Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18793 October 11, 1968

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GETULIO PANTOJA, defendant-appellant.Office of the Solicitor
General for plaintiff-appellee.
Gamaliel Magsaysay for defendant-appellant.

CAPISTRANO, J.:

This murder case is before us for review of the sentence of

death passed upon the accused by the Court of First Instance of
Quezon.Late in the night of June 28, 1957, in the Barrio of
Malinao, Atimonan, Quezon, a group of seven young men serenaded
the house, where Estelita Erotes lived. Invited to come up, the
young men accepted the invitation. When Wenceslao Hernandez was
seated beside Estelita, an uninvited Philippine Army Sergeant,
Getulio Pantoja, in T-Shirt, came up and asked Hernandez to
allow him to sit beside Estelita, but Hernandez refused the
request. The time was about 1:30 A.M., June 29. Pantoja said
nothing and showed no sign of anger. However, he immediately
left and went to his camp about half a kilometer distant, put on
his fatigue uniform, got a rifle went back to the house and
stationed himself on the stairway. The time was about 2:00 A.M.
At this time, the serenaders left the house to go to and
serenade another house in the Northern part of the Barrio.
Pantoja followed the group. When the serenaders had walked a
distance of about thirty meters with Pantoja following them at a
distance of about five meters, Pantoja suddenly shouted "Ano
yan? Ano yan?" Turning their heads back they saw Pantoja raise
the garand rifle and aim at them. Before any of them could run
away, Pantoja fired two shots in rapid succession. The first
shot hit Angel Marasigan who instantly fell on his back. The
second shot hit Wenceslao Hernandez who fell down. The other
serenaders scampered away for safety. Pantoja, who had walked
nearer, then fired one more shot at the prostrate body of
Marasigan and four more shots at the prostrate body of
Hernandez.

The accused, testifying in his own defense, admitted that the

shots he fired from the garand rifle killed Marasigan and
Hernandez. The autopsy report attributed the deaths to internal
hemorrhage and the destruction of vital organs.

The lower court found the defendant guilty of double murder,

that is, of a complex crime, and sentenced him to the penalty of
death.

We immediately noted that the lower court erred in finding the

appellant guilty of a complex crime. Appellant's brief, however,
does not contain an assignment of this error. This
notwithstanding, we can consider the error, the case under
review being a criminal case.

It is well known to students of criminal law, as early as

thirty-five years ago, that, according to Article 48 as amended,
of the Revised Penal Code, there are two classes of complex
crimes. The first class comprises cases where a single act
constitutes two or more crimes. The second class covers cases
where one crime is the necessary means for committing the other.
The case at bar does not fall under the first class because in
this case there were two acts, two shots, one killing Marasigan,
and the other killing Hernandez. If there were only one shot
killing both Marasigan and Hernandez, there would have been a
complex crime, double murder. The second class, obviously, does
not cover the case at bar. We are of the considered opinion that
the appellant is guilty of two separate and distinct murders and
that he should suffer the penalty for each murder.

Appellant contends that the qualifying circumstances of evident

premeditation and treachery did not exist. The contention is
tenable with respect to evident premeditation because the
appellant only had about half an hour (1:30 to 2:00 A.M.) for
meditation and reflection from the time he left the house, went
to his camp, put on his fatigue uniform, got a garand rifle and
returned to said house, followed the serenaders a short distance
and then fired the two shots. The time in the circumstances was
insufficient for full meditation and reflection. It was
insufficient, in the juridical sense, for his conscience to
overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to
its warning. The contention is untenable with respect to
treachery.The appellant followed the serenaders as they walked,
made no indication that he would shoot, and then suddenly fired
from behind two shots in rapid succession at Marasigan and
Hernandez from a distance of about five meters. Under the
circumstances, clearly there was treachery.
Appellant contends that the generic aggravating circumstances of
abuse of public position and ignominy were not present. The
contention is meritorious.There is nothing to show that the
appellant took advantage of his being a sergeant in the
Philippine Army in order to commit the crimes. The mere fact
that he was in fatigue uniform and had an army rifle at the time
is not sufficient to establish that he misused his public
position in the commission of the crimes. With regard to
ignominy the mere fact that the appelant fired one more shot at
the prostrate body of Marasigan and four more shots at the
prostrate body of Hernandez is not sufficient to show the
existence of said aggravating circumstance.

Appellant contends that he should be given the benefit of the

mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The contention
is tenable. The evidence shows that immediately after the
commission of the murders, the appellant voluntarily surrendered
to his detachment camp commander to whom he also surrendered the
garand rifle, and that he was ordered confined in the stockade.

The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum

period to death (Art. 248, Revised Penal Code). There being one
mitigating circumstance, voluntary surrender, the penalty for
each murder should be reclusion temporal in its maximum period
in relation to the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

The appellant contends that the lower court erred in rejecting

his defense of insanity. The contention lacks merit. The legal
presumption of sanity is reinforced by the evidence showing that
when he committed the crimes, appellant was calm and collected,
and did not show any sign of anger. The fact that he fired four
more shots at the prostrate body of Hernandez, who had refused
his request to be allowed to sit beside Estelita, shows that
revenge was in his heart. The report of Dr. Cesar Catindig of
the V. Luna General Hospital where appellant was confined for
one month by order of the trial court does not show that
appellant was insane. It merely shows that he was suffering from
psychoneurotic depressive reaction and psychoneurotic
dissociative reaction. The report, however, concludes:

In the absence of reliable information it could not be

ascertained whether the crime imputed to him was committed
when he was in such a state of mind.

That part of the judgment below awarding compensatory damages in

the amounts of P6,000 to the heirs of Angel Marasigan and P6.000
to the heirs of Wenceslao Hernandez should be modified. In 1947,
when the Project of Civil Code was drafted, the Code Commission
fixed the sum of P3,000 as the minimum amount of compensatory
damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict. The Project
of Civil Code was approved by both Houses of the Congress in
1949 as the New Civil Code of the Philippines, which took effect
in 1950. In 1948 in the case of People vs. Amansec, 80 Phil.
424, the Supreme Court awarded P6,000 as compensatory damages
for death caused by a crime "considering the difference between
the value of the present currency and that at the time when the
law fixing a minimum indemnity of P2,000 was enacted." The law
referred to was Commonwealth Act No. 284 which took effect in
1938. In 1948, the purchasing power of the Philippine peso was
one-third of its pre-war purchasing power. In 1950, when the New
Civil Code took effect, the minimum amount of compensatory
damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict was fixed in
Article 2206 of the Code at P3,000. The article repealed by
implication Commonwealth Act No. 284. Hence, from the time the
New Civil Code took effect, the Courts could properly have
awarded P9,000 as compensatory damages for death caused by a
crime or quasi- delict. It is common knowledge that from 1948 to
the present (1968), due to economic circumstances beyond
governmental control, the purchasing power of the Philippine
peso has declined further such that the rate of exchange now in
the free market is U.S. $1.00 to almost P4.00 Philippine pesos.
This means that the present purchasing power of the Philippine
peso is one-fourth of its pre-war purchasing power. We are,
therefore, of the considered opinion that the amount of award of
compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict
should now be P12,000.Parenthetically, we should point out that,
in proper cases, besides compensatory damages in the sum of
P12,000, the courts may also award additional sums as further
compensatory damages for loss of earnings and for support. The
courts may likewise award additional sums as moral damages and
as exemplary damages. (Arts 2206 and 2230, New Civil Code.)

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment of the court below is hereby

modified by: 1. Sentencing the appellant for each murder to an
indeterminate penalty of from 15 years to 20 years; 2. Ordering
the appellant to pay the heirs of Angel Marasigan the sum of
P12,000 as compensatory damages, and to pay the heirs of
Wenceslao Hernandez the sum of P12,000 as compensatory damages.
Costs against appellant.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez,

Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.