State Prosecutors vs Judge Manuel T.
Muro
19 September 1994
A.M. No. RTJ-92-876
FACTS:
The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a complaint against
respondent Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violation of the
provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges
against Imelda Marcos in violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank
Circular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report published
from the 2 newspapers, which the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the
Pres. of the Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions. The respondent’s decision was founded
on his belief that the reported announcement of the Executive Department in the newspaper in effect
repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case
thus motu propio dismissed the case. He further contends that the announcement of the President as
published in the newspaper has made such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to
take judicial notice which is discretionary on his part.
The complainants contend that the respondent judge erred in taking judicial notice on matters he
purported to be a public knowledge based merely on the account of the newspaper publication that the
Pres. has lifted the foreign exchange restriction. It was also an act of inexcusable ignorant of the law not
to accord due process to the prosecutors who were already at the stage of presenting evidence thereby
depriving the government the right to be heard. The judge also exercised grave abuse of discretion by
taking judicial notice on the published statement of the Pres. In the newspaper which is a matter that
has not yet been officially in force and effect of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice on
the statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction published in the newspaper as
basis for dismissing the case.
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross ignorance of the law. It cannot
comprehend his assertion that there is no need to wait for the publication of the circular no. 1353 which
is the basis of the President’s announcement in the newspaper, believing that the public announcement
is absolute and without qualification and is immediately effective and such matter becomes a public
knowledge which he can take a judicial notice upon in his discretion. It is a mandatory requirement that
a new law should be published for 15 days in a newspaper of general circulation before its effectivity.
When the President’s statement was published in the newspaper, the respondent admitted of not
having seen the official text of CB circular 1353 thus it was premature for him to take judicial notice on
this matter which is merely based on his personal knowledge and is not based on the public knowledge
that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice of.
The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take
judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety
exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one
of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The provincial
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it
can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety.
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual
form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is
because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial
notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial
knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not
generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those
matters which are "commonly" known.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters
which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias,
dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety
and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of
every person.
Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a mere newspaper account
which is sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice removed, took judicial notice of the
supposed lifting of foreign exchange controls, a matter which was not and cannot be considered of
common knowledge or of general notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an administrative regulation
which was not yet in force when the order of dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that judicial
notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective. The reason is simple. A law which is not
yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and
unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the requirements before a court can take judicial notice
of a fact.
Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not proper for him, to have taken
cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet in force at the time the improvident
order of dismissal was issued.
