RULE 119

2. G.R. No. 177960 January 29, 2009

JEFFREY RESO DAYAP, Petitioner, vs.

PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG, GENESA SENDIONG, ELVIE SY and DEXIE DURAN, Respondents.

Section 23. Demurrer to evidence. — After the prosecution rests its case, the court may
dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after
giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by
the accused with or without leave of court.

If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce
evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the
accused waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of
the evidence for the prosecution. (15a)

The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds
and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its
case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5) days
from its receipt.

If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to
evidence within a similar period from its receipt.

The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer
itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.

Facts:

The Provincial Prosecutor’s Office filed an Information charging Dayap with the crime of Reckless
Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and Damage to Property: that
accused drove in a reckless and imprudent manner a 10-wheeler cargo truck hitting an automobile
driven by Sendiong who was with Duran and Sy, thus causing the instantaneous death of Sendiong,
less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Duran and Sy and extensive damage to the automobile.

Dayap was arraigned before the MTC and he pleaded not guilty.
Respondents filed a motion for leave of court to file an amended information to add the allegation of
abandonment of the victims by Dayap. However, the Provincial Prosecutor later filed an Omnibus
Motion praying that the motion to amend the information be considered withdrawn.The MTC granted
the withdrawal.

Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. After the prosecution had rested its case, Dayap sought leave
to file a demurrer to evidence [grounded on the prosecution’s failure to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that he is criminally liable for reckless imprudence] which was granted.

The MTC granted the demurrer and acquitted Dayap of the crime of reckless imprudence. The MTC
found that the evidence presented by respondents failed to establish the allegations in the
Information: its witnesses never identified the accused as the one who has committed the crime and it
was not established that the accused was driving the truck at the time of the incident; there was no
death certificate that was offered in evidence on the allegation of the death of Sendiong; no medical
certificate nor doctor was presented to establish the alleged less serious physical injuries; and the
alleged damage to the automobile was also not established in any manner. On the other hand, the
prosecution’s evidence showed that the swerving of the automobile to the lane of the cargo truck is
the proximate cause of the accident.

RTC:

Respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging that the dismissal was done without
considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution and that the MTC failed to observe the manner
the trial of the case should proceed as provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court as well as
failed to rule on the civil liability of the accused in spite of the evidence presented.

The RTC affirmed the acquittal of petitioner but ordered the remand of the case to the MTC for further
proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. The RTC ruled that the MTC’s recital of every fact in
arriving at its conclusions disproved the allegation that it failed to consider the evidence presented by
the prosecution. The records also demonstrated that the MTC conducted the trial of the case in the
manner dictated by Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, except that the defense no longer
presented its evidence after the MTC gave due course to the accused’s demurrer to evidence, the
filing of which is allowed under Sec. 23, Rule 119. RTC however agreed that the MTC failed to rule on
the accused’s civil liability, especially since the judgment of acquittal did not include a declaration that
the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

COURT OF APPEALS:

Respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 42. The Court of
Appeals ruled that there being no proof of the total value of the properties damaged and respondents
were claiming the amount of ₱1,500,000.00 as civil damages, the criminal case falls under the
jurisdiction of the RTC and the proceedings before the MTC are null and void.

SUPREME COURT:

Dayap argues that the MTC had jurisdiction to hear the criminal case for reckless imprudence, owing
to the enactment of R.A. No. 7691, which confers jurisdiction to first-level courts on offenses involving
damage to property through criminal negligence. He asserts that the RTC could not have acquired
jurisdiction on the basis of a legally unfiled and officially withdrawn amended information alleging
abandonment. Respondents are also faulted for challenging the MTC’s order acquitting petitioner
through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal under Rule 42.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the MTC’s order acquitting Dayap can be challenged through a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal under Rule 42

2) Whether or not the jurisdiction over the offense charged pertained to the MTC

3) Whether or not it is proper to remand the case on the matter of civil liability for the reception
of evidence

HELD:
1) Whether or not the MTC’s order acquitting Dayap can be challenged through a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal under Rule 42

YES. The MTC granted Dayap’s demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of the offense on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases is "filed after
the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation
of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal
of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not
be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy; it is reviewable
only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the factual findings
of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing court, and the only legal basis to reverse
and set aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer to evidence is by a clear showing that the
trial court, in acquitting the accused, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.

Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari. The RTC correctly
ruled that the MTC did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint. The MTC’s
conclusions were based on facts diligently recited in the order thereby disproving that the MTC
failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also show that the
MTC correctly followed the procedure set forth in the Rules of Court.

2) Whether or not the jurisdiction over the offense charged pertained to the MTC

YES. The information filed before the trial court had remained unamended. Thus, Dayap is
deemed to have been charged only with the offense alleged in the original Information without
any aggravating circumstance. The penalty imposable upon him, were he to be found guilty, is
prision correccional in its medium period (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years) and
maximum period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years). When this case was filed, Section
32(2) of BP 129 had already been amended by R.A. No. 7691 which extended the jurisdiction of
the first-level courts over criminal cases to include all offenses punishable with imprisonment
not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties including those for civil liability.
3) Whether or not it is proper to remand the case on the matter of civil liability for the reception
of evidence

NO. The acquittal was based on the findings that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist and that Dayap did not commit the acts or omission imputed to
him; hence, the civil liability has been extinguished by his acquittal. The MTC stated that it
cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime had been committed and that the
accused was the person responsible for it. The MTC also found that the proximate cause of the
accident is caused by the swerving of the automobile and not the reckless driving of the truck
by Dayap, clearly establishing that he is not guilty of reckless imprudence.