EN BANC

[G.R. No. 191560. March 29, 2011.]

HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, Commissioner, National Police

Commission , petitioner, vs . HON. ALEJANDRO S. URRO, in his
capacity as the new appointee vice herein petitioner HON. LUIS
MARIO M. GENERAL, National Police Commission , respondent.

HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, Commissioner, National Police

Commission , petitioner, vs . President GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
thru Executive Secretary LEANDRO MENDOZA, in Her capacity as
the appointing power, HON. RONALDO V. PUNO, in His capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government and
as Ex-O cio Chairman of the National Police Commission and
HON. EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, ALEJANDRO S. URRO, and HON.
CONSTANCIA P. DE GUZMAN as the midnight appointees ,
respondents.

DECISION

BRION , J : p

Before the Court are the Consolidated Petitions for Quo Warranto, 1 and
Certiorari and/or Prohibition 2 with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction led by Atty. Luis Mario General
(petitioner). The petitioner seeks to declare unconstitutional the appointments of
Alejandro S. Urro, Constancia P. de Guzman and Eduardo U. Escueta (collectively, the
respondents) as Commissioners of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), and
to prohibit then Executive Secretary Leandro Mendoza and Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG) Secretary Ronaldo V. Puno from enforcing the respondents'
oath of o ce. Particularly, the petitioner asks that respondent Urro be ousted as
NAPOLCOM Commissioner and he be allowed to continue in office.
THE ANTECEDENTS
On September 20, 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA)
appointed Imelda C. Roces (Roces) as acting Commissioner of the NAPOLCOM,
representing the civilian sector. 3 On January 25, 2006, PGMA reappointed Roces as
acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner. 4 When Roces died in September 2007, PGMA
appointed the petitioner on July 21, 2008 5 as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner in
place of Roces. On the same date, PGMA appointed Eduardo U. Escueta (Escueta) as
acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated him as NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman. 6
Later, PGMA appointed Alejandro S. Urro (Urro) in place of the petitioner,
Constancia P. de Guzman in place of Celia Leones, and Escueta as permanent
NAPOLCOM Commissioners. Urro's appointment paper is dated March 5, 2010;
while the appointment papers of De Guzman and Escueta are both dated
March 8, 2010. 7 On March 9, 2010, Escueta took his oath of o ce before Makati
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 Regional Trial Court Judge Alberico Umali. 8
In a letter dated March 19, 2010 , DILG Head Executive Assistant/Chief-of-Staff
Pascual V. Veron Cruz, Jr. issued separate congratulatory letters to the respondents.
The letter uniformly reads.
You have just been appointed COMMISSIONER . . . National Police
Commission. . . . Attached is your appointment paper duly signed by Her
Excellency, President Macapagal Arroyo. 9

After being furnished a copy of the congratulatory letters on March 22, 2010, 1 0
the petitioner led the present petition questioning the validity of the respondents'
appointments mainly on the ground that it violates the constitutional prohibition
against midnight appointments. 1 1
On March 25, 2010 and April 27, 2010, respondents Urro and de Guzman took
their oath of o ce as NAPOLCOM Commissioners before DILG Secretary Puno and
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez, respectively. 1 2 DTEcSa

On July 30, 2010, the newly elected President of the Republic of the Philippines,
His Excellency Benigno S. Aquino III, issued Executive Order No. 2 (E.O. No. 2)
"Recalling, Withdrawing, and Revoking Appointments Issued by the Previous
Administration in Violation of the Constitutional Ban on Midnight Appointments." The
salient portions of E.O. No. 2 read:
SECTION 1. Midnight Appointments De ned. — The following
appointments made by the former President and other appointing authorities in
departments, agencies, o ces, and instrumentalities, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered as midnight appointments:

(a) Those made on or after March 11, 2010, including all appointments
bearing dates prior to March 11, 2010 where the appointee has accepted, or taken
his oath, or assumed public o ce on or after March 11, 2010, except temporary
appointments in the executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety as may be determined by the appointing
authority.

(b) Those made prior to March 11, 2010, but to take effect after said
date or appointments to office that would be vacant only after March 11, 2010.

(c) Appointments and promotions made during the period of 45 days

prior to the May 10, 2010 elections in violation of Section 261 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
SECTION 2. Recall, Withdraw, and Revocation of Midnight
Appointments. — Midnight appointments, as de ned under Section 1, are
hereby recalled, withdrawn, and revoked. The positions covered or otherwise
affected are hereby declared vacant. (Emphasis supplied.)

THE PETITION
The petitioner claims that Roces was supposed to serve a full term of six years
counted from the date of her appointment in October (should be September) 2004. 1 3
Since she failed to nish her six-year term, then the petitioner is entitled to serve this
unexpired portion or until October (should be September) 2010. 1 4 The petitioner
invokes Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 1 5 (otherwise known as the Department of the
Interior and Local Government Act of 1990) which requires that vacancies in the
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 NAPOLCOM " s hall be lled up for the unexpired term only." 1 6 Because of the
mandatory word "shall," the petitioner concludes that the appointment issued to him
was really a "regular" appointment, notwithstanding what appears in his appointment
paper. As a regular appointee, the petitioner argues that he cannot be removed from
office except for cause.
The petitioner alternatively submits that even if his appointment were temporary,
a temporary appointment does not give the President the license to abuse a public
o cial simply because he lacks security of tenure. 1 7 He asserts that the validity of his
termination from o ce depends on the validity of the appointment of the person
intended to replace him. He explains that until a presidential appointment is "o cially
released," there is no "appointment" to speak of. Since the appointment paper of
respondent Urro, while bearing a date prior to the effectivity of the constitutional ban on
appointments, 1 8 was o cially released ( per the congratulatory letter dated March 19,
2010 issued to Urro) when the appointment ban was already in effect, then the
petitioner's appointment, though temporary in nature, should remain effective as no
new and valid appointment was effectively made.
The petitioner assails the validity of the appointments of respondents De
Guzman and Escueta, claiming that they were also made in violation of the
constitutional ban on appointments. HDIaST

THE COMMENTS OF THE RESPONDENTS and THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR

GENERAL (OSG)
Prefatorily, the respondents characterize Escueta's inclusion in the present
petition as an error since his appointment, acceptance and assumption of o ce all
took place before the constitutional ban on appointments started. Thus, there is no
"case or controversy" as to Escueta.
The respondents posit that the petitioner is not a real party-in-interest to le a
petition for quo warranto since he was merely appointed in an acting capacity and
could be validly removed from office at anytime.
The respondents likewise counter that what the ban on midnight appointments
under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution prohibits is only the making of an
appointment by the President sixty (60) days before the next presidential elections and
until his term expires; it does not prohibit the acceptance by the appointee of his
appointment within the same prohibited period. 1 9 The respondents claim that
"appointment" which is a presidential act, must be distinguished from the "acceptance"
or "rejection" of the appointment, which is the act of the appointee. Section 15, Article
VII of the Constitution is directed only against the President and his act of appointment,
and is not concerned with the act/s of the appointee. Since the respondents were
ap p ointed (p e r the date appearing in their appointment papers) before the
constitutional ban took effect, then their appointments are valid.
The respondents assert that their appointments cannot be considered as
midnight appointments under the Dominador R. Aytona v. Andres V. Castillo, et al. 2 0
ruling, as restated in In Re: Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A.
Valenzuela, et al. 2 1 and Arturo M. de Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al. , 2 2 since
the petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that their appointments were made only
"for the purpose of influencing the Presidential elections," or for "partisan reasons." 2 3
The respondents pray for the issuance of a TRO to stop the implementation of
E.O. No. 2, and for the consolidation of this case with the pending cases of Tamondong
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 v. Executive Secretary 2 4 and De Castro v. O ce of the President 25 which similarly
assail the validity of E.O. No. 2.
On the other hand, while the OSG considers the respondents' appointments
within the scope of "midnight appointments" as de ned by E.O. No. 2, the OSG
nonetheless submits that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy of quo warranto in
view of the nature of his appointment. The OSG claims that since an appointment in an
acting capacity cannot exceed one year, the petitioner's appointment ipso facto expired
on July 21, 2009. 2 6
PETITIONER'S REPLY
The petitioner argues in reply that he is the legally subsisting commissioner until
another quali ed commissioner is validly appointed by the new President to replace
him. 2 7
The petitioner likewise claims that the respondents appeared to have skirted the
element of issuance of an appointment in considering whether an appointment is
made. The petitioner asserts that to constitute an appointment, the President's act of
a xing his signature must be coupled with the physical issuance of the appointment to
the appointee — i.e., the appointment paper is o cially issued in favor of the appointee
through the President's proper Cabinet Secretary. The making of an appointment is
different from its issuance since prior to the o cial issuance of an appointment, the
appointing authority enjoys the prerogative to change his mind. In the present case, the
respondents' appointment papers were o cially issued and communicated to them
only on March 19, 2010, well within the period of the constitutional ban, as shown by
the congratulatory letters individually issued to them.
Given this premise, the petitioner claims that he correctly impleaded Escueta in
this case since his appointment also violates the Constitution. The petitioner adds that
Escueta was appointed on July 21, 2008, although then as acting NAPOLCOM
Commissioner. By permanently appointing him as NAPOLCOM Commissioner, he
stands to be in office for more than six years, in violation of R.A. No. 6975. 2 8
cETDIA

The petitioner argues that even granting that the President can extend
appointments in an acting capacity to NAPOLCOM Commissioners, it may not be done
by "successive appointments" in the same capacity without violating R.A. No. 6975, as
amended, which provides a xed and staggered term of o ce for NAPOLCOM
Commissioners. 2 9
THE COURT'S RULING
We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
When questions of constitutional signi cance are raised, the Court can exercise
its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence
of an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest
on the part of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) recourse to judicial
review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis
mota of the case. 3 0
Both parties dwelt lengthily on the issue of constitutionality of the respondents'
appointments in light of E.O. No. 2 and the subsequent ling before the Court of several
petitions questioning this Executive Order. The parties, however, appear to have
overlooked the basic principle in constitutional adjudication that enjoins the Court from
passing upon a constitutional question, although properly presented, if the case can be
disposed of on some other ground. 3 1 In constitutional law terms, this means that we
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 ought to refrain from resolving any constitutional issue "unless the constitutional
question is the lis mota of the case."
Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action." This last requisite of
judicial review is simply an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the
executive and legislative acts of our co-equal branches of the government. Ultimately, it
is rooted in the principle of separation of powers. Given the presumed validity of an
executive act, the petitioner who claims otherwise has the burden of showing rst that
the case cannot be resolved unless the constitutional question he raised is determined
by the Court. 3 2
In the present case, the constitutionality of the respondents' appointments is not
t h e lis mota of the case. From the submitted pleadings, what is decisive is the
determination of whether the petitioner has a cause of action to institute and maintain
this present petition — a quo warranto against respondent Urro. If the petitioner fails to
establish his cause of action for quo warranto, a discussion of the constitutionality of
the appointments of the respondents is rendered completely unnecessary. The
inclusion of the grounds for certiorari and/or prohibition does not alter the essential
character of the petitioner's action since he does not even allege that he has a personal
and substantial interest in raising the constitutional issue insofar as the other
respondents are concerned.
The resolution of whether a cause of action exists, in turn, hinges on the nature of
the petitioner's appointment. We frame the issues under the following questions:
1. What is the nature of the petitioner's appointment as acting
NAPOLCOM Commissioner?
2. Does the petitioner have the clear right to be reinstated to his former
position and to oust respondent Urro as NAPOLCOM Commissioner?
I. Nature of petitioner's appointment
a. A staggered term of office is
not inconsistent with an acting
appointment
The petitioner asserts that contrary to what appears in his appointment paper,
the appointment extended to him was really a regular appointment; thus, he cannot be
removed from office except for cause. The petitioner argues that the appointment of an
acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner or, at the very least, the "successive appointments"
of NAPOLCOM Commissioners in an acting capacity contravenes the safeguards that
the law — R.A. No. 6975 3 3 — intends through the staggered term of o ce of
NAPOLCOM Commissioners. TSIDEa

Notably, the petitioner does not expressly claim that he was issued a permanent
appointment; rather, he claims that his appointment is actually a regular appointment
since R.A. No. 6975 does not allegedly allow an appointment of a NAPOLCOM
Commissioner in an acting capacity.
At the outset, the petitioner's use of terms needs some clari cation.
Appointments may be classi ed into two: rst, as to its nature; and second, as to the
manner in which it is made. 3 4
Under the rst classi cation , appointments can either be permanent or
temporary (acting). A basic distinction is that a permanent appointee can only be
removed from o ce for cause; whereas a temporary appointee can be removed even
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 without hearing or cause. 3 5 Under the second classi cation , an appointment can
either be regular or ad interim. A regular appointment is one made while Congress is in
session, while an ad interim appointment is one issued during the recess of Congress.
In strict terms, presidential appointments that require no con rmation from the
Commission on Appointments 3 6 cannot be properly characterized as either a regular
or an ad interim appointment.
In this light, what the petitioner may have meant is a permanent (as contrasted to
a temporary or acting) appointment to the o ce of a NAPOLCOM Commissioner, at
least for the duration of the unexpired portion of his predecessor (Roces).
Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to
make temporary appointments, unless he is otherwise speci cally prohibited by
the Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant
to the nature of the o ce involved. 3 7 The President's power to issue an acting
appointment is particularly authorized by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292).
CHAPTER 5
POWER OF APPOINTMENT
Section 16. Power of Appointment. — The President shall exercise
the power to appoint such officials as provided for in the Constitution and laws.
Section 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. —
(1) The President may temporarily designate an o cer already in the
government service or any other competent person to perform the
functions of an o ce in the executive branch , appointment to which is
vested in him by law, when: (a) the o cer regularly appointed to the o ce
is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or any other
cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy;
(2) ...

(3) In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year.

The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the

discharge of o cial functions by authorizing a person to discharge those functions
pending the selection of a permanent or another appointee. An acting appointee
accepts the position on the condition that he shall surrender the o ce once he is called
to do so by the appointing authority. Therefore, his term of o ce is not xed but
endures at the pleasure of the appointing authority. His separation from the service
does not import removal but merely the expiration of his term — a mode of termination
of o cial relations that falls outside the coverage of the constitutional provision on
security of tenure 3 8 since no removal from office is involved.
The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature 3 9 and the limitations on
or quali cations in the exercise of this power are strictly construed. 4 0 In the present
case, the petitioner posits that the law itself, R.A. No. 6975, prohibits the appointment
of a NAPOLCOM Commissioner in an acting capacity by staggering his term of o ce.
R.A. No. 6975, on the term of office, states: DCESaI

Section 16. Term of O ce. — The four (4) regular and full-time
Commissioners shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of
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 the Secretary. Of the rst four (4) commissioners to be appointed, two (2)
commissioners shall serve for six (6) years and the two (2) other commissioners
for four (4) years. All subsequent appointments shall be for a period of six (6)
years each, without reappointment or extension.

Generally, the purpose for staggering the term of o ce is to minimize the

appointing authority's opportunity to appoint a majority of the members of a collegial
body. It also intended to ensure the continuity of the body and its policies. 4 1 A
staggered term of o ce, however, is not a statutory prohibition, direct or indirect,
against the issuance of acting or temporary appointment. It does not negate the
authority to issue acting or temporary appointments that the Administrative Code
grants.
Ramon P. Binamira v. Peter D. Garrucho, Jr. , 4 2 involving the Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA), is an example of how this Court has recognized the validity of
temporary appointments in vacancies in o ces whose holders are appointed on
staggered basis. Under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 189, 4 3 (the charter of the PTA,
as amended by P.D. No. 564 4 4 and P.D. No. 1400), 4 5 the members of the PTA's
governing body are all presidential appointees whose terms of o ce are also
staggered. 4 6 This, notwithstanding, the Court sustained the temporary character of the
appointment extended by the President in favor of the PTA General Manager, even if the
law 4 7 also fixes his term of office at six years unless sooner removed for cause.
Interestingly, even a staggered term of o ce does not ensure that at no instance
will the appointing authority appoint all the members of a body whose members are
appointed on staggered basis.
The post-war predecessor of the NAPOLCOM was the Police Commission
created under R.A. No. 4864. 4 8 Pursuant to the 1987 constitutional provision
mandating the creation of one national civilian police force, 4 9 Congress enacted R.A.
No. 6975 and created the NAPOLCOM to exercise, inter alia, "administrative control
over the Philippine National Police." Later, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8551 which
substantially retained the organizational structure, powers and functions of the
NAPOLCOM. 5 0 Under these laws, the President has appointed the members of the
Commission whose terms of office are staggered.
Under Section 16 of R.A. No. 6975, the NAPOLCOM Commissioners are all given
a xed term of six years (except the two of the rst appointees who hold o ce only for
four years). By staggering their terms of o ce however, the four regular
commissioners would not vacate their o ces at the same time since a vacancy will
occur every two years.
Under the NAPOLCOM set up, the law does not appear to have been designed to
attain the purpose of preventing the same President from appointing all the
NAPOLCOM Commissioners by staggering their terms of o ce. R.A. No. 6975 took
effect on January 1, 1991. In the usual course, the term of o ce of the rst two regular
commissioners would have expired in 1997, while the term of the other two
commissioners would have expired in 1995. Since the term of the President elected in
the rst national elections under the 1987 Constitution expired on June 30, 1998, then,
theoretically, the sitting President for the 1992-1998 term could appoint all the
succeeding four regular NAPOLCOM Commissioners. The next President, on the other
hand, whose term ended in 2004, would have appointed the next succeeding
Commissioners in 2001 and 2003.
It is noteworthy, too, that while the Court nulli ed the attempt of Congress to
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 consider the terms of o ce of the then NAPOLCOM Commissioners as automatically
expired on the ground that there was no bona fide reorganization of the NAPOLCOM, 5 1
a provision on the staggering of terms of o ce is evidently absent in R.A. No. 8551 —
the amendatory law to R.A. No. 6975. Section 7 of R.A. No. 8551 reads:
Section 7. Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to
read as follows:

"SEC. 16. Term of O ce. — The four (4) regular and full-time
Commissioners shall be appointed by the President for a term of six (6) years
without re-appointment or extension."

Thus, as the law now stands, the petitioner's claim that the appointment of an
acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner is not allowed based on the staggering of terms of
office does not even have any statutory basis.
Given the wide latitude of the President's appointing authority (and the strict
construction against any limitation on or quali cation of this power), the prohibition on
the President from issuing an acting appointment must either be specific, or there must
be a clear repugnancy between the nature of the o ce and the temporary appointment.
No such limitation on the President's appointing power appears to be clearly deducible
from the text of R.A. No. 6975 in the manner we ruled in Nacionalista Party v. Bautista .
5 2 In that case, we nulli ed the acting appointment issued by the President to ll the
o ce of a Commissioner of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on the ground
that it would undermine the independence of the COMELEC. We ruled that given the
speci c nature of the functions performed by COMELEC Commissioners, only a
permanent appointment to the office of a COMELEC Commissioner can be made.
Under the Constitution, the State is mandated to establish and maintain a police
force to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. Pursuant to
this constitutional mandate, the Congress enacted R.A. No. 6975, creating the
NAPOLCOM with the following powers and functions: 5 3 aDcETC

Section 14. Powers and Functions of the Commission. — The

Commission shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(a) Exercise administrative control and operational supervision over
the Philippine National Police which shall mean the power to:
xxx xxx xxx
b) Advise the President on all matters involving police functions and
administration;
c) Render to the President and to the Congress an annual report on its
activities and accomplishments during the thirty (30) days after the end of the
calendar year, which shall include an appraisal of the conditions obtaining in the
organization and administration of police agencies in the municipalities, cities
and provinces throughout the country, and recommendations for appropriate
remedial legislation;
d) Recommend to the President, through the Secretary, within sixty
(60) days before the commencement of each calendar year, a crime prevention
program; and

e) Perform such other functions necessary to carry out the

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 provisions of this Act and as the President may direct. [Emphasis added.]

We nd nothing in this enumeration of functions of the members of the

NAPOLCOM that would be subverted or defeated by the President's appointment of an
acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner pending the selection and quali cation of a
permanent appointee. Viewed as an institution, a survey of pertinent laws and executive
issuances 5 4 will show that the NAPOLCOM has always remained as an o ce under or
within the Executive Department. 5 5 Clearly, there is nothing repugnant between the
petitioner's acting appointment, on one hand, and the nature of the functions of the
NAPOLCOM Commissioners or of the NAPOLCOM as an institution, on the other.
b. R.A. No. 6975 does not
prohibit the appointment of an
acting NAPOLCOM
Commissioner in filling up
vacancies in the NAPOLCOM
The petitioner next cites Section 18 of R.A. No. 6975 to support his claim that the
appointment of a NAPOLCOM Commissioner to ll a vacancy due to the permanent
incapacity of a regular Commissioner can only be permanent and not temporary:
Section 18. Removal from O ce. — The members of the
Commission may be removed from o ce for cause. All vacancies in the
Commission, except through expiration of term, shall be filled up for the unexpired
term only: Provided, That any person who shall be appointed in this case shall be
eligible for regular appointment for another full term.

Nothing in the cited provision supports the petitioner's conclusion. By using the
word "only" in Section 18 of R.A. No. 6975, the law's obvious intent is only to prevent the
new appointee from serving beyond the term of o ce of the original appointee. It does
not prohibit the new appointee from serving less than the unexpired portion of the term
as in the case of a temporary appointment.
While the Court previously inquired into the true nature of a supposed acting
appointment for the purpose of determining whether the appointing power is abusing
the principle of temporary appointment, 5 6 the petitioner has not pointed to any
circumstance/s which would warrant a second look into and the invalidation of the
temporary nature of his appointment. 5 7
Even the petitioner's citation of Justice Puno's 5 8 dissenting opinion in Teodoro
B. Pangilinan v. Guillermo T. Maglaya, etc. 5 9 is inapt. Like the petitioner, Pangilinan was
merely appointed in an acting capacity and unarguably enjoyed no security of tenure. He
was relieved from the service after exposing certain anomalies involving his superiors.
Upon hearing his plea for reinstatement, the Court unanimously observed that
Pangilinan's relief was a punitive response from his superiors. The point of
disagreement, however, is whether Pangilinan's lack of security of tenure deprives him
of the right to seek reinstatement. Considering that the law (Administrative Code of
1987) allows temporary appointments only for a period not exceeding twelve (12)
months, the majority considered Pangilinan to be without any judicial remedy since at
the time of his separation, he no longer had any right to the o ce. Justice Puno
dissented, arguing that Pangilinan's superiors' abuse of his temporary appointment
furnishes the basis for the relief he seeks. EcDSHT

In the present case, the petitioner does not even allege that his separation from
the o ce amounted to an abuse of his temporary appointment that would entitle him
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 to the incidental bene t of reinstatement. 6 0 As we did in Pangilinan, 6 1 we point out
that the petitioner's appointment as Acting Commissioner was time-limited. His
appointment ipso facto expired on July 21, 2009 when it was not renewed either in an
acting or a permanent capacity. With an expired appointment, he technically now
occupies no position on which to anchor his quo warranto petition.
c. The petitioner is estopped
from claiming that he was
permanently appointed
The petitioner's appointment paper is dated July 21, 2008. From that time until
he was apprised on March 22, 2010 of the appointment of respondent Urro, the
petitioner faithfully discharged the functions of his o ce without expressing any
misgivings on the character of his appointment. However, when called to relinquish his
o ce in favor of respondent Urro, the petitioner was quick on his feet to refute what
appeared in his appointment papers.
Under these facts, the additional circumstance of estoppel clearly militates
against the petitioner. A person who accepts an appointment in an acting capacity,
extended and received without any protest or reservation, and who acts by virtue of that
appointment for a considerable time, cannot later on be heard to say that the
appointment was really a permanent one so that he could not be removed except for
cause. 6 2
II. An acting appointee has no
cause of action for quo warranto
against the new appointee
The Rules of Court requires that an ordinary civil action must be based on a
cause of action, 6 3 which is de ned as an act or omission of one party in violation of the
legal right of the other which causes the latter injury. While a quo warranto is a special
civil action, the existence of a cause of action is not any less required since both special
and ordinary civil actions are governed by the rules on ordinary civil actions subject only
to the rules prescribed specifically for a particular special civil action. 6 4
Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to a public
o ce. Generally, quo warranto proceedings are commenced by the Government as the
proper party-plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an
individual may commence such action if he claims to be entitled to the public o ce
allegedly usurped by another. We stress that the person instituting the quo warranto
proceedings in his own behalf must show that he is entitled to the o ce in dispute;
otherwise, the action may be dismissed at any stage. 6 5 Emphatically, Section 6, Rule
66 of the same Rules requires the petitioner to state in the petition his right to the
public office and the respondent's unlawful possession of the disputed position.
As early as 1905, 6 6 the Court already held that for a petition for quo warranto to
be successful, the suing private individual must show a clear right to the contested
office. 6 7 His failure to establish this right warrants the dismissal of the suit for lack of
cause of action; it is not even necessary to pass upon the right of the defendant who, by
virtue of his appointment, continues in the undisturbed possession of his office. 6 8
Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (and an expired one at
that), he clearly does not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition. 6 9 The
essence of an acting appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability
at any time by the appointing authority. 7 0 The petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding
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 who seeks reinstatement to an o ce, on the ground of usurpation or illegal deprivation,
must prove his clear right 7 1 to the o ce for his suit to succeed; otherwise, his petition
must fail.
From this perspective, the petitioner must rst clearly establish his own right to
the disputed o ce as a condition precedent to the consideration of the
unconstitutionality of the respondents' appointments. The petitioner's failure in this
regard renders a ruling on the constitutional issues raised completely unnecessary.
Neither do we need to pass upon the validity of the respondents' appointment. These
latter issues can be determined more appropriately in a proper case. IEHSDA

WHEREFORE , the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., Carpio, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro,
Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza and Sereno, JJ.,
concur.

Footnotes
1.Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
2.Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

3.Rollo, p. 201.
4.Id. at 202.

5.On July 31, 2008, the petitioner took his oath of office before DILG Secretary (and
NAPOLCOM Chairman) Ronaldo V. Puno; id. at 10.
6.Id. at 33 and 180.

7.Id. at 337 and 179.

8.Id. at 162.
9.Id. at 336, 338 and 340.

10.Id. at 11.
11.Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution.

12.Rollo, pp. 149 and 162.

13.Id. at 201.
14.Ibid.

15.An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police under a Reorganized Department of the
Interior and Local Government, December 13, 1990.
16.Section 18, R.A. No. 6975.

17.Rollo, pp. 18-19.

18.The constitutional ban on appointments started on March 10, 2010.

19.Rollo, p. 160.
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 20.G.R. No. L-19313, January 19, 1962, 4 SCRA 1.

21.A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998, 298 SCRA 408.

22.G.R. No. 191002, G.R. No. 191032, G.R. No. 191057, A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, G.R. No. 191149,
G.R. No. 191342, and G.R. No. 191420, March 17, 2010.

23.Rollo, p. 166.
24.Docketed as G.R. No. 192987.

25.Docketed as G.R. No. 192991.

26.Citing Section 17 (3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292; and Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita ,
G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005, 472 SCRA 587.
27.Rollo, pp. 222-223.

28.Id. at 268.
29.Id. at 279-280.

30.Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 338 SCRA 81.

31.Sotto v. Commission on Elections, 76 Phil. 516 (1946).

32.People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).

33.R.A. No. 6975, Section 16 reads:

Section 16. Term of Office. — The four (4) regular and full-time Commissioners shall
be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary. Of the rst
four (4) commissioners to be appointed, two (2) commissioners shall serve for six (6)
years and the two (2) other commissioners for four (4) years. All subsequent
appointments shall be for a period of six (6) years each, without reappointment or
extension.
 R.A. No. 8551, Section 7 reads:

Section 7. Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read as follows:

SEC. 16. Term of O ce. — The four (4) regular and full-time Commissioners shall be
appointed by the President for a term of six (6) years without re-appointment or
extension."

34.See Marohombsar v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126481, February 18, 2000, 326 SCRA 62.
35.Marohombsar v. Alonto, Jr., G.R. No. 93711, February 25, 1991, 194 SCRA 390.

36.See Calderon v. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992, 208 SCRA 254.

37.Cabiling v. Pabulaan n , G.R. Nos. L-21764 and L-21765, May 31, 1965, 14 SCRA 274, citing
Tañada and Carreon, Philippine Political Law, 1961 ed.
38.Achacoso v. Macaraig, G.R. No. 93023, March 13, 1991, 195 SCRA 235.

39.Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, supra note 24.

40.Sarmiento III v. Mison, No. L-79974, December 17, 1987, 156 SCRA 549.

41.Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2002 ed. p. 301.

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 42.G.R. No. 92008, July 30, 1990, 188 SCRA 154.
43.AMENDING PART IX OF THE INTEGRATED REORGANIZATION PLAN BY RENAMING THE
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND TOURISM AS THE DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM, AND
CREATING THE DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM WITH A PHILIPPINE TOURIST AUTHORITY
ATTACHED TO IT IN LIEU OF PHILIPPINE TOURIST COMMISSION; May 11, 1973.
44.REVISING THE CHARTER OF THE PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY CREATED UNDER
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 189, DATED MAY 11, 1973; October 2, 1974.

45.FURTHER AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 564, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS

THE REVISED CHARTER OF THE PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES; June 5, 1978. Section 2 of P.D. No. 1400 reads:
 Section 2. Section 23 is hereby amended by adding a new Section to read as
follows:

"Section 23-A. General Manager. — Appointment and Tenure. The General Manager shall
be appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall serve for a term of six (6)
years unless sooner removed for cause; Provided, That upon the expiration of his term,
he shall serve as such until his successor shall have been appointed and qualified."

46.Sections 14-16 of P.D. No. 564 reads:

Section 14. Board of Directors Composition. — The corporate powers and functions of
the Authority shall be vested in and exercised by a Board of Directors, hereinafter referred
to as the Board, which shall be composed of: (a) the Secretary of Tourism as Chairman;
(b) the General Manager of the Authority as Vice Chairman; and (c) three (3) part-time
members who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines. The Chairman of
the Board may at the same time be appointed by the President as General Manager of
the Authority.
Section 15. Term of Office. — The term of o ce of the part-time members of the Board
shall be six years. Of the part-time members rst appointed, one shall hold o ce for six
years, one for four years, and the last one for two years. A successor to a member whose
term has expired shall be appointed for the full term of six years from the date of
expiration of the term for which his predecessor was appointed.
Section 16. Vacancy Before Expiration of Term. — Any member appointed to ll a
vacancy in the Board occurring prior to the expiration of the term for which his
predecessor was appointed shall serve only for the unexpired portion of the term of his
predecessor.
47.P.D. No. 1400.

48.AN ACT CREATING THE POLICE COMMISSION, AMENDING AND REVISING THE LAWS
RELATIVE TO THE LOCAL POLICE SYSTEM, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES; August 8,
1966. Section 3 of R.A. No. 4864 reads:
Sec. 3. Creation of Police Commission. — To carry out the objectives of this Act, there is
hereby created a Police Commission under the O ce of the President of the Philippines
composed of a chairman and two other members, to be appointed by the President with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments, and who shall hold o ce for a term of
seven years and may not be reappointed. Of the members of the Police Commission rst
appointed, one shall hold o ce for seven years, another for ve years and the other for
three years. The Chairman and members of the Police Commission may only be
removed from office for cause.
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 49.Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution.

50.See Canonizado v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133132, January 25, 2000, 323 SCRA 312.
51.Id.

52.85 Phil. 101 (1949); Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac, G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990, 192 SCRA
358.
53.As amended by R.A. No. 8551.

54.R.A. No. 4864 (AN ACT CREATING THE POLICE COMMISSION, AMENDING AND REVISING
THE LAWS RELATIVE TO THE LOCAL POLICE SYSTEM, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,
August 8, 1966); P.D. No. 765 (PROVIDING FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, August 8, 1975); E.O. No.
1040 (TRANSFERRING THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION TO THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, July 10, 1985); E.O. No. 379 (REALIGNING THE FUNCTIONS OF
SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OVER THE INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE PURSUANT
TO SECTION 31, CHAPTER 10, BOOK III OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292 n , November 24,
1989).
55.When the Police Commission was reorganized as the National Police Commission in 1972,
the latter was under the O ce of the President. In 1975, it was transferred to the Ministry
(now Department) of National Defense. Ten years later, it was placed again under the
O ce of the President. In 1991, a new NAPOLCOM was created " within the Department
[of Interior and Local Government.]" Later, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8551 making the
NAPOLCOM an "agency attached to the Department [of Interior and Local Government]
for policy and program coordination".
56.Marohombsar v. Alonto, Jr., supra note 33.

57.In Marohombsar v. Alonto, Jr., ibid. , the Court found that there are several reasons which
indicate that the maneuverings of the appointing authority were mala de undertaken.
Signi cantly, the Court found that what was actually issued to the appointee is not an
acting but an ad interim appointment, which is actually a permanent appointment.

58.Later, Chief Justice.

59.G.R. No. 104216, August 20, 1993, 225 SCRA 511.

60.Dissenting Opinion of Justice (later, Chief Justice) Puno; 225 SCRA 522.

61.Ibid.
62.Cabiling, et al. v. Pabulaan, et al., 121 Phil. 1068 (1965); and Marohombsar v. Alonto, Jr.,
supra note 33.
63.Section 1, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.
64.Section 3 (a), par. 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court.

65.Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009, 593 SCRA 68.

66.Acosta v. Flor, 5 Phil. 18 (1905).

67.Topacio v. Ong, G.R. No. 179895, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 817.

68.Castro v. Del Rosario, et al., G.R. No. L-17915, January 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 196, citing Acosta
v. Flor, 5 Phil. 18.
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 69.Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88498, June 9, 1992, 209 SCRA 637.

70.Achacoso v. Macaraig, supra note 36; and Quitiquit v. Villacorta, 107 Phil. 1060 (1960).

71.Carillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-24554, May 31, 1967, 77 SCRA 170.
n Note from the Publisher: Written as "Cabiling v. Pabualan" in the original document.
n Note from the Publisher: Written as "Executive Order No. 202" in the original document.

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