WORKSHEET 4
STRICT LIABILITY
Strict liability is commonly described as liability without mens rea – but that is not accurate in all
but the most extreme cases. Where strict liability is imposed, it means that a defendant would
incur criminal responsibility even though he may have been ignorant of one or more elements of
the actus reus. While liability may be strict, in that mens rea is not required, it is not to be
confused with absolute liability. Where liability exists without proof of any mental element and
without the availability of any defence, this is absolute liability. Accordingly, if a person’s
actions are not willed, in that he was operating in an automatous state, he is not liable.
Automatism is a defence to a strict liability offence. However, the imposition of absolute liability
is very rare in criminal law. Strict liability does exist at common law, but only in very rare cases.
Generally, it is imposed by statute.
B. STRICT LIABILITY AT COMMON LAW
1. Public Nuisance
This covers situations where, as a result of the defendant’s conduct or omission, damage or
obstruction results to the public or a section thereof. The public element is crucial:
R v Madden [1975] 3 All ER 155:
In R v Madden (1975) 1 WLR 1379 the defendant telephoned a bomb hoax to a steel works
whose business was disrupted for about an hour. James LJ. accepted that hoax telephone calls
falsely asserting the presence of explosives could amount to an offence of public nuisance but
the few employees whose day was disrupted were not a sufficiently wide class of the public
2. Libel
Lemon v Gay News [1979] 1 All ER 898
3. Criminal contempt of court This developed to protect the integrity of the judicial process. As
the cases show, the strictness is meant to ensure that the course of justice is not interfered with,
as best as possible:
R v Evening Standard [1954] 1 QB 578
C. INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
This necessarily arises where statutes are silent as to mens rea as an element of the actus reus.
Where a court is confronted with such a situation, its task is to discern the effect of the provision,
and one of the means in so doing is by seeking the legislative intention through the text. This is
referred to as looking to ‘internal factors’ so as to derive the meaning. In determining what
Parliament intends in creating criminal offences, the courts start by making the presumption that
mens rea is always required to establish criminal liability: Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea.
Thus even where no words importing mens rea are used in the definition of an offence, it is
presumed that mens rea is required.
1. Language of the Provision
Some words are accepted as importing a mental element, such as ‘knowingly’, ‘permitting’
and ‘wilfully’. Where these appear in a provision, then it is more likely than not to be
assumed that mens rea is required.
Gray’s Haulage v Arnold [1966] 1 All ER 896
James v Smee [1954] 3 All ER 273
2. Canons of Construction
These refer to certain presumptions, or guiding principles, that courts take into account when
trying to discern meaning.
Blackman v COP (1973) 21 WIR 16
Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132
Facts
The appellant, Stephanie Sweet (S), was a sub-tenant of a farmhouse, where cannabis
resin was found. S no longer lived in the house and had let out several rooms to tenants.
She did retain a room but only returned occasionally to collect letters and rent. The
appellant was charged and convicted under Section 5(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Act
1965 (1965 Act) with
“being concerned in the management of premises used for the purpose of smoking
cannabis resin.”
Issue
Section 5(b) of the 1965 Act makes no reference to the mens rea required for the offence.
The issues in question for the appeal court were (1) whether Section 5(b) created an
absolute offence and (2) if not, what was the requisite mens rea for the offence. The
appellant, S, appealed against her conviction, claiming that Section 5(b) required
the mens rea of knowledge of the prohibited purposes which the farmhouse was
being used for. While S accepted that the premises had been used for smoking
cannabis resin, she had no knowledge of this use.
Held
Section 5(b) of the 1965 Act did not create an absolute offence. Unless it is the clear
intention of Parliament that an offence is an absolute or regulatory offence (imposing
strict liability), the presumption of mens rea prevails for ‘true’ crime offences. The words
‘being concerned in the management’ under Section 5(b) had to be read as importing
a mens rea of knowledge as to the use of the premises for the prohibited purpose,
therefore the offence was a ‘true crime,’ not a regulatory crime. The conviction was
therefore quashed, as S, did not have the requisite mens rea for the offence under Section
5(b) of the 1965 Act.
Gammon (HK) Ltd v AG [1984] 2 All ER 503
B (a minor) v DPP [2000] 1 All ER 833
K [2001] 3 All ER 897
R v Kumar [2005] 1 WLR 1352
