[1] G.R. No.

143483            January 31, 2002 For more than three (3) decades (from 1952 to 1985) private respondent
Amada Solano served as the all-around personal domestic helper of the late
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the REGISTER OF Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a French national. During Ms. Hankins'
DEEDS OF PASAY CITY, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL lifetime and most especially during the waning years of her life, respondent
FORMER 3RD DIVISION) AND AMADA H. SOLANO, assisted by her Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a constant companion since no close
husband ROMEO SOLANO, respondents. relative was available to tend to her needs.

Constitutional Law; Escheat; The procedure by which the escheated property In recognition of Solano's faithful and dedicated service, Ms. Hankins
may be recovered is generally prescribed by statute, and a time limit is imposed executed in her favor two (2) deeds of donation involving two (2) parcels of
within which such action must be brought.—Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of land covered by TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 of the Registry of Deeds. Private
succession or assignment, whereby the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and respondent alleged that she misplaced the deeds of donation and were
claims the real or personal property of a person who dies intestate leaving no heir. In nowhere to be found.
the absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the state to forestall an open
“invitation to self-service by the first comers.” Since escheat is one of the incidents While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic filed a petition for the
of sovereignty, the state may, and usually does, prescribe the conditions and limits escheat of the estate of Elizabeth Hankins before the Regional Trial Court of
the time within which a claim to such property may be made. The procedure by Pasay City.1 During the proceedings, a motion for intervention was filed by
which the escheated property may be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and Romeo Solano, spouse of private respondent, and one Gaudencio Regosa,
a time limit is imposed within which such action must be brought. but on 24 June 1987 the motion was denied by the trial court for the reason
Same; Same; A claimant to an escheated property must file his claim within that "they miserably failed to show valid claim or right to the properties in
five (5) years from the date of such judgment.—In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an question."2 Since it was established that there were no known heirs and
escheated property must file his claim “within five (5) years from the date of such persons entitled to the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower court
judgment, such person shall have possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner Republic of the
municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the Philippines.
estate; but a claim not made shall be barred forever.” The 5-year period is not a
device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it By virtue of the decision of the trial court, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City
is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in cancelled TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 and issued new ones, TCT Nos. 129551
asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final judgment. and 129552, both in the name of Pasay City.
Same; Same; A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive against all persons with actual or constructive In the meantime, private respondent claimed that she accidentally found the
notice, but not against those who are not parties or privies thereto.—A judgment in deeds of donation she had been looking for a long time. In view of this
escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive development, respondent Amada Solano filed on 28 January 1997 a petition
against all persons with actual or constructive notice, but not against those who are before the Court of Appeals for the annulment of the lower court's decision
not parties or privies thereto. As held in Hamilton v. Brown, “a judgment of escheat alleging, among other, that3 -
was held conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested.
Absolute lack on the part of petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the
13.1. The deceased Elizabeth Hankins having donated the subject
appellee of any right, or in any way injure him, constitutes due process of law, proper
properties to the petitioner in 1983 (for TCT No. 7807) and 1984 (for TCT
notice having been observed.”
No. 7808), these properties did not and could not form part of her estate
when she died on September 20, 1985. Consequently, they could not
BELLOSILLO , J.: validly be escheated to the Pasay City Government;

This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify two (2) Resolutions of the Court of 13.2. Even assuming arguendo that the properties could be subject of
Appeals dated 12 November 1998 and 4 May 2000 giving due course to the escheat proceedings, the decision is still legally infirm for escheating the
petition for annulment of judgment filed by private respondent Amada H. properties to an entity, the Pasay City Government, which is not authorized
Solano on 3 February 1997 and denying petitioner's motion for by law to be the recipient thereof. The property should have been
reconsideration.

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 1 of 27

 escheated in favor of the Republic of the Philippines under Rule 91, Section years after the issuance of title in favor of respondent Pasay City on August
1 of the New Rules of Court 7, 1990. Herein petition was seasonably filed on February 3, 1997 under
Article 1144, to wit:
On 17 March 1997 the Office of the Solicitor General representing public
respondents RTC and the Register of Deeds (herein petitioner) filed an Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the
answer setting forth their affirmative defenses, to wit: (a) lack of jurisdiction time the right of action accrues: (1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an
over the nature of the action; and, (b) the cause of action was barred by the obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment.
statute of limitations.
And Article 1456, to wit: Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake
Finding no cogent reason to justify the dismissal of the petition for annulment, or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of
the Court of Appeals issued on 12 November 1998 the first of its assailed an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
Resolutions giving due course to the petition for annulment of judgment and comes.4
setting the date for trial on the merits. In upholding the theory of respondent
Solano, the Appeals Court ruled that - In its Resolution of 4 May 2000 the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by public respondents Register of Deeds of Pasay City
Herein petitioner invokes lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter on the and the Presiding judge of the lower court and set the trial on the merits for
part of respondent RTC to entertain the escheat proceedings because the June 15 and 16, 2000.
parcels of land have been earlier donated to herein petitioner in 1983 and
1984 prior to the death of said Hankins; and therefore, respondent court In its effort to nullify the Resolutions herein before mentioned, petitioner
could not have ordered the escheat of said properties in favor of the Republic points out that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
of the Philippines, assign them to respondent Pasay City government, order amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (a) in denying petitioner's
the cancellation of the old titles in the name of Hankins and order the affirmative defenses set forth in its answer and motion for reconsideration,
properties registered in the name of respondent Pasay City The 1997 Rules and in setting the case for trial and reception of evidence; and, (b) in giving
of Civil Procedure specifically laid down the grounds of annulment filed due course to private respondent's petition for annulment of decision despite
before this Court, to wit: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction the palpable setting-in of the 5-year statute of limitations within which to file
over the subject matter is conferred by law and this jurisdiction is determined claims before the court a quo set forth in Rule 91 of the Revised Rules of
by the allegations of the complaint. It is axiomatic that the averments of the Court and Art. 1014 of the Civil Code.
complaint determine the nature of the action and consequently the
jurisdiction of the courts. Thus whether or not the properties in question are Petitioner argues that the lower court had jurisdiction when it escheated the
no longer part of the estate of the deceased Hankins at the time of her death; properties in question in favor of the city government and the filing of a
and, whether or not the alleged donations are valid are issues in the present petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of subsequent discovery of
petition for annulment which can be resolved only after a full blown trial the deeds of donation did not divest the lower court of its jurisdiction on the
matter. It further contends that Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
It is for the same reason that respondent’s espousal of the statute of only provides for two (2) grounds for the annulment of judgment, namely:
limitations against herein petition for annulment cannot prosper at this stage extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. As such the discovery of the deeds of
of the proceedings. Indeed, Section 4, Rule 91 of the Revised Rules of Court donation seven (7) years after the finality of the escheat proceedings is an
expressly provides that a person entitled to the estate must file his claim with extraneous matter which is clearly not an instance of extrinsic fraud nor a
the court a quo within five (5) years from the date of said judgment. However, ground to oust the lower court of its jurisdiction.
it is clear to this Court that herein petitioner is not claiming anything from the
estate of the deceased at the time of her death on September 20, 1985; Petitioner also insists that notwithstanding the execution of the deeds of
rather she is claiming that the subject parcels of land should not have been donation in favor of private respondent, the 5-year statute of limitations within
included as part of the estate of the said decedent as she is the owner which to file claims before the court a quo as set forth in Rule 91 of the
thereof by virtue of the deeds of donation in her favor. In effect, herein Revised Rules of Court has set in.
petitioner, who alleges to be in possession of the premises in question, is
claiming ownership of the properties in question and the consequent
reconveyance thereof in her favor which cause of action prescribes ten (10)

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 2 of 27

The present controversy revolves around the nature of the parcels of land a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals.
purportedly donated to private respondent which will ultimately determine Obviously, private respondent's belated assertion of her right over the
whether the lower court had jurisdiction to declare the same escheated in escheated properties militates against recovery.
favor of the state.
A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent
We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession jurisdiction is conclusive against all persons with actual or constructive
or assignment, whereby the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and notice, but not against those who are not parties or privies thereto. As held in
claims the real or personal property of a person who dies intestate leaving no Hamilton v. Brown,8 "a judgment of escheat was held conclusive upon
heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the state to persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. Absolute lack on
forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the first comers." 5 Since the part of petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any
escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually right, or in any way injure him, constitutes due process of law, proper notice
does, prescribe the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such having been observed." With the lapse of the 5-year period therefore, private
property may be made. The procedure by which the escheated property may respondent has irretrievably lost her right to claim and the supposed
be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed "discovery of the deeds of donation" is not enough justification to nullify the
within which such action must be brought. escheat judgment which has long attained finality.

In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim In the mind of this Court the subject properties were owned by the decedent
"within 5 years from the date of such judgment, such person shall have during the time that the escheat proceedings were being conducted and the
possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be lower court was not divested of its jurisdiction to escheat them in favor of
accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim Pasay City notwithstanding an allegation that they had been previously
not made shall be barred forever.The 5year period is not a device donated. We recall that a motion for intervention was earlier denied by the
capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it escheat court for failure to show "valid claim or right to the properties in
is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in question."9 Where a person comes into an escheat proceeding as a claimant,
asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final the burden is on such intervenor to establish his title to the property and his
judgment. right to intervene. A fortiori, the certificates of title covering the subject
properties were in the name of the decedent indicating that no transfer of
Incidentally, the question may be asked: Does herein private respondent, not ownership involving the disputed properties was ever made by the deceased
being an heir but allegedly a donee, have the personality to be a claimant during her lifetime. In the absence therefore of any clear and convincing
within the purview of Sec. 4, Rule 91, of the Revised Rules of Court? In this proof showing that the subject lands had been conveyed by Hankins to
regard, we agree with the Solicitor General that the case of Municipal private respondent Solano, the same still remained, at least before the
Council of San Pedro, Laguna v. Colegio de San Jose, Inc.,7 is applicable at escheat, part of the estate of the decedent and the lower court was right not
least insofar as it concerns the Court's discussion on who is an "interested to assume otherwise. The Court of Appeals therefore cannot perfunctorily
party" in an escheat proceeding - presuppose that the subject properties were no longer part of the decedent's
estate at the time the lower court handed down its decision on the strength of
a belated allegation that the same had previously been disposed of by the
In a special proceeding for escheat under sections 750 and 751 the
owner. It is settled that courts decide only after a close scrutiny of every
petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any person alleging
piece of evidence and analyze each case with deliberate precision and
to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to be escheated is
unadulterated thoroughness, the judgment not being diluted by speculations,
likewise an interested party and may appear and oppose the petition for
conjectures and unsubstantiated assertions.
escheat. In the present case, the Colegio de San Jose, Inc. and Carlos
Young appeared alleging to have a material interest in the Hacienda de
San Pedro Tunasan; the former because it claims to be the exclusive owner WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the
of the hacienda, and the latter because he claims to be the lessee thereof Court of Appeals dated 12 November 1998 giving due course to the petition
under a contract legally entered with the former. In the instant petition, the for annulment of judgment, and its Resolution dated 4 May 2000 denying
escheat judgment was handed down by the lower court as early as 27 June petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are SET ASIDE. The decision of the
1989 but it was only on 28 January 1997, more or less 7 years after, when RTC-Br. 114, Pasay City, dated 27 June 1989, is REINSTATED. SO
private respondent decided to contest the escheat judgment in the guise of ORDERED.

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 3 of 27

[2] G.R. No. 164024               January 29, 2009 99-129, dismissing the petitioners’ complaint for annulment of title and
damages against the respondents.
LUIS B. MANESE, ANTONIA ELLA, HEIRS OF ROSARIO M. ORDOñEZ,
represented by CESAR ORDOñEZ, SESINANDO PINEDA and AURORA The subject matter of the controversy is the alleged foreshore land with an
CASTRO, Petitioners, vs.SPOUSES DIOSCORO VELASCO and GLICERIA area of about 85,521 square meters, fronting Tayabas Bay in Guisguis,
SULIT, MILDRED CHRISTINE L. FLORES TANTOCO and SYLVIA L. Sariaya, Quezon.4
FLORES, Respondents.
On October 13, 1971, respondent Dioscoro Velasco was issued Original
Natural Resources; Foreshore Lands; Words and Phrases; Foreshore land is Certificate of Title No. P-16783 5 covering said property by the Register of
defined as that strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and is Deeds of Quezon Province, based on Homestead Patent No. 133300. On
alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tides—it is part of the March 22, 1977, Velasco sold the property to respondent Sylvia Flores, and
alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1609236 was issued in her name. On
otherwise.—It is admitted by both parties that the subject matter of controversy is January 4, 1981, the property was sold by Flores to Mildred Christine Flores-
foreshore land, which is defined as that strip of land that lies between the high and Tantoco and TCT No. T-177735 7 was issued in the latter’s name. Later, the
low water marks and is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tides. It property was divided into seven lots and TCT Nos. T-177777, T-177778, T-
is that part of the land adjacent to the sea, which is alternately covered and left dry by 177779, T-177780, T-177781, T-177782, and T-177783 were issued in the
the ordinary flow of tides. It is part of the alienable land of the public domain and name of Mildred Christine Flores-Tantoco. On January 18, 1992, the lots
may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise. Foreshore land remains part of covered by TCT Nos. T-177780 8 and T-1777819 were sold back to Flores
the public domain and is outside the commerce of man. It is not capable of private such that TCT No. T-278112 10 and TCT No. 27811011 were issued in her
appropriation. name.
Same; Same; Reversion; In all actions for the reversion to the Government of
lands of the public domain or improvements thereon, the Republic of the Philippines Adjacent and contiguous to the alleged foreshore land is the agricultural land
is the real party in interest, the action to be instituted by the Solicitor General or the owned by petitioners.
officer acting in his stead, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.—In all actions
for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements On August 31, 1999, the petitioners filed a Complaint 12 for Annulment of Title
thereon, the Republic of the Philippines is the real party in interest. The action shall and Damages against respondents before the RTC of Lucena City. They
be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in behalf of alleged that the issuance of the homestead patent and the series of transfers
the Republic of the Philippines. Moreover, such action does not prescribe. involving the same property were null and void. They further alleged that they
Prescription and laches will not bar actions filed by the State to recover its property applied for lease of the foreshore land and the government had approved in
acquired through fraud by private individuals. their favor Foreshore, Reclaimed Land or Miscellaneous Lease Application.
Equity; Positive rules prevail over all abstract arguments based on equity Petitioners claimed that they were in open, continuous, exclusive and
contra legem.—As to petitioners’ contention that they should be deemed real parties notorious possession and use of said foreshore land since 1961. They stated
in interest based on the principle of equity, we rule otherwise. Equity, which has that they had introduced improvements thereon and planted coconut
been aptly described as “justice outside legality,” is applied only in the absence of, seedlings (which had grown up into coconut trees) as well as other fruit-
and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. Positive rules prevail bearing trees and plants. They added that they had subleased the land to
over all abstract arguments based on equity contra legem. several tenants.

DECISION Petitioners averred that Dioscoro Velasco was not qualified to become a
grantee of a homestead patent since he never occupied any portion nor
QUISUMBING, J.: introduced any improvements on the land. They claimed that Velasco was
issued a homestead patent because he committed fraud, misrepresentation,
For review on certiorari are the Decision 1 dated April 28, 2004 and the and falsification in connivance with employees of the Bureau of Lands. They
Resolution2 dated June 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. argued that the sale between Velasco and Flores was invalid because it was
68934. The appellate court had affirmed the Order 3 dated June 15, 2000 of not approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, Branch 59, in Civil Case No. required under Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as "The Public

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 4 of 27

Land Act."13 Hence, they claimed that the sale by Flores to Tantoco was INSTITUTE THE COMPLAINT FOR CANCELLATION OF OCT NO. P-16789
likewise invalid. ISSUED PURSUANT TO HOMESTEAD PATENT NO. 133300 IN THE
NAME OF DIOSCORO VELASCO AND THE TRANSFER CERTIFICATES
On December 2, 1999, respondents moved to dismiss 14 the complaint on the OF TITLES SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUED IN FAVOR OF S[Y]LVIA L. FLORES
following grounds: (1) petitioners do not have the legal personality to file the AND MILDRED CHRISTINE FLORES-TANTOCO.18
complaint since the property forms part of the public domain and only the
Solicitor General could bring an action for reversion or any action which may Stated simply, the sole issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are real
have the effect of canceling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of parties in interest with authority to file a complaint for annulment of title of
title issued on the basis of the patent; (2) the sale of the property by Velasco foreshore land.
to Flores is valid even without approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources as the required approval may be obtained after the sale Petitioners concede that under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, 19
had been consummated; (3) the certificate of title issued to Velasco can no only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead may institute all
longer be reviewed on the ground of fraud since a homestead patent actions for reversion in the proper courts. However, they invoke the principle
registered in conformity with the provisions of Act No. 496 15 partakes of the of equity, arguing that equity and social justice demand that they be deemed
nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding and becomes real parties in interest and given a right to present evidence showing that the
indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from its land titles of respondents are void. 20 Respondents, on the other hand,
issuance; and (4) petitioners’ action is barred by laches since for almost 28 reiterate that petitioners are not real parties in interest because they do not
years, they failed to assert their alleged right over said property. represent the State.21

On June 15, 2000, the RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss and ruled that After due consideration of the submissions and arguments of the parties, we
petitioners do not have the legal personality to file the complaint. It held that are in agreement that the instant petition lacks merit.
the government, not petitioners, is the real party in interest and, therefore,
only the Solicitor General may bring the action in court. The dispositive Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
portion of the RTC’s Order states:
SEC. 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion is granted and the plaintiffs[’] complaint be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
dismissed. avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules,
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
SO ORDERED.16 party in interest. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s Order, disposing as follows: It is admitted by both parties that the subject matter of controversy is
foreshore land, which is defined as that strip of land that lies between the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of high and low water marks and is alternatively wet and dry according to the
merit. The Order dated June 15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), flow of the tides. It is that part of the land adjacent to the sea, which is
Branch 59, Lucena City dismissing plaintiffs-appellants’ complaint for alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of tides. It is part of the
annulment of title with damages is AFFIRMED and UPHELD. alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease
and not otherwise. Foreshore land remains part of the public domain and is
SO ORDERED.17 outside the commerce of man. It is not capable of private appropriation. 22

Hence, this petition. Petitioners raise the following issue for our resolution: Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provides:

[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain
THE APPEAL AND IN AFFIRMING AND UPHOLDING THE ORDER OF or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the
DISMISSAL OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LUCENA, BRANCH 59 officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of
THAT THE PETITIONERS DO NOT HAVE THE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO the Philippines.

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 5 of 27

In all actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public
domain or improvements thereon, the Republic of the Philippines is the real
party in interest. The action shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the
officer acting in his stead, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. 23
Moreover, such action does not prescribe. Prescription and laches will not
bar actions filed by the State to recover its property acquired through fraud by
private individuals.24

Based on the foregoing, we rule that petitioners are not the real parties in
interest in this case. We therefore affirm the dismissal by the trial court of the
complaint and the ruling of the Court of Appeals that petitioners must first
lodge their complaint with the Bureau of Lands in order that an administrative
investigation may be conducted under Section 9125 of The Public Land Act.

As to petitioners’ contention that they should be deemed real parties in

interest based on the principle of equity, we rule otherwise. Equity, which has
been aptly described as "justice outside legality," is applied only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure.
Positive rules prevail over all abstract arguments based on equity contra
legem.26

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated April 28,
2004 and the Resolution dated June 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 68934 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 6 of 27

[3] G.R. No. 158230               July 16, 2008 land subsequently acquires Philippine citizenship, the sale was validated since the
purpose of the constitutional ban to limit land ownership to Filipinos has been
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF achieved. In short, the law disregards the constitutional disqualification of the
LANDS, Petitioner, vs.REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS CITY, buyer to hold land if the land is subsequently transferred to a qualified party, or
ELIZABETH LEE, and PACITA YU-LEE, Respondents. the buyer himself becomes a qualified party.

Land Registration; Ownership; Independently of the doctrine of in pari DECISION

delicto, the court sustained the sale, holding that while the vendee was an alien at
the time of the sale, the land has since become the property of a naturalized Filipino CARPIO, J.:
citizen who is constitutionally qualified to own land.—We do not subscribe to
petitioner’s position. The circumstances of this case are similar to the case of De The Case
Castro v. Teng Queen Tan, 129 SCRA 85 (1984), wherein a residential lot was sold
to a Chinese citizen. Upon the death of the alien vendee, his heirs entered into an This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 12 July 2002 and the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased and the subject land was Resolution dated 9 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
transferred to a son who was a naturalized Filipino. Subsequently, the vendor of the 53890.
lot filed a suit for annulment of sale for alleged violation of the Constitution
prohibiting the sale of land to aliens. Independently of the doctrine of in pari delicto,
the Court sustained the sale, holding that while the vendee was an alien at the time of The Facts
the sale, the land has since become the property of a naturalized Filipino citizen who
is constitutionally qualified to own land. In March 1936, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, bought Lot No. 398 from
Same; Same; Reversion; Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the Vicenta Arcenas, Francisco, Carmen Ramon, Mercedes, Concepcion,
original sellers, because of the doctrine of in pari delicto, the Solicitor General may Mariano, Jose, and Manuel, all surnamed Dinglasan. Lot No. 398, with an
initiate an action for reversion or escheat of the land to the State, subject to other area of 1,574 square meters, is located at the corner of Roxas Avenue and
defenses, as hereafter set forth.—We now discuss whether reversion proceedings is Pavia Street in Roxas City. In February 1944, Lee Liong died intestate and
still viable considering that Lot No. 398 has already been transferred to Filipino was survived by his widow Ang Chia, and his sons Lee Bing Hoo and Lee
citizens. In the reconstitution case of Lee v. Republic of the Philippines, 366 SCRA Bun Ting. On 30 June 1947, the surviving heirs of Lee Liong extrajudicially
524 (2001), involving Lot No. 398, this Court explained that the OSG may initiate an settled the estate of the deceased and partitioned among themselves Lot No.
action for reversion or escheat of lands which were sold to aliens disqualified from 398. When Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting died, Lot No. 398 was
acquiring lands under the Constitution. However, in the case of Lot No. 398, the fact transferred by succession to their respective wives, Elizabeth Lee (Elizabeth)
that it was already transferred to Filipinos militates against escheat proceedings, thus: and Pacita Yu-Lee (Pacita).
Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers, because of the
doctrine of in pari delicto, the Solicitor General may initiate an action for reversion In the 1956 case of Dinglasan v. Lee Bun Ting,3 involving Lot No. 398, the
or escheat of the land to the State, subject to other defenses, as hereafter set forth. In Court held that even if the sale of the property was null and void for violating
this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings the constitutional prohibition on the sale of land to an alien, still the doctrine
because the land is now in the hands of Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee of in pari delicto barred the sellers from recovering the title to the property.
Liong, has since died and the land has been inherited by his heirs and Eleven years later, in the case of Lee Bun Ting v. Judge Aligaen,4 the Court
subsequently their heirs, petitioners herein [Elizabeth Lee and Pacita Yu Lee]. ordered the trial court to dismiss the complaint of the Dinglasans for the
Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the Solicitor General does not dispute. recovery of Lot No. 398. Applying the doctrine of res judicata, the Court held
Same; Same; Since Lot No. 398 has already been transferred to Filipino that the case was a mere relitigation of the same issues previously adjudged
citizens, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured.—Since Lot No. 398 with finality in the Dinglasan case, involving the same parties or their privies
has already been transferred to Filipino citizens, the flaw in the original transaction is and concerning the same subject matter.
considered cured. As held in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 403 SCRA 1
(2003): Thus, the Court has ruled consistently that where a Filipino citizen sells land On 7 September 1993, Elizabeth and Pacita (private respondents) filed a
to an alien who later sells the land to a Filipino, the invalidity of the first transfer is petition for reconstitution of title of Lot No. 398 because the records of the
corrected by the subsequent sale to a citizen. Similarly, where the alien who buys the

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 7 of 27

Register of Deeds, Roxas City were burned during the war. On 3 October The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the State is not barred
2001, the Court held that the trial court’s order of reconstitution was void for by prescription. However, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred
lack of factual support because it was based merely on the plan and in ordering the reversion of Lot No. 398 to the State. Although the sale of Lot
technical description approved by the Land Registration Authority. 5 No. 398 to Lee Liong violated the constitutional prohibition on aliens
acquiring land, the Court of Appeals noted that Lot No. 398 had already been
Meanwhile, on 26 January 1995, petitioner Republic of the Philippines acquired by private respondents through succession. The transfer of Lot No.
(petitioner), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the 398 to private respondents, who are Filipino citizens qualified to acquire
Regional Trial Court of Roxas City a Complaint6 for Reversion of Title against lands, can no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial
private respondents and the Register of Deeds of Roxas City, praying that (1) transfer. The flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title
the sale of Lot No. 398 to Lee Liong be set aside for being null and void ab of the transferee is deemed valid considering that the objective of the
initio; and (2) Lot No. 398 be reverted to the public domain for the State’s constitutional proscription against alien ownership of lands, that is to keep
disposal in accordance with law. our lands in Filipino hands, has been achieved.

In their Answer, private respondents invoked as affirmative defenses: (1) The Issue
prescription; (2) private ownership of Lot No. 398; and (3) Lee Liong’s being
a buyer in good faith and for value. Furthermore, private respondents claimed Petitioner raises the lone issue that:
that as Filipino citizens, they are qualified to acquire Lot No. 398 by
succession. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE THE APPEALED DECISION AND DECLARED PRIVATE
The Register of Deeds of Roxas City did not file an answer. RESPONDENTS THE ABSOLUTE AND LAWFUL OWNERS AND
POSSESSORS OF LOT NO. 398 OF ROXAS CITY CADASTRE
On 7 May 1996, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the reversion of CONSIDERING THAT LEE LIONG, WHO IS AN ALIEN, AND THUS,
Lot No. 398 to the State. CONSTITUTIONALLY PROHIBITED TO OWN REAL PROPERTY IN THE
PHILIPPINES, ACQUIRED NO RIGHT OR TITLE OVER SUBJECT LOT
WHICH HE COULD HAVE TRANSMITTED BY SUCCESSION TO PRIVATE
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision 7 dated 12 July 2002,
RESPONDENTS’ PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST.
reversing the trial court’s decision and declaring private respondents as the
absolute and lawful owners of Lot No. 398. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution 8 dated 9 The Ruling of the Court
May 2003.
The petition is without merit.
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner argues that since the sale of Lot No. 398 to Lee Liong was void,
The Ruling of the Trial Court Lot No. 398 never became part of the deceased Lee Liong’s estate. Hence,
Lot No. 398 could not be transmitted by succession to Lee Liong’s surviving
heirs and eventually to private respondents.
The trial court ordered the reversion of Lot No. 398 to the State. The trial
court held that private respondents could not have acquired a valid title over
Lot No. 398 because the sale of the lot to their predecessor-in-interest Lee We do not subscribe to petitioner’s position. The circumstances of this case
Liong was null and void. Being an innocent purchaser in good faith and for are similar to the case of De Castro v. Teng Queen Tan,9 wherein a
value did not cure Lee Liong’s disqualification as an alien who is prohibited residential lot was sold to a Chinese citizen. Upon the death of the alien
from acquiring land under the Constitution. The trial court further held that vendee, his heirs entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the
prescription cannot be invoked against the State as regards an action for deceased and the subject land was transferred to a son who was a
reversion or reconveyance of land to the State. naturalized Filipino. Subsequently, the vendor of the lot filed a suit for
annulment of sale for alleged violation of the Constitution prohibiting the sale
of land to aliens. Independently of the doctrine of in pari delicto, the Court
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
sustained the sale, holding that while the vendee was an alien at the time of

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 8 of 27

the sale, the land has since become the property of a naturalized Filipino violating the constitutional prohibition on the sale of land to an alien. If
citizen who is constitutionally qualified to own land. petitioner had commenced reversion proceedings when Lot No. 398 was still
in the hands of the original vendee who was an alien disqualified to hold title
Similarly, in this case, upon the death of the original vendee who was a thereto, then reversion of the land to the State would undoubtedly be
Chinese citizen, his widow and two sons extrajudicially settled his estate, allowed. However, this is not the case here. When petitioner instituted the
including Lot No. 398. When the two sons died, Lot No. 398 was transferred action for reversion of title in 1995, Lot No. 398 had already been transferred
by succession to their respective spouses, herein private respondents who by succession to private respondents who are Filipino citizens.1avvphi1
are Filipino citizens.
Since Lot No. 398 has already been transferred to Filipino citizens, the flaw in
We now discuss whether reversion proceedings is still viable considering that the original transaction is considered cured.13 As held in Chavez v. Public
Lot No. 398 has already been transfered to Filipino citizens. In the Estates Authority:14
reconstitution case of Lee v. Republic of the Philippines 10 involving Lot No.
398, this Court explained that the OSG may initiate an action for reversion or Thus, the Court has ruled consistently that where a Filipino citizen sells land
escheat of lands which were sold to aliens disqualified from acquiring lands to an alien who later sells the land to a Filipino, the invalidity of the first
under the Constitution. However, in the case of Lot No. 398, the fact that it transfer is corrected by the subsequent sale to a citizen. Similarly, where the
was already transferred to Filipinos militates against escheat proceedings, alien who buys the land subsequently acquires Philippine citizenship, the
thus: sale was validated since the purpose of the constitutional ban to limit land
ownership to Filipinos has been achieved. In short, the law disregards the
Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers, because constitutional disqualification of the buyer to hold land if the land is
of the doctrine of pari delicto, the Solicitor General may initiate an action for subsequently transferred to a qualified party, or the buyer himself
reversion or escheat of the land to the State, subject to other defenses, as becomes a qualified party.15 (Emphasis supplied)
hereafter set forth.
Clearly, since Lot No. 398 has already been transferred to private
In this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat respondents who are Filipino citizens, the prior invalid sale to Lee Liong can
proceedings because the land is now in the hands of Filipinos. The no longer be assailed. Hence, reversion proceedings will no longer prosper
original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the land has been since the land is now in the hands of Filipino citizens.
inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs, petitioners herein
[Elizabeth Lee and Pacita Yu Lee]. Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 12
fact the Solicitor General does not dispute. July 2002 and the Resolution dated 9 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 53890.
The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or
private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non- SO ORDERED.
Filipinos. In this case, however, there would be no more public policy violated
since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such
land. "If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a
citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid." Thus, the
subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be
impugned on the basis of invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of the
constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been
achieved.11 (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the reversion proceedings was initiated only after almost 40
years from the promulgation of the case of Dinglasan v. Lee Bun Ting,12
where the Court held that the sale of Lot No. 398 was null and void for

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 9 of 27

[4]  G.R. No. L-23096 April 27, 1972 The matter was then elevated to the respondent Court of Appeals by the
spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon. Respondent Court in its
MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, petitioners, decision, now subject of this review, declared valid the deed of sale executed
vs.ROSARIO, ALFREDO, MARIANO, PACIFICO, ONOFRE, TEOFILO, by the mother Bienvenida de la Isla in favor of the spouses Nery and de Leon
LOLOY and TRINIDAD, all surnamed LORENZO, respondents. as to the whole three-fourths, without prejudice however to the children
demanding from their mother their participation in the amount paid for the
sale of such property. It thus ignored the grave jurisdictional defects that
Guardianship; Petition for appointment of guardian; Notice thereof to minor
attended the challenged orders, starting with the two elder children not being
above 14 years of age jurisdictional.—Service of the notice upon the minor if above
notified of the petition for guardianship, even if they were already above 14,
14 years of age or upon the incompetent, is jurisdictional. Without such notice, the
as pointed out and stressed in their petition for review. There is need then for
court acquires no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian.
the exercise of the corrective power of this Court. The original decision of the
Same; Parens patriae.—Where minors are involved, the State acts as parens
lower court has much more to recommend it. Thereby, the rights of the
patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the rights of persons or individual who
children are fully respected. With a restoration in full of what was decided by
because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other parties.
the lower court, there is a corresponding modification of the judgment of the
Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have the political
Court of Appeals. So we decide.
community to look after their welfare. This obligation the State must live up to. It
cannot be recreant to such a trust.
Same; Guardians; Property held in trust.—It is much too late in the day to The antecedents of the case were set forth in the appealed decision thus:
depart from the well-settled principle as to a trustee being incapable of acquiring "After hearing the evidence, the lower court handed down decision on June
interest opposed to that of his principal. That is in conformity with an overmastering 24, 1961, finding that in the guardianship proceedings, the court acquired no
requirement of equity and conscience. jurisdiction over the persons of the minors who were not notified of the
petition, at least 2 of them being over 14 years of age; that as the inventory
submitted by the guardian stated that the minors had no real estate, the court
FERNANDO, J.:p
did not acquire jurisdiction over the real property of the minors and could not
have validly authorized its sale, and the total absence of the requisite notice
The point to be resolved in these two petitions for the review of a decision of necessarily rendered the order of sale, ... null and void, and the defendant,
the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 30, 1964 is the extent of the Martin S. Nery, a lawyer, could not be considered a purchaser in good faith of
rights acquired by the vendees, the spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de the one-half portion of the land belonging to the minors; ... that as Silvestra
Leon1 arising from a sale of a parcel of land, four (4) hectares more or less, Ferrer, one of the sisters of Florentino Ferrer, did not sign the deed of sale ...
situated in Malaking Kahoy, Parañaque, Rizal. The vendor, Bienvenida de la upon her death in 1952, her 1/4 portion of the land passed to her nearest
Isla, was the widow of the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and guardian of their relatives, the third-party plaintiffs who are children of her sister, Tomasa
children, Dionisio, Perfecto, Maria Rebeeca, Asuncion, Mauro and Lourdes, 2 Ferrer, whose action had not prescribed 'because from the death of Silvestra
who thereafter challenged the validity of such a transaction. It was their Ferrer in 1952 up to the filing of the third-party complaint on September 3,
contention that notwithstanding an order authorizing the sale from the 1958, barely six yeaxs had elapsed'; and that the remaining 3/4 of the land in
probate court on June 2, 1953, it could be, impugned as they were not question was the conjugal property of Leoncio Lorenzo and his wife,
informed of such a move. Moreover, the guardianship proceeding, instituted Bienvenida de la Isla, 1/2 of which, upon the demise of Leoncio,
on December 7, 1950, was heard without the two elder children, Dionisio and corresponding to Bienvenida and the other half to their children, the herein
Perfecto Lorenzo being notified although they were then more than 14 years plaintiffs, in equal shares."4
of age. The heirs of Silvestra Ferrer, who originally owned one-fourth of the
property in question,3 intervened in such action. In the lower court decision,
Why respondent Court reached the decision it did on appeal was explained
they were adjudged co-owners of the aforesaid one-fourth portion of the
this way: "It is unquestioned that the property in question formerly belonged
property, the sale by the widow being considered null and void insofar as
to Florentino Ferrer and his three sisters, Agueda, Tomasa and Silvestra, and
they were concerned. The rights of the Children of Leoncio Lorenzo and
brother, Meliton. When, after the death of Florentino, that is, on December 6,
Bienvenida de la Isla to one-half of the three-fourths appertaining to such
1943, the document denominated 'Bilihan Ganap Nang Lupang-Bukid', ...
spouses were likewise accorded recognition.
was executed in favor of Leoncio F. Lorenzo, one of the children of Agueda
and married to Bienvenida de la Isla, by said Agueda, Tomasa and the

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 10 of 27

children of Meliton, already deceased, said Leoncio merely acquired the 1. What is indisputable in the light of the controlling legal doctrines is that it
participation of said sellers, equivalent to 3/4 undivided part of said land, and was the lower court and not the respondent Court of Appeals that yielded
became a co-owner to that extent with Silvestra who did not execute said obeisance to the applicable procedural rule. It is worded thus: "When a
document and, therefore,did not sell her 1/4 undivided portion of the said petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a
land, which 1/4 undivided portion passed, upon her demise in 1952, to her time and place for hearing the same, and shall cause reasonable notice
nearest relatives who are the third-party plaintiffs Rosario, Alfredo, Mariano, thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in the petition residing in the
Pacifica, Onofre, Teofilo, Loloy and Trinidad all surnamed Lorenzo, the province, including the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent
children of her deceased sister, Tomasa. Bienvenida de la Isla, then the wife himself, and may direct other general or special notice thereof to be given." 8
of said Leoncio F. Lorenzo, knew of this purchase made by her deceased The late Chief Justice Moran was quite explicit as to its jurisdictional
husband, and she had no right to mortgage the whole land which, for taxation character. These are his words: "Service of the notice upon the minor if
purposes was declared in her husband's name, without the consent of above 14 years of age or upon the incompetent, is jurisdictional. Without
aforenamed successors-in-interest of Silvestra Ferrer, much less sell the such notice, the court acquires no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian." 9
same afterwards to the defendant spouses, Martin S. Nery and Leoncia L. de
Leon, even if authorized by the guardianship court, said authority having The case cited by him in support of such view is Yangco v. Court of First
been granted upon her misrepresentation, contained in her petition of May Instance, 10 a 1915 decision. As was therein made clear: "There is no need
26, 1953, that her minor children, the plaintiff's herein, were the owners in for interpretation or construction of the word in the case before us. Its
common of 1/2 portion of the land in question, the other 1/2 pertaining to her. meaning is so clear that interpretation and construction are unnecessary. Our
However, inasmuch as the said minor plaintiffs were really the owners in simple duty is to leave untouched the meaning with which the English
common of 1/2 of 3/4 undivided part of the said land, and the other 1/2, to language has endowed the word; and that is the meaning which the ordinary
their mother and guardian, the orders of the guardianship court authorizing reader would accord to it on reading a sentence in which it was found. Where
the guardian to sell the real property of the minors, and approving the deed of language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge words so as to give them
sale executed in accordance with said authority must be construed as the color of a particular judicial theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly
referring to the correct real property of the said minors." 5 harmful. That which has caused so much confusion in the law, which has
made it so difficult for the public to understand and know what the law is with
Hence its dispositive portion provided as follows: "[Wherefore], the appealed respect to a given matter, is in considerable measure the unwarranted
judgment is hereby modified by declaring that the deed of sale ..., executed interference by judicial tribunals with the English language as found in
by Bienvenida de la Isla in favor of the defendants valid only insofar as the statutes and contracts, cutting out words here and inserting them there,
undivided 3/4 portion of the land in question is concerned, as to which making them fit personal ideas of what the legislature ought to have done or
portion, the defendants are declared owners, and that the third-party what parties should have agreed upon, giving them meanings which they do
plaintiffs, Rosario, Alfredo, Mariano, Pacifica, Onofre, Teofilo, Loloy and not ordinarily have, cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until
Trinidad, all surnamed Lorenzo, are declared owners in common of the lawyers themselves are unable to advise their clients as to the meaning of a
remaining undivided 1/4 portion of the said land. In all other respects, the given statute or contract until it has been submitted to some court for its
appealed judgment is hereby affirmed. No Costs." 6 'interpretation and construction.' " 11

The spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon and the children of the Respondent Court of Appeals cannot therefore be sustained in its
deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and the vendor, Bienvenida de la Isla, not being assumption that the probate court could have authorized the sale in question.
satisfied with the above decision instituted the petitions for review. As noted The jurisdictional infirmity was too patent to be overcome. It was the lower
at the outset, the failure of respondent Court of Appeals to give due weight to court that acted correctly. There is the more reason for deciding as we do
the grave jurisdictional defect that tainted the guardianship proceeding considering that the rights of minors are involved. It is a distinctive feature of
resulted in its judgment suffering the corrosion of substantial legal error. The our law, one that is quite commendable, that whenever their welfare may be
rights of the children of Leoncio Lorenzo as upheld by the lower court must, affected, its solicitude is made manifest. The rights of young are not to be
to repeat, be maintained. In that sense, the decision of the respondent Court ignored. Precisely their stage of immaturity calls for every procedural
of Appeals is subject to modification. Insofar however as it affirmed the lower principle being observed before their interest in property to which they have a
court decision sustaining the claim of the heirs of Silvestra Ferrer, 7 it is free claim could be adversely affected. It does not matter that their guardian is
from any infirmity. their mother. As far back as 1811, in Salunga v. Evangelista, 12 Chief Justice
Arellano took note that even a mother could have an "interest opposed to

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 11 of 27

that of her children." 13 That may not have been the precise situation in this on the face of such alleged errors that they are essentially factual. We are
case, but certainly from the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, the thus precluded from inquiring into their veracity as on such a matter what was
Lorenzo children would have been better protected if they were notified as is decided by respondent Court of Appeals is binding on us. Moreover, as to the
required by law. If there is any occasion then why there should be a strict alleged prescription, the issue was resolved satisfactorily by the lower court
insistence on rule having the impress of a jurisdictional requirement, this is it. in this fashion: "The action of said children of Tomasa Ferrer has not as yet
prescribed because from the death of Silvestra Ferrer in 1952 up to the filing
Moreover, where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it of the third-party complaint on September 3, 1958, barely six years had
is cast the duty of protecting the rights of persons or individual who because elapsed. Moreover, there is no clear and satisfactory evidence that Leoncio
of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other parties. Lorenzo and his successors-in-interest had been in continuous, adverse, and
Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have the open possession, and under claim of ownership, of the one-fourth portion
political community to look after their welfare. This obligation the state must corresponding to Silvestra Ferrer as to acquire same by acquisitive
live up to. It cannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion prescription." 17 Consequently, it was appropriate for the Court of Appeals to
of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is affirm the judgment of the lower court insofar as it recognized the rights of the
inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged heir of Silvestra Ferrer to one-fourth of the land sold.
in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary
powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great WHEREFORE, premises considered with the modification as above set forth
detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, that Dionisio, Perfecto, Maria Rebecca, Asuncion, Mauro and Lourdes, all
it is a most beneficent function, and often necessary to be exercised in the surnamed Lorenzo, children of the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and
interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot Bienvenida de la Isla are adjudged co-owners to the extent of one-half of the
protect themselves." 14 three-fourths of the property in question, as was decreed by the lower court,
the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. With costs against
2. Much less could the decision arrived at both by the lower court and Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon.
respondent Court of Appeals as to the heirs of Silvestra Ferrer 15 being
entitled to
one-fourth of the property in question be set aside. At no time had the
deceased Leoncio Lorenzo ever denied that he was holding such property in
the capacity of trustee for them. At the time then that the settlement of his
estate was pending in the probate court, his widow, Bienvenida de la Isla, the
vendor, could not assert any other right, except that traceable to her late
husband. Respondent Court of Appeals did note that petitioner Martin S.
Nery is a lawyer. As a member of the bar, he could not have been unaware
that his vendor could not sell to him more than she rightfully could dispose of.
It is much too late in the day to depart from the well-settled principle as to a
trustee being incapable of acquiring interest opposed to that of his principal.
So it was announced in Severino v. Severino. 16 That is in conformity with an
overmastering requirement of equity and conscience. He should thus be held
to the strictest degree of acccountability. The law would lay itself open to
well-deserved criticism if a principle other than the above were followed. The
Nery spouses ought to be aware that it would be unthinkable to deny its
authoritative force whenever called for.

The spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon would demonstrate its
inapplicability by the two principal errors assigned, namely, that Silvestra
Ferrer did sell her share of the property as far back as 1943 and that even if it
were not so, the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and thereafter his widow,
Bienvenida de la Isla did assert rights of ownership therein. It is obvious that

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 12 of 27

[5] G.R. No. L-58319 June 29, 1982 This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the validity of an
April 24, 1981 order of the respondent Juvenile and Domestic Relations
PATRIA PACIENTE, petitioner, vs.HON. AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, Court of Leyte which required the petitioner and Conchita Dumdum to —
Presiding Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Leyte
and Southern Leyte; FELICIANA CALLE, court-appointed guardian of give and deposit with the clerk of this court the amount of
the minors Shirley and Leandro, both surnamed HOMERES; the TEN THOUSAND PESOS (PI0,000.00) more as additional
SOLICITOR GENERAL; THE CITY FISCAL OF TACLOBAN; and, THE consideration of Lot No. 3085-G of the Tacloban Cadastre
REGISTER OF DEEDS, Tacloban City, respondents. which the court believes to be fair and reasonable price of
the property. This amount should be deposited with the clerk
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Guardianship; Jurisdiction;` Where of this court on or before June 24, 1981; otherwise TCT No.
right or title of ward to the property is clear and indubitable, although said right or T-13238 in the name of Patria Paciente now subject of a
title is determined in a separate ordinary action, not in guardianship proceedings, mortgage in favor of the Consolidated Bank and Trust
the court may order delivery or return of the property to the ward.—Insofar as the Corporation to guarantee an obligation in the amount of
acts of the guardianship court intended to effect the delivery or return of the property P30,000.00, dated December 27, 1978, will be cancelled.
conveyed are concerned. We find the orders of the respondent court valid. The
petitioner’s contentions in this regard are untenable, Even the aforecited cases relied as well as the validity of its resolution dated August 21, 1981 which denied
upon do not support her argument. While it is true that in these two cases We ruled the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner and Conchita Dumdum of the
that where title to any property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in aforesaid order and directed the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City —
question, the determination of said title or right whether in favor of the ward or in
favor of the person said to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must to cancel TCT No. 13238 of Patria Paciente and issue in lieu
be determined in a separate ordinary action and not in guardianship proceedings, We thereof a new transfer certificate of title to the following
also emphasized that if the right or title of the ward to the property is clear and present owners of Lot 3085- G of the Tacloban Cadastre:
indisputable the court may issue an order directing its delivery or return. Patria Paciente, of legal age, Filipino, married, residing in
Same; Same; Sale by minors’ mother of land in co-ownership without consent Tacloban City, 1/3; Shirley Homeres, 10 years old, residing
of the guardianship court, is illegal.—In the present case the right or title of the two in Tacloban City, 1/3; and, Leandro Homeres, 10 years old,
minors to the property is clear and indisputable. They inherited a part of the land in residing in Tacloban City, Philippines, 1/3, subject to the
question from their father. The sale of this land, where they are co-owners, by their mortgage lien of the Consolidated Bank and Trust
mother without the authority of the guardianship court is illegal (Yuson de Pua vs. Corporation.
San Agustin, 106 SCRA 7, 16).
Same; Same; Necessity of hearings and presentation of evidence to determine because of their failure to comply with the same aforestated order. The facts
whether alienation of property is in ward’s interest and consistent with the rights of of the case are as follow:
all parties, due to alleged violation of due process and guardianship court’s unusual
procedures in dealing with properties under guardianship.—Considering, however,
In 1972, Leonardo Homeres died leaving his wife, Lilia Samson Homeres,
the petitioner’s protestations of violations of due process and the guardian ship
and two minor children, Shirley and Leandro, a parcel of land known as Lot
court’s unusual procedures in dealing with the properties under guardianship, the
No. 3085-G situated in Sagkahan, Tacloban City, covered by TCT No.
respondent court is directed to conduct regular hearings and take evidence on the
12138. This lot which he had inherited from his deceased father, Felizardo
reasonable price of Lot No. 3085-G, if its alienation is found to be in the best
Homeres, has an area of one thousand seven hundred one (1,701) square
interests of the wards and consistent with the rights of all parties involved.
meters.
RESOLUTION
On September 9, 19-76, Lilia S. Homeres, sold Lot No. 3085-G to Conchita
Dumdum for P10,000.00.
GUTIERREZ, J.:
On November 11, 1976, Lilia S. Homeres filed a petition for guardianship
over the persons and estate of the minors. The petition was granted on

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 13 of 27

August 9, 1977. Lilia S. Homeres took her oath as guardian on September The issue in this case is whether the respondent court acting as a
13, 1977, guardianship court has jurisdiction to order the Register of Deeds to cancel
the transfer certificate of title of petitioner and to order the issuance of a new
On September 21, 1977, Conchita Dumdum sold Lot No. 3085-G, which had title to include the minors as co-owners with the petitioner for her having
been titled in her name under TCT No. T-13121, to petitioner Patria Paciente failed to comply with the court's order directing her to pay the minors the
for the amount of P15,000.00. Consequently, Patria Paciente was issued reasonable price of their property that their mother alienated without authority
TCT No. T-13238 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. of a competent court.

On December 27, 1978, the petitioner mortgaged the lot to the Consolidated Relying on the cases of Cui, et al. vs. Piccio, et al. 91 Phil. 712, and Parco
Bank and Trust Corporation for P30,000.00. and Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-33152, January 30, 1982,
petitioner contends that respondent court in hearing a petition for
guardianship is not the proper situs for the cancellation of a Torrens Title. In
On September 12, 1980, the Acting City Register of Deeds of Tacloban City,
the Cui case, this Court ruled:
filed a manifestation informing respondent court that Lot No. 3085-G which is
the subject of the guardianship proceedings had been registered in the name
of the petitioner under TCT No. T-13238 and that it was mortgaged to the ... Out of the cases cited, the only one we find to have some
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation to guarantee petitioner's loan of relevancy is that of Castillo vs. Bustamante, 64 Phil. 839. In
P30,000.00. this case, the court made a distinction between the
provisions of sections 709 and 593 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which now correspond to section 6, Rule 88 and
Upon being thus informed by the Register of Deeds, the respondent court
section 6 of Rule 97 of the Rules of Court. This Court in that
issued an order on November 14, 1980, directing the petitioner and the
case said in effect that while in administration proceedings
manager of the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation to appear before
the court under section 709 may only question the person
the court on January 21, 1981 and show cause why TCT No. T-13238,
suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed
covering a parcel of land co-owned by the minors, Shirley and Leandro
away property belonging to the estate, section 593 of the
Homeres, should not be cancelled for having been alienated without authority
same Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the Judge or the
from the court.
court to issue such orders as maybe necessary to secure the
estate against concealment, embezzlement and
When January 21, 1981 came, the petitioner and the manager of conveyance, and this distinction is now given emphasis by
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation did not appear before the court. respondents' counsel. the way we interpret section 573 of
Instead, Conchita Dumdum appeared and explained to the respondent court the Code of Civil Procedure as now embodied in Rule 97,
that she sold the lot which she acquired from Lilia S. Homeres to the section 6 of the Rules of Court in the light of the ruling laid
petitioner without obtaining the approval of the court because she was not down in the case of Castillo vs. Bustamante, supra, is that
aware of such requirement regarding the properties of the minors. On the the court may issue an order directing the delivery or return
same date, the respondent court again issued an order requiring the of any property embezzled, concealed or conveyed which
petitioner and the manager of the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation belongs to a ward, where the right or title of said ward is
to explain why TCT No. T- 13238 should not be cancelled for their failure to clear and indisputable.
first secure judicial authority before disposing of the said property.
xxx xxx xxx
At the hearing on April 24, 1981, George Go, the petitioner's husband,
apprised the court that the petitioner was an innocent purchaser for value of
In conclusion, we hold that the respondent Judge had no
the lot in question. Respondent court then issued the questioned order.
jurisdiction to issue his order of September 5, 1951, in the
guardianship proceedings requiring the petitioners to deliver
A motion for reconsideration filed by her and Conchita Dumdum having been the rentals collected by them to the guardian and authorizing
denied, petitioner filed the present petition. the latter to collect rentals in the future, for the reason that
the jurisdiction of the court in guardianship proceedings,
ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of having embezzled,

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 14 of 27

 concealed or conveyed property belonging to the ward for In the present case the right or title of the two minors to the property is clear
the purpose of obtaining information which may be used in and indisputable. They inherited a part of the land in question from their
action later to be instituted by the guardian to protect the father. The sale of this land, where they are co-owners, by their mother
right of the ward; and that only in extreme cases, where without the authority of the guardianship court is illegal (Yuson de Pua vs.
property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto San Agustin, 106 SCRA 7, 16).
has already been judicially decided, may the court direct its
delivery to the guardian. In issuing the above questioned order and resolution, the respondent court
did not exceed its jurisdiction but merely exercised its duty to protect persons
and in the case of Parco and Bautista the ruling reads as follows: under disability.

In Cui vs. Piccio, et al., supra, this Court held that the The respondent court's order directing the deposit of an additional
jurisdiction of the court in guardianship proceedings, consideration of P10,000.00 is a different matter. It was issued without a
ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of having embezzled, hearing to determine not only the valuation of the property but the time frame
concealed or conveyed the property belonging to the ward for fixing said valuation which is not clear. It is, consequently, null and void.
for the purpose of obtaining information which may be used
in an action later to be instituted by the guardian to protect It is true that when the petitioner and Conchita Dumdum failed to give the
the right of the ward. Generally, the guardianship court additional amount, the second order directing the cancellation of the
exercising special and limited jurisdiction cannot actually petitioner's title may be said to have superseded or cancelled the first order.
order the delivery of the property of the ward found to be The second order directed the issuance of a new title over the land inherited
embezzled, concealed, or conveyed. In a categorical by Leandro Homeres from his late father with each heir getting title to one-
language of this Court, only in extreme cases, where third of the property. Considering, however, the petitioner's protestations of
property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto violations of due process and the guardianship court's unusual procedures in
has been already judicially decided, may the court direct its dealing with the properties under guardianship, the respondent court is
delivery to the guardian. In effect, there can only be delivery directed to conduct regular hearings and take evidence on the reasonable
or return of the embezzled, concealed or conveyed property price of Lot No. 3085-G, if its alienation is found to be in the best interests of
of the ward, where the right or title of said ward is clear and the wards and consistent with the rights of all parties involved.
undisputable. However, where title to any property said to be
embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, under the WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The guardianship court in Special
Cui case, the determination of said title or right whether in Proceedings No. JP-0156 of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
favor of the persons said to have embezzled, concealed or Leyte is hereby ordered to conduct further hearings of the case as above
conveyed the property must be determined in a separate indicated.
ordinary action and not in a guardianship proceedings.
SO ORDERED,
Insofar as the acts of the guardianship court intended to effect the delivery or
return of the property conveyed are concerned, We find the orders of the
respondent court valid. The petitioner's contentions in this regard are
untenable. Even the aforecited cases relied upon do not support her
argument. While it is true that in these two cases We ruled that where title to
any property said to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in question, the
determination of said title or right whether in favor of the ward or in favor of
the person said to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property
must be determined in a separate ordinary action and not in guardianship
proceedings, We also emphasized that if the right or title of the ward to the
property is clear and indisputable the court may issue an order directing its
delivery or return.

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 15 of 27

[6] G.R. No. 151243             April 30, 2008 including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings. In
general, however, the Court of Appeals conducts hearings and receives evidence
LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI, petitioner, vs.ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER prior to the submission of the case for judgment. It must be pointed out that, in this
and AMANDA, all surnamed PABALE, respondents. case, Alamayri filed her Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence
on 21 November 2001. She thus sought to submit additional evidence as to the
Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; Words and Phrases; Res judicata identity of Jose Pabale, not only after CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 had been submitted
literally means “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing for judgment, but after the Court of Appeals had already promulgated its Decision in
or matter settled by judgment.”—Res judicata literally means “a matter adjudged; a said case on 10 April 2001. The parties must diligently and conscientiously present
thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.” Res all arguments and available evidences in support of their respective positions to the
judicata lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the court before the case is deemed submitted for judgment. Only under exceptional
merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any circumstances may the court receive new evidence after having rendered judgment;
matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, otherwise, its judgment may never attain finality since the parties may continually
in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent refute the findings therein with further evidence.
jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. Remedial Law Special Proceedings; Guardianship; The objectives of an RTC
Same; Same; Same; Bar by prior judgment distinguished from conclusiveness hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian under Rule 93 of the Rules of Court
of judgment; Concepts of the doctrine of res judicata.—The doctrine of res judicata is to determine, first, whether a person is indeed a minor or an incompetent who has
thus lays down two main rules which may be stated as follows: (1) The judgment or no capacity to care for himself and/or his properties; and second, who is most
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and qualified to be appointed as his guardian.—The objectives of an RTC hearing a
their privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving petition for appointment of a guardian under Rule 93 of the Rules of Court is to
the same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) Any determine, first, whether a person is indeed a minor or an incompetent who has no
right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the capacity to care for himself and/or his properties; and, second, who is most qualified
determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is to be appointed as his guardian. The rules reasonably assume that the people who
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot best could help the trial court settle such issues would be those who are closest to and
again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claims or most familiar with the supposed minor or incompetent, namely, his relatives living
demands, purposes, or subject matters of the two suits are the same. These two main within the same province and/or the persons caring for him.
rules mark the distinction between the principles governing the two typical cases in Same; Same; Same; The burden of proving incapacity to enter into contractual
which a judgment may operate as evidence. In speaking of these cases, the first relations rests upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is
general rule above stated, and which corresponds to the afore-quoted paragraph (b) presented, capacity will be presumed.
of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is referred to as “bar by former —While both cases involve a determination of Nave’s incompetency, it must be
judgment”; while the second general rule, which is embodied in paragraph (c) of the established at two separate times, one in 1984 and the other in 1986. A finding that
same section and rule, is known as “conclusiveness of judgment.” she was incompetent in 1986 does not automatically mean that she was so in 1984. In
Same; Same; Same; Conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a Carillo v. Jaojoco, 46 Phil. 957, 960 (1924), the Court ruled that despite the fact that
second case of a fact or question already settled in a previous case; Conclusiveness the seller was declared mentally incapacitated by the trial court only nine days after
of judgment requires only the identity of issues and parties, but not of causes of the execution of the contract of sale, it does not prove that she was so when she
action.—Conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact executed the contract. Hence, the significance of the two-year gap herein cannot be
or question already settled in a previous case. The second case, however, may still gainsaid since Nave’s mental condition in 1986 may vastly differ from that of 1984
proceed provided that it will no longer touch on the same fact or question adjudged given the intervening period. Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who
in the first case. Conclusiveness of judgment requires only the identity of issues and has not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to
parties, but not of causes of action. continue so long as the contrary be not proved; that is, that at the moment of his
Same; Appeals; Evidence; In general, the Court of Appeals conducts hearings acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind. The burden of proving
and receives evidence prior to the submission of the case for judgment; Only under incapacity to enter into contractual relations rests upon the person who alleges it; if
exceptional circumstances may the court receive new evidence after having rendered no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed.
judgment.—It is true that the Court of Appeals has the power to try cases and
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve DECISION
factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction,

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 16 of 27

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: that it was for the sale of her property in Calamba, Laguna covered
by TCT No. T-3317 (27604), she immediately returned to [Fernando]
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the the said piece of paper and at the same time repudiating the same.
Rules of Court filed by petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri (Alamayri) seeking the Her repudiation was further bolstered by the fact that when
reversal and setting aside of the Decision, 2 dated 10 April 2001, of the Court [Fernando] tendered the partial down payment to her, she refused to
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133; as well as the Resolution, 3 dated 19 receive the same; and (2) she already sold the property in good faith
December 2001 of the same court denying reconsideration of its to Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale
aforementioned Decision. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, [the Pabale siblings] on February 20, 1984 after the complaint was
upheld the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 20 February 1984, filed against her but before she received a copy thereof. Moreover,
executed by Nelly S. Nave (Nave) in favor of siblings Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, she alleged that [Fernando] has no cause of action against her as he
Roiler and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale (the Pabale siblings) over a piece is suing for and in behalf of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation who is
of land (subject property) in Calamba, Laguna, covered by Transfer not a party to the alleged Contract to Sell. Even assuming that said
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3317 (27604); and, thus, reversed and set entity is the real party in interest, still, [Fernando] cannot sue in
aside the Decision,4 dated 2 December 1997, of the Regional Trial Court representation of the corporation there being no evidence to show
(RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C. 5 The 2 that he was duly authorized to do so.
December 1997 Decision of the RTC declared null and void the two sales
agreements involving the subject property entered into by Nave with different Subsequently, [the Pabale siblings] filed a Motion to Intervene
parties, namely, Sesinando M. Fernando (Fernando) and the Pabale siblings; alleging that they are now the land owners of the subject property.
and ordered the reconveyance of the subject property to Alamayri, as Nave’s Thus, the complaint was amended to include [the Pabale siblings] as
successor-in-interest. party defendants. In an Order dated April 24, 1984, the trial court
denied [Nave’s] Motion to Dismiss prompting her to file a
There is no controversy as to the facts that gave rise to the present Petition, Manifestation and Motion stating that she was adopting the
determined by the Court of Appeals to be as follows: allegations in her Motion to Dismiss in answer to [Fernando’s]
amended complaint.
This is a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by
Sesinando M. Fernando, representing S.M. Fernando Realty Thereafter, [Nave] filed a Motion to Admit her Amended Answer with
Corporation [Fernando] on February 6, 1984 before the Regional Counterclaim and Cross-claim praying that her husband, Atty.
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna presided over by Judge Salvador P. Vedasto Gesmundo be impleaded as her co-defendant, and
de Guzman, Jr., docketed as Civil Case No. 675-84-C against Nelly including as her defense undue influence and fraud by reason of the
S. Nave [Nave], owner of a parcel of land located in Calamba, fact that she was made to appear as widow when in fact she was
Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604). [Fernando] alleged that very much married at the time of the transaction in issue. Despite the
on January 3, 1984, a handwritten "Kasunduan Sa Pagbibilihan" opposition of [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings], the trial court
(Contract to Sell) was entered into by and between him and [Nave] admitted the aforesaid Amended Answer with Counterclaim and
involving said parcel of land. However, [Nave] reneged on their Cross-claim.
agreement when the latter refused to accept the partial down
payment he tendered to her as previously agreed because she did Still unsatisfied with her defense, [Nave] and Atty. Vedasto
not want to sell her property to him anymore. [Fernando] prayed that Gesmundo filed a Motion to Admit Second Amended Answer and
after trial on the merits, [Nave] be ordered to execute the Amended Reply and Cross-claim against [the Pabale siblings], this
corresponding Deed of Sale in his favor, and to pay attorney’s fees, time including the fact of her incapacity to contract for being mentally
litigation expenses and damages. deficient based on the psychological evaluation report conducted on
December 2, 1985 by Dra. Virginia P. Panlasigui, M. A., a clinical
[Nave] filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she could not be psychologist. Finding the motion unmeritorious, the same was denied
ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of by the court a quo.
[Fernando] based on the following grounds: (1) she was not fully
apprised of the nature of the piece of paper [Fernando] handed to [Nave] filed a motion for reconsideration thereof asseverating that in
her for her signature on January 3, 1984. When she was informed Criminal Case No. 1308-85-C entitled "People vs. Nelly S. Nave" she

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 17 of 27

 raised therein as a defense her mental deficiency. This being a In the meantime, [Nave] died on December 9, 1992. On September
decisive factor to determine once and for all whether the contract 20, 1993, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo, [Nave’s] sole heir, she being an
entered into by [Nave] with respect to the subject property is null and orphan and childless, executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
void, the Second Amended Answer and Amended Reply and Cross- pertaining to his inherited properties from [Nave].
claim against [the Pabale siblings] should be admitted.
On account of such development, a motion for the dismissal of the
Before the motion for reconsideration could be acted upon, the instant case and for the issuance of a writ of execution of the
proceedings in this case was suspended sometime in 1987 in view of Decision dated June 22, 1988 in SP No. 146-86-C (petition for
the filing of a Petition for Guardianship of [Nave] with the Regional guardianship) was filed by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo on February 14,
Trial Court, Branch 36 of Calamba, Laguna, docketed as SP No. 1996 with the court a quo. [The Pabale siblings] filed their Opposition
146-86-C with Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as the petitioner. On June to the motion on grounds that (1) they were not made a party to the
22, 1988, a Decision was rendered in the said guardianship guardianship proceedings and thus cannot be bound by the Decision
proceedings, the dispositive portion of which reads: therein; and (2) that the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by the late [Nave] in their favor was never raised in the
"Under the circumstances, specially since Nelly S. Nave who guardianship case.
now resides with the Brosas spouses has categorically
refused to be examined again at the National Mental The case was then set for an annual conference. On January 9,
Hospital, the Court is constrained to accept the Neuro- 1997, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a motion seeking the court’s
Psychiatric Evaluation report dated April 14, 1986 submitted permission for his substitution for the late defendant Nelly in the
by Dra. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos and the supporting report instant case. Not long after the parties submitted their respective pre-
dated April 20, 1987 submitted by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, trial briefs, a motion for substitution was filed by Lolita R. Alamayre
both of the National Mental Hospital and hereby finds Nelly (sic) [Alamayri] alleging that since the subject property was sold to
S. Nave an incompetent within the purview of Rule 92 of the her by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Revised Rules of Court, a person who, by reason of age, Sale, she should be substituted in his stead. In refutation, Atty.
disease, weak mind and deteriorating mental processes Vedasto Gesmundo filed a Manifestation stating that what he
cannot without outside aid take care of herself and manage executed is a Deed of Donation and not a Deed of Absolute Sale in
her properties, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and favor of [Alamayri] and that the same was already revoked by him on
exploitation, said condition having become severe since the March 5, 1997. Thus, the motion for substitution should be denied.
year 1980. She and her estate are hereby placed under
guardianship. Atty. Leonardo C. Paner is hereby appointed On July 29, 1997, the court a quo issued an Order declaring that it
as her regular guardian without need of bond, until further cannot make a ruling as to the conflicting claims of [Alamayri] and
orders from this Court. Upon his taking his oath of office as Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo. After the case was heard on the merits,
regular guardian, Atty. Paner is ordered to participate the trial court rendered its Decision on December 2, 1997, the
actively in the pending cases of Nelly S. Nave with the end in dispositive portion of which reads:
view of protecting her interests from the prejudicial sales of
her real properties, from the overpayment in the foreclosure "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
made by Ms. Gilda Mendoza-Ong, and in recovering her lost
jewelries and monies and other personal effects.
1. Declaring the handwritten Contract to Sell dated January
3, 1984 executed by Nelly S. Nave and Sesinando Fernando
SO ORDERED." null and void and of no force and effect;

Both [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings] did not appeal therefrom, 2. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20,
while the appeal interposed by spouses Juliano and Evangelina 1984 executed by Nelly S. Nave in favor of the [Pabale
Brosas was dismissed by this Court for failure to pay the required siblings] similarly null and void and of no force and effect;
docketing fees within the reglementary period.

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 18 of 27

 3. Recognizing Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] as the owner of the REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered upholding the
property covered by TCT No. 111249 of the land records of VALIDITY of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1984.
Calamba, Laguna;
No pronouncements as to costs.7
4. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to execute a transfer of title
over the property in favor of Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] in the Alamayri sought reconsideration of the afore-quoted Decision of the appellate
concept of reconveyance because the sale in their favor has court, invoking the Decision,8 dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC in the
been declared null and void; guardianship proceedings, docketed as SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, which
found Nave incompetent, her condition becoming severe since 1980; and
5. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to surrender possession thus appointed Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Said Decision
over the property to Ms. [Alamayri] and to account for its already became final and executory when no one appealed therefrom.
income from the time they took over possession to the time Alamayri argued that since Nave was already judicially determined to be an
the same is turned over to Ms. Lolita [Alamayri], and incompetent since 1980, then all contracts she subsequently entered into
thereafter pay the said income to the latter; should be declared null and void, including the Deed of Sale, dated 20
February 1984, which she executed over the subject property in favor of the
6. Ordering [Fernando] and the [Pabale siblings], jointly and Pabale siblings.
severally, to pay Ms. [Alamayri]:
According to Alamayri, the Pabale siblings should be bound by the findings of
a. attorney’s fees in the sum of P30,000.00; and the RTC in its 22 June 1988 Decision in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, having
participated in the said guardianship proceedings through their father Jose
Pabale. She pointed out that the RTC explicitly named in its orders Jose
b. the costs.6
Pabale as among those present during the hearings held on 30 October 1987
and 19 November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. Alamayri thus filed on
S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation, still represented by Fernando, filed an 21 November 2001 a Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in
appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, solely Evidence so she could mark and submit as evidence certain documents to
to question the portion of the 2 December 1997 Decision of the RTC ordering establish that the Pabale siblings are indeed the children of Jose Pabale.
him and the Pabale siblings to jointly and severally pay Alamayri the amount
of P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Atty. Gesmundo, Nave’s surviving spouse, likewise filed his own Motion for
Reconsideration of the 10 April 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
The Pabale siblings intervened as appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 G.R. CV No. 58133, asserting Nave’s incompetence since 1980 as found by
averring that the RTC erred in declaring in its 2 December 1997 Decision that the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, and his right to the subject property as
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 20 February 1984 executed by Nave in their owner upon Nave’s death in accordance with the laws of succession. It must
favor was null and void on the ground that Nave was found incompetent be remembered that Atty. Gesmundo disputed before the RTC the supposed
since the year 1980. transfer of his rights to the subject property to Alamayri, but the court a quo
refrained from ruling thereon.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 10 April 2001, granted the
appeals of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation and the Pabale siblings. It In a Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals denied for
ruled thus: lack of merit the Motions for Reconsideration of Alamayri and Atty.
Gesmundo.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal filed by S. M.
Fernando Realty Corporation, represented by its President, Hence, Alamayri comes before this Court via the present Petition for Review
Sesinando M. Fernando as well as the appeal interposed by on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with the following
Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale, assignment of errors:
are hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C is hereby
I

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 19 of 27

 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE xxxx
FINDING THAT NELLY S. NAVE WAS INCOMPETENT IN SPECIAL
PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C ON JUNE 22, 1988 CANNOT (b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the
RETROACT TO AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE DEED OF SALE matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have
SHE EXECUTED ON FEBRUARY 20, 1984 IN FAVOR OF been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
RESPONDENTS PABALES. their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement
of the action or special proceeding, litigating the same thing and
II under the same title and in the same capacity; and

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their
DECISION IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-86-C DATED successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in
JUNE 22, 1988 IS NOT BINDING ON RESPONDENTS PABALES. a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have
been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included
III therein or necessary thereto.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER’S The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main rules which may be
MOTION TO SCHEDULE HEARING TO MARK DOCUMENTARY stated as follows: (1) The judgment or decree of a court of competent
EXHIBITS IN EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF JOSE jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the
PABALE AS THE FATHER OF RESPONDENTS PABALES.9 litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same
cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) Any
right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in
It is Alamayri’s position that given the final and executory Decision, dated 22
the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment
June 1988, of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C finding Nave
or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment
incompetent since 1980, then the same fact may no longer be re-litigated in
therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies
Civil Case No. 675-84-C, based on the doctrine of res judicata, more
whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the
particularly, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.
two suits are the same. These two main rules mark the distinction between
the principles governing the two typical cases in which a judgment may
This Court is not persuaded. operate as evidence.11 In speaking of these cases, the first general rule
above stated, and which corresponds to the afore-quoted paragraph (b) of
Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is referred to as "bar by former
or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." Res judicata lays the rule judgment"; while the second general rule, which is embodied in paragraph (c)
that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without of the same section and rule, is known as "conclusiveness of judgment."
fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within
its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all The Resolution of this Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds provides the
other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent following enlightening discourse on conclusiveness of judgment:
jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. 10
The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different concepts:
It is espoused in the Rules of Court, under paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section (1) bar by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.
47, Rule 39, which read:
The second concept — conclusiveness of judgment — states that a
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. – The effect of a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was there
judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as
follows: the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are
concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 20 of 27

 such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the
concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their
while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the
been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.
conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the
same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases,
If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive
the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and
or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the
privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of judgment."
question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus vs. Stated differently, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly
Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action
is not required but merely identity of issues. before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the
merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot
Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not
Appeals (197 SCRA 201, 210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez vs. Reyes the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is
(76 SCRA 179 [1977]) in regard to the distinction between bar by the same.13
former judgment which bars the prosecution of a second action upon
the same claim, demand, or cause of action, and conclusiveness of In sum, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of
judgment which bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in a fact or question already settled in a previous case. The second case,
another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or however, may still proceed provided that it will no longer touch on the same
cause of action. fact or question adjudged in the first case. Conclusiveness of judgment
requires only the identity of issues and parties, but not of causes of action.
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts
or questions which were in issue and adjudicated in former Contrary to Alamayri’s assertion, conclusiveness of judgment has no
action are commonly applied to all matters essentially application to the instant Petition since there is no identity of parties and
connected with the subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C.
extends to questions necessarily implied in the final
judgment, although no specific finding may have been made No identity of parties
in reference thereto and although such matters were directly
referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally
presented. Under this rule, if the record of the former trial SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a petition filed with the RTC by Atty.
shows that the judgment could not have been rendered Gesmundo for the appointment of a guardian over the person and estate of
without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as his late wife Nave alleging her incompetence.
having settled that matter as to all future actions between the
parties and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain A guardian may be appointed by the RTC over the person and estate of a
premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself. 12 minor or an incompetent, the latter being described as a person "suffering the
penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and
Another case, Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation, dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind,
further differentiated between the two rules of res judicata, as follows: even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound
mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes,
cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation." 14
where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is
sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case Rule 93 of the Rules of Court governs the proceedings for the appointment of
constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the a guardian, to wit:

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 21 of 27

 Rule 93: APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS unsuitability of the person for whom letters are prayed, and may pray
that the petition be dismissed, or that letters of guardianship issue to
SECTION 1. Who may petition for appointment of guardian for himself, or to any suitable person named in the opposition.
resident. – Any relative, friend, or other person on behalf of a
resident minor or incompetent who has no parent or lawful guardian, SEC. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. – At the hearing of the
or the minor himself if fourteen years of age or over, may petition the petition the alleged incompetent must be present if able to attend,
court having jurisdiction for the appointment of a general guardian for and it must be shown that the required notice has been given.
the person or estate, or both, of such minor or incompetent. An Thereupon the court shall hear the evidence of the parties in support
officer of the Federal Administration of the United States in the of their respective allegations, and, if the person in question is a
Philippines may also file a petition in favor of a ward thereof, and the minor or incompetent it shall appoint a suitable guardian of his
Director of Health, in favor of an insane person who should be person or estate, or both, with the powers and duties hereinafter
hospitalized, or in favor of an isolated leper. specified.

SEC. 2. Contents of petition. – A petition for the appointment of a xxxx

general guardian must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
SEC. 8. Service of judgment. – Final orders or judgments under this
(a) The jurisdictional facts; rule shall be served upon the civil registrar of the municipality or city
where the minor or incompetent person resides or where his property
(b) The minority or incompetency rendering the appointment or part thereof is situated.
necessary or convenient;
A petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding, without the
(c) The names, ages, and residences of the relatives of the usual parties, i.e., petitioner versus respondent, in an ordinary civil case.
minor or incompetent, and of the persons having him in their Accordingly, SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C bears the title: In re: Guardianship of
care; Nelly S. Nave for Incompetency, Verdasto Gesmundo y Banayo, petitioner,
with no named respondent/s.
(d) The probable value and character of his estate;
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, though, require that the
petition contain the names, ages, and residences of relatives of the supposed
(e) The name of the person for whom letters of guardianship
minor or incompetent and those having him in their care, so that those
are prayed.
residing within the same province as the minor or incompetent can be notified
of the time and place of the hearing on the petition.
The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the petition or
verification shall render void the issuance of letters of guardianship.
The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian
under Rule 93 of the Rules of Court is to determine, first, whether a person is
SEC. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. – When a indeed a minor or an incompetent who has no capacity to care for himself
petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court and/or his properties; and, second, who is most qualified to be appointed as
shall fix a time and place for hearing the same, and shall cause his guardian. The rules reasonably assume that the people who best could
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in help the trial court settle such issues would be those who are closest to and
the petition residing in the province, including the minor if above 14 most familiar with the supposed minor or incompetent, namely, his relatives
years of age or the incompetent himself, and may direct other living within the same province and/or the persons caring for him.
general or special notice thereof to be given.
It is significant to note that the rules do not necessitate that creditors of the
SEC. 4. Opposition to petition. – Any interested person may, by filing minor or incompetent be likewise identified and notified. The reason is
a written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of majority of simple: because their presence is not essential to the proceedings for
the alleged minor, competency of the alleged incompetent, or the appointment of a guardian. It is almost a given, and understandably so, that

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 22 of 27

they will only insist that the supposed minor or incompetent is actually earlier. Merely invoking that the ends of justice would have been best served
capacitated to enter into contracts, so as to preserve the validity of said if she was allowed to present additional evidence is not sufficient to justify
contracts and keep the supposed minor or incompetent obligated to comply deviation from the general rules of procedure. Obedience to the requirements
therewith. of procedural rules is needed if the parties are to expect fair results
therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by
Hence, it cannot be presumed that the Pabale siblings were given notice and harking on the policy of liberal construction.19 Procedural rules are tools
actually took part in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. They are not Nave’s relatives, designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are
nor are they the ones caring for her. Although the rules allow the RTC to thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some
direct the giving of other general or special notices of the hearings on the instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress,
petition for appointment of a guardian, it was not established that the RTC was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules
actually did so in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules
applies only to proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true
Alamayri’s allegation that the Pabale siblings participated in SP. PROC. No.
that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
146-86-C rests on two Orders, dated 30 October 1987 15 and 19 November
procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. 20
1987,16 issued by the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, expressly
mentioning the presence of a Jose Pabale, who was supposedly the father of
the Pabale siblings, during the hearings held on the same dates. However, Moreover, contrary to Alamayri’s assertion, the Court of Appeals did not deny
the said Orders by themselves cannot confirm that Jose Pabale was indeed her Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence merely for
the father of the Pabale siblings and that he was authorized by his children to being late. In its Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the Court of Appeals
appear in the said hearings on their behalf. also denied the said motion on the following grounds:

Alamayri decries that she was not allowed by the Court of Appeals to submit While it is now alleged, for the first time, that the [herein respondents
and mark additional evidence to prove that Jose Pabale was the father of the Pabale siblings] participated in the guardianship proceedings
Pabale siblings. considering that the Jose Pabale mentioned therein is their late
father, [herein petitioner Alamayri] submitting herein documentary
evidence to prove their filiation, even though admitted in evidence at
It is true that the Court of Appeals has the power to try cases and conduct
this late stage, cannot bind [the Pabale siblings] as verily, notice to
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve
their father is not notice to them there being no allegation to the
factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate
effect that he represented them before the Calamba Court. 21
jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further
proceedings. In general, however, the Court of Appeals conducts hearings
and receives evidence prior to the submission of the case for judgment. 17 It As the appellate court reasoned, even if the evidence Alamayri wanted to
must be pointed out that, in this case, Alamayri filed her Motion to Schedule submit do prove that the Jose Pabale who attended the RTC hearings on 30
Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence on 21 November 2001. She thus October 1987 and 19 November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was the
sought to submit additional evidence as to the identity of Jose Pabale, not father of the Pabale siblings, they would still not confirm his authority to
only after CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 had been submitted for judgment, but after represent his children in the said proceedings. Worth stressing is the fact that
the Court of Appeals had already promulgated its Decision in said case on 10 Jose Pabale was not at all a party to the Deed of Sale dated 20 February
April 2001. 1984 over the subject property, which was executed by Nave in favor of the
Pabale siblings. Without proper authority, Jose Pabale’s presence at the
hearings in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C should not bind his children to the
The parties must diligently and conscientiously present all arguments and
outcome of said proceedings or affect their right to the subject property.
available evidences in support of their respective positions to the court before
the case is deemed submitted for judgment. Only under exceptional
circumstances may the court receive new evidence after having rendered Since it was not established that the Pabale siblings participated in SP.
judgment;18 otherwise, its judgment may never attain finality since the parties PROC. No. 146-86-C, then any finding therein should not bind them in Civil
may continually refute the findings therein with further evidence. Alamayri Case No. 675-84-C.
failed to provide any explanation why she did not present her evidence

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 23 of 27

No identity of issues Alamayri capitalizes on the declaration of the RTC in its Decision dated 22
June 1988 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C on Nave’s condition "having become
Neither is there identity of issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil severe since the year 1980."25 But there is no basis for such a
Case No. 675-84-C that may bar the latter, by conclusiveness of judgment, declaration. The medical reports extensively quoted in said Decision,
from ruling on Nave’s competency in 1984, when she executed the Deed of prepared by: (1) Dr. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos, dated 14 April 1986, 26 and (2)
Sale over the subject property in favor the Pabale siblings. by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, dated 20 April 1987, 27 both stated that upon their
examination, Nave was suffering from "organic brain syndrome secondary to
cerebral arteriosclerosis with psychotic episodes," which impaired her
In SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, the main issue was whether Nave was
judgment. There was nothing in the said medical reports, however, which
incompetent at the time of filing of the petition with the RTC in 1986, thus,
may shed light on when Nave began to suffer from said mental condition. All
requiring the appointment of a guardian over her person and estate.
they said was that it existed at the time Nave was examined in 1986, and
again in 1987. Even the RTC judge was only able to observe Nave, which
In the cross-claim of Nave and Atty. Gesmundo against the Pabale siblings in made him realize that her mind was very impressionable and capable of
Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the issue was whether Nave was an incompetent being manipulated, on the occasions when Nave visited the court from 1987
when she executed a Deed of Sale of the subject property in favor of the to 1988. Hence, for this Court, the RTC Decision dated 22 June 1988 in SP.
Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984, hence, rendering the said sale void. PROC. No. 146-86-C may be conclusive as to Nave’s incompetency from
1986 onwards, but not as to her incompetency in 1984. And other than
While both cases involve a determination of Nave’s incompetency, it must be invoking the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C,
established at two separate times, one in 1984 and the other in 1986. A Alamayri did not bother to establish with her own evidence that Nave was
finding that she was incompetent in 1986 does not automatically mean that mentally incapacitated when she executed the 20 February 1984 Deed of
she was so in 1984. In Carillo v. Jaojoco,22 the Court ruled that despite the Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings, so as to render
fact that the seller was declared mentally incapacitated by the trial court only the said deed void.
nine days after the execution of the contract of sale, it does not prove that
she was so when she executed the contract. Hence, the significance of the All told, there being no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No.
two-year gap herein cannot be gainsaid since Nave’s mental condition in 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the 22 June 1988 Decision in the
1986 may vastly differ from that of 1984 given the intervening period. former on Nave’s incompetency by the year 1986 should not bar, by
conclusiveness of judgment, a finding in the latter case that Nave still had
Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who has not previously capacity and was competent when she executed on 20 February 1984 the
been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings.
as the contrary be not proved; that is, that at the moment of his acting he was Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it upheld the
incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind.23 The burden of proving validity of the 20 February 1984 Deed of Sale.
incapacity to enter into contractual relations rests upon the person who
alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is
presumed.24 hereby DENIED. The Decision, dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the
Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally incapacitated petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri.
only in 1986, when the RTC started hearing SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C; and
she was not judicially declared an incompetent until 22 June 1988 when a
Decision in said case was rendered by the RTC, resulting in the appointment
of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian. Thus, prior to 1986, Nave is still
presumed to be capacitated and competent to enter into contracts such as
the Deed of Sale over the subject property, which she executed in favor of
the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984. The burden of proving otherwise
falls upon Alamayri, which she dismally failed to do, having relied entirely on
the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 24 of 27

[7] G.R. No. 132223            June 19, 2001 "Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a guardianship proceedings over
BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, petitioner, vs. HELEN G. BELMES, respondent. the persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent docketed
as Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB. At the time, Valerie was only
6 years old while Vincent was a 2-year old child. It is claimed in the
Civil Law; Guardianship; Respondent, being the natural mother of the minor,
petition that the minors are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and
has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian.—We agree with
have an estate consisting of proceeds from their father’s death
the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent, being the natural mother of the
pension benefits with a probable value of P100,000.00.
minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian. This ruling
finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code which provides: “Art. 211. The
father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of "Finding sufficiency in form and in substance, the case was set for
their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, hearing after a 3-consecutive-weekly publications with the Sunstar
unless there is a judicial order to the contrary, x x x.” Daily.
Same; Same; Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute
parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent.— "On July 15, 1987, petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil
only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that and Vincent Vancil Jr.
respondent is very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over
Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian, "On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen
respondent’s unsuitability. Petitioner, however, has not proffered convincing Belmes, submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship
evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition
Same; Same; Courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not for guardianship under Special Proceedings No. 2819 before the
within the jurisdiction of our courts.—Significantly, this Court has held that courts Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City.
should not appoint persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of our
courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards. "Thereafter, on June 27, 1988, Helen Belmes followed her opposition
with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody
of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors at
Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- Maralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are
G.R. CV No. 45650, "In the Matter of Guardianship of Minors Valerie Vancil permanently residing; that the petition was filed under an improper
and Vincent Vancil – Bonifacia P. Vancil, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. Helen G. venue; and that at the time the petition was filed Bonifacia Vancil was
Belmes, Oppositor-Appellant," promulgated on July 29, 1997, and its a resident of 140 Hurliman Court, Canon City, Colorado, U.S.A.
Resolution dated December 18, 1997 denying the motion for reconsideration being a naturalized American citizen.
of the said Decision.
"On October 12, 1988, after due proceedings, the trial court rejected
The facts of the case as summarized by the Court of Appeals in its Decision and denied Belmes’ motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia
are: as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and instead ordered petitioner
Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office and perform her duties as such
"Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a guardian upon the posting of a bond of P50,000.00. The subsequent
Navy serviceman of the United States of America who died in the attempt for a reconsideration was likewise dismissed in an Order
said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had dated November 24, 1988."1
two (2) children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife,
Helen G. Belmes. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision reversing the
RTC order of October 12, 1988 and dismissing Special Proceedings No.
1618-CEB.

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 25 of 27

The Court of Appeals held: The said "Manifestation/Motion" was noted by this Court in its Resolution
dated November 11, 1998.
"Stress should likewise be made that our Civil Code considers
parents, the father, or in the absence, the mother, as natural Considering that Valerie is already of major age, this petition has become
guardian of her minor children. The law on parental authority under moot with respect to her. Thus, only the first and third "legal points" raised by
the Civil Code or P.D. 603 and now the New Family Code, (Article petitioner should be resolved.
225 of the Family Code) ascribe to the same legal pronouncements.
Section 7 of Rule 93 of the Revised Rules of Court confirms the The basic issue for our resolution is who between the mother and
designation of the parents as ipso facto guardian of their minor grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.
children without need of a court appointment and only for good
reason may another person be named. Ironically, for the petitioner, We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent, being the
there is nothing on record of any reason at all why Helen Belmes, the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to
biological mother, should be deprived of her legal rights as natural be his guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code
guardian of her minor children. To give away such privilege from which provides:
Helen would be an abdication and grave violation of the very basic
fundamental tenets in civil law and the constitution on family
solidarity."2 "Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a
On March 10, 1998, Bonifacia Vancil filed with this Court the present petition, judicial order to the contrary. xxx."
raising the following "legal points":
Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the
"1. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that the preferential corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. In Sagala-Eslao vs.
right of a parent to be appointed guardian over the persons and Court of Appeals,4 this Court held:
estate of the minors is absolute, contrary to existing jurisprudence.
"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts
"2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that Oppositor Helen that ‘the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one
G. Belmes, the biological mother, should be appointed the guardian of the natural rights incident to parenthood,’ a right supported by law
of the minors despite the undisputed proof that under her custody, and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not
her daughter minor Valerie Vancil was raped seven times by created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the
Oppositor’s live-in partner. nature of the parental relationship."

"3. The respondent (sic) Court of Appeals gravely erred when it Petitioner contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent.
disqualified petitioner Bonifacia P. Vancil to be appointed as judicial
guardian over the persons and estate of subject minors despite the
fact that she has all the qualifications and none of the Petitioner’s claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by
disqualifications as judicial guardian, merely on the basis of her U.S. way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family
citizenship which is clearly not a statutory requirement to become Code, thus:
guardian."
"Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents,
At the outset, let it be stressed that in her "Manifestation/Motion," dated substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving
September 15, 1998, respondent Helen Belmes stated that her daughter grandparent. xxx."
Valerie turned eighteen on September 2, 1998 as shown by her Birth
Certificate.3 Respondent thus prayed that this case be dismissed with respect In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals,5 this Court ruled:
to Valerie, she being no longer a proper subject of guardianship proceedings.

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 26 of 27

 "The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons,
the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with
either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are not
authority. Only in case of the parents’ death, absence or unsuitability personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is
may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving no statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to the
grandparent." appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not
personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here."
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental
authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with
Considering that respondent is very much alive and has exercised modification in the sense that Valerie, who has attained the age of majority,
continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in will no longer be under the guardianship of respondent Helen Belmes.
asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian, respondent’s unsuitability.
Petitioner, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that Costs against petitioner.
respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely
insists that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that SO ORDERED.
her (respondent’s) live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie,
being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship
proceeding.

Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still

petitioner cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she
is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be
able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In
fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a
guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate
those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian.

Moreover, we observe that respondent’s allegation that petitioner has not set
foot in the Philippines since 1987 has not been controverted by her. Besides,
petitioner’s old age and her conviction of libel by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 6, Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CBU-16884 6 filed by one Danilo R.
Deen, will give her a second thought of staying here. Indeed, her coming
back to this country just to fulfill the duties of a guardian to Vincent for only
two years is not certain.

Significantly, this Court has held that courts should not appoint persons as
guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it
difficult to protect the wards. In Guerrero vs. Teran,7 this Court held:

"Doña Maria Muñoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed

upon the theory that her appointment was void because she did not
reside in the Philippine Islands. There is nothing in the law which
requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or
guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no
statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with

₯Special Proceedings (Rule 91-Rule 94) Page 27 of 27