GR No L-22272 Maranan vs Perez Case

Rogelio Corachea – Passenger

Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. Found guilty, he was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6,000. Appeal
from said conviction was taken to the Court of Appeals. 1äwphï1.ñët

On December 6 1961, while appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia Maranan, Rogelio's
mother, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas to recover damages from Perez and
Valenzuela for the death of her son. Defendants asserted that the deceased was killed in self-defense,
since he first assaulted the driver by stabbing him from behind. Defendant Perez further claimed that the
death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable.

The court a quo, after trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded her P3,000 as damages against defendant
Perez. The claim against defendant Valenzuela was dismissed. From this ruling, both plaintiff and
defendant Perez appealed to this Court, the former asking for more damages and the latter insisting on
non-liability. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction earlier mentioned,
during the pendency of the herein appeal, and on May 19, 1964, final judgment was entered
therein. (Rollo, p. 33).

Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. Manila Railroad Co, that the
carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the passengers. The attendant facts
and controlling law of that case and the one at bar are very different however. In the Gillaco case, the
passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty employee. As this
Court there found:

x x x when the crime took place, the guard Devesa had no duties to discharge in connection with
the transportation of the deceased from Calamba to Manila. The stipulation of facts is clear that
when Devesa shot and killed Gillaco, Devesa was assigned to guard the Manila-San Fernando (La
Union) trains, and he was at Paco Station awaiting transportation to Tutuban, the starting point of
the train that he was engaged to guard. In fact, his tour of duty was to start at 9:00 two hours after
the commission of the crime. Devesa was therefore under no obligation to safeguard the
passengers of the Calamba-Manila train, where the deceased was riding; and the killing of Gillaco
was not done in line of duty. The position of Devesa at the time was that of another would be
passenger, a stranger also awaiting transportation, and not that of an employee assigned to
discharge any of the duties that the Railroad had assumed by its contract with the deceased. As a
result, Devesa's assault can not be deemed in law a breach of Gillaco's contract of transportation
by a servant or employee of the carrier. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Now here, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the passenger, in whose
hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the contract of carriage. In other words, unlike
the Gillaco case, the killing of the passenger here took place in the course of duty of the guilty employee
and when the employee was acting within the scope of his duties.

Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 which, unlike the
present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers absolute liability for the safety of passengers
against wilful assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees. The death of the passenger in
the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from liability. It is true that
Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code on fortuitous events has been substantially reproduced in Art. 1174 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines but both articles clearly remove from their exempting effect the case where
the law expressly provides for liability in spite of the occurrence of force majeure. And herein significantly
lies the statutory difference between the old and present Civil Codes, in the backdrop of the factual
situation before Us, which further accounts for a different result in the Gillaco case. Unlike the old Civil
Code, the new Civil Code of the Philippines expressly makes the common carrier liable for intentional
assaults committed by its employees upon its passengers, by the wording of Art. 1759 which categorically
states that
 Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have
acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common
carriers.

The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers1 are new and were taken from Anglo-
American Law.2 There, the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by its
drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the
carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely.3

Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the
employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the act be
within the course of employment only.4

Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is enough that
the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the
carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's
orders.5 The carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the
passengers from assaults committed by its own employees.6

As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the rule based on the
second view. At least three very cogent reasons underlie this rule. As explained in Texas Midland R.R.
v. Monroe, 110 Tex. 97, 216 S.W. 388, 389-390, and Haver v. Central Railroad Co., 43 LRA 84, 85: (1)
the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full measure of
protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the law, inter alia from
violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers, but above all, from the acts
of the carrier's own servants charged with the passenger's safety; (2) said liability of the carrier for
the servant's violation of duty to passengers, is the result of the formers confiding in the servant's
hands the performance of his contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the
duty of protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law; and (3) as between the
carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the
carrier's employees against passengers, since it, and not the passengers, has power to select and
remove them.

Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with due regard
not only to their technical competence and physical ability, but also, no less important, to their total
personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.

Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case, therefore, the lower court rightly adjudged the
defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code. The dismissal of the claim against the
defendant driver was also correct. Plaintiff's action was predicated on breach of contract of
carriage7 and the cab driver was not a party thereto. His civil liability is covered in the criminal
case wherein he was convicted by final judgment.

In connection with the award of damages, the court a quo granted only P3,000 to plaintiff-appellant. This is
the minimum compensatory damages amount recoverable under Art. 1764 in connection with Art. 2206 of
the Civil Code when a breach of contract results in the passenger's death. As has been the policy followed
by this Court, this minimal award should be increased to P6,000. As to other alleged actual damages, the
lower court's finding that plaintiff's evidence thereon was not convincing,8 should not be disturbed. Still,
Arts. 2206 and 1764 award moral damages in addition to compensatory damages, to the parents of the
passenger killed to compensate for the mental anguish they suffered. A claim therefor, having been
properly made, it becomes the court's duty to award moral damages.9 Plaintiff demands P5,000 as moral
damages; however, in the circumstances, We consider P3,000 moral damages, in addition to the P6,000
damages afore-stated, as sufficient. Interest upon such damages are also due to plaintiff-appellant. 10

Wherefore, with the modification increasing the award of actual damages in plaintiff's favor to P6,000, plus
P3,000.00 moral damages, with legal interest on both from the filing of the complaint on December 6,
1961 until the whole amount is paid, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects. No
costs. So ordered.