Sipiora and Baumlin: Rhetoric and Kairos page 1

Introduction
The Ancient Concept of Kairos

phillip sipiora


In ancient Greece, in the city of Olympia, a sanctuary to Zeus was erected at
a site where the first Olympiad was held in 776 b.c.e. According to Pausan-
ias, this site housed two shrines: “Quite close to the entrance to the stadium
are two altars: one they call Hermes of the Games, the other is the altar of
Opportunity. I know that a hymn to Opportunity is one of the poems of Ion
of Chios; in the hymn, Opportunity is made out to be the youngest child of
Zeus” (1935, 463). Opportunity is, of course, the god Kairos, who personifies a
seminal concept in ancient Greek culture that was strategic to classical rhet-
oric, literature, aesthetics, and ethics.1
Kairos is typically thought of as “timing,” or the “right time,” although its
use went far beyond temporal reference,2 as the essays in this volume demon-
strate. A fundamental notion in ancient Greece, kairos carried a number of
meanings in classical rhetorical theory and history,3 including “symmetry,”
“propriety,” “occasion,” “due measure,” “fitness,” “tact,” “decorum,” “conven-
ience,” “proportion,” “fruit,” “profit,” and “wise moderation,”4 to mention
some of the more common uses.5 In some critical ways, kairos is similar to an-
other master term, logos, in that both concepts generated many significant
definitions and interpretations and carried strategic implications for histori-
cal interpretation. Although many ancient writers from various arts have
capitalized on the richness of kairos, one ancient Greek in particular stands
out for having built an entire educational system on the concept—and that is
Isocrates, whose rhetorical paideia is structured upon the principle of kairos.
Further, Isocrates’ personal code of living is based on kairos, as articulated in
his many treatises suggests. I shall return to Isocrates later, in discussing how
he articulates the importance of kairos to rhetoric, as well as a modus vivendi.
Isocrates’ respect for the importance of kairos complements theories of Kairos
outlined by Plato and Aristotle—both of which are explored in James L.

1
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Kinneavy’s essay; indeed, Isocrates’ systematic treatment of kairos provides an

important historical backdrop against which other theories in this volume
may be contrasted.
Before turning to the importance of kairos in Isocrates’ life and work, I
would first like to sketch out its importance in the pre-Socratic traditions
that influenced the development of ancient Greek thought. These influences,
from literature, philosophy, and rhetoric as well as the medical arts and nu-
merology, reveal how dominant and pervasive was the concept of kairos in
antiquity. Let me begin by defining, tentatively, the concept of kairos.

Defining Kairos

As far as it has been determined, kairos first appeared in the Iliad, where it
denotes a vital or lethal place in the body, one that is particularly susceptible
to injury and therefore necessitates special protection; kairos thus, initially,
carries a spatial meaning. In Hesiod’s Works and Days, kairos takes on the
sense of “due measure” or “proper proportion”; for example, Hesiod cites the
overloading of a wagon, which can cause the axle to break. And Hesiod is
probably the source of the maxim, “Observe due measure, and proportion
[kairos] is best in all things” (Liddell and Scott). In time, kairos began to be
distinguished from chronos, or linear time.6 John E. Smith differentiates these
concepts as follows:

[W]e know that all the English expressions “a time to” are translations of the term
“kairos”—the right or opportune time to do something often called “right timing.”
This aspect of time is to be distinguished from chronos which means the uniform
time of the cosmic system, the time which, in Newton’s phrase, aequabiliter fluit. In
chronos we have the fundamental conception of time as measure, the quantity of du-
ration, the length of periodicity, the age of an object or artifact and the rate of accel-
eration of bodies whether on the surface of the earth or in the firmament above.
(1986, 4)

Chronos, then, might be distinguished from the “right time” or good time (eu-
kairos) and the “wrong time” to do something (kakakairos). Frank Kermode
characterizes the difference between chronos and kairos as that between chaos
and orderliness (1970, 64); kairos is that point of time between a fictional be-
ginning and an end, “a point in time filled with significance, charged with a
meaning derived from its relation to the end” (47). And in some cases there is
time that is without opportunity (akairos), a concept that to my knowledge
has been little explored.7 Prominent ancients such as Pindar, Theognis,

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Introduction 3

Solon, the Seven Sages (“Seal your word with silence and your silence with
the right time,” “Nothing in excess”), Aeschylus, Euripides, Sophocles, Me-
nander, the pre-Socratics, Pythagoras, some of the Sophists, Pericles, and
many others use kairos to signify various meanings. Kairos is also a significant
concept in the Bible, appearing hundreds of times in both the Old and New
Testaments. The first words of Christ call attention to the importance of tim-
ing: “The time [kairos] is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand” (Mark
1:14). And who is not familiar with this passage from Ecclesiastes (popular-
ized two millennia later by the Birds, a 1960s vocal group): “For everything
there is a season, and a time for every purpose under the sun: a time to be
born and a time to die . . . a time to kill and a time to heal . . . a time to weep
and a time to laugh.” Kairos was, and is, a seminal concept in numerous arts
and discourses.
The concept of kairos became a normative principle in Greek poets and
playwrights such as Hesiod, Theognis, Pindar, Aeschylus, Meletus, Euripides,
and Menander. The history of kairos in the development of philosophy is
equally important, particularly in the works of such pre-Socratics as Empedo-
cles and Pythagoras as well as in the later philosophies of Plato and Aristotle,
where it becomes a foundational term in the determination of ethics and aes-
thetics.8 It is in classical Greek rhetoric, however, that kairos became a truly
dominant concept, particularly in its pre-Isocratean and pre-Aristotelian in-
fluences. Kairos plays a major role in the First Sophistic movement, especially
in the works of Protagoras and Gorgias. The legacy of kairos continues in
Aristotle’s taxonomy of rhetorical principles (as Kinneavy’s essay in this vol-
ume demonstrates), particularly with regard to proof and style; it also assumes
major importance in Plato’s concept of a philosophic rhetoric and in Isocrates’
rhetorical paideia. In short, kairos was the cornerstone of rhetoric in the
Golden Age of Greece.
We owe much of our understanding of kairos in the ancient world to
twentieth-century Italian scholarship, much of which remains untranslated.9
Three scholars are particularly important for their examinations of pre-
Socratic thought: Augusto Rostagni, Doro Levi, and Mario Untersteiner. In
1922, Rostagni published the most systematic and comprehensive treatment of
the role of kairos in sophistic rhetoric, focusing on the influences of Pythago-
ras and, especially, Gorgias—whose early rhetoric drew upon the musician
Damon’s claims that harmony and rhythm are linked to psychological moods
and are capable of bewitching and persuading. The rhetor and musician, ac-
cording to Rostagni, are exponents of a single, fully developed doctrine that
grows out of the concept of kairos. Rostagni details the historical importance of
Antisthenes, a disciple of Gorgias, whose Peri lexeos e peri charakteron outlines

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the rhetorical doctrines of that period, particularly the influence of Pythago-

ras on the work of Gorgias.10 Pythagoras’ abilities as a rhetor are characterized
as polutropos—a key point of identification—because he demonstrates the
special rhetorical ability to invent language appropriate to specific classes of
listeners, the logoi paidikoi. This rhetorical ability demonstrates the art of kai-
ros (and, significantly, predates Plato’s assertion that philosophic rhetors must
seek to know the “souls of the audience”). According to Rostagni, the various
styles and manners of expression (polutropia loguo) aim at accommodating dif-
ferent audiences. If the discourse remains unchanged and unsuitable for a spe-
cific audience, it becomes polutropon, is rejected by the audience, and reveals
kakakairos. Rostagni recounts Gorgias’ Peri Kairou, which articulated the
principle that the mutability of discourse is justified and required by the ne-
cessity of adapting to rhetorical circumstances and exigencies, which include
the orientations of both speaker and listeners, the moment, the place, and so
forth.11 The “grasping of concepts” means to think in a particular way at a par-
ticular time, a function of epistemology. It is necessary, according to sophistic
rhetoric, that a rhetor “scientifically” know the various forms of the discourse
(eide ton logon), in order to avoid violating the rules of appropriateness (ton
kairon me diamartein); to alter the discourse for convenience (prepontos holon
ton logon katapoikilai); and to choose forms that are harmonious with each
other. All of these issues demonstrate the magnitude of kairos.
Rhetoric then, as an expression of kairos, became the center of education
for many of the Sophists.12 Rostagni outlines how Gorgias and Iamblicus
both drew upon Pythagorean teaching, which is based upon the combined
principles of kairos and dikaion. For Pythagoras, as well as for Gorgias, kairos
touches upon the problematic issue of knowledge.13 To frail human percep-
tion, things exist in an uncertain, ultimately unknowable way; a veil of sense
separates them, indeed, hides them from us. In accordance with kairos, there-
fore, we are compelled to maintain contrary perceptions, interpretations, and
arguments: opposing arguments—the dissoi logoi of sophistic rhetoric—re-
main equally probable, and yet the mystery of kairos enables rhetors to choose
one logos over another, making one and the same thing seem great or small,
beautiful or ugly, new or old. Drawing upon ancient sources, Rostagni con-
cludes that the cause and action of eloquence are part of a general theory of
art, the intellectual center of which would lie in the greater part of Greece
and in the school of Pythagoras:

Gorgias . . . glorifies the magical effects (goeteia, psychagogia) of logos and teaches
and explains that the rhetor must know, scientifically, the ways to the soul, from
which the speeches capable of spellbinding and persuading descend. He is a close
friend of Damone from Oa who, during the same years, in a fictitious oration ad-
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Introduction 5

dressed to the Aeropagites, defends music, showing the secret affinities that link
harmony and rhythm to various psychic moods, so that harmonies and rhythms are
actually capable of molding human character. The rhetor and the musician are ex-
ponents of a single, already fully-developed doctrine which includes two different
subjects. (1922, 149)

Along with Pythagoras, Gorgias (as a teacher of rhetoric) was an instru-

mental early figure in the theoretical development of kairos; yet it was Iso-
crates (considered by some, including Werner Jaeger, to be a Sophist) who
offered the first systematic treatment of the theoretical and pragmatic im-
portance of kairos to rhetoric and to social responsibility—the ultimate goal
of Isocratean paideia.
In his 1923 treatment of kairos in classical Greek literature, “Kairos in
Greek Literature,” Doro Levi points out the term’s etymological connections
to “death,” “ruin,” “breast,” “the seat of spiritual life,” “to worry,” “to care for,”
“to cut,” “to kill,” “to destroy.” In Homer, according to Levi, kairos usually
means “mortal,” whereas in Theognis its meaning as “opportunity” begins to
emerge, appearing later in the tragedies of Aeschylus. Passages from Euri-
pides reveal the transition in meaning from Homer’s “mortal” to the sense of
“decisive” or “opportune,” changes that occur in both verb and noun forms.
From death or “truncation of life,” the meaning shifts to decision or “trunca-
tion of doubt.” Levi also examines instances of kairos in the Seven Sages,
Thucydides, Democritus, and Pythagoras. In fifth-century literature, kairos
evolves to represent the “best opportunity,” which is the essential opportunity
to arrive at the “just measure” in conforming to whatever is necessary. It is
this evolution of the term that so influenced Plato, who found in the literary
uses of kairos a means to link together his concepts of ethics and aesthetics.
Levi’s groundbreaking 1924 essay, “The Concept of Kairos and the Philoso-
phy of Plato,” examines kairos as an ethical and aesthetic concept in Plato, one
that plays a significant role in shaping Plato’s notion of a “philosophic rheto-
ric.” Platonic aesthetics, according to Levi, is based upon principles of har-
mony, symmetry, and measure, while his ethics is based upon aesthetics, jus-
tice, and truth. Justice requires that citizens establish, within themselves, a
harmony mirroring (and supporting) just relations within the state; thus, indi-
viduals must connect together the many conflicting elements of which they
are made into a state of health or inner harmony. Central to Plato’s philosophy
(and, arguably, one of Greek philosophy’s greatest insights), this conception of
unity-in-plurality provides the connecting link between ethics and aesthetics;
and it is a link provided by kairos. Kairos is thus the fusion of ethical and aes-
thetic elements. Concepts such as the “divine logos” can be understood only if
one knows that conceptions of goodness and evil, life and death, and the cos-
mos can be known exclusively by the principle of proportion. Plato’s Protagoras,
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6 phillip sipiora

according to Levi, reveals that kairos establishes the moral value of human ac-
tions. And in the Philebus, an indisputable premium is given to proper meas-
ure as the first quality of the One, which is the beautiful and the harmonious.
Therefore, the first ethical principle in the Platonic system is the principle of
proper measure, or kairos. The principle of proper measure is also integral to
the emotions, especially love.
Love, according to Levi, is yet another Platonic theme delineated by the
principle of kairos. In the Phaedrus, Lysias’ oration prompts Socrates to articu-
late a doctrine of pure love, exemplified by his myth of the charioteer and the
two horses. The charioteer, in an anterior life, had experienced the contempla-
tion of the divine. Having fallen into the inferior world of the senses, he is at-
tracted toward the celestial sphere. In this world, one may perceive only the
beautiful. But after the reluctant horse is tamed, the bashful, timid lover fol-
lows the loved one as a god, allowing the supreme experience to take place: in
the lovers’ eyes is reflected the beauty which shines in the loved one. This ex-
perience leads one to perceive the essence of beauty (and its conjunction with
the true and the good). Again, physical beauty alone is transmitted through
the senses, and ideas (or ideals) of the good and the true cannot reveal them-
selves in appearances; only beauty remains in this domain. It is the memory of
beauty, however, that inspires conceptions of the divine, thereby transporting
the individual to a superior existence. The beautiful, therefore, provides a
means of transcendence to the good. The identification of the beautiful with
the good is a major issue in the Phaedrus, but what is significant is Levi’s con-
clusion that kairos provides the connecting link between these concepts.
Kairos is clearly a complex, multidimensional concept and, as Eric Charles
White points out in his seminal book, Kaironomia, there is much to learn
from the ancients’ treatment of the concept:
For Gorgias, kairos stands for a radical principle of occasionality which implies a
conception of the production of meaning in language as a process of continuous ad-
justment to and creation of the present occasion, or a process of continuous interpre-
tation in which the speaker seeks to inflect the given “text” to his or her own ends at
the same time that the speaker’s “text” is “interpreted” in turn by the context sur-
rounding it. (1987, 14)

White thus emphasizes the uniqueness and unpredictability of each occa-

sion, making it impossible for speakers to control discourse by planning or
by previous theory. Since each discourse must be shaped in immediate re-
sponse to the present occasion, instruction in kairos becomes virtually im-
possible. While theory, grounded in successful past discourse, provides mod-
els of right and wrong strategies, rhetorical theory cannot cast its net over
the unforseen, unpredictable, and uncontrollable moments. In a sense, then,
every rhetorical act becomes a reinvention of theory as well as of the dis-

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Introduction 7

course itself. Another way of describing the shaping influence of the ever-
emerging present occasion is to treat effective, kairic discourse as a mode of
“improvisation” (White, 14).
Kairos was clearly a strategic concept in the intellectual arts of the ancient
world, yet it is not until the time of Isocrates that we find its detailed expres-
sion in a full-scale program of rhetorical paideia. It was, indeed, the school of
Isocrates that taught the importance of socially responsible living—that is,
civic virtue—based upon rhetorical principles articulated in his Antidosis, yet
echoed in Isocrates’ many other discourses.

Kairos and the Rhetorical Paideia of Isocrates

Despite his general neglect by historians of rhetoric in English studies, Iso-

crates (436 – 338 b.c.e.) was a rhetorician/philosopher of such significance
that he has been referred to as the “father of the humanities” by scholars in
classics, speech, and philosophy. As Werner Jaeger remarks, “historically, it is
perfectly correct to describe him . . . as the father of ‘humanistic culture’ ”
(1971, 46). Henri Marrou echoes these sentiments, describing Isocrates as the
most important teacher in Greece’s Golden Age: “On the whole it was Iso-
crates, not Plato, who educated fourth-century Greece and subsequently the
Hellenistic and Roman worlds” (1982, 79).14 What may be Isocrates’ most im-
portant historical contribution, however, is his articulation of the critical im-
portance of kairos in rhetorical theory and practice.
Plato’s most detailed discussion of “philosophic rhetoric,” the Phaedrus,
concludes with Socrates’ observation that Isocrates “has a nature above the
speeches of Lysias and possesses a nobler nature; . . . something of philosophy is
inborn in his mind” (279a–b).15 This reference hints at the connection between
Isocrates’ “philosophy” (he does refer to himself as a cultural philosopher in
Against the Sophists) and kairos. James L. Kinneavy has argued that Isocrates’
oration, On the Peace (355 b.c.e.), was a strategic discourse because of its timing
and that it significantly affected the work of both Plato and Aristotle:
Plato, after this time, recognized two separate types of wisdom, one theoretical and
one practical, and permitted Aristotle to teach rhetoric for the first time in the acad-
emy. More important, the speech, the situation, and the practical success of Isocrates’
school of rhetoric critically influenced the young Aristotle. It was at this time that Ar-
istotle rejected the scientific ideal of Plato. (Greek Rhetorical Origins, 38)

Isocrates’ influence and reputation extended into the Roman world and be-
yond.16 Much of Isocrates’ success over nearly two millennia may be attrib-
uted to his formal system of rhetorical paideia, structured on the principle of
kairos. Isocrates’ school was arguably one of the most influential schools in

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8 phillip sipiora

Greek Antiquity, if not the predominant institution in the Golden Age of

Greece. One of Isocrates’ important contributions to rhetorical history is his
conjoining of phronesis or “practical wisdom” and pragmatic ethics within
the “situation” and “time” of discourse, an emphasis upon contexts that gives
primacy to the kairic dimensions of any rhetorical act.
In spite of the attention given to kairos by twentieth-century historians, no
one, to my knowledge, has offered a systematic articulation of the importance
of kairos in the rhetorical/cultural system of Isocrates.17 The general neglect
of kairos in Isocrates is surprising, given his importance in the rhetorical de-
velopment of the Golden Age and the fact that kairos, in its terminological
and conceptual forms, is ubiquitous in the Isocratean corpus. As a term, kai-
ros appears nearly one hundred times in substantive, adverbial, and adjectival
forms. In order to explore the importance of kairos in Isocrates’ discourse, let
me first summarize Isocrates’ system of phronesis and pragmatic ethics, and
then explore how kairos informs this code.18
Isocrates is quite explicit in several of his treatises about the goal of his
rhetorical paideia, which is to serve the public good in multiple arenas of
public and private discourse. Isocrates’ program stresses a pragmatic “ethics.”
His system proceeds from the belief that, once students became familiar with
certain rhetorical strategies—a weaving together of subject matter, invention,
context, and “style”—they would be able to join the ranks of “philosophers”
and become effective, socially responsible citizens. This conflation of rhetoric
and philosophy prepared students for “community service.” As Jacqueline de
Romilly puts it,

For Isocrates . . . learning to speak well is learning to arrive at ideas and advocate val-
ues that will be endorsed and prove effective. This ability, moreover, will win for
those who acquire it the esteem of their fellows; for the opinion of the community,
which is the sole criterion of truth and goodness, is also the finest recognition for
one who had proved worthy of it. (1985, 129)

This shift in emphasis is a remarkable rupture with earlier rhetorical schools

and traditions, many of which limited their “art” to a concern for mechanical
functions of speech. In contrast, Isocrates’ theory of rhetorical philosophy is a
process of seeking social “justice.” It is a modus vivendi, an ontology that con-
joins private and public activities.
Isocrates’ notion of social justice was situated within the personal ethics of
the rhetor, and Isocrates’ system emphasizes a pragmatic personal ethics by
which a rhetor’s credibility is determined by the reputation he or she brings
to the rhetorical situation. As he says in Antidosis: “[W]ho does not know
that words carry greater conviction when spoken by men of good repute than
when spoken by men who live under a cloud, and that the argument which is
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Introduction 9

made by a man’s life is of more weight than that which is furnished by

words?” (1968, 278). Further, Isocrates postulates a symbiotic relationship
between phronesis and effective discourse. Rhetoric cannot be successful
without their conjunction and Isocrates’ entire educational program is predi-
cated upon the notion that rhetoric and practical wisdom are interdependent.
Although Isocrates’ school was in direct competition with both Plato’s
Academy and Aristotle’s Lyceum, it is with Plato and his “divine” epistemol-
ogy that Isocrates stands in sharpest contrast. The Academy attempted to
train students to be dialecticians, the best of whom would be capable of lead-
ing the city-state. Isocrates’ paideia, on the other hand, promoted the educa-
tion of leaders in many areas—civic, military, and so forth—who would be,
above all else, pragmatic thinkers and speakers capable of understanding the
principle of phronesis, with a special emphasis on what is practical and expe-
dient under any given set of circumstance—the principle of kairos. Phronesis,
coupled with kairos, is integral to effective rhetoric and it must be part of a
speaker’s value system as it translates into social action:

[W]hile we call eloquent those who are able to speak before a crowd, we regard as
sage those who most skillfully debate their problems in their own minds. And if
there is need to speak in brief summary of this power, we shall find that none of the
things which are done with intelligence [phronesis] takes place without the help of
speech, but that in all our actions as well in all our thoughts speech is our guide, and
is most employed by those who have the most wisdom. (Antidosis, 1968, 257)

Practical wisdom, then, serves at least two functions: phronesis is necessary for
the activation of a preliminary, “internal” dialectic which, in turn, gives rise to
an “intelligence” that expresses itself in words and actions. This derived intel-
ligence is based upon a rhetor’s understanding of kairos. As Michael Cahn
points out, “Isocrates underlines what the concept of kairos in itself already
indicates: in rhetoric, a reliable correlation between rhetorical strategies and
desired effects cannot be prescribed because the situational factor is para-
mount” (1989, 133). And it is precisely because a rhetor cannot anticipate
every important situational circumstance that he or she must carry a flexible
attitude into any given rhetorical situation.
In Against the Sophists, his earliest known discussion of rhetoric, Isocrates
identifies attention to kairos as one of the most important characteristics of
effective rhetorical discourse. One of the reasons for the general ineffective-
ness of the Sophists, according to Isocrates, is their inability to recognize the
kairic exigencies of particular discourses. They fail to consider the right time
or make the appropriate adjustments in any given rhetorical situation. Ac-
cording to Daniel Gillis:
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10 phillip sipiora

The opportune moment must be chosen for a particular treatment of a theme, the
appropriate arguments for each of the historical events must be marshaled, and the
actual arrangement of the words must be skillful. The object of all these elements
forming good oratory is not the facile deception of the audience. (1969, 335 – 36)

In Helen Isocrates makes multiple references to the Sophists’ lack of under-

standing of kairos, going so far as to accuse them of failing to measure intel-
lectual distinctions:
[M]en have grown old, some asserting that it is impossible to say, or to gainsay, what
is false, or to speak on both sides of the same questions, others maintaining that cou-
rage and wisdom and justice are identical . . . and still others waste their time in cap-
tious disputations. (1)

Thus, kairos, like all preeminent terms in Greek rhetoric, encompasses prac-
tical as well as theoretical dimensions.
Isocrates exhorted other teachers of rhetoric to encourage their students
to be mindful of the kairos of rhetorical situations. As de Romilly points out,
“Isocrates had no faith in ‘instant’ formulas: after a discussion of the ‘general
themes used in speeches,’ he moved on to exercises, which were always re-
lated to practical situations. The pupil had to learn to choose arguments be-
fitting the occasion and arrange them in a complete speech” (1968, 130). An
understanding of the importance of kairos as a dynamic principle rather than
a static, codified rhetorical technique is integral to rhetorical success, as Iso-
crates argues in Antidosis: “[T]hose who most apply their minds to [discourse
situations] and are able to discern the consequences which for the most part
grow out of them, will most often meet these occasions in the right way”
(1968, 184). One important step in meeting these occasions “in the right
way” is to practice moderation in speech: “[W]hile we prize due measure
[eukairian] and affirm that there is nothing so precious, yet when we think
we have something of importance to say, we throw moderation to the winds”
(Antidosis, 311). The rhetor must anticipate all exigencies, since he or she can
never know the particulars of a discourse situation until actually situated
within it.
For Isocrates, an understanding of the principle of kairos means that the
rhetor remains accommodative—unlike some other philosophers and Soph-
ists, who are bound by rigid laws and systems. As he says in Against the Sophists:
I marvel when I observe these men setting themselves up as instructors of youth who
cannot see that they are applying the analogy of an art with hard and fast rules to a
creative process. For, excepting these teachers, who does not know that the art of
using letters remains fixed and unchanged, so that we continually and invariably use
the same letters for the same purposes, while exactly the reverse is true of the art of

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Introduction 11

discourse. . . . But the greatest proof of the difference between these two arts [philos-
ophy and rhetoric] is that oratory is good only if it has the qualities of fitness for the
occasion [kairos], propriety of style, and originality of treatment. (1968, 12 – 13)

The properly trained rhetor, unlike corrupt Sophists or facile philosophers, is

able to modify his or her discourse according to circumstances and to meet
the specific exigencies of each rhetorical situation, since each one involves a
unique set of circumstances.
Isocratean rhetoric, like Gorgian rhetoric, stresses the importance of the
particular moment or issue, rather than universals or ideals. In Antidosis Iso-
crates explains why he grounds his theory in practical situations. Teachers in
his school are instructed to “set [students] at exercises, habituate them to
work, and require them to combine in practice the particular things which
they have learned in order that they may grasp them more firmly and bring
their theories into closer touch with the occasions [kairon] for applying them”
(1968, 184). These occasions often involve personal encounters. For example,
Isocrates advises Demonicus (a wealthy young Cypriot) that he will best
serve his friends if he is able to discern the right time to assist them: “You will
best serve your friends if you do not wait for them to ask your help, but go of
your own accord at the crucial moment [kairois] to lend them aid” (To De-
monicus, 25). This emphasis on kairic thought and action in public and private
activities is characteristic of Isocratean rhetoric.
In Panathenaicus, Isocrates outlines the importance of kairos to political
diplomacy. In speaking of effective statesmen, Isocrates remarks: “[I]t be-
hooves a man of taste not to indulge his resourcefulness when he has more to
say on a given subject than the other speakers, but to preserve always the ele-
ment of timeliness no matter on what subject he may have occasion to speak”
(Panathenaicus, 34). In Panegyricus (7 – 9), similarly, Isocrates “adds that it is
important in oratory to be able to make proper use of the events of the past,
and at the appropriate time or Kairos” (Kerferd, 82). A significant number of
references elsewhere stress the importance of kairos (as appropriate time) in
rhetoric.
In his advice to Nicocles, Isocrates advises the King of Cyprus to measure
his emotions and behavior against the exigencies of the situation: “Do noth-
ing in anger, but simulate anger when the occasion [kairos] demands it.
Show yourself stern by overlooking nothing which men do, but kind by
making the punishment less than the offence” (To Nicocles, 23). A successful
monarch, according to Isocrates, must exercise caution in speech and behav-
ior and always be ready to capitalize on any given situation at the right time:
“Keep watch always on your words and actions, that you may fall into as few

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12 phillip sipiora

mistakes as possible. For . . . it is best to grasp your opportunities at exactly

the right moment [kairon]” (To Nicocles, 33). In Nicocles, writing in the per-
sona of King Nicocles, Isocrates offers advice on how a king’s subjects
should conduct themselves. In this discourse, kairos plays a major role in jus-
tifying monarchical rule. Nicocles argues that those who live in monarchies
are superior to appointed leaders because they “apply themselves to the
state’s business both day and night, do not let opportunities pass them by,
but act in each case at the right moment [kairon] ” (19). Nicocles emphasizes
the importance of virtuous behavior, claiming to have demonstrated his vir-
tue to the populace:

[W]e ought not to test all the virtues in the same set of conditions, but should test
justice when a man is in want, temperance when he is in power, continence when he
is in the prime of youth. Now in these situations [kairois] no one will deny that I have
given proof of my nature. (44)

Further, near the end of his address, Nicocles cautions his audience to ob-
serve prudence in economy, which is itself dependent upon the principle of
appropriateness: “Do not think that getting is gain or spending is less; for
neither the one nor the other has the same significance at all times, but either,
when done in season [en kairo] and with honor, benefits the doer” (50). Such
injunctions to pay heed to the principle of kairos are pervasive throughout
Isocrates’ treatises of advice to monarchs and aspiring leaders.
Archidamus is yet another of Isocrates’ discourses in which a political con-
flict illustrates the importance of kairos. In this case, the Spartan assembly
debates whether or not to wage war against Thebes over a land dispute. Ar-
chidamus III, son of ruling King Agesilaus, exhorts his fellow Spartans to
battle. His speech is noteworthy for several reasons: it reflects Isocrates’ sym-
pathy for Spartan policy (which is curious, considering Isocrates’ anti-
Spartan sentiment in other of his discourses); it is a lively and forceful po-
lemic, in spite of the fact that it was composed in Isocrates’ ninetieth year;
and it relies heavily upon a sensitivity to kairos, both the speaker’s and
audience’s. As other Spartans consider going to war over contested territory,
Archidamus argues that the exigencies of the (rhetorical) situation permit
him to ignore Theban legal claims: “I have not, it is true, recounted in detail
our original titles to this land (for the present occasion [kairos] does not per-
mit me to go into legendary history)” (24). In other words, the principle of
kairos permits Archidamus to embrace the most advantageous of several
competing logoi; in so doing he de-emphasizes the legal issues involved in
other counterclaims while inflaming the passions of the Spartan council.
Later in his address, Archidamus argues that kairos is a principle that guides
men to do, not what they are entitled to do but, rather, what they should do:
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Introduction 13

Those who advise us to make peace declare that prudent men ought not to take the
same view of things in fortunate as in unfortunate circumstances, but rather that
they should always consult their immediate situation and accommodate themselves
to their fortunes, and should never entertain ambitions beyond their power, but
should at such times [kairois] seek, not their just rights but their best interests. (Ar-
chidamus, 34)

The decision to make war or negotiate peace with Thebes depends upon the
expedient exploitation of particular political circumstances. Neither war nor
peace is necessarily the “correct” choice; rather, the proper course of action is
determined by taking advantage of time and opportunity. As Isocrates avers,

I know of many who through war have acquired great prosperity, and many who
have been robbed of all they possessed through keeping the peace; for nothing of
this kind is in itself either good or bad, but rather it is the use we make of circum-
stances and opportunities [kairois] which in either case must determine the result.
(49 – 50)

An individual or group that best understands the kairic dimensions of any

particular issue has a distinct advantage over an adversary. This message re-
verberates through many Isocratean discourses, particularly the Antidosis.
The “wise” or phronetic individual, according to Isocrates, must always be
aware that he or she lives in a contingent universe: “[P]eople of intelligence
. . . ought not to think that they have exact knowledge of what the result will
be, but to be minded towards these contingencies as men who exercise their
best judgment” (On the Peace, 8). In outlining a sequence of events necessary
for peace between Athens and her enemies, Isocrates emphasizes that each
step has a particular kairos: “I have already discussed most of the points which
bear upon this question, not in sequence, but as each fell into its opportune
place [kairois]” (On the Peace, 132). Isocrates considers the ability to act prag-
matically the mark of educated persons—that is, of individuals “who manage
well the circumstances which they encounter day by day, and who possess a
judgment which is accurate in meeting occasions as they arise and rarely miss
the expedient course of action” (Panathenaicus, 30 – 31). Isocrates’ central edu-
cational goal was the creation of just such a “citizen-orator,” a liberally edu-
cated person who could serve himself and others through intelligent speech
in private discourse, in the assembly, and (if need be) in the law court. If these
“public citizens” are of sufficient number and take it upon themselves to ded-
icate themselves to deliberative activity within the polis, the state has the po-
tential to rescue itself from present evils and head off future dangers. In order
for these citizens to govern effectively, however, they must be able to make
decisions according to the exigencies of particular intra- and international
situations. In Panathenaicus, Isocrates recounts the “opportunity” of earlier
Sipiora and Baumlin: Rhetoric and Kairos page 14

14 phillip sipiora

invasions of Athens and the Athenians’ successful “occasions” of resistance:

“All these whom I have instanced, having invaded our country,—not together
nor at the same time, but as opportunity [kairoi] and self-interest and desire
concurred in each course—our ancestors conquered in battle and put an end
to their insolence” (196). Such examples show how important the concept of
kairos was to the military and cultural imperialism rampant throughout many
of the Greek city-states.
Isocrates not only articulated the theory of kairos; he also practiced the
kairos he found so lacking in others. In spite of the fact that Alcidamas at-
tacked Isocrates for failing to practice kairos, the oration, On the Peace, dis-
tributed to members of the Athenian Assembly, successfully argued the futil-
ity of Athens and her allies pursuing a policy of hegemony. Also, Antidosis
was a timely response to the charges made against Isocrates and his educa-
tional system. In spite of the fact that the discourse appears years after the ac-
tual lawsuit, Antidosis was disseminated as a rebuttal to the accusation that
he, like Socrates, was a corrupting influence on the youth of Athens—a
charge that could result in exile or death. And even in this discourse of self-
defense, Isocrates notes that the principle of kairos determines which of his
previous orations he is going to quote: “I am not going to quote from [Against
the Sophists] my criticisms of others; for they are too long for the present oc-
casion [kairou]” (194). In his many treatises and letters, Isocrates consistently
emphasizes the importance of a rhetor understanding his or her audience and
the varying circumstances of the occasion.
Perhaps Isocrates’ emphasis on kairos is best summarized in Panathenai-
cus—one of his most ambitious discourses, since undertaken and published
when Isocrates was ninety-seven. In this treatise, Isocrates sums up the goals
of his rhetorical paideia:
Whom, then, do I call educated? . . . First, those who manage well the circumstances
which they encounter day by day, and who possess a judgement which is accurate in
meeting occasions as they arise and rarely misses the expedient course of action;
next, those who are decent and honourable in their intercourse with all with whom
they associate, tolerating easily and good-naturedly what is unpleasant or offensive
in others and being themselves as agreeable and reasonable to their associates as it is
possible to be; furthermore, those who hold their pleasures always under control and
are not unduly overcome by their misfortunes; . . . fourthly, and most important of
all, those who are not spoiled by success . . . but hold their ground steadfastly as in-
telligent individuals. (30 – 32)

This pragmatic, personal, and socially conscious recapitulation of what it

means to be “educated” encapsulates the principle of kairos in all its nuances:
the importance of living by phronesis or “practical wisdom” (which is itself

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Introduction 15

based on an epistemology of probability) with, always, an intense awareness

of occasion, audience, and situational context. Such is a life based on kairos.

In this volume, we have brought together essays that reveal the various his-
torical meanings, developments, complications, nuances, and implications of
kairos. Clearly one of the master concepts in the ancient world, kairos has
critical resonance for today’s world as well; indeed, the following far-reaching
essays demonstrate how strategic and dominant this concept has been and
continues to be. Excerpted here, Rostagni’s seminal essay explores the impor-
tance of Pythagoras’ treatment of kairos and its subsequent role in sophistic
rhetorical theory. As an expression of kairos, rhetoric becomes the foundation
of sophistic education. Further, for Pythagoras as well as for Gorgias, kairos
touches upon the problem of human knowledge. Kinneavy analyzes and eval-
uates the critical functions of kairos in the rhetorical theories of Plato and
Aristotle, pointing out the significance of kairos in Plato’s analysis of the rhe-
torical addressee and in Aristotle’s exposition of extrinsic appeals (particu-
larly the topoi), as well as the significance of kairos to rhetorical ethos. Carolyn
Eriksen Hill, applying Pythagorean and Gorgian theories of kairos, reconsid-
ers the conflicts between product- and process-orientations in composition.
In his germinal essay comparing chronos-time with kairic time, John E.
Smith examines the ways chronos and kairos differ in apprehending meta-
physical and historical dimensions of reality. Yet chronos and kairos are not
unrelated: kairos requires chronos, which becomes a necessary precondition
underlying qualitative uses of time; when taken by itself, conversely, chronos
fails to explain the crisis points of human experience—those moments, for
example, when junctures of opportunity arise, calling for ingenuity in appre-
hending when the time is “right.” Reconceived as a unity of kairos and chro-
nos, time thus furnishes an invaluable grid upon which the processes of na-
ture and historical order can be plotted and, by such means, interpreted and
understood. Amélie Frost Benedikt draws upon Smith’s essay in her outline
of an ethical system grounded in kairos; in addition, she examines various
uses of kairos from sophistic sources to contemporary culture. My essay on
the various meanings of kairos in the New Testament attempts to demon-
strate how strategic the Greek concept was to the formation of Christian
thought and narrative.
Richard Leo Enos investigates the role of kairos in the situational con-
straints of civic composition, particularly as writing in Greek society initially
served as a technological aid to the more primary and pervasive functions of
oral discourse. More specifically, Enos explores ancient Athenian archaeo-
logical and textual evidence that reveals inventional constraints placed upon

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16 phillip sipiora

writing used in the service of preserving oral discourse. John Poulakos exam-
ines the importance of kairos in Gorgias’ rhetorical compositions, particularly
in the way kairos functions within rhetorical texts. In Palamedes and Helen es-
pecially, Gorgias offers a glimpse of his practical principle of kairos, exempli-
fying ways in which texts can be composed so as to give the impression of
sensitivity to timeliness. Catherine R. Eskin explores the importance of kai-
ros in the medical treatises of Hippocrates, examining the most well-known
Hippocratic passages in terms of their technical emphasis on kairos. Hippo-
crates is especially interested in aligning kairos with experimentation, experi-
ence, incident, and phenomena, and he is opposed to any theorizing that is
separated from these contacts. Thus, the situational dimension of kairos be-
comes critical to Hippocrates’ scientific method. Joseph J. Hughes examines
kairos in the Roman world, principally through the concept of decorum,
which approximates kairos (but does carry quite the same panoply of mean-
ings). Noting that Cicero is the primary exponent of kairos/decorum in
Roman rhetorical culture, Hughes analyzes the movement of the concept in
Crassus Orator’s speech, De Lege Servilia.
James S. Baumlin explores the relationship between Ciceronian kairos/de-
corum and Renaissance rhetorical and ethical theory; in addition, he exam-
ines the various competing representations of time, as recorded in the age’s
popular emblem books. In a subsequent essay, he collaborates with Tita
French Baumlin in analyzing the strategic function of kairos in Elizabethan
revenge tragedy, particularly as it informs Hamlet’s attempted revenge. As
Baumlin and Baumlin argue, kairos plays a pivotal role in the age’s crisis re-
garding the powers of human reason and the Humanist aspiration to master
worldly fortune.
Gregory H. Mason, like Baumlin and Baumlin, finds kairos to be a strate-
gic issue in the interpretation of literature. According to Mason, the neglect
of kairos, of the qualitative dimension of time, has often skewed our culture’s
appreciation of the arts. In Japanese poetry, in contrast, the “haiku moment”
denotes a kairos when a seemingly commonplace event inspires poetry. Like
most lyric forms, the haiku is radically kairic, urging a sensitivity to experi-
ence that enhances the quality of each passing moment. Indeed, an aesthetic
based in kairos demands that our culture reconsider its received notions of ar-
tistic form; otherwise, we remain haunted by Neoplatonic, anti-kairic, and
static or “Ideal” criteria of evaluation. By means of such reassessment, Mason
suggests we might learn to bring a more strongly temporal perspective to the
entire spectrum of art (and of contemporary art in particular).
Roger Thompson argues for a theory of kairos that embraces both James
L. Kinneavy’s “right timing and due measure” and Paul Tillich’s “eternal
breaking into the temporal.” Indeed, aligning Tillich’s understanding of kairos
Sipiora and Baumlin: Rhetoric and Kairos page 17

Introduction 17

with Kinneavy’s opens up several new avenues of interpretation. Framing a

theory of kairos in spiritual terms allows one to reinterpret the rhetorical the-
ories of both Plato and Augustine. It also provides a critical new means to
interpret early and mid-nineteenth-century American literary and rhetorical
texts—texts that often self-consciously assert their spiritual and/or theologi-
cal import. Because American literary, rhetorical, and cultural history is per-
meated by a sense of divine urgency or mission, a theory of kairos that ac-
counts for this divine mission offers a more sensitive means of exploration. In
particular, Thompson examines Ralph Waldo Emerson’s invocation of the
“heroic” moment as prerequisite to “true” rhetoric, and places Emerson’s con-
ception alongside that of Plato and Augustine as embracing a kairos at once
historical and transcendent.
The essays in this collection thus range beyond Gorgias to explore notions
of kairos in Pythagoras, Hippocrates, Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, the
New Testament, Renaissance iconography, Elizabethan drama, American
Transcendentalism, and the Japanese haiku and tea ceremony. Beyond rhe-
torical theory (and praxis), the fields examined include theology, philosophy,
ethics, the history of medicine, psychology, aesthetics, literary theory, and
composition pedagogy. Kairos is considered in dynamic relation with other
philosophical and rhetorical concepts—for example, with the competing
temporalities of chronos and aion and the formal constraints of prepon or deco-
rum. Though ancient Greek in origin, the concept’s subsequent history is
charted through Roman, Judeo-Christian, Renaissance Humanist,
nineteenth-century American, and contemporary discourse; also duly noted
is its vital presence in Eastern literary-aesthetic culture. As the essays in this
collection thus attest, kairos remains a master concept cutting across ages,
cultures, and disciplines. It is time now to turn to the essays themselves.

Notes

1. Limitations of space preclude discussion of all of these disciplines, but let me

stress the importance of kairos for ethics. As Aristotle advises, “Know the critical situa-
tion in your life, know that it demands a decision, and what decision, train yourself to
recognize as such the decisive point in your life, and to act accordingly” (Nichomachean
Ethics 1.4.1096a32).
2. Eric Charles White explores antecedents of kairos that bring together two dis-
tinct notions of the concept: “Kairos is an ancient Greek word that means ‘the right
moment’ or ‘the opportune.’ The two meanings of the word apparently come from two
different sources. In archery, it refers to an opening or ‘opportunity’ or, more precisely, a
long tunnel-like aperture through which the archer’s arrow has to pass. Successful pas-
sage of a kairos requires, therefore, that the archer’s arrow be fired not only accurately but
with enough power for penetration. The second meaning of kairos traces to the art of
Sipiora and Baumlin: Rhetoric and Kairos page 18

18 phillip sipiora

weaving. There it is the ‘critical time’ when the weaver must draw the yarn through a gap
that momentarily opens in the warp of the cloth being woven. Putting the two mean-
ings together, one might understand kairos to refer to a passing instant when an opening
appears which must be driven through with force if success is to be achieved” (1987, 13).
Significant here is the conflation of spatial and temporal metaphors.
3. I have found nearly one hundred scholarly articles and monographs examining
kairos in classical rhetoric, literature, and philosophy. Kairos also plays a very important
role in the work of the noted twentieth-century theologian Paul Tillich, who has writ-
ten several books and nearly a dozen articles on this concept. Tillich’s general under-
standing of kairos emphasizes its role in the contextualization of codified systems. What
Tillich has done is to take Greek notions of kairos and distinguish them from logos
which, for him, denotes timelessness, particularly stasis in customs and laws. Kairos, on
the other hand, involves a qualitative, dynamic state of time. Tillich argues that it is kai-
ros that brings general theory, law, or custom into an individuated praxis (in particular,
see his “Kairos and Logos,” “Kairos and Kairoi,” and “Kairos I”). Tillich’s approach to kai-
ros would seem to have relevance to contemporary writing theory, particularly composi-
tion practice that is concerned with social and ideological contexts.
4. Gerhard Delling notes that in the period after Hesiod, kairos took on positive
tones. For poets and philosophers, kairos meant sophrosyne in the sense of “norm.” Kairos
also came to mean “wise moderation” and that which is “decisive.” Gerhard Delling
writes, “Kairos takes on the sense of fateful. Basic to this concept is that Moira forces
man to a decision by putting him in a specific situation” (1986, 455). Thus, he quotes Ar-
istotle: “ . . . Know the critical situation in your life, know that it demands a decision, and
what decision, train yourself to recognize as such the decisive point in your life, and to
act accordingly” (455).
5. There are more definitions of kairos than could reasonably be addressed in an
essay of this length. William H. Race, for example, discusses nearly a dozen different
meanings of kairos in Greek drama alone.
6. Chronos, as a Greek god, has an interesting lineage in regard to his grandson,
Kairos. Zeus was the youngest son of Chronos, who was the youngest son of Heaven
(Ouranos) and Earth (Gaea), who emerged from chaos, the Void that existed before
there was anything (Kelman, 59). For an extensive discussion of the gods Chronos and
Kairos, see Cook, “Appendix A: Kairos.”
7. In To Demonicus, Isocrates advises his addressee to avoid behavior that is inappro-
priate or akairic: “[Y]ou must avoid being serious when the occasion is one for mirth, or
taking pleasure in mirth when the occasion is serious (for what is unseasonable [akairon]
is always offensive)” (31).
8. Ethical implications of kairos can be found much earlier, as in Hesiod’s descrip-
tion of a man who violates his brother’s wife as “acting against what is proper” (parakai-
ros redzon) (Works and Days, 329).
9. There is, for example, a wealth of untranslated Italian scholarship related to many
areas of antiquity housed in La Biblioteca Nazionale in Florence, Italy.
10. Dale L. Sullivan, in a penetrating analysis of kairos in early Greek rhetoric, sug-
gests that Gorgias departs significantly from Pythagoras in his views on kairos: “In
[Gorgias’] Encomium of Helen, three meanings of kairos are apparent: poetic timing that
produces connections and thus a special logos, a point of indecision encountered when
competing opinions are presented, and a sort of irrational power that makes decision
possible. We might call these respectively the kairos of inspiration, of stasis, and of duna-
Sipiora and Baumlin: Rhetoric and Kairos page 19

Introduction 19

mis, or power. The first kairos is located in the mind of the speaker, who forms a logos but
does not yet express it; the second is in the audience who have not yet heard the logos;
and the third is in the dynamic situation occasioned by the release of the logos” (1992,
318 – 19). This insightful semiotic explanation is reminiscent of Aristotle’s configuration
of the pisteis.
11. Alcidamus, a student of Gorgias, contends that a speech given from a prepared
text ignores the context in which it is given: “For those who work hard on a written text
before a contest sometimes miss the right response [ton kairon amartanousin]: they either
become hateful to their audience by speaking longer than is desired or they stop prema-
turely when the audience wants to hear more” (qtd. in Wilson, “Due Measure,” 199).
12. The most detailed examinations of kairos in Gorgias are Augusto Rostagni,
Mario Untersteiner, and C. J. De Vogel. For a discussion of kairos in Alcidamas, see Val-
lozza, “Kairos nella retorica.”
13. Pythagoras and his followers believed that numbers are mystical in nature and of
cosmic significance, reflecting the natural order of things and the basic rhythms of life.
Aristotle notes in his Metaphysics that Pythagoras equates kairos to the number 7; all
human and cosmic events (birth, gestation, maturity, the orbit of the sun, and so forth)
are governed by rhythms of seven and, therefore, of kairos. According to Paul Kucharski,
Pythagoras taught that “kairos indicates the durations, or terms, or the times of fulfill-
ment which clearly mark the generations, the growth, and the development of human
beings” (143). In his analysis of the Pythagoreans, Wilhelm Roscher argues that Pythag-
oras and his followers identified kairos and health with the number 7: “it is the seventh
day (of illness) that is decisive [kairos] because it marks the turning point [krisis]
through which one passes, whether through amelioration or worsening of the condition
[thanatos] ” (qtd. in Kucharski, 147). According to De Vogel, kairos for Pythagoras in-
volved appropriateness in the entire cosmic-ontological order (1966, 118). There is no
question that kairos is a fundamental principle in Pythagoras’ numerological explana-
tions of human, natural, and supernatural events.
14. There has been some recent attention to the importance of Isocrates. Edward P.
J. Corbett, for example, lauds Isocrates as “the most influential Greek rhetorician among
his contemporaries” (596), while Kathleen Welch argues that Isocrates was a pivotal fig-
ure in the revitalization of Greek rhetorical culture: “The influence of Isocrates on the
classical world was immense. His concept of Greek unity and his system of education
based on rhetoric affected ancient Greek history and subsequently Roman culture”
(362). Further, Tony Lentz contends that Isocrates was the earliest significant writer in
ancient Greece: “Isocrates was the first individual who could be termed a ‘writer’ in the
modern sense of the term” (123). And Brian Vickers identifies Isocrates as the first
Greek to establish a permanent school for the teaching of deliberative and forensic dis-
course: “The pioneer who took the logical step of developing a school to train the
Greeks for political and legal speaking, with a fixed school . . . was Isocrates” (1988, 9).
15. There has been much discussion over whether this praise is sincere or ironic.
George A. Kennedy believes that this tribute “is probably an allusion to Isocrates’ early
association with and respect for Socrates compared to what Plato must have regarded as
an un-Socratic and even un-philosophic philosophy subsequently pursued” (188). For
other views, see Coulter, “Phaedrus”; Erbse, “Platons Urteil”; De Vries, “Isocrates in the
Phaedrus”; Howland, “The Attack on Isocrtes”; and Voliotis, “Isocrates and Plato.”
16. In Institutio Oratoria, Quintilian names Isocrates “the prince of instructors,
whose works proclaim his eloquence no less than his pupils testify to his excellence as a
Sipiora and Baumlin: Rhetoric and Kairos page 20

20 phillip sipiora

teacher” (2.8.14). Cicero praises him as “master of all rhetoricians” (De Oratore 2.2.94)
and cites him as an exemplary teacher: “He was a great orator and an ideal teacher . . .
and within the walls of his school brought to fulness a renown such as no one after him
has in my judgement attained” (Brutus, 32). Seventeen centuries later, no less a classicist
than John Milton would call him (in Sonnet X) “Old Man Eloquent.”
17. H. Wersdörfer, in his untranslated dissertation, examines the technical dimen-
sions of kairos in Isocrates by contrasting the rhetorician’s uses of ethical and aesthetic
kairoi.
18. See Wilhelm Süss, Ethos, 18 – 24 for a discussion of the influence of Gorgias on
Isocrates’ treatment of kairos.

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Introduction 21

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