Page |1

Spouses de Leon v CA as one for rescission of contract which is controlling. The CA correctly applied these
cases to the present one. Wherefore, the decision of the CA is affirmed.
287 scra 94 (1998)

Facts:
Cabrera v. Tiano,
Private respondents filed in the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for
annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of two parcels of land against petitioners. 8 SCRA 542 (1963)
Upon the filing of the complaint the clerk of court required private respondents to pay
G.R. No. L-17299 July 31, 1963
docket and legal fees in the total amount of P610. Petitioners moved for the dismissal
of the complaint on the ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over TOPIC: JURISDICTION
the case by reason of private respondents nonpayment of the correct amount of the
docket fees. Petitioners contended that in addition to the fees already paid based on FACTS:
the claim forP100,000 for attorney’s fees, private respondents should have paid
Under date of June 20, 1957, in action for "Partition and Recovery of Real
docket fees in the amount of P21,640 based on the alleged value for the two parcels
Estate, with Damages" was filed by Josefina and Cresencia against Tiano. In the
of land. Private respondents filed opposition to the motion to dismiss, The trial court
complaint, it was alleged that petitioners were entitled to a portion of the land, since
denied petitioners motion to dismiss but required private respondents to pay the
Josefina did not sign the sale and Crescencia was a minor at the time petitioners’ father
amount of docket fees based on the estimated value of the parcels of land in litigation
sold the land to the defendant; that defendant Tiano had usurped the portions
as stated in the complaint. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but
belonging to them, to their damage and prejudice in the amount ofP7,000.00, which
was denied. They brought the matter to the CA which rendered a decision annulling
consisted of their share in the produce of the property, during the period of
the orders of the trial court. The appellate court held that an action for rescission or
defendant's possession.
annulment of contract is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation and therefore, the
docket fees should not be based on the value of the real property, subject matter of In answer, defendant claimed that the plaintiffs herein knew of the sale and
the contract sought to be annulled or rescinded. that he was not aware of any defect in the title of his vendors. As a Special Defense,
defendant alleged that he was the absolute owner of the land by acquisitive
Issue:
prescription of ten (10) years, from the date of purchase. The court a quo rendered
WON the assessing of the docket fees to be paid for the filing of an action for the following judgment — WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby
annulment or rescission of a contract of sale, the value of the real property subject renders judgment declaring that the plaintiffs are entitled each to 1/8 of the property
matter of the contract should be used as basis as one which is not capable of pecuniary in question.
estimation
The trial court in the same decision, commissioned the Deputy Provincial
Held: Sheriff, to partition the property in question and render a report within 30 days.
Defendant moved for a reconsideration of the decision, contending that prescription
Conformably with this discussion of actions where the value of the case had already set in, and his (defendant's) title, had become irrevocable, and that the
cannot be estimated the court held that an action for recession of contract is one award of damages had no factual and legal basis. The motion for reconsideration was
which cannot be estimated and therefore the docket fee for its filing should be the flat denied on March 5, 1960. The Commissioner's report, partitioning the property was
amount of P200. 00 as then fixed in the former rule 141. We hold that Judge dalisay submitted on April 11, 1960. Defendant perfected his appeal on May 9, 1960, and on
did not err in considering as basically one for recission or annulment of contract which May 14, 1960,the same was given due course and elevated to this Court.
is not suspectible of pecuniary estimation. Consequently, the fee for docketing fee it
is P200 an amount already paid by plaintiff now respondent Matilda Lim. Thus, In claiming that prescription had taken place, defendant insisted that the
although eventually the result maybe the recovery of land, it is the nature of the action period should be counted from the date the summons was served on him, which was
on July 2, 1957. It was agreed, however, that the complaint for the recovery of the
 Page |2

land in question was presented on June 20, 1957, and the summons was sent out the As to the award of damages, the court found themselves devoid of ample authority to
following day. The Civil Code, provides that — review the same, since it involves appreciation of facts. It cannot be denied, as found
by the lower court, that plaintiffs herein are entitled to a share in the land.
The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the
court, when there is a written extra- judicial demand by the creditors, and Verily, they should also share in the produce, which, admittedly, was enjoyed by the
when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt of the debtor. defendant-appellant herein.
(Art.1155)
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed. Costs
Defendant-appellant claims that he had already acquired full ownership of against appellant in both instances.
the property in question because the judicial summons, which could civilly interrupt
his possession (Art. 1123, N.C.C.), was received by him only on July 2, 1957and the sale
in question was made on July 2, 1947. Sun Insurance v. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274 (1989)
ISSUE: Facts:
1. WON the defendant acquired the property by acquisitive prescription? Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) files a complaint for the annulment of a
decision on the consignation of fire insurance policy. Subsequently, the Private
2. WON the SC have the authority to decide as to questions of fact?
Respondent (PR) files a complaint for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a
HELD: writ of preliminary attachment in a civil case against SIOL. In addition, PR also claims
for damages, attorney’s fees, litigation costs, etc., however, the prayer did not state
1. NO. Conceding, for the purposes of argument, that the article cited is applicable,
the amount of damages sought although from the body of the complaint it can be
still appellant cannot avail himself of acquisitive prescription, for the simple reason
inferred to be in amount of P 50 million. Hence, PR originally paid only P 210.00 in
that no finding was made by the trial court that his possession from the time of the
docket fees. The complaint underwent a number of amendments to make way for
sale (July 2, 1947), was with just title, in good faith, in the concept of an owner, public,
subsequent re-assessments of the amount of damages sought as well as the
peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted (Arts. 1117 & 1118, N.C.C.).Good faith is a
corresponding docket fees. The respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by
question of fact which must be proved (Art. 1127, N.C.C.). For the purposes of
the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
acquisitive prescription, just title must also be proved, it is never presumed (Art. 1131,
N.C.C.). The factual requisite of adverse possession do not appear in the stipulation of Issue:
facts and the trial court did not make findings to this effect.
WON the Court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if private respondent
2. NO. These circumstances could and/or should have been ventilated, had the appeal did not pay the correct or sufficient docket fees.
been taken to the Court of Appeals
Ruling:
Defendant, however, having chosen to appeal the decision directly to this Court, he is
YES.
deemed to have waived questions of fact and raised only questions of law. There being
no factual finding by the lower court of the presence of the requisites of acquisitive It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
prescription this Court has to reject, as did the trial court, said defense. initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing
Moreover, on July 2, 1957, when the summons was received, the ten (10) years
of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court
necessary for acquisitive prescription had not yet elapsed. In fact, said period
may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
terminated on that very day.
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Same rule goes for permissive
counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings.
 Page |3

In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud regardless of the actual date of filing in court. Here, since the proper docket fee was
the government of the docket fee due not only in the filing of the original complaint not paid for the original complaint, it’s as if there is no complaint to speak of. As a
but also in the filing of the second amended complaint. However, a more liberal consequence, there is no original complaint duly filed which can be amended. So the
interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike in Manchester, the any subsequent proceeding taken in consideration of the amended complaint is void.
private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
Manchester’s defense that this case is primarily an action for specific
additional docket fees as required.
performance is not merited. As maybe gleaned from the allegations of the complaint
Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but subsequently, the as well as the designation thereof, it is both an action for damages and specific
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in the amount only of
been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee shall constitute a lien P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one for specific performance where
on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous.
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. Although the total amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of the
complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of the complaint totaled in the amount of
P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee. The Supreme
Manchester Development Corporation v. CA Court ruled that based on the allegations and the prayer of the complaint, this case is
an action for damages and for specific performance. Hence, it is capable of pecuniary
149 SCRA 562 estimation.
G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987 Further, the amount for damages in the original complaint was already
provided in the body of the complaint. Its omission in the PRAYER clearly constitutes
FACTS:
an attempt to evade the payment of the proper filing fees. To stop the happenstance
A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester Development of similar irregularities in the future, the Supreme Court ruled that from this case on,
Corporation against City Land Development Corporation to compel the latter to all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the
execute a deed of sale in favor Manchester. Manchester also alleged that City Land amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in
forfeited the former’s tender of payment for a certain transaction thereby causing the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees
damages to Manchester amounting to P78,750,000.00. This amount was alleged in in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib
the BODY of their Complaint but it was not reiterated in the PRAYER of same accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
complaint. Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00 only. Said docket fee is premised
on the allegation of Manchester that their action is primarily for specific performance
hence it is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The court ruled that there is an under Citizen Surety and Insurance Co. v. Melencio-Herrera
assessment of docket fees hence it ordered Manchester to amend its complaint.
Manchester complied but what it did was to lower the amount of claim for damages L- 32170 (38 SCRA 369) | March 31, 1971
to P10M. Said amount was however again not stated in the PRAYER.
Facts:
ISSUE:
Citizens Surety and Insurance Co (Citizens) alleged that at the request of
WON the amendment complaint be admitted. Santiago Dacanay, it issued 2 surety bonds to guarantee payment of P5K promissory
notes in favor Gregorio Fajardo and Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co respectively. As
HELD: security, the Santiago and Josefina Dacanay executed an Indemnity Agreement to
jointly indemnify Citizens for losses, costs and expenses (with 12% annual interest) and
No. The docket fee, its computation, should be based on the original
a REM over a parcel of land in Baguio. The Dacanays failed to pay the promissory notes
complaint. A case is deemed filed only upon payment of the appropriate docket fee
compelling Citizens to pay. The Dacanays failed to reimburse Citizens however, forcing
 Page |4

the latter to cause the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage and file a case to six hundred fourteen pesos (P1,614), and in security for its payment, executed a real
recover the unsatisfied balance. estate mortgage on a parcel of land in Pañgil, Laguna.

At petitioner’s request, the respondent Judge caused summons to be made Thereafter, defendant defaulted in the payment of the agreed monthly
by publication in the Philippines Herald. But despite such publication and deposit of installments; wherefore, plaintiff instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila an
copy with the Manila post office, the defendant did not appear within 60 days from action for the collection of the amount due on the note.
the last publication.
Judgment was there rendered for the plaintiff BACHRACH MOTOR.
Plaintiff sought the defendants to be declared in default, but the Judge
The other defendant herein, Oriental Commercial Co., Inc., interposed a
eventually dismissed the case, the suit being in personam and the defendants not
third-party claim, alleging that by virtue of a writ of execution issued in civil case No.
having appeared.
88253 of the municipal court of the City of Manila, the property which was the subject
Issue: of the mortgage and which has been levied upon by the sheriff, had already been
acquired by it at the public auction on May 12, 1933.
W/N summons made by publication is sufficient for the court to acquire
jurisdiction By reason of this third-party claim, the sheriff desisted from the sale of the
property and, in consequence thereof, the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff
Held:
remained unsatisfied. Whereupon, plaintiff instituted an action to foreclose the
No. In an action strictly in personam, personal service of summons, within mortgage. The trial court dismissed the complaint and, from the judgment thus
the forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the rendered plaintiff took the present appeal.
defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. In
ISSUE:
other words, summons by publication cannot – consistently with the due process
clause in the Bill of Rights – confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendants. Whether or not plaintiff-appellant is barred from foreclosing the real estate
mortgage after it has elected to sue and obtain a personal judgment against the
The proper recourse for the creditor is to locate properties, real or personal,
defendant-appellee on the promissory note for the payment of which the mortgage
of the resident defendant debtor with unknown address and cause them two be
was constituted as a security.
attached, in which case, the attachment converts the action into a proceeding in rem
or quasi in rem and the summons by publication may be valid. HELD:

Given the skill of debtors to conceal their properties however, the decision Yes.
of the respondent Judge should be set aside and held pending in the archives until
Section 708 of our Code of Civil Procedure which provides that:
petitioner tracks down the whereabouts of the defendant’s person or properties.
A creditor holding a claim against the deceased, secured by a
mortgage or other collateral security, has to elect between enforcing such
Backrach Motor v. Icarañgal, 68 Phil 287 (1939) security or abandoning it by presenting his claim before the committee and
share it in the general assets of the estate.
G.R. No. L-45350, May 29, 1939
Under this provision, It has been uniformly held by this court that, if the
Facts:
plaintiff elects one of the two remedies thus provided, he waives the other, and if he
Defendant Icarañgal, with one Jacinto Figueroa, for value received, executed fails, he fails utterly. (Veloso vs. Heredia, 33 Phil., 306; Cf. Osorio vs. San Agustin, 25
in favor of the plaintiff, Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., a promissory note for one thousand Phil., 404.)
 Page |5

The same rule applies under the Insolvency Law. There is indeed no valid subsequent action cannot be maintained to recover the damages resulting from the
reason for not following the same principle of procedure in ordinary civil actions. With unlawful detention."
the substitution of the administrator or executor in place of the deceased, or of the
The same doctrine is stated in Lavarro vs. Labitoria (54 Phil., 788), wherein
assignee or receiver in place of the insolvent debtor, the position of the parties plaintiff
we said that "a party will not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make
and defendant in the litigation is exactly the same in special or insolvency proceedings
it a basis for several suits" and that a claim for partition of real property as well as
as in ordinary civil actions.
improvements constitutes a single cause of action, and a complaint for partition alone
SPLITTING A SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION: bars a subsequent complaint for the improvements.

As we have heretofore stated, the creditor's cause of action is NOT ONLY The rule against splitting a single cause of action is intended "to prevent
SINGLE BUT INDIVISIBLE, although the agreements of the parties, evidenced by the repeated litigation between the same parties in regard to the same subject of
note and the deed of mortgage, may give rise to different remedies. (Frost vs. Witter, controversy; to protect defendant from unnecessary vexation; and to avoid the costs
132 Cal., 421.) The cause of action should not be confused with the remedy created and expenses incident to numerous suits." (1 C.J., 1107) It comes from that old maxim
for its enforcement. And considering, as we have shown, that one of the two remedies nemo bedet bis vexare pro una et eadem cause (no man shall be twice vexed for one
available to the creditor is as complete as the other, he cannot be allowed to pursue and the same cause).
both in violation of those principles of procedure intended to secure simple, speedy
For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single
and unexpensive administration of justice.
cause of action against the debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery
We hold, therefore, that, in the absence of express statutory provisions, a of the credit with execution of the security. In other words, the creditor in his action
mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage.
for debt or real action to foreclose the mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and, for
that reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and the
In other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By
mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and
such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two
both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only one cause
remedies is complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring personal action will leave
of action for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the rule
open to him all the properties of the debtor for attachment and execution, even
above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for
including the mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such personal action and
payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the
pursues his remedy against the mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment thereon
mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent
would still give him the right to sue for a deficiency judgment, in which case, all the
complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints simultaneously or
properties of the defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are again open to
successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, we will,
him for the satisfaction of the deficiency.
in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so much
In either case, his remedy is complete, his cause of action undiminished, and cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor.
any advantages attendant to the pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely
accidental and are all under his right of election.
Industrial Finance Corp. v. Apostol
Thus, in Santos vs. Moir (36 Phil., 350, 359), we said: "It is well recognized
that a party cannot split a single cause of action into parts and sue on each part 177 SCRA 521 (1989)
separately. A complaint for the recovery of personal property with damages for
FACTS:
detention states a single cause of action which cannot be divided into an action for
possession and one for damages; and if suit is brought for possession only a Spouses Padilla bought on credit 3 units of Isuzu trucks from Industrial
Transport & Equipment. They executed a promissory note for the balance of the
 Page |6

purchase price. This was secured by a chattel mortgage of said trucks and, as Therefore, by instituting this case in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
additional collateral, a real estate mortgage on their land. (Quezon City) to recover the unpaid balance on the promissory note from the Padilla
spouses and by subsequently obtaining a judgment in its favor, petitioner IFC is
The Padillas failed to pay several installments on the promissory note, the
considered to have abandoned its mortgage lien on the subject property
assignee Industrial Finance Corp. (IFC) sued them in the CFI for the recovery of the
unpaid balance including attys fees. CFI ruled on April 16, 1975 in favor of IFC. On Thus, finding no error in the summary judgment under appeal, the same is
appeal, CA sustained the CFI’s ruling except for modification of attorney’s fees from hereby affirmed in toto. Considering the length of time that this case has been
25% to 12% of the balance. pending, this decision is declared immediately executory.

Meanwhile, on Sep 9, 1971, private respondents Juan and Honorata

Delmendo filed a complaint against IFC, as principal party, and the Padillas, as formal
Progressive Development Corp., Inc. v. Court of Appeals
parties, in respondent CFI. The Delmendos alleged that they were the transferees of
the real property which was mortgaged earlier by the Padillas to Industrial Transport G.R. No. 123555, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 637
and Equipment, Inc. The Delmendos prayed for the cancellation of the mortgaged lien
annotated of the TCT and the delivery to them by petitioner of the owner’s copy of FACTS
said title with damages and attys fees, considering that IFC waived its rights over the
Petitioner leased to private respondent Westin Seafood Market, Inc., a parcel
mortgage when it instituted a personal action against the Padillas for collection of sum
of land with a commercial building. Private respondent failed to pay rentals despite
of money.
several demands by petitioner. Pursuant to the express authority granted petitioner
IFC moved for the dismissal of the complaint, contending that is has not under lease agreement, petitioner repossessed the leased premises, inventoried the
waived its right over the mortgage lien. The Delmendos filed a motion for summary movable properties found within and owned by private respondent and scheduled
judgment which the CFI granted. CFI ruled in favor of the Delmendos. IFC filed a public auction for the sale of the movables with notice to private respondent.
motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence this petition.
Private respondent filed with the MeTC a complaint against petitioner for
ISSUE: forcible entry with damages. At the hearing parties agreed, among others, that private
respondent would deposit with the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank in the
Whether or not, by filing a personal action for the recovery of a debt secured name of the MeTC, the amount of P8,000,000.00 to guarantee the payment of its back
by a real estate mortgage, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned, ipso jure, its rentals.
mortgage lien on the property in question.
Private respondent did not comply with its undertaking to deposit with the
HELD: designated bank the amount representing its back rentals. Instead, with the forcible
entry case still pending with the MeTC, private respondent instituted another action
Yes. A mortgage creditor may elect to waive his security and instead bring an
for damages against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
ordinary action to collect with the right to execute on all the properties of the debtor,
including the subject-matter of the mortgage. If he fails in the collection suit, he Petitioner filed a motion, to dismiss the damage suit on the ground of litis
cannot thereafter foreclose on the mortgage. pendencia and forum shopping.
Escolin: In case of splitting of a single cause of action, the ground for dismissal is res Judge Santiago denied the motion to dismiss. Thus, petitioner filed with the
judicata. Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari. But the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition due to the failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of
Escolin: If there is one cause of action but two remedies, the plaintiff should have
Judge Santiago's order, which, it explained, was a prerequisite to the institution of a
pleaded alternative remedies in his complaint.
petition for certiorari and prohibition.
 Page |7

Petitioner, aggrieved by the decision of the appellate court, filed the instant counterclaim and ordering the defendant to vacate the premises in question and to
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that it pay the plaintiff unpaid back rentals. From this decision, the defendant filed an appeal
erred in finding that petitioner failed to avail of its plain, speedy and adequate remedy with Branch Ill of the Court of First Instance of Cebu which rendered judgment
of a prior motion for reconsideration with the RTC. reversing that of the City Court. No appeal was taken by the plaintiff-appellant hence
the decision lapsed into finality and became executory. A writ of execution was issued
ISSUE
by virtue of which a notice to sell at public auction real properties belonging to the
Whether or not a motion for reconsideration should have been first filed estate of Susana Agustin was issued by the Deputy Sheriff to satisfy judgment in the
before resorting to certiorari. case. Plaintiff's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration, confessing his fault and
giving the reason why he failed to perfect the appeal on time. The motion was denied.
HELD Thereafter, with the aid of new counsel, the plaintiff-appellant filed a complaint with
Branch V, Court of First Instance of Cebu, against the defendant and the Deputy Sheriff
No. While generally a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before
of Cebu for the declaration of the nullity of the above-cited decision of Branch III, Court
resorting to certiorari in order to give the lower court an opportunity to correct the
of First Instance of Cebu in the ejectment case on the ground that the exercise of its
errors imputed to it this rule admits of exceptions and is not intended to be applied
appellate jurisdiction was null and void. The court sustained the defendant.
without considering the circumstances of the case. The filing of the motion for
reconsideration before availing of the remedy of certiorari is not sine qua non when Issues:
the issue raised is one purely of law, or where the error is patent or the disputed order
is void, or the questions raised on certiorari are the same as those already squarely I. Whether or not the present action for the annulment of the judgment in
presented to and passed upon by the lower court. the ejectment case is the proper remedy after it has become final and
executory.
In its motion for dismissal of the action for damages with the RTC petitioner II. Whether or not the Court of First Instance may, in an appeal, award the
raised the ground that another action for forcible entry was pending at the MeTC defendant-appellee's counterclaim in an amount exceeding or beyond
between the same parties involving the same matter and cause of action. Outrightly the jurisdiction of the court of origin
rejected by the RTC, the same issue was elevated by petitioner on certiorari before
the Court of Appeals. Clearly, under the prevailing circumstance, any motion for Held:
reconsideration of the trial court would have been a pointless exercise.
I. To this procedural dilemma, the solution lies in the determination of the
validity of the judgment sought to be annulled, for against a void
judgment, plaintiff-appellant's recourse would be proper. There is no
Agustin v. Bacalan question as to the validity of the court's decision with respect to the issue
of physical possession of property, the defendant-appellee's right to the
135 SCRA 340
same having been upheld. However, the plaintiff-appellant assails the
G.R. No. L-46000, March 18, 1985, money judgment handed down by the court which granted damages to
the defendant-appellee. By reason thereof, he seeks the declaration of
Facts: the nullity of the entire judgment. Plaintiff-appellant loses sight of the
The precursor of this case was a complaint for ejectment with damages filed fact that the money judgment was awarded the defendant-appellee in
by plaintiff-appellant Agustin, as administrator of the Intestate Estate of Susana the concept of a counterclaim. A defending party may set up a claim for
Agustin, against defendant-appellee Bacalan, before the City Court of Cebu. Bacalan is money or any other relief which he may have against the opposing party
a lessee of a one-door ground floorspace in a building owned by the late Susana in a counterclaim(Section 6, Rule 6, Revised Rules of Court). And the
Agustin. Due to nonpayment of rentals despite repeated demands an action to eject court may, if warranted, grant actual, moral, or exemplary damages as
him was filed wherein the City Court of Cebu rendered judgment dismissing the prayed for. The grant of moral damages, in the case at bar, as a
 Page |8

counterclaim, and not as damages for the unlawful detention of property Maceda v. CA
must be upheld. However, the amount thereof is another matter.
176 SCRA (1989)
II. It is well-settled that a court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a Facts:
set-off or counterclaim in excess of its jurisdiction (Section 5, Rule 5,
Revised Rules of Court; Ago v. Buslon,10 SCRA 202). A counterclaim A leased property originally belonged to the spouses Monserrat, a maternal
beyond the court's jurisdiction may only be pleaded by way of defense, aunt of the petition. After the spouses emigrated to the US they leased their house
the purpose of which, however, is only to defeat or weaken plaintiff's and lot in San Juan to the petitioner. As the house was old and run down, petitioner
claim, but not to obtain affirmative relief (Section 5, Rule 5, Revised Rules proposed to have it repaired and renovated subject to reimbursement of expenses
of Court). Nevertheless, the defendant-appellee, in the case at bar, set but Maceda introduced more improvements. Atty Zapata informed the petitioner that
up his claim in excess of the jurisdiction of the city court as a compulsory the properly has been sold to Pablo Zubiri . He was asked to vacate it. Maceda insisted
counterclaim. As a consequence, the doctrine enunciated under on being reimbursed for his improvements. An ejectment suit was filed against
the case of One Heart Club, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, an appellant Maceda in the MTC of San Juan metro manila. In his answer to complaint, Maceda set
who files his brief and submits his case to the Court of Appeals for up a counterclaim for the value of improvements. The MTC ordered him to vacate the
decision, without questioning the latter's jurisdiction until decision is premises and pay the plaintiff P2000 per month as compensation. Both parties
rendered therein, should be considered as having voluntarily waives so appealed to the RTC, which set aside the inferior court’s decision. It dismissed the
much of his claim as would exceed the jurisdiction of said Appellate ejectment complaint and ordered to pay Maceda P182, 000 for his necessary and
Court; for the reason that a contrary rule would encourage the useful improvements. The CA rendered a decision, modifying the decision. The CA
undesirable practice of appellants submitting their cases for decision to denied Maceda's claim for reimbursement of the cost of his improvements. It ruled
the Court of Appeals in expectation of favorable judgment, but with that the MTC lacked jurisdiction over the claim which exceeds P20,000. In his petition
intent of attacking its jurisdiction should the decision be unfavorable. for review of that decision, Maceda assails the setting aside of the money judgment
or award for his improvements.
The rule is that a counterclaim not presented in the inferior court cannot be
entertained in the Court of First Instance on appeal. The amount of judgment, Issue:
therefore, obtained by the defendant-appellee on appeal, cannot exceed the
WON the lower court erred in holding that the new owners need of the
jurisdiction of the court in which the action began. Since the trial court did not
premises is a legitimate ground for the judicial ejectment of the lessee.
acquire jurisdiction over the defendant's counterclaim in excess of the
jurisdictional amount, the appellate court, likewise, acquired no jurisdiction over Held:
the same by its decisions or otherwise. Appellate jurisdiction being not only a
continuation of the exercise of the same judicial power which has been executed Maceda's petition has no merit. The CA correctly ruled that the MTC did not
in the court of original jurisdiction, also presupposes that the original and have original jurisdiction over his counterclaim as it exceeds P20,000.
appellate courts are capable of participating in the exercise of the same judicial Correspondingly, the RTC did not have appellate jurisdiction over the claim. The
power. decision of the MTC of san Juan awarding him P158,000 on his counterclaim, and that
of the RTC raising the award to P182, 200 were invalid for lack of jurisdiction. The
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan trial court in a civil action for sum of money is limited
to a demand that does not exceed twenty thousand pesos exclusive of interest and
cost but inclusive of damages of whatever kind; A counterclaim beyond that
jurisdictional limit may be pleaded only by way of defense but not to obtain an
affirmative relief. Jurisdiction cannot be appropriated by a court no matter how well
intentioned it is, even in pursuit of the clearest substantial right, such as collection of
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judgment debt. Jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.

While it is true that under BP 8777 a lessee may not be ejected on account
of the sale or mortgage of the leased premises, the new owners need of the premises
for the construction of dwellings for its employees, coupled with the lessees failure to
pay the rentals since Dec. 1981 are to our mind, a legitimate ground for the judicial
ejectment of the lessee. Wherefore, dismissal of his counterclaim for the value of
improvements is affirmed.

Bayang v. CA

148 SCRA 91 (1987)

Topic: Cause of Action

Facts:

Bayang sued Biong for Quieting of Title with damages in 1969, which resulted
in a ruling in his favor in 1978. In 1978, Bayang sued Biong again but this time for the
income earned from the land while it was still in the latter’s possession from 1970 to
1978.

Issue

Whether or not the second case is barred by the first.

Ruling

The subject matter in the two cases are essentially the same as the income is
only a consequence or accessory of the disputed property. The claim for income from
the land is incidental to, and should have been raised by Bayang in his earlier claim for
ownership of the land. As the filing of the two cases constitute splitting of the cause
of action, the second case is barred by the first. Also, for about seven years, the
petitioner made no move at all to amend his complaint to include a claim for the
income supposedly received by private respondent during that period. He did not
make the proper claim at the proper time and in the proper proceeding. Whatever
right he might have had is now deemed waived because of his negligence.