PUBCORP Elman TSN
PUBCORP Elman TSN
1
ISSUE HELD
Whether or not petitioner, as Chairman of the NCC and No, it reinforces the dedication of public officers to their
EXPOCORP ’98, is a public officer as defined under RA 3019. duty.
Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by
HELD its holder not for his own personal gain but for the benefit of the
YES, he is a public officer. The elements of a public office public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding accountability
are complied with. The office was created by law by virtue of AO and service with responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency,
223 and EO 128. They were issued by the President upon whom patriotism and justice, all government officials and employees
executive powers are vested. NCC is created to implement the have the duty to be responsive to the needs of the people they are
provisions of the Constitution. Clearly, the NCC performs called upon to serve.
sovereign function. It is therefore a public office, and petitioner Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in
as its chair, is a public officer. the performance of their duties. This presumption necessarily
Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and employees. RA 9335
1989 defines who public officers are. A definition of public operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by providing a
officers cited in jurisprudence is that provided by Mechem, a system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging
recognized authority on the subject. A PUBLIC OFFICE is the the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC to exceed their
right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, revenue targets and optimize their revenue-generation capability
for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure and collection.
of the creating power, an individual is invested with some The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be is required to rebut it. It cannot be overturned by mere
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so conjecture or denied in advance (as petitioners would have the
invested is a public officer. It includes the delegation of sovereign Court do) specially in this case where it is an underlying principle
functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, to advance a declared public policy.
continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation Petitioners' claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn
of the position as an office. Melchem describes the delegation to BIR and BOC officials and employees into "bounty hunters and
the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government as mercenaries" is not only without any factual and legal basis; it is
the most important characteristic in determining whether a also purely speculative.
position is a public office or not. Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public
NCC performs executive functions. Promotion of officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional
industrialization and full employment is a fundamental state performance. A system of incentives for exceeding the set
policy. NCC performs sovereign functions. It is a public office, expectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept of
and petitioner is a public officer. Salary is a mere incident and public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces
forms no part of the office. dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public
service of deserving government personnel.
ABAKADA GURO PARTYLIST vs. PURISIMA
562 SCRA 251 (August 14, 2008) FIGUEROA vs. PEOPLE
498 SCRA 298 (August 9, 2006)
Public office is a public trust.
Constitutionality of RA 9335, which provides for a The operation of a market is not a governmental
system of rewards and incentives for BIR and BOC function. It is undertaken by the LGU in its private
officials and employees. and proprietary capacity.
FACTS Whether or not a member of the market committee is
This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent a public officer.
respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) FACTS
9335 (Attrition Act of 2005), which was enacted to optimize the Rivera filed an information for libel against Figueroa and
revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Flaviano regarding an article written in the People’s Daily Forum.
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The Rivera heads a vendor’s federation at the Bangkerohan public
law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to market.
exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards Petitioners were found guilty. CA affirmed the decision of the
and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives trial court.
Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board To exonerate them from liability, it is contended by
(Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the petitioners that Rivera is a public officer, and on this premise,
BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of they contended that the published article can be considered
employment status. within the purview of privileged communication.
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in ISSUE
excess of their revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Whether or not Rivera is public officer, in which the
Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any published article can be considered within the purview of
incentive or reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the privileged communication
BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess HELD
collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue. NO, Rivera is not a public officer. The published article
ISSUE is not within the purview of privileged communication.
Whether or not such law conferring such benefits is A public office is the right, authority and duty, created
violative of the concept of public accountability? and conferred by law, by which an individual is invested with
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some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be A public office is the right, authority and duty, created
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by
invested is a public officer. The most important characteristic law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
that the creation and conferring of an office involve a delegation functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the
to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; Notwithstanding that Javier came from the private
that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either sector to sit as a member of the NBDB, the law invested her with
legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, to be exercised for the some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so
public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the that the purpose of the government is achieved. In this case, the
individual is not a public officer. government aimed to enhance the book publishing industry as it
Rivera cannot be considered a public officer. Being a has a significant role in the national development. Hence, the fact
member of the market committee did not vest upon him any that she was appointed from the public sector and not from the
sovereign function of the government, be it legislative, other branches or agencies of the government does not take her
executive or judicial. The operation of a public market is not a position outside the meaning of a public office. She was
governmental function but merely an activity undertaken by the appointed to the Governing Board in order to see to it that the
city in its private proprietary capacity. Furthermore, Rivera's purposes for which the law was enacted are achieved. The
membership in the market committee was in representation of Governing Board acts collectively and carries out its mandate as
the association of market vendors, a non-governmental one body. The purpose of the law for appointing members from
organization belonging to the private sector. the private sector is to ensure that they are also properly
Even if we were to pretend that Rivera was a public represented in the implementation of government objectives to
officer, which he clearly is not, the subject article still would not cultivate the book publishing industry.
pass muster. It is required that it be a “fair and true report, made
in good faith, without any comments or remarks.” Even a mere GALERO vs. CA
cursory glance at the article reveals that it is far from being that. 559 SCRA 11 (July 21, 2008)
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IN RE: GODOFREDO DE LEON government-owned and controlled corporation. [as PNCC
(October 17, 2008) Assistant Manager]
2nd offense: By altering indicated payee in a check
Public officers and employees must live up to the voucher which was supposed to be partial payment of PNCC of
strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness, the sinking fund to a ban.
honesty, and diligence in their service. Petitioner assailed the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan
FACTS contending that he is not a public officer, since PNCC is a GOCC
In support of his promotional appointment as Clerk III, without an original charter.
De Leon submitted a Personal Data Sheet (PDS) dated April 8, ISSUE
2005 showing that he is a Career Service Sub-Professional Whether or not petitioner, as an employee of PNCC, is a
eligible, and a Report of Rating allegedly issued by the CSC public officer under RA 3019.
showing that he passed the Career Service Sub-Professional HELD
examination held in Pasig, Rizal on November 20, 1977, with a NO, he is not a public officer. PNCC has no original
rating of 78.77%. It was found out that respondent’s name was charter as it was incorporated only under the general law on
not included in the Passed/Failed Masterlist of eligibles and that corporations.
the eligibility he claimed belonged to his brother Reynaldo De The only instance where the Sandiganbayan has
Leon. Reynaldo's name was tampered in the authenticated jurisdiction over a private individual is when the latter conspires
Report of Rating dated July 18, 2005 that the respondent with a public officer either as co-principal, accomplice or
submitted. De Leon was found guilty of Dishonesty and accessory.
Falsification of Official Document. In the instant case, such is not the situation. Thus,
ISSUE Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction.
Whether or not respondent is guilty of Dishonesty and
Falsification of Official Document? PEOPLE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
HELD (February 16, 2005)
Yes, he is liable for acts of dishonesty and falsification of
public document. The respondent's acts of falsifying and The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is separate
submitting a falsified Certificate of Eligibility and making a false and distinct from CSC.
statement in his PDS fully fall within the definition of dishonesty. FACTS
Dishonesty comes in many forms, but is invariably Two (2) separate informations for violation of Section
present when a falsity is made in any material fact or when fraud 3(e) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
or deception is practiced. It is understood to imply a disposition Practices Act, were filed with the Sandiganbayan against Alas.
to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of The charges emanated from the alleged anomalous advertising
sincerity, probity, or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and contracts entered into by Alas, in his capacity as President and
straightforwardness; or a disposition to defraud, deceive or Chief Operating Officer of the Philippine Postal Savings Bank
betray. (PPSB), with Bagong Buhay Publishing Company which
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public purportedly caused damage and prejudice to the government.
Officials and Employees enunciates the State's policy of Alas filed a motion to quash the informations for lack of
promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in jurisdiction.
the public service. In the Judiciary, this translates to the need for Respondent court ruled that PPSB was a private
every employee to be an example of integrity, rectitude, and corporation and that its officers, particularly herein respondent
honesty. This is the burden that every judicial employee carries Alas, did not fall under Sandiganbayan jurisdiction.
in the performance of his or her duties. ISSUE
The respondent, unfortunately, failed to live up to this Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
standard of conduct. Public office is a public trust; public officers presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of GOCCs
and employees, particularly those involved in the dispensation of organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code for
justice - from the highest to the lowest in rank - must live up to purposes of the provisions of RA 3019, otherwise known as the
the strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness, honesty, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
and diligence in their service. HELD
YES, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction in this case.
PPSB fits the bill as a GOCC, and organized and
CLASSIFYING PUBLIC OFFICERS OF GOCCs UNDER RA 3019: incorporated under the Corporation Code as a subsidiary of the
Philippine Postal Corporation (PHILPOST). More than 99% of the
MACALINO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN authorized capital stock of PPSB belongs to the government while
376 SCRA 452 (2002) the rest is nominally held by its incorporators who are/were
FACTS themselves officers of PHILPOST. Section 32 of RA 7354,
Petitioner Felicito Macalino and his wife Liwayway Tan otherwise known as the Postal Service Act of 1992, expressly
were charged with two (2) estafa cases filed before the sanctioned the creation of PPSB
Sandiganbayan. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is separate and
1st offense: By allegedly superimposing the name of his distinct from the Civil Service Commission.
wife’s company to make it appear that the document draft was On March 30, 1995, Congress, pursuant to its authority
payable to it, where in truth and in fact, such was payable to the vested under the 1987 Constitution, enacted RA 7975
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), a maintaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over
presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
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owned or controlled corporations without any distinction (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
whatsoever. government-owned and controlled corporations, state
The legislature, in mandating the inclusion of universities or educational institutions or foundations.”
“presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government- It is of no moment that the position of petitioner is
owned or controlled corporations” within the jurisdiction of the merely classified as salary grade 26. While the first part of the
Sandiganbayan, has consistently refrained from making any above–quoted provision covers only officials of the executive
distinction with respect to the manner of their creation. branch with the salary grade 27 and higher, the second part
The deliberate omission, in our view, clearly reveals the thereof “specifically includes” other executive officials whose
intention of the legislature to include the presidents, directors or positions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are by
trustees, or managers of both types of corporations within the express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan whenever they are involved in court.
graft and corruption. Had it been otherwise, it could have simply Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over
made the necessary distinction. But it did not. petitioner together with Farahmand, a private individual charged
together with her.
GEDUSPAN vs. PEOPLE To recapitulate, petitioner is a public officer, being a
451 SCRA 187 (February 11, 2005) department manager of Philhealth, a government-owned and
controlled corporation. The position of manager is one of those
There are certain positions which have been placed mentioned in paragraph a, Section 4 of RA 8249 and the offense
under the authority of the Sandiganbayan although for which she was charged was committed in relation to her
the public officer is not necessarily occupying a office as department manager of Philhealth. Accordingly, the
Salary Grade 27 and above position. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over her person as well as the
FACTS subject matter of the case.
An information was filed against Geduspan and
Farahmand, PhilHealth Regional Manager/Director and ALZAGA, BELLO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, 505 SCRA 849 (October 27, 2006)
Tiong Bi, Inc., respectively. Geduspan released the claims of
patients to Tiong Bi Medical Center instead of West Negros Managers of AFP-RSBS, a GOCC, are under the
College. Geduspan’s position was classified under salary grade jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
26. FACTS
Geduspan argues that her position is not within the Informations were filed against petitioners relative to
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as provided for in RA 8249, alleged irregularities which attended the purchase of four lots by
which defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation
ISSUE Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). Alzaga was the Head of the Legal
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Department when one of the lots were purchased. Bello was a
a regional director/manager of a GOCC organized and Police Superintendent and he succeeded Alzaga as Head of the
incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of RA Legal Department. It was during his tenure when the other three
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act lots were purchased. Both were Vice Presidents of AFP-RSBS.
HELD Satuito was the Chief of the Documentation and Assistant Vice
YES, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. President of the AFP-RSBS.
The records show that, although Geduspan is a Director ISSUE
of Region VI of the Philhealth, she is not occupying the position of Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
Regional Director but that of Department Manager A. It is over them and their alleged offenses because the AFP-RSBS is a
petitioner’s appointment paper and the notice of salary private entity created for the benefit of its members and that
adjustment that determine the classification of her position. their positions and salary grade levels do not fall within the
The position of Department Manager A is classified jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
under salary grade 26. That position was among those HELD
enumerated in paragraph 1(g), Section 4a of RA 8249 over which YES, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction: petitioners. The AFP-RSBS was established by virtue of P.D. No.
“Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise 361 (1973) to guarantee continuous financial support to the AFP
original jurisdiction in all cases involving: military retirement system. It is similar to the GSIS and the SSS
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise since it serves as the system that manages the retirement and
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act pension funds of those in the military service.
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the The character and operations of the AFP-RSBS are
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are imbued with public interest thus the same is a government entity
officials occupying the following positions in the government, and its funds are in the nature of public funds.
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of While the first part of section 4 covers only officials of
the commission of the offense; the executive branch with the salary grade 27 and higher, the
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of second part “specifically includes” other executive officials whose
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘Grade positions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are by
27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: xxx court. In the latter category, it is the position held and not the
salary grade which determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Thus, presidents, directors or trustees, or
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managers of government owned and controlled corporations, are HELD
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It is a fundamental principle that a public office cannot
Alzaga and Bello were Head of the Legal Department be regarded as the property of the incumbent, and that a public
while petitioner Satuito was Chief of the Documentation with office is not a contract. Though there is no vested right in an
corresponding ranks of Vice Presidents and Assistant Vice office, which may be disturbed by legislation, yet the incumbent
President. These positions are not specifically enumerated in RA. has, in a sense, a right to his office. If that right is to be taken
No. 8249; however, their ranks as Vice Presidents and Assistant away by statute, the terms should be clear in which the purpose
Vice President are even higher than that of “managers” is stated. Decision of the trial court is correct.
mentioned in RA. No. 8249.
The Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the AFP-RSBS is ABEJA vs. TAÑADA
a government-owned and controlled corporation and that it has 236 SCRA 60 (August 20, 1994)
jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners who were Vice
Presidents and Assistant Vice President when the charges against Public office is not a property, which passes to the
them were allegedly committed. heirs. The right to hold public office can’t be given to
the heirs since the right is purely personal.
The characteristics of a public office (Laurel vs. Desierto) No succession of public position to heirs.
according to Mechem include: FACTS
Petitioner Evelyn Abeja and private respondent
1. There is a delegation of sovereign functions (the most Rosauro Radovan were candidates for the office of municipal
important characteristic); mayor in Pagbilao, Quezon during the 1992 nationwide elections.
2. It is created by law; Among them, Radovan was declared winner by a
3. Oath, Salary, Continuance (Salary is a usual but not a margin of 22 votes. Hence, Abeja filed an election protest
criterion in determining the nature of the position, it is covering the 22 precincts.
simply incidental but forms no part of the office; As to On the other hand, Radovan filed his counter-protest
continuance, NCC may be characterized as honorary office); postulating that the revision of the 36 precincts will only be
4. Its scope of duties; conducted after proving in the revision of the 22 precincts that
5. The designation of the position as an office. Abeja is leading by at least 1 vote.
After the case was submitted for resolution, Radovan
died. He was then substituted by the vice-mayor and surprisingly,
HONORARY OFFICE AD HOC/LUCRATIVE OFFICE
by his wife Ediltrudes Radovan.
Salary or fee is ISSUE
annexed Salary, compensation, Whether or not the substitution of the deceased mayor
Supposed to be fee, is annexed by his wife, pending the election protest, is valid in view of the
accepted for public Office for profit claim of counter damages.
good HELD
NO, it is not valid. Public office is personal to the
Bar Question: Characteristics of a Public Office incumbent and is not a property which passes to the heirs. The
heirs may no longer prosecute the deceased protestee’s
A public office is not a property within the purview of counterclaim for damages against protestant for that was
the Constitution. It cannot be the subject of inheritance. Public extinguished when the death terminated his right to occupy the
Office is wholly personal to the incumbent and cannot be passed contested office.
on to his heirs. Nobody has a vested right over it.
DE CASTRO vs. COMELEC
SEGOVIA vs. NOEL 267 SCRA 806 (February 7, 1997)
47 Phil. 543 (March 4, 1925)
An election protest survives the death of the
Though public office cannot be regarded as a protestant. The election protest continues despite
property right, such could not be taken away from a the death of the public officer.
qualified appointee through a retroactive application Public office is purely personal while an election
of a legislature. protest is not.
No express provision of the law depriving the The Vice Mayor in this case is a real party in
incumbent of his office. interest.
FACTS FACTS
Segovia was appointed Justice of the Peace of In the 1995 elections, both petitioner Jimmy de Castro
Dumanjug, Cebu on January 21, 1907. He occupied his position and private respondent were proclaimed duly elected officials of
until having passed 65 when he was ordered by the Secretary of Gloria, Oriental Mindoro. They were the mayor and vice-mayor,
Justice on July 1, 1924 to vacate the office. Since that date, Noel, respectively.
the auxiliary Justice of the Peace has acted as Justice of the Peace During his incumbency, the rival candidate of de Castro
of Dumanjug. Segovia instituted this action. Judgment of the trial filed an election protest. It was during the pendency of the
court was rendered in favor of petitioner and against respondent. protest that the protestant died. RTC dismissed the protest
ISSUE holding that it is a personal action. The extinguishment of the
Whether or not Act No. 3107 is unconstitutional in that protest follows the death of protestant.
it impairs the contractual right of the petitioner to an office
6
Upon hearing of the dismissal, the vice-mayor filed a Indeed, to hold otherwise would be a mockery of a
Motion to intervene, but it was denied. fundamental rule that public office is a public trust and would
ISSUE render futile the constitutional dictates on the promotion of
Whether or not the private respondent is allowed to morale, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness and courtesy
intervene in the election protest. in the public service.
HELD
YES, he is allowed to intervene. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. SUMILANG
While the right to public office is personal and exclusive 271 SCRA 315
to the public officer and not a property transmissible to his heirs
upon his death, still an election protest is another thing. Public office is a public trust.
An election contest is imbued with public interest FACTS
because it involves the paramount need of dispelling once and for Petitioner is the Fiscal Audit Division of the Office of the
all the uncertainty that beclouds the real choice of the electorate Court Administrator (OCA) while respondents are: Judge Augusto
with respect to who shall act as their leader and discharge the Sumilang -- of MTC, Pila, Laguna; Felicidad Malla – counter
functions of their government. After all, it does not involve mere interpreter; and Edelita Lagmay, Nieva Mercado – stenographic
conflicting private aspirations. reporters.
Also, private respondent (as a vice-mayor) has a real The Fiscal Audit Division of OCA conducted an on-the-
interest in the case with respect to the rules on legal succession. spot audit examination of the official cashbook and other
ACTIO PERSONALIS MORITUM CUM PERSONA – upon the death documents of said lower court. It was then discovered that
of the incumbent, no heir of his may be allowed to continue several anomalous transactions have taken place.
holding his office in his place. Thus, the following were filed:
1. Administrative complaint – for misappropriation of
CITY MAYOR vs. CA funds deposited by a plaintiff in a
182 SCRA 785 certain civil case, to be handed over to the clerk of court
of SC
Public office is a public trust. 2. Complaint (against Malla only) – for removing judicial
FACTS records outside court premises
Private respondent in this case is a chief veterinarian of During the investigation, it was first alleged by Malla
Zamboanga City. An administrative complaint was filed against that she and judge Sumilang withdrew the money from the bank
him by his three (3) employees for dishonesty, oppression, and under the belief that the plaintiff might demand the money upon
disgraceful and immoral conduct. the termination of the case. Later, she executed an affidavit that
The findings are as follows: she lent the sums of money to her co-employees including the
City Mayor Climaco found private respondent guilty of wife of the judge and the rest, for her personal needs.
the charge and penalized him with ‘forced resignation without Judge Sumilang contended that he had no knowledge of
prejudice to reinstatement’. the irregularities. Malla for her part averred that she only took
The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) found him the court records for a while and returned them after 5 hours.
guilty only of improper conduct with a penalty of ‘reprimand and ISSUE
warning.’ Whether or not respondents are guilty of the charge.
The Civil Service Commission (CSC) reinstated HELD
Climaco’s decision. YES, they are guilty. The evidences presented were
The Court of Appeals reinstated the MSPB decision sufficient to convict them.
modifying the penalty thereof to “6 months suspension without Malla should suffer the penalty of forfeiture of her
pay”. It further ordered his reinstatement with full back wages accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any
after having served the penalty. Hence, this petition. branch, etc. of the government. Other co-respondents were also
HELD found guilty. Judge Sumilang was also found guilty in the
For the sake of his former subordinates and his own management of his court.
sake, and bearing in mind that a public officer must be held by a The court emphasized the constitutional tenet that a
person who is both mentally and morally fit, the Court finds “public office is a public trust. All government officials and
private respondent guilty of “dishonesty, oppression, and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
disgraceful and immoral conduct” and “grave misconduct” in them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency,
office and he is hereby imposed the penalty of dismissal pursuant act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.”
to the provisions of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 30 series of
1989.
Also, the order of payment of back salaries to private OATH OF OFFICE:
respondent was improper. Section 78 of the LGC provides for the
conditions under which a public servant who was suspended or MENDOZA vs. LAXINA
dismissed by reason of an administrative charge, may be entitled G.R. No. 146875 (July 14, 2003)
to full back wages. FACTS
Under the said provision, it is required that the private Laxina took his oath and assumed office as the duly
respondent must be exonerated of the charges. In the case at bar, proclaimed and elected barangay captain of Barangay Batasan
it was shown that private respondent was not cleared of the Hills, Quezon City. Roque Fermo, his rival candidate, filed an
charges. election protest wherein Fermo was declared as the winner in
the Barangay Elections.
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Laxina vacated the position and relinquished the same to Fermo. GENERAL RULE: An individual cannot be compelled to
However, the COMELEC annulled the order which granted the accept public office because it would violate the
execution of the decision pending appeal on the ground that involuntary servitude clause of the Constitution
there existed no good reasons to justify execution. EXCEPTIONS:
The COMELEC issued a writ of execution directing
Fermo to vacate the office of Barangay but refused to 1. Article 234 of the Revised Penal Code – When one is
acknowledge receipt thereof. This did not, however, prevent elected by popular election, he cannot refuse to discharge
respondent and his staff from discharging their functions and the duties of the office without legal motive.
from holding office at the SK-Hall of Batasan Hills. 2. Section 4 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution –The
Finally, on November 16, 1999, respondent took his government may call upon the people to render personal or
oath of office as Barangay Captain and Roque Fermo turned over military service when the office is essential to the defense of
to respondent all the assets and properties of the barangay. the State.
In 2000, petitioner barangay councilors filed a 3. Posse Comitatus – This justifies the rendering of patrol
complaint agains for violation of the anti-graft and corrupt duty to maintain public service. Posse comitatus is a
practices act and falsification of legislative documents against common law term that compels citizens to help the
Laxina and all other barangay officials who signed the questioned community in the maintenance and preservation of peace
resolution and payroll. They contended that defendants made it and tranquility.
appear in the payroll that he and his appointees rendered
services starting November 8, 1999 when, in truth, they USURPER, DE FACTO AND DE JURE PUBLIC OFFICER:
commenced to serve only on November 17, 1999 after
respondent took his oath and assumed the office of barangay A. De Facto Officer
chairman. One who, in good faith, has possession of the office and
ISSUE has discharged duties pertaining thereto and is thus
Is the taking of an oath of office anew by a duly legally entitled to the emoluments of the office
proclaimed but subsequently unseated local elective official a Performs valid acts that may be performed by a de jure
condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption in officer
office where the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) orders the It is conferred by the law in order to protect the public
relinquishment of the contested position? He is entitled to emoluments during his actual service
HELD
An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public Requirements of a de facto officer:
office; a prerequisite to the full investiture with the office. It is a.) Physical possession
only when the public officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath b.) Regularly created office
that his right to enter into the position becomes plenary and c.) Color of title either through appointment or
complete. However, once proclaimed and duly sworn in office, a election
public officer is entitled to assume office and to exercise the
functions thereof. The pendency of an election protest is not Q: When is a person a de facto officer?
sufficient basis to enjoin him from assuming office or from A: where the duties of the office are exercised under any of
discharging his functions. Unless his election is annulled by a the following circumstances:
final and executory decision or a valid execution of an order
unseating him pending appeal is issued, he has the lawful right to 1.) Without a known appointment or election, but
assume and perform the duties of the office to which he has been under such circumstances of reputation or
elected. acquiesce as were calculated to induce people,
In the case at bar, Laxina was proclaimed as the winner without injury, to submit to or invoke his action,
in the 1997 Barangay Elections in Batasan Hills, Quezon City; he supposing him to be the officer he assumed to be;
took his oath on May 27, 1997 and thereafter assumed office. He or
is therefore vested with all the rights to discharge the functions 2.) Under color of a known and valid appointment or
of his office. Although in the interim, he was unseated by virtue of election, but where the officer has failed to conform
a decision in an election protest decided against him, the to some precedent requirement or condition
execution of said decision was annulled by the COMELEC. (e.g. taking an oath or giving a bond); or
3.) Under color of a known election or appointment,
OMBUDSMAN vs. JURADO but void because
G.R. No. 154155 (August 6, 2008) a.) The officer was not eligible
b.) There was a want of power in the electing or
HELD appointing body
When a public officer takes his oath of office, he binds c.) There was a defect or irregularity in its
himself to perform the duties of his office faithfully and to use existence
reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the 4.) Under the color of an election or an appointment
benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of his duties, he is to by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law,
use that prudence, caution and attention which careful men use before the same is adjudicated to be such.
in the management of their affairs. Public officials and employees
are therefore expected to act with utmost diligence and care in Note: Here, what is unconstitutional is not the act creating the
discharging the duties and functions of their office. office but the act by which the officer is appointed to an office
legally existing
8
B. Usurper De Jure Officer vs. De Facto Officer
One who undertakes to act officially without any title or
color of right BASIS DE JURE DE FACTO
One who takes an office outside of legal parameter,
subject to collateral or direct attack Requisites 1.) Existence of a de 1.) De jure office
All acts are null and void jure office
2.) Must possess the 2.) Color or right
Requirements of a usurper: legal or general
a.) No color of title qualifications for acquiescence
b.) He assumes himself to be an officer in the eyes of the office in by the public
the public question 3.) Actual physical
3.) Must be lawfully possession of
Usurper to De Facto chosen to such the office in
When people acknowledge the acts of the usurper office good faith
through the passage of time, they acquiesced to the acts 4.) Must have
of the usurper and comply without protest qualified himself
to perform the
De Facto Officer vs. Usurper duties of such
office according
BASIS DE FACTO USURPER to the mode
prescribed by
Nature Officer under One who takes law
any of the 4 possession of an
circumstance office and Basis of Right: He has the Reputation: He has
s mentioned undertakes to act authority lawful right/title to the possession and
above officially without the office performs the duties
any authority, under color or right
either actual or without being
apparent technically qualified
in all points of law
Basis of Color of right None. He has to act
Authority or title to neither lawful
office title nor color of
right or title to How Cannot be ousted Only by a direct
office. ousted proceeding (quo
warranto) and not
collaterally
Validity of Valid as to the Absolutely void:
"Official" Acts public until They can be
such time as impeached at any Validity of Valid: subject to Valid as to the
his title to the time in any official acts exceptions (e.g. they public until such
office is proceeding were done beyond time as his title to
adjudged (unless and until the scope of his the office is
insufficient he continues to authority) adjudged
act for so long a insufficient
time as to afford a
presumption of
his right to act) Rule on Entitled to Entitled to receive
compensati compensation as a compensation only
on matter of right during the time
C. De Jure Officer when no de jure
One who has the lawful right in the office but who is not in officer is declared
possession thereof The principle of "no
work, no pay" is not He is paid only for
Requisites of a de jure officer applicable to him. actual services
a.) Existence of a de jure office rendered by him.
b.) Must possess the legal qualifications for the office in
question
c.) Must be lawfully chosen to such office Points to Remember:
d.) Must have qualified himself to perform the duties of
such office according to the mode prescribed by law USURPER - an individual who undertakes to act officially without
any title or color of right, one who takes an office outside of legal
parameter; subject to direct or collateral attack
9
USURPER to DE FACTO – when people acknowledge the acts of the affected persons are entitled to the payment of salaries
usurper through the passage of time, they acquiesced to the acts for services actually rendered at a rate fixed in their
of the usurper promotional appointments.
As a chain reaction of the disapproval of Arimao’s
DE FACTO OFFICER – applies to semblance of authority; but if promotional appointment as Director II, Taher’s appointment to
appointment or creation of the office is against law or Education Supervisor II was likewise invalidated. The efficacy of
Constitution, the office does not legally exist. Thus, the appointee Taher’s appointment was dependent on the validity of Arimao’s
is classified as a plain usurper. promotional appointment which in turn was subject to the
outcome of the protest against it.
REMEDY: the aggrieved party must file a quo warranto petition Thus, Arimao and Taher were reverted to their former
within one (1) year from the time of his removal. positions. Arimao should have been allowed to re-assume her
position of Education Supervisor II as of the said date, and
RELATED CASES: thereafter remain in the said office until she was dropped from
ARIMAO vs. TAHER the rolls in 1999. Taher, in turn, should have been made to
498 SCRA 76 (August 7, 2006) return to her former position.
During Taher’s occupancy of the position of Education
De facto officer entitled to emoluments pertaining to Supervisor II after Arimao’s promotional appointment had been
the office during the period of the performance of disapproved, respondent should be deemed a de facto officer
such functions. only. A de facto officer is “one who has the reputation of being
FACTS the officer he assumes and yet is not a good officer in point of
Arimao was appointed as Director II, Bureau of Non- law.” He is one who is in possession of the office and discharging
formal Education, DECS-ARMM. Thereafter, Taher was appointed its duties under color of authority, and by color of authority is
Education Supervisor II. Arimao’s appointment, however, was meant that derived from an election or appointment, however
protested on the ground that said appointment did not pass irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere
through any evaluation by the personnel selection board. Such volunteer. The difference between the basis of the authority of a
appointment was eventually, disapproved by CSC. Arimao was de jure officer and that of a de facto officer is that one rests on
ordered to be reverted to her former position of Education right, the other on reputation.
Supervisor II. However, Taher continued to report as Education A rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from
Supervisor II. a de facto officer the salary received by the latter during the time
Taher, unaware that Arimao was granted a study leave, of his wrongful tenure. A de facto officer, not having a good title,
filed a complaint relative to petitioner’s continued absence. Thus, takes the salaries at his risk and must, therefore, account to the
Arimao was declared to have been Absent Without Leave and de jure officer for whatever salary he received during the period
directed that she be dropped from the payroll by the CSC. But of his wrongful tenure. Taher should account to Arimao for the
thereafter, Arimao was ordered to reassume her former position salaries she received from the time the disapproval of Arimao’s
as Education Supervisor II by ARMM Regional Director Misuari. promotion became final, up to the time when Arimao was
Taher filed a Petition for Prohibition as she stands to declared on AWOL and dropped from the rolls. However, Taher
suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury if she is removed may be allowed to keep the emoluments she received during said
from the office which she has held for more than five years. period, there being no de jure officer at the time.
ISSUE There is no question that Taher discharged the duties of
Who, as between Arimao and Taher, is entitled to the Education Supervisor II from the time she was appointed to the
position of Education Supervisor II position and even after her appointment was invalidated as a
HELD result of the invalidation of petitioner’s promotional
Neither Arimao nor Taher is entitled to the position of appointment. In view of the services Taher rendered to the
Education Supervisor II. TESDA and the people of the ARMM, it would be iniquitous to
Arimao cannot be reinstated by mere directive of the deny her the salary appertaining to the position corresponding to
ARMM Regional Governor. With the finality of the AWOL order the period of her service.
and her having been dropped from the rolls, Arimao legally lost However, Taher cannot continue her unauthorized
her right to the position of Education Supervisor II. occupancy, notwithstanding the fact that the position of
The finality of the disapproval of Arimao’s promotion, Education Supervisor II has been vacant since 1999. Absent any
as well as that of the Order declaring petitioner on AWOL and showing that she has been reappointed to the position after
dropping her from the rolls, is no longer disputed. Thus, as found petitioner was declared AWOL and dropped from the rolls,
by the CSC in its Resolution No. 020743, TESDA has no legal respondent cannot lay a valid claim thereto.
obligation to reinstate Arimao to the position of Education
Supervisor II. This, however, should not be construed as a MENZON vs. PETILLA
declaration that Taher is entitled to the position of Education 197 SCRA 251 (1991)
Supervisor II.
According to the Section 13, Rule 6 of the Omnibus A de facto officer is entitled to receive compensation
Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292, all appointments involved for actual services rendered by him.
in a chain of promotions must be submitted simultaneously for HELD
approval by the Commission. The disapproval of the The petitioner’s right to be paid the salary attached to
appointment of a person proposed to a higher position the Office of the Vice Governor is indubitable. The compensation,
invalidates the promotion of those in lower positions and however, to be remunerated to the petitioner, following the
automatically restores them to their former positions. However, example in C.A. No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code,
10
and pursuant to the proscription against double compensation as, recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the
with his existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized by office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable
law for the Office of the Vice Governor. grounds since it seems unjust that the public should benefit by
There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the the services of an officer de facto and then be freed from all
Office of the Vice Governor under color of a known appointment, liability to pay any one for such services. Any per diem,
by the alter ego of the President, the Secretary of Local allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by
Government, after which petitioner took his oath of office, the virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned positions
appointment, thus, have color of validity. At the very least, the may, therefore be retained by them.
petitioner is a de facto officer entitled to compensation.
The petitioner, for a long period of time, exercised the MALALUAN vs. COMELEC
duties attached to the Office of the Vice Governor. He was 254 SCRA 400 (March 6, 1996)
acclaimed as such by the people of Leyte. Upon the principle of
public policy on which the de facto doctrine is based and basic De Facto Officer v. Usurper.
considerations of justice, it would be highly iniquitous to now FACTS
deny him the salary due him for the services he actually rendered Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent Jose
as the acting Vice Governor of the Province of Leyte. Evangelista were both mayoralty candidates in Kidapawan, North
Cotabato during the 1992 national and local elections.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Among them, Evangelista was proclaimed winner by a
194 SCRA 317 (1991) margin of 706 votes. This prompted Malaluan to file an election
protest. RTC then declared him as the duly elected mayor by a
In cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto margin of 154 votes, and made Evangelista liable for all the legal
officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the expenses.
office and has discharged the duties pertaining Malaluan immediately assumed office through an
thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the Execution Pending Appeal. Evangelista appealed to COMELEC. It
office, and may in an appropriate action recover the ordered Malaluan to vacate and also made him liable for damages
salary, fees and other compensations attached to the (emoluments from April 1994-1995).
office. ISSUES
FACTS 1. Whether or not Malaluan is a de facto officer
Two (2) petitions were consolidated which seek a 2. Whether or not Malaluan should be held liable for
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 damages
issued by President Aquino. E.O. 284 allows a member of the HELD
Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other (1) YES, he is a de Facto officer. He has to be
appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition distinguished from a “Usurper” who undertakes to act officially
to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the without any title or color of right.
government and government corporations and receive the The fact that petitioner was only proclaimed by the RTC
corresponding compensation. (and not by COMELEC) does not make his position illegal. It has
The court declared E.O. 284 as constitutionally infirm. to be remembered that both RTC and COMELEC have the
Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet concurrent power to proclaim winners in the electoral process.
members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in Thus, being a de facto officer, who in good faith has had
addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) possession of the office and had discharged the duties pertaining
positions in the government and government corporations, thereto, Malaluan is legally entitled to the emoluments of the
Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple office. He need not reimburse Evangelista.
offices or employment in direct contravention of the express (2) NO, Malaluan should not be held liable for damages.
mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code mandates that the
prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the award of compensatory damages is allowed only if it is duly
1987 Constitution itself. proven that the losing party is directly or indirectly had
Now, what happens to respondent-officials during their committed any wrongful or unlawful breach of obligation, which
tenure in the questioned positions? resulted to his proclamation. In the instant case, such was not
HELD proven.
In this case, the court ordered certain respondent-Cabinet
members to immediately relinquish their other offices or ENGAÑO vs. CA
employment, as herein defined [those additional duties or 493 SCRA 324 (June 27, 2006)
functions not required by the primary functions of the official
concerned or not held in an ex-officio capacity], in the government, Entitled to the compensation due to the office
including government-owned or controlled corporations and although he clearly lacked the requisites to occupy
their subsidiaries. such position.
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents FACTS
may be considered de facto officers and as such entitled to Alit occupied, since July 1999, the position of Jail/Chief
emoluments for actual services rendered. It has been held that Superintendent, Deputy Chief, Bureau of Jail Management and
"in cases where there is no de jure, officer, a de facto officer, who, Penology (BJMP). On March 29, 2001, he was designated Officer-
in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged in-Charge (OIC) of the Bureau in view of the resignation of then
the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the BJMP Director Jacob. Engaño, on the other hand, held during the
emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action
11
period material the position of Jail Senior Superintendent of the 1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress of the
BJMP. Philippines confirmed the appointment. Petitioner sought
For the position of Director of BJMP, despite Secretary clarification from the Office of the President as to the expiry date
Lina's recommendation, the President, appointed Engaño instead of her term of office. The Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a
of Alit, who was the only one who fully met the CSC Qualification letter dated April 07, 1998 opined that petitioner's term of office
Standards for the position in question. would expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999.
Engaño appeared to have assumed the post of BJMP Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in
Chief. Alit instituted quo warranto proceedings against Engaño. office after February 02, 1999. The General Counsel, Commission
Eventually, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of on Audit, issued an opinion that "the term of Commissioner
Alit since Engaño does not possess the minimum qualifications Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in her
required by law for the position of Director of BJMP. CA affirmed appointment conformably with the constitutional intent.
the decision of the trial court. Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas
Meanwhile, Engaño retired, he having reached U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance No. 99-002-101 (99),
compulsory retirement age as of that date. Subsequently, disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed private petitioner and her co-terminus staff, effective February 02, 1999.
respondent Alit BJMP Director. ISSUE
ISSUE Whether or not Gaminde should receive salary for the
Whether Engaño is entitled to salary differential, service rendered after the expiration of her term.
emoluments, rata, allowances, rank of director and all benefits HELD
attached to the position of Chief, BJMP, being unlawfully and The appointment extended to her by President Fidel V.
arbitrarily deprived by DILG Secretary Lina Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999.
HELD However, she served as de facto officer in good faith until
The present petition must be dismissed for having February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and
become moot and academic due to supervening events, namely, other emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the
the compulsory retirement of Engaño from the service, and the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary
appointment of Alit as Director of the BJMP. and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminus staff.
Engaño’s money claim allegedly arising from his failure
to assume the position of Director, BJMP and damages is NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION vs. COA
untenable. A public office is not a property within the context of 437 SCRA 657 (September 8, 2004)
the due process guarantee of the Constitution. There is no such FACTS
thing as a vested interest in a public office, let alone an absolute National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government
right to hold it. Except constitutional offices which provide for agency tasked to receive, process and review amnesty
special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said applications. Ex-officio members are the Secretary of Justice,
to have any vested right in a public office or its salary. It is only National Defense and Interior Local Government. They turned
when salary has already been earned or accrued that said salary over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid
becomes private property and entitled to the protection of due honoraria. However, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed the
process. payment of such honoraria.
Engaño served as head of the BJMP for six (6) days only, ISSUE
but as a de facto officer at best. And while a de facto officer is Whether or not the payment of honoraria should be
entitled to some form of compensation, Secretary Lina and disallowed
Alit cannot be held personally liable for Engaño’s claim HELD
for salary, RATA and other benefits. The BJMP cannot also be COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant per
compelled to pay since it was not a party in the petition diem, honoraria or any allowance whatsoever to the
below for quo warranto, nor in the appellate proceedings representatives. The representatives assumed their
before the CA. responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but by mere
Neither is Engaño entitled to any damages. As it were, designation from the ex officio members who were themselves
the records are bereft of any showing that either Alit or Secretary designated as such. An appointment is the selection by the
Lina acted in a willful, arbitrary, baseless, or wrongful manner, as proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers
Engaño alleges. It is obvious that both, in good faith, believed that and functions of a given office. A designation merely connotes an
Engaño was unqualified for the contested position, as was imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person
subsequently found to be the case by the trial court and then by already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment.
the CA. It does not entail payment of additional benefits. Since the ex-
officio member is prohibited from receiving additional
GAMINDE vs. COA compensation, so is his representative. The representatives are
(December 13, 2000) usurpers; they are not entitled to something their own
principals are prohibited from receiving.
De Facto Officer in good faith is entitled to receive
salary for the services rendered.
FACTS QUO WARRANTO PROCEEDING:
On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines
appointed petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim, A Quo Warranto Proceeding
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She assumed office on is a special civil action, a demand by the state upon some
June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September 07, individuals or corporations to show by what right they
12
exercise some right or privilege appertaining to the state MENDOZA vs. ALLAS
which, according to the Constitution and the laws of the 302 SCRA 623 (February 4, 1999)
land, they can legally exercise by virtue of a grant or
authority from the state. A Quo Warranto Proceeding is directed against the
is a special civil action filed before the court by a person person, not to the office.
claiming to be entitled to a public office or position A Quo Warranto Proceeding can be filed only by a
unlawfully held or exercised by another. person who has interest, claim or legal standing.
FACTS
A Quo Warranto Proceeding can only be commenced by the: Petitioner Pedro Mendoza was with the Bureau of
Solicitor General; or Customs since 1972. Eventually, he was appointed as Director III.
The person claiming to be entitled to a public office or In 1993, he was temporarily designated as “Acting
position unlawfully held or exercised by another District Collector”. In his place, respondent Ray Allas was
appointed as Acting Director III, but Mendoza still continues to
The aggrieved party must file a quo warranto petition receive the salary and benefits of Director III.
within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of In 1994, he was terminated in view of Allas’
the petitioner to hold such office or position. (Section 11, Rule 66 appointment as Permanent Director III. He then filed a petition
of the Revised Rules of Court). It must be filed within the said for quo warranto against Allas. RTC held in his favor, that the
period to provide stability in the service so that public business appointment of Allas is void.
may not be unduly hampered. While the case was pending on appeal, Allas was once
again promoted to the position of Deputy Commissioner. The
RELATED CASES: disputed position was now occupied by Godofredo Olores who
TARROSA vs. SINGSON was not a party to the case.
232 SCRA 555 (May 25, 1994) Mendoza proceeded with the case against Olores
contending that the nullity extends to his successor-in-interest.
Quo Warranto Proceeding; Appointments. ISSUE
FACTS Whether or not Olores should be ousted from his
Private respondent Gabriel Singson was appointed position upon the allegation that the nullity of the position held
Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) by President extends to the successor-in-interest.
Ramos in 1993, effective on the same year. HELD
Petitioner Jesus Armando Tarrosa, in his capacity as a NO, he should not be ousted. The rule that “a judgment
taxpayer, challenged the said appointment holding that such was against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his
not submitted for confirmation to the Commission on successor-in-office” is not applicable in quo warranto cases.
Appointments. He relied on RA 7693, the law creating the BSP as The writ of quo warranto is never directed to an officer
the “Central Monetary Authority of the Philippines. as such, but always against the person.
Section 6, Article II of RA 7693 – Composition of the In the case at bar, the petition was filed solely against
Monetary Board reads: Allas. What was threshed out before the trial court was the
xxx The governor of BSP shall be the head of a qualification and right of petitioner on the contested position
department and his appointment shall be subject to the against Allas, not against Olores.
confirmation by CA. xxx Also, Allas cannot be held personally liable for
For their part, respondents contend that said petitioner’s backwages and benefits. He was merely appointed.
appointment is not among the appointments which have to be
confirmed by CA, referring to Section 16, Article VII of the Note: In this case, the successor is not a party to the Quo
Constitution. Warranto Proceeding; Bureau of Customs being not impleaded as
ISSUES party.
1. Whether or not Tarrosa has the capacity to challenge
the appointment of Singson.
2. Whether or not the appointment was validly made.
HELD B. CIVIL SERVICE
(1) NO, he has no capacity. Tarrosa filed the petition in
his capacity as a mere taxpayer. He is not a person claiming to be Scope:
entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised The Civil Service embraces the employees in all
by Singson. He failed to prove that he is entitled to the branches, subdivisions and instrumentalities, and
controverted position. agencies of the Government, including government-
(2) YES, the appointment was validly made. The court’s owned and controlled corporations with original
ruling in the case of Calderon v. Carale states that “Congress charter [Section 2(1) B- Article IX of the 1987
cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the CA and Constitution]
require confirmation of appointment of other government
officials not expressly mentioned in the 1st sentence of Section 16, Related laws/provisions:
Article VII of the Constitution. Article IX-B, Sec. 2(3) of the 1987 Constitution
PD 807, Sec. 36
EO 292, Sec. 46
13
Purpose/Objective of the Civil Service System: apply to his position. Such request was denied. Ortizo filed a
complaint for prohibition and injunction.
Purpose of the Civil Service: ISSUE
To professionalize and improve efficiency in public service Whether or not Ortizo has a valid cause of action
To promote good governance and integrity despite his failure to exhaust administrative remedies
HELD
Essential Characteristics of the Civil Service System: YES, Ortizo has a no valid cause of action. There is
Security of tenure and Merit and Fitness failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Law and jurisprudence are clear and incontrovertible on the
RELATED CASE: exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission on all cases
MERAM vs. EDRALIN involving personnel actions including reassignment. Disciplinary
154 SCRA 238 cases and cases involving personnel actions affecting employees
in the civil service – – including appointment through
Objective of the Civil Service Law; certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment,
Basis of system is on merit and fitness; security of detail, reassignment, demotion and separation, and employment
tenure. status and qualification standards–are within the exclusive
FACTS jurisdiction of the CSC. The CSC is the single arbiter of all
Private respondent Filipina Edralin (training officer of controversies pertaining to the civil service.
Bureau of Food and Drugs) was proposed for appointment to the Being an employee of the NIA, Ortizo is covered by the CSC.
position of Administrative Officer V of the Ministry of Natural Being an NIA employee covered by the Civil Service Law, Ortizo
Resources. should have first complained to the NIA Administrator, and if
However, petitioner Meram was appointed because of necessary, then appeal to the CSC. If a litigant goes to court
her qualifications and being next-in-rank. Thus, respondent without first pursuing his administrative remedies, his action is
wrote a letter to the Office of the President (President Marcos) premature, and he has no cause of action to ventilate in court.
introducing herself as the wife of Efren Edralin of Ilocos Norte. There is no convincing evidence of grave abuse of discretion
Her request was given due course. on petitioner’s part. Ortizo speculated that petitioner’s real
ISSUE intent in reassigning him was to create a vacancy in his position
Whether or not the appointment was validly made. so that petitioner could appoint someone close to him. This is a
HELD mere allegation which private respondent failed to substantiate.
NO, it was not valid. Official functions are presumed to be regular unless proven
The very purpose of the CS Law dictates that persons otherwise. This case is not an exception to the general rule on
who are qualified and next in rank should be given preferential exhaustion of administrative remedies.
consideration when filling up a vacated position. Appointment in
the CS Law should be based on merit and fitness, not on blood
ties. The act of the Office of the President violates the objective of LAW ON ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION vs. PUBLIC
the said law. SCHOOL TEACHERS:
Edralin is also estopped from questioning the orders of
the MSB and CSC since she submitted to the jurisdiction of both The exclusive authority of the Civil Service Commission over
bodies by filing her Motion for Reconsideration and Appeals with all personnel actions, promotions, assignments, transfers where the
them. issue and administration against public office are involved is
modified, viz:
GENERAL RULE: The Civil Service Commission is the
sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service; Under the new law, Magna Carta Act for Public Teachers
it exercises exclusive jurisdiction over all cases (RA 4670), it is the Department of Education that has the
involving personnel actions, promotions, assignments, exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving public school teachers.
transfers, etc. Prior to this Magna Carta law, the CSC has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Department of Education. This was not
RELATED CASE: included in RA 4670. Thus, the CSC does not have original
CORSIGA vs. DEFENSOR jurisdiction over an administrative case against a public school
391 SCRA 267 (October 28, 2002) teacher.
Law and jurisprudence are clear and Jurisdiction over administrative cases of public school
incontrovertible on the exclusive jurisdiction of the teachers is lodged with the Investigating Committee created
Civil Service Commission on all cases involving pursuant to Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School
personnel actions including reassignment, etc. Teachers (RA 4670). It is now being implemented by Section 2,
FACTS Chapter VII of DECS order No. 33, S. 1999, otherwise known as
Ortizo was the Senior Engineer B in the National the DECS Rules of Procedure.
Irrigation Administration (NIA), Jalaur-Suague River Irrigation
System, Region VI. Corsiga, then Regional Irrigation Manager of
the NIA, Region VI, issued Regional Office Memorandum (ROM)
No. 52, reassigning Ortizo to Aganan-Sta. Barbara River Irrigation
System, likewise to assist the Irrigation Superintendent thereat.
Ortizo requested for exemption stating that rotation does not
14
RELATED CASES: As petitioner is covered by R.A. 4670, it is the Investigating
EMIN vs. DE LEON Committee that should have investigated his case.
(February 27, 2002) However, at this late hour, the proceedings conducted by the
public respondent CSC can no longer be nullified on procedural
CSC does not have original administrative grounds. Under the principle of estoppel by laches, petitioner is
jurisdiction over a public school teacher; now barred from impugning the CSC’s jurisdiction over his case.
Under the principle of estoppel by laches, petitioner Here what is crucial is that the CSC had afforded petitioner
is barred from impugning the CSC’s jurisdiction over sufficient opportunity to be heard and defend himself against
his case. charges of participation in faking civil service eligibilities of
FACTS certain teachers for a fee. Not only did he answer the charges
Appointment papers for a change of status from provisional before the CSC Regional Office but he participated in the hearings
to permanent under RA 6850 of teachers were submitted to the of the charges against him to the extent that we are left with no
Civil Service Field Office-Cotabato at Amas, Kidapawan, Cotabato. doubt that his participation in its proceedings was willful and
Attached to these appointment papers were photocopies of voluntary.
certificates of eligibility of the teachers. It was found that said Participation by parties in the administrative proceedings
applications for civil service eligibility under R.A. 6850 were without raising any objection thereto bars them from raising any
disapproved. However, the certificates of eligibility they jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered
submitted were genuine as their control number belonged to the against them. In the case at bar, petitioner raised the issue of lack
batch issued. But the records showed that these certificates were of jurisdiction for the first time in his amended petition for
never issued to any one. review before the CA.
The teachers appeared and gave their sworn statements
pointing to petitioner as the person who gave them the R.A. 6850 AMPONG vs. CA
certificates of eligibility they had attached to their appointments 563 SCRA 293 (August 26, 2008)
for a fee. Upon finding a prima facie case, petitioner was formally
charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct Supreme Court is given exclusive administrative
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. supervision over all courts and judicial personnel.
CSC found him guilty. FACTS
On appeal, petitioner avers that as a teacher, original Petitioner Sarah P. Ampong and Decir were public
jurisdiction over the administrative case against him is lodged school teachers under the supervision of the Department of
with a committee and not with the CSC, as provided for by RA Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). Later, Ampong transferred
4670 otherwise known as the “Magna Carta for Public School to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Alabel, Sarangani Province,
Teacher.” where she was appointed as Court Interpreter III.
ISSUE On July 5,1994, a woman representing herself as Evelyn
Whether or not the CSC had original jurisdiction over the Decir went to the Civil Service Regional Office (CSRO) No. XI,
administrative cases against the public school teachers Davao City, to claim a copy of her PBET Certificate of Eligibility.
HELD During the course of the transaction, the CSRO personnel noticed
NO, CSC has no original jurisdiction over the that the woman did not resemble the picture of the examinee in
administrative cases against the public school teachers. Sec. 2 of the Picture Seat Plan (PSP). Upon further probing, it was
R.A. 4670 provides: petitioner Ampong who took and passed the examinations under
This Act shall be known as the “Magna the name Evelyn Decir.
Carta for Public School Teachers” and shall ISSUE
apply to all public school teachers except those Whether or not the CSC has administrative jurisdiction
in the professorial staff of state colleges and over an employee of the Judiciary for acts committed while said
universities. employee was still with the Executive or Education Department?
As used in this Act, the term “teacher” shall HELD
mean all persons engaged in classroom No, but the Court ruled against the petition on the
teaching, in any level of instruction, on full-time ground of estoppels.
basis, including guidance counselors, school It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the
librarians, industrial arts or vocational civil service. Pursuant to its administrative authority, the CSC is
instructors, and all other persons performing granted the power to "control, supervise, and coordinate the Civil
supervisory and/or administrative functions in Service examinations." This authority grants to the CSC the right
all schools, colleges and universities operated by to take cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly connected with
the Government or its political subdivisions; but the examinations.
shall not include school nurses, school However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme
physicians, school dentists, and other school Court is given exclusive administrative supervision over all
employees. courts and judicial personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only
Petitioner is the Non-Formal Education Supervisor of the the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court
DECS, in Kidapawan, Cotabato, in-charge of the out-of-school personnel's compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. It
programs. Petitioner falls under the category of “all other may take the proper administrative action against them if they
persons performing supervisory and/or administrative functions commit any violation. No other branch of government may
in all schools, colleges and universities operated by the intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
government or its political subdivisions.” separation of powers.
15
It is well settled that the jurisdiction to try a case is to HELD
be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of YES, DECS has exclusive jurisdiction over this case.
the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. Undoubtedly, the DECS-Region VI first assumed
Consonant with this principle, the time of commission is not jurisdiction over the administrative complaint against the
material to determining which court has jurisdiction. It stands to respondent. It should be recalled that when People’s Graftwatch
reason that administrative jurisdiction over petitioner belongs to forwarded the complaint to the Ombudsman (Visayas), the latter
the Supreme Court, the action having been instituted by the CSC treated it as a request for assistance and referred it to the DECS-
at the time when petitioner was already a judicial employee. Region VI and COA for appropriate action. After it had resolved to
Indeed, the standard procedure is for the CSC to bring upgrade the matter to an administrative case, the Ombudsman
its complaint against petitioner, a judicial employee, before the decided not to take cognizance of the same and refer it, instead,
OCA. Records show that the CSC did not adhere to this procedure to the DECS-Region VI.
in the present case. The SC does not agree with petitioner’s contention that
However, we are constrained to uphold the ruling of the it could assume jurisdiction over the administrative case after the
CSC based on the principle of estoppel. The previous actions of DECS-Region VI had voluntarily relinquished its jurisdiction over
petitioner have estopped her from attacking the jurisdiction of the same in favor of the petitioner. Jurisdiction once acquired is
the CSC. A party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the
a court or tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions to secure an case is terminated. When the complainants filed their formal
affirmative relief may not afterwards deny that same jurisdiction complaint with the DECS-Region VI, jurisdiction was vested on
to escape a penalty. the latter. It cannot now be transferred to petitioner upon the
instance of the complainants, even with the acquiescence of the
OMBUDSMAN vs. ESTANDARTE DECS and petitioner.
(April 13, 2007) Nonetheless, even if the Ombudsman (Visayas) had
concurrent jurisdiction over the administrative case, DECS’
Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the authority to decide the administrative case is sustained.
instance of the parties but continues until the case is The better rule in the event of conflict between two
terminated. courts of concurrent jurisdiction as in the present case, is to allow
FACTS the litigation to be tried and decided by the court which would be
A complaint was made by Faculty Club and Department in a better position to serve the interests of justice, considering
Heads of the Ramon Torres National High School (hereinafter the the nature of the controversy, the comparative accessibility of the
Faculty Club) against Estandarte, the school principal. The court to the parties, having in view their peculiar positions and
complaint consisted of 33 allegations of improprieties ranging capabilities, and other similar factors.
from illegal handling of school funds, irregular financial Considering that the respondent is a public school
transactions, perjury, and abuse of authority. Such complaint teacher who is covered by the provisions of RA 4670, the Magna
was referred to the Ombudsman. Carta for Public School Teachers, the DECS-Region VI is in a
The Ombudsman forwarded the complaint to the DECS- better position to decide the matter. Moreover, the DECS has
Region VI and COA for appropriate action. already commenced proceedings over the administrative case by
A special investigating committee was created by DECS constituting the Special Investigating Committee pursuant to
to hear the case. Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670.
Meanwhile, the COA referred the complaint against
Estandarte to the Provincial Auditor for the Province of Negros OMBUDSMAN vs. DELIJERO, JR.
Occidental. Upon investigation, it was found that in connection G.R. No. 172635 (October 20, 2010)
with 24 of the 33 allegations in the complaint were "within the FACTS
bounds of propriety." Respondent Pedro Delijero, Jr., was a public school and
In view of the findings of the auditor, the Ombudsman was administratively charged for Grave Misconduct.
(Visayas) issued the Memorandum upgrading the complaint to A complaint against respondent was filed before the
criminal and administrative cases against Ms. Estandarte. Office of the Ombudsman. It alleged that Delijero courted Myra
The Ombudsman (Visayas) decided to refer the dela Cruz (Myra), only 12 years old and a first year high school
administrative aspect of the case to the DECS-Region VI. student. Respondent, on the other hand, was Myra's 52-year-old
In view of the referral to DECS-Region VI, the Mathematics teacher.
Ombudsman (Visayas) considered the administrative case closed. Ombudsman rendered a Decision finding respondent
Consequently, the Ombudsman (Visayas) informed the DECS- guilty of Grave Misconduct and meted him the penalty of
Region VI that it would not object if the case is returned to it. dismissal.
DECS-Region VI turned over the records of the case to the HELD
Ombudsman (Visayas) for adjudication. While Ombudsman has concurrent administrative
Estandarte filed an Urgent Motion to Remand the case disciplinary authority with the DECS over public school teachers,
to the DECS-Region VI on the ground that jurisdiction is now Section 23 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides that the
exclusively vested on the latter. Ombudsman may refer a complaint to the proper disciplinary
The Ombudsman (Visayas) found Estandarte guilty of authority. Under the circumstances obtaining herein, it would
grave misconduct. On appeal, CA remanded the case to DECS- have been more prudent for petitioner to have referred the
Region VI. complaint to the DECS given that it would have been in a better
ISSUE position to serve the interest of justice considering the nature of
Whether or not the DECS has exclusive jurisdiction over the controversy. Respondent is a public school teacher and is
the case covered by RA 4670, therefore, the proceedings before the DECS
16
would have been the more appropriate venue to resolve the of the university, is a non-career civil service officer. He was
dispute. appointed by the chairman and members of the governing board
In any case, the foregoing pronouncement does not of CVPC. By clear provision of law, respondent is a non-career
automatically mean that this Court is nullifying the proceedings civil servant who is under the jurisdiction of the CSC.
before the Ombudsman as estoppel has already set in.
In Medrano, this Court ruled that the active RULE ON GOVERNMENT OWNED AND CONTROLLED (GOCCs):
participation of an individual before the administrative
proceedings and the belated challenge to the jurisdiction of the GENERAL RULE: GOCC created by special law (with
said body bars him from assailing such acts under the principle of original charter) – the officers and employees are
estoppels. governed by
In the present case, records show that Galicia was given the Civil Service Law
the right to due process in the investigation of the charges against EXCEPTION: The special law or the original charter
him. He participated in the proceedings by making known his states otherwise (Philippine Veterans Employees vs.
defenses in the pleadings that he submitted. It was only when a Philippine
decision adverse to him was rendered did he question the Veterans Bank)
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
GENERAL RULE: GOCC created by general law
(WITHOUT original charter but are incorporated only
HIGHER EDUCATION MODERNIZATION ACT OF 1997 (RA under the
8292): Corporation Code); the officers and
employees are governed by the Labor Code.
The power of the University’s Board of Regents under
RA 8292 to discipline its officials and employees is
not exclusive but concurrent with CSC.
CSC vs. SOJOR TEST TO DETERMINE WHAT LAW SHALL GOVERN: Whether
May 22, 2008 or not the corporation has an original charter
The CSC has jurisdiction over a non-career civil If YES, Civil Service Law governs
service officer. o If NONE, Labor Code governs
FACTS
Henry Sojor, was appointed president of Central Visayas
Polytechnic College by Pres. Aquino. Pursuant to the Higher GOCCs NOT COVERED BY CIVIL SERVICE LAW:
Education Modernization Act of 1997, a Board of Trustees (BOT)
was formed as the governing body in state colleges. The BOT of PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION-ENERGY DEV’T
CVPC appointed Sojor for 2 terms. CVPC was converted into the CORPORATION vs. LEOGARDO
Negros Oriental State University (NORSU) and a Board of Regents 175 SCRA 26
(BOR) succeeded the BOT as its governing body.
Three separate administrative cases were filed against 1987 Constitution shall apply because it is the law in
Sojor by CVPC faculty members before CSC Regional Office in place at the time of the decision.
Cebu for dishonesty, grave misconduct, nepotism etc. Sojor filed FACTS
MTD on the grounds that the CSC lack of jurisdiction since he is a PNOC-EDC is a subsidiary of PNOC.
presidential appointee, part of the non-competitive or In 1978, it filed with the Ministry of Labor and
unclassified service, thus exclusively under the disciplinary Employment (MOLE) a Clearance Application to Dismiss against
jurisdiction of the Office of the President, not the CSC. The CSC employee Vicente Ellelina. It was premised on the alleged
ruled that it had jurisdiction over the cases and Sojor’s claim that commission of public alarm and scandal during the company’s
he was a presidential appointee had no basis in fact or in law. CSC Christmas party.
maintained that it had concurrent jurisdiction with the BOT of Initially, the clearance was granted but was later
the CVPC. revoked. MOLE further ordered the reinstatement of Ellelina with
The CA rules in favor of Sojor and annulled the backwages.
resolutions of the CSC. The CA ruled that the power to appoint PNOC-EDC seeks the nullity of MOLE decision for lack of
carries with it the power to remove or to discipline thus it was jurisdiction. It contended that under Article 277 of the LC, the
the BOR which has jurisdiction not the CSC MOLE has no jurisdiction over PNOC-EDC because it is a GOCC.
ISSUE Thus, CSC must take cognizance.
Whether or not the CSC has jurisdiction? ISSUE
HELD Who has jurisdiction?
Yes, the CSC has jurisdiction over the case. HELD
The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over MOLE has jurisdiction. PNOC-EDC having been
the entire civil service. As defined, the civil service embraces incorporated under the General Corporation Law is a GOCC
every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the whose employees are subject to the Labor Code. The test in
government, including every government-owned or controlled determining whether a GOCC is subject to the Civil Service Law is
corporation. the manner of its creation such that government corporations
The respondent, a state university president with a created by corporation law are not within its coverage.
fixed term of office appointed by the governing board of trustees
17
BLISS UNION vs. CALLEJA, BLISS DEV’T. CORP Constitution. Since FTI is a GOCC without original charter. FTI
237 SCRA 271 (September 30, 1994) was organized under the Corporation Law and was not created
by a special law. Thus, DOLE has jurisdiction.
Government corporations which were formed under
the Corporation Code are not covered by the CSC. PHIL VETERANS EMPLOYEES UNION-NUBE vs. PHIL
FACTS VETERANS BANK
Petitioner, a duly registered labor union, filed with the (August 24, 1990)
Department of Labor a petition for certification of election of
Bliss Development Corp. (BDC). Med-arbiter dismissed the Philippine Veterans Bank has no charter of its own.
petition for lack of jurisdiction stating that majority of BDC’s FACTS
stocks is owned by the Human Settlement Development Corp. In 1984, PVB was placed under receivership by virtue of
(HSDC), a wholly-owned government corporation. Therefore, Resolution No. 334 of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank.
BDC is subject to Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. The reason was the precarious condition of the Bank.
Petitioner then filed an appeal with the Bureau of Labor A year later, on April 26, 1984, the Philippine Veterans
Relations. Executive Order 180 was issued extending the Bank Employees Union questioned the retrenchment and
government employees the right to organize and bargain reorganization program of the Bank and, on the ground of
collectively. Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations issued an security of tenure, prayed that the said program be prohibited.
order dismissing the appeal. While the case was pending, the Monetary Board
ISSUE ordered the liquidation of the Bank. The petitioners dispute the
Whether or not BDC is a GOCC subject to Civil Service authority of the CB. They claim that since PVB was created by a
laws, rules and regulations special law, a contractual relation now exists between the
HELD government and the stockholder of the bank such that this cannot
Petition is impressed with merit. Section 1 of EO 180 be disturbed without violating the non-impairment clause.
expressly limits its application to only GOCCs with original Petitioners also contend that CB cannot exercise any
charters. Public respondent’s order requiring petitioner to authority over PVB because the latter itself is also a government
register in accordance with Section 7 of EO 180 is without legal bank with the same status as the DBP, LBP, and the PNB. The CB
basis. A corporation is created by operation of law and acquired has no control over there government institutions.
a juridical personality either by special law or general law. A ISSUE
general law under which a private corporation may be formed or Whether or not the CB has the power to liquidate the
organized is the Corporation Code, the requirement of which PVB.
must be complied with by those wishing to incorporate. A HELD
government corporation is normally created by special law, YES, it has the power. The Philippine Veterans Bank has
referred to often as a charter. BDC is a government-owned no charter of its own. Even if it possesses a charter in the form of
corporation created under the Corporation Law. It is without a RA 3518, it cannot be considered as one with an original charter.
charter, governed by the Labor Code and not by the Civil Service The relations of the bank with its employees shall be governed by
Law. Hence, EO 180 does not apply to it. the provisions of the Labor Code.
The following are the indicators or characteristics that
LUMANTA vs. NLRC PVB is a private corporation:
170 SCRA 79 a. The charter of the PVB provides that the composition of
the Board shall be elected among its stockholders
Abandoned the NHA ruling, decided under the 1987 b. Only 51% of the capital stock shall be fully subscribed
Constitution. by the Government
FACTS c. Thus, the 49% of stocks should redound to the veterans
Petitioner Lumanta is an employee of Food Terminal or their heirs
Inc. (FTI), a Government-Owned and Controlled Corporation, a d. The charter states that it shall be considered as a
marketing arm of the National Food Authority (NFA). “commercial bank”
In 1987, petitioner (joined by other 54 retrenched
employees) filed a complaint for unpaid retrenchment or MACALINO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
separation pay against FTI. Complaint was filed with DOLE. 376 SCRA 452
FTI contended that the employees are under the CS
Law, not by LC being a GOCC. Thus, DOLE has no jurisdiction. On Officers of corporations without original charters are
the other hand, petitioners opined that it has marks of a private not under the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.
corporation FACTS
The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of FTI, relying on On September 16, 1992, the Special Prosecutor, Office of the
the ruling of NHA v. Juco. Hence, this petition. Ombudsman, with the approval of the Ombudsman, filed with the
ISSUE Sandiganbayan two informations against petitioner and wife
Who has jurisdiction? Liwayway S. Tan charging them with estafa through falsification
HELD of official documents and frustrated estafa through falsification of
DOLE has jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is determined at the mercantile documents. The case is a petition for certiorari
time of the filing of the complaint and at the time the decision is assailing the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the
to be rendered. Sandiganbayan to take cognizance of two criminal cases against
The 1987 Constitution is applicable. Court rejected its petitioner and his wife contending that he is not a public officer
ruling in NHA v. Juco which was decided under the 1973 within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
18
ISSUE owned or controlled corporations” within the jurisdiction of the
Whether or not the petitioner, an employee of the PNCC, Sandiganbayan, has consistently refrained from making any
is a public officer within the coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as distinction with respect to the manner of their creation.
amended. The deliberate omission, in our view, clearly reveals the
HELD intention of the legislature to include the presidents, directors or
No the petitioner is not a public officer. The Philippine trustees, or managers of both types of corporations within the
National Construction Corporation is a GOCC without an original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan whenever they are involved in
charter for it is incorporated under the general corporation law. graft and corruption. Had it been otherwise, it could have simply
Thus, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over its officers and made the necessary distinction. But it did not.
employees.
The only instance where the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over a private individual is when the latter conspires GOCCs COVERED BY CIVIL SERVICE LAW:
with a public officer either as co-principal, accomplice or
accessory. BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NLRC
In the instant case, such is not the situation. Thus, Sandiganbayan 196 SCRA 176
has no jurisdiction.
BSP is a GOCC with original charter therefore it falls
Compare this with the case of: under the CSC;
PEOPLE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN BSP employees are covered by the Civil Service Law.
(February 16, 2005) FACTS
In 1984, the Secretary-General of BSP issued five (5)
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is separate special orders (SO) for the following respondents who were all
and distinct from CSC. rank-and-file employees: Malaborbor, Misa, Evangelista, Garcia
FACTS and Esguerra.
2 separate informations for violation of Section 3(e) of The SO mandates that they will be transferred to BSP
RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Camp in Asuncion, Davao del Norte from their camp in Makiling.
Practices Act, were filed with the Sandiganbayan against Alas. Respondents averred that such order is prejudicial not only to
The charges emanated from the alleged anomalous advertising their economic stability but also to their families.
contracts entered into by Alas, in his capacity as President and Upon their filing of a complaint, they were subsequently
Chief Operating Officer of the Philippine Postal Savings Bank terminated. The LA dismissed the complaint for lack of
(PPSB), with Bagong Buhay Publishing Company which jurisdiction. NLRC reversed the decision ordering BSP to
purportedly caused damage and prejudice to the government. reinstate respondents with full back wages.
Alas filed a motion to quash the informations for lack of BSP contends that it is under the CS Law because it is an
jurisdiction. organization created under CA 111 (an Act to Create a Public
Respondent court ruled that PPSB was a private Corporation to be known as BSP) with obligation towards nation-
corporation and that its officers, particularly herein respondent building.
Alas, did not fall under Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. ISSUE
ISSUE Who has jurisdiction?
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over HELD
presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of GOCCs CSC has jurisdiction. It is a GOCC with original charter.
organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code for Considering its character and the purpose of its function, the
purposes of the provisions of RA 3019, otherwise known as the statutory designation of BSP as a “public corporation”, and the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act substantial participation of the government in the selection of its
HELD members, there is no doubt that it falls under CS Law.
YES, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction in this case.
PPSB fits the bill as a GOCC, and organized and BSP vs. COA
incorporated under the Corporation Code as a subsidiary of the (June 7, 2011)
Philippine Postal Corporation (PHILPOST). More than 99% of the ISSUE
authorized capital stock of PPSB belongs to the government while Whether or not the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) fall under
the rest is nominally held by its incorporators who are/were the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. Yes.
themselves officers of PHILPOST. The creation of PPSB was HELD
expressly sanctioned by Section 32 of RA 7354, otherwise known The court ruled that the BSP is a public corporation and its funds
as the Postal Service Act of 1992 are subject to the COA’s audit jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is separate and The BSP contends that it is not a government-owned or
distinct from the Civil Service Commission. controlled corporation; neither is it an instrumentality, agency, or
On March 30, 1995, Congress, pursuant to its authority subdivision of the government. The Supreme Court, however,
vested under the 1987 Constitution, enacted RA 7975 held that not all corporations, which are not government owned
maintaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations
presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government- as there exists another distinct class of corporations or chartered
owned or controlled corporations without any distinction institutions which are otherwise known as “public corporations.”
whatsoever. These corporations are treated by law as agencies or
The legislature, in mandating the inclusion of instrumentalities of the government.
“presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
19
Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special law to monetary value of the accrued leave credits. Mojica filed a
serve a public purpose in pursuit of a constitutional mandate, complaint for illegal dismissal against DFP before NLRC. Labor
comes within the class of "public corporations" defined by arbiter found that Mojica was illegally dismissed. NLRC reversed
paragraph 2, Article 44 of the Civil Code and governed by the law the ruling of the arbiter. Mojica’s MFR was denied. He filed a
which creates it, pursuant to Article 45 of the same Code. It is not petition for certiorari before the CA. CA agreed with the arbiter.
a private corporation which is required to be owned or Hence this petition.
controlled by the government and be economically viable to ISSUE
justify its existence under a special law. Therefore, being a public Whether or not jurisdiction is lodged with NLRC
corporation, the funds of the BSP fall under the jurisdiction of the HELD
Commission on Audit. Mojica is a civil service employee. Jurisdiction is lodged
not with the NLRC but with the Civil Service Commission. DFP
BALUYOT vs. HOLGANZA was created under Executive Order No. 46 to augment the service
(February 9, 2000) facilities for tourists and to generate foreign exchange and
revenue for the government. The Philippine Tourism Authority
NO longer applicable; (PTA) is a corporate body attached to the Department of Tourism
The CSC has jurisdiction over GOCCs with original (DOT). Thus, recruitment, transfer, promotion and dismissal of
charters. all its personnel were governed by a merit system established in
FACTS accordance with the Civil Service rules. All PTA officials and
During a spot audit conducted by a team of auditors from the employees are subject to the Civil Service rules and regulations.
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) headquarters, a cash Since DFP is under the exclusive authority of the PTA, it follows
shortage of P154,350.13 was discovered in the funds of its Bohol that its officials and employees are likewise subject to the Civil
chapter. The chapter administrator, petitioner Francisca S. Service rules and regulations. Mojica’s recourse to the Labor
Baluyot, was held accountable for the shortage. Thereafter, arbiter was not proper.
private respondent Paul E. Holganza, in his capacity as a member Civil service and labor laws shall be followed in the
of the board of directors of the Bohol chapter, filed an affidavit- resolution of complaints, grievances and cases involving
complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman charging government employees (all employees of all branches,
petitioner of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the government,
Code. including GOCCs with original charters). Labor arbiter and NLRC
ISSUE erred in taking cognizance of the complaint as jurisdiction is
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has lodged with the CSC. CA likewise erred. Decision of CA is
jurisdiction over the case. annulled and set aside.
HELD
Yes The CSC has jurisdiction. It necessarily follows that ALZAGA, BELLO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (supra)
the Office of the Ombudsman may take cognizance of the case.
The Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government
owned and controlled corporation, with an original charter under LOCAL WATER DISTRICTS (PD 198 AS AMENDED BY PD 1479
Republic Act No. 95, as amended. Those with special charters are AND RA 9286):
government corporations subject to its provisions, and its
employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service HAGONOY WATER DISTRICT vs. NLRC
Commission, and are compulsory members of the Government 165 SCRA 272
Service Insurance System. The PNRC was not "impliedly
converted to a private corporation" simply because its charter Local water districts are subject to the Civil Service
was amended to vest in it the authority to secure loans, be (CS) Law;
exempted from payment of all duties, taxes, fees and other Section 25 of PD 198 already removed by PD 1479.
charges of all kinds on all importations and purchases for its FACTS
exclusive use, on donations for its disaster relief work and other Private Respondent Dante Villanueva was employed as
services and in its benefits and fund raising drives, and be service foreman by petitioner Hagonoy when he was indefinitely
allotted one lottery draw a year by the Philippine Charity suspended and thereafter dismissed for abandonment of work
Sweepstakes Office for the support of its disaster relief operation and conflict of interest.
in addition to its existing lottery draws for blood program." Villanueva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension and underpayment of wages and emergency cost of
DUTY FREE PHIL vs. MOJICA living allowance against Hagonoy with the Ministry of Labor and
471 SCRA 776 (September 30, 2005) Employment in San Fernando, Pampanga
Petitioner Hagonoy moved for dismissal on the ground
Duty Free Phil being an entity under the DOT, its of lack of jurisdiction. Being government entity, its personnel are
employees necessarily fall under the jurisdiction of governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and not by
the CSC. the Labor Code. And the protests concerning the lawlessness of
FACTS dismissal from service fall within the jurisdiction of the Civil
The Discipline Committee of Duty Free Philippines Service Commission and not the Ministry of Labor and
(DFP) found stock clerk Mojica guilty of Neglect of Duty by Employment.
causing considerable damage to or loss of materials, assets and The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on favor of
property of DFP. Mojica was considered forcibly resigned from Villanueva.
the service with forfeiture of all benefits except his salary and the
20
NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. A “Writ HELD
of Execution” was issued by the Labor Arbiter to garnish YES, they are. Thus, water districts are governed by the
petitioner Hagonoy’s deposits with the planters Development CS Law.
Bank. A water district is a corporation created pursuant to a
Hagonoy filed a “Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution special law and such, its officers and employees are governed by
with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction”. NLRC the CS Law. The fact that said decree generally applies to all
denied the application. water districts throughout the country does not alter the fact that
ISSUE it is a special law.
Whether local water districts are GOCC whose Also, it is clear therefrom that the power to appoint
employees are subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Law members is vested with the local executives where said water
HELD districts are located. In contrast, the members of the Board of
YES. The Labor Arbiter, in asserting that it has Directors of a private corporation are elected among its
jurisdiction over the employees of Hagonoy, relied on P.D. No. stockholders. But this is not the case here. Definitely, DCWD is a
198,known as “Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973” which public corporation.
exempts employees of water districts from the application of the
Civil Service Law. However, the Labor Arbiter failed to take into DE JESUS vs. COA
account that P.D. 1479 wiped away the said exemption Moreover, 403 SCRA 668 (June 10, 2003)
the NLRC relied upon Article 9, Section 2, of the 1987
Constitution which provides that: “[T]he Civil Service embraces ... Water districts are subject to the jurisdiction of COA.
government owned or controlled corporations with original FACTS
charters.” An auditing team from the COA audited the accounts of
At the time the dispute in the CAB arose, and at the time the Catbalogan Water District (CWD). It was discovered that
the Labor Arbiter rendered its decision (which is on March 17, members of CWD’s interim Board of Directors (“Board”) granted
1986), the applicable law is that the Labor Arbiter has no themselves Representation and Transportation Allowance
jurisdiction to render a decision that he in fact rendered. By the (“RATA”), Rice Allowance, Productivity Incentive Bonus,
time the NLRC rendered its decision (August 20, 1987), the Anniversary Bonus, Year-End Bonus and cash gifts.
1987Constitution has already come into effect. The SC believes COA audit team issued two notices of disallowance.
that the 1987 Constitution does not operate retroactively as to COA explained that members of the CWD Board cannot receive
confer jurisdiction upon the Labor Arbiter to render a decision, compensation and other benefits in addition to the per diems
which was before outside the scope of its competence. Therefore, allowed by Section 13 of PD 198.
a decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter without jurisdiction ISSUE
over the case is a complete nullity, vesting no rights and imposing Whether or not COA has jurisdiction to construe any
no liabilities. Villanueva, if he so wishes, may re-file this provision of PD 198 on the compensation and other benefits
complaint in an appropriate tribunal. granted to LWUA-designated members of the board of water
districts
DAVAO CITY WATER DISTRICT vs. CSC HELD
201 SCRA 605 YES, COA has jurisdiction to construe any provision of
PD 198 on the compensation and other benefits granted to
Water districts are governed by CS Law. LWUA-designated members of the board of water districts.
FACTS The CWD was created pursuant to PD 198, as amended,
In 1973, PD 768 and PD 1479 (which amended PD 198) otherwise known as the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973. PD
was issued by the then President Marcos. Said decrees authorized 198 authorized the local legislative bodies, through an enabling
the different local legislature bodies to form and create their resolution, to create their respective water districts, subject to
respective water districts through a resolution which will be the guidelines and regulations under PD 198. PD 198 further
subject to the guidelines, rules and regulations therein laid down. created the Local Water Utilities Administration (“LWUA”), a
Decree further created the Local Water Utilities national agency, and granted LWUA regulatory powers necessary
Administration (LUWA), a national agency attached to the NEDA, to optimize public service from water districts.
and granted with power necessary to optimize public service The Constitution specifically vests in the COA the
from water utilities operation. authority to determine whether government entities comply with
Petitioner is among the more than 500 water district laws and regulations in disbursing government funds, and to
which existed throughout the country. disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of government funds.
After the ruling of Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton (that A water district is a GOCC with a special charter since it is created
all water districts are under the CS Law), CSC issued Resolution pursuant to a special law, PD 198. The COA has the authority to
No. 90-575 (that hiring and appointments in water districts will investigate whether directors, officials or employees of
be governed by CS Law). government-owned and controlled corporations, receiving
However, another ruling of Metro Iloilo Water District v. additional allowances and bonuses, are entitled to such benefits
NLRC was promulgated reversing the aforementioned ruling, that under applicable laws. Thus, water districts are subject to the
PD 198 is not the charter itself. jurisdiction of the COA.
ISSUE PD 198 governs the compensation of members of the
Whether or not the Local Water Districts formed by PD board of water districts. Thus, members of the board of water
198 are considered as GOCCs with original charters. districts cannot receive allowances and benefits more than those
allowed by PD 198.
21
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION-ENERGY DEV’T General Rule: A water district with an original charter
CORPORATION vs. NLRC is a GOCC governed by the CSC Law and CS Rules and Regulations.
222 SCRA 831 (May 31, 1993) Exception: When the corporation questioning the
jurisdiction participated actively in the proceedings in NLRC, and
Employees of a GOCC without an original charter fall in fact, sought relief therefrom.
within the scope of Section 66 of OEC. In the case at bar, petitioner never raised the issue of
FACTS lack of jurisdiction before the Executive Labor Arbiter and the
PNOC-EDC is a subsidiary of PNOC. NLRC. ZCWD is estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of NLRC
Pineda was employed therein in the Geothermal and is bound to respect the proceedings therefrom.
Construction Section, Engineering and Construction Department Also, it is only in the petition to the SC (after NLRC as
in Ormoc City. ordered the award of backwages, etc.) that petitioner raises the
Pineda filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) to run for issue of jurisdiction.
councilor in the Municipality of Kananga, Leyte. Objection to
Pineda’s candidacy while retaining his job in PNOC-EDC was DOH (DR. JOSE RODRIGUEZ MEMORIAL HOSPITAL),VIARDO
interposed by Mayor Cornejos. vs. NLRC, LINSANGAN, LAUR
Pineda eventually won, took his oath and assumed his 251 SCRA 700 (December 29, 1995)
duties while he continued working in PNOC-EDC. Beforehand, he
asked for the legal opinion of the Secretary of Justice: Employees of DJMRH fall under the jurisdiction of the
W/N he was considered automatically CSC to the exclusion of that of the NLRC and Labor
resigned upon the filing of his COC Arbiter.
W/N in case he will be elected, he could FACTS
remain appointed by any corporate offspring Laur was a patient of the then Tala Leprosarium. He
of a GOCC was discharged in 1956 after he was deemed to have been cured
On the other hand, the Legal Department of PNOC-EDC of his affliction. He was employed at the DJMRH as a patient-
opined that Pineda should be considered ipso facto resigned assistant in 1975. In 1989, complaints for Alarm and Scandal,
upon the filing of his COC in accordance with the Omnibus Oral Defamation, Grave Threats, Concealment of Deadly Weapon,
Election Code (OEC). Thus, he was terminated. Violation of the Code of Ethics of Policemen, and Conduct
ISSUE Unbecoming of a Police Officer were filed against Laur. He was
Whether or not an employee of a GOCC without an suspended with a stern warning that a repetition would result in
original charter falls within the scope of Section 66 of OEC. his outright dismissal. In 1990, Laur got involved in a mauling.
HELD Laur was dismissed by the Chief of Hospital. Laur filed with the
YES, he is under the purview of OEC. Under the said law, NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter rendered
employees of GOCC, whether or not it has an original charter, his decision in Laur’s favor.
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from office upon the filing ISSUE
of their COC. The law makes no distinction. Section 66 of the OEC Whether or not NLRC and Labor Arbiter acted without
applies to officers and employees in GOCCs, even those organized jurisdiction when they took cognizance of the complaint filed by
under the general law on incorporation and therefore not having Laur before NLRC instead of the CSC
an original or legislative charter, and even if they do not fall HELD
under the Civil Service Law but under the Labor Code. Section 66 Petition is impressed with merit. DJMRH is a public
constitutes just cause for termination of employment. medical center and health facility attached to the DOH. It
exercises strictly governmental functions relating to the
ZAMBOANGA CITY WATER DISTRICT vs. BUAT management and control of leprosy. It falls within the scope and
232 SCRA 589 (May 27, 1994) coverage of the Civil Service Law. Terms and conditions of
employment of government employees shall be governed by the
Estoppel applies in GOCC. Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. Jurisdiction is conferred
FACTS by law. Where there is none, no agreement of the parties can
Petitioner ZCWD is a GOCC engaged in the business of provide one.
supplying water in Zamboanga City. Private respondent herein is INTIA, JR. vs. COA
its employer. 306 SCRA 610 (April 30, 1999)
Due to the strike initiated by herein private
respondents against petitioner, they were terminated. Thus, they The PPC is under the jurisdiction of the CSC.
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal through their labor union. FACTS
On the other hand, ZCWD also filed their complaint to declare On April 3, 1992, RA 7354 (The Postal Service Act of
said strike as illegal. The two cases were consolidated. 1992) was enacted and approved creating the Philippine Postal
LA ruled in favor of the labor union. ZCWD contended Corporation (PPC) and defining its powers, functions and
that LA has no jurisdiction because jurisdiction of labor disputes responsibilities. The Board of Directors issued and approved a
is vested in the CSC. resolution entitled “Approving the 3-year Progressive Increase of
ISSUE Representation and Travel Allowance (RATA)”. RA 8174
Who has jurisdiction? (General Appropriations Act of 1996) was approved, Section 35
HELD of which fixes the monthly RATA of government officials. In
NLRC has jurisdiction, this is a deviation from the 1996, Corporate Auditor for PPC served Notice of Disallowance
general ruling. on PPC. Petitioners filed their Memorandum of Appeal for the
22
reversal of the Auditor’s decision. COA found the appeal devoid allowances that were granted without the prior review and
of merit. approval of the DBM. GOCCs are included in the Compensation
ISSUE and Position Classification System provided in RA 6758.
Whether or not the PPC Board of Directors can by itself,
grant through a resolution an increase in allowances to its EUGENIO vs. CSC
officials without said resolution going to the DBM for review and 143 SCRA 196 (March 31, 1995)
approval
Whether or not RATA granted to PPC officials fall within CSC has no power to abolish CESB.
the amounts provided in the General Appropriations Act FACTS
HELD Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine
SC rules in the negative in both issues. PPC has the Nuclear Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service
power to fix the salaries and emoluments of its employees, with (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank. Accordingly, she was given a
the approval of the Board of Directors. It is also within the CES Eligibility while she was given a recommendation to the
Board’s power to grant or increase allowances of PPC officials or President for a CESO rank by the CES Board.
employees. But it should first have been reviewed by the DBM However, CSC issued Resolution No. 93-4359 abolishing
before they were implemented. the CESB. The said resolution became an impediment to the
PPC, being a GOCC with an original charter, it falls appointment of petitioner as Civil Service Officer Rank IV.
within the scope of the Civil Service. As regards personnel Petitioner contends that the resolution is in violation of
matter, the Civil Service Law applies to the PPC. Since the PPC the Constitution, that CSC usurped the legislative functions of
charter expressly exempts it from the rules and regulations of Congress when it abolished the CESB.
CPCO, the Board is not required to follow the CPCO’s guidelines in ISSUE
formulating a compensation system for the PPC. The general rule Whether or not CSC has the power to abolish the CESB.
is that the PCC is covered by the Civil Service Law as regards all HELD
personnel matters except those affecting the compensation NO, it has no power. It cannot be disputed that CESB
structure and position classification in the corporation which are was created by a law (PD 1) thus, it can only be abolished by the
left to the PPC Board of Directors to formulate in accordance with legislature. In the case at bar, Congress has not enacted any law
law authorizing the abolition of CESB.
From its inception, CESB was intended to be an
PHILIPPINE RETIREMENT AUTHORITY vs. BUNAG, LOZADA autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to the CSC.
397 SCRA 27 (February 5, 2003) CSC’s power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control
which does not include CESB.
PRA is still required to observe the policies and Under AC of 1987, the purpose of attaching interrelated
guidelines issued by the President and report to the government agencies is to attain policy and program
President through the Budget Commission. coordination, not the other being the subject of control of
FACTS another.
Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA) is a GOCC.
Bunag is the former deputy general manager of PRA while Lozada RUBENECIA vs. CSC
is the incumbent department manager of PRA. The Office of the (May 31, 1995)
President (OP) disallowed unauthorized allowances, fringe
benefits and other items. PRA sought reconsideration on the The CSC has the power to assume disciplinary cases
disallowances. OP denied the request for reconsideration. involving public officers filed before the MSPB.
PRA reduced the compensation and stopped the FACTS
payment of RATA and other allowances to private respondents. Teachers of Catarman National High School in Catarman,
DBM opined that the total monthly compensation and allowances Northern Samar, filed before the Merit System Protection Board
sought have no legal basis. OP reversed the ruling of DBM and (MSPB) an administrative complaint against petitioner
awarded to the private respondents the allowances and benefits Rubenecia, the School Principal, for dishonesty, nepotism,
claimed. PRA filed a petition for review with the CA, which oppression and violation of Civil Service Rules.
affirmed the ruling of the OP. Before the MSPB could render a decision, the Commission
ISSUE issued Resolution No. 93-2387 which provided, among other
Whether or not CA erred in upholding the continued things, that cases then pending before the MSPB were to be
grant of compensation and allowances received by private elevated to the Commission for decision.
respondents prior to the effectivity of the said law The Commission, accordingly, took over the case against
HELD petitioner and rendered its Resolution No. 94-0533 finding
The function of DBM is to ensure that the proposed petitioner guilty and ordering his dismissal from the service.
compensation scheme is consistent with applicable laws and Petitioner moved for reconsideration, asserting lack of
regulations. PRA was granted the power and authority to jurisdiction on the part of the Commission.
establish and fix, review, revise and adjust the appropriate ISSUE
compensation scheme of the PRA officers and employers. PRA is Whether or not the CSC had authority to issue its Resolution
still required to observe the policies and guidelines issued by the No. 93-2387 and assume jurisdiction over the administrative case
President and report to the President through the Budget against petitioner
Commission. In view of the express powers granted to PRA by its
charter, extent of the review authority of DBM is limited. Private
respondents are not entitled to receive salaries, benefits and
23
HELD SECTION 8. Classes of Positions in the Career Service. —
The CSC has the power to effect changes in the MSPB. (1) Classes of positions in the career service appointment to
The MSPB is part and parcel of CSC. Thus, CSC has authority over which requires examinations shall be grouped into three major
it. levels as follows:
The functions of the MSPB (PD 1409) relating to the (a) The first level shall include clerical, trades, crafts,
determination of administrative disciplinary cases were, in other and custodial service positions, which involve non-
words, re-allocated to the Commission itself. These changes were professional or sub professional work in a non-
prescribed by the Commission in its effort to "streamline the supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring less than
operation of the CSC" which in turn required the "simplification four years of collegiate studies;
of systems, cutting of red tape and elimination of [an] (b) The second level shall include professional,
unnecessary bureaucratic layer." The previous procedure made it technical, and scientific positions which involve
difficult for cases to be finally resolved within a reasonable professional, technical, or scientific work in a non-
period of time. The change, theretofore, was moved by the quite supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least
legitimate objective of simplifying the course of administrative four years of college work up to Division Chief level; and
disciplinary cases. (c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career
Since it was part and parcel of the internal organization Executive Service.
of the Commission, the MSPB was not an autonomous entity (2) Except as herein otherwise provided, entrance to the first two
created by law and merely attached for administrative purposes levels shall be through competitive examinations, which shall be
to the Civil Service Commission. open to those inside and outside the service who meet the
minimum qualification requirements. Entrance to a higher level
does not require previous qualification in the lower level.
CLASSIFICATION OF CIVIL SERVICE: Entrance to the third level shall be prescribed by the Career
Executive Service Board.
Under PD 807 and EO 292 (Civil Service Law) (3) Within the same level, no civil service examination shall be
required for promotion to a higher position in one or more
SECTION 7. Career Service. — The Career Service shall be related occupational groups. A candidate for promotion should,
characterized by: however, have previously passed the examination for that level.
(1) Entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far SECTION 9. Non-Career Service. — The Non-Career Service
as practicable by competitive examination, or based on highly shall be characterized by (1) entrance on bases other than those
technical qualifications; of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career
(2) Opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by
(3) security of tenure. law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing
The Career Service shall include: authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the
(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which duration of a particular project for which purpose employment
prior qualification in an appropriate examination is was made.
required; The Non-Career Service shall include:
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or (1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential
highly technical in nature; these include the faculty and staff;
academic staff of state colleges and universities, and (2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who
scientific and technical positions in scientific or hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and
research institutions which shall establish and maintain their personal or confidential staff(s);
their own merit systems; (3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, with fixed terms of office and their personal or
Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, confidential staff;
Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant (4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment
Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and in the government is in accordance with a special
other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring
the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are special or technical skills not available in the employing
appointed by the President; agency, to be accomplished within a specific period,
(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or
Executive Service, who are appointed by the accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own
President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the responsibility with a minimum of direction and
Department of Foreign Affairs; supervision from the hiring agency; and
(5) Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the (5) Emergency and seasonal personnel.
Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate merit
system; 1.) CAREER Service
(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled - Entrance is based on merit and fitness, to
corporations, whether performing governmental or be determined as far as practicable by
proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non- competitive examination and highly
career service; and technical qualifications
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, - Has security of tenure
or unskilled.
24
CAREER LEVEL: 6. Personnel of GOCC
a.) Sub- - Ex. Clerical, no Security of tenure - means that no officer or employee in the
Professional exercise of civil service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as
(Level 1) discretion provided by law and after due process.
- Security of tenure
is with regard to the Open Career – requires examination
position held Closed Career – positions in the academe,
b.) - Ex. Supervisory, scientists
Professional technical and
(Level 2) scientific posts. Note: Mere possession of Civil Service Eligibility Certificate does
- Security of tenure not amount to appointment itself because the appointing power
is with regard to the still has the discretion. The appointing power has the last say.
position held
c.) Career - Ex. Senior 2.) NON-CAREER Service
Executive Administrators a. Entrance on bases other than those of
(Level 3) (Undersecretaries, the usual test of merit and fitness
Asst. Secretaries, b. No security of tenure, term is:
Regional Directors, Limited to a period specified by
Asst. Regional law, or
Directors) Co-terminus with that of the
- Security of tenure appointing authority or subject
is with regard to to his pleasure
rank Limited to the duration of a
particular project, seasonal,
GENERAL RULE: Only an eligible gets to be appointed casual and contractual
to public office. employees
EXCEPTIONS: Examples: Chief of Staff, Chief of
1. In case of temporary vacancy in the service Security; includes local elective
2. When there is a need to fill the vacancy but officials since they have a fixed
there is no person eligible who is available for term; contractual employees
the position Nevertheless, due process
3. Vacancy pertains to a non- permanent should still be observed in case
position of removal from office
Eligibility - refers to an accomplishment of the applicant as Under Article IX B, Section 2(2) 1987 Constitution:
required by law to hold office
- At no point within the duration of the term/ office 1.) COMPETITIVE POSITIONS
must a disqualification exist - Appointment made according to merit
- The taking of an oath is only incident to the holding of and fitness
office - Examination by the CSC
25
Note: It may be a mix of 2 of the any of the above but it is not still of employment. The signing of the contract was not made
a guarantee of security of tenure voluntary for he was made to understand that the contract was
merely for the sake of formality. Thus, it is void. Further, the
Ways to declare a position as primarily Commission itself held hat the contract was null and void. The
confidential: acceptance of a temporary appointment with no intention to
1.) Declaration by the President, upon abandon does not divest employee of security of tenure.
recommendation by the CSC (The executive In addition, it is impossible for him to relinquish his
branch has the power to declare classification of permanent post for 34 years and all his concomitant rights,
non-comparative position, Sec. 12, Book V, EO including his accrued leave benefits.
292) According to Section 24(d) of PD 807, a person
2.) Nature of the functions performed permanently appointed and subsequently separated without any
Examination not needed delinquency should be reinstated in the same position. It follows
Examples of positions which are primarily that Palmera should be immediately reinstated in his former
confidential: position of equivalent rank or compensation.
Article 480 of the Revised Administrative Code – However, in view of his pending cases before the
city administrator Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, back salaries may not be paid
Article 481 of the Revised Administrative Code – to him until he is absolved.
legal officer
ASTRAQUILLO vs. MANGLAPUS
Proximity Rule - employees are considered confidential if the (MELCHOR vs. SAEZ)
predominant reason why they are chosen by the appointing 190 SCRA 281 (October 3, 1990)
authority is the latter's belief that he can share a close intimate
relationship with the occupant which insures freedom of Ambassadors do not enjoy security of tenure.
intercourse, without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings Ambassadors are political appointees.
or betrayals of personal trust on confidential matters of state. FACTS
Alejandro Melchor was appointed to the foreign service
RELATED CASES: as a Philippine Diplomat. He was an Ambassador to Moscow,
USSR. He was charged with the offenses of establishing a private
CASES ON CAREER SERVICE restaurant in Moscow and issuing visas to persons who were not
actually qualified to travel. He was dismissed by the President.
PALMERA vs. CSC ISSUE
235 SCRA 87 Whether or not the dismissal is correct.
HELD
Security of tenure means that no officer or employee YES, it is correct. Melchor cannot complain violation of
in the CS shall be suspended or removed except for security of tenure. He does not belong to the CS because he is a
cause provided by law and after due process. political appointee.
FACTS His appointment to Foreign Service was not based on
Petitioner Rodolfo Palmera has been working with the merit and fitness; hence, their tenure is co-terminus with that of
Ministry of Public Works (MPW) for 34 years. When MPW and the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure. His
Ministry of Public Highways (MPW) were merged, he was appointment was based on “bases other than those of the usual
appointed as Asst. Regional Director for the National Capital test of merit and fitness utilized for career service”.
Region.
In 1987, he was charged with “grave misconduct and CSC, PAGCOR vs. SALAS
dishonesty” in two administrative cases. For this, he was placed 274 SCRA 414 (June 19, 1997)
under 90-day preventive suspension. On that same year he was
again suspended for the same term and for the same reason. A member of the Internal Security Staff is not a
After the lifting of his suspension, Palmera immediately confidential employee.
went back to his work despite knowing the appointment of FACTS
Pacific Mendoza in his place. DPWH then hired him in contractual In 1989, respondent Rafael Salas was appointed by the
basis under the assurance that he will be appointed to another PAGCOR Chairman as Internal Security Staff (ISS) at the Casino
position. However, after his contract expired, he was never Manila Pavilion Hotel.
renewed. In 1991, he was terminated on the ground of “loss of
Palmera appealed to the CSC for reinstatement and confidence” for being involved in a proxy betting.
nullification of Mendoza’s appointment. CSC agreed with Palmera CA ruled that Salas is not a confidential employee.
and the former found the contract issued to the latter to be ISSUE
violative of the CSC laws and regulations, but CSC dismissed his Whether or not a member of an ISS is a confidential
appeal mainly on the ground of laches. employee.
ISSUE HELD
Whether or not Palmera’s right to security of tenure NO, he is not. A position may be considered as primarily
was violated. confidential (a) when the President, upon recommendation of the
HELD Commissioner of Civil Service, has declared the position to be
YES, it was. It cannot be construed that petitioner has primarily confidential and (b) in the absence of such declaration,
the intention to relinquish his right when he signed the contract when by the nature of the functions of the office there exists
26
“close intimacy” between the appointee and the appointing xxx xxx
power which insures freedom of intercourse without As an employee in the civil service and as civil service
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals or eligible, respondent is entitled to the benefits, rights and
personal trust or confidential matters of state. It is the nature of privileges extended to those belonging to the service. He cannot
the position which finally determines whether a position is be removed or dismissed without just cause, much less, without
primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical. formal charge or prior notice. The fact that his position falls
Taking into consideration the nature of his function, his under the unclassified service or the non-career service does not
organizational ranking and his compensation level, it is obviously remove him from the protective mantle of the Civil Service Law.
beyond debate that private respondent cannot be considered Persons in the unclassified service are merely so designated
occupying a primarily confidential position. Salas is not a because the nature of their work and qualifications are not
confidential employee. Where the position occupied is remote subject to classification unlike those in the classified service. ... 18
from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust The constitutional and statutory guarantee of security
between them is no longer predominant. Salas’ position does not of tenure is extended to both those in the career and non-career
involve “such close intimacy” between him and the appointing service positions, and the cause under which an employee may be
authority (Chairman of PAGCOR) as would insure “freedom from removed or suspended must naturally have some relation to the
misgivings of betrayals of personal trust.” character or fitness of the officer or employee, for the discharge
Tenure of officials holding primarily confidential of the functions of his office 19 or expiration of the project for
position ends upon loss of confidence and their cessation entails which employment was extended.
no removal but only an expiration of their term:
Nature of Function: routinary duties that do not show close OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT vs. BUENAOBRA
intimacy with PAGCOR Chairman G.R. No. 170021 (September 8, 2006)
Organizational Ranking: two positions away from the PAGCOR
Chairman Since tenure is fixed by law, removal from office of a
Compensation Level: highest level-Pay Class 12; bottom level Pay- non-career service personnel is not at the pleasure of
Class 2 the appointing authority.
Chairman of the Commission on Filipino Language is
CASES ON NON-CAREER SERVICE a non-career official whose 7 years tenure of office is
fixed by law; her removal is not at the pleasure of the
JOCOM vs. REGALADO appointing authority.
201 SCRA 73 FACTS
An information was filed against Buenaobra, Chairman
Regardless of the classification of the position held by of the Komisyon sa Wikang Pilipino (KWP), with the
a government employee covered by civil service rules, Sandiganbayan for violation of Sec.3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The
be it a career or non-career position, such employee information however was later withdrawn after reinvestigation
may not be removed without just cause. was granted, upon the ground that no probable cause exists.
HELD
All branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and Meanwhile, the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission
agencies of the government, including government owned and (PAGC) conducted a parallel administrative investigation against
controlled corporations with original charters are covered by the Buenaobra while reinvestigation of the Sandiganbayan case was
civil service and its rules and regulations. Appointments to the on-going, charging her with the same acts and omissions subject
civil service are based on merit and fitness determined by of the Sandiganbayan case. The charge was for allegedly causing
competitive examinations, except appointments to positions undue injury to the government through gross inexcusable
which are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly negligence in not taking legal action to collect the 15% royalty fee
technical. The Civil Service Law classifies the positions in the civil of P3,366,250.00 approved by the KWF Board to be levied against
service into career and non-career service positions. The career Merylvin Publishing House, Inc. for its unauthorized reprinting
service is characterized by (1) entrance based on merit and and selling of the Diksyunaryo ng Wikang Pilipino.
fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive PAGC recommended Buenaobra’s dismissal from the
examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications; (2) service, which petitioner Office of the President adopted and
opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) consequently dismissed Buenaobra from office.
security of tenure; while a non-career position is characterized On petition for review, CA dismissed the charges against
by (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of Buenaobra. Petitioner argues that Buenaobra was a presidential
merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure appointee and a holder of a non-career service position, hence,
which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is she could be removed from the service at the pleasure of the
coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to President.
his pleasure, or limited to the duration of a particular project for ISSUE
which purpose employment was extended. Whether or not Buenaobra, a non-career service officer,
Regardless of the classification of the position held by a enjoys security of tenure.
government employee covered by civil service rules, be it a HELD
career or non-career position, such employee may not be Yes. R.A. No. 7104 creating the Commission on the
removed without just cause. An employee who belongs to the Filipino Language provides for 11 commissioners to be headed
non-career service is protected from removal or suspension by a chairman and all appointed by the President. The chairman
without just cause and non-observance of due process. and two commissioners shall serve full-time for a term of seven
years.
27
Under Sec. 6, Article IV, of the Civil Service Decree (P.D. membership in the HRET. Take note of the principle that the
No. 807), the Non-Career Service shall be characterized by (1) removal must only be for a valid cause after due process.
entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and
fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is BAUTISTA vs. SALONGA
limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous 172 SCRA 160
with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or
which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which Appointment as Chairman of the Commission on
purpose employment was made. The Non-Career Service shall Human Rights needs no confirmation by CA;
include: x x x x 3. Chairman and members of commissions and Appointments are solely for the President to make.
boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or FACTS
confidential staff; President Aquino designated petitioner Mary
Buenaobra who is the Chairman of the KWP is a non- Concepcion Bautista as "Acting Chairman, Commission on Human
career service personnel whose tenure is limited to seven years Rights. On the following years, she was permanently appointed
as provided under R.A. No. 7104. Since her tenure is fixed by law, therein.
her removal from office is not at the pleasure of the appointing She took her oath and discharged her functions. Later,
authority. Hence, Buenaobra enjoys security of tenure and may Bautista received a letter from the Secretary of the CA requesting
not be removed without just cause and non-observance of due her to submit to the Commission certain information and
process. documents as required by its rules in connection with the
confirmation of her appointment, that it would deliberate on her
appointment.
TERM OF OFFICE AND TENURE OF THE INCUMBENT: Due to her refusal, the CA disapproved her so-called “ad
interim” appointment extended by the President.
Security of Tenure: ISSUE
Whether or not the appointment as Chairman of the
No officer or employee of the civil service shall be Commission on Human Rights needs CA confirmation.
removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. HELD
[Article IX-B Section 2(3) 1987 Constitution]. NO, it need not. The position of Chairman of CHR is not
among the positions mentioned in the 1st sentence of Sec. 16, Art.
Term of Office vs. Tenure VII of the 1987 Constitution, appointments to which are to be
made with the confirmation of the CA. It follows that the
TERM TENURE appointments by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is to
be made without the review or participation of the CA. To be
It is the time during It represents the more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of
the officer may term during which the Commission on Human Rights is not specifically provided for
claim to hold office the incumbent in the Constitution itself.
as a right and fixes actually holds office. EO 292 Title II provides: The Chairman and the
the interval after Members of the CHR shall be appointed by the President for a
which several term of 7 years without reappointment. Appointment to any
incumbents shall vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor."
succeed one This is in accordance with Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution
another. and the doctrine in Mison, which is here reiterated.
28
of the Bondoc decision, the LDP Sec. Gen. informed Camasura that (Nacionalista Party vs. Angelo Bautista, 1 47 O.G. 2356;
the LDP had already expelled him for "party disloyalty." On the Nacionalista Party vs. Vera,2 47 O.G. 2375), where it was declared
basis of this development, the House of Representatives decided that “with these periods it was the intention to have one position
to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Cong. vacant every three years, so that no President can appoint more
Camasura to the HRET. The petitioner filed a petition for than one Commissioner, thereby preserving and safe-guarding
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against Rep. Pineda, et al. the independence and impartiality of the Commission” as a body,
and the HRET, praying the court to annul the decision of the we may add, for the impartiality and independence of each
House of Representatives "to withdraw the nomination and to individual Commissioner’s tenure was safeguarded by other
rescind the nomination of Camasura to the HRET"; to restrain provisions in the same Article X of the fundamental charter
Rep. Palacol or whomsoever may be designated in place of Rep. (removability by impeachment alone, and stability of
Camasura and to compel Camasura to immediately reassume and compensation in sec. 1; disability to practice any profession and
discharge his function as a member of the HRET. prohibition of conflicting interest in sec. 3)
ISSUE That the rotation of the Commissioner’s appointments
Whether or not the member of the HRET are entitled to at regular and fixed intervals of three years was a deliberate plan
security of tenure is shown by the history of the provision, and by selection of the
HELD fixed term of nine years for all subsequent appointees, since no
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be other term would give such a result. Initiated under
non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete Commonwealth Act No. 607, the rotation plan was transferred
detachment, impartiality, and independence - even independence without variation to the Constitution, evidently for the purpose of
from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty preserving it from hasty and irreflexive changes.
to party" and "breach of party discipline", are not valid grounds Now, the operation of the rotational plan requires two
for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. Thus, in the case at conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) that the
bar, HR committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a terms of the first three commissioners should start on a common
violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against date; and (2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or
Camasura is, therefore, null and void. disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled
Members of the HRET are entitled to security of tenure only for the unexpired balance of the term. Without satisfying
just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under these conditions, the regularity of the intervals between
our Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be appointments would be destroyed, and the evident purpose of
terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the the rotation (to prevent that a four-year administration should
member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent appoint more than one permanent and regular commissioner)
disability, resignation from the political party he represents in would be frustrated.
the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or While the general rule is that a public officer’s death or
removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by other permanent disability creates a vacancy in the office, so that
the House for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has the successor is entitled to hold for a full term, such rule is
formally affiliated with another political group. recognized to suffer exception in those cases where the clear
intention is to have vacancies appointments at regular intervals.
REPUBLIC vs. IMPERIAL Thus, in 43 Amer. prudence, sec. 159, p. 18, it is stated: . . . In like
96 Phil. 770 manner, it has been ruled that the resignation or the removal of
an officer during his term and the election or appointment of a
Requisites for effective operation of the rotational successor do not divide the term or create a new and distinct one,
scheme for Constitutional Commissioners. and that in such a case the successor is filling out his
HELD predecessor’s term. It seems the term of office of one elected or
Section 1, paragraph 1, of Article X of the Constitution reads as appointed to fill a vacancy in a board of several officers will be
follows: held to be for the unexpired term of his predecessor only, where
the clear intent of the creating power is that the entire board
SEC. 1. There shall be an independent Commission on Elections should not go out of office at once, but that different groups
composed of a Chairman and two other Members to be appointed should retire at regularly recurring intervals.
by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, who shall hold office for a term of nine years and GAMINDE vs. COA (supra)
may not be reappointed. Of the Members of the Commission first
appointed, one shall hold office for nine years, another for six
years, and the third for three years. The Chairman and the other
Members of the Commission on Elections may be removed from
office only by impeachment in the manner provided in this
Constitution.
The provision that of the first three commissioners
appointed, “one shall hold office for 9 years, another for 6 years,
and the third for 3 years,” when taken together with the
prescribed term of office for 9 years, without reappointment,
evidences a deliberate plan to have a regular rotation or cycle in
the membership of the commission, by having subsequent
members appointable only once every three years. This had
already been indicated in previous opinions of this Court
29
PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL POSITIONS: He terminated Arandela and the rest of the legal staff on the
ground of “loss of confidence”.
The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential CES ordered the reinstatement of respondents with
positions ends upon loss of confidence, x x x the salaries and benefits.
cessation is not removal but merely an expiration of ISSUE
term. Whether or not the removal is valid.
HELD
RELATED CASES: (1) As to the removal of Arandela, the same is valid. The
position of a Provincial Attorney is a primarily confidential
CADIENTE vs. SANTOS position. Both (with City Legal Officer) positions were created
142 SCRA 280 (June 11, 1986) under Section 19 of Republic Act No. 5185 which are categorized
as positions of trust and thus, are primarily confidential
The position of a city legal officer is primarily positions.
confidential. (2) As to the legal staff, the removal is void. There is no
FACTS need to extend the professional relationship to the legal staff
Petitioner Cadiente was appointed by Mayor Elias which assists the confidential employer above described. Since
Lopez as City Legal Officer of Davao City. The appointment was the positions occupied by these subordinates are remote from
approved as “permanent” by the CSC. that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between
Later, a new city mayor in the person of respondent them is no longer predominant. The importance of these
Santos terminated the services of Cadiente on the ground that the subordinates to the appointing authority now lies in the
position he is holding is primarily confidential in nature. Clapano contribution of their legal skills to facilitate the work of the
was appointed in his stead. confidential employee. The legal staff/subordinates, being
On appeal, CSC ruled that the above termination is permanent employees, enjoy security of tenures as guaranteed
without cause and that the position of City Legal Officer is not under the 1987 Constitution.
among those enumerated in Section 5 of RA 2260, as non
competitive service. The City Council passed a resolution SANTOS vs. MACARAIG
affirming the CSC decision. 208 SCRA 74 (April 10, 1992)
Despite the resolution respondents (city mayor, city
treasurer, city auditor) refused to recognized the position of The position of a Philippine Representative/
petitioner. Ambassador is primarily confidential.
ISSUE FACTS
Whether or not the position of a City Legal Counsel is Petitioner Rosalinda De-Perio Santos, a career service
considered primarily confidential. officer with the rank of Chief Mission II and Ambassador
HELD Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary was appointed by President
YES, it is. Same ruling was applied in the cases of Aquino to the position of permanent representative of the
Claudio v. Subido, Pinero v. Hechanova, and Corpus v. Cuaderno. Philippines – to the Philippine Mission to the United Nations and
It is a position, which requires utmost confidence on the other international organizations with station in Geneva,
part of the mayor to be extended to said officer. “Primarily Switzerland.
confidential” denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the She filed for leave of absence and 2 discounted tickets
appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy for her and for her daughter for New York. Before leaving Geneva,
which insures freedom of intercourse, without embarrassment, she was ordered to proceed to Havana. Upon refund of the
on freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust on tickets, she was questioned regarding the fare of her daughter.
confidential matters of state. The relationship existing between She was reprimanded and replaced by Escaler.
the lawyer and the client, whether a private individual or a public However, it was later discovered that the government saved
officer, is one that depends on the highest degree of trust. money because of such discounted tickets. She was absolved
The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential from the charge.
positions ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of ISSUE
office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures; and thus, Whether or not Santos was illegally terminated.
their cessation involves no removal but merely the expiration of HELD
the term of office. NO, she was not. Santos occupied a position which is
primarily confidential. The position of permanent representative
GRIÑO vs. CSC is based on special trust and confidence which the appointing
194 SCRA 458 (February 26, 1991) power, the President, had in the appointee. The tenure of
officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss
The position of a Provincial Attorney is a primarily of confidence because their term of office lasts only as long as
confidential position. confidence in them endures. As holder of a primarily confidential
FACTS position, petitioner’s foreign assignment was at the pleasure of
Petitioner Sixto Demaisip was appointed Provincial the President. The recall order terminating her tour duty in
Attorney of Iloilo. He sent a resignation letter recommending Geneva and returning her to the home office was merely a change
respondent Teotimo Arandela to his position (from senior legal of post or transfer of location of work. She has no security of
officer to provincial attorney). tenure.
When petitioner Simplicio Griño assumed the Office of The nature of the position governs than its label.
the Governor, he arranged the replacements of the legal officers.
30
ELIGIBILITY TO PUBLIC OFFICE: RELATED CASE:
MAQUERA vs. BORRA
Qualifications generally required of public officers: (September 7, 1965)
Citizenship, residence, age, education and civil HELD
service qualifications. The Supreme Court held that property qualifications are
inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican
Qualification Standards- refers to the minimum system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social
requirements not only in terms of eligibility but also justice underlying the same. The Court reasoned out that:
training, age, etc.
"Sovereignty resides in the people and all
Religious qualifications prohibited (Section 5, Article government authority emanates from them, and
III, 1987 Constitution): this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to
vote and to be voted shall not be dependent
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an upon the wealth of the individual concerned.
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free Social justice presupposes equal opportunity for
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of all, rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no
religious profession and worship, without person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. chance to be elected to public office."
No religious test shall be required for the exercise of
civil or political rights.
QUALIFICATIONS OF LOCAL ELECTIVE POSITION:
The ruling in the case of Pamil v. Teleron (November
20, 1978) on the basis of Sec. 2175 old Administrative Section 39 of The Local Government Code
Code has been superseded by the 1987 Constitution.
An elective local official must be:
RELATED CASE: Citizen of the Philippines
A registered voter in the barangay, etc. where he
PAMIL vs. TELERON intends to be elected
86 SCRA 413 A resident therein for at least 1 year immediately
preceding the day of the election
Abandoned ruling, decided under the 1973 Able to read and write Filipino or any other local
Constitution language or dialect
FACTS
In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga was elected mayor of Age Qualification:
Albuquerque, Bohol and thereafter was proclaimed. A petition Governor, vice-governor, member of Sangguniang
was filed against him by his opponent on the basis of Section Panlalawigan, mayor, vice mayor, member of
2175 of the RAC providing that “in no case shall there be elected Sangguniang Panlungsod of highly urbanized cities – at
or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active least 23 years old on the day of the election
service, etc.” The CFI dismissed the petition. Mayor, vice-mayor of independent component cities,
ISSUE component cities, or municipalities - 21 years old
Whether or not an ecclesiastic is eligible to an elective Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan- 18
municipal position years old
HELD Punong barangay or members of the Sangguniang
Under the old law, ecclesiastics are prohibited from Barangay- 18 years old
running for elective positions. Now, there is no impediment
Sangguniang Kabataan- 15 to 21 years old
because said law was already repealed. There is no more
prohibition in the 1987 Constitution. Section 2175 of the RAC had Acts Required of an Elected Official before he can assume
been impliedly repealed by Section 23 of the Omnibus Election office
Code. (Section 23 of the OEC has been repealed by the Taking of an oath - this act only incidental, failure
Constitution) to take an oath can be ratified by taking a
No religious test shall be required for the exercise of subsequent oath
civil or political rights. [Section 5(last par.), Article III of the 187 Posting of a bond - this is only a directory
Constitution] This includes the right to be voted for public office. requirement, not part of the office. It is a security
for an accountable officer. Failure to post a bond is
Property qualifications may not be imposed for the
merely a ground for disqualification.
exercise of right to run for public office; law
requiring candidates for public office to post a surety MENDOZA vs. LAXINA (supra)
bond, held unconstitutional.
OMBUDSMAN vs. JURADO (supra)
31
DISQUALIFICATIONS OF LOCAL ELECTIVE POSITION: relinquishment of the alternative remedy of availing
probation under the Probation Law.
Section 40 of the Local Government Code FACTS
Dela Torre was disqualified from running for the
The following persons are disqualified from running for any position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the last May 8, 1995
elective local position: elections on the ground that he was found guilty by the RTC in
Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense June 1990 for violation of P.D. 1612, otherwise known as the
involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable Anti-fencing Law. His conviction became final in January 1991.
by 1 year or more of imprisonment within 2 years after Under Section 40(a) of RA 7160, it is provided that a
serving sentence person is disqualified from running any elective local position if
Those removed from office as a result of an he was sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
administrative case moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by 1 year or more of
Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath imprisonment within 2 years after serving sentence.
of allegiance to the republic Dela Torre claimed that Section 40 (a) of the Local
Those with dual citizenship Government Code does not apply to his case inasmuch as the
Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases probation granted him by the MTC on December 21, 1994 which
here or abroad suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and all
Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who other legal consequences flowing therefrom, rendered
have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well.
avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code ISSUES
The insane or feeble-minded Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral
turpitude
RELATED CASES: Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40
MORENO vs. COMELEC (a)’s applicability
498 SCRA 549 HELD
YES, the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.
Those who have not served their sentence by reason Actual knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that property
of the grant of probation should not be disqualified received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious
from running for a local elective office. deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which animated the
The Punong Barangay convicted of arbitrary robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral
detention but has not served his sentence because of turpitude. The COMELEC did not err in disqualifying the
the grant of probation is not disqualified to seek local petitioner on the ground that the offense of fencing of which he
elective office/position. had been previously convicted by final judgment was one
FACTS involving moral turpitude.
Petitioner Urbano Moreno was the incumbent Punong NO, the grant of probation does not affect the
Barangay at the time of his conviction by the RTC of the crime of applicability of Section 40 of RA 7160. The legal effect of
Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. A
4 mos. and 1 day to 2 years and 4 mos. He was disqualified by the judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains
COMELEC from running for Punong Barangay in the July 2002 finality when the accused applies for probation, although it is not
Barangay Elections because he did not serve the adjudged executory pending resolution of the application for probation.
sentence having been granted probation.
ISSUE DE GUZMAN vs. SUBIDO
Whether or not Moreno should have been disqualified 120 SCRA 443
by the COMELEC?
HELD Not all convictions will tantamount to
No, he should not have been disqualified by the disqualification, only those crimes of public
COMELEC. Those who have not served their sentence by reason character.
of the grant of probation which should not be equated with FACTS
service of sentence, should not be disqualified from running for a Petitioner Ernesto de Guzman was appointed patrolman
local elective office because the two year period of ineligibility of Quezon City Dept. by the then Mayor Amoranto. He was a civil
under Sec. 40 (a) of the LGC does not even begin to run. service eligible.
His appointment was forwarded to the CSC but no
DELA TORRE vs. COMELEC proper action was made. The respondent city treasurer and
(July 5, 1996) auditor subsequently stopped the payment of salaries in view of
the said inaction.
A judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto More than a year later, CSC returned petitioner’s
attains finality when the accused applies for appointment papers still without action thereon holding that de
probation, although it is not executory pending Guzman is disqualified for appointment under the Police Act of
resolution of the application for probation 1996 for having a criminal record – violating a city ordinance for
Conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude “jaywalking”.
(Anti-Fencing Law) stands even if the candidate was ISSUE
granted probation; perfection of an appeal is a Whether or not de Guzman is disqualified from the
appointment to the Quezon City Police Force
32
HELD FACTS
NO, he is not. Not all convictions for violation of a law In 2001, Lingating filed a Petition for Disqualification
are tantamount to disqualification, only those involving moral against private respondent Cesar Sulong as candidate for mayor
turpitude and those offenses, which are public in character. in Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur.
A violation of a municipal or city ordinance for The petition was premised on a previous charge of
“jaywalking” is not a crime in the proper sense of term, for such “dishonesty and malversation of public funds”. Sulong contended
ordinance are not public laws. They only disturb the peace of a that he cannot be disqualified because said decision of the
small community. Hence, it is not the “crime” contemplated under Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) has not yet became final pending
the Police Act of 1996. his Notice of Appeal to the COMELEC.
Moreover, under Rule VI of the CSC Rules, it provides Meanwhile, since COMELEC has not yet acted on the
that the Commission shall act on appointments submitted to it appeal, the election took place which shows Sulong as winner.
within 180 days from receipt thereof. Failure to act within the COMELEC then ruled that the fact of re-election of
said period means that the appointment is approved as properly Sulong as mayor is tantamount to a condonation of the SP
made. decision and as people voted him according to their own free will.
In the instant case, more than a year had elapsed before the ISSUE
papers were returned unacted. Thus, de Guzman is reinstated Whether or not Mayor Sulong should be disqualified on
and is entitled to a 5-year back pay. the ground of the decision removing his from his previous office
HELD
REYES vs. COMELEC NO, he should not. The SP decision has not yet attained
254 SCRA 514 finality. At the time of the election, his appeal was still an
unresolved motion. The filing of such prevented the SP decision
Refusal to accept the service of decision means from becoming final.
“waiver” to accept it. The Reyes ruling cannot apply here.
A local elective official who is removed before the
expiration of his term is disqualified from being a Dual Citizenship vs. Dual Allegiance
candidate for local elective position.
FACTS DUAL CITIZENSHIP DUAL ALLEGIANCE
Petitioner Renato Reyes was the incumbent mayor of
Municipality of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro in 1992. In 1994, an - Arises when, as a result of - Refers to a situation in which a
administrative complaint was filed against him for allegedly the person
exacting money from each stallholders and non-delivery of concurrent application of simultaneously owes, by some
checks to the municipal treasurer. He was found guilty and the different positive act, loyalty to two or
removed. laws of two or more states, more
Reyes applied for a temporary restraining order, which a person is states
was granted. As a result, the SP decision cannot be served to him simultaneously considered
because of his refusal despite several attempts. Reyes postulates a national - Inimical to the national interest
that he can refuse to do so in view of the pendency of his petition. by the said states
During the election, Reyes won. Subsequently, - Voluntary, a result of an
COMELEC declared him disqualified. - Involuntary individual’s
ISSUE Volition
Whether or not the SP decision has become final and
executory so as to serve as the basis for his disqualification The ruling in the landmark case of Mercado vs.
HELD Manzano has been modified by RA 9225, otherwise
YES, it has long been final and executory. known as the Dual Citizenship Act
The refusal by a party’s counsel to receive a decision may be x x xThose seeking elective public in the Philippines
construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of his decision. shall meet the qualification for holding such public
Indeed, the failure to serve the decision was attributable to office as required by the Constitution and existing
petitioner and his counsel. The counsel knew that decision in the laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
administrative case had been rendered evident in his effort to candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
bargain with the counsel for the SP not to have the decision of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
served upon him and his client while their petition in the RTC is officer authorized to administer an oath x x x [Sec. 5
pending. (2), RA 9225].
Section 40 of the LGC does not apply when the Dual citizenship v. Dual allegiance
decision has not yet become final; “Dual citizenship” refers to “dual allegiance”; dual
Where the decision has not become final by reason of citizenship is not a ground for disqualification.
his filing of Motion for Reconsideration (MR), FACTS
respondent local official is not disqualified to run Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and private respondent
during the election. Eduardo Manzano were candidates for vice-mayor for Makati
City. Results of the election showed Manzano as the winner.
33
A Petition for Disqualification was filed by a certain FACTS
Ernesto Mamaril alleging that Manzano is an American based on These two cases were consolidated because they have
the record of the Bureau of Immigration. the same objective; the disqualification under Section 68 of the
Manzano contended that he is a Filipino citizen being Omnibus Election Code of the private respondent, Merito Miguel,
born in 1955 with Filipino parents but he is a registered for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to
foreigner with an Alien Certificate of Registration. which he was elected in the local elections of January 18, 1988,
ISSUE on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent
Whether or not Manzano is disqualified on the ground resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao.
of dual citizenship. Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to
HELD him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a
NO, he is not. The court clarified that the phrase “dual permanent resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained
citizenship” in Section 40 of LGC refers to “dual allegiance”. What the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter
is prohibited is dual allegiance, not dual citizenship. Thus, the United States for his periodic medical examination and to
persons with mere dual citizenship are not disqualified. visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident
Unlike those with dual allegiance who must be subject of Bolinao, Pangasinan that he voted in all previous elections,
to strict process with respect to the determination of their status, COMELEC ruled in favor of Miguel holding that his
for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the possession of a green card does not sufficiently establish that he
filing of their certificate of candidacy, they elect Philippine has abandoned his residence in the Philippines.
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual ISSUE
citizenship considering that their condition is unavoidable Whether or not Miguel should be disqualified
consequence of conflicting laws of different states. Thus, HELD
Manzano is qualified to run. YES, he should be disqualified. To be "qualified to run
for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the
EUSEBIO LOPEZ vs. COMELEC candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his
(July 23, 2008) status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country."
The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for
that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a
be effective. waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the
HELD United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested
While respondent was able to regain his Filipino by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his
Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when he took candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior
his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office.
Consulate General’s Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is
not enough to allow him to run for a public office. The above- ALTAREJOS vs. COMELEC, ALMINE, VERSOZA
quoted provision of law mandates that a candidate with dual 441 SCRA 655 (November 10, 2004)
citizenship must make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to Citizenship qualification is applied at the time of
administer an oath. There is no evidence presented that will proclamation of the elected official and at the start of
show that respondent complied with the provision of R.A. No. his term;
9225. Absent such proof we cannot allow respondent to run for Under Sec. 2 of RA 8171, repatriation is effected by
Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay. taking necessary oath of allegiance to the RP and
For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in registration of Certificate of Repatriation in proper
an affidavit duly executed before an officer of law who is civil registry and the immigration bureau;
authorized to administer an oath. The affiant must state in clear Petitioner did not comply with Sec.2 of RA 8171.
and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship FACTS
for it to be effective. In the instant case, respondent Lopez’s Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality
failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 elections. Private
absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads this respondents filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground
Commission to believe that he failed to comply with the positive that he is not a Filipino Citizen. Petitioner claimed that his
mandate of law. For failure of respondent to prove that he Filipino citizenship was already restored as he was already
abandoned his allegiance to the United States, this Commission issued a Certificate of Repatriation. Petitioner is also a holder of
holds him disqualified from running for an elective position in a permanent US resident visa and an Alien Certificate of
the Philippines. Registration. COMELEC (1st Division) disqualified petitioner.
COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration.
CAASI vs. CA (CASCANTE vs. COMELEC) ISSUE
191 SCRA 229 Whether or not the registration of petitioner’s
repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of
A candidate who is a green card holder must have Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting repatriation
"waived his status as a permanent resident or HELD
immigrant of a foreign country." Repatriation is effected by taking the oath of allegiance
Voluntary Acquisition. to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper
Civil Registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. Petitioner took
34
his oath on December 17, 1997 and his certificate was registered In the instant case, Aznar’s contention was not
on February 18, 2004. Petitioner completed all the requirements supported by sufficient evidence. The fact that Osmeña has a
only after he filed his Certificate of Candidacy. Citizenship “certificate” stating that he is an American does not mean that he
qualification is applied at the time of proclamation of the elected is no longer a Filipino. He did not take an oath of allegiance
official and at the start of his term. Repatriation retroacts to the before the USA nor renounced his Philippine citizenship. He is a
date of the filing of his application. Petitioner was therefore holder of a valid passport and has continuously participated in
qualified. the electoral process, both as a voter and a candidate. Indeed,
Osmeña is an American citizen but he remained a Filipino and the
BENGSON vs. HRET, CRUZ loss of his citizenship cannot be presumed. Osmeña is both
(May 7, 2001) Filipino and American. The mere fact that he is an American does
not mean that he is not still a Filipino. There is no express or
The act of repatriation allows him to recover or implied renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. Thus, he can
return to his original status before he lost his validly run.
Philippine citizenship; repatriation results to the
recovery of the original nationality. LABO vs. COMELEC
FACTS (August 1, 1989)
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He
enlisted in the US Marine Corps and, without consent of the One who subscribes to an oath of allegiance to
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the US. support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country
As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship. He was is disqualified to run.
naturalized as a US citizen in 1990. In 1994, Cruz reacquired his FACTS
Philippine citizenship through repatriation. He ran for and was Petitioner was proclaimed the mayor-elect of Baguio
elected as Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the City. Respondent filed a motion for quo warranto on the ground
May 11, 1998 elections. Bengson filed a case for Quo Warranto that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and therefore disqualified
Ad Cautelam with HRET claiming that Cruz is not qualified to to hold said public office.
become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not The decision of the CID on the question of petitioner’s
a natural born citizen. citizenship, finding the latter not a citizen of the Philippines, took
ISSUE into account the official statement of the Australian Government
Whether or not Cruz is considered a natural-born that petitioner was still an Australian citizen by reason of his
citizen after his repatriation naturalization in 1976.
HELD The petitioner contends that:
Petition is without merit. Natural-born citizens are a) His marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did
those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship;
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. b.) His naturalization in Australia made him at worst
Naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine
through naturalization. Having taken the required oath of citizenship;
allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same, Cruz is c) His naturalization in Australia was annulled after it
deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino bigamous;
father. The act of repatriation allows him to recover or return to d) His alleged lack of citizenship is a " futile
his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship. technicality" that should not frustrate the will of the electorate of
Baguio City.
AZNAR vs. COMELEC HELD
185 SCRA 703 (May 25, 1990) The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an
Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of
A person who is both an American and Filipino Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding
citizen can validly run. that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that
FACTS marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was
Private respondent Lito Osmeña filed his certificate of naturalized as such through a formal and positive process,
candidacy as Provincial Governor for Cebu Province. Herein simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian
petitioner Jose Aznar filed his Petition for Disqualification against citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took
Osmeña on the ground that the latter is an American Citizen. the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance.
The election took place wherein Osmeña was declared CA No. 63 enumerates the modes by which Philippine
as the winner. Subsequently, COMELEC dismissed the petition for citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a
lack of sufficient proof. foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3)
ISSUE subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or
Whether or not Osmeña should be disqualified laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the
HELD petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this connection that
NO, he should not be disqualified. By virtue of being the under Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution, "Dual
son of a Filipino father, the presumption that Osmeña is a Filipino allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall
remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that be dealt with by law." Thus, he is disqualified to run.
Osmeña had lost his Philippine citizenship. Petitioner failed to
positively establish this fact.
35
REPUBLIC vs. DE LA ROSA, FRIVALDO It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely
232 SCRA 785 (June 6, 1994) committed an honest mistake in jotting down the word "seven" in
the space provided for the residency qualification requirement.
Naturalization proceedings should strictly follow the An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has
prescribed rules and procedure. lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it
FACTS bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for
The Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile
naturalization of Frivaldo. Frivaldo filed a motion to set hearing to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a
ahead of schedule because of his intention to run for public office. temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of
Motion was granted. The said order was not published. The residence.
petition was granted. Lee and Frivaldo were candidates for For political purposes the concepts of residence and
governor of Sorsogon. Frivaldo was proclaimed by the COMELEC domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As
as the winner and Lee filed a petition to annul the proclamation. these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly
ISSUE and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election
Whether or not Frivaldo is qualified to run and assume purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
public office
HELD Residence vs. Domicile
Naturalization proceedings were full of procedural
flaws. The proceedings conducted are null and void for failure to RESIDENCE DOMICILE
comply with the publication and posting requirement under the - Implies the factual -Denotes a fixed permanent
Revised Naturalization Law. No decision granting citizenship in relationship of an individual to residence to which, when
naturalization proceedings shall be executory until after two (2) a certain place. It is the absent, one has the intention of
years from its promulgation. Frivaldo is not yet a Filipino citizen. physical presence of a person returning.
Petitioner’s argument, that to unseat him will frustrate the will of in a given area, community or
the electorate, is untenable. Both the Local Government Code country. To successfully effect a change
and the Constitution require that only Filipino citizens can run of domicile, one must
and be elected in public office. Private respondent is declared not demonstrate:
a citizen of the Philippines and therefore, disqualified from
continuing to serve as Governor of Sorsogon. 1. An actual removal or an
actual change of domicile;
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMELEC
248 SCRA 300 2. A bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of
“Residence” for election purposes is used residence and establishing a
synonymously with “domicile.” new one; and
FACTS
Petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her 3. Acts which correspond with
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the the purpose.
1st District of Leyte.
Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the 1st District of Leyte and a candidate for the
same position, filed a disqualification case with COMELEC APPOINTMENT AND DESIGNATION:
alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. He contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked Appointment vs. Designation
the 1-year residency requirement for candidates to the House of
Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in APPOINTMENT DESIGNATION
her Certificate of Candidacy (which stated 7 months residency - The selection, by the authority - The mere imposition by
only). vested with power, of an law of additional duties on
ISSUE individual who is to exercise the the incumbent official
Whether or not Marcos is disqualified to run functions of a given office
HELD - There is no security of
NO, she is not disqualified to run. - There is security of tenure; tenure; generally temporary
It is the fact of residence, not a statement-in a certificate generally permanent
of candidacy, which ought to be decisive in determining whether - Legislative in nature (by
or not an individual has satisfied the constitution's residency - Executive in nature (by law)
qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material authority vested with power)
only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render
a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a
Acting/ temporary capacity:
candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a
- One disqualified from such capacity does not have vested title;
certificate of candidacy, which would lead to his or her one disqualified cannot claim emoluments as a matter of right;
disqualification. basis for payment is a valid appointment
36
- Appointment to the position should not be beyond a certain BINAMIRA vs. GARRUCHO
period unless the contrary is provided 188 SCRA 154 (July 30, 1990)
- Appointment takes effect immediately even without the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments Designation is not equal to appointment; there is no
security of tenure.
2 Kinds of Appointment: FACTS
Petitioner Ramon Binamira seeks his reinstatement as
1. PERMANENT APPOINTMENT General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) from
It is issued to a person to one who meets all the which he claims to have been removed without just cause in
qualifications for the position, including the requisite violation of his security of tenure.
eligibility. He premised his claim on the communication addressed
Whenever there is a civil service eligible, appointment to him by the Minister of Tourism designating him to such
must be given to such eligible. In no case should a non- position. President Aquino approved it.
eligible be appointed to a position in a career service. When the new Tourism Secretary assumed office in the
person of respondent Garrucho, he was sought to resign. He did
2. TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT resign but under protest.
Where the appointee in those circumstances is issued It was contended that Binamira’s appointment was
an appointment and he does not possess the requisite invalid having done only by the Minister of Tourism, and not by
qualifications, such appointment is merely temporary in the President herself.
nature. The one who holds a temporary appointment ISSUE
has no fixed tenure of office. There is no violation of Whether or not there was a violation of Binamira’s
security of tenure. security of tenure
Such employment can be terminated even without HELD
cause because the termination is not removal. It would NO, there was no violation. Binamira was merely
simply be an expiration of term because he serves at the designated, not appointed to the position.
pleasure of the appointing authority. Even if so understood as an appointment, still the
appointment is void. The decree creating the PTA provides that
RELATED CASES: its General Manager shall be appointed only by the President, not
by any other officer. Appointment may be defined as the
NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION vs. COA selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual
437 SCRA 657 (September 8, 2004) who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When
completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results
Designation and Appointment in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is
FACTS replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of this office.
National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government Designation connotes merely the imposition by law of additional
agency tasked to receive, process and review amnesty duties on an incumbent official, as in this case, the Secretary of
applications. Ex-officio members are the Secretary of Justice, Tourism is designated as Chairman of the Board of Directors of
National Defense and Interior Local Government. They turned PTA. Appointment is essentially executive while designation is
over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid legislative in nature. If designated, he shall hold office only in
honoraria. However, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed the temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing
payment of such honoraria. authority. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion which,
ISSUE because of its nature, cannot be delegated.
Whether or not the payment of honoraria should be Thus, it is not legally possible for the Minister to assume
disallowed and exercise that discretion as an “alter ego” of the President. The
HELD appointment (or designation) of Binamira was not a mere
COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant per diem, mechanical act that could be validly performed by a subordinate
honoraria or any allowance whatsoever to the representatives. even if he happened to be a member of the Cabinet, like in this
The representatives assumed their responsibilities not by virtue case. Appointment of such position in this case shall be made by
of a new appointment but by mere designation from the ex officio the President, not by any other officer.
members who were themselves designated as such. An
appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an
individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given APPOINTMENT:
office. A designation merely connotes an imposition of ACHACOSO vs. MACARAIG
additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the 195 SCRA 237 (March 13, 1991)
public service by virtue of an earlier appointment. It does not
entail payment of additional benefits. Since the ex-officio Permanent appointment can only be issued to the
member is prohibited from receiving additional compensation, so person who meets all the requirements
is his representative. One who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed
tenure of office.
FACTS
Achacoso was appointed Administrator of POEA. In
compliance with a request addressed by the President, he filed a
courtesy resignation. The Secretary of Labor requested him to
37
turn over his office to the Deputy Administrator as officer-in- According to Section 24(d) of PD 807, a person
charge. He protested his replacement contending that he only permanently appointed and subsequently separated without any
filed his resignation in obedience to the President’s directive. delinquency should be reinstated in the same position. It follows
Sarmiento was appointed Administrator of the POEA. Achacoso that Palmera should be immediately reinstated in his former
contends that he is a member of the Career Service of the Civil position of equivalent rank or compensation.
Service and enjoys security of tenure. However, in view of his pending cases before the
ISSUE Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, back salaries may not be paid
Whether or not the resignation of Achacoso was valid to him until he is absolved.
HELD
The Solicitor General concedes that the office is a career ROMUALDEZ III vs. CSC
executive service position but petitioner is not a career executive 197 SCRA 168
service official entitled to security of tenure. CSC certified that
petitioner did not possess the necessary qualifications when he He who voluntarily and willingly accepted a
was appointed as administrator. Not having taken the temporary appointment loses his security of tenure
examination, he could not claim that his appointment was to the former permanent position.
permanent and guaranteed him security of tenure. A permanent Acceptance of appointment is not essential to the
appointment can be issued only “to a person who meets all the validity of the appointment but necessary to the full
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, possession of the office.
including the appropriate eligibility prescribed.” Achacoso did FACTS
not. His appointment could be regarded only as temporary. Petitioner Norberto Romualdez III was appointed as
Commercial Attache of the Department of Trade and Industry
PALMERA vs. CSC continuously for 12 years. He is a CS eligible.
235 SCRA 87 He was later transferred to respondent Philippine
Coconut Authority (PCA) where he was appointed as a Deputy
Security of tenure means that no officer or employee Administrator. The nature of the appointment is “reinstatement”
in the CS shall be suspended or removed except for and his employment was “temporary”.
cause provided by law and after due process. Subsequently, his employment was extended for
FACTS another 6 months, then it was never renewed.
Petitioner Rodolfo Palmera has been working with the Pending his appeal to CSC, Roman Santos was appointed
Ministry of Public Works (MPW) for 34 years. When MPW and in his stead. Romualdez contended that he himself is qualified to
Ministry of Public Highways (MPW) were merged, he was the disputed position so that he should be extended a permanent
appointed as Asst. Regional Director for the National Capital appointment.
Region. ISSUE
In 1987, he was charged with “grave misconduct and Whether or not it is mandatory upon CSC to extend
dishonesty” in two administrative cases. For this, he was placed permanent appointment to selected appointees with
under 90-day preventive suspension. On that same year he was corresponding CS eligibilities.
again suspended for the same term and for the same reason. HELD
After the lifting of his suspension, Palmera immediately NO, it is not mandatory. The duty of CSC is only to
went back to his work despite knowing the appointment of approve and disapprove an appointment. Its attestation is limited
Pacific Mendoza in his place. DPWH then hired him in contractual to the determination whether the appointee possesses the
basis under the assurance that he will be appointed to another required qualifications for the position for which he is appointed.
position. However, after his contract expired, he was never A discretionary duty on the part of the appointing authority
renewed. cannot be compelled by mandamus.
Palmera appealed to the CSC for reinstatement and When petitioner accepted his temporary appointment
nullification of Mendoza’s appointment. CSC agreed with Palmera in the PCA, he was thereby effectively divested of his security of
and the former found the contract issued to the latter to be tenure, and his tenure of office became dependent upon the
violative of the CSC laws and regulations, but CSC dismissed his pleasure of the appointing authority. There was no removal but
appeal mainly on the ground of laches. only an expiration of his term as temporary employee.
ISSUE
Whether or not Palmera’s right to security of tenure FELIX vs. BUENASEDA
was violated. 240 SCRA 139
HELD
YES, it was. It cannot be construed that petitioner has A residency or resident physician position is not
the intention to relinquish his right when he signed the contract permanent.
of employment. The signing of the contract was not made FACTS
voluntary for he was made to understand that the contract was This case is an aftermath of the reorganization of the
merely for the sake of formality. Thus, it is void. Further, the government after the EDSA revolution which resulted to the
Commission itself held hat the contract was null and void. The removal of various civil servants.
acceptance of a temporary appointment with no intention to Petitioner Alfredo Felix joined the National Center for
abandon does not divest employee of security of tenure. Mental Health as a Resident Physician. He was later promoted as
In addition, it is impossible for him to relinquish his a Medical Specialist I as “temporary”.
permanent post for 34 years and all his concomitant rights, In 1988, DOH issued an order which requires a board
including his accrued leave benefits. certification as a prerequisite for renewal of specialist positions
38
in various medical center. This time petitioner was not yet appointment after determining whether or not the appointee
accredited by the Psychiatry Specialty Board. possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required
DOH issued an order providing for an extension of qualifications. It cannot order or direct the appointment of a
appointments of Medical Specialist positions in cases where the successful protestant.
termination of medical specialists who failed to meet the Section 185 of the Local Government Code provides that
requirement for board certification might result in the disruption "[n]o person shall be appointed city engineer unless he is a
of hospital services. citizen of the Philippines, of good moral character, a licensed civil
Eventually, petitioner's immediate supervisor, pointed engineer, and has been an assistant city engineer or has engaged
out petitioner’s poor performance, frequent tardiness and in the practice of his profession for at least five years."
inflexibility as among the factors responsible for the non-renewal It is not disputed that both petitioner and private
of his appointment. Hence, this petition. respondent are qualified for the position. But the Commission is
ISSUE of the view that it can disapprove petitioner’s appointment and
Whether or not the conversion of the permanent direct the appointment of private respondent to the disputed
appointment of petitioner to temporary was done in bad faith in position, considering that the latter is next-in-rank.
the guise of reorganization and thus invalid, being violative of the .
petitioner's right of security of tenure UMOSO vs. CSC
HELD 234 SCRA 617
NO, it is not violative of his security of tenure. A
residency or resident physician position in a medical specialty is CSC cannot substitute its judgment for that of the
never a permanent one. “Residency” connotes training and appointing power.
temporary status. It is the step taken by a physician right after “Next-in-rank” rule.
post-graduate internship (and after hurdling the Medical FACTS
Licensure Examinations) prior to his recognition as a specialist or Petitioner Orlando G. Umoso is a Senior Civil Engineer
sub-specialist in a given field. promoted to the position of Supervising Civil Engineer I by the
It is crystal clear, from the facts of the case at bench, Regional Director.
that the petitioner accepted a temporary appointment (Medical Respondent Severino Caronan, Senior Civil Engineer,
Specialist I). As CSC has correctly pointed out, the appointment protested the appointment since the promotion was not
was for a definite and renewable period which, when it was not evaluated by the DPWH Central Review Board.
renewed, did not involve a dismissal but an expiration of the The Complainant’s Committee upheld the protest of
petitioner's term. Caronan. It then recommended that Caronan be appointed to the
contested position. It was approved by the DPWH Secretary.
ISSUES
POWER TO APPOINT: 1. Whether or not the DPWH Secretary has the ultimate
PATAGOC vs. CSC power to set aside an appointment made by the Regional Director
(May 14, 1990) 2. Whether or not CSC committed grave abuse of
discretion in substituting Caronan to the disputed position
CSC cannot substitute its judgment for that of the HELD
appointing power. (1) YES, he has the power to appoint. The appointing
FACTS power is vested upon the Department Secretary. Such power
Petitioner was appointed City Engineer by Zamboanga however, may be delegated to the regional director subject,
City Mayor Vitaliano Agan. The appointment was in the nature of however, to the approval, revision, modification, and reversal of
a reinstatement. Petitioner was previously employed by the city the Department Secretary.
government, assigned with the Bureau of Public Works (2) YES, it committed a grave abuse of discretion. The
Engineering District and with the City Engineer's Office when the CSC may only approve and disapprove the appointment. It has no
Ministry of Public Works was reorganized and he was phased authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another
out. He rose from Civil Engineering Aide II to Supervising City person is more qualified.
Engineer II. Thereafter, for six (6) years before his appointment Furthermore, the fact that petitioner occupies a “next-
as City Engineer, he was a consultant with the DPWH and then in-rank” position does not impose on the appointing authority
with a private construction firm. the duty to appoint him. The “next-in-rank” rule merely gives
Private respondent Engr. Luis Vicente L. Despalo is the preference but the appointing power is still given the discretion
incumbent Assistant City Engineer, filed a protest against as long as the minimum qualifications for such positions are
petitioner's appointment with the CSC Regional Office on the complied with.
ground that he was next-in-rank.
CSC revoked Patagoc’s appointment and placed Despalo TOMALI vs. CSC
in his stead. 238 SCRA 573
ISSUE
Whether or not CSC can validly revoke the appointment An appointment to a position in the CS is required to
of an individual on the ground that the other is more qualified be submitted to the CSC for approval in order to be
HELD complete.
NO, it cannot. It must again be emphasized that the FACTS
power of appointment is essentially discretionary and that the Petitioner Mona Tomali was appointed Development
CSC cannot substitute its judgment for that of the appointing Manager Officer II in the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA). The
power. The Commission may only approve or disapprove the
39
appointment was extended by the then OMA Executicve Director NEPOTISM RULE:
Pundato.
She assumed the duties and functions for 4 months. At Nepotism - can exist not only with regards to appointment but
which time, the appointment had not yet transmitted to the CSC also with regards to recommendation. It is can be considered
for approval. both as a criminal and administrative offense. It applies to
With the advent of the new OMA Director Lucman, original and promotional offices.
Tomali’s incomplete appointment was revoked and herein
private respondent Lucman replaced her. The OMA Chief of a. LGU – prohibition up to 4th civil degree
Human Resources Department informed her of the disapproval of
her earlier appointment. RA 7160, SECTION 79. Limitation on Appointments. — No
Upon appeal to MSPB, it dismissed her petition for lack person shall be appointed in the career service of the local
of merit. government if he is related within the fourth civil degree of
ISSUE consanguinity or affinity to the appointing or recommending
Whether or not the appointment of Tomali was deemed authority.
completed
HELD b. Others – prohibition up to 3rd civil degree
NO, it was not yet complete.
An appointment to a position in the CS is required to be
EO 292 SECTION 59. Nepotism. —
submitted to the CSC for approval in order to determine whether
(1) All appointments in the national, provincial, city and
the proposed appointee is qualified to hold the position or municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality
whether the rules pertinent to the appointing process is thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
observed. made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending
Compliance with the legal requirements for an authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons
appointment to a civil service position is essential to make it fully exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby
effective. Without the favorable certification or approval of the prohibited.
CSC (in cases where such approval is required), no title to the As used in this Section, the word "relative" and members of
office can yet be deemed permanently vested in favor of the
the family referred to are those related within the third degree
appointee. The appointment may still be withdrawn.
either of consanguinity or of affinity.
Until the appointment has become a completed act,
security of tenure will not lie.
(2) The following are exempted from the operation of the
rules on nepotism:
ORBOS vs. CSC
(a) Persons employed in a confidential capacity,
189 SCRA 459 (b) Teachers,
(c) Physicians, and
CSC has no power to make the appointment itself, its (d) Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines:
duty is only to approve or disapprove them. Provided, however, That in each particular instance full
FACTS report of such appointment shall be made to the Commission.
In the course of the reorganization of DOTC, Agon and The restriction mentioned in subsection (1) shall not be
Magnayon were appointed to the positions of Head applicable to the case of a member of any family who, after his or
Telecommunications Engineer while Madarang occupied the
her appointment to any position in an office or bureau, contracts
position of Supervising Telecommunications Engineer. Madarang
marriage with someone in the same office or bureau, in which
questioned the appointments of Agon and Magnayon by filing an
event the employment or retention therein of both husband and
appeal with the Reorganization Appeals Board of the DOTC.
wife may be allowed. xxx
The Board dismissed the appeal. Hence, Madarang
sought recourse to CSC. The latter revoked the appointments of
Sec. 67, EO 292: Penalty of fine of not more than P1,
Agon and Magnayon. Madarang was placed in their stead.
000 or not more than 6 years imprisonment, or both.
Agon and Magnayon sought their respective
reconsiderations to the CSC, but these were denied.
RELATED CASES:
ISSUE
DEBULGADO vs. CSC
Whether or not CSC committed grave abuse of
237 SCRA 186
discretion when it removed Agon and Magnayon from the
disputed position and placed Madarang instead
Prohibition against nepotism applies to both original
HELD
YES. CSC has no authority to revoke an appointment on and promotional appointments.
Where CSC disapproves the appointment, appointee
the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular
need not be previously heard.
position. CSC does not have the authority to direct the
FACTS
appointment of a substitute of his choice.
Petitioner Rogelio Debulgado is the mayor of San Carlos
The CSC has the power to approve or disapprove an
City of Cebu. He appointed his wife as General Services Officer,
appointment but it has no power to make the appointment itself
who has been in the service of the city government for 32 years.
or direct that such appointment be made by the appointing
The appointment was duly approved by CSC Field Office.
authority.
Congressman Carmona of Negros Occidental called the
attention of CSC regarding Debulgado’s appointment in favor of
40
his wife. For this, CSC recalled the appointment on the ground Passage of CS exam does not transform temporary
that the same is nepotic. appointment to permanent; new appointment is
necessary.
ISSUE FACTS
Whether or not a promotional appointment is covered Tito Dato was appointed as Private Agent by Governor
by the legal prohibition against nepotism Maleniza of Camarines Sur. He was promoted as Asst. Provincial
HELD Warden. But because he had no CS eligibility, he could not be
YES, it is still covered. Both original and promotional extended a permanent appointment. Thus, his temporary
appointments are particular species of personnel action. The appointment has been renewed annually.
original appointment of a civil service employee and all Dato represented himself as an eligible which led to his
subsequent personnel actions undertaken by or in respect of that appointment to a permanent status. But the same was later
employee such as promotion, transfer, reinstatement, re- revoked by CSC after discovering that he did not possess the
employment, etc. must comply with the CSC Implementing Rules, necessary qualifications.
including of course, the prohibition against nepotism in Rule Thereafter, Dato was charged criminally for allegedly
XVIII. Promotional appointment that violates prohibition against consenting to the evasion of sentence of some detention
nepotism is null and void. prisoners. For this he was indefinitely suspended.
To limit the thrust of the prohibition against nepotism Eventually, CSC approved the permanent status of Dato
to the appointment issued at the time of initial entry into the after having passed the examination for Supervising Security
government service, and to insulate from that prohibition Guard. The change of status was to be made retroactive to the
appointments subsequently issued when personnel actions are date of release of said examination.
thereafter taken in respect of the same employee, would be In the meantime, Sangguniang Panlalawigan suppressed
basically to render that prohibition “meaningless and toothless”. the appropriation for the above position and deleted his name
from petitioner’s plantilla. After being acquitted from the
LAUREL vs. CSC charges, he requested for reinstatement and backwages but was
203 SCRA195 not heeded.
ISSUE
One of the objectives of the CS Law is to avoid Whether or not Dato was a permanent employee at the
nepotism. time he was suspended
FACTS HELD
Petitioner is a duly elected governor of Batangas. He NO, he was not yet. Passing a civil service examination
designated his brother Benjamin Laurel as Acting Provincial does not ipso facto convert a temporary appointment into a
Administrator in the Office of the Governor, a primarily permanent one. There must be a new appointment since a
confidential position. permanent appointment is not a continuation of a temporary
Private respondent Sanggalang wrote to CSC appointment- these are two distinct acts of the appointing
questioning the said appointment on the grounds that the authority.
position in question is a career position, that the appointment
violates the Civil Service Law and that the Governor violated the GLORIA vs. DE GUZMAN
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 249 SCRA 126
Laurel contended that there was no violation for his
brother was merely designated, and not appointed to the Mere "designation" does not confer upon the
position. designee security of tenure in the position of office.
CSC revokes the designation for being nepotic. Passage of CS exam does not transform temporary
ISSUE appointment to permanent; new appointment is
Whether or not the designation is valid. necessary.
HELD FACTS
NO, it is invalid. The position of Provincial Private respondents were employees of the Philippine
Administrator is embraced in the career service under Section 5 Air Force College of Aeronautics (PAFCA) which was created by
of PD 807. Being a career service, its entrance must be based on virtue of PD 1078.
merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by PAFCA Board of Trustees issued a Resolution which
competitive examination, etc. declared that "All faculty/administrative employees are also
More specifically, in order for an individual to be subject to the required CS eligibilities". Thus, herein private
appointed to an open career position, it requires prior respondents were issued only temporary appointments because
qualification in appropriate examination, and not by blood ties. at the time of their appointment, they lacked appropriate CS
eligibilities.
OTHER RELATED CASES: Private respondent Cerillo was issued a 1-year
temporary appointment to the position of Board Secretary II of
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES vs. CA PAFCA. It was emphasized that temporary appointments were
246 SCRA 281 good and renewable only up to 1992.
In 1992, Cerillo was relieved by reason of loss of
A new appointment is necessary for converting a confidence. Subsequently, however, she was designated as
temporary status into a permanent one; "Coordinator for Extension Services."
Subsequently, PAFCA was converted into a state college
to be known as the Philippine State College of Aeronautics
41
(PSCA). The power to make appointments was retained by the Employment Center. However, when said appointment was
Board. submitted to CSC Regional Office No. III, it was disapproved on
PSCA Office-In-Charge informed private respondents the ground that petitioner’s eligibility was not appropriate.
that they shall be deemed separated from the service upon the Petitioner was advised by SBMA of the disapproval of his
expiration of their temporary appointments. appointment. In view thereof, petitioner was issued a temporary
Five months after the lapse of the terms of their appointment. The CSC affirmed the disapproval of his permanent
temporary appointments, private respondents filed a "Petition appointment. The CA shunned the issue of constitutionality of the
for Mandamus and Reinstatement, with Back Wages and Memo Circular. It ruled that petitioner has no standing as only
Damages". the appointing officer may request reconsideration of the action
ISSUE taken by the CSC. Also, petitioner was not the real party in
Whether or not Cerillo (together with the other interest as his appointment was dependent on the CSC’s
respondents) is entitled to reinstatement to the position of approval.
Coordinator for Extension Services ISSUE
HELD Who may file reconsideration or appeal?
NO, she is not entitled. The judgment which orders the HELD
reinstatement of Cerillo to the said position is improper. A permanent appointment in the career service is
Although she is temporarily extended an appointment as Board issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position
Secretary II, was dismissed therefrom because of loss of to which the appointment is made in accordance with the
confidence. This dismissal was neither contested nor appealed provisions of law, the rules and the standards promulgated
from by Ms. Cerillo. There is no question, therefore, that her pursuant thereto. It implies the civil service eligibility of the
dismissal as Board Secretary II could not have been the subject of appointee. The law requires the appointment to be submitted to
the petition for mandamus and reinstatement filed before the CSC which will ascertain, in the main, whether the proposed
respondent Judge. The fact is that private respondent's appointee is qualified to hold the position and whether the rules
assignment as "Coordinator for Extension Services" was a mere pertinent to the process of appointment were observed. The
designation. Not being a permanent appointment, the designation appointing officer and the CSC acting together, though not
of the position cannot be the subject of the case for concurrently but consecutively, make an appointment complete
reinstatement. In acting on the appointment, the CSC determines whether the
Furthermore, even granting that Ms. Cerillo could be appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the
validly reinstated as "Coordinator for Extension Services", her required qualifications. If the appointee does, the appointment
reinstatement thereto would not be possible because the position must be approved; if not, it should be disapproved. According to
is not provided for in the PSCA plantilla. The PSCA could not have the CA, only the appointing authority had the right to challenge
made any valid appointment for his inexistent position. This the CSC’s disapproval. It relied on Section 2 of Rule VI of CSC
could very well be the reason why she was merely designated as Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998, which provides: Section 2.
Coordinator. As a mere designee, she could not have acquired any Request for Reconsideration of, or appeal from, the disapproval
right to the position even if the position existed. At any rate, a of an appointment may be made by the appointing authority and
mere "designation" does not confer upon the designee security of submitted to the Commission within fifteen (15) calendar days
tenure in the position of office which he occupies in an acting from receipt of the disapproved appointment.
capacity only.
Appointing Authority’s Right to Challenge CSC Disapproval
ABELLA vs. CSC The power of appointment necessarily entails the
442 SCRA 507 exercise of judgment and discretion. Significantly, the selection of
the appointee -- taking into account the totality of his
The appointing authority and the appointee are real qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his
parties … to challenge the CSC disapproval of the personality -- is the prerogative of the appointing authority. No
appointment. tribunal, not even this Court, may compel the exercise of an
FACTS appointment for a favored person. The CSC’s disapproval of an
Petitioner, a lawyer, retired from the Export Processing appointment is a challenge to the exercise of the appointing
Zone Authority (EPZA), as Department Manager of the Legal authority’s discretion. The appointing authority must have the
Services Department. He held a civil service eligibility for the right to contest the disapproval. Thus, Section 2 of Rule VI of CSC
position of Department Manager, having completed the training Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998 is justified insofar as it allows
program for Executive Leadership and Management in 1982 the appointing authority to request reconsideration or appeal.
under the Civil Service Academy, pursuant to CSC Resolution No.
850, which was then the required eligibility for said position. The Appointee’s Legal Standing to Challenge the CSC Disapproval
CSC issued Memorandum Circular No. 21, series of 1994 While there is justification to allow the appointing
(Pertinent provision: Positions covered by the CES: (a) the authority to challenge the CSC disapproval, there is none to
position is a career position, (b) above division chief level (c) preclude the appointee from taking the same course of action.
duties and responsibilities require performance of executive or Aggrieved parties, including the CSC, should be given the right to
managerial functions. Upon promotion or transfer to other file MRs or to appeal. Although commonly directed towards
Career Executive Service (CES) positions, these incumbents shall ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, legal
be under temporary status in said other CES positions until they standing and real party in interest are different concepts. The
qualify. Two years after retirement, petitioner was hired by the question in standing is whether such parties have alleged such a
SBMA on a contractual basis. He was issued by SBMA a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to assure that
permanent employment as Department Manager III, Labor and concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
42
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of The Court, however, hasten to add that the
difficult constitutional questions. On the other hand, the question aforementioned ruling does not mean that the raison d' etre
as to real party-in-interest is whether he is the party who would behind the prohibition against midnight appointments may not
be [benefited] or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to be applied to those made by chief executives of local government
the avails of the suit. If legal standing is granted to challenge the units, as here. Indeed, the prohibition is precisely designed to
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act despite discourage, nay, even preclude, losing candidates from issuing
the lack of personal injury on the challenger’s part, then more so appointments merely for partisan purposes thereby depriving
should petitioner be allowed to contest the CSC Order the incoming administration of the opportunity to make the
disapproving his appointment. Clearly, he was prejudiced by the corresponding appointments in line with its new policies.
disapproval, since he could not continue his office. Although The appointment of Quirog cannot be categorized as a
petitioner had no vested right to the position, it was his eligibility midnight appointment. For it is beyond dispute that Quirog had
that was being questioned. Corollary to this point, he should be been discharging and performing the duties concomitant with the
granted the opportunity to prove his eligibility. He had a personal subject position for a year prior to her permanent appointment
stake in the outcome of the case, which justifies his challenge to thereto. Surely, the fact that she was only permanently appointed
the CSC act that denied his permanent appointment. to the position of PGDH-OPA after a year of being the Acting
Provincial Agriculturist more than adequately shows that the
The Appointee a Real Party in Interest filling up of the position resulted from deliberate action and a
The rule refers to a real or present substantial interest careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the
as distinguished from a mere expectancy; or from a future, appointee's qualifications. The fact that Quirog had been the
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. The appointee Acting Provincial Agriculturist since June 2000 all the more
is rightly a real party in interest too. He is also injured by the CSC highlights the public need for said position to be permanently
disapproval, because he is prevented from assuming the office in filled up.
a permanent capacity. Moreover, he would necessarily benefit if a
favorable judgment is obtained, as an approved appointment DE RAMA vs. CA
would confer on him all the rights and privileges of a permanent 353 SCRA 94
appointee.
QUIROG vs. AUMENTADO The prohibition on “Midnight Appointments” under
570 SCRA 582 (Nov. 11, 2008) Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution applies only
to presidential appointments and not to local chief
No violation of CSC resolution prohibiting midnight executives.
appointment where the filing up resulted from FACTS
deliberate action and careful consideration of Mayor Conrado de Rama won as mayor of Pagbilao,
qualification. Quezon. One of the first things he did upon assumption of office
FACTS was to write the Civil Service Commission and seek the recall of
Liza Quirog was appointed by Bohol Prov. Gov. the appointments of 14 municipal employees. According to him,
Relampagos as Provincial Government Department Head of the said appointments should be recalled as they were “midnight”
Office of the Bohol Provincial Agriculture (PGDH-OPA) on May appointments of the former mayor, Evelyn Abeja. The CSC denied
28, 2001 and the appointment was confirmed by the Sangguniang his request saying that the appointments of the 14 employees
Panlalawigan in Res. No. 2001-199on June 1, 2001. She took her were made in accordance with law and that the sec.15, Article VII
oath on the same day. of the Constitution which is being relied upon by Mayor de Rama,
On June 28, 2001, the Director of CSCROVII invalidated pertains only to the appointments of the outgoing President and
Quirog's appointment as PGDH-OPA upon finding that the same not of local elective officials.
was part of the bulk appointments issued by then Gov. Upon appeal to the CA, Mayor de Rama filed a
Relampagos after the May 14, 2001 elections allegedly in supplemental pleading to the appeal alleging that the
violation of CSC Res. No. 010988 dated June 4, 2001 which is appointments were also tainted with fraud since the former
about prohibition against the issuance of midnight appointments. mayor did not follow the rule in sec.80 of Ra 7041 that
The CSC set aside the orders and declared that the appointment appointments can only be made within 4 months from the
of Quirog was not a midnight appointment as it was not hurriedly publication of the vacancies.
issued nor did it subvert the policies of the incoming ISSUE
administration Whether the appointments made by the former mayor
The CA set aside the CSC resolution ruling that Quirog's should be recalled.
appeal should have been dismissed outright for lack of legal HELD
personality NO. The CSC has correctly ruled that the appointments
ISSUE were made in accordance with the law. It was already too late for
Whether or not the subject appointment was a midnight Mayor de Rama to claim that appointments were tainted with
appointment? fraud since he did not raise this in his first complaint, which only
HELD relied on his allegation that the same were midnight
No, it cannot be said that Quirog's appointment was a appointments. Only the CSC has the power to recall the
midnight appointment. The constitutional prohibition on so- appointments upon grounds mentioned in the Revised
called midnight appointments, specifically, those made within Administrative Code. However, none of the grounds exist to
two (2) months immediately prior to the next presidential warrant the recall of the said appointments. To grant the mayor’s
elections, applies only to the President or Acting President. request is to violate the security of tenure of the appointed
employees.
43
Aside from this, the Court ruled that it was error for The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the
Mayor de Rama to invoke the constitutional prohibition against independence of the COMELEC, foremost among which is the
midnight appointments. According to the Court, this only pertains security of tenure of its members. That guaranty is not available
to appointments made by an outgoing President and is not to the respondent as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC by
applicable to appointments made by an outgoing mayor. designation of the President.
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar
CARILLO vs. CA is no justification for the President to fill the void by extending
77 SCRA 170 the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. This is still
a government of laws and not of men. The problem allegedly
Appointments must be express and should appear on sought to be corrected, if it existed at all, did not call for
the appointment itself. presidential action.
FACTS
Matias Carillo was appointed as Chief of Police. The CSC vs. DARANGINA
newly elected mayor asked him to resign. In his stead, Cornelio (January 31, 2007)
de la Ray was appointed Acting Chief of Police.
Carillo contended that his appointment was approved Where a non-eligible holds a temporary
with the consent of the municipal council in a special session appointment, his replacement by another non-
which approved the plantilla of personnel with his name eligible is not prohibited.
appearing as incumbent in the position of Chief of Police. Carillo FACTS
sought reinstatement. Darangina was a development management officer V in
CFI dismissed Carillo’s complaint. CA affirmed the the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA). On September 25, 2000, he
ruling. was extended a temporary promotional appointment as director
ISSUE III, Plans and Policy Services. On October 11, 2000, the CSC
Whether or not the appointment was valid approved this temporary appointment effective for 1 year from
HELD the date of its issuance unless sooner terminated.
NO, it was not valid. Under RA 1551, governing On October 31, 2000, newly appointed OMA Executive
appointments of municipal employees, the approval by the Director terminated the temporary appointment of Darangina on
municipal council of Chief of Police must be express and should the ground that he is not a career executive service eligible.
appear on the appointment itself. Such consent cannot be Tomawis then appointed Sali as director III. But he is not also a
inferred from the council’s approval of the municipal budget career executive service eligible. Thus, the CSC disapproved his
containing petitioner’s name. appointment.
On appeal, CSC sustained the termination of Darangina’s
BRILLANTES vs. YORAC temporary assignment but ordered the payment of his salaries
192 SCRA 358 from the time he was appointed on September 25, 2000 until his
separation on October 31, 2000. On MFR, CSC modified its order.
The President has no power to appoint a COMELEC Thus, Darangina should be paid his backwages from the time his
Commissioner in an acting capacity. employment was terminated on October 11, 2000 until
FACTS September 24, 2001, the expiration of his one year temporary
The petitioner is challenging the designation by the appointment.
President of Associate Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting CA ordered the reinstatement of Darangina to his post
Chairman of the COMELEC, in place of Chairman Hilario B. to finish his 12-month term with backwages from the date of his
Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding removal until reinstatement.
commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d' etat ISSUE
attempt. Whether or not Darangina is entitled to reinstatement
Petitioner challenged the power of the President to and backwages
make the designation in view of the status of the Commission on HELD
Elections as an independent constitutional body and the specific As a rule, no person may be appointed to a public office
provision of Article IX-C, Section 1(2) of the Constitution that unless he or she possesses the requisite qualifications. The
"(I)n no case shall any Member (of the COMELEC) be appointed exception to the rule is where, in the absence of appropriate
or designated in a temporary or acting capacity." eligibles, he or she may be appointed to it merely in a temporary
The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting capacity. An acting or temporary appointment seeks to prevent a
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal matter hiatus in the discharge of official functions by authorizing a
that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the person to discharge the same pending the selection of a
intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their permanent appointee. The temporary appointee accepts the
independence. position with the condition that he shall surrender the office
ISSUE when called upon to do so by the appointing authority. Such pre-
Whether or not the designation of Yorac is valid termination of a temporary appointment may be with or without
HELD cause as the appointee serves merely at the pleasure of the
NO, it is not valid. In the choice of the Acting Chairman, appointing power.
the members of the COMELEC would most likely have been Career executive service eligibility is a necessary
guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have qualification for the position of director III in Plans and Policy
appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof Services, OMA.
were for them and not the President to make.
44
Where a non-eligible holds a temporary appointment, wherever they are most needed and will likely create the greatest
his replacement by another non-eligible is not prohibited. impact.
Reinstatement will not lie in favor of Darangina. With
the expiration of his term upon his replacement, there is no DEMOTION – defined as the movement from one
longer any remaining term to be served. position to another involving the issuance of an
It is not disputed that he was paid his salary during the appointment and diminution in duties, responsibilities,
entire twelve-month period in spite of the fact that he served status or rank that may or may not involve a reduction
only from September 25, 2000 to October 31, 2000, or for only of salary. It involves the issuance of an appointment.
one month and six days. Clearly, he was overpaid. He is ordered This may be in the guise of reassignment.
to refund the salaries he received from that date up to September
24, 2001. REASSIGNMENT – defined as the movement of an
employee from one organizational unit to another in the
MANIEBO vs. CA same department or agency, which does not involve a
G.R. No. 158708 (August 10, 2010) reduction in duties, responsibilities, status or rank. It
FACTS does not require the issuance of an appointment. As a
Maniebo was given a promotional permanent rule, consent is not necessary.
appointment as Cashier III in the Office of the Municipal
Treasurer because she appeared to possess the qualifications for GENERAL RULE: A public officer or employee may be reassigned
the position including the Career Service (Professional) within the office with or without his consent
Eligibility. It appears in her Personal Data Sheet that she passed
with a rating of 74.01% the Career Service (Professional) EXCEPTION: when the reassignment involves diminution of
examination. However, it was discovered that the petitioner had rank, salary, duties (this amounts to demotion)
actually failed in the examination for obtaining a rating of only TRANSFER – defined as a movement from one position
60%. to another, which is of equivalent rank, level or salary,
The CSC Regional Office (CSCRO) No. IV rendered a without break in service. It requires a prior
decision finding respondent Justina Maniebo guilty of Possession appointment or agreement or consent of appointee.
of Spurious Report of Rating, Falsification, Grave Misconduct. Where the appointment does not indicate a specific station, an
Accordingly, respondent Maniebo is hereby meted the penalty of employee may be transferred or reassigned provided the transfer
DISMISSAL from the service. affects no substantial change in title, rank and salary
Maniebo contends that even assuming that PROMOTION - is the advancement from one position to
notwithstanding her lack of any civil service eligibility upon her another with an increase in duties and responsibilities
entry into the Civil Service, she could still be deemed to have as authorized by law, and usually accompanied by an
acquired eligibility by operation of law under the terms of increase in salary. It must still comply with CSC rules.
Republic Act No. 6850, a law granting civil service eligibility to
employees efficiently serving the Government for at least seven RELATED CASES:
years.
HELD STA. MARIA vs. LOPEZ
Section 2 of RA 6850 shows that not every temporary or 31 SCRA 637 (February 18, 1970)
provisional employee is automatically deemed to be a permanent
employee after rendering at least seven years of service in the A dean of a UP college holds a non-competitive or
Government. The CSC still needs to evaluate whether the unclassified civil service position.
employee is qualified to avail himself or herself of the privilege FACTS
granted by the statute. Felixberto C. Sta. Maria, a professor of English and
Accordingly, any temporary employee who has served Comparative Literature (formerly Dean of the UP College in
for the required duration of seven years must first be found by Baguio), was elected Dean of the College of Education on
the CSC to continuously possess the minimum qualifications for nomination of the UP President. His appointment as such Dean
holding the position, except the required eligibility, before he or was for a 5-year term, unless sooner terminated.
she may be granted civil service eligibility. Students of the UP College of Education presented to
Even an appointment initially approved by the CSC may President Salvador P. Lopez a number of demands having a
be subsequently recalled when found to be invalid. R.A. No. 6850 bearing on the general academic program and the physical plant
was never meant to cure an appointment void from the very and services, with a cluster of special demands.
beginning for being based on a false representation of eligibility, But after an open forum, it was contended by students
like that of the petitioner. A contrary construction of the statute that Dean Sta. Maria did not act on some of their demands which
will, in effect, reward dishonesty. led the students to boycott their classes. The Dean offered a
dialogue with the students but the latter would not accede until
the former is ousted from the position.
OTHER MOVEMENTS IN PUBLIC OFFICE: To this effect, President Lopez issued the transfer order
for Dean Sta. Maria to his office to become the Special Assistant in
Main features of the CES PROGRAM charge of public information and relations. Lopez explained that
- The rank classification in the civil service will allow mobility “he cannot permit the continued disruption of the academic life of
and flexibility of assignments so that the Government could the institution"; that the transfer order was made "[i]n the
utilize the services or special talents of these career executives interest of the service" and "as an emergency measure".
45
ISSUE ISSUE
Whether or not Dean Sta. Maria was validly transferred Whether or not the reassignment of Navarro is valid
HELD HELD
NO, he was not validly transferred. YES, it is valid. The appointment of Navarro as school
The term “unless sooner terminated” cannot be equated principal does not refer to any particular station and she is not
with such terms as “terminable at will” or “removable at entitled to stay at any specific school. As such, she could be
pleasure.” Petitioner’s contract has a fixed term of five years. A assigned to any station and she is not entitled to stay
dean of a UP college holds a non-competitive or unclassified civil permanently at any specific school. She may be assigned to any
service position. As such, and upon the provisions of his contract station as the exigencies of public service require even without
of employment, he is protected by constitutional and statutory her consent.
provisions on security of term. He cannot be removed during the When she was assigned to Carlos Albert High School, it
term except for cause and after prior hearing and investigation. A could not have been with the intention to let her stay in said
transfer is a movement from one position to another which is of school permanently. Otherwise, her appointment would have so
equivalent rank, level or salary, without break in service. stated. Consequently, she may be assigned to any station or
Promotion is the advancement from one position to another school in Quezon City as the exigencies of public service so
with an increase in duties and responsibilities as authorized by require.
law, and usually accompanied by an increase in salary. Sta.
Maria’s appointment is to a specific position at a specific station. GLORIA vs. ICASIANO, CA
He cannot, without his consent, be transferred before the end of 338 SCRA 10
his term. Petitioner’s transfer was in fact a removal. The transfer
was a demotion, which requisites are also embodied in the Transfer is void when it is indefinite.
university charter and in the university code. Reassignment that is indefinite violates security of
More than this, the transfer was a demotion. A tenure and is in effect constructive dismissal.
demotion, because: FACTS
First, Deanship in a university, being an academic Private respondent, Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed
position which requires learning, ability and School Divisions Superintendent of Quezon City by President
scholarship, is more exalted than that of a special Aquino.
assistant who merely assists the President, as the title Upon the recommendation of DECS Secretary Gloria,
indicates. The special assistant does not make respondent was reassigned as Vocational Superintendent of the
authoritative decisions. Deans make authoritative Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST), to fill up the
decisions. vacuum created by the retirement of Superintendent Banaoag
Second. The position of dean is a line position where the Lauro.
holder makes authoritative decisions in his own name Petitioner requested Secretary Gloria to reconsider the
and responsibility. A special assistant does not rise request but was denied.
above the level of staff position. Hence, this petition.
Third. The position of dean is created by law, the ISSUE
university charter, and cannot be abolished even by the Whether or not the transfer is violative of private
Board of Regents. That of special assistant, upon the respondent’s security of tenure
other hand, is not so provided by law; it was a creation HELD
of the university president. YES, it is violative. The reassignment of private
respondent appears to be indefinite. It can be gleaned from the
DECS vs. CA, NAVARRO Memorandum by Gloria that the reassignment is more than
183 SCRA 555 (March 22, 1990) temporary as the private respondent has been described as “fit
for the job, being an expert in the field”.
One may be assigned to any station or school as the There is nothing in the memorandum to show that the
exigencies of public service so require. reassignment is temporary or would only last until a permanent
Reassignment of school principal in the Division of replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact
City Schools. evinces an intention on the part of the petitioners to reassign
FACTS private respondent with no definite period or duration. Such
Respondent Gloria Navarro was appointed secondary feature of the reassignment in question is definitely violative of
School Principal II. Her appointment was without reference to tenure of the private respondent.
any particular school. For some years however, her station as
high school principal had been at Carlos Albert High School. 3 Levels of officers in Career Service:
In 1982, petitioner Edna Azurin in her capacity as 1. Clerical – Security Position
Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon City, effected a 2. Technical – Security Position
reshuffling of all high school principals in QC in the alleged 3. Senior Positions in Bureaucracy – Rank Position
exigencies of service since all of the principals had been
overstaying in one station for more than 5 years.
As result, Navarro was reassigned to Manuel Roxas High
School without diminution neither in rank nor in salary. Navarro
informed Azurin of her refusal to comply with the reassignment
on the ground that under the Magna Carta of Public School
Teachers, teachers cannot be transferred without their consent.
46
FERNANDEZ vs. STO.TOMAS other hand, private respondent Fernandez was the PAGASA
242 SCRA 193 Finance and Management Division Chief of DOST.
Secretary Padolina issued a Special Order 129
There is no violation of security of tenure where the reassigning Fernandez to the Finance Management Service
appointment was without specification to any Director’s Office in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
particular office or station. Fernandez requested the order to be lifted for it violates
Appointments to staff of CSC are not appointment to his security of tenure tantamount to her constructive dismissal.
a specified public office but appointments to But it was denied. On appeal to CSC, her appeal was likewise
particular position or ranks. dismissed.
FACTS Subsequently, another order was issued by Padolina
Petitioner Salvador Fernandez was the Director of the directing the return of certain PAGASA officials to their units. He
Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit ("OPIA") while also ordered the retention of other PAGASA personnel including
petitioner de Lima was the Director of the Office of the Personnel respondent.
Relations ("OPR"), both at the Central Office of the CSC. Meanwhile, respondent was also charged with
While petitioners were so serving, Resolution 94-3710 Insubordination.
was issued by Patricia A. Sto. Tomas and Ramon Ereneta, Jr., CSC ruled in favor of Padolina while CA reversed the
Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, of CSC. same holding that SO 129 as void. The reassignment has
Petitioners had received Office Orders from the effectively demoted Fernandez.
Commission assigning petitioner Fernandez to Region V at ISSUES
Legaspi City and petitioner de Lima to Region III in San Fernando, 1. Whether or not Fernandez was validly reassigned
Pampanga. Thus, they filed this petition. 2. Whether or not SO 129 is valid
ISSUE HELD
Whether or not Resolution No. 94-3710 violated (1) NO, he was not. The alleged reassignment removes
petitioners' constitutional right to security of tenure. Fernandez the power of supervision over 41 employees who are
HELD part of her staff and subordinates, thereby resulting in a
NO, it did not violate. Firstly, appointments to the staff diminution of her status. Even if such reassignment is temporary,
of the Commission are not appointments to a specified public it is diminution nonetheless.
office but rather appointments to particular positions or ranks. In (2) NO, it is void. The questioned order contains no
the instant case, petitioners were each appointed to the position definite date or duration of reassignment. In fact, the return of
of Director IV, without specification of any particular office or the various personnel shall be subject of a separate DOST special
station. order. It is tantamount to a floating assignment.
It follows that the reassignment of petitioners
Fernandez and de Lima from their previous positions to the PLAZA vs. CASSION
Research and Development Office (RDO) in the Central Office of 435 SCRA 295
the Commission in Metropolitan Manila and their subsequent
assignment from the RDO to the Commission's Regional Offices in Transfer is a movement from one position to another
Regions V and III had been effected with express statutory which is of equivalent rank, level or salary without
authority and did not constitute removals without lawful break in service and may be imposed as an
cause.[Section 26(7), Book V, Title I, subtitle A of the 1987 administrative penalty.
Revised Administrative Code – recognizes reassignment as a Mayor has a power to devolve national DSWD
management prerogative vested in the commission and for that employees to CSSDO in line with devolution under RA
matter in any department or agency of government embraced in 7160.
the Administrative Code] FACTS
It also follows that such re-assignment did not involve Mayor Plaza issued Executive Order (EO) No. 06-92
any violation of the constitutional right of petitioners to security dated October 5, 1992 reconstituting the City Social Services
of tenure considering that they retained their positions of Development Office (CSSDO), devolving or adding thereto 19
Director IV and would continue to enjoy the same rank, status national DSWD employees headed by petitioner Virginia Tuazon,
and salary at their new assigned stations which they had enjoyed Social Welfare Officer V. Mayor Plaza designated her Officer-in-
at the Head Office of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila. Charge of the reconstituted CSSDO. Its office was transferred
Petitioners had not, in other words, acquired a vested right to from the original CSSDO building to the DSWD building.
serve at the Commission's Head Office. The CSSDO was originally composed of herein
respondents, headed by Carolina M. Cassion, Social Welfare
PADOLINA vs. FERNANDEZ Officer IV. Aggrieved by such development, they refused to
249 SCRA 126 recognize petitioner Tuazon as their new head and to report at
the DSWD building. They contended that the issuance of EO No.
A diminution of any of the categories (rank, salary, 06-92 by Mayor Plaza and the designation of petitioner Tuazon as
duties, etc.) is sufficient to constitute a demotion. Officer-in-charge of the CSSDO are illegal.
A reassignment which removes from the office the Despite Mayor Plaza’s series of orders to respondents to
power of supervision over employees is a diminution report for work at the DSWD building, they failed to do so and
of her status. thus they were dropped the rolls. The CSC affirmed Plaza’s order
FACTS but the CA set aside the assailed CSC Resolutions and EO No. 06-
Petitioner William Padolina was the DOST Secretary 92 issued by Mayor Plaza and reinstated respondents to their
while Dr. Leoncio Amadore was the PAGASA Secretary. On the former positions without loss of seniority rights and emoluments
47
with full back wages and other benefits corresponding to the gleaned that the reassignment was for the purpose of vindication
period from January 1993 up to actual reinstatement. or harassment on the part of the respondent.
ISSUE
Whether or not Mayor Plaza has the power to issue EO REYES, JR. vs. BELISARIO
No. 06-92? G.R. No. 154652 (August 14, 2009)
HELD FACTS
Yes, Mayor Plaza is empowered to issue EO No. 06-92 in Deputy Administrators Simplicio Belisario, Jr. and
order to give effect to the devolution decreed by the Local Emmanuel B. Malicdem filed before the Office of the Ombudsman
Government Code. As the local chief executive of Butuan City, a criminal complaint against LWUA Administrator Prudencio M.
Mayor Plaza has the authority to reappoint devolved personnel Reyes, Jr. for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, or
and may designate an employee to take charge of a department the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
until the appointment of a regular head, as was done by the Only 13 days after the filing of the graft charge, the
Mayor here. Reyes issued Office Order reassigning Belisario and Malicdem
CSC Memo Cir. No. 19, Series of 1992, provides further together with De Jesus from the offices they then held to the
that heads of departments appointed by the local chief executive Office of the Administrator. The OIC for Administration issued a
must have the concurrence of the majority of all the members of directive to the Magilas Security Agency to bar the Belisario and
the Sanggunian concerned. While initially, the Sanggunian Malicdem from using the rooms and facilities they occupied prior
rejected petitioner Tuazon’s appointment as the City Government to their reassignments.
Department Head II of the CSSDO, however, it later confirmed her Atty. Arnaldo M. Espinas, LWUA corporate legal counsel,
appointment. sought the opinion of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
The Court Appeals erred in ruling that EO No. 06-92 regarding the regularity of the reassignments of respondents and
violated respondents’ security of tenure as they were transferred of De Jesus.
to another office without their consent. There was no such The CSC responded through a legal opinion which
transfer. Transfer is a movement from one position to another categorically ruled that the reassignments were not in order,
which is of equivalent rank, level or salary without break in were tainted with bad faith, and constituted constructive
service and may be imposed as an administrative penalty. The dismissal.
change of respondents’ place of work from the original CSSDO ISSUE
office to the DSWD building is not a transfer. It was only a Whether or not the reassignments are proper. No.
physical transfer of their office to a new one done in the interest HELD
of public service. There were no new movements or As a general rule, "official acts" enjoy the presumption
appointments from one position to another. of regularity, and the presumption may be overthrown only by
evidence to the contrary. When an act is official, a presumption of
VINZONS-CHATO v. MARTINEZ regularity exists because of the assumption that the law tells the
344 SCRA 18 official what his duties are and that he discharged these duties
accordingly. The presumption does not apply when an official’s
A subsequent reassignment is not a diminution of acts are not within the duties specified by law, particularly when
rank if the employee still retains the same rank. his acts properly pertain or belong to another entity, agency, or
BIR Commissioner is authorized to assign or public official.
reassign revenue officers. In the present case, the CSC had spoken by way of an en
FACTS banc resolution, no less, that the petitioner LWUA
Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato, a Commissioner of Administrator’s reassignment orders were illegal because, by
the Internal Revenue while respondent Estrella Martinez was the law, the authority to reassign officers and employees of the
Asst. Revenue District Officer of the BIR assigned in Pandacan. LWUA lies with the LWUA Board; the LWUA Administrator’s
Petitioner issued a Revenue Travel Assignment authority is merely to recommend a reassignment to the Board.
pursuant to the exigencies of the revenue service. As a result, The court also ruled that Administrator acted in bad
respondent was reassigned to the national office as Asst. Division faith in reassigning the Belisario and Malicdem barely ten (10)
Chief. days after the latter filed their complaint against him for violation
It was alleged by respondent that a certain Tecson was of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. No reassignment shall
designated by petitioner as Revenue District Officer despite the be undertaken if done whimsically because the law is not
fact that respondent was the next-in-rank. intended as a convenient shield for the appointing/disciplining
Respondent filed a complaint before BIR Selection authority to harass or suppress a subordinate on the pretext of
Board and to the Grievance Committee, both were of no avail. advancing and promoting public interest.
Finally, RTC ruled in her favor.
ISSUE
Whether or not the reassignment was valid
HELD
YES, it is valid. Such is not a demotion for there is no
diminution of rank, etc. The appointment of respondent as Chief
Revenue Officer II will not be altered by her subsequent
reassignment for she retains the same rank.
Such reassignment of revenue entails the prevention of
familiarity and patronage between BIR officers and taxpayers of a
particular area. Nowhere in the reassignment order can it be
48
CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE (CES): CARINGAL vs. PCSO
472 SCRA 577
Security of tenure in CES is acquired with respect to
rank and not to position; within the CES, personnel Temporary appointment can be withdrawn from him
can be shifted to another position without violating anytime without violating the constitutionally
their rights to security of tenure. guaranteed right to security of tenure.
Passing CES Exam entitles the examinee to
RELATED CASES: conferment of CES eligibility. Upon conferment, the
CUEVAS vs. BACAL incumbent of CES position may qualify for
347 SCRA 338 appointment to CES rank without CES eligibility, his
appointment may be withdrawn anytime without
Security of tenure in the CES is acquired with respect violating his right to security of tenure.
to rank, not to position; FACTS
Petitioner’s appointment is not permanent, as she In 1998 petitioner Jose Caringal was appointed as the
does not have the rank appropriate for his position Assistant Department Manager of the PCSO. In 2000 he was
as Chief Public Attorney. reassigned to the Assets and Investment Department. He
FACTS protested his assignment contending that it was a constructive
Respondent Josefina Bacal (CESO III) is the Chief Public dismissal.
Attorney at the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO). On the other hand, CSC Dir. Del Monte wrote the PCSO Admin Dept. stating
petitioner Carina Demaisip was appointed Chief Public Defender that his office inadvertently omitted to stamp on petitioner’s
(formerly Chief Public Attorney) by President Estrada. Since the appointment the collatilla that “the appointee does not have
position was held by respondent, the President “designated” security of tenure until he obtains a CES eligibility” and that he
petitioner to the same position. On the other hand, respondent could not effect the necessary correction since petitioner has the
was appointed Regional Director for Public Defender’s office. original copy of his appointment.
For that, respondent questioned her replacement by On June 22, 2000, the PCSO Board of Directors issued a
filing a quo warranto. CA ruled in her favor finding her as lawfully resolution terminating the employment of petitioner on the
entitled to the office. ground that he does not have security of tenure as he does not
Petitioner then filed this petition. She contends that it is possess a Career Executive Service (CES) eligibility. The CSC and
tantamount to her demotion because there is diminution of CA affirmed the decision.
salary: ISSUE
Bureau Director (as Chief Public Attorney) III – salary Whether or not Caringal termination from service was
grade 30 in accordance with Civil Service law and rules?
RD of the Chief Public Attorney V – salary grade 28 HELD
ISSUES Yes his termination was in accordance with the CSC law
1. Whether or not Bacal, with a rank level III, is eligible and rules.
for the position of Chief Public Attorney which carries a level Under the rules promulgated by the CES Board, what
rank I entitles an examinee to a conferment of a CES eligibility is his
2. Whether or not respondent Bacal (CESO) has a valid passing the CES examination. Upon conferment of a CES
and vested right to the position of Chief Public Attorney, and as eligibility, an incumbent of a CES position may qualify for
such, cannot be transferred to the position of RD appointment to a CES rank. After such appointment, the
HELD appointee is entitled to a security of tenure.
(1) NO, she is not qualified. The ruling of CA is Petitioner Caringal does not possess the required CES
erroneous. Bacal is not qualified for not having the rank eligibility. Hence, he has no security of tenure as his
appropriate for a Chief Public Attorney. Her appointment is only appointment is merely temporary. His appointment did not
temporary, thus, she cannot claim security of tenure. attain permanency, thus, it can be withdrawn from him anytime
(2) NO, she has no vested right. It is thus proper for the without violating the constitutionally guaranteed right to security
respondent to be transferred to RD of Chief Public Attorney of tenure.
which corresponds to her CESO III. She may have been
considered for promotion to rank I as CPA were it not for the AMORES vs. CSC
appointment of Demaisip. If respondent was formerly paid salary (April 29, 2009)
equivalent to salary grade 30, it was only because under the law
“if a CESO is assigned to a position with a higher salary grade Appointment of non-CES eligible to CES position;
than that actually corresponding to his/her position, he/she will Petitioner’s separation from the service without just
be allowed the salary of the CES position. cause as Department Director for Hospital Support
Security of tenure in the CES is thus acquired with Services is valid as her position belongs to the CES.
respect to rank and not to position. The guaranty of security of HELD
tenure to members of the CES does not extend to the particular What at the outset weighs heavily on petitioner’s case is
position to which they may be appointed but to the rank to which the fact that the position of Deputy Director for Hospital Support
they are appointed by the President. Services at the LCP belongs to the career executive service
Bacal also has no personality to file a quo warranto appointments to which by law require that the appointees
proceeding. possess the corresponding CES eligibility. Petitioner, however,
does not profess that at any time he was holding the said position
he was able to acquire the required eligibility therefor by taking
49
the CES examinations and, subsequently, conferred such best merely temporary as it is said to be conditioned on the
eligibility upon passing the said examinations. In fact, no slightest subsequent obtention of the required CES eligibility. This rule,
suggestion can be derived from the records of this case, which according to De Leon v. Court of Appeals, Dimayuga v. Benedicto,
would tend to show that in his entire tenure at the LCP he, at any Caringal v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and Achacoso
given point, had been conferred a CES eligibility. It is thus as v. Macaraig, is invariable even though the given appointment may
much surprising as it is absurd why petitioner, despite the have been designated as permanent by the appointing authority.
limitations in his qualifications known to him, would insist that We now come to address the issue of whether
he had served as Deputy Director at the LCP in a permanent petitioner’s separation from service violated his right to security
capacity. of tenure. Security of tenure in the career executive service,
We begin with the precept, firmly established by law which presupposes a permanent appointment, takes place upon
and jurisprudence, that a permanent appointment in the civil passing the CES examinations administered by the CES Board. It
service is issued to a person who has met the requirements of the is that which entitles the examinee to conferment of CES
position to which the appointment is made in accordance with eligibility and the inclusion of his name in the roster of CES
law and the rules issued pursuant thereto. An appointment is eligibles. Under the rules and regulations promulgated by the CES
permanent where the appointee meets all the requirements for Board, conferment of the CES eligibility is done by the CES Board
the position to which he is being appointed, including the through a formal board resolution after an evaluation has been
appropriate eligibility prescribed, and it is temporary where the done of the examinee’s performance in the four stages of the CES
appointee meets all the requirements for the position except only eligibility examinations. Upon conferment of CES eligibility and
the appropriate civil service eligibility. compliance with the other requirements prescribed by the Board,
Under Section 7 of the Civil Service Law, positions in the an incumbent of a CES position may qualify for appointment to a
civil service are classified into open career positions, closed CES rank. Appointment to a CES rank is made by the President
career positions and positions in the career service. In turn, upon the Board’s recommendation. It is this process which
positions in the career service are tiered in three levels as completes the official’s membership in the CES and confers on
follows: him security of tenure in the CES. Petitioner does not seem to
have gone through this definitive process.
SECTION 8. Classes of Positions in the Career Service. - (1) At this juncture, what comes unmistakably clear is the
Classes of positions in the career service appointment to which fact that because petitioner lacked the proper CES eligibility and
requires examinations which shall be grouped into three major therefore had not held the subject office in a permanent capacity,
levels as follows: there could not have been any violation of petitioner’s supposed
right to security of tenure inasmuch as he had never been in
(a) The first level shall include the clerical, trades, crafts and possession of the said right at least during his tenure as Deputy
custodial service positions which involve non-professional or Director for Hospital Support Services. Hence, no challenge may
subprofessional work in a non-supervisory or supervisory be offered against his separation from office even if it be for no
capacity requiring less than four years of collegiate studies; cause and at a moment’s notice. Not even his own self-serving
claim that he was competent to continue serving as Deputy
(b) The second level shall include professional, technical and Director may actually and legally give even the slightest
scientific positions which involve professional, technical or semblance of authority to his thesis that he should remain in
scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity office. Be that as it may, it bears emphasis that, in any case, the
requiring at least four years of college work up to the Division mere fact that an employee is a CES eligible does not
Chief level; and automatically operate to vest security of tenure on the appointee
inasmuch as the security of tenure of employees in the career
(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive executive service, except first and second-level employees,
Service. pertains only to rank and not to the office or position to which
they may be appointed.
With particular reference to positions in the career
executive service (CES), the requisite civil service eligibility is GENERAL vs. LTO RD ROCO
acquired upon passing the CES examinations administered by the 350 SCRA 528
CES Board and the subsequent conferment of such eligibility
upon passing the examinations. Once a person acquires eligibility, Unless and until an employee in the CES is appointed
he either earns the status of a permanent appointee to the CES to the appropriate CES rank, he acquires no security
position to which he has previously been appointed, or he of tenure even if he is a CES eligible
becomes qualified for a permanent appointment to that position HELD
provided only that he also possesses all the other qualifications Section 27 (1), of the Civil Service Law (Subtitle A, Tittle I, Book V
for the position. Verily, it is clear that the possession of the of E.O. No. 292), provides:
required CES eligibility is that which will make an appointment in
the career executive service a permanent one. Petitioner does not (1) Permanent status. - A permanent appointment shall be issued
possess such eligibility, however, it cannot be said that his to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to
appointment to the position was permanent. which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
Indeed, the law permits, on many occasions, the prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and
appointment of non-CES eligibles to CES positions in the standards promulgated in pursuance thereof.
government in the absence of appropriate eligibles and when In the career executive service, the acquisition of security of
there is necessity in the interest of public service to fill vacancies tenure which presupposes a permanent appointment is governed
in the government. But in all such cases, the appointment is at by the rules and regulations promulgated by the CES Board thus:
50
Career Executive Service Eligibility Executive Service eligible; provided that such appointee shall
Passing the CES examination entitles the examinee to subsequently take the required Career Executive Service
a conferment of a CES eligibility and the inclusion of his name examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher class
in the roster of CES eligibles. Conferment of CES eligibility is until he qualifies in such examination.
done by the Board through a formal Board Resolution after an xxx xxx xxx
evaluation is done of the examinee’s performance in the four stages e. Assignments Reassignments and Transfers. Depending upon
of the CES eligibility examinations. their ranks, members of the Service shall be assigned to occupy
xxx xxx xxx positions of undersecretary, Assistant Secretary. Bureau Director,
Appointment to CES Rank Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional
Upon conferment of a CES eligibility and compliance with Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of
the other requirements prescribed by the Board, an incumbent of a equivalent rank as may be identified by the Board on the basis of
CES position may qualify for appointment to a CES the members’ functional expertise.
rank. Appointment to a CES rank is made by the President upon the As clearly set forth in the foregoing provisions, two
recommendation of the Board. This process completes the requisites must concur in order that an employee in the career
official’s membership in the CES and most importantly, executive service may attain security of tenure, to wit:
confers on him security of tenure in the CES. a) CES eligibility; and
There are six (6) ranks in the CES ranking structure. The b) Appointment to the appropriate CES rank.
highest rank is that of a Career Executive Service Officer I (CESO I), In addition, it must be stressed that the security of tenure of
while the lowest is that of CESO VI. employees in the career executive service (except first and
The appropriate CESO rank to which a CES eligible may second-level employees in the civil service), pertains only to rank
be appointed depends on two major qualification criteria, namely: and not to the office or to the position to which they may be
(1) level of managerial responsibility; and, (2) performance. appointed. Thus, a career executive service officer may be
Performance is determined by the official’s performance transferred or reassigned from one position to another without
rating obtained in the annual CESPES. On the other hand, losing his rank which follows him wherever he is transferred or
managerial responsibility is based on the level of the general duties reassigned. In fact, a CESO suffers no diminution of salary even if
and responsibilities, which an eligible is performing, as follows: assigned to a CES position with lower salary grade, as he is
Levels of Duties and Responsibilities Rank compensated according to his CES rank and not on the basis of
Equivalent the position or office he occupies.
If level of managerial responsibilities are I In the case at bar, there is no question that respondent
comparable to that of an Undersecretary Ramon S. Roco, though a CES eligible, does not possess the
appropriate CES rank, which is - CES rank level V, for the position
If comparable to that of an Assistant Secretary II of Regional Director of the LTO (Region V). Falling short of one of
the qualifications that would complete his membership in the
If comparable to that of a Bureau Director, or a III CES, respondent cannot successfully interpose violation of
Department Regional Director security of tenure. Accordingly, he could be validly reassigned to
other positions in the career executive service. Thus, in Achacoso
If comparable to that of an Assistant Bureau v. Macaraig, the Court held that:
Director, Department Assistant Regional Director IV It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only “to
or Department Service Chief a person who meets all the requirement for the position to which
he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
If comparable to that of Bureau Regional Director V prescribed.” Achacoso did not. At best, therefore, his
appointment could be regarded only as temporary. And being so,
If comparable to that of a Bureau Assistant VI it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and “at
Regional Director a moment’s notice,” conformably to established jurisprudence.
xxx xxx xxx
As a general rule, a CES eligible will be recommended for The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service
appointment to the rank equivalent of the level of his managerial does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant
responsibility if his performance rating is Satisfactory or higher. If even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such
the performance rating is Outstanding, he will be recommended right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which
one rank higher than his level of managerial responsibility. in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does
(Emphasis supplied) not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be
So also, pertinent provisions of the Integrated appointed to it in the first place or, as an exception to the rule,
Reorganization Plan, read: may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the
absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to
c. Appointment. Appointment to appropriate classes in the Career him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so
Executive Service shall be made by the President from a list of designated.
career executive eligibles recommended by the Board. Such Moreover, under the mobility and flexibility principles of
appointments shall be made on the basis of rank; provided that the Integrated Reorganization Plan, CES personnel may be
appointments to higher ranks which qualify the incumbents to reassigned or transferred from one position to another, thus:
assignments as undersecretary and heads of bureaus and offices e. Assignments, Reassignments and Transferees ...
and equivalent positions shall be with the confirmation of the Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, members of
Commission on Appointments. The President may, however, in the Career Executive Service may be reassigned or transferred from
exceptional cases, appoint any person who is not a Career one position to another and from one department, bureau or office
51
to another; provided that such reassignment or transfer is made in On 13 August 2001, the CSC held that Collantes’ relief as
the interest of public service and involves no reduction in rank or Undersecretary of DND amounted to illegal dismissal as he was
salary; provided, further, that no member shall be reassigned or not given another post concomitant to his eligibility. However, on
transferred oftener than every two years; and provided, 30 August 2001, the Court of Appeals in a decision C.A. G.R. SP
furthermore, that if the officer concerned believes that his No. 62874 dismissed the petition for quo warranto and
reassignment or transfer is not justified, he may appeal his case to mandamus. The case attained finality when Collantes did not
the President.[10] pursue an appeal to the CA decision.
One last point. Respondent capitalizes on the fact that ISSUE:
petitioner Luis Mario M. General is not a CES eligible. The Whether or not Collantes resigned from his position as
absence, however, of such CES eligibility is of no moment. As Undersecretary for Civilian Relations of the Department of
stated in Part III, Chapter I, Article IV, paragraph 5(c), of the National Defense (DND), but not from his rank as a Career
Integrated Reorganization Plan – Executive Service Officer (CESO)
HELD:
“...the President may, in exceptional cases, appoint any person who A courtesy resignation is just as effectual as any other
is not a Career Executive Service eligible; provided that such resignation. There can be no implied promises of another
appointee shall subsequently take the required Career Executive position just because the resignation was made out of courtesy.
Service examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher Any express promise of another position, on the other hand,
class until he qualified in such examination.” would be void, because there can be no derogation of the
discretion of the appointing power, and because its object is
Evidently, the law allows appointment of those who are not outside the commerce of man.
CES eligible, subject to the obtention of said eligibility, in the POSITION refers to the particular or specific office from
same manner that the appointment of respondent who does not which one may be appointed. RANK, on the other hand, refers
possess the required CES rank (CES rank level V) for the position not to a particular position but to the class to which one belongs
of Regional Director of the LTO, is permitted in a temporary in the hierarchy of authority in an organization or bureaucracy.
capacity. Mobility and flexibility in the assignment of personnel,
the better to cope with the exigencies of public service, is thus the
COLLANTES vs. CSC and DND distinguishing feature of the Career Executive Service. x x x. and
(March 6, 2007) General v. Roco:
It must be stressed that the security of tenure of
While there is indeed a distinction between position employees in the career executive service (except first and
and rank, such that a CESO may be transferred or second-level employees in the civil service), pertains only to rank
reassigned from one position to another without and not to the office or to the position to which they may be
losing his rank, there can be no distinction between appointed. Thus, a career executive service officer may be
resigning from a position and resigning from a rank. transferred or reassigned from one position to another without
The rank of a CESO is deactivated upon separation losing his rank which follows him wherever he is transferred or
from the government service, which includes the reassigned. In fact, a CESO suffers no diminution of salary even if
resignation of a CESO from his position. assigned to a CES position with lower salary grade, as he is
The rank of CESO deactivated upon resignation. compensated according to his CES rank and not on the basis of
the position or office he occupies.
FACTS: While there is indeed a distinction between position
Petitioner Nelson Collantes (hereafter, Collantes) was and rank, such that a CESO may be transferred or reassigned
conferred Career Executive Service Eligibility on 29 February from one position to another without losing his rank, there can be
1996. Then President Fidel V. Ramos accorded him the rank of no distinction between resigning from a position and resigning
Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) II on 10 February 1997. from a rank. The rank of a CESO is deactivated upon separation
More than a year later, he was appointed as Undersecretary for from the government service, which includes the resignation of a
Peace and Order of the Department of Interior and Local CESO from his position.
Government (DILG).
With the change of administration, upon the election of DE LEON vs. CA, JACOB MONTESA
President Joseph Estrada, Collantes relinquished his DILG post. 371 SCRA 413 (December 5, 2001)
Pres. Estrada appointed Collantes to the controversial post – FACTS
Undersecretary for Civilian Relations of the Department of In the decision sought to be reconsidered, the court
National Defense (DND), which he later on renounced in favor of ruled that private respondent’s appointment on August 28, 1986,
another presidential appointee. He was not given any other post as Ministry Legal Counsel –CESO IV of the Ministry of Local
in the government despite his promotion in rank by Pres. Estrada Government was temporary.
the highest rank in the CES ranking structure, CESO Rank I, on 17 Applying the case of Achacoso v. Macaraig, it was held
July 1999. President Estrada appointed Mr. Edgardo Batenga to that since the private respondent was not a Career Executive
the much coveted position of Undersecretary for Civilian Service eligible, his appointment did not attain permanency
Relations of the DND. because he did not possess the required CES eligibility for the
Collantes instituted a Petition for Quo Warranto and CES position to which he was appointed to, thus he can be
Mandamus and maintained that he was constructively dismissed transferred or resigned without violating his right to security of
from work, without any cause and due process of law, and thus, tenure.
his position in the DND was never vacated at all. On March 19, 1992 the Court issued a Minute
Resolution holding that Achacoso v. Macaraig is not applicable to
52
the case of private respondent because there was no Career The evidence on record and the admissions made by
Executive Service Board during the Freedom Constitution or at both respondents in their comments filed with this Court and
the time of appointment of petitioner. Therefore, having met all with the investigating court sufficiently establish their
the requirements for the position to which he was appointed, he culpability. Court’s examination of the records of the case tells us
cannot be removed in violation of the constitutional guarantee on that there was connivance between the respondents on the
security of tenure and due process. manner of collecting and disbursing the amounts awarded to the
Private respondent contends that the nature of his accident victims so that they (the respondents) could personally
appointment can no longer be passed upon and controverted in benefit from the proceeds of the court's award.
the present case considering that said issue had already been Respondent Escalona had already resigned from the
settled in the foregoing Minute Resolution of the Court, as stated service. His resignation, however, does not render this case moot,
in Rule 39, Sec. 47, paragraph c of the Rules of Court. nor does it free him from liability. In fact, the Court views
Rule 39, Sec. 47, paragraph c of the Rules of Court – respondent Escalona's resignation before the investigation as
once an issue has been adjudicated in a valid judgment of a indication of his guilt, in the same way that flight by an accused in
competent court, it can no longer be controverted anew and a criminal case is indicative of guilt. In short, his resignation will
should be finally laid to rest. not be a way out of the administrative liability he incurred while
ISSUE in the active service. While we can no longer dismiss him, we can
Whether the Court possess any rights to re-examine the still impose a penalty sufficiently commensurate with the offense
case despite what was stated in the Rules of Court? YES he committed.
HELD We treat respondent Superada no differently. While his
The Court is not precluded from re-examining its own death intervened after the completion of the investigation, it has
ruling and rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn been settled that the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an
adherence to res judicata would involve the sacrifice of justice to administrative matter by the mere fact that the respondent
technicality. It must be stressed that this is not the first time that public official ceases to hold office during the pendency of the
the principle of res judicata has been set aside in favor of respondent's case; jurisdiction once acquired, continues to exist
substantial justice, which is after all the avowed purpose of all until the final resolution of the case.
law and jurisprudence.
With regards to the issue of the private respondent’s
designation: A CES eligibility is not a requirement in the case of PERSONS EXCLUDED FROM CES (CESB RES. NO. 799, MAY
private respondent, the mobility and flexibility concepts in the 2009):
assignment of personnel in CES, which allow transfer or
reassignment of CES personnel to other CES position without 1. Managerial and executive positions with fixed term of office as
violating his right to security of tenure. provided in charter or law;
2. Managerial and executive positions in non-career service
GONZALES VS. ESCALONA which includes the following:
566 SCRA 4 (September 19, 2008) a. Elective officials and their personal/confidential staff;
FACTS b. Secretaries and other officials of cabinet rank and
A verified complaint for Conduct Prejudicial to the Best their personal and confidential staff;
Interest of the Service and Grave Misconduct in connection with c. Chairman and members of commissions and boards
the enforcement of the writ of execution of the decision in with fixed terms of office and their personal and confidential
Criminal Case No. 2150 against Atty. Joseph N. Escalona and staff;
Edgar V. Superada (deceased). d. Contractual personnel and emergency and seasonal
The complaint showed that in convicting the accused in staff.
Criminal Case No. 2150, the RTC awarded damages to
complainant Felisa L. Gonzales. The RTC issued a writ of POSITIONS EXCLUDED FROM CES:
execution directing respondent Superada to enforce the
judgment. Since the accused was insolvent, the judgment was 1. Managerial and executive positions in the national government
enforced against the accused's employer, Serafica Enterprises belonging to the closed career systems which are administered
(Serafica). by special bodies such as the foreign service, PNP, state colleges
The complainant alleged that even before the writ of and universities unless provided in their respective charters, the
execution was issued by the RTC, respondent Superada scientific career service and the like;
approached her and demanded the amount of P27,500.00, 2. Position of Head Executive Assistant.
allegedly for expenses in serving the writ. The complainant was
able to give the respondent only P7,000.00. POWER OF APPOINTMENT:
The complainant further alleged that without her
consent, both respondents accepted from Serafica twenty-four Power to appoint is discretionary
(24) postdated checks of Land Bank-Ormoc City, each in the
amount of P13,710.85 (or a total of P329,060.00) in payment of The power to appoint is discretionary on the part of the
the damages awarded to the victims of the vehicular accident. All head of office, not the commission. What then is the power of the
the checks were made payable to respondent Escalona. The first commission? Its power is either to approve or disapprove or to
check was dated April 7, 2000, while the last check was dated attest or to remove. Meaning the first action taken by the
January 31, 2002. commission is maybe to remove the appointment, but it
HELD presupposes that in so doing it recognizes the appointee claims
to conform to the qualifications required for the position.
53
So if the appointee possesses the qualifications required KINDS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS:
for the positions including the appropriate civil service eligibility,
the commission has no other option except to attest or approve AD INTERIM APPOINTMENT – one made during the time when
the appointment. In this instance, it is not allowed to disapprove the appointing or confirming body is not in session and there is
the appointment and that is where the appointee possesses the an existing clear and present urgency caused by an impending
qualification required for the position. It follows therefore that if obstruction or “paralyzation” of the functions assigned to the
the appointee does not have the qualification including the office, if no immediate appointment is made
appropriate eligibility then it is within the power of the – It is immediately effective and is subject only
commission to disapprove the appointment. That is the nature of to the (1) disapproval by the Commission on
the attestation power of the commission. Now, the second act in Appointments or as a (2) result of the next
issuing the appointment is not proper. Why? Because of the adjournment of the Congress (Article VII,
power to appoint to the head of office or agency is not to the Section 16 of the Constitution)
commission. The power to appoint is an act of discretion of the
appointing power. REGULAR APPOINTMENT – one made during the session of the
Congress
In Tomali case, her appointment was not transmitted to – It has three stages:
the Commission. What is the effect of the non-transmittal to the
CS? So, therefore it is still the power or authority of the head to Nomination by the President
recall the appointment, which in the first place was never Consent by the CA
submitted to the Commission. So what completes the Appointment by the President
appointment is precisely the action taken by the CSC. In the
absence of such action more so if the action has not yet been Note: Strictly speaking, no appointment until consented thereto
forwarded to the Commission, it is still within the power of the by the CA. Until there is confirmation by CA, the appointee is
head to issue another appointment and the person cannot merely in acting capacity and thus, nature of such position is
complain because he has yet no vested right to the position. Now merely temporary.
would your answer still be the same if the appointment was
already submitted, but the commission has not acted on the
same. Let us say, for the sake of discussion, let’s say the FOUR GROUPS WHOM THE PRESIDENT SHALL APPOINT:
appointment was already transmitted to the Commission but the
Commission has not yet acted on such. Is it still within the power I. The heads of the executive departments,
of the head to withdraw such appointment? Not yet acted but it ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
was already transmitted. Once the power has been performed it officers of the armed forces from the rank of
cannot be withdrawn. If the appointment was already submitted colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
to the commission, it is no longer within the authority of the head appointments are vested in him by the
to recall or withdraw such appointment. Once performed can no Constitution.
longer be withdrawn. The appointment becomes complete when II. All other officers of the Government whose
the commission has acted and the action may be either to appoint appointments are not otherwise provided for by
or disapprove but it cannot substitute to its own judgment to that law.
of the appointing power even if the other person is better III. Those whom the President may be authorized
qualified. by law to appoint.
IV. Officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Nature of Appointment Congress may be law vest in the President alone.
The nature of an appointment is likewise important to “Other officers whose appointments are vested in him by the
determine whether an employee or officer maybe be re-assigned Constitution” – are the regular members of the Judicial and Bar
to some other office. I read from the local paper, the city mayor Council, the chairman and the members of COA, CSC and
re-assigning some officials. If you are asked: Are those re- COMELEC, members of the Regional Consultative Commission.
assignments valid? A permanent appointment is security of
tenure of such appointment. Now if such security of tenure is Now there are four groups, these were already asked in
violated where the officers are re-assigned to other office, it will the bar exams, the categories of officers that shall be appointed
depend on the appointment issued to the employee. Where re- by the president with the concurrence of the Commission on
appointment does not indicate a specific station, then the Appointment.
employee may therefore be re-assigned provided there is no
substantial restraint in terms of rank, status and duties also Under the first sentence, the heads of the executive
salary. If is a constructive removal then it is a violation of the departments, ambassadors, public ministers, members of the AFP
security of tenure. So it depends on the appointment. If the from the rank of naval captain and colonel. And you have the
appointment indicates a specific station, then that employee members of the Constitutional Commission. There are only three
cannot be re-assigned elsewhere more so transfer without its constitutional commissions. You have the appointment of
consents. Ombudsman. It is subject to concurrence of the Commission on
Appointment.
55
executive branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an shall be effective only until disapproval
acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as by the Commission on Appointments or
long as the President deems that person competent. until the next adjournment of the
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the Congress. "
President the obligation to appoint automatically the Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can
whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear
and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for
qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without basis.
her alter ego should be.
BAUTISTA vs. SALONGA
MATIBAG vs. BENIPAYO 172 SCRA 160
380 SCRA 49
FACTS Appointment as Chairman of the Commission on
On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc appointed Human Rights needs no confirmation by CA.
petitioner as "Acting Director IV" of the EID. On February 15, Appointments are solely for the President to make.
2000, then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the FACTS
appointment of petitioner as Director IV of EID in a "Temporary" President Aquino designated petitioner Mary
capacity. On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo Concepcion Bautista as "Acting Chairman, Commission on Human
appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Rights. On the following years, she was permanently appointed
Borra and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term therein.
of seven years and all expiring on February 2, 2008.In his She took her oath and discharged her functions. Later,
capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum Bautista received a letter from the Secretary of the CA requesting
dated April 11, 2001 addressed to petitioner as Director IV of the her to submit to the Commission certain information and
EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco documents as required by its rules in connection with the
Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law confirmation of her appointment, that it would deliberate on her
Department. On April 16, 2001, petitioner requested Benipayo to appointment.
reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her Due to her refusal, the CA disapproved her so-called “ad
reassignment to the Law Department. Benipayo denied her interim” appointment extended by the President.
request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC ISSUE
Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000.Petitioner Whether or not the appointment as Chairman of the
appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the Commission on Human Rights needs CA confirmation.
COMELEC en banc in a Memorandum dated April 23, 2001.during HELD
the pendency of which, petitioner filed the instant petition NO, it need not. The position of Chairman of CHR is not
questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of among the positions mentioned in the 1st sentence of Sec. 16, Art.
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of VII of the 1987 Constitution, appointments to which are to be
the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim made with the confirmation of the CA. It follows that the
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the appointments by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is to
constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, be made without the review or participation of the CA. To be
as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of
reappointments of its Chairman and members. In the meantime, the Commission on Human Rights is not specifically provided for
on September 6, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo renewed in the Constitution itself.
once again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo as COMELEC EO 292 Title II provides: The Chairman and the
Chairman and Borra and Tuason as Commissioners, respectively, Members of the CHR shall be appointed by the President for a
for a term of seven years expiring on February 2, 2008. term of 7 years without reappointment. Appointment to any
ISSUE vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor."
Whether or not an ad interim appointment is This is in accordance with Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution
temporary. and the doctrine in Mison which is here reiterated.
HELD
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment QUINTOS-DELES vs. CA
because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be 177 SCRA 259
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into
office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Appointment of a sectoral representative needs CA
Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent confirmation.
character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim FACTS
appointment permanent in character by making it effective until Petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles and three others were
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to
next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of
16, Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows: the Constitution.
"The President shall have the power to The above sectoral representatives-appointees were
make appointments during the recess not able to take their oaths and discharge their duties due to the
of the Congress, whether voluntary or opposition of some Congressmen-members of CA. The latter
compulsory, but such appointments insisted that the appointments still have to be confirmed by CA.
56
Quintos-Deles opined that her appointment as sectoral TARROSA vs. SINGSON
representative for women does not require confirmation by the 232 SCRA 555
CA to qualify her to take her seat in the House of Representatives.
In a meeting with the Committee on ConCom and CA Appointment as Governor of the Bangko Sentral Ng
offices for the deliberation of her appointment, the Committee Pilipinas need not be confirmed by CA.
ruled against the position of Quintos-Deles. Hence, this petition. FACTS
ISSUE This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner as a
Whether or not the appointment of a sectoral "taxpayer," questioning the appointment of respondent Gabriel
representative by the President needs the CA confirmation Singson as Governor of the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas for not
HELD having been confirmed by the CA.
YES, it needs CA confirmation. We construed Section 16, The petition seeks to enjoin respondent Singson from
Article VII of the Constitution to mean that only appointments to the performance of his functions as such official until his
offices mentioned in the 1st sentence of the law require appointment is confirmed by the CA and respondent Salvador M.
confirmation by the CA. Enriquez, Secretary of Budget and Management, from disbursing
Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives public funds in payment of the salaries and emoluments of
may be filled by appointment by the President by express respondent Singson.
provision of the Constitution, it is indubitable that sectoral ISSUE
representatives to the House of Representatives are among the Whether or not the appointment of Singson as Governor
"other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in of the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas needs CA confirmation.
this Constitution," referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, HELD
Art. VII whose appointments are subject to confirmation by the NO, it need not. SC ruled that Congress cannot by law
Commission on Appointments. expand the confirmation powers of the CA and require
There are appointments vested in the President in the confirmation of appointment of other government officials not
Constitution which, by express mandate of the Constitution, expressly mentioned in the 1st sentence of Section 16 of Article VII
require no confirmation such as appointments of members of the of the Constitution.
Supreme Court and judges of lower courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and CALDERON vs. CARALE
the Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI). No such 208 SCRA 254
exemption from confirmation had been extended to
appointments of sectoral representatives in the Constitution. Appointments as Chairman and Commissioners of the
NLRC need not be confirmed by CA.
SARMIENTO vs. MISON FACTS
156 SCRA 549 In 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the
Labor Code (PD 442) was approved. Pursuant to said law,
Appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of President Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of
Customs need not be confirmed by CA. the NLRC representing the public, workers and employers
FACTS sectors. The appointments stated that the appointees may qualify
In this petition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office.
lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Petitioner Peter John Calderon challenged the
professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent constitutionality of the said appointments contending that they
Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of should have been affirmed by CA.
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent ISSUE
Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, Whether or not appointments as Chairman and
from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and Commissioners of the NLRC need CA confirmation.
emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment is HELD
unconstitutional. NO, it need not. The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII
Petitioners contended that the appointment is void by refers to all other officers of the government whose
reason of its not having been confirmed by CA. The respondents, appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those
on the other hand, maintain otherwise. whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.
ISSUE Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall
Whether or not the appointment of Mison as within the above sentence more specifically under the "third
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs needs CA confirmation. groups" of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the
HELD President may be authorized by law to appoint. The Chairman
NO, it need not. It is evident that the position of and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not in the 1st sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments
one of those within the first group of appointments where the requires confirmation by the CA.
consent of the CA is required. To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the
As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the CA of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members
1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those of the NLRC, it is unconstitutional because:
officers whose appointments need the consent of the CA, the
1987 Constitution, on the other hand, deliberately excluded the 1) It amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16,
position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto appointments
consent (confirmation) of the CA. requiring confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; and
57
2) It amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. Compare this with the earlier case of:
16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of IN RE: VALENZUELA
the Commission on Appointments on appointments, 298 SCRA 408
which are otherwise entrusted only with the President. FACTS
Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments
Deciding on what law to pass is a legislative signed by the President dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo
prerogative. Determining their constitutionality is a judicial Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago
function. City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments
appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15,
MANALO vs. SISTOZA Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision
312 SCRA 239 prohibits the President from making any appointments two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and
Appointments to the positions of directors, chief up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
superintendents, etc. of PNP are not required to be executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
confirmed by CA. prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
FACTS ISSUE
RA 6975 creating the DILG was enacted by President Whether or not, during the period of the ban on
Aquino. Pursuant to said law, she promoted the ranks of 15 appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution, the
respondent police officers in their capacities as directors, chief President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary,
superintendents, etc.. One of them is Sistoza in view of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII
The appointments were made without CA confirmation HELD
and were in a permanent capacity. The DBM Secretary effected During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the
the disbursements of salaries of those police officers. Constitution “two months immediately before the next
Petitioner Jesulito Manalo, in his capacity as a taxpayer, presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the President
opposed the said appointments for being made in violation of RA is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor
6975, which requires CA confirmation. allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply
ISSUE mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts
Whether or not the appointments to the positions of within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Sec.
directors, chief superintendents, etc. of PNP are required to be 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect
confirmed by CA once every 6 years.
HELD The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were
NO, it need not. While it is settled that only Presidential unquestionably made during the period of the ban. They come
appointments belonging to the 1st group require CA confirmation, within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments.
the appointments of the respondents are not within the said While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in
sentence. the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any
PNP is separate and distinct from AFP. The former is a compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments
police force which is civilian in character while the officers of the during the period of the ban.
latter undergo military training. Thus, the chief superintendents
and directors of PNP are not equal to the rank of colonel or naval RUFINO vs. ENDRIGA
captain of AFP. 496 SCRA 16
DE CASTRO vs. JBC No law can cut off the President's control over the
(March 17, 2010) CCP in the guise of insulating the CCP from the
HELD President's influence.
Prohibition on midnight appointment in Sec. 15, Art. Vll FACTS
does not apply to appointment of members of the Supreme Court. During the term of Pres. Ramos, the CCP Board included
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition Endriga, Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez, Lenora A.
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Cabili ("Cabili"), and Manuel T. Mañosa ("Mañosa"). On Dec. 22,
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done 1998, then Pres. Estrada appointed seven new trustees to the
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the CCP Board for a term of four years to replace the Endriga group
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the as well as two other incumbent trustees. On Jan. 6, 1999, the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto questioning Pres.
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Estrada's appointment of seven new members to the CCP Board,
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), alleging that under Sec. 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals "shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees
that the prohibition against the President or Acting President held at the next regular meeting x x x." In case "only one trustee
making appointments within two months before the next survive[s], the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee
presidential elections and up to the end of the President's or acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the [CCP]." The
Acting President's term does not refer to the Members of the Endriga group claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is
Supreme Court. entirely vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such
The express intent of the framers is enshrined in Sec. 4, vacancies, acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the
Art. Vlll, which is a command to the President to fill up any CCP. They asserted that when former Pres. Estrada appointed the
vacancy within 90 days from its occurrence. Rufino group, only one seat was vacant. They also maintained
58
that under the CCP Charter, the trustees' fixed four-year term policies and undertaking activities, but ultimately these policies
could only be terminated "by reason of resignation, incapacity, and activities are all subject to the President's power of control.
death, or other cause." Presidential action was neither necessary The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law can cut
nor justified since the CCP Board then still had 10 incumbent off the President's control over the CCP in the guise of insulating
trustees who had the statutory power to fill by election any the CCP from the President's influence. By stating that the
vacancy in the Board. "President shall have control of all the executive x x x offices," the
The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was 1987 Constitution empowers the President not only to influence
under the supervision and control of the President. The Endriga but even to control all offices in the Executive branch, including
group cited Section 3 of PD 15, which states that the CCP "shall the CCP. Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence.
enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x."
The Court of Appeals declared the Endriga group MAROHOMBSAR vs. CA
lawfully entitled to hold office as CCP trustees and thus ousted 326 SCRA 62
the Rufino group from the CCP Board.
In their motion for reconsideration, the Rufino group Ad interim appointments are permanent but their
asserted that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the terms last only until the appointing disapproves
power to appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees of the them.
Board. The law may not validly confer on the CCP trustees the FACTS
authority to appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the latter Respondent Brillante Guinar Maruhom was appointed
would be officers of equal rank and not of lower rank. Section as Technical Assistant to the Office of the Chancellor of the
6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow Mindanao State University (MSU). It was confirmed by the Board
trustees should be declared unconstitutional being repugnant to of Regents.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing the When the Salary Standardization Law was enacted, his
appointment only of "officers lower in rank" than the appointing position was converted into Executive Asst. II whose
power. appointment was temporary since he was not a CS eligible. Upon
ISSUE passing the Career Professional exam, he was extended a
Whether or not the President has the power to appoint permanent appointment.
the members of the CCP Board of Trustees? Upon assuming office, a letter of termination was sent
HELD to him. Thus, he filed with CSC a complaint for illegal dismissal,
Yes, the President has the power. which was granted. CSC added that his termination violated his
Under Sec. 16 Art. VII of the Constitution, there is a security of tenure.
fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments On the other hand, petitioner contended that the
Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, appointment was void for lack of confirmation by the Board of
commissions, or boards. The present case involves the Regents before it was submitted to CSC for attestation. Petitioner
interpretation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution added that the position was confidential and co-terminus with
with respect to the appointment of this fourth group of officers. the term of the then MSU President. It was added that the
The clear intent remained that these inferior or lower in rank appointment was ad interim considering that it was made by the
officers are the subordinates of the heads of departments, University President, rather than the Board of Regents.
agencies, commissions, or boards who are vested by law with the ISSUE
power to appoint – this excludes a situation where the appointing Whether or not private respondent enjoys security of
officer appoints an officer equal in rank as him. The law may not tenure
also authorize officers other than the heads of the agency, HELD
commission, or their fellow trustees for the effects are the same, NO, he does not. The appointment extended to the
which is to fill the vacancies in the CCP Board. Since the President private respondent was made without condition nor limitation as
exercises control over "all the executive departments, bureaus, to tenure. However, the permanent status of respondent was
and offices," the President necessarily exercises control over the recognized and attested by CSC. Ad interim appointments are
CCP which is an office in the Executive branch. Sec. 3 of PD 15 permanent but their terms last only until the Board of Regents
stating board to appoint lower-ranked officers. Thus, the disapproves them.
Chairman of the CCP Board is the "head" of the CCP who may be
vested by law, under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 MODES OF TERMINATING OFFICIAL RELATIONS:
Constitution, with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers of
the CCP. 1. Abolition of office
Insofar as it authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to 2. Abandonment of an office
elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is 3. Acceptance of another office incompatible with the
unconstitutional because it violates Section 16, Article VII of the first
1987 Constitution. It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15 4. Resignation
empowers the remaining trustees to "elect" and not "appoint" 5. Expiration of term or tenure
their fellow trustees for the effect is the same, which is to fill 6. Recall
vacancies in the CCP Board. 7. Removal
Section 3 of PD 15, as amended, states that the CCP 8. Reaching the age limit
"shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x."45 This 9. Prescription of the right to office
provision does not free the CCP from the President's control, for 10. Impeachment
if it does, then it would be unconstitutional. This provision may 11. Death
give the CCP Board a free hand in initiating and formulating
59
12. Failure to assume elective office within 6 months In 1977, private respondent Violeta Garcia, a Bachelor
from proclamation of Laws graduate and a 1st grade civil service eligible was
13. Conviction of a crime appointed for the following positions:
14. Filing a certificate of candidacy Deputy Register of Deeds VII (permanent status)
Deputy Register of Deeds III (permanent status)
ABOLITION OF OFFICE Acting Brach Register of Deeds
Except when restrained by the Constitution, Congress Deputy Register of Deeds II (temporary status, for not
has the right to abolish an office, even during the term for which being a member of the Bar pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 649)
an existing incumbent may have been elected; neither means For this, she appealed to CSC. NALTDRA was directed by
removal nor separation. CSC to restore Garcia to her position in LRC or its equivalent in
a. Constitutional offices cannot be abolished by Congress. NALTDRA. It relied on the “vested right theory” ruling that the
b. No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when new Bar membership requirement does not apply to her but only
it undermines the security of tenure of its members. to the filling up of vacant lawyer positions on or after February 9,
(Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution) 1981. It does not apply to her since she has been holding her
c. Valid abolition of office does not constitute removal of position since 1977.
the incumbent. ISSUE
d. It is within the legal competence of the city council to Whether or not membership in the Bar, which is the
create, consolidate and reorganize city offices and qualification requirement, prescribed for appointment to the
positions wholly supported by local funds. disputed position should apply only to the new applicants and
not to those already in service.
REQUISITES OF A VALID ABOLITION HELD
a. Must be made in good faith; NO, the provision should apply to all without
b. With clear intent to do away with the office; qualification. EO 649, Section 8 is clear on its wordings “All
c. Not for personal or political reasons; positions therein shall cease to exist from the date specified in
d. Must not be implemented in a manner contrary to law. the implementing order”.
EO 649 therefore abolished all positions in the now
ABOLITION vs. REMOVAL defunct LRC and required new appointments to be issued to all
employees of the NALTDRA.
GENERAL RULE: There is no vested right in public Abolition does not mean removal. It does not involve
office removal for the reason that the post subsists or that one is
EXCEPTION: Constitutional offices which the law merely separated therefrom. After the abolition, there is in law
provides for special immunity as regards salary and no occupant. Thus, there can be no tenure to speak of.
nature
OTHER RELATED CASES:
DARIO vs. MISON
REMOVAL OF PUBLIC ABOLITION OF PUBLIC
176 SCRA 84
OFFICERS OFFICE
A reorganization is void where there is no showing
Position still exists, Effected bona fide that legitimate structural changes have been made.
only the officer is (done in good FACTS
separated faith), As an aftermath of the EDSA Revolution, President
Can be made for Must be done Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3 reorganizing the Philippine
reasonable cause pursuant to the Government.
There is an law With the advent of the reorganization process, the
occupant There is no President called upon “all appointive public officials to submit
There can be occupant their courtesy resignations, beginning with the members of SC”.
violation of There is no She also abolished the Batasang Pambansa, positions of prime
security of tenure violation of minister and cabinet. Dario Mison is a custom official whose
security of tenure services were terminated by the Customs Commissioner.
ISSUE
RELATED CASE: Whether or not the reorganization is valid
NALTDRA vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION HELD
221 SCRA 145 NO, it is void. Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have
been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith.
Abolition vs. Removal, there is no ‘vested right’ in As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in
public office. "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
FACTS bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of
This case arose from the issuance of EO 649 or the a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position
Reorganization of the Land Registration Commission into itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is
(NALTDRA) which took effect on February 9, 1981. nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political
reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise
not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever
60
"abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" any position closest to his old position in terms and functions,
as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, without diminution of rank, etc.
82 or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of Earlier, petitioner received a letter from DOST Secretary
ample funds. advising him to file his retirement application, and to turn-over
There is no showing that legitimate structural changes the properties, records in his custody to OIC of Benjamin Damian.
have been made — or a reorganization actually undertaken, for Thus, Guerrero filed this instant petition as it violates
that matter — at the Bureau since Commissioner Mison assumed his security of tenure.
office, which would have validly prompted him to hire and fire ISSUE
employees. There can therefore be no actual reorganization to Whether or not the abolition is valid
speak of, in the sense, say, of reduction of personnel, HELD
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of NO, it is void. The renaming and restructuring of the
economy or redundancy of functions, but a revamp of personnel Philippine General Hospital and its components cannot give rise
pure and simple. to a valid and bona fide abolition of the position of the PGH
Director. This is because where the abolished office and the
GINSON vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MURCIA offices created in its place have similar functions, the abolition
158 SCRA 1 lacks good faith.
61
CANONIZADO vs. AGUIRRE Here, an incompatibility exists between the positions of
323 SCRA 312 the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. As CPLC, Elma will be required
to give his legal opinion on his own actions as PCGG Chairman,
Where one office is abolished and replaced with the PCGG being an agency under the Executive Department, and
another office vested with similar functions, the review any investigation conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft
abolition is void. Commission, which may involve himself as PCGG Chairman.
Implied abolition of NAPOLCOM under Sec. 8 of RA
8551 is unconstitutional. LIBAN vs. GORDON
FACTS (593 SCRA 68)
The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) was
originally created under RA 6975. The members of the PNRC chairman not incompatible with being senator.
NAPOLCOM are herein petitioners. None of their terms had FACTS
expired when the amendatory law was passed. During Gordon’s incumbency as a member of the Senate
Eventually, RA 8551 was passed. By virtue of which, all of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of Phil. National Red
who are members of the NAPOLCOM were separated from the Cross (PNRC) by the PNRC Board of Governors.
office and their current terms were deemed expired upon its Petitioners Liban et al. alleged that by accepting the
effectivity. Pursuant thereto, President Ramos also appointed chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, Gordon has
new members of NAPOLCOM. Others were also appointed by ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13,
President Estrada. Article VI of the Constitution.
This prompts petitioners to file this action assailing the
constitutionality of RA 8551. ISSUE
ISSUE Whether or not Sec.13, Art. VI of the Phil. Constitution
Whether or not the abolition is valid. applies to the case of respondent.
HELD HELD
NO, it is void. Where one office is abolished and No. The PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded,
replaced with another office vested with similar functions, the and privately run charitable organization. The PNRC is not a
abolition is a legal nullity. Abolition of an office connotes an government-owned or controlled corporation. The PNRC does
intention to do away with such office wholly and permanently. not have government assets and does not receive any
Identity of functions is an indicia of bad faith. appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is
To effect an abolition, the new law must expressly financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and
abolish the old offices. An implied abolition is also effected when private entities.
there has been inconsistency and irreconcilability in the nature, The PNRC Board of Governors, which exercises all
duties and functions of the petitioner’s offices under the old and corporate powers of the PNRC, elects the PNRC Chairman and all
new law. other officers of the PNRC. The incumbent Chairman of PNRC,
RA 8851 does not result in the creation of an entirely respondent Senator Gordon, was elected, as all PNRC Chairmen
new office. Thus, it is unconstitutional. are elected, by a private sector-controlled PNRC Board four-fifths
of whom are private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER INC. vs. ELMA Chairman is not appointed by the President or by any
494 SCRA 54 subordinate government official. Decisions or actions of the PNRC
Board are not reviewable by the President. The President cannot
The crucial test in determining whether reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Board.
incompatibility exists between two offices is whether Neither can the President reverse or modify the decisions or
one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense actions of the PNRC Chairman. It is the PNRC Board that can
that one office has the right to interfere with the review, reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC
other. Chairman.
FACTS The PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the
Respondent Magdangal Elma was first appointed as Philippine Government. Not being a government official or
PCGG Chairman. During his tenure as such, he was also appointed employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a
as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He took his oath of government office or employment.
office, but waived any remuneration he may receive as CPLC.
ISSUE
Whether or not the position of PCGG Chairman or that ABANDONMENT OF AN OFFICE
of the CPLC falls under the prohibition against multiple offices Abandonment of an office is a species of resignation;
imposed by Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 while resignation in general is a formal relinquishment,
Constitution? abandonment is a voluntary relinquishment through non-user.
HELD
Yes, they fall under such prohibition. The general rule in ELEMENTS OF ABANDONMENT:
Sec. 7, Art. IX-B permits an appointive official to hold more than 1 1. Intention to abandon
office only if “allowed by law or by the primary functions of his 2. Overt or external act by which the intention is carried
position” and as long as there is no incompatibility. The crucial into effect
test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two
offices is whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the
sense that one office has the right to interfere with the other.
62
WAYS OF ABANDONMENT: Under the LGC, his resignation should have been tendered to the
1. NON-USER – refers to a neglect to use a privilege or right SB, and not to the mayor.
or to exercise an easement or an office Subsequently, his appointment to the SP was declared
2. ACQUISCENCE – the officer in his wrongful removal or void. Now he wants to reassume his position in the SB.
discharge (for instance, a summary removal), commits an ISSUE
unreasonable delay in taking steps to vindicate his rights Whether or not there was a resignation or
abandonment
ABSENCE WITHOUT LEAVE (AWOL) – The SC upheld the HELD
validity of Section 35, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules of CSC, This is a case of abandonment. Although a resignation is
which provides that officers and employees who are absent for at not deemed complete without an acceptance thereof by the
least 30 days without approved leave are considered on AWOL proper authority, an office may still be deemed relinquished
and shall be dropped from service after due notice. Mere delay in through abandonment.
qualifying for the office is not abandonment. The elements of abandonment are present.
ADIONG vs. CA
RELATED CASES: 371 SCRA 375
Resignation vs. Abandonment. Section 82: (a) Resignations by elective local officials shall be
FACTS deemed effective only upon acceptance by the following
Respondent Augusto Antonio was elected Barangay authorities:
Captain. He was later elected as the president of the Association (1) The President, in the case of governors,
of Barangay Councils (ABC). In that capacity, the President vice-governors, and mayors and vice-
appointed him as member of SB of the Municipality of San mayors of highly urbanized cities and
Andres. independent component cities;
Meanwhile, the DILG Secretary designated Antonio as a (2) The governor, in the case of municipal
temporary member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP). mayors, municipal vice-mayors, city mayors
Thus, he resigned as an SB member. He tendered his and city vice-mayors of component cities;
resignation to the mayor who did not forward the same to the SB. (3) The sanggunian concerned, in the case of
sanggunian members; and
63
(4) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of office" has no factual support in the record. There was a tender of
barangay officials. resignation "effective at the pleasure of the President." Obviously,
xxx … it was not meant to be effective immediately; acceptance was still
Non-compliance with this provision makes the necessary.
resignation not valid. Abandonment by the incumbent of his office before
acceptance of his resignation is punishable under the RPC.
Petitioner claims that there was "implied" acceptance of said
Article 238, of the Revised Penal Code: resignation. It appears, however, that action thereon was held in
abeyance. The President, apparently, needed more time to
Article 238. Abandonment of office or position. - Any public officer consider the validity of the view submitted by the respondent in
who, before the acceptance of his resignation, shall abandon his his memorandum and confidential letter.
office to the detriment of the public service shall suffer the As Governor, the respondent contended, he can be
penalty of arresto mayor. appointed Cabinet Minister and, as such, assigned later to the
Batasan without forfeiting the governorship. Plainly,
abandonment cannot be inferred from the conduct of the
If such office shall have been abandoned in order to evade the respondent. This is belied, however, by the Local Government
discharge of the duties of preventing, prosecuting or punishing Minister's approval of the request of the respondent that he be
any of the crime falling within Title One, and Chapter One of Title considered "on leave of absence" while his resignation was
Three of Book Two of this Code, the offender shall be punished by "pending consideration by the President."
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, and Good faith and the regularity in the performance of official duty
by arresto mayor if the purpose of such abandonment is to evade are always presumed, in the absence of clear and convincing
the duty of preventing, prosecuting or punishing any other crime. proof to the contrary.
64
ELEMENTS OF RESIGNATION: 25, 1986 when she called on all appointive public officials to
1. The officer or employee must show a clear intention to tender their "courtesy resignation" as a "first step to restore
relinquish or surrender his position confidence in public administration."
2. It must be accompanied by the act of relinquishment. Verily, a "courtesy resignation" cannot properly be
interpreted as resignation in the legal sense for it is not
REQUISITES OF A VALID AND COMPLETE RESIGNATION: necessarily a reflection of a public official's intention to
1. There must be an acceptance of the resignation by the surrender his position. Rather, it manifests his submission to the
appointing power. will of the political authority and the appointing power.
2. Accepting person must have authority to accept the
resignation. COLLANTES, vs. CSC and DND (supra)
3. If the resignation has been accepted, it can no longer be
revoked. GONZALES VS. ESCALONA
4. Withdrawal of resignation must be with the consent of 566 SCRA 4 (September 19, 2008)
the accepting authority.
FACTS
PRINCIPLE OF HOLD-OVER – In the absence of any express or A verified complaint for Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
implied constitutional prohibition to the contrary, the public Interest of the Service and Grave Misconduct in connection with
officer is entitled to hold his office until his successor shall have the enforcement of the writ of execution of the decision in
been duly chosen and shall have qualified. Criminal Case No. 2150 against Atty. Joseph N. Escalona and
– The purpose of this principle is to prevent a hiatus in the public Edgar V. Superada (deceased).
service The complaint showed that in convicting the accused in
– If the public officer is mandated by law to hold-over, the Criminal Case No. 2150, the RTC awarded damages to
resignation, even if accepted, will not be effective until after the complainant Felisa L. Gonzales. The RTC issued a writ of
appointment of his successor. execution directing respondent Superada to enforce the
judgment. Since the accused was insolvent, the judgment was
RELATED CASES: enforced against the accused's employer, Serafica Enterprises
(Serafica).
ORTIZ vs. COMELEC The complainant alleged that even before the writ of
162 SCRA 812 execution was issued by the RTC, respondent Superada
approached her and demanded the amount of P27,500.00,
“Courtesy resignation" cannot properly be allegedly for expenses in serving the writ. The complainant was
interpreted as resignation in the legal sense. able to give the respondent only P7,000.00.
FACTS The complainant further alleged that without her
Petitioner Mario Ortiz was appointed Commissioner of consent, both respondents accepted from Serafica twenty-four
the COMELEC by then President Marcos for a term expiring May (24) postdated checks of Land Bank-Ormoc City, each in the
17, 1992. amount of P13,710.85 (or a total of P329,060.00) in payment of
When Proclamation No. 1 was enacted by President the damages awarded to the victims of the vehicular accident. All
Aquino, petitioner (together with other Commissioners) availed the checks were made payable to respondent Escalona. The first
of the retirement benefits by any public officer or employee check was dated April 7, 2000, while the last check was dated
separated from service as a result of the reorganization, provided January 31, 2002.
that he has rendered at least 20 years. HELD
COMELEC denied their applications for retirement on The evidence on record and the admissions made by
the ground that they were not entitled to such retirement both respondents in their comments filed with this Court and
benefits on the ground that petitioner’s voluntary resignation with the investigating court sufficiently establish their
prevented the completion of his term. Having only 16 years in culpability. Court’s examination of the records of the case tells us
service, he is not entitled to the benefits. that there was connivance between the respondents on the
Petitioner contended that he did not resign but placed manner of collecting and disbursing the amounts awarded to the
his position at the disposal of the President. accident victims so that they (the respondents) could personally
ISSUE benefit from the proceeds of the court's award.
Whether or not there was a resignation Respondent Escalona had already resigned from the
HELD service. His resignation, however, does not render this case moot,
NO, there was none. Petitioner’s separation from nor does it free him from liability. In fact, the Court views
government service as a result of the reorganization ordained by respondent Escalona's resignation before the investigation as
the then President Aquino government may not be considered a indication of his guilt, in the same way that flight by an accused in
resignation within the contemplation of the law. a criminal case is indicative of guilt. In short, his resignation will
From the foregoing it is evident that petitioner's not be a way out of the administrative liability he incurred while
"resignation" lacks the element of clear intention to surrender his in the active service. While we can no longer dismiss him, we can
position. We cannot presume such intention from his statement still impose a penalty sufficiently commensurate with the offense
in his letter of March 5, 1986 that he was placing his position at he committed.
the disposal of the President. He did not categorically state We treat respondent Superada no differently. While his
therein that he was unconditionally giving up his position. It death intervened after the completion of the investigation, it has
should be remembered that said letter was actually a response to been settled that the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an
Proclamation No. 1 which President Aquino issued on February administrative matter by the mere fact that the respondent
65
public official ceases to hold office during the pendency of the In the course of the audit and examination of the
respondent's case; jurisdiction once acquired, continues to exist petitioner’s collection accounts, the Commission on Audit (COA)
until the final resolution of the case. discovered that the petitioner was unable to account for
P4,080,799.77
GONZALES vs. HERNANDEZ The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. It noted
2 SCRA 228 that the most severe penalty which may be imposed on the
petitioner is removal from service, and that under Section 66 of
Conditional resignation may still be repudiated. the Omnibus Election Code, petitioner was already deemed
FACTS resigned when she filed her Certificate of Candidacy on 16
Petitioner Guillermo Gonzales was appointed as an January 1998.
attorney-agent of the Investigation and Secret Service Division, ISSUE
Department of Finance (DOF), but a case was instituted against Whether or not Pagano may still be administratively
him. He was found guilty of disreputable conduct prior to charged even if she is separated from civil service by operation of
entering the service, and called upon to resign or be separated for law. Yes.
cause. HELD
He filed a letter of resignation, but subject to the result The Court ruled that the precipitate resignation of a
of the appeal with the CS Board of Appeals. government employee charged with an offense punishable by
Petitioner’s wife Lilia was appointed to his former dismissal from the service does not render moot the
position. Said appointment automatically became permanent administrative case against him. Resignation is not a way out to
with 6 months. She was promoted as Economist Tax Researcher evade administrative liability when facing administrative
of DOF. Meanwhile, petitioner was accepted as emergency helper sanction. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude
in the GSIS. the finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall
As CS Appeals Board decision came out, it modified the still be answerable.
penalty against petitioner and imposes upon him a suspension of The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the
2 months only, without pay. He was reinstated. petitioner’s separation from government service. Even if the most
Respondent Undersecretary of Finance opposed the severe of administrative sanctions - that of separation from
reinstatement on the ground that petitioner has already rendered service - may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are
his resignation. other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is later found
ISSUE guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the
Whether or not there was a valid resignation disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture
HELD of benefits.
NO, the petitioner cannot be considered resigned. Moreover, this Court views with suspicion the
Where an employee's resignation from his position in the precipitate act of a government employee in effecting his or her
government service was made expressly "subject to the result of separation from service, soon after an administrative case has
my appeal to the CS Board of Appeals,” there is no resignation to been initiated against him or her. An employee’s act of tendering
speak of, because to constitute a complete and operative act of his or her resignation immediately after the discovery of the
resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear intention anomalous transaction is indicative of his or her guilt as flight in
to relinquish or surrender his position. criminal cases.
The acceptance, by an employee who resigned
conditionally from his position pending the termination of his ESTRADA vs. DESIERTO
case in the CS Board of Appeals, of another position as emergency 323 SCRA 312
laborer in a government corporation, does not constitute an HELD
abandonment of his old position, because his temporary Resignation is not a high level abstraction. It is a factual
employment is not incompatible with his old position, and he question and its elements are beyond quibble: the officer or
could resign from the same any time, as soon as his case had been employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender
definitely decided in his favor. his position; it must be accompanied by the act of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by
PAGANO vs. NAZARRO formal requirements. It can be oral, written. It can be express,
G.R. No. 149072 (September 21, 2007) implied. As long as resignation is clear, it must be given effect.
FACTS The resignation of President Estrada cannot be doubted.
While Pagano was employed as Cashier IV of the Office It was confirmed by his leaving the Malacañang. Certainly, the
of the Provincial Treasurer of Benguet, it was discovered that in national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be
her accountabilities she had incurred a shortage of attained if he did not give up his presidency. The press release
P1,424,289.99. The Provincial Treasurer wrote a letter directing was his valedictory, final or farewell. His presidency is now in the
petitioner to explain why no administrative charge should be past tense.
filed against her in connection with the cash shortage.
On1998, petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy for TOTALITY TEST: That is, the acts or omissions before, during
the position of Councilor in Baguio City. Thereafter, the Office of and after January 20, 2001; that is, the totality of prior,
the Provincial Governor of Benguet found the existence of a contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial
prima facie case for dishonesty, grave misconduct and evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
malversation of public funds through falsification of official
documents and directed the petitioner to file an answer.
66
IGOY vs. SORIANO February 2, 1999-- indicated expiration of her term
367 SCRA 70 February 2, 2000 – expiration date of her term
according to the OP
Resignation from office could not be used as a way to Gaminde’s team relied on the opinion of the OP. Thus,
escape offense. beyond February 2, 1999, the Commission on Audit ordered their
FACTS disallowance.
Doroteo Igoy is one of the petitioners in particular case. COA opined that Gaminde’s team must serve only the
He alleged that while the aforesaid case was still pending before unexpired portion of Barlonay’s team.
the Court of Appeals, he tried to look for a person in the Supreme ISSUE
Court who may assist him in obtaining justice. Sometime in July When is the expiration of Gaminde’s term?
1999, a friend introduced complainant to a certain “Justice” of the HELD
Supreme Court. He narrated to the said Justice the history of their The 7-year term of Commissioner Gaminde, who was
case. In turn, the said Justice asked for and received from him the appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 2, 1999 since
sum of P20,000.00. However, the said Justice reminded the term of her predecessor ended on February 2, 1992.
complainant that he could offer no help while the case was In the same manner, the term of her successor must be
pending before the Court of Appeals. Atty. Soriano from the Office deemed to start on February 2, 1999 and will expire on February
of the Clerk of Court, First Division of the Supreme Court was 2, 2006., nothwithstanding that Gaminde served as de facto
allegedly that “justice”. Atty. Soriano filed a resignation from his officer until February 2, 2000.
post. Note: Appointee who is confidential in nature must serve
ISSUE according to the pleasure of the appointing power. Thus, if the
Whether Soriano should be exculpated from his offense office of the appointing authority ceased to exist, it follows that
despite his resignation the appointee must also be removed.
HELD De Facto office concept was also applied in this case.
No. Resignation should not be used either as an escape
or as an easy way out to evade administrative liability by court REACHING THE AGE LIMIT
personnel facing administrative sanction. Atty. Gilbert Soriano’s Military Officer – 56 years old
offer to resign was obviously an attempt to evade whatever Judiciary – 70 years old
penalty may be imposed on him. However, the mere expedient of Usual CS Eligible – 65 years old
resigning from the service will not extricate him from the RA 1616 (SPECIAL RETIREMENT LAWS) – which
consequences of his acts. allows optional retirement after an officer has
rendered a minimum number of years of
government service.
EXPIRATION OF TERM
REMOVAL
TERM vs. TENURE
No officer or employee of the civil service shall be
TERM TENURE removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. [Article
- The term during which an - Represents the term during IX-B, Section 2 (3) of the 1987 Constitution]
officer may claim to hold office which the incumbent actually The power to remove is implied in the power to
as a right and fixes the interval holds office appoint.
after which the several
incumbents shall succeed one - May be shorter than the term RELATED CASES:
another for reasons within or beyond
the power of the incumbent ADIONG vs. CA
- Not affected by hold-over 371 SCRA 374
68
neglect and gross inefficiency in the performance of his suspended petitioner from office for 60 days. He was later
official duties. removed and replaced by the vice-governor.
In the Northern Mindanao case, Zaldivar received in While his petition was pending before SC, petitioner
his official capacity from judgment debtor P3,000 which he filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of
failed to turn over to the judgment creditor. This is an act of Cagayan for the 1992 elections. Three separate petitions for his
misappropriation of funds amounting to dishonesty. He also disqualification were then filed against him, all based on the
failed to issue official receipts. ground that he had been removed from office. COMELEC ruled at
Under the Civil Service rules, if respondent is found inasmuch as the resolutions of the Commission become final and
guilty of 2 or more charges, the penalty to be imposed should be executory only after five (5) days from promulgation, petitioner
that corresponding to the most serious charge and the rest will may still be voted upon as a candidate for governor pending the
be considered aggravating circumstances. Dishonesty, a grave final outcome of the disqualification cases.
offense punishable by dismissal on the first offense, is the most To sum it up, he was re-elected.
serious charge of which Zaldivar is found guilty of. Gross neglect ISSUE
of duty and gross inefficiency will be considered as aggravating Whether or not the re-election rendered the
circumstances. Dismissal from service is the appropriate penalty administrative case pending against him moot and academic.
to be imposed on Zaldivar. HELD
Yes. A public official could not be removed for
misconduct committed during a prior term and that his
DOCTRINE OF CONDONATION (AGUINALDO DOCTRINE): reelection operated as a condonation of the officer's previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
An elective official charged for an offense during his therefore. But that was because in that case, before the petition
prior term cannot be applied to his present term. This principle questioning the validity of the administrative decision removing
is applicable even if he did not run for re-election since term has petitioner could be decided, the term of office during which the
already expired. However, take note that this principle is alleged misconduct was committed expired. Removal cannot
applicable only to administrative cases. extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct
was committed.
Take note that an act or omission may give rise to an The rule is that a public official can not be removed for
administrative case as well as a criminal case. In the administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since
administrative case, what is being punished is the misconduct or his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's
the dereliction or neglect of duty. previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefore. The foregoing rule, however, finds no
If it involves moral turpitude, upon conviction by final application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts
judgment can there only be an administrative case filed against he may have committed during the failed coup.
an official. But if it is merely misconduct, final judgment
rendered in the criminal case is not necessary. The REYES vs. COMELEC
administrative case can proceed independently. 254 SCRA 516
MISCONDUCT – refers to the behavior of public officer which Doctrine of Condonation does not apply.
affects his duties FACTS
GRAVE MISCONDUCT - there is flagrant violation of an Petitioner Renato U. Reyes was the incumbent mayor of
established rule the municipality of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. An
DISHONESTY – may or may not be connected with public duty; administrative complaint was filed against him with the
defect of character which affects his Sangguniang Panlalawigan. It was alleged that Reyes collected
right to continue in office P50,000.00 from each market stall holder in the Public Market
without remitting the same to the municipal treasurer.
RELATED CASES: SP found petitioner guilty and removed him from office.
The decision however cannot be served upon him due to his
AGUINALDO v. SANTOS continued refusal. Subsequently, Reyes was re-elected for the
212 SCRA 768 same position.
ISSUE
Doctrine of Condonation. Whether the reelection of petitioner rendered the
FACTS administrative charges against him moot and academic
Petitioner Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo was the duly elected HELD
Governor of the province of Cagayan. He was to serve a term of Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC.
four (4) years. The case at bar is the very opposite of the above case. Here,
After the coup d’etat, a sworn complaint for disloyalty although Reyes brought an action to question the decision in the
to the Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution was administrative case, the TRO issued in the action he brought
filed by the mayors of Cagayan, against petitioner for acts the lapsed, with the result that the decision was served on petitioner
latter committed during the coup. and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because
Petitioner filed an answer to the complaint denying the petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President. He was
allegations but admitting that he is sympathetic to the cause of thus validly removed from office and, pursuant to Sec. 40 (b) of
the rebels. On the basis thereof, respondent Secretary of DILG the LGC, he was disqualified from running for reelection.
69
PEOPLE vs. JALOSJOS speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that
324 SCRA 692 the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases.
Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not
Doctrine of Condonation cannot apply to criminal obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral victory only
acts done during the previous term. signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the
FACTS Senate, "they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his
Romeo Jalosjos is a member of the Congress who was freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could
confined at the National Penitentiary while his conviction for achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish
statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. within the confines of prison."
He filed his motion asking that he be allowed to fully In once more debunking the disenfranchisement
discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at argument, it is opportune to wipe out the lingering
legislative sessions and committee meetings despite having been misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the
convicted at the first instance of a non-bailable offense. people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in
ISSUE the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent
Whether the reelection of petitioner allows him to fully discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the
discharge the duties of a Congressman mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people
HELD themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law.
NO. The doctrine of condonation or forgiveness cannot
apply to criminal acts which the re-elected official may have PEOPLE vs. HON. MACEDA
committed during his previous term. The administrative liability 380 Phil. 1
of a public officer is separate and distinct from his criminal
liability. As a necessary consequence of arrest and detention,
The re-election of Jalosjos as Congressman is not a all prisoners cannot practice their profession nor
reasonable classification in criminal enforcement. The functions engage in business or occupation or hold office,
and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift elective or appointive, while in detention.
him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom. His FACTS
continued incarceration is valid and constitutionally mandated This case stems from denial by the SC of the People’s
curtailment of his rights to provisional liberty pending the appeal motion seeking reconsideration of our August 13, 1990 decision
of his conviction. holding that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda committed
If there are two or more cases, the accused is penalized no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of August 8,
by the more serious charge while the other charge is considered 1989 giving custody over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana
as aggravating. to the Clerk of Court of the Antique RTC, Atty. Deogracias del
Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355.
TRILLANES vs. PIMENTEL At that time, sufficient reason was shown why Javellana should
(June 27, 2008) not be detained at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial court’s
order specifically provided for private respondent’s detention at
Doctrine of Condonation does not apply to criminal the residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private respondent
cases. was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but was to be held
FACTS as detention prisoner in said residence. It was however found
In the aftermath of the "Oakwood Incident,” petitioner that the order was not strictly complied with because Javellana
Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, was not detained in the residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went
with coup d'etat before the RTC. Close to four years later, about his normal activities as if he were a free man, including
petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw his hat in the engaging in the practice of law.
political arena and won a seat in the Senate. Before the ISSUE
commencement of his term, he filed an "Omnibus Motion for Whether Javellana can practice his profession
Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and HELD
Related Requests". Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based
The trial court denied all the requests in the omnibus on the filing of criminal cases against him. By such arrest, he is
motion. deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave
ISSUE Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private respondent
Whether or not denying Trillanes’ Omnibus Motion is tantamount Javellana
to removing
withhim
thefrom
obligation
office, “to
depriving
hold and
thedetain”
peoplehim
of proper
in Atty.representation
del
Rosario’s residence in his official capacity as the clerk of court of
the regional trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was
appointed judge, he ceased to be the personal custodian of
HELD accused Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court must be
No. Petitioner's contention hinges on the doctrine in deemed the custodian under the same undertaking.
administrative law that "a public official cannot be removed for As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the
since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he
officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He
to remove him therefor." must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against
The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or
is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether
70
under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not CSC vs. BELAGAN
practice their profession nor engage in any business or 440 SCRA 578
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in HELD
detention. Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or
BONDOC vs. PINEDA deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior,
201 SCRA 792 (1991) especially by a government official. To constitute an
administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be
Members of the HRET have security of tenure; connected with the performance of the official functions and
disloyalty to the political party is not a valid ground duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct as distinguished
for expulsion from the HRET. from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent
FACTS to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must
In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, be manifest. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct
1987, Pineda of the LABAN was proclaimed winner as consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who
representative for the 4th District of Pampanga. In due time, unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to
Bondoc of NP filed a protest in the HRET. By Oct. 1990, a decision procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary
had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin to duty and the rights of others. This is apparently present in
of 23 votes. The re-examination and re-appreciation of the respondent’s case as it concerns not only a stolen kiss but also a
ballots, at the instance of the LDP members in HRET, resulted in demand for a “date,” an unlawful consideration for the issuance
increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Cong. of a permit to operate a pre-school. Respondent’s act clearly
Camasura, an LDP, voted with the SC justices and Cong. Cerilles, constitutes grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal.
an NP, to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
Moved by candor and honesty, Camasura revealed to Effects of dismissal:
the LDP Sec. General not only the final tally in the Bondoc case
but also that he voted for Bondoc. On the eve of the promulgation 1. Forfeiture of retirement benefits
of the Bondoc decision, the LDP Sec. Gen. informed Camasura that 2. Perpetual Disqualification
the LDP had already expelled him for "party disloyalty." On the 3. Disqualified from other government offices
basis of this development, the House of Representatives decided
to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Cong. Note: But entitled to terminal leave and benefits already earned
Camasura to the HRET. The petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against Rep. Pineda, et al. Dropping of a public officer from the rolls:
and the HRET, praying the court to annul the decision of the
House of Representatives "to withdraw the nomination and to - If he has been absent without leave for more than
rescind the nomination of Camasura to the HRET"; to restrain 30 days
Rep. Palacol or whomsoever may be designated in place of Rep. - This is not a sanction from an administrative case
Camasura and to compel Camasura to immediately reassume and - There is no forfeiture of retirement benefits
discharge his function as a member of the HRET. - Possibility of re-employment
ISSUE
Whether or not the member of the HRET are entitled to RELATED CASE:
security of tenure
HELD GONZALES vs. CSC
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be 390 SCRA 124
non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality, and independence - even independence An action of dropping an employee is not disciplinary
from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty in nature. This means that such employee can still
to party" and "breach of party discipline", are not valid grounds avail of the retirement benefits.
for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. Thus, in the case at FACTS
bar, HR committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a Petitioner Jesus R. Gonzales was a Utility Worker II
violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against assigned in Pharmacy Section of the respondent Philippine
Camasura is, therefore, null and void. Children’s Medical Center (PCMC), a GOCC.
Members of the HRET are entitled to security of tenure Subsequently, he started absenting from his work
just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under without the approved Leave of Absence and without explaining
our Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be the reasons therefore. He was absent AWOL. The HRM Officer
terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the sent him a notice that in case he would not report for work, he
member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent will be terminated. But petitioner made no answer. For this, he
disability, resignation from the political party he represents in was dropped from service.
the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or ISSUE
removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by Whether or not Gonzales was legally dropped out from
the House for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has service
formally affiliated with another political group. HELD
YES, he was. Under Section 35, Rule XVI of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing EO 292 and Par. 21(b) of CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 12, Series of 1994, Officers and employees who are
absent for at least 30 days without the approved leave are
71
considered AWOL and shall be dropped from service after due Meanwhile, CSC affirmed the order dropping the
notice. But when the exigencies of the service require his respondents from the roll. CA, then, reversed the decision of the
immediate presence and he fails to return to the service, the head CSC reinstating respondents and ordered the payment of their
of office may drop him even prior to the expiration of the 30-day backwages. It was attested that no investigation was actually
period. conducted and that the respondents were not given an
An action of dropping an employee is not disciplinary in opportunity to explain their side and prove their defenses.
nature. This means that such employee can still avail of the Respondents aver that Dagadag has no legal personality
retirement benefits. to file the instant petition because he had ceased to be the
municipal mayor of Tanudan, Kalinga; and that the CSC, being the
aggrieved party, is the proper party to file this petition.
OTHER RELEVANT CASES: ISSUE
ROMAGOS vs. METRO CEBU WATER DISTRICT Who may appeal from the Decision of the Court of
G.R. No. 156100 (September 12, 2007) Appeals
HELD
Mental incapacity due to immoral or vicious habits Dagadag has lost his legal personality to interpose the
under Section 46, EO 292 is different from mental instant petition.
incapacity under Section 26, EO 292. CSC and the mayor of Tanudan are real parties in
FACTS interest in this case and, therefore, can contest the assailed joint
Metro Cebu Water District (MCWD) employed Vilma E. Decision of the CA before the SC.
Romagos as Clerk-Processor B. On August 9, 1999, MCWD barred The CSC is the party adversely affected by the
Romagos from entering the work premises unless she undergoes questioned Decision of the CA because it has been mandated by
psychiatric treatment and is certified by her doctor to be the Constitution to preserve and safeguard the integrity of our
mentally fit to work. Thereafter, MCWD informed Romagos that civil service system.
she was being dropped from the rolls for mental incapacity. As regards the mayor of Tanudan, there are two (2)
Romagos filed with the CSC Regional Office (CSCRO) a reasons why he may interpose such appeal. The first is rooted in
Complaint-Appeal, questioning the procedure and factual basis of his power to appoint officials and employees of his municipality.
her dismissal. The CSCRO dismissed the appeal holding that the Both respondents were appointed by petitioner during his
evidence cited by MCWD established that Romagos was mentally incumbency.
incapacitated. The CSC’s disapproval of an appointment is a challenge
ISSUE to the exercise of the appointing authority’s discretion. The
Whether or not the CA correctly held that there was appointing authority must have the right to contest the
proper procedure and substantial basis for MCWD to declare disapproval. Thus, Section 2 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum
Romagos mentally unfit to work and drop her from the rolls. No. Circular 40, s. 1998 is justified insofar as it allows the appointing
HELD authority to request reconsideration or appeal. Significantly, it
Mental incapacity due to immoral or vicious habits has not challenged the assailed Decision.
under Sec. 46 EO 292 is different from mental incapacity under The appointing authority stands to be adversely
Sec. 26 EO 292. The first carries administrative disabilities, while affected when the CSC disapproves an appointment. Thus, the
the second does not. But both result in loss of employment – a said authority can ‘defend its appointment since it knows the
property right protected under due process clause. While reasons for the same’. It is also the act of the appointing authority
petitioner at time of dropping from the rolls was suffering from that is being questioned when an appointment is disapproved.
protracted mental disorder, the same did not render her His right to appeal flows from the fact that his power to appoint
incapable of performing her work. There was incomplete cause to carries with it the power to remove.
drop her. She is reinstated w/payment of back salaries up to Where the petitioner (a public officer) ceases to be
reinstatement. mayor, the appeal and/or action he initiated may be continued
and maintained by his successor if there is substantial need to do
DAGADAG vs. TONGNAWA so. If the successor failed to pursue the appeal and/or action, the
(February 3, 2005) same should be dismissed.
Records show that upon petitioner’s cessation from
The appointing power is the real party in interest to public office, his successor did not file any manifestation to the
challenge the disapproval by the CSC of the effect that he is continuing and maintaining this appeal. Thus,
appointment Dagadag has lost his legal personality to interpose the instant
FACTS petition.
Dagadag was formerly the mayor of the municipality of
Tanudan, Province of Kalinga. Respondents Tongnawa and DEATH
Gammod are the municipal engineer and municipal planning and The death of the incumbent of an office necessarily
development coordinator, respectively, of the said municipality. renders the office vacant.
Respondents were found liable for insubordination,
non-performance of duties and absences without official leaves FAILURE TO ASSUME OFFICE
(AWOL). Respondents appealed to the CSC contending that their Section 11 of BP 881 provides: “The office of any official
right to due process has been violated. They were suspended for elected who fails or refuses to take his oath of office within 6
2 months. Their MFR was denied by the CSC and thus, they months from his proclamation shall be considered vacant, unless
appealed to the CA. said failure is for cause or causes beyond his control.”
72
FILING OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
Section 66 of BP 881 provides “Any person holding a CRONYISM – is a legal ground for the impeachment of a
public appointive office or position, including active members of President. This refers to the violation of his oath of office and
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the officers and employees unduly favoring a crony to the prejudice of public interest.
in GOCC, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from office upon
his filing of COC.” A verified complaint for Impeachment may be filed by:
Any member of the House of Representatives
RELATED CASE: By any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof
PNOC-EDC vs. NLRC
222 SCRA 831 (May 1, 1993) RELATED CASES:
74
FRANCISCO, NMMP vs. invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has
425 SCRA 44 sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money
raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a
Whether offenses in the impeachment complaint result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It
constitute valid impeachable offenses is a non- is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to
justiciable political question. all members of the public.
FACTS At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to
Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. This
Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given
poised in front of the Court was the constitutionality of the their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of
subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief
impeachment provided for by law. Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
ISSUE As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the
Whether or Not the filing of the second impeachment validity of any official action which he claims infringes his
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of
House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the
in the Constitution and whether the resolution thereof is a prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in
political question – has resulted in a political crisis. his office.
HELD The framers of the Constitution also understood
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached
Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the
controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate
the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete
methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate
permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint
interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution. does.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the To the argument that only the House of Representatives
controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section
the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading
means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo
of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with
sovereign people. "impeachment proceeding."
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the
balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment
to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by
given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives
There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint
upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be
is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be filed against the same official within a one-year period.
allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial
calibrated system of independence and interdependence that scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of
insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief
assigned to it by the Constitution. Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction
assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues
personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the
government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other
imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its two great branches of the government.
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a
indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all
been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and
is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or
of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle
right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has
personal interest. discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind
there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the
public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just
there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have
75
less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every RELATED CASES:
individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.
Thus, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment EVARDONE vs. COMELEC
Proceedings which were approved by the House of 464 SCRA 204
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Recall is a political question.
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 FACTS
of Article XI of the Constitution. Felipe Evardone is the mayor of municipality of Sulat,
Eastern Samar. Private respondent Alexander Apelado filed a
petition for recall against him.
RECALL [Sec. 69-75 of the LGC] This prompted Evardone to file a TRO with the SC,
- The termination of official relationship of an elective official for which was granted. Before the TRO was issued, a signing process
loss of confidence prior to the expiration of his term through the was already made by the people. However, COMELEC nullified
will of the electorate the signing process upon the issuance of the said TRO.
Evardone also assailed the ground of “loss of
LOSS OF CONFIDENCE – is the formal withdrawal by an confidence” as a ground to remove him from office.
electorate of their trust in a person’s ability to discharge his office ISSUE
previously bestowed on him by the same electorate. Whether or not “loss of confidence” is a sufficient
ground to remove Evardone from office
BY WHOM EXERCISED: HELD
By the registered voters of a local government unit to which the YES, it is. Whether or not the electorate of the
local elective official subject to such recall belongs. Municipality of Sulat has lost confidence in the incumbent mayor
is a political question. It belongs to the realm of politics where
INITIATION OF THE RECALL PROCESS: only the people are the judge.
By the registered voters of the local government unit. “Loss of Confidence” is the formal withdrawal by an
electorate of their trust in a person’s ability to discharge his office
(1) RECALL BY REGISTERED VOTERS – Recall of a provincial, previously bestowed on him by the same electorate. The
city, municipal or barangay official may also be validly initiated constituents have made a judgment and their will to recall must
upon petition by at least 25% of the total number of registered be afforded with high respect.
voters in the local government unit concerned during the election However, to hold an election on recall approximately 7
in which the local official sought to be recalled was elected. months before the regular election will be violative of the LGC.
PROHIBITION FROM RESIGNATION Generally: For those not related or connected with the
The elective official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed to functions of the office, the act or omission should amount to a
resign while the recall process is in progress. crime and conviction by final judgment of the crime involving
moral turpitude or disqualification to hold office, is a pre-
LIMITATIONS ON RECALL requisite for disciplinary action. In other words, where the crime
Any elective official may be the subject of a recall election only committed is not essentially connected with the performance of
once during his term of office for loss of confidence. No recall the official duties, the officer may not be proceeded
shall take place within one year from the date of the official’s administratively based thereon until final judgment of conviction
assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular shall have been rendered by the court of justice.
election.
76
The exception is when the crime or act committed also Nevertheless, the court found her conduct unbecoming
constitutes a violation of administrative rules; there no of a court employee and fined her P2000.
conviction is required.
REMOLONA vs. CSC
RELATED CASES: 362 SCRA 304
77
oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist 2. Charges involve dishonesty, etc.
and to counteract his evil acts and actuations. The private life of 3. Charges would warrant removal from office
an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. 4. Continued stay in the office may prejudice the
Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or case filed against
employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of
the service. DAYS OF SUSPENSION:
Dismissal is not too harsh a penalty. Although no Local elective officials – not exceeding 60 days
pecuniary damage was incurred by the government, as petitioner Appointive officials – not exceeding 90 days
posits, there was still falsification of an official document that Public officer charged under the Ombudsman Act – 6 months
constitutes gross dishonesty which cannot be countenanced,
considering he was an accountable officer and occupied a RA 3019 – preventive suspension is mandatory upon violation of
sensitive position. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for its provisions
Public Officials and Employees enunciates the State policy of
promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in APPEAL:
the public service. When allowable, shall be made within 15 days from the receipt of
the decision, unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION: filed, which petition shall be decided within 15 days
TWO (2) KINDS OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION OF CIVIL PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION – shall be based only of the
SERVICE EMPLOYEES WHO ARE CHARGED WITH OFFENSES following grounds:
PUNISHABLE BY SUSPENSION OR REMOVAL: Newly discovered evidence
The decision is not supported by the evidence on record
1. Pending Investigation (Section 51, Book V, Title I, Errors of law or irregularities have been committed
Subtitle A of RAC of 1987)
- Not entitled to back wages even if one is
subsequently exonerated PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65:
- This is not a penalty, but a measure to enable the
disciplining authority to investigate charges From the resolution of the CSC, the petitioner may file a
against the accused by preventing the latter from Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 (not Rule 45) to the SC
intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses within 30 days from receipt of copy of the resolution.
against him
Provisions on Summary Dismissal have already been repealed by
2. Pending Appeal (Section 47 of the same Code) – if the RA 6654, approved on May 20, 1988 and published in the Official
penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension Gazette on May 30, 1988. Thus, there must always be hearing and
or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated notice. An exception to this is when there is a waiver.
- To be entitled to back wages, one must be
completely exonerated of the charges against him RELATED CASES:
and the reason for his suspension is unjustified, GLORIA vs. CA
both must concur 306 SCRA 287
- Is actually punitive although it is in effect
subsequently considered illegal if respondent is There are 2 kinds of preventive suspension.
exonerated and the administrative decision finding FACTS
him guilty is reversed Private respondents were public school teachers who
did not report for work during a teacher’s strike. They were
SUSPENSION IS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE BY THE administratively charged with grave misconduct, etc. Result of
DISCIPLINING AUTHORITY TO PREVENT: the investigation showed all of them as guilty.
On appeal to MSPB, one of them was also found guilty
1. Concealing of documents and was imposed a 6-month suspension. CA ruled that they were
2. Harassing of witness entitled to back salaries “beyond the 90-days” of their
3. Using the office to meddle in the investigation or to suspension.
influence the outcome of the case Hence, this petition by DECS Secretary Gloria.
ISSUE
GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSION: Whether or not employees have the right to
Dishonesty compensation pending investigation
Oppression Whether or not employees have the right to
Grave Misconduct compensation pending appeal
Neglect in the performance of duty HELD
If there are reasons to believe that the (1) NO, the respondents are not entitled to back salaries
respondent is guilty of charges which would pending investigation even if they are exonerated. It is one of
warrant his removal from the service those sacrifices which holding a public office requires. Preventive
suspension pending investigation is not a penalty but a measure
REQUISITES OF SUSPENSION UNDER THE OMBUDSMAN ACT: intended to be able for the disciplining authority to conduct an
1. Evidence of guilt is strong unhampered investigation. For this reason, it is limited only to 90
78
days. The preventive suspension of CS employees charged with conducted a 2nd ocular inspection before issuing a Motor Vehicle
dishonesty, oppression, etc is authorized by the CS Law. It cannot, Inspection Report. Saril approved the registration of the vehicle
therefore, be considered “unjustified”. after payment of registration fee. The vehicle turned out to be
(2) YES, the respondents may be entitled to back stolen. The DOTC conducted an investigation and Rabang and
salaries pending appeal if eventually they are found innocent. Saril were charged with grave misconduct, gross negligence if the
This is so because preventive suspension pending appeal is performance of official duties and conduct prejudicial to the best
actually “punitive”. Hence, they should be reinstated with full pay interest of the service. Rabang was found guilty of gross
for the period of suspension. negligence by the DOTC Sec. and was suspended for 6 months
Under the existing jurisprudence, such award should while SAril was admonished. The CSC sustained the DOTC
not exceed the equivalent of 5 years pay at the rate last received findings but changed the penalty to dismissal from service. The
before the suspension was imposed. CA found Rabang guilty only for simple negligence and penalized
On the other hand, if the conviction is affirmed, the him with suspension for three months without pay but ordered
period of his suspension becomes part of the final penalty of his reinstatement and payment of his corresponding backwages
suspension or dismissal. and befits due him after he has served his 3 mos. suspension.
ISSUE
SALES vs. MATHAY Whether or not Rabang should receive payment of
129 SCRA 180 (May 3, 1984) backwages? No.
HELD:
Before a public official can claim back salaries, The Court held in Bruguda vs. Secretary of Education,
suspension should be unjustified or that the Culture and Sports that “the payment of backwages during the
employee was innocent was the charges proffered period of suspension of a civil servant who is subsequently
against him. reinstated is proper if he is found innocent of the charges and the
FACTS suspension is unjustified.” In this case, although Rabang is not
Being guilty of gross neglect of duty, petitioner Sales, a guilty of gross neglect of duty he is however liable for simple
clerk of the Bureau of Posts, was given a 6 months suspension. neglect. He is not exonerated from liability. Moreover preventive
During such time, he was not given any salary. He then claimed suspension pending appeal was not unjustified as it was to
for back salaries from Auditor General Mathay, which was protect public interest considering that he was charged with
denied. Mathay reasoned that Sales’ claim for back salaries “may gross negligence/gross neglect of duty and found guilty thereof
not be authorized for the reason that you have not shown that by the DOTC and the CSC.
your suspension for the period covered by the claim is The Court sustained the penalty of suspension for 3
unjustified, that you have not rendered service for said period, months without pay imposed by the CA for simple neglect of duty
and that you were not exonerated from the administrative since this is his 1st offense in 15 years of service. The CSC and
charges against you.” DOTC are ordered to reinstate Rabang however he is not entitled
ISSUE to payment of back wages during the period of time he was
Whether or not Sales is entitled to back salaries during considered to be on preventive suspension.
the period he was under suspension.
79
from the time he was formally notified of the case against him. Sandiganbayan found him guilty of the charges. Appeals were
However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his taken at the SC.
fault, neglect, or request, other than the appeal duly filed, the However, BP 195 was passed regarding the suspension
duration of such delay shall not be counted in computing the time of and loss of benefits upon any public officer against whom any
of termination of the case. criminal charges are filed for any offense involving fraud upon
(d) Any abuse of the exercise of the power of preventive government or public funds.
suspension shall be penalized as abuse of authority. Sandiganbayan suspended him.
Bayot contended that the application of said law upon
Section 64. Salary of Respondent Pending Suspension. - The him amounts to an ex post facto legislation and that he cannot be
respondent official preventively suspended from office shall suspended from his current position based on an act which was
receive no salary or compensation during such suspension; but done while he was in his previous position.
upon subsequent exoneration and reinstatement, he shall be paid ISSUE
full salary or compensation including such emoluments accruing Whether or not Bayot was validly suspended
during such suspension. HELD
YES, he was. The claim of petitioner that he cannot be
suspended because he is presently occupying a position different
Section 24, RA 6770: from that under which he is charged is untenable. The
amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent public
Section 24. Preventives Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under information under RA 3019 or for any offense involving fraud
his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the upon the government or public funds or property whether as a
evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of
or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges suspended from “office”. Thus, by the use of the word "office" the
would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's same applies to any office which the officer charged may be
continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. holding, and not only the particular office under which he was
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is charged.
terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than
six (6) months, without pay, except when the delay in the DELOSO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to 173 SCRA 409
the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case
the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the Indefinite suspensions are invalid.
period of suspension herein provided. FACTS
Petitioner Amor D. Deloso was the duly elected mayor
of Botolan, Zambales. A certain Juan Villanueva filed a complaint
Section 13, RA 3019: with the Tanodbayan accusing him of having committed acts in
violation of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) in relation to
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer the award of licenses to operate fish corrals in the municipal
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid waters of Botolan, Zambales and the issuance of five (5) tractors
information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised of the municipality to certain individuals allegedly without any
Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended agreement as to the payment of rentals.
from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall For this, he was suspended indefinitely.
lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is ISSUE
acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries Whether or not the indefinite suspension of Deloso is
and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless proper
in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed HELD
against him. NO. It would be most unfair to the people of Zambales
who elected the petitioner to the highest provincial office in their
RELATED CASES: command if they are deprived of his services for an indefinite
period with the termination of his case possibly extending
BAYOT vs. SANDIGANBAYAN beyond his entire term simply because the big number of
128 SCRA 383 sequestration, ill-gotten wealth, murder, malversation of public
funds and other more serious offenses plus incidents and
Suspension from office is not a penalty because it is resolutions that may be brought to the Supreme Court prevents
not imposed as a result of a judicial proceeding. the expedited determination of his innocence or guilt.
FACTS Clearly then, the policy of the law as mandated by the
Petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot is one of the several Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite duration. In this
persons accused in more than one hundred (100) counts of particular case the mere fact that petitioner is facing a charge
Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents before the under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a
Sandiganbayan. different rule of law. To do so would be to negate the safeguard of
In the meantime, petitioner ran for the post of the equal protection guarantee.
municipal mayor of Amadeo, Cavite. He was elected. Afterwhich,
80
LIBANAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN Sandiganbayan, the petitioner similarly claimed that the order of
233 SCRA 163 suspension, based on his indictment as a member of the
FACTS Sangguniang Bayan, could no longer attach to him, as he was
Petitioner Libanan is the incumbent vice-governor of already the duly elected and incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern
Eastern Samar and was a former member of the Sangguniang Samar. Rejecting his thesis, the Court explained:
Panlalawigan prior to the 1992 elections. He was charged in In Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, this Court rejected a
conspiring to other members to prevent and exclude Docena similar argument advanced by Governor Deloso
(Respondent), a qualified replacement of a deceased member, who, at the time of issuance of the suspension
from exercising his rights and prerogatives as a member of the order, was already occupying the office of governor
said body. In effect, the SANDIGANBAYAN issued a resolution and not the position of municipal mayor that he
suspending their respective public position and office for ninety held previously when charged with having violated
(90) days. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging the Anti-Graft Law. Prior to Deloso, in Bayot v.
three grounds: [1] Order of Suspension if executed shall affront Sandiganbayan, the suspension of then Cavite
the petitioner’s right for due process; [2] the suspension would Mayor Bayot was also sustained even as he was
assault his covenant to the people of Samaras their vice- charged for acts committed as government auditor
governor; and [3] the reasons sought to be prevented by the of the Commission on Audit.
suspension no longer exist. Petitioner contends that the order of The Court reiterated this doctrine in Segovia v. Sandiganbayan in
suspension, being predicated on his acts supposedly committed this wise:
while still amember of the Sangguniang Bayan, can no longer The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to
attach to him now that he is the duly elected and incumbent Vice- all persons indicted upon a valid information under
Governor of Eastern Samar. the Act, whether they be appointive or elective
ISSUE officials; or permanent or temporary employees, or
Whether or not the Order of Suspension given by the pertaining to the career or non-career service. It
SANDIGANBAYAN is valid? applies to a Public High School Principal; a Municipal
HELD Mayor; a Governor; a Congressman; a Department of
Yes. The Court ruled that the term "office" used in the Science and Technology (DOST) non-career Project
law could apply to any office which the officer charged might Manager; a Commissioner of the Presidential
currently be holding and not necessarily the particular office Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The term
under which he was charged. The suspension order cannot “office” in Section 13 of the law applies to any office
amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. which the officer might currently be holding and not
Public office is "a public agency or trust, "and it is not the necessarily the particular office in relation to which
property envisioned by the Constitutional provision which he is charged. (Emphasis supplied)
petitioner invokes.
Suspension pendente lite prevents the accused from committing
BERONA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN further acts of malfeasance while in office
435 SCRA 306 Petitioners’ other contention that there is no longer any
HELD danger that petitioners would intimidate prosecution witnesses
Section 13 of RA 3019 is so clear and explicit that there since two of the latter’s witnesses had already completed their
is hardly room for any extended court rationalization of the law. testimonies in court is also untenable. Equally futile is their claim
Section 13 unequivocally mandates the suspension of a public that Dr. Beroña’s suspension would deprive his constituents in
official from office pending a criminal prosecution under RA 3019 the Municipality of Pilar the services and leadership of their
or Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense highest elected municipal official to the greater detriment of
involving public funds or property or fraud on government. This public service.
Court has repeatedly held that such preventive suspension is These reasons cannot override the mandatory character
mandatory, and there are no ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’ about it. of Section 13. The possibility that the accused would intimidate
The purpose of a pre-suspension hearing is to witnesses or hamper their prosecution is just one of the grounds
determine the validity of the information. The court can then for preventive suspension. Another is to prevent the accused
have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office.
trial on the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension and Thus, we held in Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan that –
dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceedings that
impairs its validity. That hearing is similar to a challenge to the x x x, the fact that petitioner’s preventive
validity of the information by way of a motion to quash. In this suspension may deprive the people of Samar of the
case, the Sandiganbayan had determined the validity of the services of an official elected by them, at least
information in a pre-suspension hearing conducted for that temporarily, is not a sufficient basis for reducing
purpose. Hence, petitioners’ suspension is unquestionably what is otherwise a mandatory period prescribed
mandatory. by law. The vice governor, who has likewise been
elected by them, will act as governor. Indeed, even
Suspension pendente lite applies to any office the officer might be the Constitution authorizes the suspension for not
currently holding more than sixty days of members of Congress
Petitioners contend that the Sandiganbayan has no legal found guilty of disorderly behavior, thus rejecting
basis to suspend them because they are presently occupying the view expressed in one case that members of the
positions different from those under which the Information legislature could not be suspended because in the
charged them. We have long settled this issue. In Libanan v. case of suspension, unlike in the case of removal,
81
the seat remains filled but the constituents are Services recommended that Palmera be hired on a contractual
deprived of representation. basis The petitioner signed the contract but it was never
renewed. On November 21, 1991, Palmera filed with respondent
The period imposed by the Sandiganbayan is also in Civil Service Commission a letter-appeal for his reinstatement
accord with our previous rulings limiting to 90 days the period of with full back wages and without loss of seniority rights.
preventive suspension under Section 13. ISSUE
Section 13 reinforces the principle that a public office is a Whether or not the suspension was proper
public trust. Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer HELD
from hampering his prosecution by intimidating or influencing Yes. Preventive suspension is not a penalty but a
witnesses, tampering with documentary evidence, or committing measure intended by the disciplining authority to conduct an
further acts of malfeasance while in office. Petitioners’ last feeble unhampered investigation. In this case, although the Court
argument that the prosecution evidence is weak misses the point. ordered for his reinstatement, he may only be awarded
They lose sight of the fact that preventive suspension is not a backwages if he should be found out to be innocent of the charges
penalty. The accused public officers whose culpability remains to against him.
be proven are still entitled to the constitutional presumption of
innocence. The presence or absence of the elements of the crime
is evidentiary in nature, which the court will pass on after a full- PURPOSE OF PRE-SUSPENSION HEARING:
blown trial on the merits.
TALAGA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
RELUCIO vs. CSC G.R. No. 169888 (November 11, 2008)
(November 21, 2002) HELD
The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension
A civil service employee terminated from the service hearing is to determine the validity of the information so that the
and later found innocent of the charges, is entitled to court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed
back salaries. with the trial on the merits of the case, or withhold the
FACTS suspension and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the
Evelyn M. Relucio is a Community Affairs Officer IV of Iligan City. proceedings
She claimed that her
impairs
father,
its the
validity.
late Alberto
That hearing
Mansueto,
is similar
Jr., was
to aa World War
failed to obtain such. In 1982, EO No. 790 was issued granting challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to
and extending the veteran preference rating in civil service quash.
examination to any one child of a veteran. Thus, petitioner filed a In this case, Sandiganbayan had determined the validity
petition to avail of said preference rating in civil service of the Information when Talaga filed his Motion to Quash. The
examination, aware that the military service of her father was not hearings or proceedings held thereon, in effect, constituted a pre-
yet officially recognized by the PVAO. suspension hearing. Sandiganbayan has followed the dictates of
PVAO issued a certification stating that Alberto the law.
Mansueto, Jr., was a World War II Veteran and the CSC granted JUAN vs. PEOPLE
Relucio a Career Service Professional Eligibility. In a revalidation 322 SCRA 125
of their records to ascertain the truthfulness of the claims, CSC
and PVAO did not find the records of Alberto Mansueto. A preventive suspension of an elective public officer
ISSUE under Section 13 of RA 3019 is mandatory after the
Whether or not Relucio is entitled for backwages determination of the validity of the information.
FACTS
HELD Petitioner Rogelio Juan is a barangay chairman who was
Under the existing jurisprudence, a civil service employee terminated
accused
fromfor
theviolation
service and
of the
laterOEC
found
forinnocent
willful and
of the
unlawful
charges,use
is entitled
of to b
VHF Radio Transreceiver, and equipment owned by the barangay
PALMERA vs. CSC government.
182 SCRA 785 For this, he was immediately suspended by the RTC. It is
the contention of Juan that his case is not subject to Section 13 of
Preventive Suspension is not punitive in nature. RA 3019, which mandates the preventive suspension of indicted
FACTS public officials.
DPWH Secretary Vicente R. Jayme charged Palmera, ISSUE
along with several others, with grave misconduct and dishonesty Whether or not the suspension of Juan is proper
in two administrative. Thereafter, all the respondents were HELD
placed under 90-day preventive suspension Another YES, it is. A preventive suspension of an elective public
memorandum was issued by then DPWH Secretary Ferrer officer under Section 13 of RA 3019 is mandatory after the
charging Palmera, together with other respondents, with grave determination of the validity of the information.
misconduct and dishonesty., Palmera was again placed under In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension
preventive suspension. Palmera's second preventive suspension hearing held to determine the validity of the information that had
was lifted but he was no longer ordered reinstated. The been filed against petitioners, the numerous pleadings filed
petitioner alleges that it was while he was still under preventive against them have achieved the goal of the procedure. The right
suspension that he learned of Pacifico Mendoza's appointment to to due process is satisfied not just by an oral hearing but by the
his position. Palmera said he was repeatedly assured he would be filing and the consideration by the court of the parties’ pleadings,
appointed to another position but no such appointment was ever memoranda and position papers.
extended him. Instead, the DPWH Assistant Secretary for Legal
82
SANTIAGO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN to present a motion to quash the information on any other
356 SCRA 636 grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of court.
However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal
Courts have the ministerial duty to issue and order proceedings on the ground that the acts for which the accused is
suspension upon determination of the validity of the charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act
information filed before it. 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code,
FACTS should be treated only in the same manner as a challenge to the
A group of employees of the Commission on criminal proceeding by way of a motion to quash on the ground
Immigration and Deportation filed a complaint against Senator provided in Paragraph (a), Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of
Meriam Defensor-Santiago, as the then CID Commissioner. The Court, i.e., that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In
charge was for the alleged violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt other words, a resolution of the challenge to the validity of the
Practices Act. criminal proceeding, on such ground, should be limited to an
For this, Santiago was suspended by Sandiganbayan for inquiry whether the facts alleged in the information, if
90 days. Hence, this petition. hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of an offense
ISSUE punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on bribery of
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has the authority to the Revised Penal Code.
suspend a CID Commissioner It therefore suffices that the accused is afforded the
HELD opportunity of challenging the validity or regularity of the
YES, it has. The authority of the Sandiganbayan has both proceedings against him and that the information charging the
legal and jurisprudential support. It is but a ministerial duty of accused of any of the offenses mentioned under Section 13, R.A.
the court to issue and order suspension upon determination of No. 3019 is found to be valid before the court suspends the
the validity of the information filed before it. accused pendente lite.
However, it should be noted that the accused should be In the present case, the record shows that petitioners were
given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of given the chance to dispute the validity of the Information against
the criminal proceedings against him. Section 16 (3), Article VI of them and the January 17, 2001 Order suspending them for ninety
the 1987 Constitution (60 days) is distinctive from Section 13 or (90)-days while their case is pending when they opposed
RA 3019 (preventive, not a penalty). Montera’s motion for their suspension.
83
REASONS WHY SALARY OF A PUBLIC OFFICER CANNOT BE compensation of government officials and employees covered by
GARNISHED: the civil service under Article IX B, Section 5, viz:
Sec. 5. The Congress shall provide for the
1. The nature of a salary is that it is still a part of standardization of compensation of government
public funds or treasury. officials and employees, including those in
2. Prohibition of suit against the State, “Doctrine government-owned or controlled corporations
of State Immunity” with original charters, taking into account the
3. It would be contrary to public policy nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the
qualifications required for their positions.
Section 8, Article IX B, 1987 Constitution:
The salary received by petitioner during his stint at MECO
Section 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee appears to be way beyond that authorized by RA No. 6758,
shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law. For this
specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of reason, it is doubtful that petitioner’s employment with the
the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind MECO is embraced by the civil service. Otherwise, the salary rate
from any foreign government. received by petitioner from MECO would not have been legally
feasible, unless there was a law exempting the MECO from the
Salary Standardization Law.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional,
double, or indirect compensation.
RIGHT TO RETIREMENT PAY
ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION DOUBLE COMPENSATION Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public
- Public officer is given - a public officer holds two officer against whom any criminal prosecution
additional remuneration as an sets of public offices, thus, under a valid information under this Act or
ex-officio member receiving salaries from both under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
on bribery is pending in court, shall be
RELATED CASE: suspended from office. Should he be convicted by
VALDEZ vs. GSIS final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or
(June 30, 2008) gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is
acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement
Only full-time services with compensation are and to the salaries and benefits which he failed
credited for retirement purposes. to receive during suspension, unless in the
HELD meantime administrative proceedings have been
Relevantly, the last paragraph of Section 10 of RA No. filed against him.
8291 dictates that for purposes of computation of government
service, only full-time services with compensation are included: RELATED CASES:
CRUZ vs. TANTUICO
For the purpose of this section, the term service 166 SCRA 670
shall include full time service with compensation:
Provided, That part time and other services with Retirement pay cannot be made to apply to one’s
compensation may be included under such rules indebtedness.
and regulations as may be prescribed by the GSIS. FACTS
The case arose when an investigation of the anomaly
While petitioner invokes the proviso in the above-quoted revealed that it was the handiwork of a "syndicate" composed of
provision of law, the GSIS, which has been given the authority to employees of the Budget Commission and the Department of
include part-time services in the computation, has pointed out Education and Culture (DEC). Using falsified computations and
that the services in the MMSU, PHIVIDEC and as OIC Vice- service records, some sixty-eight (68) treasury warrants were
Governor of Ilocos Norte cannot be credited because, aside from issued and made payable to fictitious or "ghost" teachers in
having been rendered part-time in said agencies, the said Zamboanga del Sur.
positions were without compensation as defined in Section 2(i) Petitioner Romana Cruz as paying teller was impleaded.
of RA No. 8291. The auditor of the Bureau of Treasury decided to charge the
Petitioner’s insistence that the emoluments he received as check against Cruz. COA Acting Chairman Tantuico affirmed the
MECO director be the basis in the computation of his retirement decision. Thus, the check was charged against Cruz’ retirement
benefits, the same being the highest basic salary rate, is pay.
unavailing. Indeed, the salaries that he received at the time he ISSUE
served as MECO director were unusually high for any position Whether or not the retirement pay accruing to the
covered by the civil service. Petitioner received a monthly pay of public officer may be withheld and applied to her indebtedness to
P40,000.00 in addition to a P65,000.00 representation and travel the government
allowance and US$2,500.00 per diem for overseas board
meetings. The Constitution itself mandated the standardization of
84
HELD be exempt from attachment, garnishment,
NO. The retirement pay accruing to a public officer may execution, levy or other processes issued by the
not be withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative
government is settled. Section 624 of the Revised Administrative bodies including Commission on Audit (COA)
Code cannot be construed to authorize a deduction of the value of disallowances and from all financial obligations of
the treasury warrants from her retirement benefits. Said section the members, including his pecuniary
provides: "Section 624. Retention of salary for satisfaction of accountability arising from or caused or occasioned
indebtedness. — When any person is indebted to the by his exercise or performance of his official
Government of the Philippine Islands (or Government of the functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in
United States), the Insular Auditor may direct the proper officer connection with his position or work except when
to withhold the payment of any money due him or his estate, the his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is
same to be applied in satisfaction of such indebtedness." in favor of the GSIS.
Pension in this case is a bounty flowing from the
graciousness of the Government intended to reward past services It is clear from the above provision that COA
and, at the same time, to provide the pensioner with the means disallowances cannot be deducted from benefits under RA 8291,
with which to support himself and his family. as the same are explicitly made exempt by law from such
deductions. Retirement benefits cannot be diminished by COA
TANTUICO vs. DOMINGO disallowances in view of the clear mandate of the foregoing
230 SCRA 391 provision. It is a basic rule in statutory construction that if a
statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
Retirement pay cannot be made to apply to one’s literal meaning and applied without interpretation. This is what
indebtedness. is known as plain-meaning rule or verba legis.
FACTS Accordingly, the GSIS’ interpretation of Section 39 that
Petitioner Francisco Tantuico was appointed Chairman COA disallowances have become monetary liabilities of
of the Commission on Audit (COA). He secured his 1 st clearance in respondents to the GSIS and therefore fall under the exception
preparation for his retirement. stated in the law is wrong. No interpretation of the said
After the EDSA revolution, he relinquished his position provision is necessary given the clear language of the statute. A
thru a courtesy resignation and was replaced by Guingona. He meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the
also applied for his 2nd clearance for the said retirement. All the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein by
signatures were obtained except that of Guingona. From then, the construction.
clearance remained unacted. Moreover, if we are to accept the GSIS’ interpretation,
After the inventory of COA properties, it showed some then it would be unnecessary to single out COA disallowances as
missing properties. Thus, a re-audit was made. For this, Guingona among those from which benefits under RA 8291 are exempt. In
refused to release the other half of his retirement benefits. such a case, the inclusion of COA disallowances in the
ISSUE enumeration of exemptions would be a mere surplusage since the
Whether or not the half of Tantuico’s retirement GSIS could simply consider COA disallowances as monetary
benefits may be withheld to answer for the fiscal accountabilities liabilities in its favor. Such a construction would empower the
HELD GSIS to withdraw, at its option, an exemption expressly granted
NO. Regardless of petitioner's monetary liability to the by law. This could not have been the intention of the statute.
government that may be discovered from the audit concerning That retirement pay accruing to a public officer may not
his fiscal responsibility or accountability as former COA be withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the government
Chairman, respondent Guingona cannot withhold the benefits has been settled in several cases. In Cruz v. Tantuico, Jr., the
due petitioner under the retirement laws. Court, citing Hunt v. Hernandez,explained the reason for such
Well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are policy thus:
liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention
is to provide for the retiree's sustenance and comfort, when he is x x x we are of the opinion that the exemption should
no longer capable of earning his livelihood. be liberally construed in favor of the pensioner.
Pension in this case is a bounty flowing from the
GSIS vs. COA graciousness of the Government intended to reward
441 SCRA 534 past services and, at the same time, to provide the
pensioner with the means with which to support
Benefits granted under the GSIS Act (RA 8291) are himself and his family. Unless otherwise clearly
not subject to judicial and administrative processes, provided, the pension should inure wholly to the
including COA disallowances; exception. benefit of the pensioner. It is true that the
HELD withholding and application of the amount involved
The last paragraph of Section 39, RA 8291 specifically provides: was had under section 624 of the Administrative
Code and not by any judicial process, but if the
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and gratuity could not be attached or levied upon
Lien.- execution in view of the prohibition of section 3 of
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx Act No. 4051, the appropriation thereof by
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein administrative action, if allowed, would lead to the
as well as the benefits, sums or monies same prohibited result and enable the respondents
corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall to do indirectly what they can not do directly under
85
section 3 of Act No. 4051. Act No. 4051 is a later retiree from the System, which do not arise in the performance of
statute having been approved on February 21, 1933, his duties and are not incurred relative to his work. The general
whereas the Administrative Code of 1917 which policy, as reflected in our retirement laws and jurisprudence, is to
embodies section 624 relied upon by the exempt benefits from all legal processes or liens, but not from
respondents was approved on March 10 of that year. outstanding obligations of the member to the System. This is to
Considering section 3 of Act No. 4051 as an exception ensure maintenance of the GSIS’ fund reserves in order to
to the general authority granted in section 624 of the guarantee fulfillment of all its obligations under RA 8291.
Administrative Code, antagonism between the two Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, we find it
provisions is avoided. necessary to nonetheless differentiate between those benefits
which were properly disallowed by the COA and those which
The above ruling was reiterated in Tantuico, Jr. v. were not.
Domingo, where the Court similarly declared that benefits under Anent the benefits which were improperly disallowed,
retirement laws cannot be withheld regardless of the petitioner’s the same rightfully belong to respondents without qualification.
monetary liability to the government. As for benefits which were justifiably disallowed by the COA, the
The policy of exempting retirement benefits from same were erroneously granted to and received by respondents
attachment, levy and execution, as well as unwarranted who now have the obligation to return the same to the System.
deductions, has been embodied in a long line of retirement It cannot be denied that respondents were recipients of
statutes. Act No. 4051, which provides for the payment of benefits that were properly disallowed by the COA. These COA
gratuity to officers and employees of the Insular Government disallowances would otherwise have been deducted from their
upon retirement due to reorganization, expressly provides in its salaries, were it not for the fact that respondents retired before
Section 3 that “(t)he gratuity provided for in this Act shall not be such deductions could be effected. The GSIS can no longer
attached or levied upon execution.” recover these amounts by any administrative means due to the
The law which established the GSIS, Commonwealth Act specific exemption of retirement benefits from COA
No. 186 (“CA No. 186”), went further by providing as follows: disallowances. Respondents resultantly retained benefits to
SEC. 23. Exemptions from legal process and liens. – which they were not legally entitled which, in turn, gave rise to
No policy of life insurance issued under this Act, or an obligation on their part to return the amounts under the
the proceeds thereof, except those corresponding principle of solutio indebiti.
to the annual premium thereon in excess of five Under Article 2154 of the Civil Code, if something is
hundred pesos per annum, when paid to any received and unduly delivered through mistake when there is no
member thereunder, shall be liable to attachment, right to demand it, the obligation to return the thing arises.
garnishment, or other process, or to be seized, Payment by reason of mistake in the construction or application
taken, appropriated, or applied by any legal or of a doubtful or difficult question of law also comes within the
equitable process or operation of law to pay any scope of solutio indebiti.
debt or liability of such member, or his beneficiary, In the instant case, the confusion about the increase and
or any other person who may have a right payment of benefits to GSIS employees and executives, as well as
thereunder, either before or after payment; nor its subsequent disallowance by the COA, arose on account of the
shall the proceeds thereof, when not made payable application of RA 6758 or the Salary Standardization Law and its
to a named beneficiary, constitute a part of the implementing rules, CCC No. 10. The complexity in the
estate of the member for payment of his debt. application of these laws is manifested by the several cases that
have reached the Court since its passage in 1989. The application
Presidential Decree No. 1146, which amended CA No. 186, of RA 6758 was made even more difficult when its implementing
likewise contained a provision exempting benefits from rules were nullified for non-publication. Consequently, the
attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes. However, the delivery of benefits to respondents under an erroneous
exemption was expressly made inapplicable to “obligations of the interpretation of RA 6758 gave rise to an actionable obligation
member to the System, or to the employer, or when the benefits for them to return the same.
granted are assigned by the member with the authority of the While the GSIS cannot directly proceed against
System.” respondents’ retirement benefits, it can nonetheless seek
The latest GSIS enactment, RA 8291, provides for a restoration of the amounts by means of a proper court action for
more detailed and wider range of exemptions under Section 39. its recovery. Respondents themselves submit that this should be
Aside from exempting benefits from judicial processes, it likewise the case, although any judgment rendered therein cannot be
unconditionally exempts benefits from quasi-judicial and enforced against retirement benefits due to the exemption
administrative processes, including COA disallowances, as well as provided in Section 39 of RA 8291. However, there is no
all financial obligations of the member. The latter includes any prohibition against enforcing a final monetary judgment against
pecuniary accountability of the member, which arose out of the respondents’ other assets and properties. This is only fair and
exercise or performance of his official functions or duties or consistent with basic principles of due process.
incurred relative to his position or work. The only exception to
such pecuniary accountability is when the same is in favor of the
GSIS.
Thus, “monetary liability in favor of GSIS” refers to
indebtedness of the member to the System other than those
which fall under the categories of pecuniary accountabilities
exempted under the law. Such liability may include unpaid social
insurance premiums and balances on loans obtained by the
86
SANTIAGO vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT ISSUE
G.R. No. 146824 (November 21, 2007) Whether or not the Board of Directors of BOD are
entitled to receive benefits in addition to those authorized to be
COA can direct withholding of salary pending paid by their charter and the guidelines by LWUA after the
litigation of public officer’s liability. effectivity of the Salary Standardization Law
FACTS HELD
Santiago filed a motion for clarification of the NO. The Salary Standardization Law does not apply to
dispositive portion of the Decision in this case, which was directors of water districts because they are in fact limited to
promulgated on June 15, 2006. The dispositive portion reads: policy-making and are prohibited from the managements of the
districts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED in that The erroneous application of the law by public officers
respondent COA is authorized merely to withhold does not stop the Government from making a subsequent
petitioner's salary but not to apply it to the alleged correction of such errors. As already stated PD 198 expressly
shortage for which her liability is still being litigated. No prohibits the grant of compensation other than the payment of
costs. per diems, as determined by LWUA, to the directors of water
districts. Practice, without more, no matter how long continued,
She requested COA and the Municipal Mayor of Goa, cannot give rise to any vested right if it is contrary to law.
Camarines Sur, to pay her representation allowance, additional
compensation allowance, productivity bonus, year-end bonus, DE JESUS vs. COA (supra)
clothing allowance and other benefits, excluding her salary, from
October 1998 up to the present based on the dispositive portion QUERUBIN vs. COA
of the Decision. G.R. No. 159299 (July 7, 2004)
COA replied that the items requested cannot be paid to FACTS
petitioner because this Court has already clarified the issue when Pursuant to Resolution No. 313, series of 1995, of the
it stated in the body of the Decision that ". . . COA can direct the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), Querubin and
proper officer to withhold petitioner's salary and other others, Members of the Board of the BCWD, received benefits and
emoluments. . . ." According to COA, "emoluments" necessarily allowances such as Uniform Allowance, Rice Allowance, Mid-Year
include all allowances and any money due petitioner. Bonus, etc. However, disallowed by the State Auditor in his post-
ISSUE audit of BCWD’s 1999 accounts, on the ground that they ran
Whether or not COA can withhold the salary and counter to the provision of Section 13 of Presidential Decree No.
emoluments of Santiago. Yes. 198, as amended, otherwise known as the Provincial Water
HELD Utilities Act of 1973.
The Court ruled that COA can direct the proper officer ISSUE
to withhold petitioner's salary and other emoluments under Whether or not the allowances and bonuses granted to
Section 21, Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Book V of the Administrative petitioners are prohibited under Section 13 of PD 198. YES
Code of 1987, which is substantially the same as Section 37 of PD HELD
No. 1445. It was held in De Jesus that Section 13 of PD 198, as
It is noted that the to withhold the salary of petitioner is amended, categorically forbids the grant of bonuses and
in accordance with the COA Guidelines to the Examiner/Auditor allowances other than payment of per diems. De Jesus likewise
in case of a cash shortage contained in Chapter 3 of the COA declared that LWUA Resolution No. 313, series of 1995, which
Handbook on Cash Examination. grants compensation and other benefits to the members of the
The State Auditors' finding of cash shortage against Board of Directors of Local Water Districts, is not in conformity
petitioner municipal treasurer, which has not been satisfactorily with Section 13 of PD 198, as amended.
disputed, is prima facie evidence against her. The prima facie Accordingly, the Court sustains the disallowance of the
evidence suffices for the withholding of petitioner's salary, in monetary benefits granted to petitioners Members of the Board
order to safeguard the interest of the Government. of the BCWD in accordance with LWUA Resolution No. 313, series
of 1995. Having been granted said allowances and bonuses in
BAYBAY WATER DISTRICT vs. COA 1999, before the Court declared in Baybay Water District the
374 SCRA 482 illegality of payment of additional compensation other than the
allowed per diem in Section 13, of PD 198, as amended, they can
Practice, without more, no matter how long thus be considered to have received the same in good faith.
continued, cannot give rise to any vested right if it is Hence, they need not refund them.
contrary to law.
FACTS DE JESUS vs. CSC
The resident auditor of Baybay Water District 471 SCRA 626
conducted an audit of its 1994 accounts. In the course of the
audit, the auditor disallowed the payments of per diems (in No refund of benefits received in good faith.
excess of those authorized by Local Water Utilities HELD
Administration), RATA, rice allowances and duplication claims of Although neither the CSC nor the CA ordered them to
cash gifts granted to the DWD Board of Directors. refund the monetary allowances and benefits found to be in
The Board of Directors argued that the giving of such violation of Section 13 of PD 198, petitioners assert that they
benefits has long been a standing practice within the corporation. should not be required to do so, because they had received those
Hence, this petition. benefits in good faith. This issue has been settled in several other
87
cases beginning with De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, in which compensation or remuneration. The dispositive portion of the
this Court pronounced thus: decision reads:
ISSUES
“x x x. Petitioners here received the additional 1. Whether or not respondent has jurisdiction to moto
allowances and bonuses in good faith under the propio declare LWUA Board Resolution No.313 as amended by
honest belief that LWUA Board Resolution No. 313 Resolution 39 to be totally in conflict with Sec 13 of PD 198 as
authorized such payment. At the time petitioners amended.
received the additional allowances and bonuses, 2. Whether or not Sec. 13 of PD 198 as amended,
the Court had not yet decided Baybay Water prohibit petitioners’ entitlement to RATA, EME, BONUSES and
District. Petitioners had no knowledge that such OTHER BENEFITS and ALLOWANCES.
payment was without legal basis. Thus, being in 3. Whether or not Petitioners are liable to settle /
good faith, petitioners need not refund the refund the disallowed allowances, Bonuses andOther Benefits
allowances and bonuses they received but received by petitioners.
disallowed by the COA.” HELD
1. Petitioners contend that the COA lacks jurisdiction to
Considering that the instant controversy had also arisen declare whether or not LWUA Board Resolution Nos. 313 and 39
prior to the promulgation of Baybay Water District v. are consistent with Section 13 of PD No. 198, as amended, on
Commission on Audit, the present petitioners need not refund the matters pertaining to the compensation and "other benefits" of
allowances and bonuses they have already received in good faith. the Directors of the LWD. This is allegedly the function of the
courts. The Court has already settled this issue in a myriad of
BARBO vs. COA cases. Particularly, in Rodolfo S. de Jesus [Catbalogan Water
568 SCRA 304 District] v. COA, the Court upheld the authority and jurisdiction of
the COA to rule on the legality of the disbursement of government
No refund of benefits received in good faith. funds by a water district and declared that such power does not
FACTS conflict with the jurisdiction of the courts, the DBM, and the
Petitioners are officials of the Local Water Utilities LWUA. Citing Section 2, Subdivision D, Article IX of the1987
Administration (LWUA) and designated members of the Interim Constitution the Court declared that it is the mandate of the COA
Board of Directors of the San Fernando Water District (SFWD). to audit all government agencies, including government-owned
On December 4, 1995 and February 12 1996, the LWUA and controlled corporations with original charters. Indeed, the
Board of Trustees issued Board Resolution No. 313,Series of 1995 Constitution specifically vests in the COA the authority to
and Board Resolution No. 39, Series of 1996 respectively. These determine whether government entities comply with laws and
Board Resolutions authorized the Board of Directors of SFWD to regulations in disbursing government funds, and to disallow
receive reimbursable allowances in the form of Representation illegal or irregular disbursements of government funds. This
and Transportation Allowance (RATA), Travel Allowance, and independent constitutional body is tasked to be vigilant and
Extraordinary & Miscellaneous Expense (EME); Christmas Bonus; conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the
Uniform Allowance; Rice Allowance; Medical and Dental Benefits; government's, and ultimately the people's, property.
and Productivity Incentive Bonus. Pursuant to the said Board 2. A water district is a government-owned and
Resolutions, petitioners received EME, Rice Allowance, Christmas controlled corporation with a special charter since it is created
Bonus, and Productivity Bonus from SFWD during the calendar pursuant to a special law, Presidential Decree 198. It is
years starting 1994 until 1996.On June 30, 1997, a Special Audit undeniable that PD 198 expressly prohibits the grant of RATA,
Team of COA Regional Office No. III at San Fernando, Pampanga EME, and bonuses to members of the board of Water Districts.
audited the financial accounts of SFWD for the period covering Section 13 of PD 198, as amended, reads as follows:
January 1, 1994 to July 15, 1996. The COA Special Audit Team Compensation. - Each director shall receive a per diem, to be
disallowed the payment of the above-mentioned benefits and determined by the board, for each meeting of the board actually
allowances received by petitioners after the same were found to attended by him, but no director shall receive per diems in any
be excessive and contrary to Sections 228, 162 and 163 of the given month in excess of the equivalent of the total per diems of
Government Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM) and to four meetings in any given month. No director shall receive other
Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 954073in relation compensation for services to the district. Any per diem in excess
to Section 13 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198 (Provincial of P50shall be subject to approval of the Administration. In
Water Utilities Act of 1973) as amended. Thus, petitioners were Baybay Water District v. Commission on Audit, the members of
directed to refund the benefits and allowances subject of the the board of Baybay Water District also questioned the
disallowance. The Regional Director, affirmed the Special Audit disallowance by the COA of payment of RATA, rice allowance and
Team's Notice of Disallowance No. 97-004 (94, 95, 96). COA excessive per diems. The Court ruled that pursuant to PD 198,
denied the petition for review and affirmed the ruling of the COA members of the board of water districts cannot receive
Regional Director as contained in its First Indorsement. allowances and benefits more than those allowed by PD 198.
The COA stressed that the Directors of local water Construing Section 13 of PD 198, in Baybay, the Court declared:
districts (LWDs) were prohibited from receiving compensation xxx Under Section 13 of this Decree, per diem is precisely
other than per diems and that LWUA Board Resolution Nos. 313 intended to be the compensation of members of board of
and 39 were contrary to the law which it intended to implement, directors of water districts. Indeed, words and phrases in a
specifically, Section 13 of PD No. 198, as amended. Citing the case statute must be given their natural, ordinary, and commonly-
Peralta v. Mathay, the COA declared that the subject bonuses and accepted meaning, due regard being given to the context in which
allowances received by petitioners constituted additional the words and phrases are used. By specifying the compensation
which a director is entitled to receive and by limiting the amount
88
he/she is allowed to receive in a month, and, in the same The COA issued a memorandum directing all unit
paragraph, providing "No director shall receive other heads/auditors/team leaders of the national government
compensation" than the amount provided for per diems, the law agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations
quite clearly indicates that directors of water districts are which have effected payment of any form of additional
authorized to receive only the per diem authorized by law and no compensation or remuneration to cabinet secretaries, their
other compensation or allowance in whatever form. Section 13 of deputies and assistants, or their representatives, in violation of
PD 198 is clear enough that it needs no interpretation. It the rule on multiple positions, to immediately cause the
expressly prohibits the grant of compensation other than the disallowance of such additional compensation or remuneration
payment of per diem, thus pre-empting the exercise of any given to and received by the concerned officials,
discretion by water districts in paying other allowances and ISSUE
bonuses. Whether or not the petitioners should be disallowed from
3. While we sustain the disallowance of the above receiving allowances and per diems
benefits by respondent COA, however, we find that the SFWD HELD
affected personnel who received the above-mentioned benefits Yes, the petitioners should be disallowed. Since the
and privileges acted in good faith under the honest belief that Executive Department Secretaries, as ex-officio members of the
Board Resolution Nos. 313 and 39 authorized such payment. NHA Board, are prohibited from receiving “extra (additional)
Petitioners here received the additional allowances and bonuses compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an
in good faith under the honest belief that LWUA Board Resolution honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism,” it
No. 313 authorized such payment. At the time petitioners follows that petitioners who sit as their alternates cannot
received the additional allowances and bonuses, the Court had likewise be entitled to receive such compensation. A contrary
not yet decided Baybay Water District. Petitioners had no rule would give petitioners a better right than their principals.
knowledge that such payment was without legal basis. Thus,
being in good faith, petitioners need not refund the allowances BITONIO vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
and bonuses they received but disallowed by the COA. G.R. No. 147392 (March 12, 2004)
FACTS
Section 13, PD 198 as amended by RA 9286: Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director
IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the Department of Labor
Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended, is hereby and Employment. He was later designated to be the DOLE
amended to read as follows: representative to the Board of Directors of PEZA. As
representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA, the
petitioner was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he
"Sec. 13. Compensation. - Each director shall receive per attended during the years 1995 to 1997.
diem to be determined by the Board, for each meeting After a post audit of the PEZA’s disbursement
of the Board actually attended by him, but no director transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per diems to the
shall receive per diems in any given month in excess of petitioner.
the equivalent of the total per diem of four meetings in ISSUE
any given month. Whether or not Bitonio is entitled to receive per diems
for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors’ meetings as
" Any per diem in excess of One hundred fifty pesos representative of the Secretary of Labor. No.
(P150.00) shall be subject to the approval of the HELD
Administration. In addition thereto, each director shall It must be noted that the petitioner’s presence in the
receive allowances and benefits as the Board may PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as
prescribed subject to the approval of the representative of the Secretary of Labor. As the petitioner himself
Administration." admitted, there was no separate or special appointment for such
position. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from
DELA CRUZ vs. COA receiving compensation for his additional office or employment,
371 SCRA 157 such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the
Board only in behalf of the Secretary of Labor.
Representatives of ex-officio members of the NHA are In Civil Liberties Union case, the court ruled that the ex-
likewise prohibited from receiving per diems and officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of
other allowances the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no
FACTS right to receive additional compensation for his services in the
Petitioners, numbering 20, were members of the Board of said position. The reason is that these services are already paid
Directors of the National Housing Authority (NHA) from 1991 to for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal
1996. This petition assails the decision rendered by the office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance
Commission on Audit (COA), denying petitioners’ appeal from the attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member
Notice of Disallowance issued by the NHA Resident Auditor on thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation performing the
October 23, 1997. Such Notice disallowed payment to petitioners primary function of his principal office in defining policy in
of their representation allowances and per diems for the period monetary banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of
from August 19, 1991 to August 31, 1996 in the total amount of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled
P276,600.00. to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a
per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such
89
euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional WHAT MATTERS MAY BE SUBJECT AND NOT SUBJECT TO
compensation is prohibited by the Constitution. NEGOTIATION OR CBA:
SUBJECT NOT SUBJECT
DBM vs. MANILA’S FINEST RETIREES ASSOCIATION, INC
G.R. No. 169466 (May 9, 2007) - Matters that would
require expenditure of
FACTS - Scheduling of public funds (ex.
In 1975, PD 765 was issued, constituting the Integrated leave granted by Increase of salaries)
National Police (INP). law (ex. Maternity
In 1990, RA 6975, referred to as PNP Law, was enacted. or paternity leave) - Exercise of
Under said law, the PNP would initially consist of the members of management
the INP, created under PD 765. - Conduct of prerogative (ex.
In 1998, RA 6975 was amended by RA 8551. Among recreational activities Appointment,
other things, the amendatory law reengineered the retirement promotion)
scheme in the police organization. Relevantly, PNP personnel,
under the new law, stood to collect more retirement benefits - Terms and conditions
than what the INP members of equivalent rank, who had retired of employment (because
under the INP law, received. Hence, the INP retirees, spearheaded they are provided by
by the MFRAI, filed this petition. law – CS Law, Labor
ISSUE Code, others)
Whether or not the INP retirees are entitled to the
retirement benefits granted to the PNP retirees, by virtue of said RELATED CASES:
PNP Law or Republic Act No. 6975, as amended by Republic Act
8551. ARIZALA vs. CA
(September 14, 1990)
HELD
Yes. Pursuant to Section 23 of R.A. No. 6975, the PNP Government employees’ right to self- organize should
initially consisted of the members of the police forces who were be pursuant to the limitations set forth by the CSC
integrated into the INP by virtue of P.D. No. 765, while Section 86 FACTS
of the same law provides for the assumption by the PNP of the Under the Industrial Peace Act, government-owned or
police functions of the INP and its absorption by the former, controlled corporations have a duty to bargain collectively and
including its appropriations, funds, records, equipment, etc., as were otherwise subject to the obligations and duties of
well as its personnel. employers in the private sector. It was under the regime of said
The INP was never abolished or terminated out of Industrial Peace Act that the Government Service Insurance
existence by RA 6975. Instead, the INP was being absorbed by the System (GSIS, for short) became bound by a collective bargaining
PNP. Hence, members of the INP which include herein agreement executed between it and the labor organization
respondents are, therefore, not excluded from availing representing the majority of its employees, the GSIS Employees
themselves of the retirement benefits accorded to PNP retirees Association. The agreement contained a "maintenance-of-
under RA 6975. membership" clause. The Act also prohibited supervisors to
become, or continue to be, members of labor organizations
composed of rank-and-file employees, and prescribed criminal
RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION sanctions for breach of the prohibition.
The petitioners, Pablo Arizala, Sergio Maribao,
BASIS OF STRIKE- Provisions in the 1987 Constitution Leonardo Joven and Felino Bulandos, occupied supervisory
Article III, Section 8 – The right of the people, including positions in the GSIS. Demands were made on all four of them to
those employed in the public and private sectors, to resign from the GSIS Employees Association, in view of their
form unions, associations, societies, for purposes not supervisory positions. They refused to do so. Consequently, two
contrary to law. criminal cases for violation of the Industrial Peace Act were
Article IX-B, Section 2(5) –The right to self-organization lodged against them in the City Court of Cebu: one involving
shall not be denied to government employees. Arizala. and Maribao and the other, Joven and Bulandus. The
appellants moved for reconsideration. They argued that when the
Article XIII, Section 3(2) – The State shall afford full
protection to labor xxx. It shall guarantee the rights of so called "1973 Constitution" took effect on January 17, 1973
all workers of self-organization, collective bargaining pursuant to Proclamation No. 1104, the case of Arizala and
and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, Maribao was still pending in the Court of Appeals and that of
including the right to strike, in accordance with law. xxx Joven and Bulandus, pending decision in the City Court of Cebu;
that since the provisions of that constitution-and of the Labor
Code subsequently promulgated (eff., November 1, 1974),
repealing the Industrial Peace Act placed employees of all
categories in government-owned or controlled corporations
without distinction within the Civil Service, and provided that the
terms and conditions of their employment were to be "governed
by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations" and hence, no
longer subject of collective bargaining, the appellants ceased to
90
fall within the coverage of the Industrial Peace Act and should RTC ruled that the strike was illegal. CA affirmed. It
thus no longer continue to be prosecuted and exposed to further ruled that since SSS employees are covered by the CS
punishment for a violation thereof. They pointed out further that Law, SSS-EA does not have the right to strike.
the criminal sanction in the Industrial Peace Act no longer ISSUE
appeared in the Labor Code. The Appellate Court denied their Whether or not the SSS-EA has the right to strike
plea for reconsideration. HELD
HELD NO, they do not have such right. While the Constitution
Executive Order No. 180: and the Labor Code are silent as to whether or not government
The scope of the constitutional right to self-organization employees may strike, they are prohibited from striking, by
of "government employees" was defined and delineated in express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 series of 1987
Executive Order No. 180 (eff. June 1, 1987). of the Civil Service Commission and as implied in E.O. No. 180.
The right of Government employees to deal and SSS employees are part of the civil service and are
negotiate with their respective employers is not quite as covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum
extensive as that of private employees. Excluded from prohibiting strikes.
negotiation by government employees are the "terms and MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSN. vs. LAGUIO
conditions of employment . . . that are fixed by law," it being only 200 SCRA 323
those terms and conditions not otherwise fixed by law that "may
be subject of negotiation between the duly recognized Public school teachers have no right to strike.
employees' organizations and appropriate government FACTS
authorities." And while EO No. 180 concedes to government Petitioners and other teachers in other cities and
employees, like their counterparts in the private sector, the right municipalities in Metro Manila staged a protest rally at the DECS
to engage in concerted activities, including the right to strike, the premises without disrupting classes as a last call for the
executive order is quick to add that those activities must be government to negotiate the granting of demands. No response
exercised in accordance with law, i.e., are subject both to "Civil was made by the respondent Secretary of Education, despite the
Service Law and rules" and "any legislation that may be enacted demonstration, so the petitioners began the ongoing protest
by Congress," that "the resolution of complaints, grievances and mass actions.
cases involving government employees" is not ordinarily left to Because of their refusal to heed the “Return to Work”
collective bargaining or other related concerted activities, but to order, DECS Secretary filed administrative complaints against
"Civil Service Law and labor laws and procedures whenever them. They were all found guilty. Thus, some of the petitioners
applicable;" and that in case "any dispute remains unresolved were suspended while the others were dismissed.
after exhausting all available remedies under existing laws and ISSUE
procedures, the parties may jointly refer the dispute to the Whether or not the petitioners have the right to strike
(Public Sector Labor-Management) Council for appropriate HELD
action." What is more, the Rules and Regulations implementing NO, they do not have. This question was already settled
Executive Order No. 180 explicitly provide that since the "terms in a long line of cases.
and conditions of employment in the government, including any The petitioners' obvious remedy was NOT to halt the
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government- administrative proceedings but, on the contrary, to take part,
owned and controlled corporations with original charters are assert and vindicate their rights therein, see those proceedings
governed by law, the employees therein shall not strike for the through to judgment and if adjudged guilty, appeal to the CSC; or
purpose of securing changes thereof." if, pending said proceedings, immediate recourse to judicial
The petitioners appear to be correct in their view of the authority was believed necessary because the respondent
disappearance from the law of the prohibition on supervisors Secretary or those acting under him or on his instructions were
being members of labor organizations composed of employees acting without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
under their supervision. The Labor Code (PD 442) allowed discretion, to apply, not directly to the SC, but to the RTC, where
supervisors (if not managerial) to join rank-and-file unions. there would be an opportunity to prove the relevant facts
warranting corrective relief.
SSS-EA vs. CA Parties-litigant are duty bound to observe the proper
175 SCRA 686 order of recourse through the judicial hierarchy; they by-pass the
rungs of the judicial ladder at the peril of their own causes. SC is a
Employees under the CS Law are covered under the court of last resort. Its review jurisdiction is limited to resolving
memorandum prohibiting strikes. questions of law where there is no dispute of the facts or the facts
FACTS have already been determined by lower tribunals, except only in
SSS filed a complaint for damages against petitioners, criminal actions where capital penalties have been imposed.
alleging that, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal
strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, GESITE vs. CA
preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and G.R. Nos. 123562-65 (November 25, 2004)
SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the
strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor-Management FACTS
Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the Gesite, et. al are public school teachers of the E. de los
strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered Santos Elementary School in Manila.
damages as a result of the strike. Beginning March 1990, simmering unrest struck the
ranks of the public school teachers in Metro Manila. They pressed
for, among others, the immediate payment of their allowances,
91
13th month pay for 1989,etc. When their demands were not absence from, work which it was the teachers ’ duty to perform,
granted, the dissatisfied teachers resolved to take direct mass undertaken for essentially economic reasons.
actions. The public school teachers who went on strike are
On September 17, 1990, a regular school day, about 800 penalized not because they exercised their right to peaceably
teachers in Metro Manila did not conduct classes. Instead, they assemble and petition the government for the redress of their
assembled in front of the DECS offices to air their grievances. grievances, but because their successive unauthorized and
When their representatives conferred with then DECS unilateral absences produced adverse effects upon their students
Secretary Isidro Cariño, he brushed aside their complaints, for whose education they are responsible.
warning them they would lose their jobs for taking illegal mass JACINTO vs. CA
actions. 281 SCRA 657
The action of the DECS Secretary caused more teachers FACTS
to join the protest action. These included the above-named four Petitioners are public school teachers from various
petitioners who did not report for work. Hence, the DECS schools in Metropolitan Manila. Between the period September
Secretary filed administrative complaints against them for 17 to 21, 1990, they incurred unauthorized absences in
defying his return-to-work order. connection with the mass actions then staged; and on September
ISSUE 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño immediately issued a
Whether or notpetitioners, in joining the mass actions return-to-work order. They were administratively charged with
taken by the public school teachers, may be held liable for gross misconduct; gross neglect of duty, etc. for joining
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.YES. unauthorized mass actions; ignoring report-to-work directives;
HELD unjustified abandonment of teaching posts; non-observance of
It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction is that employees Civil Service law, rules and regulations; non-compliance with
in the public service may not engage in strikes, mass leaves, reasonable office rules and regulations; and incurring
walkouts, and other forms of mass action that will lead in the unauthorized absences without leave, etc.
temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.8 The right of ISSUE
government employees to organize is limited to the formation of Were the public school teachers penalized for the
unions or associations only, without including the right to strike. exercise of their right to assemble peacefully and to petition the
Here, petitioners, in joining the mass actions, failed to government for redress of grievances?
hold classes to the prejudice of their students. While petitioners HELD
have the right to assemble peaceably to air their grievances, Improper Exercise of the Right to Peaceful Assembly
however, they should have exercised such right in a lawful and to Petition for a Redress of Grievances. There is no question
manner. as to the petitioners’ rights to peaceful assembly to petition the
Their absences without authority caused adverse effects government for a redress of grievances and, for that matter, to
upon their students for whose education they are responsible. organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as
Clearly, their acts constitute conduct prejudicial to the best well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. Although the
interest of the service. Constitution vests in them the right to organize, to assemble
peaceably and to petition the government for a redress of
BANGALISA vs. CA grievances, there is no like express provision granting them the
276 SCRA 64 right to strike. Rather, the constitutional grant of the right to
strike is restrained by the proviso that its exercise shall be done
They were not punished because they exercised their in accordance with law.
right but because their conduct is prejudicial to the It cannot be denied that the mass action or assembly
best interest of public service. staged by the petitioners resulted in the non-holding of classes in
FACTS several public schools during the corresponding period.
Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among the
800 public school teachers who staged mass actions in 1990 to ALIPAT vs. CA
dramatize their grievances as concerning the failure of public 308 SCRA 781
authorities to implement certain laws concerning their benefits.
DECS Secretary issued a “return to work order” but Being found liable for a lesser offense is not
petitioners did not comply. Thus, they were charged with grave equivalent to exoneration.
misconduct, etc. and placed under suspension. FACTS
DECS Secretary found them guilty. CSC affirmed, except Petitioners are the 28 public school teachers in Metro
as to Mariano who was exonerated. Manila. They were among those who participated in the mass
Petitioners contended that the suspension was unlawful actions held and defied the “Return to Work” order issued by the
since they were not on strike but merely exercising their DECS Secretary.
constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the They were respectively filed with administrative
government for the redress of their grievances. charges for grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, etc. DECS
ISSUE Secretary found them guilty and were dismissed from service
Whether or not the petitioners were on strike. effective immediately.
HELD On appeal to CSC, the penalty was reduced to reprimand
YES, they were. The mass actions launched by the public for being found guilty only of violation of reasonable office rules
school teachers were for all intents and purposes a strike – they and regulations. CA affirmed the CSC decision. Thus, they were
constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or not completely exonerated.
92
Petitioners now claimed for backwages and that they strikers, being government employees, have no right to strike
were denied due process because of certain deficiencies in the although they may form a union.
DECS hearing. ISSUE
ISSUES Whether the petitioner, NPDC, is a government agency,
Whether or not the mass actions can be considered as or a private corporation, for on this issue the right of its
strike employees to strike depends.
Whether or not petitioners can claim backwages HELD
HELD NPDC is an agency of the government, not a GOCC. Since
(1) YES, it can be considered as strike. It has long been NPDC is a government agency, its employees are covered by civil
settled that mass actions, like in this case, amounted to strike in service rules and regulations (Sec. 2, Article IX, 1987
every sense of the term. Constitution). Its employees are civil service employees (Sec. 14,
(2) NO, they cannot claim. This is so because they were Executive Order No. 180). Thus, they have no right to strike.
not completely found innocent of the charges. Being found liable
for a lesser offense is not equivalent to exoneration. Still,
petitioners were found guilty only of conduct prejudicial to the RIGHT TO INFORMATION
best interest of the service.
Section 28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution:
DELA CRUZ vs. CA
305 SCRA 303 Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,
the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure
Exercise of the right to peaceably assemble must be of all its transactions involving public interest.
within a reasonable limits.
FACTS Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution:
Petitioners are public school teachers from various
schools in Metro Manila who were simultaneously charged for Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of
having attended a “mass action”, preventively suspended and public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and
eventually dismissed from service by the DECS Secretary. to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, etc. as well as
Upon appeal, MSPB ruled against them, hence, this to government research data used as basis for policy
petition. development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
ISSUE limitations as may be provided by law.
Whether or not the mass action can be considered as a
strike Exceptions:
1. In matters of state secrets (national
HELD security, secrecy of bank deposits)
YES, it is. It has long been settled that mass actions, like 2. Decision of courts prior to
in this case, amounted to strike in every sense of the term. The promulgation
right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for 3. Trade Secrets
redress of grievances must be exercised with reasonable limits so
as not to prejudice the public welfare. RELATED CASES:
The teachers were penalized not because they exercised GONZALES vs. NARVASA
their right to peaceably assemble but because of the manner by 337 SCRA 733
which such right is executed.
The right to information is a self-executory provision.
REPUBLIC vs. CA FACTS
(December 20, 1989) Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen
and as a lawyer, filed this instant case to compel respondents to
Employees of the NPDC have no right to strike. furnish him with the information regarding the Preparatory
FACTS Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR).
National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) was The PCCR was created by President Estrada to study
originally created in 1963 under EO 30, as the Executive and recommend amendments or revisions to the 1987
Committee for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.
and other national parks, and later renamed as the National Gonzales contended that PCR is a public office that only
Parks Development Committee under EO 68. It was registered in the law can create, not the President. Thus, President Estrada is
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a non-stock intervening in a process which he is totally excluded by the
and non-profit corporation, known as "The National Parks Constitution.
Development Committee, Inc." ISSUE
Meanwhile, two unions under NPDC, namely: the Rizal Whether or not Gonzales can invoke the right to
Park Supervisory Employees Association and Trade Union of the information in order for his request to be granted
Philippines and Allied Services staged a strike alleging unfair HELD
labor practices by NPDC. YES, he can. Under both the 1973 and 1987
Thus, there was filed a complaint against the union to Constitution, the right to information is a self-executory
declare the strike illegal and to restrain it on the ground that the provision which can be invoked by any citizen before the courts,
though Congress may provide for reasonable conditions upon the
93
access to information such as those found in RA 6713, otherwise Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the
known as the “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public present petitions provide an exception to the "moot and
Officials and Employees.” academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the
When a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the
public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to
the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the general ‘public’ which possesses the right. the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition
yet evading review.
NORTH COTABATO vs. GRP The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of
568 SCRA 410 agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF
Duty to inform; a duty of officialdom even if nobody back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be
demands. renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar
FACTS or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original.
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of That the subject of the information sought in the
the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of present cases is a matter of public concern faces no serious
their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed
a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA- of public concern. In previous cases, the Court found that the
AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of
in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Deeds, the need for adequate notice to the public of the various
The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the laws, the civil service eligibility of a public employee, the proper
MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public
petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the officials, the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth,
scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary and the identity of party-list nominees, among others, are
Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same. matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of
The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the
negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly
between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF affects the lives of the public at large.
peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out
Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3,
Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a
No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual
Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on matters refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present
disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the
MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated very concept underlying them, namely, the associative
signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated
Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to
unconstitutional. independence.
HELD The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of
strands, namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.
and Governance.
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or MORFE vs. MUTUC
controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to 22 SCRA 424
resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic
questions. The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual The Statement of Assets and Liabilities is not an
cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary infringement to the right of privacy.
in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will FACTS
not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of Petitioner Jesus P. Morfe filed a declaratory relief before
government. the SC assailing the constitutionality of Section 7 of RA 3019 or
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, The provision states that every public officer, either
the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and within thirty (30) days after its approval or after his assumption
intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping of office "and within the month of January of every other year
with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo. thereafter," as well as upon the termination of his position, shall
Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non- prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, a
signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP "true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities,
94
including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, The right to information is a public right and when a mandamus
the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the
of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year . requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that
Morfe contends that the provision is violative of due the petitioner is a citizen and therefore part of the general public
process and an unlawful invasion of the right to privacy and that which possesses the right.
it is an insult to the personal integrity and dignity of public In the instant case while refusing to confirm or deny the
officials. claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any
ISSUE provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the
Whether or not the law is valid petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service
HELD eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of
YES, it is. The Anti-Graft Act of 1960 was aimed at those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar
curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official examinations and licensure examinations for various professions,
corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public are released to the public.
service. It is intended to further promote morality in public Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service
administration. A public office must indeed be a public trust. eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore,
Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the
commands the assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called government employees concerned claim to be civil service
for norms of such character. The times demanded such a eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their
remedial device. professed eligibilities from the CSC.
By the provisions of the challenged section, it becomes
much more difficult by those disposed to take advantage of their EXEMPTIONS FROM COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE OF
position to commit acts of graft and corruption. While in the INFORMATION:
attainment of such public good, no infringement of constitutional
rights is permissible, there must be a showing, clear, categorical, CHAVEZ vs. PCGG
and undeniable, that what the Constitution condemns, the statute (December 9,1998)
allows.
The challenged statutory provision does not call for FACTS
disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a person Petitioner Francisco I Chavez (in his capacity as
to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship such taxpayer, citizen and a former government official) initiated this
a requirement possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes original action seeking (1) to prohibit and “enjoin respondents
very far in precluding assent to an objection of such character. [PCGG and its chairman] from privately entering into, perfecting
This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue of the position he and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late
holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the
emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further compulsory properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the
revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the statement of Philippines and/or abroad — including the so-called Marcos gold
the amounts and sources of income, the amounts of personal and hoard"; and(2) to “compel respondent[s] to make public all
family expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for the negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and all
next preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional documents related to or relating to such negotiations and
intrusion into what would otherwise be a private sphere. agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs."-Chavez is
the same person initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and
LEGASPI vs. CSC their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public
150 SCRA 530 treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's
economy; he says that what impelled him to bring this action
The public, through any citizen, has a right to verify were several news reports 2 bannered in a number of
the list of eligibilities from the CSC. broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items
FACTS referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of
Petitioner Valentin Legaspi requested for information Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss
on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between
sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to
government employees had allegedly represented themselves as split or share these assets.
civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations Petitioner demands that respondents make public any
for sanitarians. and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of
Respondent CSC denied the request on the ground that recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any
the petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi's actual interest compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves
in the civil service eligibilities. Thus, Legaspi filed a mandamus an issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a
invoking the right to information under the Constitution. "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be
ISSUE greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people.
Whether or not the request should be granted. Hence, the people in general have aright to know the transactions
HELD or deals being contrived and effected by the government.-
YES, it should be. These constitutional provisions are RESPONDENT ANSWERS that they do not deny forging a
self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which the right compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim,
to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is no
mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations
95
and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid
compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and test which can be applied. “ “Public concern" like "public interest"
conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a
binding. broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
Petitioner invokes Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because
people to information on matters of public concern shall be such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen.
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or
well as to government research data used as basis for policy importance, as it relates to or affects the public.”-As to whether
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such or not the above cited constitutional provisions guarantee access
limitations as may be provided by law. Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to information regarding ongoing negotiations or proposals prior
to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and to the final agreement, this same clarification was sought and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions clearly addressed by the constitutional commissioners during
involving public interest. their deliberations:
Respondent answers that the above constitutional MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions" which
provisions refer to completed and operative official acts, not to should be distinguished from contracts, agreements, or
those still being considered. treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the
ISSUE steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or
Whether or not the Court could require the PCGG to does he refer to the contract itself?
disclose to the public the details of any agreement, perfected or MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here, I suppose, is
not, with the Marcoses. generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a
HELD contract, and already a consummated contract, Mr.
The "information" and the "transactions" referred to in Presiding Officer.
the subject provisions of the Constitution have as yet no defined MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations
scope and extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact leading to the consummation of the transaction?
limitations within which the right may be exercised or the MR. OPLE. Yes, subject to reasonable safeguards on the
correlative state duty may be obliged. However, the following are national interest.
some of the recognized restrictions: (1) national security matters Considering the intent of the Constitution, the Court
and intelligence information- there is a governmental privilege believes that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as
against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding well as other government representatives; to disclose sufficient
military, diplomatic and other national security matters. But public information on any proposed settlement they have
where there is no need to protect such state secrets, the privilege decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-
may not be invoked to withhold documents and other gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite
information, provided that they are examined "in strict propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency
confidence" and given "scrupulous protection."(2) trade secrets or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the
and banking transactions-trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to stage when common assertions are still in the process of being
the Intellectual Property Code and other related laws) as well as formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is a need, of
banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of
Act) are also exempted from compulsory disclosure (3) criminal information in general, as discussed above— such as on matters
matters- Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations,
such as those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and intelligence and other classified information.
the detention of criminals, which courts neither may nor inquire
into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution. Efforts at NERI vs. SENATE
effective law enforcement would be seriously jeopardized by free 564 SCRA 153
public access to, for example, police information regarding rescue
operations, the whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on covert Right to information does not extend to “privileged
criminal activities. (4) Other confidential information. information.”
The Ethical Standards Act 31 further prohibits public FACTS
officials and employees from using or divulging "confidential or On April 21, 2007, the DOTC entered into a contract
classified information officially known to them by reason of their with ZTE for the supply of equipment and services for the NBN
office and not made available to the public." Other acknowledged Project in the amount of nearly Php6B and was to be financed by
limitations to information access include diplomatic the Republic of China. Several Resolutions regarding the
correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meetings and executive investigation and implications on national security and
sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal government-xto-government contracts regarding the NBN
deliberations of the Supreme Court. Project were introduced in Senate. Respondent Committees
In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., the Court emphasized that initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain
the information sought must be “matters of public concern," personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project.
access to which may be limited by law. Similarly, the state policy Petitioner was summoned to appear and he testified to the
of full public disclosure extends only to "transactions involving Committees for eleven (11) hours, but refused to answer three
public interest" and may also be "subject to reasonable important questions, invoking his right to executive privilege. For
conditions prescribed by law."- As to the meanings of the terms failing to appear in the other days that he was summoned, Neri
"public interest" and "public concern," the Court, in Legaspi v. was held in contempt.
Civil Service Commission, elucidated: “In determining whether or
96
ISSUES Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of
Whether Neri can invoke executive privilege; consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3,
Whether the invocation of executive privilege violate which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b)
Sec. 28, Art. II and Sec. 7, Art. III; and to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
Whether the Committees gravely abused their either house of Congress.
discretion by holding Neri in contempt. ISSUE
RULING Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public
The communications elicited by the three questions are officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
covered by executive privilege. Despite the revocation of E.O. President prior to appearing before either house of Congress,
464, there is a recognized claim of executive privilege. The valid and constitutional?
privilege is said to be a necessary guarantee of presidential HELD
advisors to provide “the President and those who assist him with No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is
freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of
and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain
unwilling to express except privately.” Furthermore, the claim information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in
was properly invoked by the letter provided by Executive pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition,
Secretary Ermita stating the precise and certain reason that the an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this
said information may impair the country’s diplomatic as well as case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to
economic relations with the Republic of China. outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a
The petitioner was able to appear in at least one of the particular case.
days where he was summoned and expressly manifested his Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from
willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If
exception only of those covered by his claim of executive the executive branch withholds such information on the ground
privilege. The right to public information and full public disclosure that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason
of transactions, like any other right, is subject to limitation. These therefor and why it must be respected.
include those that are classified by the body of jurisprudence as The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the
highly confidential. The information subject to this case belongs to executive branch to evade congressional requests for information
such kind. without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or
The Committees violated Sec. 21, Art. VI of the proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking
Constitution for having failed to publish its Rules of Procedure. said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid
Inquiries are required to be in accordance with the “duly of legislation is frustrated.
published rules of procedure.” Without these, the aid of Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides
legislation are procedurally infirm. that, once the head of office determines that a certain information
is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the
SENATE vs. ERMITA President’s authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official
488 SCRA 1 from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express
pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the
Doctrine of executive privilege which includes appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the
matters of diplomatic character under negotiation is President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.
only presumptive; exception. Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary
FACTS to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive privilege, as
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the
that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the
“Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in
Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to
Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. The
of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that
Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
unconstitutional. confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being,
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose
Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing
alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive that obligation in a particular case.
department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege,
Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive
Police (PNP). Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of
officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as the President", which means that he personally consulted with
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be
others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In
elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to
“Gloriagate Scandal”. exercise such power. There is even less reason to uphold such
97
authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not insofar as they impinge on petitioners' demand for access to the
explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.
is further invalid on this score. The Court held: “Applying the principles adopted in
PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential – since there
AKBAYAN vs. AQUINO should be 'ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is
(July 16, 2008) approved' – the offers exchanged by the parties during the
FACTS negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is
The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese
Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the sidelines of the Asia- representatives submitted their offers with the understanding
Europe Summit in Helsinki in September 2006 was hailed by that 'historic confidentiality' would govern the same. Disclosing
both Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a “milestone in the only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future
continuing cooperation and collaboration, setting a new chapter negotiations.”
of strategic partnership for mutual opportunity and growth (for It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the
both countries).” Philippine offers in treaty negotiations would discourage future
JPEPA which has been referred to as a ‘mega treaty’ is a Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views
comprehensive plan for opening up of markets in goods and during negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty
services as well as removing barriers and restrictions on negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where
investments. It is a deal that encompasses even our commitments negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of lesser
to the WTO. importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of
The complexity of JPEPA became all the more evident at greater national interest.
the Senate hearing conducted by the Committee on Trade and
Commerce last November 2006. The committee, chaired by PMPF vs. MANGLAPUS
Senator Mar Roxas, heard differing views and perspectives on (September 13, 1988)
JPEPA. On one hand the committee heard Government’s rosy HELD
projections on the economic benefits of JPEPA and on the other The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of
hand the views of environmental and trade activists who raised authority and expedition of decision, which are inherent in
there very serious concerns about the country being turned into executive action. Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is
Japan’s toxic waste basket. The discussion in the Senate showed its confidential nature. Although much has been said about
that JPEPA is not just an issue concerning trade and economic "open" and "secret" diplomacy, with disparagement of the latter,
relations with Japan but one that touches on broader national Secretaries of State Hughes and Stimson have clearly analyzed
development concerns. and justified the practice. In the words of Mr. Stimson:
ISSUES "A complicated negotiation …cannot be carried
1. Do the therein petitioners have standing to bring this through without many, many private talks and
action for mandamus in their capacity as citizens of the discussion, man to man; many tentative
Republic, as taxpayers, and as members of the Congress suggestions and proposals. Delegates from other
countries come and tell you in confidence of their
2. Can this Honorable Court exercise primary troubles at home and of their differences with
jurisdiction of this case and take cognizance of the instant other countries and with other delegates; they tell
petition. you of what they would do under certain
circumstances and would not do under other
3. Are the documents and information being requested circumstances… If these reports… should become
in relation to the JPEPA exempted from the general rules public… who would ever trust American
on transparency and full public disclosure such that the Delegations in another conference? (United States
Philippine government is justified in denying access Department of State, Press Releases, June 7, 1930,
thereto. pp. 282-284)
HELD
The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, xxxx
2008 its ruling on the case of “Akbayan Citizens Action Party et al
vs. Thomas G. Aquino et al” (G.R. No. 170516). The Highest There is frequent criticism of the secrecy in which
Tribunal dismissed the Petition for mandamus and prohibition, negotiation with foreign powers on nearly all subjects is
which sought to compel respondents Department of Trade concerned. This, it is claimed, is incompatible with the substance
Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al to furnish of democracy. As expressed by one writer, "It can be said that
petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic there is no more rigid system of silence anywhere in the world."
Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and the lists of the Philippine (E.J. Young, Looking Behind the Censorship, J. B. Lipincott Co.,
and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and 1938) President Wilson in starting his efforts for the conclusion
all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. of the World War declared that we must have "open covenants,
In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the openly arrived at." He quickly abandoned his thought.
JPEPA has been made accessible to the public since 11 September No one who has studied the question believes that such a
2006, and thus the demand to be furnished with copy of the said method of publicity is possible. In the moment that negotiations
document has become moot and academic. Notwithstanding this, are started, pressure groups attempt to "muscle in." An ill-timed
however, the Court lengthily discussed the substantive issues, speech by one of the parties or a frank declaration of the
98
concession which are exacted or offered on both sides would The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
quickly lead to a widespread propaganda to block the impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall
negotiations. After a treaty has been drafted and its terms are be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines
fully published, there is ample opportunity for discussion before is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside,
it is approved. but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
"x x x In this vast external realm, with its
important, complicated, delicate and manifold Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than
problems, the President alone has the power to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under
speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
makes treaties with the advice and consent of the nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and
Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of punishment, according to law.
negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and
Congress itself is powerless to invade it. As The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
Marshall said in his great arguments of March 7, effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
1800, in the House of Representatives, "The
President is the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, and its sole representative with Section 3, RA 3019:
foreign nations."
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts
or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law,
LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES: the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
Sections 2 and 3, Article XI, 1987 Constitution:
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the (a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules
and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on and regulations duly promulgated by competent
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the authority or an offense in connection with the official
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded,
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and induced, or influenced to commit such violation or
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but offense.
not by impeachment.
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any
Section 3. The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or
power to initiate all cases of impeachment. for any other person, in connection with any contract or
transaction between the Government and any other
A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any part, wherein the public officer in his official capacity
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a has to intervene under the law.
resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall
be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and (c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any
referred to the proper Committee within three session days gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote himself or for another, from any person for whom the
of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or
sixty session days from such referral, together with the obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for permit or license, in consideration for the help given or
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this
thereof. Act.
A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall
be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the (d) Accepting or having any member of his family
Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its accept employment in a private enterprise which has
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded. pending official business with him during the pendency
thereof or within one year after its termination.
In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is
filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by Government, or giving any private party any
the Senate shall forthwith proceed. unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
official more than once within a period of one year. or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or
99
government corporations charged with the grant of Section 7, RA 6713:
licenses or permits or other concessions.
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed
without sufficient justification, to act within a in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall
reasonable time on any matter pending before him for constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official
the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
person interested in the matter some pecuniary or
material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of (a) Financial and material interest. - Public officials and
favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in employees shall not, directly or indirectly, have any financial or
favor of or discriminating against any other interested material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of
party. their office.
100
(ii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of a gift in the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by
nature of a scholarship or fellowship grant or medical treatment; impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or
or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or
misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate
(iii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of travel proceedings. An official removable by impeachment cannot be
grants or expenses for travel taking place entirely outside the ousted by a disbarment proceeding. In order for the
Philippine (such as allowances, transportation, food, and lodging) Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction, the following must concur:
of more than nominal value if such acceptance is appropriate or (1) act must be in relation to public office, and (2) accused must
consistent with the interests of the Philippines, and permitted by be a high-ranking official.
the head of office, branch or agency to which he belongs.
The Ombudsman shall prescribe such regulations as may be DUTIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES:
necessary to carry out the purpose of this subsection, including
pertinent reporting and disclosure requirements. TWO-FOLD DUTIES
1. Owing to the public solely
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to restrict or prohibit any 2. Owing to an individual
educational, scientific or cultural exchange programs subject to
national security requirements. -- A public officer is liable for damages arising from the
performance or non-performance if the duty is owing to an
individual, if owing to the public, there is no liability on the
LIABILITY OF MINISTERIAL OFFICERS: principle of damnum absque injuria (there is injury and damage
NONFEASANCE: Neglect or refusal to perform an act but no wrong is committed) so long as the public officer acts in
which is the officer’s legal obligation to perform good faith.
MISFEASANCE: Failure to use that degree of care, skill
and diligence required in the performance of official Discretionary power vs. Ministerial power
duty
MALFEASANCE: The doing, through ignorance, DISCRETIONARY POWER MINISTERIAL POWER
inattention or malice, of an act which he had no legal - To act in a prescribed
- Dependent upon the sound
right to perform manner in accordance with
discretion or judgment of the
the law
public officer
GENERAL RULE ON LIABILITY:
A superior officer is not liable for the acts of a
- Mandamus cannot be
subordinate officer unless he has: - Remedy of mandamus will
invoked
lie
Personal knowledge of such act which caused injury
Conspiracy RA 6713 – CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS
Supervision and control over the subordinate but did FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES:
not exercise the same correctly
Under RA 6713, damage must be quantified.
No subordinate officer or employee shall be civilly liable for acts
done by him in good faith in the performance of his duties. Section 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees
a. Commitment to public interest over personal interest
However, he shall be liable for: b. Professionalism
Willful or negligent acts c. Justness and sincerity
Acts, which are contrary to law, public policy, etc. d. Political neutrality
e. Responsiveness to public
Even though he acted under the orders and instructions of his f. Nationalism and patriotism
superiors g. Commitment to democracy
h. Simple living
RELATED CASES:
IN RE: GONZALES Section 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees
160 SCRA 771 a. Act promptly on letters and requests
HELD b. Submit annual performance reports
It is important to make clear that the Court is not here c. Process documents and papers expeditiously
saying that its Members or the other constitutional officers d. Act immediately on the public’s personal transactions
referred to in this case are entitled to immunity from liability for e. Make documents accessible to the public, within
possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of reasonable working hours
Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the Court is
saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirement that Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions
must be observed before such liability may be determined and a. Financial and material interest
enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed b. Outside employment and other activities related thereto
from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under c. Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information
Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the d. Solicitation or acceptance of gifts
101
EO 292 allows head of agencies the authority to grant RELATED CASES:
government employees to engage in private practice provided PNB vs. GANCAYCO
there is no conflict of interest 15 SCRA 92
Section 8. Statements of Assets and liabilities Exception to the provisions of the Bank Secrecy Law.
a. Within 30 days after assumption of office FACTS
b. On or before April 30, of every year thereafter Defendants Emilio A. Gancayco and Florentino Flor, as
c. Within 30 days after separation from service special prosecutors of the Department of Justice, required the
plaintiff Philippine National Bank to produce at a hearing the
Section 9. Divestment records of the bank deposits of Ernesto T. Jimenez, former
A public official or employee shall avoid conflicts of administrator of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative
interests at all times. When a conflict of interests arises, he shall Administration, who was then under investigation for
resign from his position in any private business enterprise within unexplained wealth.
30 days from his assumption of office and or divest himself of his The bank declined the order of the prosecutors invoking
shareholdings or interests within 60 days from such assumption. the provisions of the Bank Secrecy Law.
Same rule shall apply where the public official or ISSUE
employee is a partner in a partnership. Whether a bank can be compelled to disclose the
records of accounts of a depositor who is under investigation for
unexplained wealth
UNEXPLAINED WEALTH OF PUBLIC OFFICERS: HELD
YES. This case is an exception to the general rule. Cases
Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution: of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these two classes of
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits
employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from the
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; policy as to the other. This policy expresses the notion that a
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its
discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as
Section 8, RA 3019 in relation to RA 1379: relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.
Section 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. If in accordance BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS vs. PURISIMA
with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered One thousand 161 SCRA 576
three hundred seventy-nine, a public official has been found to
have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in Exception to the provisions of the Bank Secrecy Law.
the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money FACTS
manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful Manuel Caturla is a special agent of the Bureau of
income, that fact shall be a ground for dismissal or removal. Customs. The accusation against him was filed by the BIR.
Properties in the name of the spouse and unmarried children of In the course of the preliminary investigation thereof,
such public official may be taken into consideration, when their the Tanodbayan issued a subpoena duces tecum to the Banco
acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank, commanding its
shown. Bank deposits shall be taken into consideration in the representative to appear at a specified time at the Office of the
enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law Tanodbayan and furnish the latter with duly certified copies of
to the contrary. the records in all its branches and extension offices, of the loans,
savings and time deposits and other banking transactions,
LAW ON SECRECY OF BANK DEPOSITS (RA 1405): appearing in the names of Caturla, his wife and their children.
Caturla moved to quash the subpoena on the ground
Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking that it would result to a violation of the Bank Secrecy Law.
institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds ISSUE
issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political Whether or not the imposition of the subpoena violates
subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as the provisions of the Bank Secrecy Law.
of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, HELD
inquired or looked into by any person, government official, NO, this case falls under the exception. Thus, the
bureau or office, except: subpoena can be imposed. The inquiry into illegally acquired
Upon written permission of the depositor property — or property NOT "legitimately acquired" — extends
In cases of impeachment to cases where such property is concealed by being held by or
Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or recorded in the name of other persons. This proposition is made
dereliction of duty of public officials, clear by R.A. No. 3019 which quite categorically states that the
In cases where the money deposited or invested is the term, "legitimately acquired property of a public officer or
subject matter of litigation employee shall not include . . . property unlawfully acquired by
the respondent, but its ownership is concealed by its being
recorded in the name of, or held by, respondent's spouse,
ascendants, descendants, relatives or any other persons.
102
To sustain the petitioner's theory, and restrict the It was further discovered that the client’s account was
inquiry only to property held by or in the name of the insufficient.
government official or employee, or his spouse and unmarried This prompts Union Bank to file a case against Allied
children is unwarranted in the light of the provisions of the Bank. However, both RTC and CA denied Union Bank’s request
statutes in question, and would make available to persons in for the examination of the said account number in the Allied
government who illegally acquire property an easy and fool- Bank.
proof means of evading investigation and prosecution; all they ISSUE
would have to do would be to simply place the property in the Whether or not Allied Bank can be compelled to submit
possession or name of persons other than their spouse and to the inspection
unmarried children. This is an absurdity that we will not ascribe HELD
to the lawmakers. NO, it cannot. The prohibition applies because the case
does not fall under any of the exceptions. Two other exceptions
MARQUEZ vs. DESIERTO are also added, to wit;
359 SCRA 772 In an examination made in the course of a special and
general examination of a bank that is specifically
In order for the Bank Secrecy Law to apply, there authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied
must be a pending case before a court of competent that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank
jurisdiction. fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being
FACTS committed and that it is necessary to look into the
Petitioner Marquez received an order from Ombudsman deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity.
Desierto to produce several bank documents for purposes of in- In an examination made by an independent auditor
camera inspection relative to various accounts maintained at hired by the bank to conduct its regular audit provided
Union Bank of the Philippines. The accounts to be inspected are that the examination is for audit purposes only and the
involved in fact-finding investigation by the Ombudsman against results thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the bank.
a certain Lagdameo.
Petitioner declined the order invoking the Bank Secrecy
Law. LIABILITY OF HEAD OF OFFICE:
ISSUE
Whether or not Marquez can be cited for contempt for ALBERT vs. GANGAN
failure to produced the documents as ordered by the 353 SCRA 680 (March 6, 2001)
Ombudsman
HELD The head of the office does not automatically become
NO. The following are the requisites before an in- liable for office- related offenses.
camera inspection by the Ombudsman may be allowed: FACTS
A pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction Community Mortgage Program (CMP) is a scheme in
The account must be clearly identified mortgage financing through the concept of community
The inspection must be limited to the subject matter of ownership. Under its financing procedure, application for loan is
the pending case coursed through duly accredited originators such as NHA and
The bank personnel and the account holder must be NGOs. National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NMHFC)
notified to be present during the inspection approved the CMP. An application for Purchase Commitment
Such inspection may cover only the account identified Line for AMAKO was submitted (P 36M) and was approved. It
in the pending case was discovered that the AMAKO project was 3 months in arrears
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation in their amortization. COA found petitioner as among the
before any court of competent authority. What is there is a mere persons liable for the amount representing the payment of the
investigation, a fishing expedition. Thus, the prohibition applies. loan proceeds obtained by AMAKO.
ISSUE
UNION BANK vs. CA Whether or not petitioner can be held liable
321 SCRA 563 HELD
The mere fact that a public officer is the head of the
The prohibition applies because the case does not fall agency does not necessarily mean that he is the party ultimately
under any of the exceptions. liable in case of disallowance of expenses for questionable
FACTS transactions of his agency. He cannot be held personally liable for
A check in the amount of 1 million was drawn against a the same simply because he was the final approving authority of
certain account with private respondent Allied Bank payable to the transaction and that the officers and employees who
the order of Jose Alvarez. The payee deposited the check with processed the same are directly under his supervision. It would
petitioner Union Bank who credited the amount to the account of be improbable for him to check all the details and conduct
Alvarez. physical inspection and verification. Every person who signs or
Upon clearing by the bank, it was discovered that the initials documents in the course of transit through standard
amount of 1M was erroneously encoded instead of P1,000.00 operating procedure does not automatically become a
only by the clearing house staff. Union Bank notified Allied of the conspirator in a crime which transpired at a stage where he had
discrepancy for the automatic debiting against the account of no participation. There is no evidence or record to show that
Allied. Allied refused to accept the charge slip since the petitioner had knowledge of the fraudulent scheme perpetrated
transaction was completed per Union Bank’s original transaction. by some employees of NHMFC. In fact, he filed a complaint
103
before the Ombudsman against the subordinate employees who This is the function of the PENR and CENR offices as mandated in
appeared responsible for the fraud. DAO No. 37, Series of 1996.
104
ISSUE CALUB vs. CA
Whether or not Larin can recover moral damages 331 SCRA 55
HELD
YES, he can. As a rule, a public official may not recover The Doctrine of State Immunity affording protection
damages for charges of falsehood related to his official conduct to a public official applies only to activities within the
unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice. scope of their authority done in good faith.
The test is “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless FACTS
disregard of whether it was false or not.” The DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles carrying
In the case at bar, there is sufficient basis for the award illegal-sourced lumber. The vehicles and the load of lumber were
of moral and exemplary damages in favor of a BIR Revenue taken by the team to a DENR office. Calub, a DENR officer, filed a
official where he suffered anxiety and humiliation because of a criminal charge against the drivers but they were later acquitted.
baseless prosecution by a taxpayer. Petitioner presented no Subsequently, the vehicle owner and one of the drivers filed a
evidence to prove that Larin extorted money from him. When the complaint for recovery of possession of the impounded vehicles
tax evasion case investigation was started against Bañas, Larin with an application for replevin against the petitioners, which the
was not yet the RD. Hence, there is sufficient basis for the award trial court granted.
of moral and exemplary damages in favor of Larin where he ISSUE
suffered anxiety and humiliation because of such baseless Whether or not the complaint for replevin against the
prosecution by the taxpayer. However, considering that the petitioners is a suit against the state.
awards is in favor of a government official in connection with his HELD
official function, it is with caution that the Court affirms granting Yes. Well established is the doctrine that the State may
moral damages, for it might open the floodgates for government not be sued without its consent. And a suit against a public officer
officials counter-claiming in suits filed against them in connection for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its
with their functions and lest the amounts awarded would make purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. However, the
the citizens hesitant to expose corruption in government for fear protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally
of suits from vindictive officials. This must be done cautiously. applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in
Otherwise, it would discourage citizens from filing against erring good faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption. In the
officers. present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to
account were performed by them in the discharge of their official
LANSANG vs. CA duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature. In
February 23, 2000 implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry
Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were
Doctrine of State Immunity does not apply where the performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR,
public official is being sued in his personal capacity. and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no
FACTS malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the
Petitioner Lansang evicted Gabi with malice and bad petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It
faith. However, there was no evidence of such abuse of authority cannot prosper without the State’s consent.
on record.
Gabi sued Lansang in his personal capacity. PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE INC. vs. LICHAUCO
G.R. No. 142362 (May 3, 2006)
ISSUE
Whether or not Lansang can invoke the Doctrine of Public officer cannot invoke immunity if complaint
State Immunity against him does not impose financial liability on the
HELD State but merely nullification of state action.
The Doctrine of Immunity from suit applies to FACTS
complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. (PASI) entered into a
performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be Memorandum of Understanding with the DOTC, on a planned
regarded as one against the State where the satisfaction of launch of Philippine-owned satellite into outer space. PASI
judgment against a public official concerned will require the State averred that while preparations for the launching were ongoing,
itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the respondent Lichauco, then DOTC Undersecretary for
amount necessary to pay the damages. Communications, allegedly “embarked on a crusade to malign the
On the other hand, the rule does not apply where the name of Michael de Guzman (PASI president) and sabotage the
public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are business of PASI.” Lichauco’s purported efforts against PASI
unlawful and injurious to the rights of the others. Neither does it culminated allegedly in her offering an orbital slot to other
apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his parties, despite prior assignment to PASI of the said slot. It was
official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts later claimed that Lichauco subsequently awarded the orbital slot
complained of may have been committed while he occupied a to another entity.
public position. Aggrieved, PASI and de Guzman instituted a civil action
against Lichauco and the unknown awardee of the orbital slot.
Note: The Doctrine of State Immunity” may only be invoked if the The complaint, alleging three (3) causes of action, was for
public official performs governmental functions. If the injunction (the award of orbital slot to another should be
performance itself is unlawful, the government cannot be held enjoined since the DOTC previously assigned the same slot to
liable. PASI), declaration of nullity of award (as it was rendered beyond
105
Lichauco’s authority), and damages (for maligning the name of de information for the same offense before the Regional Trial Court
Guzman and sabotaging the business of PASI). having territorial jurisdiction and venue of the commission of the
ISSUE offense.
Whether or not the suit is against the state. HELD
HELD No. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which amended Section 4
The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the of P.D. No. 1606 clearly indicates that offenses of municipal
performance of official functions against an officer of the mayors shall be under the Sandiganbayan. Therefore, the petition
government by a private citizen which would result in a charge is untenable.
against or financial liability to the government must be regarded
as a suit against the State itself, although it has not been formally
impleaded. However, government immunity from suit will not RA 3019 – ANTI- GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT:
shield the public official being sued if the government no longer
has an interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the OLD RULE: all violations under this law shall be
liability of the officer is personal because it arises from a tortuous cognizable by ordinary courts
act in the performance of his/her duties. NEW RULE: RA 7975, as amended by RA 8249
As to the first two (2) causes of action, the Court rules Jurisdiction of Ordinary Courts:
that the defense of state immunity from suit do not apply since Low-ranking officials, below Regional Directors, Salary grade 26
said causes of action cannot be properly considered as suits and below
against the State in constitutional contemplation. These causes of
action do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:
the State, but merely the nullification of state action. The prayers High-ranking officials, Regional Directors up, Salary grade 27 and
attached to these two causes of action are for the revocation of higher
the Notice of Bid and the nullification of the purported award,
nothing more. Had it been so that petitioner additionally sought
damages in relation to said causes of action, the suit would have ACT PUNISHING THE RECEIVING AND GIVING OF GIFTS OF
been considered as one against the State. Had the petitioner PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES:
impleaded the DOTC itself, an unincorporated government
agency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit would have been x x x it is punishable for any public official or employee, whether
considered as one against the State. But neither circumstance of the national or local governments, to receive, directly, and for
obtains in this case. private persons to give, or offer to give, any gift, present or other
valuable thing on any occasion, including Christmas, when such
BINAY vs. SANDIGANBAYAN gift, etc. is given by reason of his official position regardless of
316 SCRA 65 whether or not the same is for past favor or favors or the giver
hopes or expects to receive a favor or better treatment on the
The Sandiganbayan covers cases against Municipal future from the public official concerned in the discharge of his
Mayors despite the passage of RA 7975. official functions xxx
FACTS
The Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Exception (Section 14 of RA 3019):
Sandiganbayan three separate informations against petitioner
Jejomar Binay, The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying Section 14. Exceptions - Unsolicited gifts or presents of small or
petitioner's motion to quash. Petitioner's motion for insignificant value offered or given as a mere ordinary token of
reconsideration, which was opposed by the prosecution, was gratitude or friendship according to local customs or usage, shall
likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan. The resolution denying be excepted from the provisions of this Act.
the motion for reconsideration, however, was issued before the
petitioner could file a reply to the prosecution's opposition to the
motion for reconsideration. Republic Act Nos. 7975 [An Act to DISABILITIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES:
Strengthen the Functional and Structural Organization of the
Sandiganbayan, amending for that Purpose Presidential Decree Section 7, Article IX-B, 1987 Constitution:
No. 1606, as amended.] and 8249 [An Act Further Defining the
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the purpose Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, Providing Funds designation in any capacity to any public office or position during
Therefor, and for Other Purposes.] Whether the Sandiganbayan, his tenure.
under these laws, exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over
criminal cases involving municipal mayors accused of violations Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of
of Republic Act No. 3019 [Otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
Corrupt Practices Act.] and Article 220 of the Revised Penal employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
Code5 [Illegal use of public finds or property.] is the central issue instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or
in these consolidated petitions. controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had been ousted of While under Sec. 7, Article IX-B all other appointive
its jurisdiction over the case of municipal mayor after the passage officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office
of Republic Act No. 7975, coupled with the filing earlier of an or employment in the government during their tenure
106
when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof
of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies increased during the term for which he was elected.
and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized [FORBIDDEN OFFICE] (Article VI Sec. 13)
by the Constitution itself. In other words, Sec. 7, Article IX-
B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
elective and appointive officials and employees, while Sec. personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before
13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative
to the President, Vice-President, Cabinet members, their bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested
deputies and assistants (National Amnesty Commission financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special
vs. COA, 437 SCRA 655) privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office.
Section 7, Article IX-B, 1987 Constitution: He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called
Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or upon to act on account of his office. (Article VI, Sec. 14)
designation in any capacity to any public office or position during
his tenure.
No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.
his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or [Article IX-B, Sec. 2 (4)]
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or RELATED CASES:
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION vs. COA (supra)
107
proscription against appointment or designation of elective RAMOS vs. IMBANG
officials to other government posts 530 SCRA 759
HELD FACTS
YES, it violated the proscription in the Constitution. It is Complainant Ramos sought the assistance of Atty.
further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against Jovellanos. She
position of Mayor of Olongapo City, hence, an excepted gave respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a
circumstance, citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, receipt for P5,000 only. Subsequently, Ramos found out that
where we stated that the prohibition against the holding of any respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that
other office or employment by the President, Vice-President, he was in face employed in the Public Attorney’s Office.
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants during ISSUE
their tenure, as provided in Sec. 13, Art. VII, of the Constitution, Whether or not a PAO lawyer can engage in private
does not comprehend additional duties and functions required by practice of law.
the primary functions of the officials concerned, who are to HELD
perform them in an ex officio capacity as provided by law, No. Government employees are expected to devote
without receiving any additional compensation therefor. themselves completely to public service. For this reason, the
This argument is apparently based on a wrong premise. private practice of profession is prohibited.
Congress did not contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as Lawyers in government service cannot handle private
ex officio or automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of cases for they are expected to devote themselves full-time to the
Olongapo City without need of appointment. The phrase "shall be work of their respective offices.
appointed" unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted
posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of attorney's fees from the complainant as this was inconsistent
Olongapo City. Had it been the legislative intent to make the with the office's mission. Respondent violated the prohibition
subject positions ex officio, Congress would have, at least, against accepting legal fees other than his salary.
avoided the word "appointed" and, instead, "ex officio" would
have been used. QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE
A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC
LORENZANA vs. FAJARDO HELD
A.C. No. 5712 (June 29, 2005) A clerk of court can already engage in the practice of
FACTS law immediately after her separation from the service and
Lorenzana filed a complaint against Atty. Fajardo with without any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions
violation of the Civil Service Law and Canon 6 of the Code of under Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of court’s limitation is
Professional Responsibility and seeks his disbarment from the that she cannot practice her profession within one year before
practice of the law profession. The complaint alleged that the the office where he or she used to work with. In a comparison
respondent, while employed as Legal Officer V at the Urban between a resigned, retired or separated official or employee, on
Settlement Office in Manila, was a member of the PLEB of Quezon the one hand, and an incumbent official or employee, on the
City and a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Brgy. other, the former has the advantage because the limitation is only
Novaliches Proper. The complaint also alleged that Atty. Fajardo with respect to the office he or she used to work with and only
was engaged in the private practice of law. for a period of one year. The incumbent cannot practice at all,
ISSUE save only where specifically allowed by the Constitution and
Whether or not Atty. Fajardo violated the law. the law and only in areas where no conflict of interests
HELD exists.
Yes. Respondent failed to establish that his primary
functions as Legal Officer of the Manila Urban Settlements Office
allow his appointment as PLEB member, an exception to dual Other Pertinent Provisions:
appointment prohibited by the Constitution and the statutes.
Indeed, respondent, in accepting such appointment, has R.A. No. 7160 or Local Government Code
transgressed the Constitution, the Administrative Code of
1987, and the Local Government Code of 1991. Being contra Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. -
leges, respondent also violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Attorney’s Oath. (a) It shall be unlawful for any local government official or
Respondent cannot justify his practice of law by employee, directly or indirectly, to:
claiming that his office (the Manila Urban Resettlement) is “not
really strict when it comes to appearing in some private cases as (1) Engage in any business transaction with the local
they (employees) were sometimes called to render service even government unit in which he is an official or employee or over
on holidays without additional compensation.” At most, he which he has the power of supervision, or with any of its
should have asked written permission from his chief as required authorized boards, officials, agents, or attorneys, whereby money
by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules that is to be paid, or property or any other thing of value is to be
“(n)o officer or employee shall engage directly in any private transferred, directly or indirectly, out of the resources of the local
business, vocation or profession or be connected with any government unit to such person or firm;
commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without
a written permission from the head of the Department.” (2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games
licensed by a local government unit;
108
(3) Purchase any real estate or other property forfeited in
favor of such local government unit for unpaid taxes or
assessment, or by virtue of a legal process at the instance of the
said local government unit;
-END OF PART I-
109
Part II: PUBLIC CORPORATION (2) The power may also be exercised by the LGU under
Section 6 of the LGC. Cities or provinces may create barangays,
but has no power to create municipalities (territorial
KINDS OF CORPORATIONS: subdivisions other than the barangay is vested with the
PRIVATE – for the benefit of the stockholders thereof Congress).
and its members
- For personal ends; private gains of members Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local government
PUBLIC – for the carrying out of governmental or unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
sovereign functions boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by
- For public purpose Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other
QUASI-PUBLIC – a private corporation which provides political subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the sangguniang
for public needs panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned in the case
of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to
TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A CORPORATION IS A such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code.
PRIVATE OR PUBLIC: (Section 6, LGC)
The relation of the corporation to the State, the functions they
perform and the power they possess
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS FOR THE CREATION OF A
KINDS OF PUBLIC CORPORATION: MUNICIPALITY:
1. Income
A. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION – 2. Territory
Has a two-fold objective: 3. Population
1. To carry out governmental function (ex: power to tax) 4. Corporate name
2. As an agency of the inhabitants of the community to 5. Approval of the vote of majority in a plebiscite in the
regulate local affairs (similar to a business enterprise) units directly affected
Has a two-fold character: EFFECT OF CREATION: annexed corporation is now part and
1. As a body politics, it assumes governmental task parcel of the annexing corporation
(sovereign)
2. As a body corporate, it is similar to a business Conflict of boundaries between municipal corporations
enterprise (proprietary) is administrative in nature. It must be settled jointly by the
3. Sanggunian of both municipal corporations.
Note: The state is prohibited to take over such enterprises,
however, may regulate the same through a valid exercise of Sections 118 and 119 of the Local Government Code
police power. provides the following:
B. QUASI-CORPORATION – has a limited and narrow Section 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of
purpose, that is, to assist the State in carrying out its Boundary Dispute – Boundary dispute between and among local
governmental tasks government units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably.
To this end:
Municipal corporation vs. Quasi-corporation (a) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in
the same city or municipality shall be referred for settlement to
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION QUASI-CORPORATION the Sangguniang Panglungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned.
- Has the element of a local - Absence of local government, (b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities
government unit has the element of self- within the same province shall be referred for settlement to the
government Sangguniang Panlalawigan concerned.
- Separate personality (c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component
- Established for a limited cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred for
purpose settlement to the Sanggunians of the provinces concerned.
(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or
municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the
other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly
POWER TO CREATE MUNICIPALITIES:
referred for settlement to the respective Sanggunians of the
parties.
(1) The power to create is generally vested in Congress.
(e) In the event the Sanggunian fails to effect an amicable
According to Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, no province,
settlement within 60 days from the date the dispute was referred
city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter, the
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
dispute shall be formally tried by the Sanggunian concerned
accordance with the criteria established in the local government
which shall decide the issue within 60 days from the date of the
code and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in
certification referred to above.
a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
110
Section 119. Appeal – Within the time and manner prescribed by Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities
the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of the and barangays within the ARMM. There is no provision in the
Sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional
jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The Regional Trial Court legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and
shall decide the appeal within one (1) year from the filing thereof. barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is
Pending final resolution of the disputed area prior to the dispute followed.
shall be maintained and continued for all legal purposes. However, insofar as it grants to ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, it is against
RELATED CASES: Sec. 5, Art. Vl and Sec. 20, Art. X of Constitution. The power to
TAN vs. COMELEC create a province or city inherently involves the power to create
142 SCRA 727 a legislative district, which is a power only Congress can exercise.
Hence, the creation of Shariff Kabunsuan Province is
“Political units affected” include the mother province unconstitutional.
and the new unit.
FACTS BAGABUYO vs. COMELEC
Because of the enactment of BP 885 — An Act Creating G.R. No. 176970 (December 8, 2008)
a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the FACTS
Province of Negros del Norte, Petitioners, who are residents of Cagayan de Oro's then Congressman Constantino G.
the Province of Negros Occidental, filed the case for the purpose Jaraula filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859 and eventually
of stopping respondent COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite became Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371. The said law increased the
which, pursuant to and in implementation of the aforesaid law. Cagayan de Oro’s legislative district from one to two. COMELEC
Petitioners contend that the law is unconstitutional and promulgated a resolution implementing the said law for election
it is not in complete accord with the LGC. The plebiscite was purposes. Bagabuyo filed a petition against COMELEC arguing
confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros del that the law cannot be implemented without having a plebiscite
Norte and excluded the voters from the rest of the province of of which is indispensable for the division and conversion of a
Negros Occidental. local government unit.
ISSUE ISSUE
Whether or not the plebiscite held is valid Whether or not there is a need for a plebiscite to
HELD implement the law. No.
NO, it is void. It can be plainly seen that the aforecited HELD
constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be first Creation, division, merger, abolition, and alteration of
obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in boundaries under Art. X Sec. 10 requires the commencement of a
the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, plebiscite whereas the legislative apportionment or
divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the reapportionment under Art. VI, Sec.5 does not need a plebiscite.
boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries Both provisions mentioned above are within the vested authority
of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily of the legislature. The Legislature undertakes the apportionment
be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries and reapportionment of legislative districts, and likewise acts on
in order that there can be created the proposed new province of local government units by setting standards for their creation,
Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries and by
two political units would be affected. The first would be the actually creating, dividing,merging, abolishing local government
parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries units and altering their boundaries through legislation.
would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would The legislative district under Article VI, Section 5, is not
be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother a political subdivision through which functions of government
province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte. are carried out. Neither is it a corporate unit. A legislative district
BP 885 is thus unconstitutional. merely delineates the areas occupied by the people who will
choose a representative in their national affairs. In the case at
SEMA vs. COMELEC bar, no division of CDO city takes place or is mandated. CDO city
G.R. No. 177597 (July 16, 2008) politically remains a single unit and its administration is not
divided along territorial line. Its territory remains completely
FACTS whole and intact; there is only the addition of another legislative
ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, district and the delineation of the city into two districts for
exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article purposes of representation in the House of Representatives.
VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 Thus, Art. X, Sec.10 of the Constitution does not come
(MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion
composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Cagayan de Oro into two districts
Maguindanao.
ISSUE LEAGUE OF CITIES vs. COMELEC
Whether or not Sec. 19, Art VI of RA 9054 is (February 15, 2011)
constitutional. FACTS
HELD RA No. 9009 which amended Section 450 of the LGC
Yes, insofar as the delegation of the power to create increased the annual income requirement for conversion into a
municipalities & barangays, provided. Under Section 19, Article city from P20 million to P100 million. Five years later, 16 new
VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional cities were created by Congress, exempting them from the P100M
111
income requirement in RA 9009. Considering Sec. 10, Art. X Tomas to speak of. It has no right to assert, no cause of action, no
requiring the LGU created to be in accord with the criteria corporate existence at all, and it must perforce remain part and
established “in the local government code, is the exemption parcel of Kapalong. Based on this premise, it submits that
valid? respondent Judge should have dismissed the case.
HELD ISSUE
Yes. Consistent with its plenary legislative power, Whether or not Municipality of Santo Tomas legally
Congress can impose the said verifiable criteria of viability which exists
need not be embodied in the local government code. Congress
can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory law, HELD
like in this case. The passage of amendatory laws is no different NO, it does not. Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
from the enactment of laws. The cityhood laws specifically expressly provides that only "entities authorized by law may be
exempted the 16 from the criteria earlier mentioned. parties in a civil action." Now then, as ruled in the Pelaez case
supra, the President has no power to create a municipality. Since
PELAEZ vs. AUDITOR GENERAL private respondent has no legal personality, it can not be a party
15 SCRA 569 (December 24, 1965) to any civil action, and as such, respondent Judge should have
dismissed the case, since further proceedings would be pointless.
President has no power to create municipalities.
FACTS MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO vs. MENDEZ
President of the Philippines issued several EO’s creating 239 SCRA 12
33 municipalities.
Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice-President of the The municipality has attained a de jure status.
Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil FACTS
action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, President Garcia issued EO 353 creating the municipal
against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the
representatives and agents, from passing in audit any municipality of San Narciso of the same province, the barrios of
expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala
orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. along with their respective sitios.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and By virtue of EO 174, issued by President Macapagal, the
void for it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to
ISSUE have gained the status of a 5th class municipality. The EO added
Whether or not the President has the power to create that "(t)he conversion of this municipal district into (a)
municipalities municipality as proposed in House Bill No. 4864 was approved by
HELD the House of Representatives."
NO, he does not have. RA 2370 became effective, barrios The Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo
may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names warranto against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres.
changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding The petition sought the declaration of nullity of EO 353 and
provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the prayed that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of
areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the San Andres be permanently ordered to refrain from performing
municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is the duties and functions of their respective offices.
situated." This statutory denial of the presidential authority to ISSUE
create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to Whether or not the Municipality of San Andres legally
create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. exists
HELD
MUNICIPALITY OF KAPALONG vs. MOYA YES, it has achieved the status of a de jure municipal
166 SCRA 71 (September 29, 1988) corporation. Granting EO 353 was a complete nullity for being
the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power,
President has no power to create municipalities. the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could
FACT offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San
From portions of the Municipality of Kapalong, Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own
President Garcia created respondent Municipality of Santo closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto
Tomas, and the latter now asserts jurisdiction over eight (8) municipal corporation. The Municipality of San Andres had been
barrios of petitioner. in existence for more than 6 years. On the contrary, certain
For many years and on several occasions, this conflict of governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the
boundaries between the two municipalities was brought, at the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres: Thus, (1)
instance of private respondent, to the Provincial Board of Davao it was classified as 5th class municipality, (2) municipal circuits
for it to consider and decide. However, it appears that no action was constituted there.
was taken on the same. Private respondent then filed a complaint All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of
with the then CFI of Davao, presided over by herein public San Andres in the province of Quezon must now be conceded.
respondent Moya against the Municipality of Kapalong, for
settlement of the municipal boundary dispute, recovery of
collected taxes and damages.
Petitioner contends that the President has no power to
create municipalities. Thus, there is no Municipality of Santo
112
MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ vs. BAZ some other time is fixed therefor by the law or ordinance
265 SCRA 183 creating it.
AUTONOMY:
In governmental functions, municipal corporations
cannot complain if legislature requires it to produce
ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY (Section 2, Article X of the
a list of expenditures or require the former to allot
1987 Constitution):
budget for the construction of bridges or roads.
- Decentralization of administration; transfer of power
But if property was acquired through non-
from center to local government
governmental capacity, legislature cannot direct the
municipal corporations since the fund was derived
POLITICAL AUTONOMY (Section 18, Article X of the 1987
from profit of the corporations in its business
Constitution):
transactions. Legislature is now subject to the
- Broader in scope, covers administrative autonomy
following limitations:
- Decentralization of political powers usually exercised
by the national government
1. Non-impairment of contracts
2. No law enacted within the municipal
corporations
3. Property cannot be confiscated without just
compensation
114
PROVISIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION REGARDING conducted in the place where he renders or holds office. For all
AUTONOMY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS: other local elective officials, the venue shall be the place where
the sanggunian concerned is located.
ARTICLE X, SECTION 2 ARTICLE X, SECTION 18
-Grant of local or (c) However, no investigation shall be held within ninety (90)
- Grant of political autonomy, days immediately prior to any local election, and no preventive
administrative autonomy,
creation of ARMM, establishing the suspension shall be imposed within the said period. If preventive
transfer or power from the
basic structure of the government suspension has been imposed prior to the 90-day period
central government to the
taking into account their customs, immediately preceding local election, it shall be deemed
grass roots level
etc. automatically lifted upon the start of aforesaid period. (Section
62, LGC)
PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE LGC REGARDING Preventive Suspension. - (a) Preventive suspension may be
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS AGAINST ERRING OFFICERS: imposed:
Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. - An elective local official may be (1) By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a
disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the province, a highly urbanized or an independent component city;
following grounds: (2) By the governor, if the respondent is an elective official of a
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines; component city or municipality; or
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution; (3) By the mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of the
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross barangay.
negligence, or dereliction of duty;
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an (b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the
offense punishable by at least prision mayor; issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given
(e) Abuse of authority; the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working continuance in office of the respondent could influence the
days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, records and other evidence: Provided, That, any single preventive
and sangguniang barangay; suspension of local elective officials shall not extend beyond sixty
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or (60) days: Provided, further, That in the event that several
residence or the status of an immigrant of another country; administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he
and cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and
other laws. known at the time of the first suspension.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the (c) Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the
grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court. suspended elective official shall be deemed reinstated in office
(Section 60, LGC) without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against
him, which shall be terminated within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the time he was formally notified of the case against
Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. - A verified
him. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to
complaint against any erring local elective official shall be
his fault, neglect, or request, other than the appeal duly filed, the
prepared as follows:
duration of such delay shall not be counted in computing the time
(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a
of termination of the case.
highly urbanized city, an independent component city or
component city shall be filed before the Office of the President;
(d) Any abuse of the exercise of the power of preventive
(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality
suspension shall be penalized as abuse of authority. (Section 63,
shall be filed before the sangguniang panlalawigan whose
LGC)
decision may be appealed to the Office of the President; and
(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be
filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan Salary of Respondent Pending Suspension. - The respondent
concerned whose decision shall be final and executory. (Section official preventively suspended from office shall receive no salary
61, LGC) or compensation during such suspension; but upon subsequent
exoneration and reinstatement, he shall be paid full salary or
compensation including such emoluments accruing during such
Notice of hearing. - (a) Within seven (7) days after the
suspension. (Section 64, LGC)
administrative complaint is filed, the Office of the President or
the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the
respondent to submit his verified answer within fifteen (15) days Rights of Respondent. - The respondent shall be accorded full
from receipt thereof, and commence the investigation of the case opportunity to appear and defend himself in person or by
within ten (10) days after receipt of such answer of the counsel, to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
respondent. him, and to require the attendance of witnesses and the
production of documentary process of subpoena or subpoena
(b) When the respondent is an elective official of a province or duces tecum. (Section 65, LGC)
highly urbanized city, such hearing and investigation shall be
115
Form and Notice of Decision. - (a) The investigation of the case Berces opposed the stay of execution pending appeal on
shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from the start the ground that AO 18 “authorizing the President to stay the
thereof. Within thirty (30) days after the end of the investigation, execution pending appeal” was already repealed by the LGC.”
the Office of the President or the sanggunian concerned shall ISSUE
render a decision in writing stating clearly and distinctly the facts Whether or not the President still has the power to stay
and the reasons for such decision. Copies of said decision shall the execution pending appeal
immediately be furnished the respondent and all interested HELD
parties. YES, it has. Thus, AO 18 was not repealed by RA 7160.
We find that the provisions of Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and
(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 are not irreconcilably
term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every inconsistent and repugnant and the two laws must in fact be read
administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the together. The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an
candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets "appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or
the qualifications required for the office. executory." As worded, there is room to construe said provision
as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the
(c) The penalty of removal from office as a result of an execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing to infer
administrative investigation shall be considered a bar to the therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the
candidacy of the respondent for any elective position. (Section authority to order a stay of the appealed order. Section 68 does
66, LGC) not impose an obligation to execute a decision. It does not
deprive the Office of the President to issue an order of the stay of
execution pending appeal. If the intention of Congress was to
Administrative Appeals. - Decisions in administrative cases may,
repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18, it could have
within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, be appealed to the
used more direct language expressive of such intention. The
following:
execution of decisions pending appeal is procedural and in the
(a) The sangguniang panlalawigan, in the case of decisions of
absence of a clear legislative intent to remove from the reviewing
the sangguniang panlungsod of component cities and the
officials the authority to order a stay of execution, such authority
sangguniang bayan; and can be provided in the rules and regulations governing the
(b) The Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the
appeals of elective officials in administrative cases. The term
sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of
"shall" may be read either as mandatory or directory depending
highly urbanized cities and independent component cities.
upon a consideration of the entire provision in which it is found,
its object and the consequences that would follow from
Decisions of the Office of the President shall be final and
construing it one way or the other. In the case at bench, there is
executory. (Section 67, LGC) no basis to justify the construction of the word as mandatory.
116
on his part to present evidence in his behalf. The requisite of MALINAO vs. REYES
joinder of issues is squarely met with respondent’s waiver of 255 SCRA 616
right to submit his answer.
The so-called "Decision" prepared by a sole SP
REGIDOR vs. CHIONG BIAN member cannot be regarded as the decision of the SP
173 SCRA 507 for lack of the signatures of the requisite majority.
FACTS
Section 63, Preventive Suspension. Petitioner Virginia Malinao is Human Resource Manager
FACTS III of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. Respondent Mayor Wilfredo Red
Respondents William Chiongbian (Provincial Governor) filed a case against her in the Office of the Ombudsman for gross
and others members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved neglect of duty, inefficiency and incompetence. While the case
a resolution recommending the suspension of the petitioners was pending, he appointed a replacement for petitioner.
who failed to appear on at the hearing of a compliant for In retaliation, petitioner filed an administrative case
unspecified misconduct which respondent Robert O. Taclob filed against respondent Mayor in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
against them in the office of the Governor and the Sangguniang Marinduque, charging him with abuse of authority and denial of
Panlalawigan. due process. He was found guilty and was suspended for 1
Pursuant to the resolution, Chiongbian suspended the month.
petitioners "from their elective positions as City Mayor, City Vice- The transcript of stenographic notes of the session
Mayor and Sangguniang Panglunsod members of Tangub City for shows that the suspension by SP was by the vote of 5 to 3 of its
a period of 60 days. members. The result of the voting was subsequently embodied in
The petition alleges that respondents Governor a "Decision" signed by only one member of the Sanggunian,
Chiongbian and the SP acted without authority, and contrary to Rodrigo V. Sotto, who did so as "Presiding Chairman, Blue Ribbon
law, in issuing the Order of Preventive Suspension against the Committee, SP."
petitioners because under Section 63 of the preventively The mayor questioned the "Decision" on the ground
suspended by the Minister of Local Government, not by the that it was signed by Sotto alone, apparently acting in his
Provincial Governor. capacity. He contended that because of this the decision could
ISSUE only be considered as a recommendation of the Blue Ribbon
Whether or not the Provincial Governor has the Committee and he was not bound thereby.
authority to preventively suspend the petitioners in their ISSUE
capacities as Mayor, City Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang Whether or not the “decision” was valid
Panglunsod members HELD
HELD NO, it was not. Neither may the so-called "Decision"
NO, he has no authority. Section 7, Rule 18 of the prepared by SP member Sotto be regarded as the decision of the
Implementing Rules & Regulations of the LGC. The rule should be SP for lack of the signatures of the requisite majority. Like the
read in juxtaposition with Section 63 of the Code which provides procedure in the Supreme Court, the voting following the
that "preventive suspension may be imposed: deliberation of the members of the Sanggunian did not
(a) by the Minister of Local Government if the necessarily constitute their decision unless this was embodied in
respondent is a provincial or city official; an opinion prepared by one of them and concurred in by the
(b) by the provincial governor if the respondent is an others, in the same way that the voting following the deliberation
elective municipal official, or on a case in the Supreme Court becomes its decision only after
(c) by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is the opinion prepared by a Justice is concurred in by others
an elective barangay official." composing the majority. Until they have signed the opinion and
In light of Section 63 of the Code, Section 7 of Rule 18 of the decision is promulgated, the Justices are free to change their
the Implementing Rules & Regulations should be interpreted to votes.
mean that the Minister of Local Government may preventively Member Sotto admits that the draft decision he
suspend an elective provincial or city official, the Provincial prepared had only his signature "due to the reluctance of some
Governor may preventively suspend an elective municipal Kagawads to affix their signatures." Consequently the draft never
official, and the city or municipal mayor may preventively should became a decision. It is noteworthy that the draft was signed by
be for complaints against provincial or city officials are supposed Member Sotto in his capacity as "Presiding Chairman of the Blue
to be filed with the Minister (NOW secretary) of Local Ribbon Committee of SP and that it did not provide spaces for the
Government, hence, it is he (not the provincial governor) who signatures of other members of the SP had it been intended that
would know whether or not the charges are serious enough to it be signed by them. This act led the DILG to conclude that the
warrant the suspension of the accused elective provincial or city draft was simply the report and recommendation of the Blue
official. In this case, the implementing rule (Sec. 7, Rule 18) does Ribbon Committee to the SP.
not in fact clash with the law (Sec. 63, Local Government Code) —
the draftsmanship is not perfect but the use of the phrase "as the
case may be" and the term "respectively" indicates a delineation POWERS OF A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION:
of the power to suspend.
The following are not inherent to municipal corporations:
1. Police power
2. Power of eminent domain
3. Power of taxation
117
SOURCES OF POWER: Thus, their job is simply recommendatory. They
1. Philippine Constitution cannot exercise police power.
2. Charter creating it The barangay assembly does not have police power.
3. Local Government Code It simply recommends the adoption of measures. It
does not have police power. Section 398 of Local
WAYS OF CONFERMENT: Government Code provides:
In order to exercise their power, there must be
conferment either: Powers of the Barangay Assembly. — The barangay assembly
1. Express – enumerated by law, LGC or municipal shall:
charter (a) Initiate legislative processes by recommending to the
2. Implied – arises by implication sangguniang barangay the adoption of measures for the welfare
3. Inherent – necessary and indispensable to a of the barangay and the city or municipality concerned;
municipal corporation (ex: capacity to sue, to enter (b) Decide on the adoption of initiative as a legal process
into contracts) whereby the registered voters of the barangay may directly
propose, enact, or amend any ordinance; and
1. POLICE POWER (c) Hear and pass upon the semestral report of the sangguniang
barangay concerning its activities and finances. (Section 398,
The least limitable. Most insistent power among the LGC)
three.
Section 16 of the LGC: (Known as the “General Welfare RELATED CASES:
Clause) VELASCO vs. BLAS
115 SCRA 540
General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise
the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied The only ground upon which a provincial board may
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or declare any municipal resolution, ordinance. or order
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order
which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. is 'beyond the powers conferred upon the council or
Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government president making the same.
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the FACTS
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and The Municipal Council of Silang authorized Emilia S.
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, Blas to operate a cinema, near the medical clinic of Dr. Virgilio S.
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self- Velazco. The resolution expressly prohibited the installation and
reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public use of any loudspeaker or any similar device that would make the
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote sound audible outside the theater. The resolution also stipulated
full employment among their residents, maintain peace and that violation of the prohibition or other conditions imposed for
order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their the operation of the cinema would constitute sufficient ground
inhabitants. (Sec. 16, LGC) for the revocation of the permit. Bias started the construction of
the cinema. However the Provincial Board of Cavite, upon
The General Welfare Clause is divided into two parts: representations made by Dr. Velazco, declared the resolution
aforementioned null and void on the ground that it was contrary
(1) General administrative power, which is the power to adopt to the provisions of R.A. No. 1224.
ordinances to carry out its programs; and Blas asked the Provincial Board to reconsider the
(2) Police power proper, which is the power to enact ordinances resolution but her request was denied. Since Blas continued with
to promote public safety, ensure convenience and comfort for the the construction of the cinema notwithstanding the action of the
populace. Provincial Board, it passed Resolution No. 80 advising the Mayor
of Silang to stop the construction. Dr. Velazco filed an action in
LIMITATIONS OF THE POLICE POWER: the trial court to declare the operation of the cinema illegal and to
1. Territorial limits stop its construction because (1) the noise produced by the
2. Interest of public so requires construction was harmful to the patients of the clinic and (2) the
3. Reasonable necessity of the means used operation of the cinema contravenes the provisions of R.A No.
4. Not unduly oppressive 1224. After holding that the operation of the cinema does not
5. Exercise must not be contrary to law, morals, etc. contravene R.A. No. 1224, that the failure of Bias to appeal the
action of the Provincial Board to the Office of the President of the
Q: Can the Liga ng mga Barangay exercise police power? Philippines did not make it final and binding upon her, and that
A: No, they cannot. Under Section 491 of the LGC, “There shall be the noise from the construction was not a nuisance, the trial
an organization of all barangays to be known as Liga ng mga court dismissed the complaint. Hence, the Present appeal which
Barangay, for the primary purpose of determining the poses questions of law only.
representation of the liga in the sanggunians and for ventilating, ISSUE
articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay Whether or not the questioned Resolution 68 declaring
government administration and securing, through proper and legal null and void the earlier resolution granting the petitioner the
means, solutions thereto.” authority to establish a cinema house is legal
HELD
118
Yes, Resolution 68 is illegal. The only ground upon VELASCO vs. VILLEGAS
which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, 120 SCRA 568
ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or
order is 'beyond the powers conferred upon the council or An ordinance carries with it the presumption of
president making the same.' Absolutely no other ground is legality.
recognized by the law. A strictly legal question is before the FACTS
provincial board in its consideration of a municipal resolution, Petitioners Tomas Velasco and others challenged the
ordinance, or order. The provincial disapproval of any resolution, constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of
ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the fact Manila, the contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of
that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of property of petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood
the legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial board passes without due process of law.
these limits, it usurps the legislative functions of the municipal The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be
council or president. Such has been the consistent course of prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the
executive authority Viewed in the light of the foregoing doctrine, business of massaging customers or other persons in any
Resolution No. 68 is indeed ultra vires. adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or
rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS ASSN. vs. as long as the operator of the barber shop and the rooms where
CITY OF MANILA massaging is conducted is the same person."
20 SCRA 849 (October 23, 1967)
ISSUE
For an ordinance to be valid, it must comply with due Whether or not the ordinance is valid
process, must not be arbitrary, unreasonable or HELD
oppressive nor vague, indefinite and uncertain. YES, it is. The objectives behind the enactment of
FACTS Ordinance 4964 are: "(1) To be able to impose payment of the
Petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under
Association, It was then alleged that the Municipal Board of the Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely
City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760 regulating motel different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of
operations in the city. barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality
Petitioners assailed the provision which: (1)would which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for
require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized massage of customers." This Court has been most liberal in
representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause.
entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any SC made clear the significance and scope of such a
room or other quarter to any person or persons without his clause, which "delegates in statutory form the police power to a
filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all municipality. This clause has been given wide application by
times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular
middle name, the date of birth, etc. (2) it also being provided that circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts.
the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging Such, it is well to recall, is the progressive view of the Philippine
houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or Jurisprudence." As it was then, so it has continued to be.
the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives. There is no showing, therefore, of the
Petitioners contended that the ordinance is void on due unconstitutionality of such ordinance.
process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or
oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and PATALINGHUG vs. CA
likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the 229 SCRA 554
guaranty against self-incrimination.
ISSUE The declaration of the said area as a commercial
Whether or not the ordinance was valid zone thru a municipal ordinance is an exercise of
HELD police power.
YES, it is valid. An ordinance, having been enacted by FACTS
councilors who must, in the very nature of things, be familiar The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted
with the necessities of their particular municipality or city and Ordinance No. 363, otherwise known as the "Expanded Zoning
with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject Ordinance of Davao City. Section 8 of which provides that
and necessitate action, must be presumed to be valid and should “Funeral Parlors/Memorial Homes with adequate off street
not be set aside unless there is a clear invasion of personal parking space shall be established not less than 50 meters from
property rights under the guise of police regulation. Unless, any residential structures, churches and other institutional
therefore, the ordinance is void on its face, the necessity for buildings."
evidence to rebut its validity is unavoidable. In the case at bar, After obtaining a permit, petitioner commenced the
there being no factual foundation laid for overthrowing Ord. No. construction of his funeral parlor. Residents of Barangay Agdao
4760 of Manila as void on its face, the presumption of complained about the construction since it was allegedly situated
constitutionality must prevail. within a 50-meter radius from the Iglesia ni Kristo Chapel and
several residential structures and was just meters away from Mr.
Tepoot’s residential structure.
119
Patalinghug alleged that Mr. Tepoot's building was used (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in
for a dual purpose both as a dwelling and as a place where a order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact
laundry business was conducted. Thus, the place is commercial. definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to
ISSUE underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
Whether or not petitioner's operation of a funeral home
constitutes permissible use within a particular district or zone in LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. CA
Davao City. 251 SCRA 42
HELD
NO, it does not. In the case at bar, the testimony of City Where there is a conflict between a general law and a
Councilor Vergara shows that Mr. Tepoot's building was used for special statute, the special statute should prevail.
a dual purpose both as a dwelling and as a place where a laundry FACTS
business was conducted. But while its commercial aspect has RA 4850 created the Laguna Lake Development
been established by the presence of machineries and laundry Authority (LLDA), an agency tasked for the protection of the
paraphernalia, its use as a residence, other than being declared environment and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable
for taxation purposes as such, was not fully substantiated. Tax development. It was later amended by PD 813 which gives LLDA
declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for the exclusive jurisdiction to issue new permit for the use of the
zoning purposes. lake waters for any projects or activities in or affecting the said
The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone lake including navigation, construction, and operation of
thru a municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power to fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
promote the good order and general welfare of the people in the Then came the LGC which gives the municipalities in the
locality. Corollary thereto, the state, in order to promote the Laguna Lake Region the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing
general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with privileges within their municipal waters.
property, and with business and occupations. Thus, persons may Municipal governments thereupon assumed the
be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. But the
to secure the general welfare of the state and to this fundamental Mayor's permit to construct fishpens and fishcages were all
aim of government, the rights of the individual may be undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the LLDA on
subordinated. The ordinance which regulates the location of fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity.
funeral homes has been adopted as part of comprehensive zoning This prompts LLDA to sent notices to the owners of the
plans for the orderly development of the area covered illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
thereunder. structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures
within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall
SANGALANG vs. MENDEZ be effected.
176 SCRA 719 The affected fishpen owners challenged the authority of
LLDA to issue such notices contending that it is the municipalities
The opening of certain streets to traffic was who have the power to regulate the issuance of permits and
warranted by the demands of the common good and fishing privileges, not LLDA.
is a valid exercise of police power. ISSUE
FACTS Who has jurisdiction over Laguna Lake and its environs
Respondent Mayor Nemesio Yabut ordered for the insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges are
feasibility study for the opening of the streets of Bel-Air Village concerned?
calculated to alleviate traffic congestion along the public streets HELD
of Makati, Metro Manila. LLDA has the authority. The provisions of LGC do not
Studies revealed that previously, Bel-Air subdivision necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the
plan was approved upon the condition that “its major latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake
thoroughfares connecting the public streets and highways shall region.
be opened to public traffic”. It has to be conceded that the charter of the LLDA
Thus, the respondent mayor ordered the opening of constitutes a special law while the LGC or RA 7160 is a general
certain streets in that village upon the premise of public law. Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special
necessity. Petitioners contended that since they were the owners statute, the special statute should prevail since it evinces the
of the streets, they should not be deprived of the same without legislative intent more clearly that the general statute.
due process and payment of just compensation. The power of the LGU to issue fishing privileges was
ISSUE clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is evident from the
Whether or not the opening of the streets by the fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code
respondent mayor was a valid exercise of police power empowering local governments to issue fishing permits is
HELD embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under
YES, it was. The opening of the Orbit Street to traffic the heading, "Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other
was warranted by the demands of the common good and is a Revenue Raising Power of Local Government Units."
valid exercise of police power.
The concept of police power is well-established in this
jurisdiction.
It has been defined as the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of
120
BALAQUIT vs. CFI AGUSAN clubs, cabarets or dance halls shall henceforth be issued
163 SCRA 182 permits/licenses to operate within the jurisdiction of the
municipality and no license/permit shall be issued to any
The ordinance is void when it is not justified by any professional hostess, hospitality girls and professional dancer for
necessity for the public interest. employment in any of the aforementioned establishments
FACTS prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night
At issue in the petition is the validity and clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal employing hostesses”.
Board of the City of Butuan. It is entitled “An Ordinance It is contended that the ordinance is invalid, the
Penalizing Any Person, Group Of Persons, Entity Or Corporation municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business,
Engaged In The Business Of Selling Admission Tickets To Any occupation or calling, petitioners at the same time alleging that
Movie Or Other Public Exhibitions, Games, Contests Or Other their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were
Performances To Require Children Between Seven (7) And violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect
Twelve (12) Years Of Age To Pay Full Payment For Tickets withdrawn without judicial hearing.
Intended For Adults But Should Charge Only One-Half Of The Said ISSUE
Ticket.” Whether or not the ordinance is valid
Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of HELD
Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an NO, it is void. It is clear that municipal corporations
invalid exercise of police power. cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be
ISSUE regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It
Whether or not the ordinance is valid would he, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under
HELD review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do so is
No, it is void. The ordinance is not justified by any to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal
necessity for the public interest. The police power legislation to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open
must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the
reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. The legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of
evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations.
cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same
amount of money for the admission of their children, as they PHILIPPINE GAMEFOWL vs. IAC
would for themselves. A reduction in the price of admission 146 SCRA 294
would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the
petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The Philippine Gamefowl Commission cannot directly
The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss exercise the power to license cockpits which in effect
of earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply usurps the authority directly conferred by law on the
with it. municipal authorities.
Furthermore there will be difficulty in its FACTS
implementation because as already experienced by petitioners This case involves a conflict of jurisdiction between the
since the effectivity of the ordinance, children over 12 years of Philippine Gamefowl Commission (PGC) and the municipal
age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to avail government of Bogo, Cebu, both of which claim the power to
of the benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does not provide a issue licenses for the operations of cockpits in the said town.
safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such, the ISSUE
respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth certificates be Who has jurisdiction?
exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of children. HELD
This is, however, not at all practicable. We can see that the A study of P.D. 1802, as amended by P.D. 1802-A shows
ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon that it is the municipal mayor with the authorization of the
the business of petitioners. Sangguniang Bayan that has the primary power to issue licenses
Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the for the operation of ordinary cockpits.
ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and Even the regulation of cockpits is vested in the
the general welfare. municipal officials, subject only to the guidelines laid down by the
PGC. Its power to license is limited only to international derbies
DELA CRUZ vs. PARAS and does not extend to ordinary cockpits. Over the latter kind of
123 SCRA 569 cockpits, it has the power not of control but only of review and
supervision.
Municipal corporations cannot prohibit the The power of review vested in the PGC by P.D. 1802-A
operation of business. They may be regulated, but not have been modified by the LGC. Under the Code, the Sangguniang
prevented from carrying on their business. Panlalawigan is supposed to examine the ordinance, resolutions
FACTS and executive orders issued by the municipal government and to
The municipal mayor and municipal council of Bocaue, annul the same, but only on one ground, to wit, that it is beyond
Bulacan enacted Ordinance No. 84. This Ordinance is known as the powers of the municipality or ultra vires.
the “Prohibition and Closure Ordinance” of Bocaue, Bulacan. Significantly, no similar authority is conferred in such
The ordinance contained the following, “Being the categorical terms on the PGC regarding the licensing and
principal cause in the decadence of morality and because of their regulation of cockpits by the municipal government.
other adverse effects on this community, no operator of night
121
RURAL BANK OF MAKATI vs. MUNICIPALITY OF who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of
MAKATI justice.
(July 2, 2004)
For an ordinance to be valid:
A municipality may order the closure of a bank for 1. It should not contravene the Constitution
failure to secure a business license. 2. It must not be unfair, oppressive, partial,
HELD discriminatory, confiscatory
The Supreme Court ruled that the Municipality of 3. It must be general and consistent with public policy
Makati may, in the exercise of police power under the general 4. It must not be unreasonable
welfare clause, order the closure of a bank for failure to secure
the appropriate mayor’s permit or business license. MONTEVERDE vs. GENEROSO
(September 29, 1928)
MAGTAJAS vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP., INC.
234 SCRA 255 A dam or a fishery constructed in a navigable stream
is not a nuisance per se, thus it cannot be summarily
The ordinance must be in harmony with the general abated.
law that it implements. FACTS
FACTS Tomas Monteverde is the owner of a parcel of land
When the Philippine Amusement and Gaming situated in the barrio of Santa Ana, municipality of Davao,
Corporation (PAGCOR) opened a branch on Cagayan de Oro City, Province of Davao.
there was an instant opposition from different sectors in the The parcel of land is bounded on the northwest by the
community, including the local government. In fact, the mayor of Agdao River. The Tambongon Creek is a branch of the Agdao
CDO brought this petition attacking, among others, gambling as River and runs through Monteverde's land. For fishpond
intrinsically harmful citing various provisions of the Constitution purposes, Monteverde constructed two dams across the Agdao
and several decisions of the Court expressive of the General and River and five dams across the Tambongon Creek. The two dams
official disapprobation of the vice. in the Agdao River were destroyed by order of the district
Thus, the SP of CDO enacted Ordinance 3553 which engineer of Davao. The provincial governor of Davao also
prohibits the use of buildings for the operations of casinos, and threatened to destroy the other dams in the Tambongon Creek.
Ordinance 3375-93 which prohibits the operations of casinos. The motive behind the destruction of the dams in the Agdao
They invoke the state policies on the family and the River and the proposed destruction of the dams in the
proper upbringing of the youth and call attention to an old case Tambongon Creek was to safeguard the public health.
which sustained a municipal ordinance prohibiting the playing of To prevent the contemplated action with reference to
“panguingue”. The petitioners decry the immorality of gambling. the Tambongon Creek, Monteverde sought in the CFI of Davao to
They also impugn the wisdom of PD 1869 (which they describe obtain an order of injunction in restraint of the provincial
as “a martial law instrument”) in creating PAGCOR and governor, the district engineer, and the district health officer, but
authorizing it to operate casinos. in this attempt Monteverde was unsuccessful in the lower court.
ISSUE ISSUE
Whether or not the above ordinances are valid Is a provincial governor, a district engineer, or a district
HELD health officer authorized to destroy private property consisting
NO, they are void. It is not competent for the SP to enact of dams and fishponds summarily and without any judicial
such ordinances since these are contrary to PD 1869 which proceedings whatever under the pretense that such private
authorizes casino gambling. property constitutes a nuisance?
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. HELD
Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered NO. A provincial governor, a district engineer, or a
inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the district health officer is not authorized to destroy private
Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, property consisting of dams and fishponds summarily and
for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to without any judicial proceedings whatever under the pretense
deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own that such private property constitutes a nuisance.
discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or A dam or a fishery constructed in a navigable stream is
allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of not a nuisance per se. A dam or a fishpond may be a nuisance per
gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider accidens where it endangers or impairs the health or depreciates
sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits property by causing water to become stagnant.
lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Nuisances are of two classes: Nuisances per se and
Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no nuisances per accidens. As to nuisanees per se, since they affect
authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that the immediate safety of persons and property, they may be
courts do no sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. As to
is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that nuisances per accidens, even the municipal authorities, under
questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of their power to declare and abate nuisances, would not have the
statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved right to compel the abatement of a particular thing or act as a
only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the nuisance without reasonable notice to the person alleged to be
function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is maintaining or doing the same of the time and place of hearing
exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are before a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing or act
answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents does in law constitute a nuisance.
122
LIM vs. CA to Ordinance No. 59, s. 1993 like other infrastructure projects
(August 12, 2002) relating to roads, streets and sidewalks previously undertaken by
the city.
The power to suspend or revoke licenses and permits HELD
is expressly premised on the violation of the The use of LGU funds for the widening and improvement of
conditions of these permits and licenses. privately-owned sidewalks is unlawful as it directly contravenes
FACTS Section 335 of RA 7160. This conclusion finds further support
Bistro Pigalle, Inc. filed a petition for mandamus and from the language of Section 17 of RA 7160 which mandates
prohibition against Manila City Mayor Alfredo Lim. Bistro filed LGUs to efficiently and effectively provide basic services and
the case because policeman under Lim’s instructions inspected facilities. The law speaks of infrastructure facilities intended
and investigated Bistro’s license as well as work permits and primarily to service the needs of the residents of the LGU and
health certificates of its staff. This caused the stoppage of work in "which are funded out of municipal funds." It particularly refers
Bistro’s night club and restaurant operations (The New Bangkok to "municipal roads and bridges" and "similar facilities."33
Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant). Lim also refused to Applying the rules of ejusdem generis, the phrase "similar
accept Bistro’s application for a business license, as well as work facilities" refers to or includes infrastructure facilities like
permit applications of Bistro’s staff. sidewalks owned by the LGU. Thus, RA 7160 contemplates that
ISSUE only the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of
Whether or not Mayor Lim has the authority to do such infrastructure facilities owned by the LGU may be bankrolled
acts with local government funds.
HELD Clearly, the question of ownership of the open spaces
NO, he does not have the authority. The authority of (including the sidewalks) in Marikina Greenheights Subdivision is
mayors to issue licenses and permits is beyond question. The law material to the determination of the validity of the challenged
expressly provides for such authority under Section 11(1), Article appropriation and disbursement made by the City of Marikina.
II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and on the other Similarly significant is the character of the direct object of the
hand, Section 455(3)(iv) of the LGC. expenditure, that is, the sidewalks.
From the language of two laws, it is clear that the power Whether V.V. Soliven, Inc. has retained ownership of the
of the mayor to issue business licenses and permits necessarily open spaces and sidewalks or has already donated them to the
includes the corollary power to suspend or revoke, or even refuse City of Marikina, and whether the public has full and unimpeded
to issue the same. However, the power to suspend or revoke access to the roads and sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights
these licenses and permits is expressly premised on the violation Subdivision, are factual matters. There is a need for the prior
of the conditions of these permits and licenses. The mayor must resolution of these issues before the validity of the challenged
observe due process in exercising these powers, which means appropriation and expenditure can be determined. The case was
that the mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice and remanded.
opportunity to be heard.
Furthermore, the mayor has no power to order a police JAVELLANA vs. KINTANAR
raid on these establishments in the guise of inspecting or (July 30, 1982)
investigating these commercial establishments.
An ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity.
PARAYNO vs. JAVELLANOS FACTS
495 SCRA 85 (July 14, 2006) Glicerio Javellana is the owner of a market (building and
lot) in Bago City which has served the general population of that
There must be an order issued by the court for the city and the adjoining municipalities for 20 years under a Mayor's
abatement of a nuisance which is not a nuisance per permit. In 1968, the City Treasurer refused to accept Javellana's
se. payment for a municipal license due to the enactment of
FACTS Ordinance No. 150. Javellana filed a petition seeking the
The municipality provided that a gasoline station must be declaration of nullity of the following:
100 meters away from the nearest public school. But it was not 1. Ordinance No. 150 - prohibits the establishment,
shown that the municipal corporation attempted to measure the maintenance or operation of a public market in that city
distance. by any person other than the city government
HELD 2. Ordinance No. 142 - requires vendors to pay inspection
The distance was so crucial in determining whether or not a and other market fees; and
violation was committed by the petitioner. Clearly, there was no 3. Ordinance No. 145 - requires prior inspection by the
valid exercise of police power. City Health Officer of all foodstuff to be sold to the
The matter of the establishment or operation of a gas station public.
is not a nuisance per se. There must be an order issued by the Appellants claim that the ordinances are unreasonable
court. and that the City of Bago has no power to enact them.
ISSUE
ALBON vs. FERNANDO Whether or not the ordinances are valid
G.R. No. 148357 (June 30, 2006) HELD
FACTS YES, they are all valid as a result of the exercise of police
City of Marikina undertook a public works project to widen, power by the local government. Ordinances Nos. 142 and 145 are
clear and repair the existing sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights manifestly valid; No. 142 because it is a regulatory and revenue
Subdivision. It was undertaken by the city government pursuant ordinance; No. 145 because is it promotive of general welfare and
123
both are authorized by Section 15 of R. A. No. 4382, otherwise 2. POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
known as the Charter of Bago, which spells out in detail the
general powers and duties of the Municipal Board of City. There POWER UNDER THE ARTICLE III, SECTION 9 OF THE
is also no question that Ordinance No. 150 was enacted pursuant CONSTITUTION:
to Section 15, paragraph (cc) of the Charter of Bago which
empowers the Municipal Board ". . . to prohibit the establishment The power must be exercised by the State under the
or operation within the city limits of public markets by any following conditions:
person, entity, association, or corporation other than the city." 1. Expropriator must enter a private property
The test of a "public market" is its dedication to the 2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period
service of the general public and not its ownership. A scrutiny of 3. The entry must be under warrant or color of legal
the charter provision will readily show that by public market is authority
meant one that is intended to serve the public in general. This is 4. The property must be devoted for public use
the only conclusion which can be drawn when it used the word 5. The utilization must be payment of just compensation
"public" to modify the word "market" for if the meaning sought to
be conveyed is the ownership thereof then the phrase "by any BASIS OF POWER UNDER SECTION 19 OF THE LGC:
person, entity, association, or corporation other than the city"
will serve no useful purpose. The power must be exercise by the local government under
the following conditions:
BATANGAS CATV vs. CA 1. Must be exercised by the chief executive
2. Must be pursuant to an ordinance
The power to fixed rates of cable operators are under 3. Must be for public use, for the benefit of the poor and
the jurisdiction of NTC. the landless
HELD 4. There must be payment of just compensation
This is with regard to the enactment of the City of 5. Must be made pursuant to the Constitution and
Batangas of a law providing for the regulation of the operations pertinent laws
of cable TV, including the fixing of subscribed rates. The matter 6. There must be a valid offer and the offer was not
of regulating activity of cable operators is governed by law. The accepted
agency tasked to implement such is the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC). What the City of Limitations under the Constitution:
Batangas was doing here is the usurping the power belonging to 1. Due process
NTC. The power to fixed these rates charged by cable operators 2. Just compensation
is under the power of NTC and not of the municipal corporation.
When LGU may immediately take possession of the property:
Take note of the following provisions: 1. Upon the filing of the expropriation proceeding,
and
Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of 2. Upon making a deposit with the proper court of at
Ecological Balance. - It shall be the duty of every national agency least 15 % of the fair market value (amount shall
or government-owned or controlled corporation authorizing or be determined by the proper court based on the
involved in the planning and implementation of any project or fair market value at the time of the taking of the
program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of property)
non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest
cover, and extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the Q: If the State takes municipal property, is it compensable?
local government units, nongovernmental organizations, and other A: It depends. If the subject property is public, there is no need to
sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the pay just compensation since the municipal corporation is acting
project or program, its impact upon the people and the community as a mere agent of the State. On the other hand, if the subject
in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures property is private, then there must be just compensation
that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects
thereof. (Section 26, LGC) RELATED CASES:
MODAY vs. CA
(February 20, 1997)
Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be
implemented by government authorities unless the consultations
The power of eminent domain may be validly
mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and
delegated by the national legislature to the local
prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, governments.
That occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented
FACTS
shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been
The SB of Municipality of Bunawan, Agusan del Sur
provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
passed a resolution authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate
(Section 27, LGC) the petition for expropriation proceeding of a lot along the
national highway owned by herein petitioner Percival Moday.
The resolution was approved by the mayor. However,
the SP disapproved the same on the ground that the
expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still
124
available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the To authorize the condemnation of any particular land
government center. by a grantee of the power of eminent domain, a necessity must
The expropriation was approved by the court despite exist for the taking thereof for the proposed uses and purposes.
the opposition. Hence, this petition. Necessity within the rule that the particular property to
ISSUE be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute
Whether or not the expropriation is valid but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would
HELD combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least
YES. The power of eminent domain may be validly inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and
delegated by the national legislature to the local governments. property owner consistent with such benefit.
The disapproval of the SP is infirm. The only ground
upon which a provincial board may declare void any municipal YUJUICO vs. ATIENZA
resolution, ordinance or order is when the same is “beyond the 472 SCRA 460
powers conferred upon the council or president making the
same. SP was without authority to disapprove the resolution General Rule: Non-payment of the just compensation
because the municipality clearly has the power to exercise the does not entitle the property owner to recover the
right. possession of the expropriated property.
Exception: When there already has been a lapse of 5
LAGCAO vs. LABRA years when the just compensation decreed by the
G.R. No. 155746 (October 13, 2004) court has not been paid.
HELD
HELD The Supreme Court ruled in this case that the non-
Private lands rank last in the order of priority for payment of the just compensation does not entitle the property
purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation owner to recover the possession of the expropriated property.
proceedings may be resorted to only after the other modes of But there is an exception to this rule. In what instance
acquisition are exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is may the landowner recover his property? When there already
mandatory because these are the only safeguards of oftentimes has been a lapse of 5 years when the just compensation decreed
helpless owners of private property against what may be a by the court has not been paid. So, there will be recovery by the
tyrannical violation of due process when their property is landowner.
forcibly taken from them allegedly for public use.
MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE vs. VM REALTY
CITY OF MANILA vs. THE ARELLANO LAW COLLEGES, INC. CORPORATION
(February 28, 1950) 292 SCRA 376
Necessity within the rule that the particular property The authority of the mayor to file an expropriation
to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean case must be based on an ordinance, not a resolution
an absolute but only a reasonable or practical FACTS
necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit The respondent questioned the petition for
to the public with the least inconvenience and expropriation filed by Parañaque on the ground that it has no
expense to the condemning party and property cause of action because the authority of the mayor filing the
owner consistent with such benefit. expropriation case was simply a resolution and not an ordinance.
FACTS HELD
At issue in this case is the proper interpretation of Take note that under Section 19, what is required is not
Section 1 of RA 267 which provides: "Cities and municipalities a resolution but an ordinance. So, there is a difference between
are authorized to contract loans from the Reconstruction Finance an ordinance and a resolution. An ordinance is law while a
Corporation, the Philippine National Bank, and/or any other resolution is merely an expression of the sentiments or opinions
entity or person at a rate of interest not exceeding eight per cent of the members of the Sanggunian.
per annum for the purpose of purchasing or expropriating
homesites within their respective territorial jurisdiction and MALONZO vs. ZAMORA
reselling them at cost to residents of the said cities and 333 SCRA 875
municipalities."
ISSUE There is no law which prohibits the 3 readings in one
Whether or not RA 267 empowers cities to expropriate single session day.
as well as to purchase lands for homesites FACTS
HELD A supplemental budget was passed appropriating money for
YES, it does. Act No. 267 empowers cities to expropriate the repair of the offices of the councilors. The councilors and
as well as to purchase lands for homesites. The word Mayor Malonzo were administratively charged because the
"expropriating," taken singly or with the text, is susceptible of ordinance was passed in just one day.
only one meaning. But this power to expropriate is necessarily HELD
subject to the limitations and conditions noted in the decisions The Supreme Court ruled that there is no law which
above cited. The National Government may not confer upon its prohibits the 3 readings in one single session day.
instrumentalities authority which it itself may not exercise. A
stream can not run higher than its source.
125
BELUSO vs. MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted
G.R. No. 153974 (August 7, 2006) for the purpose. (Section 186, LGC)
127
Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government real properties of the MIAA are owned by the Republic of the
Units. - Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the Philippines and therefore exempt from real estate taxes.
taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays There is no dispute that a government-owned or
shall not extend to the levy of the following: xxx (o) Taxes, fees or controlled corporation is not exempt from real estate tax.
charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and However, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled
instrumentalities, and local government units. (Section 133, corporation. A government-owned or controlled corporation
LGC) must be “organized as a stock or non-stock corporation.” MIAA is
not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation.
Exemptions from Real Property Tax. - The following are exempted MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with
from payment of the real property tax: (a) Real property owned corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental
by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political functions, which under the Administrative Code, refers to any
subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person; xxxx department framework, vested with special functions or
(Section 234, LGC) jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter.
RELATED CASE: A government instrumentality like MIAA falls under
Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code. Section 133(o)
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs recognizes the basic principle that local governments cannot tax
CA, CITY OF PARANAQUE the national government, which historically merely delegated to
(July 20, 2006) local governments the power to tax. While the 1987 Constitution
now includes taxation as one of the powers of local governments,
Land used by the MIAA are exempt from real estate local governments may only exercise such power “subject to such
taxes imposed by the Local Government Code. guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide.”
FACTS: Also, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, which its
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates Charter calls the “principal airport of the Philippines for both
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Complex in international and domestic air traffic,” are properties of public
Parañaque City under E.O No. 903 (“MIAA Charter”). MIAA dominion because they are intended for public use. As
administers the land, improvements and equipment within the properties of public dominion, they indisputably belong to the
NAIA Complex. State or the Republic of the Philippines. Section 234(a) of the
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) Local Government Code exempts from real estate tax any “[r]eal
issued Opinion No. 061 and opined that the Local Government property owned by the Republic of the Philippines. Section
Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption from real estate tax 234(a) of the Local Government Code states that real property
granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA Charter. MIAA owned by the Republic loses its tax exemption only if the
paid some of the real estate tax already due. “beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or
MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax otherwise, to a taxable person.” MIAA, as a government
Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the taxable years instrumentality, is not a taxable person under Section 133(o) of
1992 to 2001. The City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, the Local Government Code. Thus, even if we assume that the
issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands Republic has granted to MIAA the beneficial use of the Airport
and Buildings; thereafter posted and published notices of auction Lands and Buildings, such fact does not make these real
sale. properties subject to real estate tax.
The OGCC issued Opinion No. 147 clarifying OGCC
Opinion No. 061. The OGCC pointed out that Section 206 of the Q: What are the fundamental principles governing financial
Local Government Code requires persons exempt from real estate affairs, transactions, and operations of local government units?
tax to show proof of exemption. The OGCC opined that Section 21
of the MIAA Charter is the proof that MIAA is exempt from real Fundamental Principles. - The financial affairs, transactions, and
estate tax. operations of local government units shall be governed by the
City of Paranaque argued that MIAA, being a following fundamental principles: (a) No money shall be paid out
government-owned or controlled corporation, is not exempt of the local treasury except in pursuance of an appropriations
from real estate tax. Respondents averred that Sec. 193 of the ordinance or law; (b) Local government funds and monies shall
LGC expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of be spent solely for public purposes; (c) Local revenue is
“government-owned and-controlled corporations” upon the generated only from sources expressly authorized by law or
effectivity of the Local Government Code. ordinance, and collection thereof shall at all times be
ISSUE: acknowledged properly; xxx (Section 305, LGC)
Are the airport lands and buildings exempt from real estate
tax under existing laws?
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the land used by the
MIAA are exempt from real estate taxes imposed by the Local
Government Code. The first reason for this is that MIAA is not
GOCC but rather an instrumentality of the national government
and therefore exempt from government taxation under Section
133 of the Local Government Code. The second reason is that the
128
ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. FEATI BANK AND and one Arceli P. Jo, involving a parcel of land and improvements
TRUST CO thereon located at Mayapis St., San Antonio Village, Makati.
94 SCRA 533 As there was unpaid balance of just compensation due
to respondents, RTC ordered the garnishment of the bank
A resolution of the Municipal Council must prevail account of the municipality. Petitioner filed a motion to lift the
over the contractual obligations imposed by a party garnishment, on the ground that the manner of payment of the
to the contract. expropriation amount should be done in installments.
FACTS ISSUE
Plaintiff Ortigas & Co, sold to Augusto Padilla y Angeles Whether or not the bank account of petitioner
and Natividad Angeles two parcels of land. The said vendees municipality may be subject to levy
transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in HELD
favor of one Emma Chavez. Plaintiff executed the corresponding NO, it is not. The funds deposited in the second PNB
deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez. The deeds of sale account are public funds of the municipal government. In this
contained the stipulations or restrictions that: jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not
(1) The parcel of land s shall be used by the Buyer subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by
exclusively for residential purposes, statute. More particularly, the properties of a municipality,
(2) All buildings shall not be at a distance of less than 2 whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use
meters from its boundary line cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money
Subsequently, defendant-appellee bank bought the lots judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived
directly from Emma Chavez, "free from all liens and from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended
encumbrances.” It commenced the construction of a building to primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the
be devoted to banking purposes. governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are
Ortigas demanded the bank to stop the construction of exempt from execution.
the commercial building on the said lots but the latter refused to Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent
comply with the demand, contending that the building was being and PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a municipality fails
constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations according or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final
to Resolution No. 27. money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of
ISSUE the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and
Whether or not the resolution of the Municipal Council approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the
of Mandaluyong declaring the lots as part of the commercial and corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefore.
industrial zone of the municipality, prevailed over the building
restrictions imposed by Ortigas on the lots in question. BAGUIO CITIZENS ACTION INC. vs. THE CITY COUNCIL AND
HELD CITY MAYOR OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO
The resolution of the council must prevail. Resolution (April 20, 1983)
No. 27, declaring the western part of Highway 54, now E. de los
Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Being a public land, no disposition thereof could be
Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously made by the City.
passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the FACTS
exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, In this petition, petitioners assailed the validity of
safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the Ordinance 386 passed by the City Council of Baguio City, to wit;
locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing "An Ordinance Considering All Squatters Of Public Land,
in the area, especially where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The Other Than Those Earmarked For Public Use In The City Of
lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and Baguio Who Are Duly Registered As Such At The Time Of The
commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a Promulgation Of This Ordinance As Bonafide Occupants Of Their
main traffic artery which runs through several cities and Respective Lots And Which Shall Hereafter Be Embraced As A
municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless City Government Housing Project And Providing For Other
stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are Purposes."
hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents ISSUE
in its route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt Whether or not the ordinance is valid
zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the HELD
municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal Council, was The Ordinance in question is a patent nullity. It
reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in considered all squatters of public land in the City of Baguio as
passing the subject resolution. bona-fide occupants of their respective lots. Being
unquestionably a public land, no disposition thereof could be
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI vs. CA made by the City of Baguio without prior legislative authority. It
190 SCRA 207 is the fundamental principle that the state possesses plenary
power in law to determine who shall be favored recipients of
Public funds are not subject to levy and execution, public domain, as well as under what terms such privilege may be
unless otherwise provided for by statute. granted not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of
FACTS exercising what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.
Municipality of Makati filed an expropriation And the law has laid in the Director of Lands the power of
proceeding against private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors exclusive control, administrations, disposition and alienation of
Consortium, Inc., Home Building System & Realty Corporation public land that includes the survey, classification, lease, sale or
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any other form of concessions or disposition and management of permanently withdrawn from public use may be used or
the lands of public domains. conveyed for any purpose for which other real property
belonging to the local government unit concerned may be
CITY OF QUEZON vs. JUDGE ERICTA lawfully used or conveyed: Provided, however, That no freedom
(June 24, 1983) park shall be closed permanently without provision for its
transfer or relocation to a new site.
Taking of burials sites privately owned for charitable
purposes is not a valid exercise of police power. (c) Any national or local road, alley, park, or square may be
FACTS temporarily closed during an actual emergency, or fiesta
An ordinance was passed by the City Council of Quezon City celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs, or an
requiring the operators or owners of memorial parks to set aside undertaking of public works and highways, telecommunications,
6% of their cemetery for charity burial of deceased persons. and waterworks projects, the duration of which shall be specified
HELD by the local chief executive concerned in a written order:
The Supreme Court ruled that it is not a valid exercise of Provided, however, That no national or local road, alley, park, or
police power. This actually involves a confiscation of private square shall be temporarily closed for athletic, cultural, or civic
property. In no case that this ordinance promotes the general activities not officially sponsored, recognized, or approved by the
welfare of the people. In fact, it passes the burden to the owners local government unit concerned.
or operators. In fact, the matter of charity of burial is the burden
of the municipal corporation. (d) Any city, municipality, or barangay may, by a duly enacted
ordinance, temporarily close and regulate the use of any local
street, road, thoroughfare, or any other public place where
POWER TO ENTER INTO CONTRACTS: shopping malls, Sunday, flea or night markets, or shopping areas
may be established and where goods, merchandise, foodstuffs,
Requisites: commodities, or articles of commerce may be sold and dispensed
a. The municipal contract must be within the corporate to the general public. (Section 21, LGC)
powers of the municipal corporation:
It is entered on its behalf by the municipal officer within Under Section 21 of the Local Government Code, the
its corporate powers. Otherwise, if it is outside of the corporate municipal corporation having an ordinance enacted by the
powers of the municipality, it is ultra vires. It is void. Sanggunian may order the closure or opening, temporarily or
b. Such contract must be entered into by a duly authorized permanently of roads, alleys, parks or squares (RAPS).
municipal officer:
What is the effect of a contract entered on behalf of the If it is a permanent closure, the requirement is 2/3 of all
municipal corporation by non-authorized municipal officer? the members of the Sanggunian. There must be an adequate
The authorized municipal officer is local chief executive substitute for the public of what is being withdrawn from the
on the basis of a law or an ordinance or resolution that is passed public use.
by the municipal corporation.
If a municipal contract is entered by a municipal officer May there be a closure of a national road, alley, park or
outside the scope of his powers, it is not binding upon the square? YES, but only temporary. The permanent closure only
municipal corporation. The municipal corporation cannot be applies to a local public facility.
held by liable unless there is ratification. There is ratification
where the benefits are accepted by the municipal corporation In the case of a park or square, it can be temporarily
arising from that municipal contract. So, there is now ratification closed such as in the case of an emergency or a fiesta or a rally or
to provide for compensation arising from such contract. such other activities.
c. The need for certificate of availability of public funds to be
certified by the public officer or project officer: Section 21 provides that no freedom park shall be
There must be an appropriation. closed permanently without provision for its transfer or
d. It must be under oath: relocation to a new site. There must be a new freedom park in
Another important requirement is the formal case one is subject to closure.
requirement. What is the formal requirement? The contract
thereto must be under oath. The Local Government Code, in line with the
decentralization, has already granted to the municipal
Closure and Opening of Roads. (a) A local government unit may, corporation to negotiate and secure financial grants or donations
pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or in kind or anything of monetary value, even without securing
open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its prior authority from any office of the national government.
jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in case of permanent
closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least two-thirds The exception to this rule is where there is national
(2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian, and when necessary, security implication, there is a need to secure prior authority
an adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to from the proper agency of the government.
closure is provided.
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nature, amount, and terms of such assistance to both Houses of criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of
Congress and the President. (Section 23, LGC.) evidence shall suffice to support such action.
Under Sec. 481 LGC, City Legal Officer is to represent If the injury is caused in the course of the performance
the city in civil actions & special proceedings wherein of a governmental function or duty no recovery, as a rule, can be
the city or any of its officials is a party. Where post is had from the municipality unless there is an existing statute on
vacant, City Prosecutor remains the city’s legal the matter, nor from its officers, so long as they performed their
adviser & officer for civil cases. duties honestly and in good faith or that they did not act
wantonly and maliciously.
ASEAN vs. URDANETA With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is
G.R. No. 162525 (September 23, 2008) that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons
ex contractu or ex delicto.
FACTS
Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City Mayor RULE IN DETERMINING NATURE OF FUNCTION PERFORMED:
Rodolfo E. Parayno entered into five contracts that involve a
massive expenditure of public funds amounting to P250 million. A municipal corporation proper has a public character
The Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance as counsel for as regards the state at large insofar as it is its agent in
Urdaneta City. government, and private insofar as it is to promote local
Petitioner claimed that the trial court erred in allowing necessities and conveniences for its own community. Stated
LAzaro Law Firm to represent Urdaneta City. Petitioners contend differently, Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity and
that only the City Prosecutor can represent Urdaneta City and their functions are twofold.
that law and jurisprudence prohibit the appearance of the Lazaro
Law Firm as the city's counsel. Public character vs. Private character
ISSUE
Whether or not Lazaro Law Firm can represent the PUBLIC CHARACTER PRIVATE CHARACTER
Urdaneta City. No. - They exercise the right - The municipalities exercise a
HELD springing from sovereignty, and private, proprietary or
The court ruled that Lazaro Law Firm’s appearance as while in the performance of the corporate right, arising from
Urdaneta City's counsel is against the law as it provides expressly duties pertaining thereto, their their existence as legal persons
who should represent it. The City Prosecutor should continue to acts are political and and not as public agencies.
represent the city. governmental.
Section 481(a) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of - Their officers and agents in
1991 mandates the appointment of a city legal officer. Under - Their officers and agents in the performance of such
Section 481(b)(3)(i) of the LGC, the city legal officer is supposed such capacity, though elected or functions act in behalf of the
to represent the city in all civil actions, as in this case, and special appointed by them, are municipalities in their corporate
proceedings wherein the city or any of its officials is a party. nevertheless public or individual capacity.
functionaries performing a
public service, and as such they
TORTS COMMITTED BY MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS: are officers, agents, and
servants of the state.
The State cannot be held liable for the negligence of the
officers of the municipal corporations. However, the government PRINCIPLE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR:
cannot assure faithful compliance of laws by these officers. A
municipal corporation can be held liable only if there is a law Under the principle of respondeat superior the
providing for such liability like: principal is liable for the negligence of its agents acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks. The rule of law is a general one, that
Article 2189 of the New Civil Code constitutes a the superior or employer must answer civilly for the negligence
particular prescription making provinces, cities and or want of skill of his agent or servant in the course or line of his
municipalities liable for damages for the death or employment, by which another, who is free from contributory
injury suffered by any person by reason of the fault, is injured.
defective condition of roads, streets and other public
works under the control or supervision of said
municipal governments.
Article 34 of the Civil Code provides that when a city
or municipal police force refuses or fails to render
aid or protection to any person in case of danger to
life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily
liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall
be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action
herein recognized shall be independent of any
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RELATED CASES: constitutes a particular prescription making provinces, cities and
municipalities liable for damages for the death or injury suffered
PALAFOX vs. PROVINCE OF ILOCOS by any person by reason of the defective condition of roads,
(102 Phil. 1186) streets and other public works under the control or supervision
of said municipal governments.
The municipal corporation is not liable if the In other words, sec. 4 of RA 409 refers to liability arising
government employee was performing a government from negligence in general regardless of the object thereof,
task. whereas Article 2189 of the CC, governs liability due to defective
FACTS streets in particular. The Civil Code is decisive herein because the
The father of the petitioners Palafox was ran over by a present action is based on the alleged defective condition of a
heavy equipment, a truck, owned by the municipal corporation road.
causing the death of his son.
ISSUE JIMENEZ vs. CITY OF MANILA
Whether or not the municipal corporation is liable. 150 SCRA 510
HELD
At the time of the accident, the municipal corporation The municipality can be held liable for damages
was performing a governmental task and the one operating the caused to individuals as in the instant case.
equipment is a regular driver. So, the municipal corporation is FACTS
not liable. Petitioner went to Sta. Ana public market to buy
The exception to this rule is in the case of a special "bagoong" at the time when the public market was flooded with
agent. Let us say the regular driver was not around and the ankle deep rainwater. Afterwhich, he turned around to return
mechanic was ordered to drive the equipment. In this case, the home but he stepped on an uncovered opening which could not
mechanic is a special agent who caused injuries or death to third be seen because of the dirty rainwater, causing a dirty and rusty
persons and the municipal corporation is liable. four inch nail, stuck inside the uncovered opening, to pierce the
left leg of petitioner. Despite the medicine administered to him by
CITY OF MANILA vs. TEOTICO the latter, his left leg swelled with great pain. He was then rushed
22 SCRA 269 to the hospital where he had to be confined for 20 days due to
high fever and severe pain.
The municipality can be held liable for damages Upon his discharge from the hospital, he had to walk
caused to individuals as in the instant case. around with crutches for fifteen (15) days. His injury prevented
FACTS him from attending to the school buses he is operating. As a
Genaro N. Teotico fell inside an uncovered and result, he had to engage the services of one Bienvenido Valdez to
unlighted catchbasin or manhole as he stepped down from the supervise his business for a compensation of P900.00.
curb to board a jeepney. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the Petitioner sued for damages the City of Manila and the
manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces Asiatic Integrated Corporation under whose administration the
thereof to pierce his left eyelid. In addition, he suffered injuries Sta. Ana Public Market had been placed by virtue of a
and the allergic eruptions caused by anti-tetanus injections Management and Operating Contract.
administered to him in the hospital, required further medical ISSUE
treatment by a private practitioner. Whether or not the respondent City of Manila should be
Thus, Teotico filed, a complaint for damages against the jointly and severally liable with Asiatic Integrated Corporation
City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city for the injuries petitioner suffered
treasurer and chief of police. He contended that his injuries were HELD
due to the defective condition of a street which is "under the YES. In the case at bar, there is no question that the Sta.
supervision and control" of the City. Ana Public Market, despite the Management and Operating
ISSUE Contract between respondent City and Asiatic Integrated
Can the City of Manila be held liable to Teotico for damages? Corporation remained under the control of the former. The fact of
HELD supervision and control of the City over subject public market
YES, it can be held liable. At any rate, under Article 2189 was admitted by Mayor Ramon Bagatsing in his letter to
of the CC, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to Secretary of Finance.
attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, There is no argument that it is the duty of the City of
city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What Manila to exercise reasonable care to keep the public market
said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have reasonably safe for people frequenting the place for their
either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. marketing needs. While it may be conceded that the fulfillment of
Burgos avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this such duties is extremely difficult during storms and floods, it
circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or must however, be admitted that ordinary precautions could have
supervision" by the City of Manila, under RA 409. been taken during good weather to minimize the dangers to life
Insofar as its territorial application is concerned, RA and limb under those difficult circumstances.
409 is a special law and the Civil Code is a general legislation; but To recapitulate, it appears evident that the City of
as regards the subject-matter of the provisions of sec. 4, RA 409 Manila is likewise liable for damages under Article 2189 of the
and Article 2189 of the CC, the former establishes a general rule Civil Code, respondent City having retained control and
regulating the liability of the City of Manila for damages or injury supervision over the Sta. Ana Public Market and as tort-feasor
to persons or property arising from the failure of city officers to under Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
enforce the provisions of said Act; while article 2189 of the CC
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Petitioner had the right to assume that there were no and lessee remains as the law between them. Therefore, a breach
openings in the middle of the passageways and if any, that they of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages even
were adequately covered. Had the opening been covered, if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract.
petitioner could not have fallen into it. Thus the negligence of the
City of Manila is the proximate cause of the injury suffered, the TORIO v. FONTANILLA
City is therefore liable for the injury suffered by the petitioner. (October 23, 1978)
CITY OF MANILA vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT Holding a town fiesta is an act for the special benefit
179 SCRA 428 of a specific community and not for the general
welfare of the public.
Doctrine of respondeat superior. FACTS
FACTS The Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan,
The father of the litigating minors, died and was buried resolved to celebrate the town fiesta and created a "Town Fiesta
in the North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to Irene Executive Committee" to undertake, manage and supervise the
Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021. festivities. The Executive Committee created a sub-committee on
The lot where the mortal remains of the deceased was leased to "Entertainment and Stage", which constructed two stages, one for
the bereaved family for five (5) years only. The subject lot was the "zarzuela" and another for "cancionan." During the program
certified as ready for exhumation. people went up the "zarzuela" stage and before the play was over
On the basis of such certification, the authorities of the the stage collapsed, pinning underneath one of the performers,
North Cemetery authorized the exhumation and removal from resulting in his death.
subject burial lot the remains of the said deceased, placed the The heirs of the deceased sued the municipality and the
bones and skull in a bag or sack and kept the same in the councilors for damages. The municipality invoked that the
depository or bodega of the cemetery. Subsequently, the same lot holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental
in question was rented out to another lessee so that when the function from which no liability can arise to answer for the
plaintiffs herein went to said lot on All Souls Day, that the resting negligence of any of its agents. The councilors maintained that
place of their dear departed did not anymore bear the stone they merely acted as agents of the municipality in carrying out
marker. the municipal ordinance.
Irene Sto. Domingo (widow) was informed that she can ISSUE
look for the bones of her deceased husband in the warehouse of Whether or not the municipality can be made liable
the cemetery. But she holds that it was impossible to locate the HELD
remains of her late husband in a depository containing thousands YES, they can be made liable. SC held that the holding of
of sacks of human bones. She was even offered another lot but a town fiesta though not for profit is a proprietary function for
was never appeased. Thus, she filed a complaint against the city. which a municipality is liable for damages to third persons ex
ISSUE contractu or ex delicto; that under the principle of respondeat
Whether or not the operations and functions of a public superior the principal is liable for the negligence of its agents
cemetery are a governmental, or a corporate or proprietary acting within the scope of their assigned tasks; and that the
function of the City of Manila, if propriety, the city can be held municipal councilors have a personally distinct and separate
liable for damages from the municipality, hence, as a rule they are not co-
HELD responsible in an action for damages for tort or negligence unless
YES, the city can be made liable. In the absence of a they acted in bad faith or have directly participated in the
special law, the North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the commission of the wrongful act.
City of Manila which was created by resolution of the Municipal The failure of the municipality or its agents despite the
Board. The administration and government of the cemetery are necessary means within its command, to prevent the onlookers
under the City Health Officer, the order and police of the from mounting on the stage resulting in its collapse and death of
cemetery, the opening of graves, inches, or tombs, the exhuming one of the performers constitutes negligence from which liability
of remains, and the purification of the same are under the charge arises. Liability rests on negligence, which is "the want of such
and responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. The care as a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under the
City of Manila furthermore prescribes the procedure and circumstances of the case."
guidelines for the use and dispositions of burial lots and plots Article 27 of the New Civil Code which allows action for
within the North Cemetery through Administrative Order No. 5, s. damages against a public servant or employee who refuses or
1975. With the acts of dominion, there is, therefore no doubt that neglect without just cause to perform his duties covers a case of
the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City nonfeasance or non-performance by a public officer of his official
of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character. duty; it does not apply to a case of negligence or misfeasance in
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, petitioner carrying out an official duty.
City of Manila is liable for the tortious act committed by its agents The municipal councilors are not liable for damages
who failed to verify and check the duration of the contract of arising from the wrongful act of the municipal officials unless
lease. The contention of the petitioner-city that the lease is they participated in the commission thereof.
covered by Administrative Order No. 5, is not meritorious for the
said administrative order covers new leases.
Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was -END-
leased in favor of the private respondents. Hence, obligations
arising from contracts have the force of law between the God bless you!
contracting parties. Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor
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