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Negotiation processes in urban

redevelopment projects: Dealing with
conflicts by balancing integrative and
distributive approaches
a a a
Marlijn Baarveld , Marnix Smit & Geert Dewulf
a
Department of Construction Management and Engineering, University of
Twente, Enschede, the Netherlands
Published online: 16 Jul 2015.

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To cite this article: Marlijn Baarveld, Marnix Smit & Geert Dewulf (2015): Negotiation processes in urban
redevelopment projects: Dealing with conflicts by balancing integrative and distributive approaches,
Planning Theory & Practice, DOI: 10.1080/14649357.2015.1058972

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 Planning Theory & Practice, 2015
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14649357.2015.1058972

Negotiation processes in urban redevelopment projects: Dealing with conflicts

by balancing integrative and distributive approaches
Marlijn Baarveld*, Marnix Smit and Geert Dewulf

Department of Construction Management and Engineering, University of Twente, Enschede, the Netherlands
(Received 31 January 2014; accepted 2 June 2015)

Dealing with conflict through dialogue receives considerable attention in current planning
approaches. However, debate and negotiation are also inevitable features in the planning of urban
redevelopment projects. Insight into the negotiation process contributes to current planning
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practice as negotiation provides a strong basis for addressing conflicts and satisfying both
individual and common interests. In this paper the concepts of integrative and distributive
negotiation are explored and analysed in two urban redevelopment projects involving cultural
heritage buildings in the Netherlands. The paper shows the negotiation dynamics over time and
argues that openly formulating joint ambitions and making strong statements to fulfil individual
interests are both essential in coming to a mutually beneficial agreement.
Keywords: planning; negotiation; urban redevelopment; mutual gains; agreement; heritage

Introduction
In urban development planning processes, actors have to make decisions about conditions where
they will act and commit to future actions that will satisfy their interests (Forester, 2006). However,
decision-making in urban development is difficult as projects have multiple interrelated issues that
involve many interdependent actors (Samsura, Van der Krabben, & Van Deemen, 2010; Shmueli,
Kaufman, & Ozawa, 2008). Actors face situations with different individual goals plus common
goals, interests and values. Further, planning issues are often fuzzy, full of uncertainties and
complications throughout the various stages of the planning processes (De Roo, Hillier, & Van
Wezemael, 2012). In such a setting, conflicts between actors are likely. Finding a way to deal with
these conflicts and satisfying public and private interests is crucial in order to bring a planning
process forward and realize spatial plans and projects.
In response to increasing conflicts, complexity and uncertainty in planning, a wide range of
planning literature has been developed. The main shift that has taken place in the last three
decades is from rational blueprint planning to communicative planning (Allmendinger & Tewdwr-
Jones, 2002; Connelly & Richardson, 2004; De Roo & Silva, 2010; Healey, 1997; Innes, 1995,
2004; Innes & Booher, 1999). Central to communicative planning is an ongoing dialogue
involving all stakeholders, both powerful and powerless, who have an interest in the issue (Healey,
1997; Innes & Booher, 1999). Conflicts and power differences are recognized and assumed to be
resolvable through empowerment, inclusion, open and fair dialogue, trust and mutual learning.
Critics insist that this consensus building approach can only work when underlying harmony is
assumed, and this they consider to be a utopian state in such a heavily politicized arena as planning
(Flyvbjerg, 2002; Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002; Fox-Rogers & Murphy, 2014; Hillier, 2003;
Pløger, 2004; Sager, 2013; Tewdwr-Jones & Allmendinger, 1998). In their view, power,
persuasion and strategic behaviour intrinsically form part of the relationship between actors in a

*Corresponding author. Email: m.y.baarveld@utwente.nl

q 2015 Taylor & Francis

 2 M. Baarveld et al.

network environment. For example, Hillier (2003) argues that “actors may see little benefit in
behaving ‘communicative rationally’ when strategic, instrumental powerplays and manipulation
of information could result in more favourable outcomes for themselves” (p. 41). Contrary to the
focus on reason and dialogue in building consensus in communicative planning, in this alternative
perspective; interaction between actors is seen as an exercise of power with strategic, non-rational
arguments and debate. Such a perspective would do well to capture the role of power in the real
world of planning. There is a need to look at what is actually happening, rather than what we
normatively would like to happen.
Several scholars argue that it might be worth paying more attention to conflict and
negotiation dynamics in planning practice (Blokhuis, Snijders, Han, & Schaefer, 2012; Fuller,
2011; Ruming, 2012; Shin, 2010; Shmueli et al., 2008). Dialogue is only a part of the
interchange between participants in communicative planning (Sager, 2013). The various
perspectives on power show that debate and negotiation are also inevitable elements in planning
practice. Forester (2009) argues that if actors are in conflict, negotiation can provide a strong
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basis for implementing plans and satisfying individual and collective interests. Such negotiations
differ from dialogue or debate in that actors are seeking agreement on practical action, whereas,
through dialogue, actors are only seeking understanding and meaning, and through debate actors
are trying to get what they want (Forester, 2008). Hence, in addition to focusing on dialogue in
communicative planning it is also interesting to study negotiation in planning processes prone to
conflict.
Although the concept of negotiation has received extensive attention, negotiation processes in
complex multi-actor environments, such as urban redevelopment projects, are still poorly
understood (Blokhuis et al., 2012; Shmueli et al., 2008). In response, this paper aims to offer insight
into the development of negotiation processes in the planning practice of urban redevelopment
projects and into how these processes influence achieving mutually beneficial agreements.
To achieve this, we carried out a longitudinal in-depth case study of two urban redevelopment
projects with cultural heritage buildings in the Netherlands. As we will set out further in this paper,
particularly in these projects, actors face dilemmas in negotiations as there are many conflicting but
interdependent public and private interests to be realized.
Before we describe the case studies, we will start with a theoretical discussion on the concept of
negotiation in planning. This provides a framework for understanding what is happening in
negotiation processes. Following this, we will describe our research method. The projects and our
findings are then presented. We conclude by reflecting on the negotiation process in planning.

Negotiation processes in planning: integrative and distributive approaches

The term “negotiation” is widely used, with authors from various academic backgrounds using
different but overlapping definitions. For example, Putnam and Roloff (1992) describe negotiation
as similar to decision-making or joint problem-solving, but differing from other types of
communication by its goals, relationships and normative practices. Fisher, Ury, and Patton (1991)
state that: “negotiation is a basic means of getting what you want from others. It is back-and-forth
communication designed to reach an agreement when you and the other side have some interests
that are shared and others that are opposed” (p. 6). Lax and Sebenius (1986) define negotiation as “a
process of potentially opportunistic interaction by which two or more parties, with some apparent
conflict, seek to do better through jointly decided action than they could otherwise” (p. 87). At its
simplest, negotiation is the process by which elements of plans and development applications are
traded in an effort to ensure an outcome (Ruming, 2012). Overlapping components in all these
definitions are that (1) two or more interdependent actors are involved, (2) they have diverging
interests, (3) they perceive some conflict but also (4) have some shared interests, (5) they
 Planning Theory & Practice 3

communicate, and (6) aim to reach an agreement. In achieving an agreement, actors can use various
negotiation strategies.
The literature makes a general distinction between integrative negotiation and distributive
negotiation (Leeuwis, 2000; Neale & Bazerman, 1992; Ness & Haugland, 2005; Walton &
McKersie, 1965). Integrative negotiation, also referred to as a “creating value” strategy, is a mutual
process of discovering the other actors’ interests, developing new and often wider problem
definitions, employing problem-solving behaviour and searching for ways to increase the total
benefit (Der Foo, Elfenbein, Tan, & Aik, 2004; Leeuwis, 2000; Sebenius, 1992). In contrast,
distributive negotiation refers to dividing or apportioning scarce and fixed resources among the
negotiators (Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010). This is similar to negotiation strategies aimed at
claiming value (Sebenius, 1992). Although integrative and distributive negotiations are widely
studied in the negotiation literature, there is no univocal operationalization. However, in both
forms, certain features seem to be important in the behaviour of actors in order to deal with conflict
and come to mutually beneficial agreements.
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Often mentioned features of integrative negotiation processes are their focus on underlying
interests; a common search for creative solutions; the open sharing of information and mutual
trust. Addressing the first feature, Shmueli et al. (2008) argue that actors should consider
interests rather than positions, and should seek to develop options that honour the priorities of all
parties. Interests are the underlying reasons why an actor takes a particular view, which they will
express in a position (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2008). In negotiations, positions are the
demands of actors and their preferred action to address a particular problem (Shmueli et al.,
2008). Fisher et al. (1991) similarly prescribe that in negotiations actors should focus on
interests not on positions, because “when negotiators bargain over positions, they tend to lock
themselves into those positions [ . . . ] making it less and less likely that any agreement will
wisely reconcile the parties’ original interests” (p. 7). Second, an integrative approach can be
characterized by a common search for creative solutions and the generation of new possibilities.
Solving current problems while making a plan for a better future requires creative approaches
for generating alternatives and convincing others of their reasonableness and feasibility (Shmueli
et al., 2008). Lax and Sebenius (2002) argue that actors should look beyond the locus of the
parties and issues immediately involved. A third feature of integrative negotiations is the sharing
of information and open communication, since this is considered crucial in understanding each
other’s interests and discovering new possibilities. According to Forester (Forester, 1982), an
actor’s key source of power in the planning process is information. Actors need information to
understand the physical and social environment they are trying to affect, the issues at stake, the
actors’ interests and the relationships among those actors (Shmueli et al., 2008). However,
sharing information also makes an actor more vulnerable to exploitation. Information can be
selectively perceived or strategically manipulated (Shmueli et al., 2008). Hence, sufficient
mutual trust is required to share information, and this constitutes a fourth feature of integrative
negotiation processes. Many negotiation scholars have demonstrated the importance of trust in
value-creating processes (Murtoaro & Kujala, 2007; Thompson et al., 2010; Tzafrir, Sanchez, &
Tirosh-Unger, 2012).
By contrast, in distributive negotiation processes actors are focused on satisfying their own
interests and trying to get the best deal. This is considered important, as otherwise actors may
become too committed to simply reaching an agreement and settle for one that is not in their
interests (Fisher et al., 1991; Thompson et al., 2010). In negotiation literature it is argued that actors
should accept any set of terms superior to their “best alternative to a negotiated agreement”
(BATNA) and reject outcomes that are worse than their BATNA, or even leave the negotiation
(Thompson et al., 2010). Often mentioned features of distributive or “claiming value” processes are
competition between parties, trying to convince other actors of one’s own right and holding on to
 4 M. Baarveld et al.

one’s own perceptions and positions (Leeuwis, 2000; Sebenius, 2009). Using this approach, actors
seek to claim value through persuasive argument, making single-issue offers and making negative
and threatening comments (Schei, Rognes, & Shapiro, 2011).
In reality, negotiation processes contain both integrative and distributive elements. Lax and
Sebenius (1986) go as far as to argue that, although theoretically distinguishable, integrative and
distributive approaches are inseparable as at a certain point in the process the value created has to
be divided, and a claim on the increased value by one party means there will be less for the others.
This means that actors have to handle two opposing motives in negotiations: cooperating to create
value and competing to claim value. According to Lax and Sebenius (1986), actors must learn, in
part from each other, what is jointly possible and desirable, and at the same time they must seek to
advance their individual interests. Forester (2009) argues that working carefully to identify
underlying interests and satisfy diverse actors’ interests can protect against the risk of “good
process, bad outcome” because together actors can focus on the achievable outcomes and compare
them to their best alternatives. If actors do not expect the outcome to be superior to their best
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alternative, then the negotiations might reach an impasse and actors might use their power to block
the process (van Rijswick & Salet, 2012). Susskind (2008) argues that agreements will only be
strong enough to be implemented when parties feel that their core interests have been met, the
process has been fair and everything possible has been done to maximize joint gains. Otherwise
actors might opt out of the agreement in a later stage of the process. This implies that – besides
value-creating processes such as identifying underlying interests, creating new solutions and
sharing information – the claiming process of trying to get the best deal is essential in negotiations.
Through balancing cooperation with competition, negotiation processes can result in a mutually
beneficial agreement. A mutually beneficial agreement can be seen as a win-win solution, one that
simultaneously realizes the objectives of multiple parties (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Sebenius,
1992) and forms a basis for future joint action (Forester, 2009). Hence, negotiations that balance
integrative and distributive strategies have the potential to handle conflicts and bring planning
processes forward by satisfying the various interests in planning projects. However, achieving
mutually beneficial agreements is difficult and often actors fail to reach such an agreement
(Thompson & Hastie, 1990).
Therefore, an increased understanding of the linked processes of integrative and distributive
negotiation is needed if one is to make greater use of the opportunities to achieve a mutually
beneficial agreement in complex multi-actor environments such as those found in urban
development projects. The main features of integrative and distributive negotiation processes as
previously described can provide a basic framework and a starting point to look at actors’ strategies
and dynamics in negotiation processes where there is no univocal operationalization of the
negotiation concepts. As such, the framework can help in sharpening the analysis and
understanding of negotiation processes in urban planning practice. Table 1 summarizes the
negotiation concepts that we used to frame the negotiation processes in our analysis.

Table 1. Basic analytical framework

Integrative negotiation Distributive negotiation

Cooperation Competition
Focus Searching together for creative solutions Trying to get the best deal for oneself
Satisfying shared and common interests Satisfying own interests
Focusing on underlying interests Holding on to own perceptions and positions
Communication Openly sharing information Withholding or manipulating information
Open communication Threatening, applying pressure
Trust Mutual trust Distrust
 Planning Theory & Practice 5

Research method
Longitudinal case study involving two projects
The research aim is to increase understanding of dealing with conflicts through negotiation in urban
redevelopment projects. Case studies are an appropriate research strategy in seeking insight into
dynamics in a specific setting (Eisenhardt, 1989). Further, to understand negotiation processes it is
important to take account of changes over time (Fuller, 2011). Consequently, we opted for a
longitudinal case study approach. A longitudinal analysis facilitates the detection of possible
cause – effect relationships as key events are placed in sequence (Langley & Truax, 1994).
Comparing two urban redevelopment projects in the Netherlands provided the opportunity to
explore more holistic explanations within and between cases (Pettigrew, 1997).

Case selection and general context of the projects

It can be appropriate to select a few cases based on expectations of their information content rather
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than use random sampling if one wants to understand certain processes (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Flyvbjerg, 2006). As we aimed to study the projects longitudinally, and consequently could not
know the negotiation outcomes in advance, we selected two urban redevelopment projects in which
we expected to find conflicts and negotiations due to their characteristics. We studied two large-
scale urban redevelopment projects which included the re-use of existing heritage buildings: New
Hembrug and De:Werkplaats. Both projects are located in the Netherlands and had similar aims: to
redevelop their respective areas into places to live, work and play, with a creative and distinctive
atmosphere by re-using the heritage buildings.
As in most European countries, the public sector in the Netherlands has been very active and
dominant in planning practice (Gerrits, Rauws, & de Roo, 2012; Heurkens & Hobma, 2014).
Besides regulating land through detailed land-use plans, municipalities were pro-active as
initiators, coordinators and risk-bearing investors in greenfield and brownfield development (Van
der Krabben & Jacobs, 2013; Van der Krabben & Needham, 2008). This dominant role is changing
due to the decrease in public finances and increase of development risks in recent years. Today,
public bodies are strongly dependent on private capital to fund their spatial ambitions.
Consequently, negotiations to reach agreements on costs, benefits and risks have become
increasingly important in planning projects.
This is especially prevalent in projects that include adaptive re-use of cultural heritage.
Historically, governments were responsible for the protection, maintenance, restoration and finance
of built cultural heritage. In the last decade the central policy shifted from preserving the heritage
buildings through legal protection towards “preserving through development” (Janssen, Luiten,
Renes, & Rouwendal, 2014). As a result, heritage preservation needs to be integrated into urban
development plans. Although governmental parties, private developers, citizens and other actors
support the re-use of cultural heritage buildings, strong debates take place in relation to costs and
benefits. Actors perceive the value of heritage buildings differently. Some actors emphasize the
economic value, others the cultural-historical value, the aesthetic quality or the community
identity. Some benefits are intangible and therefore unlikely to generate direct economic benefit for
the investors. In this setting conflicts can easily arise and a satisfactory outcome for the actors
involved seems to depend heavily on the negotiation process. Hence, urban redevelopment projects
including the re-use of cultural heritage buildings are excellent cases for studying negotiation
processes.
When we started the study, the initiators of the projects had already begun to draft plans and
were seeking other actors who could join the planning process, bear risks and invest in the project.
This gave us the opportunity to follow the progress of the projects and gain insight into the
negotiations towards an agreement that defined the roles, tasks and responsibilities of the actors
 6 M. Baarveld et al.

involved, including risk distribution and the balancing of costs and benefits. As spatial ambitions
were already laid down but agreements were not yet made specific, conflicts over costs and benefits
and negotiations were to be expected. Table 2 summarizes the contextual characteristics of both
projects, to be discussed in more detail in the findings section.

Data collection
We studied the projects in real time and collected data on the two projects over the period 2009–
2013. Several sources were used. Our primary source was interviews with key actors who could
describe how the negotiations took place and why they acted as they did. Secondary sources were
documents including master plans, official decision documents of the city council, studies of the
cultural-historical elements, progress reports and news articles. These documents were used to
provide background information on the substance of plans and agreements, organizations and date
of events.
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To start the research, we developed insights into the projects’ contexts by holding open
interviews with the project managers of the organizations initiating the projects. For De:Werkplaats
this was the project manager from the Municipality of Tilburg and, for New Hembrug both the
project manager from the central government’s real estate agency (RVOB) and the planner from the
Municipality of Zaanstad. These informants provided an overview of events, the issues they had to
deal with, and an insight into the negotiations. Throughout the study period we kept in contact with
them to keep track of new developments and issues. Besides the interviews, documents were
reviewed to produce a timeline and identify phases of the project.
Next, in 2010 we conducted a series of semi-structured interviews with the project managers of
those organizations directly involved in the planning process and whose support was needed to

Table 2. Contextual characteristics of the two projects

New Hembrug De:Werkplaats
Size 44 ha 15 ha
Location Industrial area, along the North Sea Inner-city, near railway station in the
Canal, between the cities of Amsterdam city of Tilburg, in the south of the
and Zaanstad, in the north-west of the Netherlands
Netherlands
Cultural heritage 56 listed heritage buildings < 30 heritage buildings
Reason to start project End of military activities by Ministry of Ambition of municipality to strengthen
Defence city centre
Start project (year) 2003 2000
Signed cooperation 2012 2013
agreement (year)
Actors Ministry of Defence: (former) Municipality of Tilburg: local
Organization: role landowner authority, landowner, partner in joint
Central government Real Estate Agency venture
(RVOB): delegated agent to sell area, Private developer (VolkerWessels):
developer, member of steering developer, partner in joint venture
committee for redevelopment
Municipality of Zaanstad: local
authority, member of steering
committee for redevelopment
Province of Noord-Holland: regional
authority, member of steering
committee for redevelopment
 Planning Theory & Practice 7

implement the plans. In this interview round we focused on analysing the interests and issues of
each key actor. With the New Hembrug project we interviewed one representative of each of the
three organizations on the steering committee (RVOB’s project manager, the project manager of
the municipality, and the project manager of the province). With De:Werkplaats we similarly
interviewed one representative of both organizations in the joint venture (the project manager of
municipality and the project assistant of the private developer).
By 2013, both projects had defined their redevelopment strategy, and binding cooperation
agreements were signed that specified the ambition, the roles of the key actors and the distribution
of risks, responsibilities and tasks among them. Signing these agreements was seen as a major event
by the actors. Consequently, we held another round of semi-structured interviews with the key
actors involved. To gain a full picture of the process, we not only interviewed those actors who
were part of the formal cooperation (as interviewed in 2010) but also other actors who, according to
our informants, had influenced the process and thus might provide a useful different perspective on
the negotiations. In the New Hembrug case, we held eight interviews: three with RVOB personnel
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(a former project manager, the current project manager, and the planner), two people from the
Municipality of Zaanstad (the project manager and the head of planning staff), the Ministry of
Defence project manager, the province’s financial planner, plus a project manager from the
Ministry of Infrastructure. In the De:Werkplaats case we again interviewed eight informants: five
from the municipality (the project manager, the real-estate manager, the project director, the urban
planner and the financial planner), two from the private developer (the project manager and the
project assistant), an architect and a manager in charge of the buildings’ temporary use. In this
semi-structured interview round, we focused more specifically on the negotiation process leading
up to the final agreement. We asked the interviewees to describe the negotiations before the
agreement, any integrative and distributive negotiation behaviour in the process, the cooperation in
general and to what extent they were satisfied with the agreement.

Data analysis
The central focus in the case analysis was on the negotiation processes between the key actors in the
urban redevelopment projects. The basic framework of integrative and distributive negotiation
features (Table 1) was the starting point for analysis of the negotiation processes. The framework,
therefore, was a means to focus on specific subjects and to interpret the actors’ actions (Yanow &
Schwartz-Shea, 2006). Besides the negotiation process itself, we also analysed the projects’
contexts and outcomes. As Pettigrew (1997) observed, negotiation processes cannot be explained
by referring only to individual or collective behaviours and actions. They are dependent on their
unique development context in terms of location and organization, for example (Ruming, 2012).
Furthermore, the negotiation context is shaped by the actors involved and the issues discussed (Lax
& Sebenius, 2002). Hence, in gaining insight into the context of the negotiations, we described the
physical characteristics of the projects, the actors involved, what their interests and their specific
roles were, and what kinds of issues were negotiated. To analyse outcomes, criteria needed to be
chosen with reference to the purpose of the measurement, the evaluation’s specific subjects, and the
context (Alexander, 2009; Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006; Kanter & Brinkerhoff, 1981; Thompson
et al., 2010). Given that actor satisfaction is a key element in mutually beneficial agreements, we
analysed the extent to which actors were satisfied with the content of the agreement made during
the negotiation process, including its risk distribution, balancing of costs and goal achievement, and
their satisfaction with the process leading to the agreement.
We first carried out within-case analyses of each case before moving to a cross-case analysis.
We did this in an iterative manner, comparing empirical data with our initial theoretical concepts of
the basic framework to search for patterns and underlying mechanisms. First, we produced an initial
 8 M. Baarveld et al.

chronological timeline for each case, identifying events in the project. Second, we transcribed the
interviews and coded the interviews using Nvivo software, searching for contextual characteristics,
features of the negotiation process and of the outcome. To distinguish between integrative and
distributive negotiation, we inductively created a list of “catchwords”: words and synonyms related
to the features of integrative and distributive negotiation in our framework (Table 1). Using these
catchwords, we determined whether the behaviour of actors during the negotiation process was
directed more towards integrative or distributive negotiation. For example, if we found the phrase
“we informed each other” in the data, we coded the word “informed” and marked this as integrative
behaviour since “openly sharing information” is a feature of integrative negotiation.
Third, we compiled a case study report to reconstruct the process from the perspectives of the
various actors and to tell the story in their own words. This helped in becoming familiar with each
case, and allowed any patterns unique to one case to emerge before the data were generalized
(Eisenhardt, 1989). We then focused on the conflicting issues. For each such issue identified, we
summarized the related interests of actors, their negotiation behaviour, what caused shifts in
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behaviour, and how the issue was resolved (the outcome of that issue). The issues were then put in
time order on a white board, showing what happened in which phase of the project, and whether the
process could be characterized as generally integrative or distributive.
After we analysed the projects separately, we compared the two cases to identify similarities
and differences (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles & Huberman, 1994). In seeking patterns in the negotiation
processes of the two cases, we noted the phases in their planning processes and, when conflicting
issues arose, the content of such issues and the type of negotiations used to resolve them.
Specifically, we observed at which moments and under what circumstances deadlocks and impasses
occurred and how they were overcome. Subsequently, we compared the outcomes of the two cases
and explored to what extent differences and similarities could be explained by differences in the
negotiation processes.

The New Hembrug project

Context of New Hembrug
The area of New Hembrug is a former military complex of 44 hectares located between the cities of
Amsterdam and Zaanstad, in the northwest of the Netherlands, along the North Sea Canal with its
associated industrial areas. From 1895 until the 1970s the area was used for producing, testing and
storing ammunition by the Ministry of Defence. The area has 56 listed industrial heritage buildings
surrounded by trees, which gives the area a mysterious atmosphere (SteenhuisMeurs, 2010).
In 2003, all military activities ceased, the area was abandoned and was put up for sale. From that
moment, several actors became involved in planning a new future for the area. The Ministry of
Defence owned the land and aimed to sell it at the market price to recover the costs that had been
invested in maintaining the buildings and in soil remediation. The central government’s real estate
agency (RVOB) was commissioned by the Ministry to handle the sale and find a suitable buyer
within a reasonable time. The area is located within the Municipality of Zaanstad, and therefore
they are the legal authority for local spatial plans. As they owned neither the land nor the buildings,
they could have limited themselves to evaluating plans and granting building permits. However,
they were interested in creating a new high quality area and in preserving the heritage buildings and
so, over time, they became more actively involved (Gemeente Zaanstad, 2011a). For similar
reasons as the municipality, the Province of Noord Holland, the regional authority, became
involved in the project. To coordinate planning, the RVOB, the province and the municipality
formed a steering committee. Although these actors agreed on the potential of the area, plans were
not implemented for almost 10 years. Many issues were debated, most of them related to
characteristics that made a feasible redevelopment plan hard to identify: many of the heritage
 Planning Theory & Practice 9

buildings were in poor condition, there was serious soil pollution, and limitations on new housing
due to proximity to the harbour and airport (RVOB, gemeente Zaanstad, provincie Noord-Holland,
2011). The consequences of the economic crises also complicated the process, with private
developers unwilling to take over the area and realize new functions. The actors involved had
different, conflicting views on how to deal with these issues, and throughout the processes they
negotiated over tasks, responsibilities, risks, and finances. Several shifts in integrative and
distributive approach in the negotiation process can be seen during the project. Table 3 provides an
overview of the New Hembrug project.

Negotiation processes in the New Hembrug project

In 2003, RVOB started searching for opportunities to sell the area for a price that could cover
the costs already incurred by the Ministry of Defence. The reallocation procedure meant that
the state-owned land had first to be offered to other governmental departments. One option
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was to build a prison on the land but this would mean that the cultural heritage buildings
would not be preserved. Since preserving the heritage was the main goal of the province, they
resisted this idea. Eventually, in 2008 it was determined that a prison would not be realized,
and the province considered purchasing the area, including the existing buildings, and started
negotiations with RVOB. However, they could not come to an agreement: the province – as a
public organization – was unwilling to take on the risks associated with the ground pollution,
and RVOB would not lower the price as that would be contrary to their order from the
Ministry of Defence.
Once this potential deal was abandoned, and with no other government bodies showing any
interest in buying the property, the RVOB investigated selling the area to a private developer.
To guide this process, the RVOB, the province and the municipality established a steering
committee. Together they drew up a document with the main requirements, restrictions, and
ambitions for any redevelopment. This document formed the basis of a market consultation in 2009
to determine the conditions under which private developers would consider taking on the area.
Several developers gave their views, but none wanted to redevelop the area at their own risk. They

Table 3. Overview of the New Hembrug project

2011– 2012
2003– 2008 2008– 2011 Specifying cooperation and
Period Initiating the project Developing strategy agreement
Conflict issues Preserving and re-using deteriorating heritage buildings
Division of costs for clearing ground pollution and sanitation Specifying roles and
Deciding on a development strategy distribution of risks
Negotiation RVOB takes the lead, holds Holding on to positions, not Searching for new solutions,
process on to position, no sharing information, not willing to take risks,
cooperation controlling, inflexible, not applying pressure,
willing to take risks, identifying underlying
searching for new ideas interests
Integrative or Distributive Distributive →Integrative Distributive →Integrative
distributive?
Outcome £ £ Agreement over
redevelopment strategy
All actors satisfied
 10 M. Baarveld et al.

all agreed that the area had potential, but they argued that there were too many risks due to the
ground pollution, the many heritage buildings and their poor state, the unclear role of the
government bodies, and the area’s large size (Gemeente Zaanstad, 2010).
Despite the outcome of this market consultation, RVOB, reflecting their main function, clung to
the idea of selling the area to a private developer. To reduce the risks for a potential developer, the
Ministry of Defence agreed to clean up the most heavily polluted ground without transferring these
costs to a new owner. However, a substantial amount of new real estate would still be needed, in
addition to the existing buildings, to make the project financially feasible. The municipality thought
this might endanger the existing green character and mysterious atmosphere of the area. They
blamed the RVOB for failing to prevent the cultural heritage buildings deteriorating and felt that
RVOB did not acknowledge their main interest. Although they did not have legal or financial
resources to enforce maintenance of the heritage buildings, the local council kept raising this issue
(Gemeente Zaanstad, 2011a). According to an RVOB project manager,
“The municipality experienced the period of vacancy of the heritage buildings as excessive. They were
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agitated, dissatisfied and almost angry about the degeneration that threatened the buildings” (March 2013).
In turn, RVOB experienced the municipality as inflexible when it came to making exceptions for
New Hembrug, and too focused on executing yet more studies on the state of the cultural heritage
buildings and the ground pollution to reduce uncertainty, which RVOB considered sufficiently
investigated. This inflexibility frustrated RVOB’s plans for organizing events and finding
temporary use for the buildings. There were few options for creative solutions. According to a
project manager of the province,
“With every request for a permit to organize an event, the municipality dug its heels in. They wanted to
control everything, but that doesn’t work, because it is an area with a complex history” (December 2012).
In this period, the cooperation among the public parties became tense, and negotiations had a
distributive character. Distrust increased, information was not openly shared, the public partners
mainly worried about their own interests, were inflexible towards each other and hardly made any
effort to find creative solutions. Belief in the redevelopment possibilities was undermined when
private developers were not attracted despite the efforts to reduce risks and develop outline plans.
Options decreased further due to the decline of the real-estate market as a consequence of the
economic crisis.
During 2011, RVOB began to accept that a private developer could not be found who would
take over the area, and that the costs of the ground remediation would not be recouped. Two
broad scenarios were left: put a fence around the area and abandon it, or develop the area by
themselves. Furthermore, RVOB recognized that – as a part of central government – they had
to manage their land and cultural heritage responsibly (Gemeente Zaanstad, 2011b). The process
started shifting towards a more integrative form of negotiation when RVOB demonstrated its
own concerns with preserving the heritage buildings – the main interest of the municipality
and the province. This shift also seemed to be related to management changes at all three
governmental bodies. The new representatives were all personally driven to advance the New
Hembrug project, exchanged information openly and, according to our interviewees, were
seen as forming a strong team in the New Hembrug project’s steering committee. The RVOB,
municipality and province all sensed an urgency to act and were willing to actively participate
in the process which cleared the way for a renewed search for redevelopment strategies.
The shared ambition was clear: the area had to be transformed while respecting the
“mysterious” atmosphere, and the heritage buildings should be preserved and re-used wherever
possible. New Hembrug would become a mixed-use area with space for creative artists,
restaurants and bars, small retail units and leisure (RVOB, gemeente Zaanstad, provincie Noord-
Holland, 2011).
 Planning Theory & Practice 11

However, when it came to specifying roles and distributing risks, the negotiation process again
became distributive. RVOB put pressure on the municipality and the province to share the risks and
investments equally. According to a project manager of the municipality,
The RVOB strongly believed that “if we do this development ourselves, we do it together” and expected
the municipality to take risks. That was a tense moment, as our chairman clearly hinted that this was not
a possibility, that it was non-negotiable. However, the RVOB director kept pushing and suggested that
the total project would stop if the municipality did not act. (April 2013).
The negotiations over the distribution of the redevelopment risks almost reached deadlock. All
three actors had to consider what they were prepared to do to continue the project; was it acceptable
and legitimate, what were their limits, and were their efforts being balanced by what the others were
doing? Eventually RVOB realized that the municipality and the province were not going to come
round and agree to its wishes. The process then became more integrative when the municipality and
province stated clearly that they were not going to fulfil the wishes of RVOB. Rather, they showed
their willingness to participate in ways more appropriate to the tasks of regional and local
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authorities. As a result, RVOB switched its focus to other financial sources. They approached three
ministries, and all three were willing to grant financial aid of e10 million each, including the
Ministry of Defence, as “getting rid of Hembrug” became more important than recovering costs.
These decisions were seen as a major breakthrough in the process by all interviewees.
The next step was to commit the various government bodies by specifying the details of the
cooperation and coming to a formal agreement. Although all the actors had expressed their
willingness to advance the project, this process was far from easy. Promises were not sufficiently
specific or detailed, and this hindered progress and trust among the actors. To overcome these
issues three sessions were organized with an external mediator. In these sessions all the actors had
to specify their interests and aims, and the commitments they could make. Further, role-playing
exercises were used to gain a deeper understanding of each other’s underlying interests and internal
organizational difficulties. The interviewees believed that this had helped in understanding each
other and that these sessions were important in coming to an agreement and laying out the main
arrangements.
Once the parties had reached a broad agreement they had to construct a contract. This took some
time because they did not agree on the level of flexibility, the precise terms, and the contractual
format. However, by exchanging and revising proposed texts they became familiar with the contract.
Finally, the agreement, in which the ambition, roles, responsibilities and resources of each actor were
detailed, was signed in May 2012 (Gemeente Zaanstad, Provincie Noord-Holland, RVOB, 2012).

Outcome: the New Hembrug Agreement

The agreement was seen as a breakthrough by all the interviewees, and all the actors were satisfied
with the outcome of the process. Interviewees indicated that this was the best they could have
achieved in the current situation. The “what” and the “how’”had been defined and formed a basis
for future cooperation. Nevertheless, recouping the investments and identifying appropriate uses
that add to the value of the area remain challenges. The success of the project still strongly depends
on developments in the real-estate market.

De:Werkplaats project
Context of De:Werkplaats
The De:Werkplaats is located at a former 15º̄h (hectare) railway workplace near the central railway
station in the city of Tilburg in the south of the Netherlands. It is part of a larger project by the
municipality to improve the quality of the area and strengthen the city centre. The area has about
 12 M. Baarveld et al.

thirty historically valuable buildings built between 1867 and 1930, some of which have seen more
recent functional adaptions. Since 1990 the Municipality of Tilburg has been developing ideas to
strengthen the city centre. In a 2000 vision statement it was suggested that the municipality should
buy the former railway workplace to realize these ambitions. The municipality endorsed the area’s
potential and started negotiations with the owner, the national railway company, to move the
remaining activities elsewhere and take over the site. In 2007 the railway company and the
municipality agreed on transferring ownership of the site to the municipality at the end of 2010. The
municipality also committed itself to preserving the historically valuable buildings (Bilan, 2004;
Boei, 2008). The municipality was thus not only the local authority but became the landowner and
the owner of the heritage buildings, and consequently had several sometimes conflicting interests:
strengthening the city centre, recouping investments, reducing the risks associated with large-scale
developments, and preserving the heritage.
In order to reduce the risks and to gain expertise in real-estate development the municipality
organized a European tender in 2009 to select a private developer to cooperate in a joint venture,
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dividing risks and development rights equally (Gemeente Tilburg, 2009). One large private
developer, VolkerWessels, was willing to accept the conditions and ambitions of the municipality.
Their interests were twofold: to develop attractive real estate that could be sold for a good price, and
to construct those buildings themselves. The municipality and the private developer shared the
same aim: to redevelop the area into a dynamic and lively multifunctional area for arts, theatre,
education and living, while maintaining the old industrial atmosphere. However, in the planning
process conflicts arose on how to achieve this aim. Table 4 summarizes the De:Werkplaats project.

Negotiation processes in the De:Werkplaats project

The tendering process set the starting point for the cooperation between the municipality and the
private developer in a joint venture, and an initial cooperation agreement was signed in early 2010.
The first step in the cooperation was to formulate a vision and a programme. The municipality and

Table 4. Overview of the De:Werkplaats project

2011– 2013
2000– 2009 2009–2011 Specifying cooperation and
Period Initiating the project Developing strategy agreement
Conflict Buying the area and Re-using the heritage buildings and fitting them within the
issues moving the workplace development
Formulating a joint ambition in Specifying roles and
the form of a master plan distributing risks
Interpreting the master plan in
drawing up detailed plans
Investments for temporary use
Authority over spatial quality
Negotiation Municipality in the Searching for new ideas, Holding on to positions, not
process lead, a lack of close formulating a joint ambition, fully sharing information,
cooperation not fully sharing information demanding control, taking as
few risks as possible, searching
for new solutions
Integrative or Neither Integrative → Distributive Distributive → Integrative →
distributive Distributive and Integrative
Outcome x x Agreement an important basis
for future development
Parties not fully satisfied
 Planning Theory & Practice 13

the private developer started working on their joint ambition in an open, constructive manner, and
the process can be characterized as integrative. They drew up a master plan, picturing a financially
feasible real-estate programme. Specific arrangements for preserving the heritage buildings were
not made, and re-using the buildings appeared to be an ongoing issue in later phases of the project.
While drawing up the master plan, the municipality re-emphasized their ambition for the centre of
the area, and the private developer accepted this. Their master plan was presented in spring 2011
(Gemeente Tilburg, VolkerWessels and BDP Khandekar, 2011). The city council agreed with the
basic programme, but did not agree with the more detailed descriptions regarding retaining
flexibility to respond to changes in ambition or in the real-estate market (Gemeente Tilburg, 2011).
At the same time, the local University of Applied Science, the Library and several other cultural
organizations presented their own plan for the central area (Barcode Architects, 2011). Although
these actors were not involved in the master-plan process, the municipality and the private
developer adopted their plan as an elaboration of the master plan. As an intended new user, the
University of Applied Science placed several demands for its involvement in the plan. The
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municipality agreed with this, disregarding their agreement with the private developer and without
fully informing them. The interviewees from the municipality and from the private developer
described how this put pressure on the joint venture cooperation, with the process turning more
distributive in nature.
After finishing the master plan in spring 2011, the municipality and the private developer
continued working towards the final agreement with more detailed arrangements on roles,
responsibilities, risks and finances. During these negotiations, the impact of the economic crisis
became clearer: it would be harder to sell real estate and find new users. Consequently, both
actors agreed that mandatory agreements over the length of the project would be undesirable
(Gemeente Tilburg, 2012). Further, the private developer made clear that they would not take on
as much of the risk as initially agreed due to the declining real-estate market and increasing
uncertainties. In general, they had to become more cautious in taking risks. This statement
hardened the negotiations and they became distributive, especially since reducing risks was the
municipality’s main reason for seeking to cooperate with a private developer in the first place.
The municipality balanced taking back development risks against ending the cooperation.
It decided that the former was the best option to achieve its aims and minimize losses. However,
in exchange for this, it demanded more options for discontinuing the contract with the private
developer. In turn, the private developer was afraid that the municipality could too easily
disband the contract. Negotiations followed and resulted in splitting the project and the contract
into two phases. This was seen by both parties as a breakthrough in the negotiations as there was
now more room to manoeuvre and find new solutions. The private developer’s project manager
explained:
An important step was that we decided not to lay down everything to the end in detail, but insert a break
in the contract in 2018. [ . . . ] We both realized that we could not negotiate a solution if we insisted on
specifying arrangements through to the end, but that we could if we split the contract in two. So we did”
(July 2013).
The process then returned to a more integrative one: the actors searched for new possibilities,
traded risks and authority, communicated openly with each other and shared relevant information.
Next, arrangements on roles, responsibilities and tasks had to be laid down in an agreement.
This process was characterized by both integrative and distributive behaviours. The actors
searched for alternatives that could realize the redevelopment, but which also safeguarded their
own interests. Several disputes took place related to the plan and the programme: how to
interpret the master plan, temporary use of the heritage buildings, and authority over spatial
quality. The municipality and the private developer seemed to be interpreting and using the
 14 M. Baarveld et al.

master plan differently. The municipality saw the master plan as a broad framework that could
be flexibly elaborated in the detailed plans, whereas the private developer saw it as a blueprint
that guaranteed the agreed real-estate densities and thus ensured financial feasibility. Both
parties stuck to their respective positions and were unwilling to give in. Negotiations over the
authority for spatial quality were also difficult. According to the private developer’s project
assistant, “it was a breakpoint for the municipality” (July 2013). Eventually the private
developer accepted the demands of the municipality as it did not want the negotiations to
collapse, and considered the project and the relationship with the municipality more important
than this issue.
The final contract, specifying terms and conditions, now had to be drawn up, and the private
developer and the municipality worked together in short sessions. Halfway through this process
there was a change in some key individuals at the municipality, bringing in people who were not
previously involved in the project. They looked critically at the contract, and negative legal checks
meant that some parts had to be changed. This annoyed the private developer and the negotiations
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again became tense. As a municipality project manager put it,

“The cooperation shifted from very easy to hard. I think we caused this ourselves. We had doubts about
continuing, made decisions ourselves without informing them, and forced our ideas on some issues”
(August 2013).
The trust in each other that existed was damaged by changing ideas, holding on to positions, and
authority issues. Nevertheless, in July 2013, the definitive agreement between the municipality and
the private developer was signed and a formal joint venture was established to coordinate the area’s
development (Gemeente Tilburg and VolkerWessels, 2013).

Outcome: the De:Werkplaats Agreement

All the interviewees concurred that the final agreement constituted an important basis on which to
continue the project. However, they also indicated that they were not fully satisfied with some parts
of the agreement. Interviewees from the municipality were least satisfied with the distribution of the
risks and the fact that they still bore risks. The interviewees from the private developer would have
preferred other arrangements for authority over spatial quality. Also, with hindsight, those from the
municipality felt they should have created more options for temporary use, aimed for a lower
density and split the contract into several smaller parts. They saw this as probably being better
suited to the current real-estate market. However, such alternatives would have directly influenced
the financial feasibility of the master plan, making it harder to recover investments made by the
municipality and private developer.

Cross-case analysis of the negotiation processes

Context of urban redevelopment projects as the setting of the negotiation processes
The projects presented show some resemblance in terms of the steps taken and the negotiation
processes, although the local context of the projects differs. In both cases a public actor took the
lead and cooperated with others to realize urban redevelopment, create new uses and preserve
heritage buildings. At De:Werkplaats, the municipality bought the area themselves in order to
realize its ambitious city centre plan, and established a joint venture with the private developer to
share risks and responsibilities. In return, the private developer had the right to develop half of the
area. Consequently, they also shared decision-making power about the content of the plan and
planning process. At New Hembrug the Ministry of Defence and RVOB aimed to sell the area and
they did not intend to actively develop the area themselves. However, no other public or private
developer was willing to buy the land. As the central government was landowner and also had the
 Planning Theory & Practice 15

public responsibility to take good care of land and heritage buildings, they had to act and invest in
the area. Provincial and local government cooperated with the central government in a steering
committee to guide the planning process and safeguard the heritage buildings within the
redevelopment. In both projects conflicts centred on finding financially feasible re-use options and
developing workable plans. Actors had to deal with similar issues: preserving and re-using heritage
buildings, formulating joint ambitions, specifying roles and distributing risks, and formalizing
arrangements in a contract.
Certain contextual factors seemed to have a large impact on the negotiation process in both
projects. Both started before the economic crisis, and the actors had high ambitions with regard
to the quality of the redevelopment and positive expectations on the financial feasibility of
realizing these ambitions. During the economic crisis actors’ budgets were restricted, the real-
estate market weakened and profit uncertainties increased. All actors were reluctant to take risks,
and this made negotiations on roles and the distribution of risks more complex. At New
Hembrug, RVOB was unable to attract a private developer, and at De:Werkplaats the actors had
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to revise earlier cooperation terms. Alternatives for cooperation with other actors or for
redevelopment strategies were limited. Hence cooperation continued, but in ways other than
initially foreseen.
Further, actors who were not initially involved in the projects influenced the negotiation
processes. At New Hembrug the initial actors explicitly looked to other parties to search for a buyer,
and at a later stage involved three ministries to finance the project. A buyer was not found, but
involving the ministries was a successful strategy. Given that the ministries had no direct interest in
the project, issues were added to justify their investments. This amounted to a major breakthrough,
allowing the project to continue to the realization phase. Similarly at De:Werkplaats, other actors
became involved, for example in drawing up the master plan and in temporarily using the heritage
buildings. These actors not only created new opportunities, they also put pressure on the existing
cooperation between the municipality and the private developer because roles and responsibilities
were not clear and were poorly communicated. Thus, in practice, adding actors and associated
issues increased opportunities but also added complexity to the negotiations.

Both integrative and distributive approaches in dynamic negotiation processes

The conflicts that occurred during the planning process were handled in various ways. Integrative
and distributive negotiations took place throughout the planning processes in both projects. The
level of openness in communication, sharing information, and trust varied. At some moments trust
was mutual; actors actively sought new and creative solutions and shared information. At other
moments distrust increased, as actors strongly held on to their positions, were inflexible in their
ideas, and withheld information. Individual actions influenced the overall process dynamics,
resulting in a predominant strategy of either integrative or distributive negotiation at different
times. All the actors seemed to respond strongly to each other’s actions. For example, if actor A
started to demonstrate distributive behaviour, by withholding information or showing inflexibility
towards actor B’s request, actor B also shared less information and became less willing to help, and
so trust was damaged. As a result, the negotiation process became distributive. The process became
integrative again once one actor broke out of the negative spiral by displaying behaviour contrary to
the current predominant strategy.
Generally, the projects show that formulating ambitions is an integrative process, whereas
specifying roles, risks and responsibilities related to realizing these ambitions is a distributive
process. This makes sense, as during the first stage actors will explore the others’ interests and
opportunities of collective action. Therefore they need to communicate openly and share
information. In the next stage, when commitments have to be made effective, individual interests
 16 M. Baarveld et al.

might not to be fully satisfied and actors show a distributive approach. Taking a closer look at the
negotiation processes, however, shows that shifts between integrative and distributive strategies
occur throughout all phases of the planning process.
At the start of a cooperation, when actors need to formulate their joint ambition, the process can
be characterized as integrative negotiation. At De:Werkplaats, the municipality and private
developer established a joint venture and developed a master plan in an open, constructive manner.
They shared information and jointly searched for redevelopment strategies which would be in the
interest of both actors. At New Hembrug, the actors also defined their ambitions for the
redevelopment together when they established a steering committee. However, the process shifted
to distributive as RVOB held strongly to the position of selling the area to a private developer, did
not actively prevent deterioration of the heritage buildings, and consequently undermined the main
interest of the other actors. At a later stage, once RVOB had decided to develop the area
themselves, and showed understanding for the municipality’s and province’s interest of heritage
preservation, mutual trust increased and they again worked constructively together to draft the
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ambitions and search for alternative solutions. Showing understanding of the other’s interests,
sharing information, mutual trust and belief in opportunities, appear to have been important in this
stage of the projects.
Once ambitions had been broadly defined, arrangements on redevelopment details, organization
and finances had to be specified. Adding detail to the somewhat “vague” ambitions set in the master
plans and initial cooperation agreements raised conflicts. Instead of searching for solutions that
would achieve the ambitions, actors mainly focused on satisfying their own interests. For example,
in the beginning of New Hembrug, the municipality resisted most of RVOB’s ideas as they thought
these endangered its main interest, of preserving the cultural heritage site. In both projects, the
processes shifted to distributive negotiation as soon as the parties started to negotiate their roles and
the distribution of risks. Actors were reluctant to take on risks and strove to get the best deal that
safeguarded their interests. The private developer at De:Werkplaats and the municipality at New
Hembrug made strong statements about their preferred tasks and their positions regarding accepting
fewer risks. These claims were motivated by the increased uncertainties, which they could not
influence, in the declining real-estate market. At this point the actors were forced to consider
alternatives. In both projects the options were limited. At New Hembrug two options were open:
fence off the area and wait for better times, or redevelop the area without the desired involvement of
a private developer. Whereas RVOB wanted to share risks with the province and the municipality,
these parties made it clear that they were unwilling to do so. At De:Werkplaats, the private
developer argued they could no longer take on as much of the development risk as first intended,
and the municipality concluded they had two options: to either accept more of the risks or to end the
cooperation. For the actors in both projects, discontinuing the cooperation would mean the end of
the project, and that individual and shared ambitions would not be realized in the near future.
Conversely, continuing implied that some concessions would have to be made and that individual
interests might not be fully realized. These tough negotiations hampered the process and both
projects came close to deadlock situations.
In both projects, the clear statement concerning the actors’ limitations in taking on risks
appeared essential to overcome this deadlock. All interviewees considered the statements as
breakthroughs in both projects. Such an unequivocal statement forced the other parties to consider
their options in terms of realizing their individual interests and in trading off competing interests.
Hence, the statements encouraged actors to make informed decisions on future cooperation and to
consider the desirability of adjusting their positions. As such, the distributive behaviour of holding
strongly to one’s position and making a clear statement created an opportunity to integratively
search for alternatives. Within the new negotiation boundaries, parties started to search for possible
organizational and financial arrangements that would allow the project to be implemented.
 Planning Theory & Practice 17

Outcome: agreements were made but the level of satisfaction varied

In both projects the negotiation process resulted in an agreement that specified the future
cooperation of the actors – including roles, responsibilities, tasks and the distribution of risks.
However, the satisfaction levels of the actors varied. At New Hembrug the actors were satisfied:
although a private developer had not been attracted, the area would still be redeveloped and
heritage buildings re-used. They accepted they could not redevelop the area as first envisaged and
adopted a different redevelopment strategy that could satisfy their individual and common interests.
At De:Werkplaats, no party was fully satisfied because they all had to give up on some of their
important initial demands. Due to binding agreements signed at the start of the project and high
initial investments, both actors were limited in their room for manoeuvre. When they reduced their
demands, the actors did so because they thought the best thing was to continue with the project, but
afterwards some regretted decisions they had made. In conclusion, a combination of integrative and
distributive approaches were both needed to handle conflicts and bring the planning process
forward to an agreement. However, the development of the negotiation process appears also to have
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influenced the actors’ satisfaction: not all individual interests were fully satisfied.

Discussion and conclusions

Our analysis of the negotiation processes in two urban redevelopment projects contributes to
knowledge on the dynamics between integrative and distributive approaches – in order to deal with
conflicts in planning practice, and how these processes encourage the achievment of mutually
beneficial agreements. The framework we developed served as a starting point for structurally
analysing these processes. The urban redevelopment projects with cultural heritage buildings were
complex, and the initiating actor needed to cooperate with other actors to fund the project, split
risks and satisfy individual and collective interests. The case study shows that despite there being a
general consensus among actors on the desirability of redeveloping the areas, and preserving the
cultural heritage buildings, many conflicts arose throughout the planning processes. These conflicts
were not solved only through dialogue but also required tough negotiations. A good example of the
limitation of building agreements only through dialogue was seen in the risk averse claims made by
parties in the De:Werkplaats case when the real-estate market declined and financial uncertainties
increased. The deadlock caused was only broken after tough negotiations, resulting in a
redistribution of risks and responsibilities that both actors eventually supported.
The cases demonstrate that in the negotiation process both integrative and distributive
approaches are essential in coming to a mutually beneficial agreement. Throughout the planning
phases actors shift back and forth between those approaches, depending on the issues at stake, the
actions of other actors, and the previous history of the process. Through searching for joint
ambitions, sharing information and showing understanding of the other’s interest, a common
ground for cooperation is found and commitment to realize individual and collective goals is
created. Only with open communication and sharing information are actors able to explore the
others’ interests and opportunities of collective action. This integrative approach, quite similar to
the characteristics of the consensus-building dialogue, appeared to be relevant throughout the
planning process, especially at the beginning of the project and to break a negative spiral when
alternatives had to be found for changing circumstances. However, when those relatively vague
ambitions and roles had to be made specific, negotiations became distributive. Our two cases show
that when individual interests were endangered, actors stopped sharing information, did not listen
to other ideas and were reluctant to change position. As each actor appeared to react strongly to the
other’s action, the negotiations reached an impasse. However, the distributive negotiation was also
of value in bringing the planning process forward. It appeared essential to make strong statements
part way through the process for the cooperation to continue. Such statements rescoped the
 18 M. Baarveld et al.

negotiations, enabling parties to overcome a deadlock and continue the cooperation in an

integrative process.
The finding that both integrative and distributive negotiations are important is consistent with
the claims of negotiation scholars who argue that actors need to balance integrative and distributive
negotiation (Lax & Sebenius, 1986) to avoid suboptimal outcomes (Schei et al., 2011; Thompson
et al., 2010) and to achieve a good deal while strengthening relationships and reputations (Allred,
2000; Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007). These scholars argue that actors will try to satisfy their own
interests and to get the best deal. To achieve this, they should reject any outcome that is worse than
their best alternative to a negotiated agreement (Fisher et al., 1991; Lax & Sebenius, 1986).
In practice this is complicated as alternatives are generally unknown, uncertain or too vague.
Further, some agreements made in a previous stage are binding, or have large financial
consequences if an actor discontinues the cooperation. Hence, actors are limited in their options to
switch to an alternative. In these particular cases the actors gave up some of their initial demands in
order to continue the project and satisfy just some of their interests. Hence, the considerations
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should be seen as a trade-off between competing interests.

In future urban redevelopment projects it is expected that those trade-offs will have to be made
more often due to shrinking public budgets and increasing uncertainties and risks in many urban
redevelopment projects as a consequence of the changed economic circumstances. Actors will be
challenged in flexibility and in finding alternatives to satisfy their interests. Opportunities might be
found in widening the scope of the negotiations through involving more actors with various
interests and resources, as according to Lax and Sebenius (2002) the power to realize joint value
lies in the differences between actors. As such, dealing with conflict through a wide and open search
for alternatives to realize joint ambitions, acknowledgment of others’ underlying interests and clear
statements of an actors’ bottom-line in negotiation, will be even more essential in planning practice
to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes.

Funding
The work reported here was part of a research programme involving the University of Twente, Platform 31,
four municipalities (Tilburg, Hengelo, Enschede and Zaanstad), the Dutch Government’s real estate and
development company (RVOB) and the Netherlands Railways Company (NS). The parties contributed
financially, granted access to their documentation, and met to discuss the research findings.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors
Marlijn Baarveld is a PhD researcher at the Department of Construction Management and
Engineering of University of Twente, the Netherlands. Her research focuses on the negotiation
process and value-capturing strategies to re-use cultural heritage buildings in urban redevelopment
projects. She is currently working as a consultant at the Dutch Cultural Heritage Agency.
Marnix Smit is Assistant Professor at the Department of Construction Management and
Engineering of the University of Twente, the Netherlands, and has experience in research and
lecturing in urban planning and public– private partnerships (PPP). Marnix holds an MSc in Public
Administration and a PhD in Urban Planning. His PhD research explored how the public interest
could be safeguarded in PPP projects in urban developments.
Geert Dewulf is Dean of the Faculty of Engineering Technology and Professor of Planning and
Development at the University of Twente, the Netherlands. In 2012 –2013, he was the UPS
 Planning Theory & Practice 19

Foundation Visiting Professor at Stanford University. Geert Dewulf has written numerous
publications on PPP. His research focuses on public – private governance issues and strategic
planning.

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