Punishment Case Briefs
Punishment Case Briefs
FACTS
The appellant was a petrol dealer, claimed he was violently robbed on an evening while he
was carrying money in a bag from his petrol filling station to his house. It was alleged that
the appellant was one of the robbers. He was convicted and sentenced to 15 years I.H.L by
the trial judge. He then appealed on the grounds that the sentence was excessive and that,
Issues
Whether or not the good record of the accused is relevant when the court decides to
impose a deterrent sentence.
Holdings
1 .Where the identity of an accused person is in issue, there can be no better proof of his
identity than the evidence of a witness who swears to have seen the accused committing
the act.
2. Where the court finds an offence to be very grave, it must not only impose a punitive
sentence, but also a deterrent or exemplary one so as to indicate the disapproval of
society of that offence. Once the court decides to impose a deterrent sentence, the good
record of the accused is irrelevant. The trial judge must have taken into consideration the
prevailing wave of robbery in the country before imposing such a deterrent sentence
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
KWASHIE AND ANOTHER v. THE REPUBLIC [1971] 1 GLR 488 (policemen and smuggling)
FACTS
Two policemen used their office as police detectives to seize a large quantity of goods that
had been smuggled into the country. Rather than sending the goods to the station, they
were sent to the private house of one of the accomplices for the purpose of selling them
for the benefit .The appellants and their accomplices were found guilty of stealing contrary
Issues
1. Whether or not the sentence was to be deterrent and exemplary since they
Holdings
(2) Since the offence was of a very grave nature, the sentence must not only have been
punitive but it must also have been a deterrent or exemplary in order to mark the
disapproval of society of such conduct by police officers. When a court decides to impose a
deterrent sentence the value of the subject-matter of the charge and the good record of
social or official position of the offender, and on the other, that the offence may be
aggravated by reason of such position. The trial judge was justified in taking the official
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
Facts
On the 22nd day of June, 1998, the two accused persons, called the victim to their
office, pushed her into a store room and had sex with her in turns without her
consent. After the incident, the victim reported the matter to her friends who
accompanied her back to the Central Police Station, whereupon prompt
investigations were conducted by the Police which confirmed the report of Rape
against the victim. The two accused persons were subsequently arrested, charged,
tried convicted and sentenced after their conviction by the jury.
Issue
Whether the accused persons are truly guilty based on the premise that the
accused arraigned before any court in any criminal trial it is the duty of the
prosecution to prove the essential ingredients of the offence charged against the
accused person beyond any reasonable doubt.
Holdings
We are therefore of the opinion that, once the quilt of an accused person has been
established in a criminal trial using the accepted standard and or burden of proof,
the issue of punishment must be considered using different criteria.
This is because, in imposing sentence on a convicted person, the courts normally
take into consideration factors such as whether the sentence is of a deterrent,
reformative, or retributive nature. Sometimes, the criminal and previous
antecedents of the accused are taken into consideration.
The courts must show their revulsion against such animal instincts by imposing
very harsh and long sentences to serve as a deterrent to like minded persons.
It was then seen that it was not necessary to increase the sentence of the
appellants.
ABU AND OTHERS v. THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 294
Facts
The appellants were charged on two counts with the offences of conspiracy to steal
and stealing bags of cement belonging to Messrs A. Lang Ltd. The first and second
appellants were sentenced to three years imprisonment with hard labour on each of
the conspiracy count and eighteen months' imprisonment with hard labour on the
stealing count, both sentences to run concurrently.The third and fourth appellants
were acquitted and discharged on the stealing count, but sentenced to three years'
imprisonment with hard labour on the conspiracy count.
Issues
Holdings
The court took into account the part played by each appellant, their status as first
offenders, the nature of the offenses, the value of the property stolen, the degree of
organization and planning by each appellant before administering the various
sentences.
.n
Facts
On 30 May 1968, the appellant was convicted in the Circuit Court, Kumasi, on one
count of possessing three forged Bank of Ghana ten new cedi notes, contrary to
section 18 (2) of the Currency Act, 1964 (Act 242). He admitted to one previous
conviction for stealing and one for attempted stealing for which he had been
sentenced to three months' imprisonment with hard labour on 28 May 1966 in the
Circuit Court, Kumasi. The circuit court thereupon sentenced the appellant to seven
years' imprisonment with hard labour and remarked that the appellant "has criminal
propensities and must be dealt with severely.”
The appellant then appealed on the grounds that his sentence was too harsh and
excessive.
Issue
Whether the sentence given by the Circuit Court Judge was harsh
Whether the Circuit Court has the jurisdiction to impose the sentence that was
imposed upon the appellant
Holdings
The court views the the sentence ought to be a term harsh enough to be a deterent
and short enough to satisfy the reformative element in criminal justice. The judges
agreed that it was this view and not because the circuit court lacks jurisdiction to
impose the sentence that it imposed, that the appeal was allowed against the
sentence. The sentence of seven years' imprisonment with hard labour was
quashed and in its place is substituted a sentence of three years' imprisonment with
hard labour. The appeal against conviction was dismissed.
Facts
The defendant killed the victim during a drunken fight whilst heavily intoxicated. He
suffered from alcohol dependency syndrome, a recognised medical condition.
Issues
Facts
The appellant appeals against her conviction and sentence by the District
Magistrate Grade II, Techiman. On Monday 28 February 1972 the appellant was
arraigned before the District Court Grade II, Techiman, on a charge of selling above
the controlled price as fixed by the Price Control. The particulars of the charge are
that the appellant sold one single cake of New Sunlight soap for 15p. instead of the
maximum controlled price of 10p. scheduled for Techiman area and thus making an
illegal profit of 5p. The appellant pleaded guilty to the charge and she was
convicted and sentenced to a fine of ¢80.00 or three months' imprisonment with
hard labour.
Issues
Whether the appellants sentence should be lessened as a result of the law being
repealed
Holding
At the time N.R.C.D. 17 was made the value of the cedi had fallen and the prices of
commodities had soared. E.I. 17 was intended to make the consequent adjustment
in the prices of commodities.
If E.I. 17 of 1972 had come into effect soon after N.R.C.D. 17 the appellant might
have been caught by those provisions and the illegal profit she made would have
been only one pesewa. Even though the appellant, technically, ought to have sold
the soap at 10p. it would have been absurd to hold her to that price in the light of
the economic conditions of the day. The appeal was then dismissed.
This is an appeal against the Judgment of the Court of Appeal reducing a sentence of 15
years I. H. L imposed on the Appellant to 12 years I. H. L.
The Appellant was charged with five (5) others on two counts of conspiracy to commit
crime contrary and possessing Narcotic Drug without lawful authority. The high court
found the appellant guilty and sentenced him to 15 years I.H.L. The case was appealed and
the court of appeal reduced the sentence to 12 years I.H.L.
0;
Issues: Whether the court of appeal should have granted the appeal based on the
disability of the appellant?
Whether the appellant’s grounds for appeal for a lesser sentences was just?
Holdings: The Supreme court held that the appellant did not suffer his disability
while in prison and if with the disability, he decided to employ same to engaging in
such crime, that disability should not influence the court in passing sentence on
him. The court found no merit in the appeal. The sentence of 12 years I. H. L. which
was imposed by the Court of Appeal was set aside and the sentence of 15 years I.
H. L. passed by the trial court was replaced.
Holdings: The appeal was dismissed and the sentence by the court of appeal was
maintained. The appellant received 30 years with I.H.L. The court came to this
conclusion and issued a punishment befitting for deterrence. The court ruled that a
way must be found to protect society from the activities of these criminals and the
only possible way is to confine them for a considerable length of time. The
Appellant if he is mindful of reforming must do so whiles in prison. JSC Dotse was
the only dissenting judge and reasoned that consistency in sentencing was
important and that the guidelines were important in such cases.
Holdings: The court decided that grave offences (such as in the instant case) usually
called for deterrent sentences. But the general principle was that a sentence of
imprisonment, even though intended specifically as a general deterrence, must not
be excessive in relation to the facts of the offences. The sentences of the first
appellant to fifteen years imprisonment was excessive and ought to be reduced to
ten years imprisonment. The appeal against sentence was allowed.
Issues: Whether or not the sentence for the charge was reasonable?
Holdings: The court submitted that the deceased was the aggressor in the whole
situation but the charge for manslaughter was agreed up beyond reasonable doubt.
The court agreed that due to the circumstance of the case, there was no need to
impose such a long sentence because the deceased was already a man of temper.
The sentence was reduced to 4 years I.H.L and this was seen as more reasonable
and adequate.