EN BANC

[ GR L-42050-66, Nov 20, 1978 ]

PEOPLE v. JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA +

DECISION

176 Phil. 186

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the
Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of
Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the
Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one
basic question of law.
These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance, namely:
the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, presided by Hon. Amante
P. Purisima (17 Petitions), the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
XVIII, presided by Hon. Maximo A. Maceren (8 Petitions) and, the Court of
First Instance of Samar, with Hon. Wenceslao M. Polo, presiding, (I
Petition).
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective
accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the
three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before
them the details of which will be recounted below an Order quashing or
dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the
Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by
Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of
the crime.
Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and
substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon"
penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9. This is the central
issue which we shall resolve and dispose of, all other corollary matters not
being indispensable for the moment.
A - The Information filed by the People -
1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the Court presided by
Judge Purisima follows:

"THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,

-versus- Crim. Case No. 19639

PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y
VIOLATION OF PAR. 3,
DURAN,
Accused. PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF
PROCLAMATION 1081

x-----------------------------x
"INFORMATION
"The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN of a
violation of paragraph 3, Presidential Decree No. 9 of Proclamation 1081,
committed as follows:
"That on or about the 14th day of December, 1974, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody
and control one (1) carving knife with a blade of 6-1/2 inches and a wooden
handle of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of 11-3/4 inches, which the said
accused carried outside of his residence, the said weapon not being used as
a tool or implement necessary to earn his livelihood nor being used in
connection therewith.
"Contrary to law." (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66)
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the name of the
accused, the date and place of the commission of the crime, and the kind of
weapon involved.
2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with the Court
presided by Judge Maceren follows:
"THE PEOPLE OF THE
CRIM. CASE NO. 29677
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff, VIOL. OF PAR. 3,
PD 9 IN REL. TO LOI
- versus - No. 266 of the Chief
Executive dated April 1, 1975
REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO,
Accused.
x-----------------------------x
"INFORMATION
"The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO of a
VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 in
relation to Letter of Instruction No. 266 of the Chief Executive dated April
1, 1975, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 28th day of January, 1977, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
knowingly carry outside of his residence a bladed and pointed weapon, to
wit: an ice pick with an overall length of about 8 1/2 inches, the same not
being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn his livelihood nor being
used in connection therewith.
"Contrary to law." (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32)
The other Informations are likewise similarly worded except for the name
of the accused, the date and place of the commission of the crime, and the
kind of weapon involved.
3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First Instance of Samar
is quoted hereunder:

"PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Complainant, CRIM. CASE NO. 933

- versus - For:

PANCHITO REFUNCION, ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF

Accused. DEADLY WEAPON
 (VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9)
x-----------------------------x
"INFORMATION
"The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Samar, accuses
PANCHITO REFUNCION of the crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
DEADLY WEAPON or VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9 issued by the President of
the Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated
Sept. 21 and 23, 1972, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the evening at Barangay
Barruz, Municipality of Matuguinao, Province of Samar, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously carried with him outside of
his residence a deadly weapon called socyatan, an instrument which from
its very nature is not such as could be used as a necessary tool or
instrument to earn a livelihood, which act committed by the accused is a
Violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.
"CONTRARY TO LAW." (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)
B - The Orders of dismissal -
In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred with
the submittal of the defense that one essential element of the offense
charged is missing from the Information, viz: that the carrying outside of
the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in
furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion,
insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.
1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:

"x x x the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession of bladed
weapon or the like outside residence may be prosecuted and tried under
P.D. No. 9, the information must specifically allege that the possession of
bladed weapon charged was for the purpose of abetting, or in furtherance of
the conditions of rampant criminality, organized lawlessness, public
disorder, etc. as are contemplated and recited in Proclamation No. 1081, as
justification therefor. Devoid of this specific allegation, not necessarily in
the same words, the information is not complete, as it does not allege
sufficient facts to constitute the offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The
information in these cases under consideration suffer from this defect.
 "xxx xxx xxx

"And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to

believe the murmurings of detained persons brought to Court upon a
charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than
ever before, policemen -- of course not all can be so heartless -- now have in
their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with
the terrifying risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years
for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of scissors, which only God knows where
it came from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace
officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only
convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has the
semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash cans,
may already serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten times more
incriminating than the infamous paltik.

"For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of intentions and wisely
applied, its necessity can never be assailed. But it seems it is backfiring,
because it is too hot in the hands of policemen who are inclined to
backsliding.

"The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be found in the heart of
the Fiscal and the conscience of the Court, and hence this resolution, let
alone technical legal basis, is prompted by the desire of this Court to apply
said checkvalves." (pp. 55-57, rollo of L-42050-66)
2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the charges as
follows:

"xxx xxx xxx

"As earlier noted the 'desired result' sought to be attained by Proclamation

No. 1081 is the maintenance of law and order throughout the Philippines
and the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless violence as well
as any act of insurrection or rebellion. It is therefore reasonable to conclude
from the foregoing premises that the carrying of bladed, pointed or blunt
weapons outside of one's residence which is made unlawful and punishable
by said par. 3 of P.D. No. 9 is one that abets subversion, insurrection or
rebellion, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder or is
intended to bring about these conditions. This conclusion is further
strengthened by the fact that all previously existing laws that also made the
carrying of similar weapons punishable have not been repealed, whether
expressly or impliedly. It is noteworthy that Presidential Decree No. 9 does
not contain any repealing clause or provisions.

"xxx xxx xxx

"The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these deadly weapons if

not concealed in one's person and if not carried in any of the aforesaid
specified places, would appear to be not unlawful and punishable by law.

"With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9, however, the

prosecution, through Assistant Fiscal Hilario H. Laqui, contends in his
opposition to the motion to quash, that this act is now made unlawful and
punishable, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, regardless of the intention
of the person carrying such weapon because the law makes it 'mala
prohibita'. If the contention of the prosecution is correct, then if a person
happens to be caught while on his way home by law enforcement officers
carrying a kitchen knife that said person had just bought from a store in
order that the same may be used by one's cook for preparing the meals in
one's home, such person will be liable for punishment with such a severe
penalty as imprisonment from five to ten years under the decree. Such
person cannot claim that said knife is going to be used by him to earn a
livelihood because he intended it merely for use by his cook in preparing his
meals.

"This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential Decree No. 9 were to

be interpreted and applied in the manner that the prosecution wants it to
be done. The good intentions of the President in promulgating this decree
may thus be perverted by some unscrupulous law enforcement officers. It
may be used as a tool of oppression and tyranny or of extortion.

"xxx xxx xxx

"It is therefore the considered and humble view of this Court that the act
which the President intended to make unlawful and punishable by
Presidential Decree No. 9, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, is one
that abets or is intended to abet subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless
violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder." (pp. 28-30, rollo of L-
46229-32)
3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his order
dismissing the Information filed before him, thus:

"x x x We believe that to constitute an offense under the aforecited

Presidential Decree, the same should be or there should be an allegation
that a felony was committed in connection or in furtherance of subversion,
rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence and publid disorder. Precisely
Proclamation No. 1081 declaring a state of martial law throughout the
country was issued because of wanton destruction to lives and properties
widespread lawlessness and anarchy. And in order to restore the tranquility
and stability of the country and to secure the people from violence and loss
of lives in the quickest possible manner and time, carrying firearms,
explosives and deadly weapons without a permit unless the same would fall
under the exception is prohibited. This conclusion becomes more
compelling when we consider the penalty imposable, which is from five
years to ten years. A strict enforcement of the provision of the said law
would mean the imposition of the Draconian penalty upon the accused.

"xxx xxx xxx

"It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and during martial
law, as a matter of status symbol, carrying deadly weapons is very common,
not necessarily for committing a crime nor as their farm implement but for
self-preservation or self-defense if necessity would arise specially in going
to and from their farm." (pp. 18-19, rollo of L-46997)
In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given before
arraignment of the accused. In the criminal case before the Court of First
Instance of Samar the accused was arraigned but at the same time moved to
quash the Information. In all the cases where the accused were under
arrest, the three Judges ordered their immediate release unless held on
other charges.
C - The law under which the Informations in question were filed by the
People.
As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are charged with
illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential Decree No.
9, Paragraph 3.
We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:

"PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9

"DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 AND NO. 7

DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1972, AND SEPTEMBER 23, 1972,
RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING PENALTIES
THEREFOR.

"WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972,

the Philippines has been placed under a state of martial law;

"WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General Order No. 6

dated September 22, 1972 and General Order No. 7 dated September 23,
1972, have been promulgated by me;

"WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence,

criminality, chaos and public disorder mentioned in the aforesaid
Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms,
explosives and other deadly weapons;

"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief

of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in order to attain the desired
result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6
and 7, do hereby order and decree that:

"1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 is unlawful
and the violator shall, upon conviction suffer:
(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or electrocution as a
Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct, if the firearm involved in
the violation is unlicensed and is attended by assault upon, or resistance to
persons in authority or their agents in the performance of their official
functions resulting in death to said persons in authority or their agent; or if
such unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of crimes against
persons, property or chastity causing the death of the victim, or used in
violation of any other General Orders and/or Letters of Instructions
promulgated under said Proclamation No. 1081;

(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to life

imprisonment as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct, when
the violation is not attended by any of the circumstances enumerated under
the preceding paragraph;

(c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs shall be imposed
upon the owner, president, manager, members of the board of directors or
other responsible officers of any public or private firms, companies,
corporations or entities who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the
firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity concerned to
be used in violation of said General Orders Nos. 6 and 7.

"2. It is unlawful to possess deadly weapons, including hand grenades, rifle

grenades and other explosives, including, but not limited to, 'pill box
bombs,' 'molotov cocktail bombs,' 'fire bombs,' or other incendiary device
consisting of any chemical, chemical compound, or detonating agents
containing combustible units or other ingredients in such proportion,
quantity, packing, or bottling that ignites by fire, by friction, by concussion,
by percussion, or by detonation of all or part of the compound or mixture
which may cause such a sudden generation of highly heated gases that the
resultant gaseous pressures are capable of pro-ducing destructive effects on
contiguous objects or of causing injury or death of a person; and any person
convicted thereof shall be punished by imprisonment ranging from ten to
fifteen years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.

"3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt

weapon such as 'fan knife,' 'spear,'
'dagger,' 'bolo,' 'balisong,' 'barong,' 'kris,' or club, except where such
articles are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood
and while being used in connection therewith; and any person found guilty
thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to ten
years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.

"4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2 and 3 is

committed during the commission of or for the purpose of committing, any
other crime, the penalty shall be imposed upon the offender in its
maximum extent, in addition to the penalty provided for the particular
offenses committed or intended to be committed.

"Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the year of Our
Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two.

"(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President
Republic of the Philippines"
D - The arguments of the People -
In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as stated
earlier joins the City Fiscal of Manila and the Provincial Fiscal of Samar in
seeking the setting aside of the questioned orders of dismissal, the main
argument advanced on the issue now under consideration is that a perusal
of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related
to subversive activities; that the act proscribed is essentially a malum
prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.[1]
The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory offenses
the intention of the accused who commits the act is immaterial; that it is
enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated; that P.D. 9 provides
and condemns not only the carrying of said weapon in connection with the
commission of the crime of subversion or the like, but also that of
criminality in general, that is, to eradicate lawless violence which
characterized pre-martial law days. It is also argued that the real nature of
the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information.[2]
E - Our Ruling on the matter -
1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal
prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.3
Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly
requires that for a complaint or information to be sufficient it must, inter
alia, state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to
avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare
his defense accordingly.[4]
To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution and
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is imperative for the specific statute
violated to be designated or mentioned in the charge. In fact, another
compelling reason exists why a specification of the statute violated is
essential in these cases. As stated in the order of respondent Judge Maceren
the carrying of so-called "deadly weapons" is the subject of another penal
statute and a Manila city ordinance. Thus, Section 26 of Act No. 1780
provides:

"Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about
his person any bowie knife, dirk, dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: x x
x. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction
in a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a fine not exceeding
five hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six
months, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the
court."
Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by Ordinance No.
3928 which took effect on December 4, 1957, in turn penalizes with a fine of
not more than P200.00 or imprisonment for not more than one month, or
both, at the discretion of the court, anyone who shall carry concealed in his
person in any manner that would disguise its deadly character any kind of
firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly weapon . . . in any public
place. Consequently, it is necessary that the particular law violated be
specified as there exists a substantial difference between the statute and
city ordinance on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the
circumstances of the commission of the crime and the penalty imposed for
the offense.
We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the
city ordinance are deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3).[5] P.D. 9 (3) does not
contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by implication is not
favored.[6] This principle holds true with greater force with regards to penal
statutes which as a rule are to be construed strictly against the state and
liberally in favor of the accused.[7] In fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code
provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or
practice to the contrary.
Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be made to
fall, at the discretion of a police officer or a prosecuting fiscal, under the
statute, or the city ordinance, or the presidential decree. That being the
case, the right becomes more compelling for an accused to be confronted
with the facts constituting the essential elements of the offense charged
against him, if he is not to become an easy pawn of oppression and
harassment, or of negligent or misguided official action a fear
understandably shared by respondent Judges who by the nature of their
judicial functions are daily exposed to such dangers.
2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged in the
caption as well as in the body of the Information with a violation of
paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the offense treated in
the presidential decree in question?
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside
one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a
necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of
carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in
connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence,
criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon,
if concealed, outside of the scope of the statute or the city ordinance
mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying any of the
weapons described in the presidential decree is not a criminal offense in
itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable under the decree is the
motivation behind it. Without that motivation, the act falls within the
purview of the city ordinance or some statute when the circumstances so
warrant.
Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only reasonable,
logical, and valid construction given to P.D. 9 (3).
3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9 (3) covers one and all
situations where a person carries outside his residence any of the weapons
mentioned or described in the decree irrespective of motivation, intent, or
purpose, converts these cases into one of "statutory construction". That
there is ambiguity in the presidential decree is manifest from the conflicting
views which arise from its implimentation. When ambiguity exists, it
becomes a judicial task to construe and interpret the true meaning and
scope of the measure, guided by the basic principle that penal statutes are
to be construed and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly
against the state.
4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure - a
presidential decree in these cases - the primary rule is to search for and
determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the
controlling factor, for in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per
Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit of a statute is
within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter
would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions.[8]
There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent or reason for
P.D. 9 (3).
First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the enactment of
P.D. 9. These events are clearly spelled out in the "Whereas" clauses of the
presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of martial law in the country
pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the desired
result of Proclamation 1081 as well as General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which
are particularly mentioned in P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact that
subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, and
public disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are committed and
abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and other deadly weapons.
The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a
statute usually introduced by the word "whereas", is not an essential part
of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects in
the statute (p. 120, rollo of L-42050-66); that the explanatory note or
enacting clause of the decree, if it indeed limits the violation of the decree,
cannot prevail over the text itself inasmuch as such explanatory note
merely states or explains the reason which prompted the issuance of the
decree. (pp. 114-115, rollo of 46997)
We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem of determining
what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire
into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others
in the preamble or "whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events
which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated
therein.

"A 'preamble' is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the makers as
to the mischiefs which are to be remedied, and objects which are to be
accomplished, by the provisions of the statute." (West Norman Timber v.
State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble"; italics
supplied)

"While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when
the statute is in itself ambiguous and difficult of interpretation, be resorted
to, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty which otherwise does not exist."
(James v. Du Bois, 16 N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294, cited in Words and Phrases,
"Preamble")
In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al., v. The City of Cebu, et al., this
Court had occasion to state that "(L)egislative intent must be
ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an
isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of
statutory construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might
easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and
evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is
associated. Thus, an apparently general provision may have a limited
application if read together with other provisions."[9]
Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within its
reason or intent.
In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas" clause, the
presidential decree states:

"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief

of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in order to attain the desired
result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6
and 7, do hereby order and decree that:

"xxx xxx xxx"

From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those related
to the desired result of Proclamation 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and
7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer to firearms and therefore have no
relevance to P.D. 9 (3) which refers to blunt or bladed weapons. With
respect to Proclamation 1081 some of the underlying reasons for its
issuance are quoted hereunder:

"WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up arms against our duly
constituted government and against our people, and having committed and
are still committing acts of armed insurrection and rebellion consisting of
armed raids, forays, sorties, ambushes, wanton acts of murders, spoilage,
plunder, looting, arsons, destruction of public and private buildings, and
attacks against innocent and defenseless civilian lives and property, all of
which activities have seriously endangered and continue to endanger public
order and safety and the security of the nation, x x x."

" xxx xxx xxx

"WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land a state of

anarchy and lawlessness, chaos and disorder, turmoil and destruction of a
magnitude equivalent to an actual war between the forces of our duly
constituted government and the New People's Army and their satellite
organizations because of the unmitigated forays, raids, ambuscades,
assaults, violence, murders, assassinations, acts of terror, deceits,
coercions, threats, intimidations, treachery, machinations, arsons, plunders
and depredations committed and being committed by the aforesaid lawless
elements who have pledged to the whole nation that they will not stop their
dastardly effort and scheme until and unless they have fully attained their
primary and ultimate purpose of forcibly seizing political and state power in
this country by overthrowing our present duly constituted government, x x
x." (See Book I, Vital Documents on the Declaration of Martial Law in the
Philippines by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, pp. 13-39)
It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a
motivation connected with or related to the afore-quoted desired result of
Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D. 9 (3), and nothing else.

"Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be achieved and

the evils sought to be remedied." (U.S. v. American Tracking Association,
310 U.S. 534, cited in LVN Pictures v. Philippine Musicians Guild, 110 Phil.
725, 731; italics supplied)

"When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in
mind, and the statute should be construed with reference to its intended
scope and purpose." (Statutory Construction by E.T. Crawford, pp. 604-
605, cited in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compaña de
Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055, 1060; italics supplied)
5. In the construction of P.D. 9 (3) it becomes relevant to inquire into the
consequences of the measure if a strict adherence to the letter of the
paragraph is followed.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid
presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a
legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences.[9-a]
It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the President of
the Republic there was no intent to work a hardship or an oppressive result,
a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one person with a
weapon to impose hardship on another, and so on.[10]
At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the following:

"And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to

believe the murmurings of detained persons brought to Court upon a
charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than
ever before, policemen -- of course not all can be so heartless -- now have in
their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with
the terrifying risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years
for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of scissors, which only God knows where
it came from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace
officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only
convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has the
semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash cans,
may already serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten times more
incriminating than the infamous paltik." (pp. 72-73, rollo L-42050-66)
And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people' s interpretation
of P.D. 9 (3) results in absurdity at times. To his example We may add a
situation where a law-abiding citizen, a lawyer by profession, after
gardening in his house remembers to return the bolo used by him to his
neighbor who lives about 30 meters or so away and while crossing the
street meets a policeman. The latter upon seeing the bolo being carried by
that citizen places him under arrest and books him for a violation of P.D. 9
(3). Could the presidential decree have been conceived to produce such
absurd, unreasonable, and insensible results?
6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally
in favor of an accused.
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be "the
tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; the object is to establish
a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the
discretion of the court limited."[11] The purpose is not to enable a guilty
person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a
precise definition of forbidden acts.[12]
Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this manner, viz:

"Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person should be brought

within their terms who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be
pronounced criminal which is not made clearly so by the statute." (U.S. v.
Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246)

"The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only
factor controlling the interpretation of such laws, instead, the rule merely
serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in
determining the meaning of penal laws." (People v. Manantan, 5 SCRA
684, 692)
F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.
The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9 (3) must be alleged in the
Information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid
charge. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts
alleged therein.[13] Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the
elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order.
Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the defendant may
move to quash the complaint or information when the facts charged do not
constitute an offense.
In U.S. v. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused is charged with
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204 of the Revised
Penal Code, failure to allege in the Information that the judgment was
rendered knowing it to be unjust, is fatal.[14]
In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice Cesar Bengzon
who later became Chief Justice of the Court affirmed an order of the trial
court which quashed an Information wherein the facts recited did not
constitute a public offense as defined in Section 1, Republic Act 145.[15]
G - The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because the People could
have availed itself of other available remedies below.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:

"Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. - If the

motion to quash is sustained the court may order that another information
be filed. If such order is made the defendant, if in custody, shall remain so
unless he shall be admitted to bail. If such order is not made or if having
been made another information is not filed within a time to be specified in
the order, or within such further time as the court may allow for good cause
shown, the defendant, if in custody, shall be discharged therefrom, unless
he is in custody on some other charge."

"Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. - The information or complaint may be

amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before
the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of
form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be
done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant."

xxx xxx xxx

Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of the
Informations in these cases, viz:
First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have filed an
amended Information to include the second element of the offense as
defined in the disputed orders of respondent Judges. We have ruled that if
the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a punishable offense,
the case should not be dismissed but the prosecution should be given an
opportunity to amend the Information.[16]
Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a complaint
either under Section 26 of Act No. 1780, Second, quoted earlier, or Manila
City Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Ordinance No. 3928, especially
since in most if not all of the cases, the dismissal was made prior to
arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash.
Section 8, Rule 117 states that:

"An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another

prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the
grounds specified in section 2, subsections (f) and (h) of this rule."
Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or Information is
barred only when the criminal action or liability had been extinguished
(Section 2(f)) or when the motion to quash was granted for reasons of
double jeopardy. (ibid., [h])
As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be successfully invoked
by the accused in all these cases should new complaints be filed against
them, is a matter We need not resolve for the present.
H - We conclude with high expectations that police authorities and the
prosecuting arm of the government true to the oath of office they have
taken will exercise utmost circumspection and good faith in evaluating the
particular circumstances of a case so as to reach a fair and just conclusion if
a situation falls within the purview of P.D. 9 (3) and the prosecution under
said decree is warranted and justified. This obligation becomes a sacred
duty in the face of the severe penalty imposed for the offense.
On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor Rodolfo A. Nocon
on his letter to the City Fiscal of Manila on October 15, 1975, written for the
Secretary, now Minister of Justice, where he stated the following:

"In any case, please study well each and every case of this nature so that
persons accused of carrying bladed weapons, specially those whose purpose
is not to subvert the duly constituted authorities, may not be unduly
indicted for the serious offenses falling under P.D. No. 9."[17]
Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to inquire into the
wisdom of a law, it is however a judicial task and prerogative to determine
if official action is within the spirit and letter of the law and if basic
fundamental rights of an individual guaranteed by the Constitution are not
violated in the process of its implementation. We have to face the fact that
it is an unwise and unjust application of a law, necessary and justified
under prevailing circumstances, which renders the measure an instrument
of oppression and evil and leads the citizenry to lose their faith in their
government.
WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We AFFIRM
the Orders of respondent Judges dismissing or quashing the Information
concerned, subject however to Our observations made in the preceding
pages 23 to 25 of this Decision regarding the right of the State or Petitioner
herein to file either an amended Information under Presidential Decree No.
9, paragraph 3, or a new one under other existing statute or city ordinance
as the facts may warrant.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, Teehankee, Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Castro, C.J., and Antonio, J., in the result.
Barredo, J., concurs with the qualification that under existing
jurisprudence conviction is possible, without the need of amending
information, in violation of other laws or ordinance on concealment of
deadly weapon.
Makasiar, J., concurs with Justice Barredo in that under the information,
the accused can be validly convicted of violating Sec. 26 of Act No. 1780 or
the city or town ordinances on carrying concealed weapons.
Concepcion, Jr., J., concurs with the additional observation that accused
could properly be convicted of a violation of Art 1780 of the Philippine
Commission or of the ordinance.
Aquino, J., took no part.

People vs Purisima (1978)

Summary Cases: People vs. Purisima 86 SCRA 542

Subject: Right of the accused to be to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him; Repeal by implication not favored; Element s of the offense punished under Par 3, Presidential
Decree No. 9; Statutory construction: the intent of the law prevails over the strict adherence to the
letter of the law; Resort to Preamble or Whereas clause in order to discover legislative intent; The result
or effects of the presidential decre e must be within its reason or intent; It is presumed that undesirabl e
consequences are never intended by a legislative measure; Penal statutes are to be construed strictly
against the state and liberally in favor of an accused; The Informations are fatally defective; Remedy
against order of court sustaining a motion to quash the Information;

Facts: These twenty -six (26) consolidated Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines are
directed against three Courts of First Instance, presided by Hon. Purisima, Hon. Maceren, and Hon. Polo

Before these courts were filed Informations charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of
deadly weapo n" in violation of Paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 9 issued by (then) President
Marcos, to wit:

"3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as 'fan knife,'
'spear,' 'dagger,' 'bolo,' 'balisong,' 'barong,' 'kris,' or club, except where such articles are being used as
necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being used in connection therewith; and any
person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a
Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct

The weapons described in the different Informations consisted of (a) a carving knife with a blade of 6-
1/2 inches and a wooden handle, (b) an ice pick with an overall length of about 8 1/2 inches, and (c) a
socyatan. In the Informatio ns, the accused was charged of carryi ng the said items “outside of his
residence, the said weapon not being used as a tool or implement necessa ry to earn his livelihood nor
being used in connection therewith.”

In the present petition assailing the said Orders, the main argument advanced by the government is that
a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive
activities, that the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public
policy.

Held:
Right of the accused to be to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him

1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Hence, Section 5, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court, expressly requires that for a complaint or information to be sufficient it
must, inter alia, state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and
to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.

2. To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution and the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, it is imperative for the specific statute violated to be designated or mentioned in the
charge. In fact, another compelling reason exists why a specification of the statute violated is
essential in these cases. As stated in the order of respondent Judge Maceren the carrying of so-
called "deadly weapons" is the subject of another penal statute (Section 26 of Act No. 1780) and
a Manila city ordinance (Ordinance No. 3820).

3. . Thus, what arises is a situation where a particular act may be made to fall, at the discretion of a
police officer or a prosecuting fiscal, under the penal statute, or the city ordinance, or the
presidential decree. That being the case, the right becomes more compelling for an accused to
be confronted with the facts constituting the essential elements of the offense charged against
him, if he is not to become an easy pawn of oppression and harassment, or of negligent or
misguided official action

Repeal by implication not favored

4.The court does not agree with petiti oner that the above-mentioned penal statute and the city
ordinance are deemed repealed by Presidentia l Decree No. 9 . PD No. 9 par (3) does not contain any
repealing clause or provision, and repeal by implication is not favored. This principle holds true with
greater force with regards to penal statutes which as a rule are to be construed strictly against the state
and liber ally in favor of the accuse d. In fact, Articl e 7 of the New Civil Cod e provides that laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse

Elements of the offense punished under Par 3, Presidential Decree No. 9

5. The offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or
pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the
act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion,
rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.

6. It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of
the scope of the penal statute or the city ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of
carrying any of the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What
makes the act criminal or punishable under the decree (PD No. 9) is the motivation behind it. Without
that motivation, the act f alls within the purview of the city ordinance or the penal statute when the
circumstances so warrant.
Statutory construction: the intent of the law prevails over the strict adherence to the letter of the law

7. That there is ambiguity in the presidential decree is manifest from the conflicting views which arise
from its implementation. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to construe and interpret the
true meaning and scope of the measure, guided by the basic principle that penal statutes are to be
construed and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the state.

8. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, a presidential decree in these cases, the
primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislati ve intent is the
controlling factor , for in the word s of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo , per Mr. Justi ce Claudio
Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict
adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions.”

9. The court resorted to ceratin aids to ascertain the intent or reason for P.D. 9(3):

(a) the preamble or "whereas" clauses which enumera te the facts or events which justify the
promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein

(b) the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within its reason or intent

Resort to Preamble or Whereas clause in order to discover legislative intent

10. The events which led to or precipitated the enactment of P.D. 9. are spelled out in the "Whereas"
clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of martial law in the country pursuant to
Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the desired result of Proclamation 1081 as well as
General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are particularly mentioned in P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact that
subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, and public disorder mentioned in
Proclamation 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and other deadly
weapons.

11. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes
necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the
preamble or "whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of
the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

12. While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when the statute is in itself
ambiguous and difficult of interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty which
otherwise does not exist

13. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an
isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in
the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually
intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated.
Thus, an apparently general provision may have a limited application if read together with other
provisions. [see Aboitiz Shipping Corporation vs. The City of Cebu]

The result or effects of the presidential decree must be within its reason or

14. The acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those related to the desired result of Proclamation 1081 and General
Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer to firearms and therefore have no relevance to
P.D. 9(3) which refers to blunt or bladed weapons. It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or
bladed weapon with a motivation connected with or related to the afore-quoted desired result of
Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D. 9(3), and nothing else.

15. Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind, and the
statute should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose
G.R. No. L-8848 November 21, 1913

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appllee,

vs.
WILLIAM C. HART, C. J. MILLER, and SERVILIANO NATIVIDAD, defendants-appellants.

Pedro Abad Santos, for appellants Hart and Natividad.

W. H. Booram, for appellant Miller.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were arraigned in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga on a charge of vagrancy under the provisions of Act No. 519, found guilty, and were each
sentenced to six months' imprisonment. Hart and Miller were further sentenced to a fine of P200,
and Natividad to a fine of P100. All appealed.

The evidence of the prosecution as to the defendant Hart shows that he pleaded guilty and was
convicted on a gambling charge about two or three weeks before his arrest on the vagrancy charge;
that he had been conducting two gambling games, one in his saloon and the other in another house,
for a considerable length of time, the games running every night. The defense showed that Hart and
one Dunn operated a hotel and saloon at Angeles which did a business, according to the
bookkeeper, of P96,000 during the nineteen months preceding the trial; that Hart was also the sole
proprietor of a saloon in the barrio of Tacondo; that he raised imported hogs which he sold to the
Army garrison at Camp Stotsenberg, which business netted him during the preceding year about
P4,000; that he was authorized to sell several hundred hectares of land owned by one Carrillo in
Tacondo; that he administered, under power of attorney, the same property; and that he furnished a
building for and paid the teacher of the first public school in Tacondo, said school being under
Government supervision.

The evidence of the prosecution as to Miller was that he had the reputation of being a gambler; that
he pleaded guilty and was fined for participating in a gambling game about two weeks before his
arrest on the present charge of vagrancy; and that he was seen in houses of prostitution and in a
public dance hall in Tacondo on various occasions. The defense showed without contradiction that
Miller had been discharged from the Army about a year previously; that during his term of enlistment
he had been made a sergeant; that he received rating as "excellent" on being discharged; that since
his discharge he had been engaged in the tailoring business near Camp Stotsenberg under articles
of partnership with one Burckerd, Miller having contributed P1,000 to the partnership; that the
business netted each partner about P300 per month; that Miller attended to business in an efficient
manner every day; and that his work was first class.

The evidence of the prosecution as to Natividad was that he had gambled nearly every night for a
considerable time prior to his arrest on the charge of vagrancy, in the saloon of one Raymundo, as
well as in Hart's saloon; that Natividad sometimes acted as banker; and that he had pleaded guilty to
a charge of gambling and had been sentenced to pay a fine therefor about two weeks before his
arrest on the vagrancy charge. The defense showed that Natividad was a tailor, married, and had a
house of his own; that he made good clothes, and earned from P80 to P100 per month, which was
sufficient to support his family.
From this evidence it will be noted that each of the defendants was earning a living at a lawful trade
or business, quite sufficient to support himself in comfort, and that the evidence which the
prosecution must rely upon for a conviction consists of their having spent their evenings in regularly
licensed saloons, participating in gambling games which are expressly made unlawful by the
Gambling Act, No. 1757, and that Miller frequented a dance hall and houses of prostitution.

Section 1 of Act No. 519 is divided into seven clauses, separated by semicolons. Each clause
enumerates a certain class of persons who, within the meaning of this statute, are to be considered
as vagrants. For the purposes of this discussion, we quote this section below, and number each of
these seven clauses.

(1) Every person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to
work, and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling; (2) every person
found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying
through the country without visible means of support; (3) every person known to be a
pickpocket, thief, burglar, ladrone, either by his own confession or by his having been
convicted of either of said offenses, and having no visible or lawful means of support when
found loitering about any gambling house, cockpit, or in any outlying barrio of a pueblo; (4)
every idle or dissolute person or associate of known thieves or ladrones who wanders about
the country at unusual hours of the night; (5) every idle peron who lodges in any barn, shed,
outhouse, vessel, or place other than such as is kept for lodging purposes, without the
permission of the owner or person entitled to the possession thereof; (6) every lewd or
dissolute person who lives in and about houses of ill fame; (7) every common prostitute and
common drunkard, is a vagrant.

It is insisted by the Attorney-General that as visible means of support would not be a bar to a
conviction under any one of the last four clauses of this act, it was not the intention of the Legislature
to limit the crime of vagrancy to those having no visible means of support. Relying upon the second
clause to sustain the guilt of the defendants, the Attorney-General then proceeds to argue that
"visible means of support" as used in that clause does not apply to "every person found loitering
about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses," but is confined entirely to "or tramping or straying
through the country." It is insisted that had it been intended for "without visible means of support" to
qualify the first part of the clause, either the comma after gambling houses would have been
ommitted, or else a comma after country would have been inserted.

When the meaning of a legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty of the courts to ascertain, if
possible, the true legislative intention, and adopt that construction of the statute which will give it
effect. The construction finally adopted should be based upon something more substantial than the
mere punctuation found in the printed Act. If the punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning which
is reasonable and in apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be used as an additional
argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of the statute as thus punctuated. But an
argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive, and the courts will not hesitate to change
the punctuation when necessary, to give to the Act the effect intended by the Legislature,
disregarding superfluous or incorrect punctuation marks, and inserting others where necessary.

The Attorney-General has based his argument upon the proposition that neither visible means of
support nor a lawful calling is a sufficient defense under the last four paragraphs of the section;
hence, not being universally a defense to a charge of vagrancy, they should not be allowed except
where the Legislature has so provided. He then proceeds to show, by a "mere grammatical criticism"
of the second paragraph, that the Legislature did not intend to allow visible means of support or a
lawful calling to block a prosecution for vagrancy founded on the charge that the defendant was
found loitering around saloons, dram shops, and gambling houses.
A most important step in reasoning, necessary to make it sound, is to ascertain the consequences
flowing from such a construction of the law. What is loitering? The dictionaries say it is idling or
wasting one's time. The time spent in saloons, dram shops, and gambling houses is seldom anything
but that. So that under the proposed construction, practically all who frequent such places commit a
crime in so doing, for which they are liable to punishment under the Vagrancy Law. We cannot
believe that it was the intention of the Legislature to penalize what, in the case of saloons and dram
shops, is under the law's protection. If it be urged that what is true of saloons and dram shops is not
true of gambling houses in this respect, we encounter the wording of the law, which makes no
distinction whatever between loitering around saloons and dram shops, and loitering around
gambling houses.

The offense of vagrancy as defined in Act No. 519 is the Anglo-Saxon method of dealing with the
habitually idle and harmful parasites of society. While the statutes of the various States of the
American Union differ greatly as to the classification of such persons, their scope is substantially the
same. Of those statutes we have had an opportunity to examine, but two or three contain a provision
similar to the second paragraph of Act No. 519. (Mo. Ann. Stat., sec. 2228; N. D. Rev. Codes, sec.
8952; N. M. Comp. Laws 1897, sec. 1314.) That the absence of visible means of support or a lawful
calling is necessary under these statutes to a conviction for loitering around saloons, dram shops,
and gambling houses is not even negatived by the punctuation employed. In the State of
Tennessee, however, we find an exact counterpart for paragraph 2 of section 1 of our own Act
(Code of Tenn., sec. 3023), with the same punctuation: lawph!1.net

. . . or of any person to be found loitering about saloons or dram shops, gambling houses, or
houses of ill fame, or tramping or strolling through the country without any visible means of
support.

A further thought suggest itself in connection with the punctuation of the paragraph in question. The
section, as stated above, is divided into seven clauses, separated by semicolons. To say that two
classes of vagrants are defined in paragraph 2, as to one of which visible means of support or a
lawful calling is not a good defense, and as to the other of which such a defense is sufficient, would
imply a lack of logical classification on the part of the legislature of the various classes of vagrants.
This we are not inclined to do.

In the case at bar, all three of the defendants were earning a living by legitimate methods in a
degree of comfort higher that the average. Their sole offense was gambling, which the legislature
deemed advisable to make the subject of a penal law. The games in which they participated were
apparently played openly, in a licensed public saloon, where the officers of the law could have
entered as easily as did the patrons. It is believed that Act No. 1775 is adequate, if enforced, to
supress the gambling proclivities of any person making a good living at a lawful trade or business.

For these reasons, the defendants are acquitted, with the costs de oficio.

With costs de officio.

this sentence is found at the end of a "Decree of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage"
from a Trial Court in the Philippines, just before the final "It is so ordered."
US vs. Hart (GR 8848)
FACTS:
Hart, Miller, and Natividad were found guilty in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga on a charge of vagrancy. All appealed.
Evidence of the prosecution as to the defendant Hart shows that
he pleaded guilty and was convicted on a gambling charge about
2-3 weeks before his arrest on the vagrancy charge.
Hart had been conducting two gambling games, one in his saloon
and in another house.
Each of the defendants was earning a living at a lawful trade or
business.
Sec. 1 of Act No. 519 – divided into 7 clauses, separated by semicolons.
Each clause enumerates a certain calls of person who, within the
meaning of this statute, are to be considered as vagrants.
“Every person having no apparent means of subsistence, who had the
physical ability to work, and who neglects to apply himself or herself to
some lawful calling; every person found loitering about saloons or
dram shops or gambling housed, or tramping or straying through the
country without visible means of support; … … …”

ISSUE:
Whether or not “without visible means of support" apply to
“every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops”
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
When the meaning of legislative enactment is in question, it is
the duty of the courts to ascertain, if possible, the true legislative
intention, and adopt that the construction of the statute which
will give it effect.
The construction finally adopted should be based upon
something more substantial than the mere punctuation found in
the printed Act.
If the punctuation of the statute gives it a meaning which is
reasonable and in apparent accord with the legislative will, it
may be used as an additional argument for adopting the literal
meaning of the words of the statute as thus punctuated.
But an argument based upon punctuation alone is not
conclusive, and the courts will not hesitate to change the
punctuation when necessary, to give the Act the effect intended
by the Legislature, disregarding superfluous or incorrect
punctuation marks, and inserting others where necessary.
HELD:
A most important step in this reasoning, necessary to make it
sound, is to ascertain the consequences flowing from such a
construction of the law.
o What is loitering? It is idling or wasting one’s time.
o The time spent in saloons, dram shops, and gambling
houses is seldom anything but that.
o If “visible means of support” does not apply to “every
person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or
gambling houses”, practically all who frequent such places
commit a crime of vagrancy.
Vagrancy as defined in Act No. 519 is the Anglo-Saxon method of
dealing with the habitually idle and harmful parasites of the
society.
o That the visible means of support or a lawful calling is
necessary under these statutes to a conviction for loitering
around saloons, dram shops, and gambling houses is not
even negatived by the punctuation employed.
For these reasons, the defendants are acquitted.
G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996

DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:

Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won
during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was
filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition
signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13,
1995.1 At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement
provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioner's
opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on
December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF,
with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the
trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to
explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall
election was without COMELEC approval.2

In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall
election an January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for
injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the
Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of
the Office of the Solicitor General's manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the
COMELEC, the latter through its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter
filed a reply.3

Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place within
one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding
a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now
barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first
Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner
cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the
SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local
election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK election from
the recall election. We do not agree.

The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:

Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of
a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
 (b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.

[Emphasis added]

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to
the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and
kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.4 The evident intent of Section 74 is to
subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b)
construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official
may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus,
subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election
will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of
removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election
which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within
the purview of the phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall
election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in
the enactment of a statute.5 An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or
provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated,
repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.6

It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony
with the Constitution.7 Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code,
specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section
3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum . . . ."

Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot
countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:

We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather
than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually
found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth". . .8

The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in
this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.

Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit
necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one
year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the
next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could
choose the official's replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than
a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent
of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election
where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled
by the electorate.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under Section
74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned
is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997. 9

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. The
temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election
should be as it is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:

I concur with Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco in his ponencia.

However, I wish to add another reason as to why the SK election cannot be considered a "regular
local election" for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

The term "regular local election" must be confined to the regular election of elective local officials, as
distinguished from the regular election of national officials. The elective national officials are the
President, Vice-President, Senators and Congressmen. The elective local officials are Provincial
Governors, Vice-Governors of provinces, Mayors and Vice-Mayors of cities and municipalities,
Members of the Sanggunians of provinces, cities and municipalities, punong barangays and
members of the sangguniang barangays, and the elective regional officials of the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao. These are the only local elective officials deemed recognized by
Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by
trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated in by those
who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are registered
voters. One of the requirements for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he can vote
is that he be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in the Omnibus
Election Code (Section 113-118).

Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424, Local
Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are not qualified to vote in a regular
election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18. In no manner then may SK elections be
considered a regular election (whether national or local).

Indeed the Sangguniang Kabataan is nothing more than a youth organization, and although fully
recognized in the Local Government Code and vested with certain powers and functions, its elective
officials have not attained the status of local elective officials. So, in Mercado vs. Board of Election
Supervisors (243 SCRA 422 [1995]), this Court ruled that although the SK Chairman is an ex-
officio member of the sangguniang barangay — an elective body — that fact does not make him "an
elective barangay official," since the law specifically provides who comprise the elective officials of
the sangguniang barangay, viz., the punong barangay and the seven (7) regular sangguniang
barangay members elected at large by those qualified to exercise the right of suffrage under Article
V of the Constitution, who are likewise registered voters of the barangay. This shows further that the
SK election is not a regular local election for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local
Government Code.

Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:

I concur with Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco in his ponencia.

However, I wish to add another reason as to why the SK election cannot be considered a "regular
local election" for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991.

The term "regular local election" must be confined to the regular election of elective local officials, as
distinguished from the regular election of national officials. The elective national officials are the
President, Vice-President, Senators and Congressmen. The elective local officials are Provincial
Governors, Vice-Governors of provinces, Mayors and Vice-Mayors of cities and municipalities,
Members of the Sanggunians of provinces, cities and municipalities, punong barangays and
members of the sangguniang barangays, and the elective regional officials of the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao. These are the only local elective officials deemed recognized by
Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
 appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by
trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated in by those
who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are registered
voters. One of the requirements for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he can vote
is that he be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in the Omnibus
Election Code (Section 113-118).

Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424, Local
Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are not qualified to vote in a regular
election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18. In no manner then may SK elections be
considered a regular election (whether national or local).

Indeed the Sangguniang Kabataan is nothing more than a youth organization, and although fully
recognized in the Local Government Code and vested with certain powers and functions, its elective
officials have not attained the status of local elective officials. So, in Mercado vs. Board of Election
Supervisors (243 SCRA 422 [1995]), this Court ruled that although the SK Chairman is an ex-
officio member of the sangguniang barangay — an elective body — that fact does not make him "an
elective barangay official," since the law specifically provides who comprise the elective officials of
the sangguniang barangay, viz., the punong barangay and the seven (7) regular sangguniang
barangay members elected at large by those qualified to exercise the right of suffrage under Article
V of the Constitution, who are likewise registered voters of the barangay. This shows further that the
SK election is not a regular local election for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local
Government Code.
Paras v. Comelec
PARAS v. COMELEC, (D)
G.R. No. 123169, 4 November 1996

FACTS:

 Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won
during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed
by the registered voters of the barangay.
 Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall
election on November 13, 1995. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above
the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of
petitioner's opposition.
 December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995.
To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan
City a petition for injunction, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting a
summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner
and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the
barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval.
 January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election an January
13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction.
 January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the Office of the
Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition.
 Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place within one
(1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular
local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996,
and every three years thereafter.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the recall election is valid.

HELD:
 No, the recall is not valid. It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context,i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 4 The evident
intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office.
Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective
local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus,
subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will
unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of
public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by
R.A No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the
phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be
conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.
 Petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance.
Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition: We admonish against a too-literal reading of
the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That
intention is usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth. The spirit, rather than
the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to
its spirit and intent.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-7747 November 29, 1955

NIEVES TINIO, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. GREGORIO

FRANCES, ET AL., defendants and appellees.

Pedro D. Maldia for appellants.

Godofredo V. Salamanca for appellees.

LABRADOR, J.:

This action was brought by the heirs of the deceased Sergio Nicolas
to annul the sale of a homestead which had been inherited by them
from said decedent. Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land
containing an area of 10.0709 hectares, more or less, in San
Fabian, Santo Domingo, Nueva Ecija in the year 1917. His
application was approved on June 22, 1917. He filed the
corresponding final proof papers in relation to the homestead and
on June 15, 1943 the said final proof was approved by the Director
of Lands, who thereupon ordered the issuance of a patent in his
favor. (Exhibit A.) At the time of the issuance of the above order,
Sergio Nicolas had already died, so the order directs the issuance of
the patent to his heirs, represented by his widow. In or about the
year 1947 the heirs transferred their rights to the homestead to the
defendants. The above transfers were approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce on March 9, 1948 and thereafter the
defendants secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their
favor. Original Certificate of Title No. P-558 has been issued also in
their favor, covering the said parcel of land.
chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

The present action was commenced on April 27, 1953 to annul the
conveyances executed by plaintiffs to defendants and to recover the
land, together with the fruits of the land received by the
defendants, as damages. The defendants alleged the execution of
the sales in their favor. After the issues had been joined the parties
presented an agreed statement of facts, the most pertinent parts of
which have already been set forth above. The trial court held that
the transfer or conveyance of the homestead made by the heirs of
the original homesteader was a mere transfer of the rights of the
original homesteader to the land authorized under the provisions of
Section 20 of the Public Land Act (A. A. 141); therefore, as it was
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, the
conveyance was valid. It held that section 118 of the Public Land
Act is not applicable; that both Section 20 and Section 118 being
apparently conflicting, they should be reconciled subh that the
prohibition contained in section 118 should be made to apply only if
the patent had already been issued, otherwise section 20 would be
absolutely useless. Against this judgment the appeal was
prosecuted in this Court.The provisions which affect the conveyance
sought to be annulled are as follows:

SEC. 20. If at any time after the approval of the application and
before patent is issued the applicant shall prove to the satisfaction
of the Director of Lands that he has complied with all the
requirements of the law, but cannot continue with his homestead,
through no fault of his own, and there is a bona fide purchaser for
the rights and improvements of the applicant on the land, and that
the conveyance is not made for purposes of speculation, then the
applicant, with the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce, may transfer his rights to the land and
improvements to any person legally qualified to apply for a
homestead, and immediately after such transfer, the purchaser shall
file a homestead application to the land so acquired and shall
succeed the original homesteader in his rights and obligations
beginning with the date of the approval of said application of the
purchaser. Any person who has so transferred his rights may not
agan apply for a new homestead. Every transfer made without the
previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce
shall be null and void and shall result in the cancellation of the entry
and the refusal of the patent. (C. A. 141). chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

SEC. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches,

units, or institutions, lands acquired under free patentor homestead
provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from
the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five
years from and after the date of the issuance of the patent or grant,
nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt
contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but the
improvements or crop on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to
qualified persons, associations, or corporations. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five

years and before twenty-five years after issuance of title shall be
valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except on
constitutional and legal grounds. (Id.).

The legislative policy or intent is to conserve the land which a

homesteader has acquired under the Public Land Law, as above
stated, for him and his heirs. The legislative policy is so strone and
consistent that the original period of five years from the issuance of
the patent, within which period conveyance or sale thereof by the
homesteader or his heirs was prohibited (section 116 of Act No.
2874) is now extended to 25 years if no approval of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Commerce is secured. (Sec. 118, par. 2, C. a. No.
141, as amended by C. A. No. 456.) Provision has also been
inserted authorizing the repurchase of the homestead when
properly sold by the homesteader within five years from the date of
the sale. (Sec. 119, C. A. No. 141.) This legislative intent and policy
is also sought to be carried out in Section 20, as may be seen from
the fact that transfer of homestead rights from a homesteader can
only be justified upon proof satisfactory to the Director of Lands that
the homesteader cannot continue with his homestead through no
fault of his own. This is not the only requirement; a previous
permission of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce should
first be obtained, as it is also expressly provided that any transfer
made without such previous approval is null and void and shall
result in the cancellation of the entry and the refusal of the patent."
(C. A. 141). As the conveyances now in question are claimed to
have been and were evidently made under the provisions of section
20 of the Public Land Act, the important question to be determined
is whether said conveyances satisfy requirements of said section 20
of the Act.chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law lib rary

The stipulation of facts on this point is as follows:

That the heirs of Sergio Nicolas executed in or about 1947 a

transfer of homestead rights over the land in question in favor of
the defendants, which transfer was approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce on March 9, 1948; that with the approval
of said transger of homestead rights, the defendants caused the
issuance of a homestead patent in their favor, the title being
evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. P-558 of the land
records of Nueva Ecija.

The above stipulation does not state expressly that the Director of
Lands had, after investigation, been satisfied that the applicant or
homesteader "has complied with all the requirements of the law, but
cannot continue with the homestead through no fault of his own."
Furthermore, according to the stipulation, the transfer was made in
1947 and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture in 1948 so that
the conveyances were not made with with previous approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. So neither of the
requirements of section 20 has been complied with. chanroblesv irt ualawli brary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib ra ry

But it is suggested that in accordance with the presumption of

regularity of official acts the Director of Lands must have
recommended the approval of the transfer. Admitting arguendo that
such is the case, the conveyances still suffer from at least one fatal
defect in that it does not appear that they had to be made because
the homesteader could not continue with his homestead through no
fault of his own. We may not and cannot indulge in presumptions on
this necessary requirements, because the order for the issuance of
the patent states just the opposite. The order for the issuance of the
patent states expressly that the homesteader had already complied
with all the requirements of the law with respect to cultivation,
possession and otherwise, thus:

(5) That an investigation for the purpose of verifying the statements

contained in the final proof papers was conducted by a
representative of the Bureau of Lands, who found that the applicant
has fully complied with the residence and cultivation requirements
of the law; and

xxx xxx xxx chanrobles vi rtual law lib rary

. . ., the undersigned is of the opinion that the applicant has
complied with the requirements of law preliminary to the issuance
of patent to the land applied for and already surveyed." (Exhibit A.).

The order for the issuance of a patent as well as the statements of

fact therein contained, as above-quoted, conclusively disprove the
existence of the requirement that the homesteader could not
continue with the homestead through no fault of his own. chanroble svi rtualaw lib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

In a legal sense, furthermore, when the Director of Lands issues the

order for the issuance of a patent, after the approval of the final
proof, the right of the homesteader to the patent becomes absolute
and then it becomes the ministerial duty of the corresponding
officials of the Government to issue said patent. To all intents and
purposes the order for the issuance of a patent is the same in effect
as the issuance of a patent itself (Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil.,
499). And if the law (section 118, C. A. No. 114) prohibits the sale
or conveyance of a homestead after the issuance of a patent, the
prohibition should be extended, in view of the apparent policy of the
law, to the date on which the order for the issuance of the patent is
issued, which in this case is June 13, 1943.chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

Resuming what we have stated above, we find that the conveyances

made by the heirs of the homesteader to the defendants heren in
the year 1947 do not comply with the first requirements of section
20 of the Public Land Act that the Director of Lands is satisfied from
proofs submitted by the homesteader that he (homesteader) could
not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own, and
with the second that a conveyance must be made with the prior or
previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce;
that from the date of an order for the issuance of a patent for a
homestead the homesteader to all intents and purposes is
considered as having the patent actually issued to himself, in so far
as the prohibition contained in section 118 of the Public Land Act,
otherwise the intent and policy of the law may be avoided by the
homesteader by postponing the getting of his patent. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

In accordance herewith the conveyances executed by the plaintiffs

to the defendants are hereby declared null and void, the transfer
certificate of title issued in the name of the defendants (P-558 of
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija) ordered
cancelled, and the possession of the land returned to the plaintiffs
upon return to the defendants of the amounts received as price for
the sale. No damages or costs. So ordered. chanroble svi rtualaw lib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary
Tinio, et al. v. Frances, et al.
Case No. 290
G.R. No. L-7747 (November 29, 1955)
Chapter III, Page 90, Footnote No.61

FACTS:
Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija and was approved in 1917. In
1943,the final proof was approved by the Director of Lands who issued a patent in his
favor, but because Sergio Nicolas died, he was substituted by his heirs, represented by
his widow. In 1947, the heirs transferred their rights to the homestead to the defendants,
with approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and secured the issuance
of a homestead patent in their favor. In 1953, heirs of the deceased Sergio Nicolas
wanted to annul the sale of a homestead and to recover the land, together with the fruits
of the land as damages.

ISSUE:
WON, the sale or transfer of right of the heirs of Sergio Nicolas over the parcel of land
was valid.
HELD:
No. Conveyance made by the heirs of the homesteader to the Defendants do not
comply with the first requirement of Sec. 20 of the Public Lands Act that the Director of
lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader that he could not continue
with his homestead through no fault of his own, and that the conveyance must be made
with the prior or previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. Thus
the conveyance made by the heirs of Nicolas was null and void.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-8759. May 25, 1956.]
SEVERINO UNABIA, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR, CITY TREASURER, CITY
AUDITOR and the CITY ENGINEER, Respondents-Appellants.

DECISION
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu ordering Respondents to
reinstate Petitioner as foreman (capataz), Garbage Disposal, Office of the City Engineer, Cebu City, at
P3.90 per day from the date of his removal.
The case was submitted to the court for decision on a stipulation of facts the most pertinent of which are
as follows: Petitioner was a foreman, Group Disposal, Office of the City Health Officer, Cebu City, at
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

P3.90 per day. On June 16, 1953, the City Mayor removed him from the service and his place was taken
by Perfecto Abellana, and latter by Pedro E. Gonzales. Before June 16, 1953, the Group Disposal Division,
including personnel, was transferred from the City Health Department to the Office of the City Engineer.
In April, 1954, Petitioner sought to be reinstated but his petition was not headed by the Respondents.
On the basis of the above facts, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held that Petitioner is a person in the
Philippine Civil Service, pertaining to the unclassified service (section 670, Revised Administrative Code as
amended), and his removal from his position is a violation of section 694 of the Revised Administrative
Code and section 4 of Art XII of the Constitution. The court further held that the notation at the bottom
of Petitioner’s appointment to the effect that his appointment is “temporary pending report from the
Government Service Insurance System as to the appointee’s physical and medical examination” did not
make his appointment merely temporary.
First error assigned on this appeal is the failure to include in the complaint, the names of the persons
holding the Offices of City Mayor, City Treasurer, City Auditor and City Engineer, all of Cebu City, they
being designated only by their official positions. This is no reason for a reversal of the proceedings and of
the judgment. As said persons were sued in their official capacity, it is sufficient that they be designated
by their official positions.
It is also contended that the use of capitals in the words “Civil Service” in section 1 and 4 of Article XII of
the Constitution and the use of small letters for the same words, “civil service,” in section 670, Revised
Administrative Code, indicates that only those pertaining to the classified service are protected in the
above-mentioned sections of the Constitution. We see no validity in this argument. Capital “C” and “S” in
the words “Civil Service” were used in the Constitution to indicate the group. No capitals are used in the
similar provisions of the Code to indicate the system. We see no difference between the use of capitals in
the former and of small letters in the latter. There is no reason for excluding persons in the unclassified
service from the benefits extended to those belonging to the classified service. Both are expressly
declared to belong to the Civil Service; hence, the same rights and privileges should be accorded to
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both. Persons in the unclassified service are so designated because the nature of their work and
qualifications are not subject to classification, which is not true of those appointed to the classified service.
This cannot be a valid reason for denying privileges to the former that are granted the latter.
As the removal of Petitioner was made without investigation and without cause, said removal is null and
void and Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated to the position from which he was removed. (Lacson vs.
Romero, 84 Phil., 740, 47 Off. Gaz. [4], 1778).
There is, however, an additional objection to the reinstatement raised in the memorandum submitted by
the attorneys for the Respondents in lieu of oral argument. This is the fact that as Petitioner was removed
on June 16, 1953 and only filed his petition on July 1, 1954, or after a delay of one year and 15
days, Petitioner should no longer be allowed to claim the remedy, he being considered as having
abandoned his office.
We cannot or should not overlook this objection. If an employee is illegally dismissed, he may conform to
such illegal dismissal or acquiesce therein, or by his inaction and by sleeping on his rights he may in law
be considered as having abandoned the office to which he is entitled to be reinstated. These defenses are
valid defenses to an action for reinstatement. To that effect is our decision in the case of Mesias vs. Jover,
et al., 97 Phil., 899, decided November 22, 1955. In that case we cited with approval Nicolas vs. United
States, 66 L. Ed. 133, and the following ruling therein contained: chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

“A person illegally dismissed from office is not thereby exonerated from the obligation to take steps for
his own protection, and may not for an unreasonable length of time, acquiesce to the order of
removal and then sue to recover the salary attached to the position. In case of unreasonable delay he
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may be held to have abandoned title to the office and any right to recover its emoluments.” (Mesias vs.
Jover, supra.)
Difficulty in applying the principle lies in the fact that the law has not fixed any period which may be
deemed to be considered as an abandonment of office. In the abovecited case decided by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States, 11 months was considered an unreasonable delay amounting to
abandonment of office and of the right to recover its emoluments. However, we note that in actions of
quo warranto involving right to an office, the action must be instituted within the period of one year. This
has been the law in the island since 1901, the period having been originally fixed in section 216 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190). We find this provision to be an expression of policy on the part of
the State that persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should
immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of one year,
they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment. There are weighty reasons of
public policy and convenience that demand the adoption of a similar period for persons claiming rights to
positions in the civil service. There must be stability in the service so that public business may be unduly
retarded; delays in the statement of the right to positions in the service must be discouraged. The
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following considerations as to public officers, by Mr. Justice Bengzon, may well be applicable to employees
in the civil service: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“Furthermore, constitutional rights may certainly be waived, and the inaction of the officer for one year
could be validly considered as waiver, i.e., a renunciation which no principle of justice may prevent, he
being at liberty to resign his position anytime he pleases.
“And there is good justification for the limitation period; it is not proper that the title to public office
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should be subjected to continued uncertainly, and the peoples’ interest requires that such right should be
determined as speedily as practicable.” (Tumulak vs. Egay, 46 Off. Gaz., [8], 3693, 3695.)
Further, the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any person claims to be entitled to
an office or a position in the civil service as against another actually holding it, so that the Government
may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one, for the person actually holding
the office, although illegally, and another, for one not actually rendering service although entitled to do
so. We hold that in view of the policy of the State contained in the law fixing the period of one year within
which actions for quo warranto may be instituted, any person claiming right to a position in the civil service
should also be required to file his petition for reinstatement within the period of one year, otherwise he
is thereby considered as having abandoned his office.
One other point, merely procedural, needs to be considered. This is the fact that the objection as to the
delay in filing the action is raised for the first time in this Court, not having been raised in the court below.
The above circumstance (belated objection) would bar the consideration if it were a defense merely.
However, we consider it to be essential to the Petitioner’s right of action that the same is filed within a
year from the illegal removal. The delay is not merely a defense which may be interposed against it subject
to waiver. It is essential to Petitioner’s cause of action and may be considered even at this stage of the
action.
“We would go farther by holding that the period fixed in the rule is a condition precedent to the existence
of the cause of action, with the result that, if a complaint is not filed within one year, it cannot prosper
although the matter is not set up in the answer or motion to dismiss.” (Abeto vs. Rodas, 46 Off. Gaz., [3],
930, 932.)
A defense of failure to state a causes of action is not waived by failure to raise same as a defense (section
10, Rule 9).
For all the foregoing considerations, we hold that as Petitioner was dismissed on June 16, 1953 and did
not file his petition for mandamus for his reinstatement until July 1, 1956, or after a period of one year,
he is deemed to have abandoned his right to his former position and is not entitled to reinstatement
therein by mandamus. Without costs. SO ORDERED.