CRIMINAL LAW 2

Case Doctrines/ Digests

U.S. vs.
Tabiana, G.R. Gelasio Tabiana, was a member of the municipal council, and had twice served as municipal president. He was also a candidate for reelection to the
No. 11847, 1 latter office. Julian Canillas was also a justice of the peace of the municipality. The two men were brothers-in-law and occupied the same house. One
February 1918 morning, a neighbor of Gelasio Tabiana had appeared before Julian Canillas, justice of the peace, and had procured from him a warrant for the arrest
of Tabiana and his herdsman upon the charge of a trivial misdemeanor, consisting of an alleged trespass committed upon the complainant's premises
by Tabiana's cattle.
The warrant for the arrest of Tabiana and his herdsman was placed in the hands of two policemen. The defendant showed some irritation and resisted
several times. At one point, Tabiana approached the policeman, Callado, and hit him in the breast with his hand or fist, at which instant the policeman
seized him by the wrist and resistance ceased. As the policeman started to carry the prisoner away two bystanders interfered and took him away from
the policeman. By this time Julian Canillas, the justice of the peace, had arrived on the scene and being evidently excited, he hit Callado on the back,
when he too was stopped by another policeman. Canillas also appears to have spoken other excited words little comporting with the dignity and duties
of his office.

ISSUE: Whether the accused were guilty of direct assult.

RULING: Yes.
From the proofs of record, we are convinced that everything done by Tabiana upon this occasion is properly referable to the idea of resistance and
grave disobedience. We discern in his conduct no such aggression as accompanies the determination to defy the law and its representative at all
hazards. Upon the previous occasions of his contact with the policemen on this day, Tabiana yielded, though with bad grace; and it is evident that he
would upon this occasion, have gone to the police station again if it had not been for the acts of others in rescuing him, and for the intervention of the
justice of the peace, who ordered the policemen to desist.
Upon the whole we find the defendant Tabiana guilty of resistance and serious disobedience to public authority under article 252, Penal Code, and not
of the more serious offense indicated in subsection 2 of article 249, Penal Code, which was applied by the Court of First Instance. The question
whether an offense consists of simple resistance or of grave resistance is to be determined with a view to the gravity of the act
proved and the particular conditions under which committed. In considering this question reference should also be had to the nature and extent of the
penalties attached by the authors of the Code of the different offenses. Thus, when it is observed that the offense indicated in article 249 carries with it
a penalty ranging from prision correccional to prision mayor in its minimum degree, with corresponding fines, it is obvious that the lawmaker here had in
mind serious offenses, characterized in part at least by the spirit of aggression directed against the authorities or their agents. It should be observed
that the circumstances mentioned in subsections 1 to 4 of article 250 are not qualifications of the definition contained in article 249 but are aggravating
circumstances which are to be used in the application of the penalties. This means that the mere fact that an offense of resistance happens to be
characterized by some circumstance mentioned in one of these subsections does not necessarily determine that the offense falls within the definition
contained in article 249. It is obvious, for instance, that a Government functionary may commit an offense under article 252 as well as under article 249;
and the relative gravity of the offense determines whether it falls under the one article or the other.

People vs.
Gumban, G.R. ISSUE:
No. 13658, 9 Whether the act of slapping the municipal president constitutes direct assault.
November 1918
HELD:
YES. In the present case, the crime involved is that of assault upon a person in authority, in which the force necessary to constitute this crime is
specifically defined by the law and consists in laying hands upon the person. In this case, it is not necessary to ascertain what force the law requires
in order to constitute an assault, since the law itself defines concretely this force in providing that it consists in laying hands upon the person. The law
simply mentions the laying of hands, without making any distinction as to the different cases, and it would not be just to make that distinction when the
law does not make it.
It is to be noted that the same provision of the law regarding intimidation or resistance as other constitutive elements of assault and it expressly
requires that they be serious. If the law had intended to distinguish between the case of a serious laying of hands and that which is not serious, it would
have laid down that distinction. This seems to indicate that the distinction which the law makes in the cases of intimidation or resistance is not intended
to be applied to the case of laying hands.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
People vs. Hernandez, then Governor of Camarines Norte, was tried and convicted of resistance to agents of persons in authority and arbitrary detention.
Hernandez, Hernandez ordered called and ordered the chief of police to arrest Gomez on the alleged ground the Gomez was committing an act of trespass to
G.R. Nos. dwelling and an abuse in the house in question by carrying away a chair by force.
39840-41, 23 Gomez was placed in detention until Hernandez wrote to the police that he will not be able to file an information on that same night, thus Gomez was
December 1933 released. He was in detention from 6pm to 8:45pm.

Ruling:
NO. There is no question that a sheriff may attach the property of a judgment or execution debtor if he is clothed with the necessary authority under a
judicial writ, as provided for in section 453 of Act No. 190. However, the facts showed that the provincial sheriff exceeded his authority in the
performance of his duties as such, and the rule in such cases is that the victim of the abuse has a legitimate right to defend himself. (People vs. Chan
Fook, 42 Phil., 230.) The appellant did nothing more than act in that sense and therefore he cannot be guilty of resistance. His was an act of legitimate
self-defense.
Sarcupuedes Sarcpuedes was convicted of direct assault upon a person in authority. He laid hands on a teacher-nurse in the school building by hitting her twice on
vs. People, the face with his raincoat and violently pushing her to the window because the teacher-nurse ordered the closing of a pathway across her land thru
G.R. No. L- which Hilarion and his wife to pass in going to and from the school for the reason to seek the teacher-nurse an explanation.
3857, 22
October 1951 Ruling:
Lucrecia was, on the day of the commission of the offense, a teacher-nurse of the Elementary Public School, among her official duties being to give
health instruction to the pupils to instruct teachers about how to give 1st aid treatment in the school clinic and to look after sanitary
facilities of the school. A teacher is expressly included in Art. 152 among the officials deemed to be persons in authority. She was engaged in the
performance of her official duties when the assault was committed. Lucrecia was hurt while performing her ordinary government tasks. The attack was
on occasion of her performance of her official work. She was pounced upon while engaged in the
performance of her official duties, within the meaning of Art. 148.
Clarin vs.
Justice of the
Peace, G.R. No.
L-7661, 30 April
1955

Justo vs. Court Facts: Accused challenge the district officer to fight outside because of the latter’s failure to accommodate accused for a teacher’s position.
of Appeals,
G.R. No. L- ISSUE: WON the offended party is still a person in authority after accepting to “go out” and fight
8611, 28 June
1956 RULING:
YES. The character of person in authority is not assumed or laid off at will, but attaches to a public official until he ceases to be in office. Assuming that
the complainant was not actually performing the duties of his office when assaulted, this fact does not bar the existence of the crime of assault upon a
person in authority, so long as the impelling motive of the attack is the performance of official duty. This is apparent from the phraseology of Article 148
of the Revised Penal Code, in penalizing attacks upon person in authority "while engaged in the performance of official duties or on occasion of such
performance", the words "on occasion" signifying "because" or "by reason" of the past performance of official duty, even if at the very time of the
assault no official duty was being discharged.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
People vs. A national election was conducted, Accused Mordeno and Fortun (private respondents), entered an elementary school, where poll clerks and
Ortiz, G.R. No. canvassers were holding their meeting for the canvass of election results.
L-15344, 30 That the accused attacked and boxed through violence the people in the said precincts, while the latter were in the performance of their duties as poll
May 1960 clerk, watcher and election inspector.

Ruling: A careful scrutiny of the allegations in the information aforequoted shows that the accused are charged to have committed not only the crime of
assault upon a person in authority defined in Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code but also that of disturbance of public order defined in Article 153 of
the same Code. For it is alleged therein that the accused by laying hands upon election inspectors and watchers in public places, had caused serious
disturbance and interrupted or disturbed public performances and functions. The accused are thus charged with the complex crime of assault
upon a person in authority with disturbance of public order.
Each separate crime charged in the information is, therefore, punishable with imprisonment of more than six months and a fine of more than two
hundred pesos. Consequently, they are, according to section 44, paragraph (f) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act 296), within the original
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.
People vs.
Balbar, G.R. Tiburcio Balbar allegedly entered the room where schoolteacher Ester Gonzales was conducting her classes. Without warning, he allegedly placed his
Nos. L-20216-7, arms around her and kissed her on the eye. Shocked, Gonzales instinctively pushed Balbar away and tried to flee. He allegedly brought out his "daga"
29 November (a local dagger) and pursued her, catching up with her before she was able to get out of the room. Balbar embraced her again, at the same time
1967 holding on to his "daga". They both fell to the floor, as a result of which complainant sustained slight physical injuries.

Ruling:
NO. The lower court’s dismissal of the information on the ground that there is no express allegation in the information that the accused had knowledge
that the person attacked was a person in authority is clearly erroneous.

People vs.
Baladhay, C.A., A school teacher officially travelling from one place to another to deliver school reports and school properties in compliance with a directive of his
67 O.G. 4213 superiors is considered engaged in the performance of official duty, and an assault committed against the teacher while on his way is direct assault
committed against the teacher while on his way is direct assault upon a person in authority. The duties of teachers are not limited to the confines of the
classroom because there are duties which are discharged by them outside the classrooms.

People vs.
Lunar, G.R. No.
L-15579, 29
May 1972
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
People vs. Loreto Renegado, a clerk, was sentenced with death penalty for stabbing Mr. Mamerto Lira, teacher, both working at Tiburcio Tancinco Vocational
Renegado, School, within the school premises. According to the witnesses, the accused planned to kill the victim because of ill-feelings which started when the
G.R. No. L- victim asked the accused to help him type the test questions for the former’s upcoming exam. The respondent refused which caused the victim to give
27031, 31 May a remark that: "you can finish your work if you only will sit down and work." After few days, the victim attacked the victim while the latter was drinking a
1974 bottle of pepsi cola.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the victim was stabbed during the performance of his duties as a public school teacher, thus, committing a crime of murder with assault
upon person in authority.
HELD:
The killing of Lira is complexed with assault upon a person in authority. A teacher either of a public or of a duly recognized private school is a person in
authority under Art. 152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 578. Appellant refused the request of Lira under pretext
that he had much work in the principal's office and furthermore that typing test questions for teachers was not among his duties; Lira reminded
Renegado that the principal gave necessary instructions for that purpose, and ended up with the remark: "you can finish your work if you only will sit
down and work"; Lira's remark was neither insulting nor slanderous but more of a reminder to Renegado that if he would sit down and work he could
finish all the work that had to be done; as a teacher of the school, Lira had the authority to call the attention of an employee of the institution to comply
with his duties and to be conscientious and efficient in his work; it was Renegado's violent character, as shown by his own evidence, which led him to
react angrily to the remark of Lira and conceive of a plan to attack the latter. Under these enumerated facts, We conclude that the impelling motive for
the attack on Mamerto de Lira was the performance by the latter of his duties as a teacher.

People vs. The provincial fiscal of Quezon, on behalf of the People, sought a review on certiorari of the "decision" of respondent court acquitting private
Court of First respondents as accused in the information filed against them for DIRECT ASSAULT upon an agent of a person in authority "not for any other reason
Instance, G.R. than the fact that the information under which they are being tried charges no offense at all”.
No. L-41045, 28
November 1975 ISSUE:
W/N the lower court erred in acquitting private respondents as accused in the information filed against them for direct assault upon an agent of a
person in authority "not for any other reason than the fact that the information under which they are being tried charges no offense at all

HELD:
YES. An information for the crime of direct assault is deficient if it does not allege the essential element of the crime that the accused had knowledge of
or knew the position of authority held by the person attacked, in this case, that of a barrio councilman (and hence the agent of a person in authority
under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 1978). The information must allege that the accused knew the position
of authority held by the offended party although it is not necessary to allege further that the accused also knew that such position is that of a person in
authority, since "this is a matter of law."
The Supreme Court ruled that since the "decision" of acquittal was really a mere dismissal of the information for failure to charge an offense and was
not a decision on the merits with factual findings, it is patent that the fiscal’s proper course is not present petition but the refiling of a valid information
against respondents-accused
People vs. RULING:
Lanseta, G.R.  The Court ruled that Direct Assault should have been complexed with Homicide, yet, since that complex crime has not been expressly
No. L-30413, 22 charged, there can be no conviction therefore. Hence, the accused should only be convicted of simple Homicide, attended by the mitigating
January 1980 circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same.
 Although the Information includes some allegations constitutive of Direct Assault, it is still deficient in that it did not allege an essential element
thereof, which is that the accused had knowledge of or knew the position of authority held by the person attacked.
 In the present case, although the Information alleged that the accused attacked and assaulted "Patrolman Quiterio Surilla a member of the
Manila Police Department, duly appointed, qualified and acting as such, and while in the performance of his official duties, " the same did not
allege that the accused knew or must have known that he was a policeman, although the evidence establishes that appellant had become
aware of the Identity of his victim because, as witness Asuncion Tura testified, the latter, who was not in uniform introduced himself as a
detective to appellant. Besides, appellant had allowed himself to be frisked and to be led away for investigation by the victim.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
People vs. FACTS: Appellants were found guilty of the crimes charged during the trial for 3 separate cases – i.e. the court finds accused Armando Seda and
Seda, G.R. Ricardo Austria guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of murder with direct assault; murder; and, attempted murder.
Nos. 44810-12, ISSUE: WON the trial court correctly convicted the appellants for murder with direct assault.
21 May 1984 RULING: No. Only murder will be considered because the deceased Chief of Police was not in the performance of official duty.

People vs. Pedrosa confronted the two about the false information they gave the municipal official concerning the alleged payment of the slaughter fee to him. A
Hecto, G.R. No. heated discussion ensued and the Hectos tried to attack Pedrosa. Mrs. Caridad Pedrosa pulled her husband away and the trouble was averted.
L-52787, 28
February 1985 Whether the complex crime of murder with assault upon a person in authority was committed by the accused.
 YES. The contention of the defense that the trial court erred in convicting them of the complex crime of murder with assault upon a person in
authority. They pointed out that when the barangay captain was killed he was not in actual performance of his official duties. Be that as it may,
the fact is, the attack on the deceased was occasioned by the official duties done by him. As the barangay captain, it was his duty to enforce
the laws and ordinances within the barangay. If in the enforcement thereof he incurs the enmity of his people who thereafter treacherously
slew him, the crime committed is murder with assault upon a person in authority.

People vs. Issue: Whether or not the accused can be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with assault upon an agent of a person in authority
Rodil, G.R. No.
L-35156, 20 Ruling: No. While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant knew because the victim, who was in civilian clothing, told him that he was an
November 1981 agent of a person in authority; he cannot be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with assault upon an agent of a person in authority, for the
simple reason that the information does not allege the fact that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was
an agent of a person in authority.

People vs. Facts: Both accused Regala and Flores were convicted by the trial court with crime of
Regala, G.R. murder with assault upon an agent of a person in authority qualified by the circumstances of
No. L-23693, 27 treachery and evident premeditation. Appellant Regala was enraged because the deceased (Sgt.
April 1982 Juan Desilos Jr.) pushed his companion Delfin Flores and admonished him not to get i n through
the exit gate, then pulled out his knife and stabbed the victim in the abdomen.
Issue: Whether or not he is guilty of complex crime of murder with assault upon an agent of a
person in authority.
Ruling: No, they were guilty of simple homicide aggravated by recidivism and by contempt
for or insult to a public authority or disregard of the respect due the offended party
on account of his rank. The appellant cannot be convicted of the complex crime of
homicide with assault upon an agent of a person i n authority because the i nformation
filed against appellant did not allege the essential elements of assault that the accused
then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a person
in authority.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
People vs.
Abalos, G.R. Facts: An information was filed in the trial court imputed the crime of direct assault with murder to herein appellant Tiburcio Abalos, alias "Ewet," with
No. 88189, 9 the allegations that he assaulted and struck said Sofronio Labine, a member of the Integrated National Police, with a piece of wood, while said Labine
July 1996 was engaged in maintaining of peace and order during the barangay fiesta of Canlapwas, of said municipality, thereby inflicting upon him "Lacerated
wound 2 inches parietal area right. Blood oozing from both ears and nose" which wound directly caused his death.

Issue: Whether accused is guilty of crime charged.

Ruling: Yes. Appellant committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are that there must be an attack, use of force, or serious
intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the assault was made when the said person was performing his duties or on the
occasion of such performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused must have the
intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority.

Here, Labine was a duly appointed member of the then INP in Catbalogan, Samar and, thus, was an agent of a person in authority pursuant to Article
152 of the RPC, as amended. There is also no dispute that he was in the actual performance of his duties when assaulted by appellant, that is, he was
maintaining peace and order during the fiesta in Barangay Canlapwas. Appellant himself testified that he personally knew Labine to be a policeman
and, in fact, Labine was then wearing his uniform.
People vs.  Appellee’s submission was that there was no voluntary surrender because appellant Sion surrendered to a mere barangay “Kagawad” or
Sion, G.R. No. Sangguniang Barangay member, and not to police authorities, implying that the former is not a person in authority
109617, 11 ISSUE:
August 1997 Whether appellee is incorrect in saying that Sion did not surrender to a person in authority.
Ruling: Section 388 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which expressly provides, in part, that “[f]or purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the
punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in
authority in their jurisdictions . . . .” This law expands the definition of a person in authority under the Revised Penal Code, wherein among the
barangay officials, only the barangay captain or chairman, now called Punong Barangay, is expressly considered a person in authority, as provided in
Article 152 thereof. Thus, in addition to the Punong Barangay, the members of the Sangguniang Barangay, or Kagawads, and members of the
Lupong Tagapayapa are now considered not merely as agents of, but as persons, in authority.

People vs. Facts: RTC Romblon found Julio Recto guilty of (1) two counts of complex crime of qualified direct assault with frustrated homicide, (2) complex crime
Recto, G.R. No. of qualified direct assault with murder and (3) homicide.
129069, 17 Issue: Whether or not the trial court was correct in convicting Julio Recto of the crime (1) qualified direct assault with frustrated homicide for Melchor
October 2001 Recto and Capt. Orbe.
Ruling:
No. The trial court erred in convicting appellant of qualified direct assault with frustrated homicide. In the case at bar, the victims, Melchor Recto and
Percival Oble -- being then the barangay chief tanod and barangay captain, respectively of Ambulong, Magdiwang, Romblon -- were clearly agents of a
person in authority. However, in the case of Recto, contrary to the findings of the trial court, he was not "engaged in the performance of his official
duties" at the time he was shot. Neither was he attacked "on the occasion of such performance." Thus, appellant's liability amounted only to attempted,
not frustrated, homicide. While in the case of Orbe, he was attacked on the occasion of the performance of his duty.
Appellants should therefore be convicted of attempted homicide for Recto and the complex crime of qualified direct assault with attempted homicide for
Orbe.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
Rivera vs. Rivera attacked Lt. Edward Leygo, knowing him to be a policeman by challenging the latter to a
People, G.R. fistfight and thereafter grappling and hitting the policeman on his face thus injuring him in
No. 138553, 30 the process while the latter was actually engaged in the performance of his official duties conducting a routinary patrol.
June 2005
Direct Assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in 2 ways:
a. By any person/s who, without a public uprising, shall employ force/intimidation for the attainment of
any of the purposes enumerated in the crimes of rebellion and sedition
b. By any person/s who, without a public uprising, shall attack/employ force/seriously intimidate/resist
any person in authority/any of his agents while engaged in the performance of official duties/on the
occasion of such performance
Rivera’s case falls under the 2nd mode, which is the more common form of assault and
aggravated when the assault is committed with a weapon/when the offender is a public
officer/employee/when the offender lays hand upon a person in authority.

Here, the evidence on record clearly bears out that it was Leygo who was attacked by Rivera,
not the other way around. Both the witnesses for the prosecution and the defense are one in
saying that it was only Rivera who was in confrontation with Leygo. Rivera’s anger started to
burst when the truck driver reported to him that Leygo prohibited the unloading of the chicken
dung and ordered him to return. That the other policemen did not retaliate is no basis for the
Court to affirm Rivera’s contention that Leygo was the aggressor.
Leygo was in the performance of his official duties as a police officer at the time he was
attacked. He was wearing the designated police uniform and was on board a police car
conducting a routinary patrol when he first came upon the truck unloading chicken manure.
Because the unloading of chicken dung was a violation of a municipal ordinance, Leygo ordered
the truck driver to return from where he came but Rivera commanded the driver not to listen to
the police.
Gelig vs. Parties are both public school teachers . The victim was the teacher of Appellants son. Accused-Appellant was charged with direct assault
People, G.R. for pushing victim thereby causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result, victim suffered contusion.
No. 173150, 28 Ruling:
July 2010
It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense against public order that may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or
persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of
rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist
any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.
Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. The pertinent portion of the provision reads as follows:
Art. 152. Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in Authority Who shall be deemed as such.
xxxx
In applying the provisions of articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors, and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly
recognized private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such
performance shall be deemed persons in authority. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 873, approved June 12, 1985).
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
Conquilla vs. Facts:
Bernardo, A.M. Conquilla charged respondent judge with usurpation of authority, grave misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law. Complainant alleged that on 4
No. MTJ-09- July 2008, a criminal complaint for direct assault was filed against her before the MTC of Bocaue, Bulacan. She contends that Judge has no authority
1737, 9 to conduct preliminary investigations pursuant to A.M. No. 05-08-[2]6-SC which provides that first level court judges no longer have the authority to
February 2011 conduct preliminary investigations.
Issue:
Whether or not the conduct of the respondent judge is a direct contravention of A.M. No. 05-8- 26-SC

Ruling:
Yes. The Resolution in A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC, which took effect on 3 October 2005, removed the conduct of investigation from the scope of authority of
first level courts judges.
MTC judges are no longer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation. The complaint was direct assault a public school teacher. The duration of
the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods is 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years. Thus, the offense charged against
complainant requires the conduct of preliminary investigation as provided under Section 1 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. It was therefore incumbent
upon respondent judge to forward the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for preliminary investigation, instead of conducting
the preliminary investigation himself.
U.S. vs. When Cosme Nonoy, the deputy sheriff demanded of the defendant, Cayetano Ramayrat, that he deliver the said land to the plaintiff, Sabino Vayson,
Ramayrat, G.R. the said defendant, Cayetano Ramayrat, voluntarily, unlawfully and criminally refused, and still refuses, to deliver the said land to the aforementioned
No. 6874, 8 Sabino Vayson. The provincial fiscal of Misamis, Agusan, and Surigao charged Cayetano Ramayrat with the crime of gross disobedience to the
March 1912 authorities.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of the crime gross disobedience to the authorities.
Ruling:
We do not think that the defendant disobeyed any judicial order whatever. The order issued by the justice of the peace and alleged to have to
have been disobeyed, is a writ of execution and addressed, as was natural and proper, to the competent sheriff, and not to the defendant. In it the
sheriff is commanded to place the plaintiff, Sabino Vayson, who had won in the suit against the herein defendant for the recovery of the property, in
possession of the said disputed land. Such command is made solely and exclusively to the sheriff, and not to the defendant.
U.S. vs. Facts: The policeman testified that he then informed the defendant that he came there for the purpose of arresting him, and the defendant asked him if
Bautista, G.R. he had an order of arrest, which question was answered by the policeman in the affirmative. Said policeman further testified that immediately after he
No. 10678, 17 had notified the defendant that he was a policeman and had an order of arrest, the defendant submitted to the arrest without further resistance or
August 1915 objection.
Issue: W/N guilty of resistance
Held: NO
-The whole record shows that the resistance given by the defendant was done under the belief that the persons who had entered his house were
tulisanes. The record also shows, by the declaration of the witnesses for the prosecution, that as soon as he had been informed that they were officers
of the law, armed with an order of arrest, he peaceably submitted and accompanied them. We do not believe that the- law contemplates the
punishment of persons for resistance of the authorities under circumstances such as those which are disclosed in the present case. If the defendant
believed that those who had entered his house were, in fact, tulisanes, he was entirely justified in calling his neighbors and in making an attempt to
expel them from his premises.

People vs. Jose Ma. Veloso was charged and convicted of the crime of Resistance of the agents of the authority. Police raided Parliamentary Club owned by
Veloso, G.R. Veloso which was proven to be a gambling house.
No. 23051, 20 Persons were apprehended including Veloso. Veloso contended that he was Representative Veloso and not “John Doe” as stated in the search
October 1925 warrant hence the police had no right to search the house.
Veloso insisted in his refusal to be searched so policeman took hold of Veloso only to meet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker and gave him a
blow which injured the policeman quite severely. Veloso was finally searched. It took two policemen to subdue him and gambling utensils were
obtained in his pockets. Veloso refused to obey and shouted offensive epithets against the policemen in the conduct of placing him in the patrol wagon.
Issue: W/N Veloso was guilty of Resistance and Serious Disobedience.
Ruling:
Yes. Veloso bit a policeman on the right forearm and gave a blow on another part of the body which severely injured the policeman, and it required 2
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
policemen to subdue him.

People vs. Tac- Appellant (Renato): convicted with qualified illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition and murder
an, G.R. Nos. Issue: W/N the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities.
76338-39, 26 Ruling: NO. While a teacher or professor of a public or recognized private school is deemed to be a "person in authority," such teacher or professor is
February 1990 so deemed only for purposes of application of Articles 148 (direct assault upon a person in authority), and 151 (resistance and disobedience to a
person in authority or the agents of such person) of the Revised Penal Code. In marked contrast, the first paragraph of Article 152 does not identify
specific articles of the Revised Penal Code for the application of which any person "directly vested with jurisdiction, etc." is deemed "a person in
authority." Because a penal statute is not to be given a longer reach and broader scope than is called for by the ordinary meaning of the ordinary words
used by such statute, to the disadvantage of an accused, we do not believe that a teacher or professor of a public or recognized private school may be
regarded as a "public authority" within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, the provision the trial court applied in the
case at bar.

Del Castillo vs.

People, G.R.
No. 185128, 30
January 2012

People vs. Facts: Ladislao Bacolod pleaded guilty to an information charging him with the crime of serious
Bacolod, G.R. physical injuries thru reckless imprudence committed on February 21, 1948 in Santa Fe, before the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Subsequently, he
No. L-2578, 31 was arraigned in another case for having caused a public disturbance on the same date.
July 1951 The accused with deliberate intent, and on the occasion of a dance held in the municipal tennis court in connection with the town fiesta, did then and
there willfully, criminally and feloniously cause a serious disturbance in a public place by firing a sub-machine gun which wounded one Consorcia
Pasinio, thereby causing panic among the numerous people present in the said dance who ran and scampered in all directions.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that the two informations do not describe the same offense. One is a crime against persons; but the other is an
offense against public peace and order.
 The first is punished under article 263 of the Revised Penal Code and the latter under article 153 referring to individuals disturbing public
gatherings or peaceful meetings.
 The proof establishing the first would not establish the second, it being necessary to show, besides the willful discharge of firearm, that there
was a dance in the tennis court in connection with the town fiesta, and that the people in attendance became panicky and terrified. The
offenses are not the same although they arose from the same act of Ladislao Bacolod. Consequently, conviction for the first does not bar
trial for the second.
 CRIMINAL LAW 2
People vs. FACTS: The appellant Romeo Doriquez was charged with the offense of grave oral defamation by insulting and saying defamatory words to Atty. Sixto
Doriquez, G.R. Demaisip. He was also indicted for discharge of firearm upon said attorney.
No. L-24444-45, Doriquez contends that the filing of the information for discharge of firearm has placed him in peril of double jeopardy as he had previously been
29 July 1968 charged with the offense of alarm and scandal in a complaint filed in the municipal court of Batad, Iloilo, upon the same facts which constitute the basis
of the indictment for discharge of firearm.
ISSUE:
WON the filing of the information for discharge of firearm has placed the accused in peril of double jeopardy as he had previously been charged with
the offense of alarm and scandal.
RULING:
NO. The offense of discharge of firearm is not the same as the crime of alarm and scandal, nor is it an attempt or a frustration of the latter felony.
Neither may it be asserted that every crime of discharge of firearm produces the offense of alarm and scandal. Nor could the reverse situation be true,
for the less grave felony of discharge of firearm does not include or subsume the offense of alarm and scandal which is a light felony.
Although the indictment for alarm and scandal filed under article 155(1) of the Revised Penal Code and the information for discharge of firearm
instituted under article 258 of the same Code are closely related in fact (as the two apparently arose from the same factual setting, the firing of a
revolver by the accused being a common element), they are definitely diverse in law. Firstly, the two indictments do not describe the same felony -
alarm and scandal is an offense against public order while discharge of firearm is a crime against persons. Secondly, the indispensable element of the
former crime is the discharge of a firearm calculated to cause alarm or danger to the public, while the gravamen of the latter is the discharge of a
firearm against or at a certain person, without intent to kill.