Build Up To The Abyssinian Crisis 1935
Build Up To The Abyssinian Crisis 1935
In 1935, the Italian army under Mussolini invaded Abyssinia (modern day Ethiopia).
Mussolini wanted to recreate the Roman Empire and was a prominent member of the
League of Nations. Unlike the conflict in Manchuria, the League of Nations could not
ignore the conflict as it was so close to their headquarters in Europe, and Abyssinia had
borders to many imperial possessions of France and Britain.
In 1934, the was a dispute between Italian and Abyssinian forces in the Wal-Wal oasis.
Mussolini used this as a reason for the invasion of Abyssinia in 1935. During this march to
war, the Abyssinian leader, Haile Selassie, took his case to the League of Nations in the
hope of receiving assistance from them. The crisis can be divided in a number of phases.
During phase one from January 1935 and October 1935, Mussolini prepared for invasion
of Abyssinia. Britain and France delayed any action between the League of Nations.
Britain and France were more concerned with the rise of Hitler and needed Mussolini to
help them against Hitler. To combat this Britain and France signed the Stresa Pact with
Mussolini. However, despite this public opinion was turning against Italy and many in
Britain supported the use of force against Italy in Abyssinia. It was at this point that many
British politicians began to speak about how Italy was in the wrong and should be
protected by the League. However this did not result in action, just more talk and debate.
The League eventually declared that in the Wal-Wal incident no one could be held to
blame and as such Italy should be given some of Abyssinia. Mussolini didn’t agree and in
October 1935, his armies invaded Abyssinia.
STRESA PACT
The Stresa Pact was an agreement between Britain, France, and Italy which formalised
opposition to German rearmament. It committed Britain, France and Italy to work together
against Germany.
Even though it was negotiated at the same time as the Abyssinian Crisis, it did not once
mention Abyssinia. Mussolini therefore felt comfortable in invading Abyssinia without
intervention from Britain and France.
Failure of the League in Abyssinia
The Italian Invasion of 1935 was a decisive victory for Italian forces over those of
Abyssinia. This of course should not come as a surprise as the Italian forces were far
superior to those of Abyssinia. The League had been designed to prevent this very from
happening and should be able to arbitrate against a larger power invading a smaller
power.
The rules of the League of Nations made it absolutely clear that Italy was in the wrong and
that international sanctions should be imposed upon Italy as the aggressor. The League
set up a committee which was to agree about what sanctions they should impose. Time is
off the essence with sanctions as the longer they take to be imposed, the longer the
aggressor had to stockpile resources for when sanctions took effect. In response to the
aggression, the League of Nations banned the selling of weapons to Italy, it also banned
loans and selling of ribber, tin and metals.
The League argued over the decision about whether to ban oil being exported to Italy. One
of the stumbling blocks was support for the decision from other countries to support the
measures. Major powers like France and Britain were reluctant to enforce sanctions. One
major decision was the closure of the Suez Canal to Italian shipping. Had Britain and
France done this it would have cut off Italian supply ships being able to access Abyssinia
as easily which would have supported Abyssinia in the war.
The decision on oil was finally made in February 1936, but it was too little too late.
Mussolini had already overrun most of Abyssinia by this point and American oil
companies increased their sales to Italy.