THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 166536. February 4, 2010.]

FLOR MARTINEZ, represented by MACARIO MARTINEZ, authorized

representative and Attorney-in-Fact , petitioner, vs . ERNESTO G.
GARCIA and EDILBERTO M. BRUA , respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA , J : p

Before us is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
to annul and set aside the Decision 1 dated August 12, 2004 and the Resolution 2 dated
November 18, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61591, which
reversed and set aside the Decision 3 dated April 15, 1998 and Order 4 dated August
11, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Branch 267, in Special Civil Action
No. 574.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Respondent Edilberto Brua was the registered owner of a parcel of land located
in Mandaluyong, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certi cate of Title (TCT) No. 346026 of the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal, which is the subject matter of this case. The property was
rst mortgaged to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and such
mortgage was annotated at the back of TCT No. 346026 as Entry No. 91370, inscribed
on June 5, 1974. 5 On February 5, 1980, respondent Brua obtained a loan from his
brother-in-law, respondent Ernesto Garcia, in the amount of One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) and, to secure the payment of said loan, respondent
Brua mortgaged the subject property to respondent Garcia, as evidenced by a Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage 6 executed in respondent Garcia's favor. Since the title to the
subject property was in the possession of the GSIS and respondent Garcia could not
register the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, he then executed an A davit of Adverse
Claim 7 and registered it with the Registry of Deeds of Rizal on June 23, 1980 as Entry
No. 49853/T-346026, 8 which remained uncanceled up to this time. EAIaHD

Sometime in October 1991, respondent Brua requested respondent Garcia to

pay the former's loan with the GSIS, so that the title to the subject property would be
released to the latter. Respondent Garcia then paid GSIS the amount of P400,000.00
and, thus, the title to the subject property was released to him.
On October 22, 1991, a Deed of Absolute Sale 9 was executed between
respondents Garcia and Brua over the subject property, where respondent Brua sold
the property in the amount of P705,000.00. In the same deed, it was stated that the
subject property was only a partial payment of respondent Brua's mortgage
indebtedness to respondent Garcia, which he could no longer redeem from the latter.
Respondent Garcia then registered the Deed of Sale with the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
on October 24, 1991, and a new TCT No. 5204 1 0 was issued in the names of
respondent Garcia and his wife. However, the annotations at the back of the previous
title were carried over to the new title, to wit: Entry No. 56837, a Notice of Levy on
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 Attachment and/or Levy inscribed on January 8, 1981; 1 1 Entry No. 2881 showing a
Notice of Levy on Execution in favor of petitioner Flor Martinez, which was inscribed on
July 11, 1988; 1 2 Entry No. 3706, which was a Certi cate of Sale in favor of petitioner
inscribed on September 2, 1988; 1 3 Entry No. 72854, which was a Notice of Levy on
Execution in favor of Pilipinas Bank inscribed on December 8, 1981; 1 4 and Entry No.
16611 inscribed on October 24, 1991, which was the cancellation of respondent Brua's
mortgage with GSIS. 1 5
It appeared that the annotations found at the back of the title of the subject
property in favor of petitioner, i.e., Notice of Levy on Attachment and/or Levy, Notice of
Levy on Execution, and Certi cate of Sale, were all made in connection with petitioner's
action for Collection of Sum of Money, which she led against respondent Brua at the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 60, docketed as Civil Case No. 39633. In that case, a
decision was rendered in favor of petitioner, where the RTC ordered respondent Brua to
pay the former the amount of P244,594.10, representing the value of the dishonored
checks plus 12% interest per annum as damages and the premium paid by petitioner
for the attachment bond. The decision became nal and executory as respondent Brua
failed to appeal the same, and a notice of levy on execution was issued. A public
auction was subsequently conducted, where the subject property was awarded to
petitioner as the sole bidder in the amount of P10,000.00, and a Certi cate of Sale was
issued in her favor.
The annotation of Pilipinas Bank's Notice of Levy on Execution annotated as
Entry No. 72854 on the title of the subject property was by virtue of a civil case led by
Filipinas Manufacturers Bank, now known as Pilipinas Bank, against respondent Brua.
aCIHAD

On February 9, 1994, respondents Garcia and Brua led with the RTC of Pasig,
Branch 267, an Action to Quiet Title, initially against petitioner due to the
encumbrances/liens annotated on respondent Garcia's new title. They contended that
these encumbrances/liens were registered subsequent to the annotation of respondent
Garcia's adverse claim made in 1980, and prayed that these be canceled. Subsequently,
the complaint was amended to include Pilipinas Bank as an additional defendant.
Petitioner and Pilipinas Bank filed their respective Answers thereto.
Trial thereafter ensued.
On April 15, 1998, the RTC rendered its decision dismissing respondent Garcia's
action for quieting of title, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant complaint is hereby
dismissed for lack of merit and judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
defendants Flor Martinez and Pilipinas Bank as against plaintiffs Ernesto Garcia
and Edilberto Brua who are further directed to pay both defendants attorney's fees
in the amount of P50,000.00 each.

Accordingly, the judicial inscriptions particularly, Entry No. 3706/T-346026,

annotation of certi cate of sale and Entry No. 72854/T-346026 are held to be
valid, subsisting liens which do not constitute a cloud on Transfer Certi cate of
Title No. 5204. 1 6

In so ruling, the RTC found that the adverse claim which respondent Garcia
caused to be annotated on the previous title of the subject property, i.e., TCT No.
346026, on June 23, 1980 was predicated on his interest as a mortgagee of a loan, of
P150,000.00, which he extended to respondent Brua; that respondent Garcia's adverse
interest was merely that of a second mortgagee, as he was not yet the purchaser of the
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 subject property as of said date; that when the judicial liens, i.e., Notice of Levy on
Attachment and/or Levy and Notice of Levy on Execution, were caused to be registered
by petitioner on respondent Brua's title on January 8, 1981 and July 8, 1998,
respectively, by virtue of petitioner being adjudged judgment creditor by Branch 60 of
RTC Makati, respondent Garcia's claim became inferior to that of petitioner. The RTC
said that respondent Garcia's inaction to preserve his adverse claim as a second
mortgagee, which was inscribed on June 23, 1980, and his sudden decision to redeem
and purchase the subject property from the GSIS in October 1991 — when petitioner's
Notice of Levy on Attachment and/or Levy, Notice of Levy on Execution and Certi cate
of Sale were already inscribed at the back of respondent Brua's title — showed bad
faith on the part of respondent Garcia; that respondent Brua did not even testify or
participate in the case, except when he was impleaded as a plaintiff in the case. The
RTC did not give credit to respondent Garcia's claim that he and respondent Brua had
no prior knowledge of the occurrence of a public auction and the consequent
annotation of the certi cate of sale, and found respondent Garcia to be a buyer in bad
faith of the subject property. EaHIDC

The RTC also ruled that the Notice of Levy on Execution, which was annotated on
December 8, 1981 as Entry No. 72854 on respondent Brua's title arising from Civil Case
No. 7262 entitled "Pilipinas Bank v. Edilberto Brua," was a valid levy on the subject
property in favor of Pilipinas Bank. The levy could not be canceled, as this would impair
the interest of the bank which had been decided upon by a co-equal court. The RTC
found that the sale between respondents appeared to be tainted with bad faith, which
constrained petitioner and Pilipinas Bank from engaging the services of lawyers; thus,
the award of attorney's fees in the latter's favor.
Respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC on August 11,
1998.
Respondents led their appeal with the CA. However, respondent Brua failed to
le his appellant's brief; thus, his appeal was considered abandoned and dismissed.
Petitioner and Pilipinas Bank filed their respective appellees' briefs.
On August 12, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated April 15, 1998 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Granting the instant appeal, Entry No. 72854 (Notice of Levy on
Execution in favor of Pilipinas Bank), Entry No. 2881 (Notice of Levy on Execution
in Favor of Flor Martinez) and Entry No. 3706 (Certi cate of Sale in favor of Flor
Martinez) inscribed in TCT No. 346026 and carried over to TCT No. 5204, are
hereby CANCELLED. 1 7

The CA said that a subsequent sale of property covered by a certi cate of title
cannot prevail over an adverse claim, duly sworn to and annotated on the certi cate of
title previous to the sale; that while one who buys a property from the registered owner
need not have to look behind the title, he is nevertheless bound by the liens and
encumbrances annotated thereon; and, thus, one who buys without checking the
vendor's title takes all the risks and losses consequent to such failure. The CA found
that in order to protect his interest, respondent Garcia executed an A davit of Adverse
Claim on June 23, 1980, annotated it on the title of the subject property under Entry No.
49853 and it has remained uncanceled up to this time; that such adverse claim was
registered prior to the inscription of the Certi cate of Sale in favor of petitioner under
Entry No. 3706 and Pilipinas Bank's Notice of Levy on Execution under Entry No. 72854;
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 that the prior registration of respondent Garcia's adverse claim effectively gave
petitioner and Pilipinas Bank notice of the former's right to the subject property and,
thus, petitioner was deemed to have knowledge of respondent Garcia's claim and could
not be considered as a buyer in good faith at the time she purchased the subject
property in the public auction; that petitioner could not claim that she was a purchaser
in good faith, since respondent Garcia's adverse claim was entered on June 23, 1980,
eight years ahead of petitioner's Certi cate of Sale on September 2, 1988; that when
the Notice of Levy on Execution in favor of Pilipinas Bank was annotated on respondent
Brua's title, the sheriff who caused the annotation was charged with knowledge that the
property sought to be levied upon on execution was encumbered by an interest, which
was the same if not better than that of the registered owner thereof; and that such
notice of levy could not prevail over the existing adverse claim of respondent Garcia
inscribed on the title as can be deduced from Section 12, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
HEcTAI

The CA found that the RTC erred in concluding that respondent Garcia was a
purchaser in bad faith, since his adverse claim was entered in respondent Brua's title in
1980, and respondent Garcia could not have foretold at the time he caused such
annotation of adverse claim that petitioner would purchase the same property eight
years thereafter; and that while good faith is presumed, bad faith must be established
by competent proof by the party alleging the same; and, thus, in the absence of
respondent Garcia's bad faith, he is deemed to be a purchaser in good faith, and his
interest in the property must not be disturbed.
The CA also found that a Notice of Adverse Claim remains valid even after the
lapse of 30 days, as provided for in Sec. 70 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529
pursuant to our ruling in Sajonas v. CA ; that since no petition was led by petitioner for
the cancellation of respondent Garcia's Notice of Adverse Claim, the adverse claim
subsisted and his rights over the subject property must consequently be upheld.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in a Resolution
dated November 18, 2004.
Petitioner is now before us via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the
CA in issuing its assailed decision and resolution.
Petitioner contends that respondent Garcia's adverse claim is nothing but a
notice that he has an interest adverse to that of respondent Brua to the extent of
P150,000.00, which was the amount of the loan secured by a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage executed by respondent Brua in favor of respondent Garcia; that the adverse
claim cannot be said to be superior to a nal sale conducted by the sheriff by authority
of the court pursuant to a judgment that has attained nality; that Sajonas v. CA, on
which the CA anchored its decision, differs from this case, since the adverse claim
made in the title by therein petitioner Sajonas was by virtue of a contract to sell; that
unlike in this case, respondent Garcia caused the annotation of his adverse claim as a
mortgagee of respondent Brua in the amount of P150,000.00 in 1980; and respondent
Garcia's payment of the GSIS loan in 1991, upon the request of respondent Brua, was
presumably for the reason that respondent Brua could no longer discharge the GSIS
obligation; and to avoid the foreclosure of the property by the GSIS, respondent Brua
asked Garcia to redeem it; that respondent Garcia's adverse claim in 1980 was not as a
vendee of the property like in Sajonas, but merely as a mortgagee. acCITS

Petitioner admits that respondent Garcia, as a mortgagee on the basis of which

an adverse claim was inscribed on the title of the subject property, is protected by Sec.
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 12, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court; and, thus, petitioner knows that she is obliged as a
vendee in the public sale to pay liens and encumbrances then existing at the time of the
sale on September 2, 1988, which necessarily included the adverse claim of respondent
Garcia in the amount of P150,000.00.
In his Comment, respondent Garcia claims that the petition faces outright
dismissal, since the appropriate remedy of the petitioner should have been a petition
for review under Rule 45 which had already lapsed; that when the CA reversed the RTC
decision, such action did not constitute grave abuse of discretion since it had legal
basis; that any lien or adverse claim earlier inscribed prevails over those liens or
adverse claims inscribed subsequent thereto.
Respondent Brua did not le his comment. Thus, we dispensed with the ling of
the same in a Resolution dated June 19, 2006.
Petitioner led her Reply, arguing that a petition for certiorari may be availed of
where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual.
The parties submitted their respective memoranda as required in Our Resolution
dated August 30, 2006.
We dismiss the petition.
Petitioner should have led a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court instead of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, since she is assailing the CA
decision and resolution which are nal judgments. Rule 45 clearly provides that
decisions, nal orders or resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature
of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by ling a petition for
review, which is just a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. 1 8
And the petition for review must be led within fteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or nal order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of petitioner's
motion for a new trial or reconsideration led in due time after notice of the judgment.
19

In this case, petitioner received a copy of the CA Resolution denying her motion
for reconsideration on November 24, 2004; and, thus, under Rule 45, she has 15 days
from receipt of such resolution, or until December 9, 2004, to le a petition for review.
However, petitioner did not le a petition for review; instead, she led a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 on January 24, 2005. 2 0 Hence, the CA decision and resolution
have already attained finality, and petitioner has lost her right to appeal.DHIaTS

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, a board or an o cer

exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. 2 1 In this case, petitioner had the remedy of appeal, and it was
the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, a special civil
action for certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal that the petitioner has
already lost. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a
judgment to the proper forum despite the availability of that remedy, certiorari not
being a substitute for a lost appeal. 2 2 Certiorari will not be a cure for failure to timely
file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. 2 3
While there are instances where the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be
resorted to despite the availability of an appeal, the long line of decisions denying the
special civil action for certiorari, either before appeal was availed of or in instances
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 where the appeal period had lapsed, far outnumber the instances where certiorari was
given due course. 2 4 The few signi cant exceptions are: (1) when public welfare and the
advancement of public policy dictate; (2) when the broader interests of justice so
require; (3) when the writs issued are null; (4) when the questioned order amounts to an
oppressive exercise of judicial authority, 2 5 which we nd to be not present in this case.
Notably, petitioner did not even fail to advance an explanation why appeal was not
availed of, nor was there any showing that the issue raised in the petition for certiorari
could not be raised on appeal. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of
procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately
explain his failure to abide by the rules. 2 6
In fact, the argument raised by petitioner, i.e., that the Court of Appeals had no
legal authority to vary the ndings of the trial court and substitute its own conclusion,
which were patently contrary to the trial court's ndings, and conclusion, relates to the
wisdom and soundness of the assailed CA decision and resolution. Where the issue or
question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision — not the
jurisdiction of the court to render said decision — the same is beyond the province of a
special civil action for certiorari. 2 7 Erroneous ndings and conclusions do not render
the appellate court vulnerable to the corrective writ of certiorari, for where the court has
jurisdiction over the case, even if its ndings are not correct, these would, at the most,
constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctable by certiorari. 2 8 For if
every error committed by the trial court or quasi-judicial agency were to be the proper
subject of review by certiorari, then trial would never end, and the dockets of appellate
courts would be clogged beyond measure. 2 9
Even if we consider this petition for certiorari under Rule 65, it must be shown
that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and not mere errors of judgment, for the petition to be granted. 3 0 As we
said, certiorari is not a remedy for errors of judgment, which are correctible by appeal.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and mere abuse of discretion is not
enough — it must be grave. 3 1 EICSTa

Petitioner contends that the adverse claim of respondent Garcia inscribed on the
title of the subject property is but a notice that the latter has an interest adverse to
respondent Brua's title, to the extent of P150,000.00 secured by a real estate
mortgage, and such adverse claim cannot be considered superior to that of a nal sale
conducted by the sheriff by virtue of a court judgment that has attained finality.
Sec. 12, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 12. Effect of levy on execution as to third persons. — The
levy on execution shall create a lien in favor of the judgment obligee over the
right, title and interest of the judgment obligor in such property at the time of the
levy, subject to liens and encumbrances then existing.

Clearly, the levy does not make the judgment creditor the owner of the property
levied upon. He merely obtains a lien. 3 2 Such levy on execution is subject and
subordinate to all valid claims and liens existing against the property at the time the
execution lien attached, such as real estate mortgages. 3 3
Respondent Garcia's adverse claim, which refers to the deed of mortgage
executed by respondent Brua in his favor, was annotated on respondent Brua's title
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Rizal on June 23, 1980 as Entry No. 49853. The
adverse claim was already existing when the Notice of Levy on Execution, as well as the
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 Certi cate of Sale in favor of petitioner, was inscribed on July 11, 1988 and September
2, 1988, respectively; and, hence, the adverse claim is su cient to constitute
constructive notice to petitioner regarding the subject property. When petitioner
registered her Notice of Levy on Execution on the title of the subject property, she was
charged with the knowledge that the subject property sought to be levied upon on
execution was encumbered by an interest the same as or better than that of the
registered owner thereof. 3 4 Thus, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the
CA when it held that the notice of levy and subsequent sale of the subject property
could not prevail over respondent Garcia's existing adverse claim inscribed on
respondent Brua's certificate of title.
The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest
of a person over a piece of real property, where the registration of such interest or right
is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act No. 496 (now P.D. No.
1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves a warning to third parties dealing
with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right
than that of the registered owner thereof. 3 5AaHDSI

Petitioner cannot be considered as a buyer in good faith. A purchaser in good

faith and for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some
other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for
the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or interest
of some other person in the property. 3 6 Here, petitioner admitted on cross-
examination that when she registered her notice of attachment in 1981 and the levy on
execution on July 11, 1988, she already saw respondent Garcia's adverse claim
inscribed on respondent Brua's title on June 23, 1980. 3 7
Petitioner claims that Sajonas v. CA 3 8 is not applicable, since the adverse claim
registered on the title of the subject property made by the Sajonases in 1984 was by
virtue of a contract to sell, so that when the full purchase price was eventually paid on
September 4, 1984, a deed of sale of the property was subsequently executed and
registered in the Registry of Deeds of Marikina on August 28, 1985; that when the
respondent therein registered his notice levy on execution on February 12, 1985, such
notice of levy could not have precedence over the adverse claim, because there was no
more property to levy upon. In this case, however, respondent Garcia caused the
annotation of his adverse claim only as a mortgagee of respondent Brua in the amount
of P150,000.00 in 1980. The subsequent deed of sale was executed in 1991 between
respondents Garcia and Brua after the former paid the latter's loan from with the GSIS.
When a new title was issued in respondent Garcia's name, the notice of levy on
execution and the certi cate of sale were already annotated on the title of the subject
property; and, thus, the sale in favor of respondent Garcia could not prevail over the
previous auction sale in petitioner's favor.
We are not impressed.
The issue posed in Sajonas was whether the adverse claim inscribed on TCT No.
N-190417 was still in force when private respondent therein caused the annotation of
the notice of levy on execution on the title; if the adverse claim was still in effect, then
respondent therein was charged with the knowledge of pre-existing interest over the
subject property and, thus, the Sajonases were entitled to the cancellation of the notice
of levy inscribed on the title.
We ruled in Sajonas that the inscription of the adverse claim on the title of the
subject property was still in effect on February 12, 1985, when the sheriff annotated the
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 notice of levy on execution in favor of respondent therein; that respondent, therein was
charged with knowledge that the subject property sought to be levied upon on
execution was encumbered by an interest the same as or better than that of the
registered owner thereof. We then said that such notice of levy could not prevail over
the existing adverse claim inscribed on the certificate of title in favor of the Sajonases.
As in that case, the adverse claim of respondent Garcia based on the Deed of
Mortgage executed by respondent Brua over the subject land in the former's favor was
existing when the Notice of Levy on Execution was inscribed in favor of petitioner.
Although the deed of sale between respondents Brua and Garcia was done after the
notice of levy on execution and certi cate of sale were inscribed on the title, it was
clearly stated in the deed that the subject property was only a partial payment for
respondent Brua's mortgage indebtedness to respondent Garcia, which the former
could no longer redeem from the latter. Thus, the sale of the subject property by
respondent Brua to respondent Garcia was by reason of respondent Brua's prior loan
from respondent Garcia, which was secured by a mortgage on the subject property;
and this mortgage was registered and already existing on the title of the subject
property when the Notice of Levy on Execution and Certi cate of Sale in favor of
petitioner were inscribed thereon. Thus, petitioner's claim over the subject property
must yield to the earlier encumbrance registered by respondent Garcia. ScaHDT

WHEREFORE , the petition is DISMISSED . The Decision dated August 12, 2004
and Resolution dated November 18, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
61591 are AFFIRMED .
SO ORDERED.
Corona, Carpio, * Velasco, Jr., and Nachura, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Designated to sit as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza

per Special Order No. 818 dated January 18, 2010.

1. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, with Justices Roberto A. Barrios and
Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; rollo, pp. 22-35.

2. Id. at 37-38.
3. Id. at 39-46; per Judge Florito S. Macalino.
4. Id. at 47-48.
5. Exhibit "B-1," records, Garcia, p. 213.
6. Exhibit "C," id. at 215.

7. Exhibit "D," id. at 217.

8. Exhibit "B-2," id. at 213.
9. Exhibit "F," id. at 219-220.
10. Exhibit "B," id. at 213.

11. Exhibit "B-3," id. at 213.

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 12. Exhibit "B-4," id. at 214.
13. Exhibit "B-6," id.
14. Exhibit "B-4," id.

15. Id. at 214.

16. Rollo, p.46.
17. Id. at 34-35.
18. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 755, 785 (2003), citing Heirs
of Marcelino Pagobo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121687, October 16, 1997, 280 SCRA
870, 883.
19. RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Sec. 2.
20. The 60th day fell on January 23, 2005, which was a Sunday.
21. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Sec. 1, Rule 65, 1997.

22. International Exchange Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165403, February 27, 2006,
483 SCRA 373, 381.
23. Abedes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174373, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 268, 282.
24. Heirs of Lourdes Potenciano Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147205, March 10,
2004, 425 SCRA 236, 242; Jan Dec Construction v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146818,
February 6, 2006, 481 SCRA 556, 564.
25. Id.
26. Duremdes v. Duremdes, G.R. No. 138256, November 12, 2003, 415 SCRA 684.
27. International Exchange Bank v. Court of Appeals, supra.
28. Id.
29. Jan Dec Construction v. Court of Appeals, supra.
30. Buntag v. Paña, G.R. No. 145564, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 302, 306.
31. Id.
32. Paras, RULES OF COURT, Third Edition, Vol. 1, 804 (1990).
33. Francisco, REVISED RULES OF COURT IN THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. II, 711 (1966).
34. Sajonas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102377, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 79, 98: Diaz-
Duarte v. Ong, G.R. No. 130352, November 3, 1998, 298 SCRA 389.
35. Sajonas v. Court of Appeals, id. at 89.
36. Diaz-Duarte v. Ong, supra at 397.
37. TSN, October 15, 1996, p. 8.
38. Supra note 34.

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