999, respondent had been the personal lawyer of the complainant and incorporator and counsel of
Solar Farms & Livelihood Corporation. However, in 1999 complainant discontinued availing of the services of
respondent in view of the admission of his (complainant’s) son to the bar; he also discontinued paying
dividends to respondent and even concealed from him the corporations’ financial statements which compelled
the respondent to file the multiple criminal and civil cases in the exercise of his rights as a stockholder.

The investigating commissioner further noted that respondent is guilty of forum shopping when he filed identical
charges against the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon City and in the Office of
the City Prosecutor of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. It was also observed that respondent was remiss in his
duty as counsel and incorporator of both corporations for failing to advise the officers of the corporation, which
he was incidentally a member of the Board of Directors, to comply with the reportorial requirements of the SEC
and the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Instead, he filed cases against his clients, thereby representing conflicting
interests.

The investigating commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six months4 which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

We find that the professional relationship between the complainant and the respondent is more extensive than
his protestations that he only handled isolated labor cases for the complainant’s corporations. Aside from being
the brother-in-law of complainant’s wife, it appears that even before the inception of the companies, respondent
was already providing legal services to the complainant, thus:

COMM. NAVARRO:

Was there a formal designation or you where only called upon to do so?

ATTY. AURELIO:

Well, I understand in order to show to the employees that they have labor lawyer and at that time I went to the
office at least half day every week but that was cut short. And so when there are cases that crop-up involving
labor then they called me up.

xxxx

ATTY. OLEDAN:

Will counsel deny that he was the personal lawyer of the complainant long before he joined the company?

ATTY. AURELIO:

Yes, with respect to the boundary dispute between his land and his neighbor but the subject matter of all the
cases I filed they all revolved around the Financial Statement of the 2 corporations. I never devolves any
information with respect to labor cases and the MERALCO case with respect to boundary dispute, nothing I
used.

ATTY. OLEDAN:

Was he not also the lawyer at that time of complainant when he incorporated the second corporation in 1992?

ATTY. AURELIO:

Well, I was the one submitted the corporate papers and I think after that I have nothing to do with the SEC
requirements regarding this corporation. Just to submit the incorporation papers to the SEC and anyway they
have already done that before. They have already created or established the first corporation way back before
the second corporation started and there was no instance where I dealt with the Financial Statement of the
corporation with respect to its filing with the SEC.

ATTY. OLEDAN:
My only question is whether he incorporated and therefore was aware of the corporate matters involving Solar
Farms?

ATTY. AURELIO:

As a stockholder I’m aware.

ATTY. OLEDAN:

As a lawyer?

ATTY. AURELIO:

Well, as a stockholder I’m aware.

xxxx

ATTY. OLEDAN:

You are not the one who filed….

ATTY. AURELIO:

I was the one who filed the corporate paper but that’s all the participation I had with respect to the requirement
of the SEC with respect to the corporation.

COMM. NAVARRO:

So, you acted as legal counsel of the corporation even before the initial stage of the incorporation?

ATTY. AURELIO:

There are two (2) corporations involving in this case, Your Honor, and the first was I think Solar Textile and this
was….

COMM. NAVARRO:

You were already the legal counsel?

ATTY. AURELIO:

No, this was created before I became a stockholder.

COMM. NAVARRO:

Who was then the legal counsel before of Solar?

MR. YAO:

Siya pa rin pero hindi pa siya stockholder.

ATTY. OLEDAN:
Because, Your Honor, he happens to be the brother-in-law of the wife of the complainant and he is the
husband of the wife of her sister so that’s why he was… (inaudible)… other legal matters even before the
corporation that was formed and he became also a stockholder and in fact he charge the corporation certain
amounts for professional service rendered it is part of the Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Malabon as annex to the complaint so he cannot say that he only presented, that he only filed the papers at
SEC and aside from that when the corporation, the Solar Farms was already formed and the property which he
is now questioning was purchased by complainant. He was the one who negotiated with the buyer, he was
always with the complainant and precisely acted as complainant’s personal lawyer. The truth of the matter he is
questioning the boundary and in fact complainant had survey conducted in said parcel of land which he bought
with the assistance and legal advice of respondent and in fact complainant gave him only a copy of that survey.
Him alone. And he used this particular copy to insists that this property allegedly belong to the corporation
when in truth and in fact he was fully aware that it was the complainant’s personal funds that were used to pay
for the whole area and this was supported by the stockholders who admitted that they were aware that the
parcel of land which he claims does not appear in the Financial Statement of the corporation was purchased by
the complainant subject to reimbursement by the Board and should the corporation finally have sufficient fund
to cover the payment advance by complainant then the property will be transferred to the corporation. All of
these facts he was privy to it, Your Honor, so he cannot say that and he is also a stockholder but the fact is,
prior to the incorporation and during the negotiation he was the personal counsel of the complainant. 5

It appears that the parties’ relationship was not just professional, but they are also related by affinity. The
disagreement between complainant’s wife and the respondent affected their professional relationship.
Complainant’s refusal to disclose certain financial records prompted respondent to retaliate by filing several
suits.

It is essential to note that the relationship between an attorney and his client is a fiduciary one. 6 Canon 17 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. The long-established rule is that an attorney is not
permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter
consents. This obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their
relationship. The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the
litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other
change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.7

Notwithstanding the veracity of his allegations, respondent’s act of filing multiple suits on similar causes of
action in different venues constitutes forum-shopping, as correctly found by the investigating commissioner.
This highlights his motives rather than his cause of action. Respondent took advantage of his being a lawyer in
order to get back at the complainant. In doing so, he has inevitably utilized information he has obtained from his
dealings with complainant and complainant’s companies for his own end.

Lawyers must conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.8 Lawyers cannot be allowed to exploit their profession for
the purpose of exacting vengeance or as a tool for instigating hostility against any person—most especially
against a client or former client. As we stated in Marcelo v. Javier, Sr.:9

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence
necessarily reposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients,
his profession, the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well
as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done
by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in
the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.10 (Emphasis supplied)

In sum, we find that respondent's actuations amount to a breach of his duty to uphold good faith and fairness,
sufficient to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leonardo A. Aurelio is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon receipt of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court Administrator is directed to
circulate this order of suspension to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 4078. July 14, 2003]

WILLIAM ONG GENATO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ESSEX L. SILAPAN, respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

In this complaint for disbarment filed by William Ong Genato against respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan,
complainant alleged that in July 1992, respondent asked if he could rent a small office space in
complainant’s building in Quezon City for his law practice. Complainant acceded and introduced
respondent to Atty. Benjamin Dacanay, complainant’s retained lawyer, who accommodated respondent
in the building and made him handle some of complainant’s cases. Hence, the start of the legal
relationship between complainant and respondent.

The conflict between the parties started when respondent borrowed two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) from complainant which he intended to use as downpayment for the purchase of a new
car. In return, respondent issued to complainant a postdated check in the amount of P176,528.00 to
answer for the six (6) months interest on the loan. He likewise mortgaged to complainant his house and
lot in Quezon City but did not surrender its title claiming that it was the subject of reconstitution
proceedings before the Quezon City Register of Deeds.

With the money borrowed from complainant, respondent purchased a new car. However, the
document of sale of the car was issued in complainant’s name and financed through City Trust
Company.

In January 1993, respondent introduced to complainant a certain Emmanuel Romero. Romero likewise
wanted to borrow money from complainant. Complainant lent Romero the money and, from this
transaction, respondent earned commission in the amount of P52,289.90. Complainant used the
commission to pay respondent’s arrears with the car financing firm.
Subsequently, respondent failed to pay the amortization on the car and the financing firm sent demand
letters to complainant. Complainant tried to encash respondent’s postdated check with the drawee
bank but it was dishonored as respondent’s account therein was already closed.

Respondent failed to heed complainant’s repeated demands for payment. Complainant then filed a
criminal case against respondent for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage.

In the foreclosure case, respondent made the following allegation in his Answer:

xxx xxx xxx

4. That complainant is a businessman who is engaged in the real estate business, trading and buy and
sell of deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and other shady deals and has many cases pending in
court;

xxx xxx xxx

Complainant denied respondent’s charges and claimed that respondent’s allegation is libelous and not
privilege as it was irrelevant to the foreclosure case. Complainant further pointed to paragraph 12 of
respondent’s Answer, thus:

12. That on January 29, 1993, before paying for the next installment on his car on January 30, 1993,
defendant Essex L. Silapan asked the complainant to execute a Deed of Sale transferring ownership of
the car to him but the latter said that he will only do so after the termination of his criminal case at
Branch 138 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, x x x where he (complainant) wanted
Essex L. Silapan, his former counsel in that case, to offer bribe money to the members of the review
committee of the Department of Justice where a petition for review of the resolution of the
Investigating Prosecutor was pending at the time, x x x or, in the event that the said petition for review
is denied, he wanted Essex L. Silapan to offer bribe money to the prosecutor assigned at the above-
mentioned Court, and even to the presiding Judge, for his eventual acquittal, which defendant Essex L.
Silapan all refused to do not only because such acts are immoral and illegal, but also because the
complainant confided to him that he was really involved in the commission of the crime that was
charged of in the above-mentioned case. (emphasis supplied)

Complainant gripes that the foregoing allegations are false, immaterial to the foreclosure case and
maliciously designed to defame him. He charged that in making such allegations, respondent is guilty of
breaking their confidential lawyer-client relationship and should be held administratively liable therefor.
Consequently, he filed this complaint for disbarment, praying also that an administrative sanction be
meted against respondent for his issuance of a bouncing check.

When required by the Court to comment, respondent explained[1] that it was complainant who offered
him an office space in his building and retained him as counsel as the latter was impressed with the way
he handled a B.P. 22 case[2] filed against complainant. Respondent insisted that there was nothing
libelous in his imputations of dishonest business practices to complainant and his revelation of
complainant’s desire to bribe government officials in relation to his pending criminal case. He claimed
to have made these statements in the course of judicial proceedings to defend his case and discredit
complainant’s credibility by establishing his criminal propensity to commit fraud, tell lies and violate
laws. He argued that he is not guilty of breaking his confidential lawyer-client relationship with
complainant as he made the disclosure in defense of his honor and reputation.

Secondly, respondent asserted that he executed the real estate mortgage in favor of complainant
without consideration and only as a “formal requirement” so he could obtain the P200,000.00 loan and
for this reason, he did not surrender his title over the mortgaged property to complainant.

Thirdly, respondent claimed that he issued the postdated check, not for account or for value, but only:
(a) to serve as “some kind of acknowledgment” that he already received in advance a portion of his
attorney’s fees from the complainant for the legal services he rendered, and (b) as a form of assurance
that he will not abandon the cases he was handling for complainant.

Lastly, respondent denied that he received a P52,289.90 commission from Romero’s loan which he
allegedly helped facilitate. He alleged that the amount was paid to him by Romero as attorney’s fees,
the latter being his client. He used this amount to pay his arrears with the car financing firm. On
January 29, 1993, before paying the next amortization on the car, he asked complainant to execute a
deed of sale transferring ownership of the car to him. Complainant refused and insisted that he would
transfer ownership of the car only after the termination of his criminal case which respondent was
handling as his defense lawyer. Consequently, respondent stopped paying the amortization on the car.
Respondent also alleged that he filed a perjury case against complainant who, in turn, filed a complaint
for libel against him.

In a Resolution, dated October 27, 1993, the Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

On August 3, 2002, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved the report of the investigating
commissioner finding the respondent guilty as charged and recommending his suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year.

We affirm the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

Prefatorily, we stress that we shall not delve into the merits of the various criminal and civil cases
pending between the parties. It is for the trial courts handling these cases to ascertain the truth or falsity
of the allegations made therein. For this reason, it is not for us to sanction respondent for his issuance
of a bouncing check. His liability has yet to be determined by the trial court where his case is pending.

The only issue in this administrative case is whether respondent committed a breach of trust and
confidence by imputing to complainant illegal practices and disclosing complainant’s alleged intention to
bribe government officials in connection with a pending case.

Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of
his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. The long-established rule is
that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional character
by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client
arises at the inception of their relationship.[3] The protection given to the client is perpetual and does
not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party’s ceasing to employ the
attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the
death of the client.[4]

It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or
information is limited only to communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a
lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or
perpetration of a fraud.[5] If the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the complainant’s alleged
intention to bribe government officials in relation to his case, the communication is not covered by the
privilege as the client does not consult the lawyer professionally. It is not within the profession of a
lawyer to advise a client as to how he may commit a crime as a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thus, the
attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no professional employment in the strict sense.

Be that as it may, respondent’s explanation that it was necessary for him to make the disclosures in his
pleadings fails to satisfy us. The disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as they were not
pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper for the respondent to use it against the complainant
in the foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of litigation therein and respondent’s
professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked in said case. A lawyer must conduct
himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His
relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness.

Thus, the Court agrees with the evaluation of the IBP and finds that respondent’s allegations and
disclosures in the foreclosure case amount to a breach of fidelity sufficient to warrant the imposition of
disciplinary sanction against him. However, the recommended penalty of one (1) year suspension of
respondent from the practice of law seems to be disproportionate to his breach of duty considering that
a review of the records of this Court reveals that this is the first administrative complaint against him.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan is ordered suspended from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months effective upon receipt of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court
Administrator is directed to circulate this order of suspension to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

[B.M. No. 793. July 30, 2004]

IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF ATTY. LEON G.
MAQUERA

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:
May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the practice of law in a
foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney be meted the same sanction as a
member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction? There is a
Rule of Court provision covering this case’s central issue. Up to this juncture, its reach and breadth have
not undergone the test of an unsettled case.

In a Letter dated August 20, 1996,[1] the District Court of Guam informed this Court of the suspension of
Atty. Leon G. Maquera (Maquera) from the practice of law in Guam for two (2) years pursuant to the
Decision rendered by the Superior Court of Guam on May 7, 1996 in Special Proceedings Case No.
SP0075-94,[2] a disciplinary case filed by the Guam Bar Ethics Committee against Maquera.

The Court referred the matter of Maquera’s suspension in Guam to the Bar Confidant for comment in its
Resolution dated November 19, 1996.[3] Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar in a foreign jurisdiction, where he has also
been admitted as an attorney, is also a ground for his disbarment or suspension in this realm, provided
the foreign court’s action is by reason of an act or omission constituting deceit, malpractice or other
gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or a violation of the lawyer’s oath.

In a Memorandum dated February 20, 1997, then Bar Confidant Atty. Erlinda C. Verzosa recommended
that the Court obtain copies of the record of Maquera’s case since the documents transmitted by the
Guam District Court do not contain the factual and legal bases for Maquera’s suspension and are thus
insufficient to enable her to determine whether Maquera’s acts or omissions which resulted in his
suspension in Guam are likewise violative of his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.[4]

Pursuant to this Court’s directive in its Resolution dated March 18, 1997,[5] the Bar Confidant sent a
letter dated November 13, 1997 to the District Court of Guam requesting for certified copies of the
record of the disciplinary case against Maquera and of the rules violated by him.[6]

The Court received certified copies of the record of Maquera’s case from the District Court of Guam on
December 8, 1997.[7]
Thereafter, Maquera’s case was referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from the IBP’s receipt of the case
records.[8]

The IBP sent Maquera a Notice of Hearing requiring him to appear before the IBP’s Commission on Bar
Discipline on July 28, 1998.[9] However, the notice was returned unserved because Maquera had
already moved from his last known address in Agana, Guam and did not leave any forwarding
address.[10]

On October 9, 2003, the IBP submitted to the Court its Report and Recommendation and its Resolution
No. XVI-2003-110, indefinitely suspending Maquera from the practice of law within the Philippines until
and unless he updates and pays his IBP membership dues in full.[11]

The IBP found that Maquera was admitted to the Philippine Bar on February 28, 1958. On October 18,
1974, he was admitted to the practice of law in the territory of Guam. He was suspended from the
practice of law in Guam for misconduct, as he acquired his client’s property as payment for his legal
services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his client’s
case.[12]

In its Decision, the Superior Court of Guam stated that on August 6, 1987, Edward Benavente, the
creditor of a certain Castro, obtained a judgment against Castro in a civil case. Maquera served as
Castro’s counsel in said case. Castro’s property subject of the case, a parcel of land, was to be sold at a
public auction in satisfaction of his obligation to Benavente. Castro, however, retained the right of
redemption over the property for one year. The right of redemption could be exercised by paying the
amount of the judgment debt within the aforesaid period.[13]

At the auction sale, Benavente purchased Castro’s property for Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$500.00),
the amount which Castro was adjudged to pay him.[14]

On December 21, 1987, Castro, in consideration of Maquera’s legal services in the civil case involving
Benavente, entered into an oral agreement with Maquera and assigned his right of redemption in favor
of the latter.[15]
On January 8, 1988, Maquera exercised Castro’s right of redemption by paying Benavente US$525.00 in
satisfaction of the judgment debt. Thereafter, Maquera had the title to the property transferred in his
name.[16]

On December 31, 1988, Maquera sold the property to C.S. Chang and C.C. Chang for Three Hundred
Twenty Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$320,000.00).[17]

On January 15, 1994, the Guam Bar Ethics Committee (Committee) conducted hearings regarding
Maquera’s alleged misconduct.[18]

Subsequently, the Committee filed a Petition in the Superior Court of Guam praying that Maquera be
sanctioned for violations of Rules 1.5[19] and 1.8(a)[20] of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules) in force in Guam. In its Petition, the Committee claimed that Maquera obtained an
unreasonably high fee for his services. The Committee further alleged that Maquera himself admitted
his failure to comply with the requirement in Rule 1.8 (a) of the Model Rules that a lawyer shall not
enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire a pecuniary interest adverse to a
client unless the transaction and the terms governing the lawyer’s acquisition of such interest are fair
and reasonable to the client, and are fully disclosed to, and understood by the client and reduced in
writing.[21]

The Committee recommended that Maquera be: (1) suspended from the practice of law in Guam for a
period of two [2] years, however, with all but thirty (30) days of the period of suspension deferred; (2)
ordered to return to Castro the difference between the sale price of the property to the Changs and the
amount due him for legal services rendered to Castro; (3) required to pay the costs of the disciplinary
proceedings; and (4) publicly reprimanded. It also recommended that other jurisdictions be informed
that Maquera has been subject to disciplinary action by the Superior Court of Guam.[22]

Maquera did not deny that Castro executed a quitclaim deed to the property in his favor as
compensation for past legal services and that the transaction, except for the deed itself, was oral and
was not made pursuant to a prior written agreement. However, he contended that the transaction was
made three days following the alleged termination of the attorney-client relationship between them,
and that the property did not constitute an exorbitant fee for his legal services to Castro.[23]
On May 7, 1996, the Superior Court of Guam rendered its Decision[24] suspending Maquera from the
practice of law in Guam for a period of two (2) years and ordering him to take the Multi-State
Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) within that period. The court found that the attorney-
client relationship between Maquera and Castro was not yet completely terminated when they entered
into the oral agreement to transfer Castro’s right of redemption to Maquera on December 21, 1987. It
also held that Maquera profited too much from the eventual transfer of Castro’s property to him since
he was able to sell the same to the Changs with more than US$200,000.00 in profit, whereas his legal
fees for services rendered to Castro amounted only to US$45,000.00. The court also ordered him to
take the MPRE upon his admission during the hearings of his case that he was aware of the
requirements of the Model Rules regarding business transactions between an attorney and his client “in
a very general sort of way.”[25]

On the basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP concluded that although the said
court found Maquera liable for misconduct, “there is no evidence to establish that [Maquera]
committed a breach of ethics in the Philippines.”[26] However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him
indefinitely for his failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP since 1977, which failure is, in
turn, a ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys under
Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court.[27]

The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions committed in a foreign
jurisdiction is found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme Court
Resolution dated February 13, 1992, which states:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.—A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a
case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie
evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis supplied).

The Court must therefore determine whether Maquera’s acts, namely: acquiring by assignment Castro’s
right of redemption over the property subject of the civil case where Maquera appeared as counsel for
him; exercising the right of redemption; and, subsequently selling the property for a huge profit, violate
Philippine law or the standards of ethical behavior for members of the Philippine Bar and thus constitute
grounds for his suspension or disbarment in this jurisdiction.

The Superior Court of Guam found that Maquera acquired his client’s property by exercising the right of
redemption previously assigned to him by the client in payment of his legal services. Such transaction
falls squarely under Article 1492 in relation to Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Paragraph 5 of Article 1491[28] prohibits the lawyer’s acquisition by assignment of the
client’s property which is the subject of the litigation handled by the lawyer. Under Article 1492,[29] the
prohibition extends to sales in legal redemption.

The prohibition ordained in paragraph 5 of Article 1491 and Article 1492 is founded on public policy
because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of
his client[30] and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client.

The case of In re: Ruste[31] illustrates the significance of the aforementioned prohibition. In that case,
the attorney acquired his clients’ property subject of a case where he was acting as counsel pursuant to
a deed of sale executed by his clients in his favor. He contended that the sale was made at the instance
of his clients because they had no money to pay him for his services. The Court ruled that the lawyer’s
acquisition of the property of his clients under the circumstances obtaining therein rendered him liable
for malpractice. The Court held:

…Whether the deed of sale in question was executed at the instance of the spouses driven by financial
necessity, as contended by the respondent, or at the latter’s behest, as contended by the complainant,
is of no moment. In either case an attorney occupies a vantage position to press upon or dictate his
terms to a harassed client, in breach of the “rule so amply protective of the confidential relations, which
must necessarily exist between attorney and client, and of the rights of both”.[32]
The Superior Court of Guam also hinted that Maquera’s acquisition of Castro’s right of redemption, his
subsequent exercise of said right, and his act of selling the redeemed property for huge profits were
tainted with deceit and bad faith when it concluded that Maquera charged Castro an exorbitant fee for
his legal services. The court held that since the assignment of the right of redemption to Maquera was in
payment for his legal services, and since the property redeemed by him had a market value of
US$248,220.00 as of December 21, 1987 (the date when the right of redemption was assigned to him),
he is liable for misconduct for accepting payment for his legal services way beyond his actual fees which
amounted only to US$45,000.00.

Maquera’s acts in Guam which resulted in his two (2)-year suspension from the practice of law in that
jurisdiction are also valid grounds for his suspension from the practice of law in the Philippines. Such
acts are violative of a lawyer’s sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his clients. They are also violative
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which states that “[a] lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful the trust and confidence reposed in him;” and Rule
1.01 which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The
requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the Philippine
Bar but is also a continuing requirement to maintain one’s good’s standing in the legal profession.[33]

It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Court’s judgment ordering Maquera’s suspension from the
practice of law in Guam does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines.
Under Section 27,[34] Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the acts which led to his suspension in
Guam are mere grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction, at that only if the basis of the
foreign court’s action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction.[35]
Likewise, the judgment of the Superior Court of Guam only constitutes prima facie evidence of
Maquera’s unethical acts as a lawyer.[36] More fundamentally, due process demands that he be given
the opportunity to defend himself and to present testimonial and documentary evidence on the matter
in an investigation to be conducted in accordance with Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Said
rule mandates that a respondent lawyer must in all cases be notified of the charges against him. It is
only after reasonable notice and failure on the part of the respondent lawyer to appear during the
scheduled investigation that an investigation may be conducted ex parte.[37]

The Court notes that Maquera has not yet been able to adduce evidence on his behalf regarding the
charges of unethical behavior in Guam against him, as it is not certain that he did receive the Notice of
Hearing earlier sent by the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline. Thus, there is a need to ascertain
Maquera’s current and correct address in Guam in order that another notice, this time specifically
informing him of the charges against him and requiring him to explain why he should not be suspended
or disbarred on those grounds (through this Resolution), may be sent to him.
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the IBP that Maquera should be suspended from the practice of law
for non-payment of his IBP membership dues from 1977 up to the present.[38] Under Section 10, Rule
139-A of the Revised Rules of Court, non-payment of membership dues for six (6) months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the IBP, and default in such payment for one year shall be ground for
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.[39]

WHEREFORE, Atty. Leon G. Maquera is required to SHOW CAUSE, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
this Resolution, why he should not be suspended or disbarred for his acts which gave rise to the
disciplinary proceedings against him in the Superior Court of Guam and his subsequent suspension in
said jurisdiction.

The Bar Confidant is directed to locate the current and correct address of Atty. Maquera in Guam and to
serve upon him a copy of this Resolution.

In the meantime, Atty. Maquera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR or until he
shall have paid his membership dues, whichever comes later.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Maquera’s personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all
courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 5841. January 20, 2002]

EMILY SENCIO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERT CALVADORES respondent.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Complainant Sencio alleged that sometime in 1997 her eldest son, Herbert Sencio, died in a vehicular
accident. She was referred by her mother-in-law to respondent Calvadores to prosecute the civil aspect
of the case. On 19 May 1998 she initially gave the respondent the amount of P1,500 and promised to
pay the attorney’s fees later.

On 20 August 1998, after having accumulated enough funds, the complainant paid the respondent the
amount of P12,000 as attorney’s fees and for other expenses relating to the case. The payment was
duly acknowledged by the respondent.[2]

From that time on, complainant Sencio regularly contacted the respondent to update herself of the
status of the case. The respondent kept on assuring her that everything would be alright. Finally,
however, complainant discovered that the respondent did not file any case, a fact which the respondent
admitted. The latter promised to return to the complainant the money he had received from her.

The complainant returned several times to respondent’s house and even patiently waited for him
outside his house to get back her money. The respondent, however, did not return to her the money.
He still did not file the case in court either.

In its Order[3] of 19 November 1999, the Commission on Bar Discipline, through Commissioner Victor C.
Fernandez, required the respondent to submit his answer to the complaint and reminded him that if he
failed to answer, he would be considered in default and the case would be heard ex-parte.

Notwithstanding his receipt of the Order, as evidenced by the registry return card, the respondent did
not file any answer to the complaint. He was then given notice to appear at the hearing on 29 May
2001.

In the initial hearing on 29 May 2001, the respondent did not appear. The hearing was reset to 16 July
2001. The respondent was warned that if he would fail to appear on that date, the evidence for the
complainant would be received; the case would be deemed submitted for decision; and he would have
to face the consequences of his non-appearance and disrespectful attitude towards the Commission on
Bar Discipline.[4]

When the case was called for hearing on 16 July 2001, the respondent did not appear despite due
notice. Fortunately for him, the counsel for the complainant was not available for the presentation of
evidence. The hearing was reset to 7 September 2001, and the respondent was directed to be present
at such hearing.[5] The Commission reiterated the warning in its Order of 29 May 2001. But, on that
date the respondent failed again to appear.[6] The hearing was then reset to 24 October 2001 but was
later cancelled and reset to 14 December 2001.[7]

Again, despite due notice, the respondent did not appear for the hearing on 14 December 2001.
Commissioner Wilfredo E.J. E. Reyes, who took charge of the investigation, received the evidence for the
complainant. In his Report and Recommendation, he found the respondent guilty of the violation of
Canons 16, 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended that the respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months and be ordered to return to the
complainant the amount of P12,000.

In its Resolution No. XV-2002-410 dated 3 August 2002, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the
Report and Recommendation of Commisioner Reyes.

We agree with the findings and conclusion of the Commission, as approved and adopted by the Board of
Governors of the IBP. The breach of respondent’s sworn duty as a lawyer and of the ethical standards
he was strictly to honor and observe has been sufficiently established.

Needless to state, a lawyer-client relationship existed between the respondent and the complainant. As
such, the respondent, under Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, owed fidelity to the
cause of his client. Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication
and care; less than that, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer.[8] In failing to file the case he undertook
to handle, the respondent violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule
18.03 thereof, which provides that “a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.”

Likewise, in not returning the money to the complainant after a demand therefor was made following
his failure to file the case, the respondent violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly Rule 16.03 thereof, which requires that “a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his
client upon demand.” It is settled that the unjustified withholding of money belonging to his client
warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.[9]

We also frown upon the attitude of the respondent in not answering the complaint and in deliberately
disregarding the orders and notices of the IBP on many occasions. This attitude showed a character or
disposition which stains the nobility of the legal profession. He chose not to appear at the scheduled
hearings despite due notice and the warnings. Section 30, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically
provides:

Sec. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. – No attorney shall be removed or
suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has full opportunity upon reasonable notice to
answer the charges against him, to produce witness in his behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel.
But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusations, the court may proceed to
determine the matter ex parte.

The Commissioner then had no recourse but to receive ex-parte the evidence of the complainant.

In view of the foregoing, the recommendation of the IBP to suspend the respondent and to return the
amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000) to the complainant is affirmed, with the modification that
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law is hereby increased to six (6) months and that the
return of the P12,000 should be done within thirty (30) days from notice, with legal interest.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ROBERT CALVADORES is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months effective immediately, and ordered to return to Emily Sencio, within thirty
(30) days from notice of this Resolution, the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000) with interest
at 12% per annum from the date of the promulgation of this Resolution until its return. The respondent
is further warned that a commission of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.