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686 SINGAPORE LAW REPORTS (REISSUE) [2008] 4 SLR(R)

XP
v
Public Prosecutor

[2008] SGHC 107

High Court — Magistrate’s Appeal No 50 of 2007

V K Rajah JA
9, 30 April; 4 July 2008

Criminal Law — Statutory offences — Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) —
Outrage of modesty — Section 354 Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed)

Evidence — Proof of evidence — Standard of proof — Complainants’ testimonies

uncorroborated or contradicted by other witnesses — Whether Prosecution’s case
proved beyond reasonable doubt — Import of presumption of innocence remaining
unrebutted

Evidence — Witnesses — Multiple complainants — Accused convicted on two

complainants’ charges but acquitted of other two complainants’ charges — Need for
reasoned grounds explaining judge’s differing conclusions vis-à-vis different
complainants — Whether complainants unusually convincing — Whether collusion
disproved beyond reasonable doubt

Facts

The appellant was the teacher-in-charge of the water polo co-curricular activity
at an all-boys secondary school (the “School”) in 2001-2002 and 2004-2005,
having taken leave of absence to pursue further education in 2002-2003.
Nineteen charges were initially brought against him by seven different
complainants, concerning primarily outrage of modesty offences under s 354 of
the Penal Code. Of these, ten charges were stood down and the appellant was
acquitted of six and convicted of three charges following an 80-day trial in the
District Court. The three convictions concerned two complainants E and D,
while the six acquittals concerned two other complainants B and C.

E was a student of the School from 2001 to 2004 and alleged that the appellant
had molested him on two occasions in 2001 when E was in Secondary 1. E’s
allegations first surfaced vaguely only in 2004 and he was no longer a student of
the School when the formal complaint was made in 2005 to the School principal.
In particular, E alleged that the appellant had molested him in early 2001 while
conducting a “sports check” to examine his back for injuries. According to E the
appellant told him to pull down his trunks and then massaged his groin area and
touched his penis. The second alleged incident occurred a few months later
during a water polo team camp, when the appellant allegedly brought E to a
“portakabin” and massaged E’s back, temples, shoulders and chest. The original
formulation of this charge stated that the appellant had rubbed E’s nipples, but
E’s testimony during trial was conspicuously silent about whether his nipples
had been touched, despite some prompting by the trial judge.
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[2008] 4 SLR(R) XP v PP 687

The second complainant D joined the School in 2003 as a Secondary 1 student.

D and E were good friends, and were also close to B and C. D alleged that the
appellant molested him during a camp in 2004 when D was 14 years old and in
Secondary 2. D first stated that the appellant requested to share his sleeping bag
as a blanket as it was cold, and while sleeping next to him in a gymnasium
aerobics room along with about 30 other boys, the appellant groped his buttocks
in the middle of the night and tugged at his shorts. However, on cross
examination, D asserted that he and the appellant had never shared his sleeping
bag. Six witnesses testified that D and the appellant did not sleep next to each
other during the camp.

The trial judge found that the complainants had not colluded as the Defence
alleged, and convicted the appellant of the three charges concerning D and E,
but acquitted him of the six similar charges concerning B and C. She only gave
detailed grounds of decision for the three convictions. The appellant appealed
against the three convictions, denying that he had committed the alleged acts
and arguing that the trial judge erred on several counts.

Held, allowing the appeal:

(1) When the Defence alleged collusion amongst the complainants, the
Prosecution bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that there
was no collusion to make a false complaint. The trial judge did not satisfactorily
explain why she found an absence of collusion; her lack of reasoning suggested
that she could have erred in placing the burden of proof of collusion on the
Defence instead, and she misdirected herself in relying on the rhetorical
question of why a student might risk scrutiny and uncomfortable attention to
sabotage a resented teacher: at [21], [25] and [26].

(2) There was no formal legal requirement for corroboration under s 136 of
the Evidence Act where a case turned on the complainant’s word against that of
the accused. The reminder, devised from the jurisprudence, that a complainant’s
testimony had to be unusually convincing in order to prove the Prosecution’s
case beyond a reasonable doubt without independent corroboration, did not
change the ultimate rule that the Prosecution had to prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt, but was helpful in setting the threshold for the complainant’s
testimony to be preferred over the accused’s evidence. This reminder should not
be confined to the categories of witnesses who were supposedly accomplices,
young children or sexual offence complainants; nor did it dispense with having
to assess the complainant’s testimony against that of the accused: at [27] and
[31].

(3) On the 2001 “sports check” charge, it was undisputed that there was no
corroboration of E’s evidence. The trial judge erred in preferring E’s testimony
over contradictory evidence by independent witnesses such as Coach 4 and Ms
BB. Coach 4 testified that the appellant had never asked to excuse E from
training for the sports check as E alleged. The judge also erred in finding that E
told Ms BB in 2003 about having been touched by the appellant; Ms BB was a
truthful prosecution witness and had clarified unequivocally that the
conversation took place in 2004, providing cogent reasons for this confirmation.
The judge erred in extrapolating further from the finding that the conversation
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688 SINGAPORE LAW REPORTS (REISSUE) [2008] 4 SLR(R)

took place in 2003, that the appellant therefore did in fact molest E in 2001: at
[42] to [48].

(4) E’s account of the alleged 2001 portakabin incident was conspicuous for
the glaring and deeply troubling absence of a crucial particular in the original
charge: the allegation that the appellant had rubbed E’s nipples. Having allowed
the Prosecution’s application to amend the charge to remove the reference to the
rubbing of E’s nipples, it was plainly wrong for the judge to then omit to
consider the significance of E’s failure to state specifically that his nipples had
been rubbed as the original charge could only have been formulated on precisely
what E had disclosed to the investigating officer. E’s failure to repeat such a
fundamental allegation on the stand should have been recognised as a very
disturbing development that severely compromised E’s credibility and the
overall strength of the charge: at [50].

(5) On the charge concerning D, the judge erred in finding, contrary to the
evidence of six witnesses, that the appellant had even slept next to D during the
2004 camp. D’s credibility was also significantly corroded by his evidence on
whether the appellant had shared D’s sleeping bag as a blanket with him. While
it was not necessary for the Prosecution to prove that the appellant and D had
shared the sleeping bag as a blanket, D’s subsequent equivocation on a fact so
inextricably intertwined to his account of the alleged incident was fundamentally
detrimental to his credibility and the overall cogency of the Prosecution’s case.
The judge also erred in relying on the appellant’s police statement P89 as
ostensible admissions by the appellant, because P89 had been recorded when the
appellant was still suffering from a recent attack of his heart ailment.
Furthermore, the appellant’s apparent admission that he and D had shared D’s
sleeping bag as a blanket was strenuously denied by D himself. No significant
weight should thus have been accorded to P89: at [56] to [59], [61] and [63].

(6) While it was technically not procedurally improper for the trial judge to
give reasons only for the charges on which she had convicted the appellant, in
the context of the present case, where all the charges were similar in nature and
the Defence was strenuously arguing that the four complainants had colluded to
make the accusations falsely, it was imperative for the judge to explain why she
had reached different decisions on six of the nine similar charges. These six
acquittals would affect the complainants’ collective credibility and the
Prosecution’s overall case. Where several similar charges emanated from a few
complainants who also gave evidence to corroborate each other, the judge ought
to give reasons for deciding differently vis-à-vis the different complainants,
especially if she also relied on their evidence in making findings of guilt. If the
judge did not find B and C credible, she could have erred in holding that there
was no collusion amongst the complainants. The judge thus left a legal void in
not offering her reasons for acquitting the appellant on the charges concerning B
and C, especially since she dismissed the Defence’s allegations that they had
colluded with the others in fabricating charges against the appellant: at [65] to
[70].

[Observation: Teachers, being in a position of considerable authority vis-à-vis

their young charges, had to be cautious never to find themselves in situations
with the potential to harmfully exploit that relationship. The appearance of
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[2008] 4 SLR(R) XP v PP 689

propriety was extremely important in the student-teacher relationship. Teachers

had to be mindful never to cross boundaries of personal and cultural proprieties
and should be ever conscious of respecting their students’ privacy and personal
space, avoiding potentially compromising situations at all costs. Should there be
a need for student-teacher bonding involving any physical contact, this should
invariably take place in the open, in the presence of others, without occasioning
even the slightest hint of impropriety: at [96].
It was the constitutional role of the court to carefully and dispassionately
evaluate the Prosecution’s and Defence’s case theories on the sole basis of legal
proof and not mere suspicion or intuition. Objective and not subjective belief
was the essential touchstone of guilt, and there was simply no place for
subsequent speculation or implication that an acquitted accused might be
“factually guilty”. Our adversarial system required the Prosecution to
conscientiously and irrefutably ensure that an unbreakable and credible chain of
evidence secured every guilty verdict. While perfectly proper prosecutions might
sometimes fail because of unexpected frailties in the evidential links, this system
was eminently credible, pragmatic and effective, and rigorous adherence to these
standards would ensure public confidence in the legal system: at [98].]

Case(s) referred to
Goh Han Heng v PP [2003] 4 SLR(R) 374; [2003] 4 SLR 374 (refd)
Jagatheesan s/o Krishnasamy v PP [2006] 4 SLR(R) 45; [2006] 4 SLR 45 (refd)
Khoo Kwoon Hain v PP [1995] 2 SLR(R) 591; [1995] 2 SLR 767 (refd)
King, The v Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658 (refd)
Lee Kwang Peng v PP [1997] 2 SLR(R) 569; [1997] 3 SLR 278 (refd)
Loo See Mei v PP [2004] 2 SLR(R) 27; [2004] 2 SLR 27 (refd)
Miller v Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372 (refd)
Ng Kwee Leong v PP [1998] 3 SLR(R) 281; [1998] 3 SLR 942 (refd)
PP v Choo Thiam Hock [1994] 2 SLR(R) 702; [1994] 3 SLR 248 (refd)
PP v Mohammed Liton Mohammed Syeed Mallik [2008] 1 SLR(R) 601; [2008]
1 SLR 601 (refd)
PP v Wang Ziyi Able [2008] 2 SLR(R) 61; [2008] 2 SLR 61 (refd)
Public Prosecutor v Mardai [1950] MLJ 33 (refd)
R v Brydon (1995) 2 BCLR (3d) 243 (refd)
R v Dennis Patrick Murtagh and Kenneth Kennedy (1955) 39 Cr App R 72 (refd)
Tang Kin Seng v PP [1996] 3 SLR(R) 444; [1997] 1 SLR 46 (refd)
Teo Keng Pong v PP [1996] 2 SLR(R) 890; [1996] 3 SLR 329 (refd)
Took Leng How v PP [2006] 2 SLR(R) 70; [2006] 2 SLR 70 (refd)
Woolmington v The Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462 (refd)

Legislation referred to
Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) ss 136, 147(3), 159
Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) s 354 (consd)
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690 SINGAPORE LAW REPORTS (REISSUE) [2008] 4 SLR(R)

Engelin Teh SC and Thomas Sim (Engelin Teh Practice LLC) for the appellant;
Leong Wing Tuck and Hon Yi (Attorney-General’s Chambers) for the respondent.

[Editorial note: This was an appeal from the decision of the District Court in [2007]
SGDC 285.]

4 July 2008

V K Rajah JA:

1 The present appeal against convictions and sentence arose from a

battery of grave accusations levelled against the appellant, concerning
primarily outrage of modesty offences under s 354 of the Penal Code
(Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed). These consisted of 19 original charges, brought by
seven different complainants; ten of the charges were, however, stood
down. Of the remaining nine charges (involving four complainants), the
appellant was acquitted of six charges and convicted of three (involving the
two complainants in the present appeal, E and D).

2 The appellant, a physics teacher at an all boys’ school (“the School”)

was in charge of the water polo co-curricular activity (“CCA”) for the
periods of 2001–2002 and 2004–2005. Between 2002 and 2003, he took
leave of absence to pursue further education. The alleged offences were
committed in 2001 and 2004, when the two complainants were in
Secondary 1 and Secondary 2 respectively. The first complainant, E, was
admitted to Secondary 1 in 2001 and joined the water polo and swimming
CCAs. In 2004, he first informed the head of department of CCAs, Mrs AA,
and later the principal of the school (“the Principal”) about his distress over
the appellant’s conduct towards some of the other boys. Remarkably, his
own personal allegations only fully surfaced in 2005, after he had left the
School. Following a sensational 80-day-long trial spread over a period from
10 April to 31 December 2006, the appellant was convicted only of the
following three charges (collectively “the Charges”):

AMENDED 16th CHARGE:

You,

[the appellant], male/33 years …

are charged that you, on a day in early 2001 in the afternoon, during
the waterpolo training session at Toa Payoh Swimming Complex
changing room toilet, Singapore, did use criminal force to one [E],
male/13 years, knowing it to be likely that you will thereby outrage the
modesty of the said person, to wit, by massaging his groin area and
holding his penis, and you have thereby committed an offence
punishable under Section 354 of the Penal Code, chapter 224.
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[2008] 4 SLR(R) XP v PP 691

AMENDED 17th CHARGE:

You,

[the appellant], male/33 years …

are charged that you, during the waterpolo and swimming team camp
sometime in 2001, in the afternoon, in a container [portakabin]
housing the Prefects’ Room at the old compound of [X Secondary
School], Singapore, did use criminal force to one [E], male/13 years,
knowing it to be likely that you will thereby outrage the modesty of the
said person, to wit, by massaging and rubbing his bare chest, and you
have thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 354 of
the Penal Code, chapter 224.

AMENDED 15th CHARGE:

You,

[the appellant], male/33 years …

are charged that you, between the 6th day to the 9th day of June 2004, at
about 3am at the Gymnasium Aerobics Room, [the School], Singapore,
did use criminal force to one [D], male/14 years, knowing it to be likely
that you will thereby outrage the modesty of the said person, to wit, by
groping and stroking his buttocks, and you have thereby committed an
offence punishable under Section 354 of the Penal Code, chapter 224.

3 The appellant has consistently denied all the allegations levelled

against him though he has readily acknowledged that he conducted “sports
checks” on the water polo boys on one occasion in 2001 to ensure that they
had not sustained any back injuries from the sport. Nor was it disputed that
the appellant and some of the boys would give each other massages to
relieve muscle aches and pains. However, the appellant strenuously denied
that he had ever molested any of the boys. He fervently and resolutely
maintained that the complainants had colluded to bring false charges
against him because they bitterly resented his strict authoritarian style of
managing the team. The trial judge (“the Judge”) was unconvinced. She
found the two complainants E and D to be “unusually convincing”
witnesses and convicted the appellant on these three charges, sentencing
him to nine months’ imprisonment on the 16th charge, four months’
imprisonment on the 17th charge and three months’ imprisonment on the
15th charge. The sentences on the 15th and 16th charges would run
consecutively, while the sentence on the 17th charge would run
concurrently, adding up to 12 months’ imprisonment in all.
4 Having heard the parties and examined the notes of evidence as well
as the exhibits, I had little hesitation in concluding that there were
decidedly reasonable doubts concerning the appellant’s guilt on each of the
three remaining charges. The convictions were mistakenly founded on
conflicting evidence, certain aspects of which were rather improbable, and
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plainly unsafe. I do not propose to revisit every factual detail and evidential
peccadillo as much of this has already been adequately covered in PP v XP
[2007] SGDC 285 (“GD”). It would be far more appropriate and
constructive to consider the legal framework for the fundamental evidential
issues articulated in the trial judge’s GD, as well as the principal evidential
planks on which the Judge’s convictions rested.

Dramatis personae: The key witnesses

5 I set the stage by briefly introducing the key witnesses for the
Prosecution as well as highlighting the main issues arising from their
testimonies.

The complainants

6 The first complainant, E, entered the School in Secondary 1 in 2001.

Soon after, he joined the swimming and water polo CCAs. He was 16 years
old and in Secondary 4 when he first alluded vaguely to the alleged
incidents when he met with Mrs AA and the Principal (see [2] above),
though, and rather crucially, E’s account of his meetings with Mrs AA and
the Principal differed from theirs. He graduated from the School at the end
of 2004 and was no longer a student of the School when the formal
complaint to the Principal was made on 30 April 2005. Both his complaints,
it bears reiterating, were about alleged incidents that had taken place some
four years earlier. At the time of the trial he was 18 years old.

7 The second complainant, D, joined the School in 2003 as a

Secondary 1 student. He was allegedly molested by the appellant in 2004
when he was 14 years old. At the time of the trial he was 16 years old. The
other two complainants at the trial, B and C, joined the School in 2001 and
2002 respectively. B, like E, was 13 years old when the alleged offence
occurred, and C alleged that he was molested at the ages of 12, 15 and 16. At
the time of the trial, B was 18 and C was 17. The four complainants were
good friends though E claimed that they had drifted apart after he left the
School.

8 Two other complainants, W and G, whose accusations the

Prosecution initially crystallised into charges but later withdrew, also
testified for the Prosecution. W and G gave evidence relevant to the
15th charge; W claimed to have slept on the other side of D when the
alleged groping incident occurred. Despite D himself testifying, to the
contrary, that he had slept next to C, the Judge nevertheless decided that she
“could not ignore” the evidence of W and G that D had “told them that he
was ‘freaked out’ by the [appellant’s] conduct the morning after they had
seen him sleeping next to the [appellant] as this casual remark confirmed
that he was still affected by the incident the next morning” (GD at [239]).
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[2008] 4 SLR(R) XP v PP 693

The other prosecution witnesses

9 Ms BB was E’s mathematics teacher when he was in Secondary 2. E
said he would sometimes go to her classroom after school to chat. He
testified that in 2003 he told her about the alleged “sports check” incident,
but Ms BB later corrected, in her testimony, her initial statement to the
police and affirmed unequivocally that the conversation only took place in
2004, after the appellant had returned to the School. This of course did not
sit well with E’s evidence. I carefully assessed her testimony. There is no
reason not to accept the entirety of her testimony. Indeed, the Judge did not
find her to be an unreliable witness. Rather, for apparently implausible
reasons, she sought to rely on Ms BB’s earlier statement despite her very
cogent reasons for departing from it (see [47] and [48] below).
10 Mrs AA was the head of department of CCAs. At a casual lunch at
Wisma Atria in 2004, E and another complainant, C, told Mrs AA that they
were unhappy about the appellant sleeping in close proximity with
members of the water polo team. She testified that she advised E to lodge a
complaint with the School, and E said he would do so after the national
swimming competition in July 2004.
11 Among the other boys called as prosecution witnesses were O, the
water polo team captain in 2004–2005, K and H. The appellant’s counsel
vigorously emphasised that their testimonies contradicted D’s evidence that
the appellant had slept next to him. A water polo team coach, Coach 2, also
testified for the Prosecution. His testimony undermined the Prosecution’s
case but the Judge did not rely in any significant way on his evidence for
reasons which are not entirely clear.

The defence witnesses

12 The Defence called the Principal, whom the Prosecution conceded
“came across as an honest witness”. The Principal’s testimony also departed
in some aspects from his police statement in relation to the 17th charge. He
explained that his recollection in court was more reliable as he had not been
adequately prepared for the police interview when he gave his statement.
The Judge rejected his testimony, finding that he was unable to explain why
he had given two versions about the alleged incident (GD at [160]–[162]).
Despite the Principal himself recanting from his earlier police statement
(Exh P95), the Judge allowed it to be substituted for his oral testimony
under s 147(3) of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed), and relied on it
as “a critical piece of evidence” which, among other things, “revealed that
the [appellant] had admitted to the Principal that he had given a massage to
E in the portakabin” (GD at [166]).
13 The remaining two of the three water polo coaches, Coach 1 and
Coach 3, also testified for the Defence, as did the swimming coach, Coach 4.
Their evidence supported crucial aspects of the Defence’s case theory.
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694 SINGAPORE LAW REPORTS (REISSUE) [2008] 4 SLR(R)

Decision below
14 After setting out the chronological background leading to the charges
and distilling the crux of the evidence and relevant legal issues raised in the
course of the trial, the Judge first considered as preliminary issues whether:
(a) the complainants were credible and reliable young witnesses; and
(b) whether there was evidence of collusion. She then considered the
evidence relating to each of the three convictions. Most unfortunately, she
did not explain or give her reasons in relation to the numerous charges of
which the appellant was acquitted. Why did she arrive at wholly different
conclusions despite relying on the conduct and evidence of the other two
complainants in deciding that their original complaints were genuine and
not concocted together (see GD at [39]–[50])? Specifically, she found that B
and C only mentioned the appellant’s inappropriate behaviour to their
counsellor and parents respectively when they were compelled to. Both B’s
counsellor and C’s father testified that they were visibly uncomfortable and
unforthcoming, and that C even broke down (GD at [39]–[42]). Yet,
notwithstanding all this, the Judge did not find these two complainants
unusually convincing, unlike E and D. In relation to D’s complaint, the
Judge also relied on the testimonies of W and G, whose charges had been
earlier withdrawn (GD at [239]). I found this rather troubling; see [64]–[70]
below.
15 The Judge dismissed the Defence’s allegation of collusion on the basis
that E did not expect Ms BB to act on the information and “only
experienced disappointment when she did not probe further” (GD at [32]).
Nor did she find his conduct during the meeting with the Principal in
August 2004 suggestive of an attempt to frame the appellant,
notwithstanding that E did not disclose to the Principal the alleged
incidents in 2001 (GD at [33]). With respect, this was an issue she ought to
have assessed more carefully and delved further into. While in sexual
offences, particularly those involving young victims, there is quite often,
and understandably, a time lapse or delay in the revelation of the incident,
one has to wonder whether E’s curious reticence over the 2001 allegations,
despite having purportedly earlier ventilated his grave unhappiness about
the appellant’s conduct with the other boys, taken cumulatively with his
entire testimony and character, undermined his credibility in a significant
manner.
16 The Judge “did not doubt that the boys got together to gripe about the
[appellant’s] conduct and they probably did agree to do something against
him” (GD at [37]) during a hostel stay at the school premises in March-
April 2004 (“the 2004 Hostel Stay”, see GD at [30]). However, she dismissed
all likelihood that the two gatherings during the 2004 Hostel Stay supported
the appellant’s allegation of collusion, and considered (at [38]) that:
The evidence also strongly suggested that [the boys] were not aware of
each other’s complaints before the meeting with the Principal on
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[2008] 4 SLR(R) XP v PP 695

30 April 2005. If indeed there was a common plan to fabricate false

allegations against the [appellant], they would have acted in unison in
some way and this was clearly lacking on the evidence.

With respect, this was a rather peculiar conclusion to draw; indeed, the
converse is more likely as the boys must have known of each others’
grievances as well as precisely why they were meeting the Principal, as they
were close friends with a common cause.
17 Having assessed their testimonies, the Judge found E and D to be
“forthright and honest witnesses who gave a coherent and convincing
account of the molest incidents that concerned them” (at [56]). Further, she
found that their evidence was “satisfactorily corroborated in certain
material aspects” (ibid). On the 16th and 17th charges (ie, the first two of
the Charges set out at [2] above) involving the first complainant, E, the
Judge believed E’s testimony and found that his animosity towards the
appellant did not create a reasonable doubt that he could have falsely
accused the appellant. She was also inclined to view E’s complaints to his
teachers Ms BB and Mrs AA, as well as to the Principal, as showing that his
complaints were genuine and motivated by a noble desire to protect his
juniors from the appellant’s inappropriate conduct.
18 The Judge found that the 17th charge was not inherently flawed and
that E’s evidence on what happened in the portakabin was “not inherently
incredible” (GD at [132]–[142]), nor was his “selective” recollection
damaging to his credibility. In particular, she found the Principal’s police
statement (Exh P95) to be a “critical piece of evidence as it confirmed E’s
evidence that he had reported to the Principal in August 2004 that he had
been taken to the portakabin by the [appellant] and that the [appellant] had
given him a massage without [him wearing] his T-shirt” (at [166]). She thus
accepted E’s account notwithstanding evidence that the portakabin was an
unlikely location as it was fully exposed to passers-by. The Judge also
rejected the Defence’s arguments that no offence had been committed on
the evidence, since the appellant had merely given a massage to the
complainant and had stopped when asked to do so.
19 As for D, the Judge found that the appellant himself had admitted in
his police statement (Exh P89) to sleeping next to D and sharing D’s
sleeping bag as a blanket with him. This was sufficient to corroborate D’s
account so that D’s further allegation that the appellant had groped his
buttocks and tugged at his shorts could be believed. The Judge also decided
that D had “good reasons for not reporting the incident” and did not
collude with the others to fabricate his allegation (at [243]–[247]).
20 The appellant was judged to be an unreliable witness principally
because his evidence on the stand was contradicted by his two police
statements, Exhs P84 and P89. In particular, the Judge took the appellant’s
answers in Exh P89 as effective corroboration of D’s evidence that they had
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696 SINGAPORE LAW REPORTS (REISSUE) [2008] 4 SLR(R)

slept next to each other and shared D’s sleeping bag as a blanket. The Judge
also found that the appellant’s evidence was contradicted by the Principal’s
police statement (but not his testimony) as well as Mrs AA’s evidence. She
therefore decided that there was no reasonable doubt as to the appellant’s
guilt and accordingly convicted him of the Charges. I will deal specifically
with the Judge’s analysis in discussing the Charges sequentially below.

The law on collusion and corroboration

21 When the Defence alleges collusion amongst the complainants, the

burden is on the Prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there
was indeed no collusion to make a false complaint. This iron rule has been
established in cases such as Khoo Kwoon Hain v PP [1995] 2 SLR(R) 591
(“Khoo Kwoon Hain”), Lee Kwang Peng v PP [1997] 2 SLR(R) 569 (“Lee
Kwang Peng”) and Loo See Mei v PP [2004] 2 SLR(R) 27 (“Loo See Mei”).
The Defence, though, has first to establish that the complainants have a
motive to falsely implicate the accused. As Yong Pung How CJ explained in
Goh Han Heng v PP [2003] 4 SLR(R) 374 at [33]:
[W]here the accused can show that the complainant has a motive to
falsely implicate him, then the burden must fall on the Prosecution to
disprove that motive. This does not mean that the accused merely
needs to allege that the complainant has a motive to falsely implicate
him. Instead, the accused must adduce sufficient evidence of this motive
so as to raise a reasonable doubt in the Prosecution’s case. Only then
would the burden of proof shift to the Prosecution to prove that there was
no such motive. [emphasis added]

22 This phraseology is similar to that employed in Loo See Mei at [40],

that “the Prosecution bears the burden of proving that the complainant …
had no reason to falsely implicate the accused” [emphasis added]. However,
this is perhaps an insufficiently precise formulation of the test. All the
Prosecution has to prove beyond reasonable doubt is that the “witness did
not falsely implicate the accused” [emphasis added] (Loo See Mei at [41]).
Of course the two are closely intertwined since one would be unlikely to
falsely accuse another without some prior motive, but what really matters in
the final analysis is whether it can be established that the witness did or did
not in fact falsely implicate the accused. Motive and conduct remain legally
distinct concepts and ought not to be conflated. The Prosecution can
successfully rebut allegations of collusion without having to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the witnesses in question had no motive or reason to
make a false complaint, if, for example, there were independent
eyewitnesses or other real evidence independently establishing the truth of
the complaint. If the witness could not possibly have made a false
complaint, then his motive is irrelevant. Conversely, a finding that the
witnesses in question had no motive to make a false complaint would often
(and not invariably) lead to the conclusion that they did not in fact do so,
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[2008] 4 SLR(R) XP v PP 697

but this in itself is not the determinative inquiry in considering the

possibility of collusion.

23 In the present case, the appellant’s allegations of collusion were based

on the complainants’ close friendship and their obvious resentment
towards him for being a harsh, interfering disciplinarian who was strict
with training and took upon himself the task of overseeing their studies.
The appellant, a teacher since 1997, asserted that he only encountered
difficulty with the boys’ attitude in 2004 when he returned from his
overseas studies. According to the appellant, the team had become slack
and ill-disciplined and had lost their drive during his absence. His
persistent attempts to remould them resulted in frequent scolding,
reprimands, recriminations and open confrontations with the more
aggressive boys, especially E. Counsel for the appellant argued that it could
not have been mere coincidence that the four complainants were close
friends (with E and D being particularly close).

24 The Judge correctly appreciated, citing Lee Kwang Peng and Khoo
Kwoon Hain, that the burden was on the Prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that there was no collusion (GD at [28]–[29]). However,
she did not appear to have adequately considered the complainants’ close
friendship, opportunity and motives for collusion raised by the Defence,
and did not properly apply this requirement in determining that “the
allegations of collusion were not borne out and the complainants in this
case did not collude to give false evidence against the [appellant]” (at [29]).
She reiterated, without substantively addressing the Defence’s plausible
arguments (at [39]), that:
I was also not convinced that there was a conspiracy to fabricate false
allegations against the [appellant] after examining the conduct of and
the roles played by the complainants … in the events that led to the
lodging of the complaints with the Principal on 30 April 2005.
[emphasis added]

25 The Prosecution argued that her reference to “not [being] convinced”,

though regrettable, was merely an unpropitious choice of words, and that
the Judge did in fact carefully consider whether there existed any reasonable
possibility of collusion among the complainants. While I agree that the
Judge’s conclusions should not be read in isolation, it does appear that the
Judge simply did not or could not satisfactorily explain why she found an
absence of collusion. She took a broad-brush approach without
condescending into the very specific charges levelled against the boys by the
appellant. This lack of reasoning does seem to subtly suggest that she could
have unconsciously erred in placing the burden of proof of collusion on the
Defence, contrary to the stated rule. The Judge’s confusion in applying the
burden of proof is most evident in [42] of the GD where she concluded
rhetorically:
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698 SINGAPORE LAW REPORTS (REISSUE) [2008] 4 SLR(R)

As can be seen, the complainants only mentioned the [appellant’s]

inappropriate behaviour when they were “impelled” to talk about their
incidents by their parents. This was hardly the behaviour of boys who
were allegedly scheming to lay false complaints against the [appellant].
Their discomfort in discussing such matters with their own parents or
mentioning this to their friends showed that they did not treat molest
allegations lightly and would use them as a tool of revenge. Why would
any student fabricate an allegation that he had been sexually molested
by a teacher and open himself up to intense scrutiny and
uncomfortable attention not just from his friends and his school mates,
but also from his teachers, parents and his relatives just because he is
very angry with his teacher?

26 Why indeed? This, with respect, was precisely the wrong question to
ask. The issue was not why a student might risk “intense scrutiny and
uncomfortable attention” to sabotage a resented teacher, but whether there
existed a reasonable possibility of collusion to falsely accuse the appellant,
whom the complainants undisputedly resented. Besides, there are any
number of possible motivations to falsely accuse someone; the short answer
could well be, as the Judge anticipated but found incredible, simply
“because he is very angry with his teacher” (ibid)! It is entirely plausible that
when such a complaint is made, the complainant may either be unaware of
or have failed to think through the consequences. The short point is that the
query posed by the Judge to herself does not admit of a single unequivocal
answer. In my view, the Judge misdirected herself on this issue.
27 As for the treatment of a complainant’s testimony where the case
literally turns on one person’s word against another’s, there is no formal
legal requirement for corroboration (see s 136 of the Evidence Act), nor is it
a strict rule that judges must remind themselves of the danger of convicting
based on the testimony of one complainant. However, there is good reason
for the case law-devised reminder that a complainant’s testimony must be
unusually convincing in order to prove the Prosecution’s case beyond a
reasonable doubt without independent corroboration (see generally PP v
Mohammed Liton Mohammed Syeed Mallik [2008] 1 SLR(R) 601). I now
turn to the origins of this requirement.
28 The phrase “unusually convincing” appears to have been first
borrowed in Khoo Kwoon Hain ([21] supra) at [45] from a 1949 Kuala
Lumpur criminal appeal case, Public Prosecutor v Mardai [1950] MLJ 33, in
which Spenser-Wilkinson J (citing no direct authority) declared (at 33):
Whilst there is no rule of law in this country that in sexual offences the
evidence of the complainant must be corroborated; nevertheless it
appears to me, as a matter of common sense, to be unsafe to convict in
cases of this kind unless either the evidence of the complainant is
unusually convincing or there is some corroboration of the
complainant’s story. It would be sufficient, in my view, if that
corroboration consisted only of a subsequent complaint by the
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[2008] 4 SLR(R) XP v PP 699

complainant herself provided that the statement implicated the

accused and was made at the first reasonable opportunity after the
commission of the offence. [emphasis added]

29 There has been some not altogether fruitful academic debate about
the sufficiency of corroboration in the guise of a subsequent complaint by
the complainant; s 159 of the Evidence Act allows as corroboration “any
former statement made by such witness, whether written or verbal, on oath,
or in ordinary conversation”, though only to buttress the witness’s
credibility by showing that his testimony in court is consistent with his
previous statements. Corroboration in the Baskerville sense is clearly to be
preferred, ie, the corroborating evidence must be independent and must
confirm in a material particular that the accused committed the offence (see
The King v Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658; Jeffrey Pinsler, Evidence, Advocacy
and the Litigation Process (LexisNexis, 2nd Ed, 2003) (“Pinsler”) at pp 296
and 309). The better view is that elegantly espoused by Yong Pung How CJ
in Khoo Kwoon Hain at [51]:
… [I]f Spenser-Wilkinson J meant in PP v Mardai … that a mere
corroboration by virtue of s 159 [of the Evidence Act] is sufficient to
remove the caution that the complainant’s testimony must be
unusually convincing, then I respectfully disagree. If the complainant’s
evidence is not unusually convincing, I cannot see how the fact that she
repeated it several times can add much to its weight. …

30 However, the abiding, indeed, overriding, concern remaining in the

final assessment must be whether a reasonable doubt continues to exist: see
Pinsler at p 297, unhesitatingly affirming that:
The more recent authorities have departed from the technical
application of the corroboration warning. Moreover, where supporting
evidence is required, the courts have stressed that they are primarily
concerned about whether guilt has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt by the totality of the evidence rather than whether corroborative
evidence in the strict Baskerville sense exists. [emphasis added]

31 Nevertheless, the highlighted proposition in Spenser-Wilkinson J’s

judgment has understandably found favour in our jurisprudence for its
inherent pragmatism and intuitive good sense. It does nothing, however, to
change the ultimate rule that the Prosecution must prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt, but it does suggest how the evidential Gordian knot may
be untied if proof is to be found solely from the complainant’s testimony
against the accused. In other words, the “unusually convincing” standard
sets the threshold for the complainant’s testimony to be preferred over the
accused’s evidence where it is a case that boils down to one person’s word
against another’s.

32 As Yong Pung How CJ said in Teo Keng Pong v PP [1996] 2 SLR(R)

890 at [73]:
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I would add that there is nothing magical about the words ‘unusually
convincing’. They are but another way of saying that the witness’s
testimony was so convincing that the Prosecution’s case was proven
beyond reasonable doubt, solely on the basis of that evidence.

and again in Tang Kin Seng v PP [1996] 3 SLR(R) 444 at [44]:

In my view, the right approach is to analyse the evidence for the
Prosecution and for the Defence, and decide whether the complainant’s
evidence is so reliable that a conviction based solely on it is not unsafe.
… [emphasis added]

33 This reminder should not, however, be confined to the categories of

witnesses who are supposedly accomplices, young children or sexual
offence complainants. Prof Michael Hor (Michael Hor, “Corroboration:
Rules and Discretion in the Search for Truth” [2000] Sing JLS 509) rightly
observes (at 518) that the categorical approach is both under- and over-
inclusive:
It is clear that witnesses of potentially doubtful credibility may fall
outside these categories: witnesses with a grudge against the accused,
or witnesses who stand to gain something by incriminating the
accused. … Conversely, there are witnesses who are within the classic
corroboration categories, but whose credibility is not any more in
question than any other witness ... The judges look silly directing the
jury or themselves that it is dangerous to convict on the
uncorroborated testimony of potentially reliable witnesses who happen
to fall within the classic corroboration categories.

34 If “unusually convincing” is shorthand for “convincing enough to

prove the Prosecution’s case beyond a reasonable doubt without
corroboration”, then the short answer to this observation is simply that
witnesses within the categories who are reliable are most often unusually
convincing, and their testimonies can support a conviction. Since the
warning is not a rule of law and as s 136 of the Evidence Act expressly does
away with the formal, legal need for corroboration, a judge who concludes
that a witness’s testimony is unusually convincing will not be bound to
formally direct himself as such. If the appellate court disagrees on the
evidence that the witness was unusually convincing, or finds a reasonable
doubt notwithstanding the ostensible credibility of the testimony, then the
conviction will be set aside because a reasonable doubt exists, and not
because the judge did not remind himself of the standard. Thus the
standard or test viewed in isolation might be misleading in so far as it might
be interpreted to suggest that an unusually convincing witness’s testimony
could overcome even materially and/or inherently contradictory evidence
to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The phrase “unusually convincing”
is not a term of art; it does not automatically entail a guilty verdict and
surely cannot dispense with the need to consider the other evidence and the
factual circumstances peculiar to each case. Nor does it dispense with
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[2008] 4 SLR(R) XP v PP 701

having to assess the complainant’s testimony against that of the accused,

where the case turns on one person’s word against the other’s. Assuming
that there is no other evidence, the witness must thus be “unusually
convincing” to the point where the court can safely say his account is to be
unreservedly preferred over that of another. It cannot be employed as a fig
leaf to mask internal inconsistencies or evidential gaps in the Prosecution’s
obligation to establish its case theory beyond any reasonable doubt.
35 It also goes without saying that if the witness’s testimony is not
unusually convincing, then the standard of proof will not be met and other
evidence (or a confession) must be led to secure a conviction. Such
evidence, if corroborative of the witness’s account, might then contribute to
discharge the Prosecution’s legal burden of proof. Obviously, even where
there is corroboration, there may still not be enough evidence to convict;
for example, if there is other conflicting evidence, then that can be enough
to produce reasonable doubt. Thus corroboration alone cannot support a
conviction – the test uncompromisingly remains that of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The only real value in this guideline therefore is to
remind all that, in a case where no other evidence is available, a single
witness’s testimony can constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt – but
only when it is so unusually convincing as to overcome any doubts that
might arise from the lack of corroboration.
36 In the present case, it is noteworthy that there was absolutely no
Baskerville corroboration (see [29] above) for the two charges concerning
the first complainant, E, while the third charge raised conflicting evidence
on several material points. Having summarised the relevant evidential
principles, I now turn once again to the factual matrix.

The Charges
37 The first two charges related to E and concerned incidents that
supposedly took place in 2001. No statement by E had been recorded by the
School as E was no longer its student when the complaints were
investigated by the School prior to being lodged with the police. It bears
mention that the 2001 complaints were also conspicuous for their lack of
corroboration from other witnesses even though such witnesses existed and
could have been found. The main issues were the consistency of E’s own
evidence and the linking of his evidence with that of the other witnesses to
ascertain if they could form an unbreakable evidential chain.

The 2001 “sports check” charge

38 E testified that in early 2001 (when he was 13 years old) during a
swimming training session at Toa Payoh Swimming Complex, while he was
resting by the side of the pool, he observed the appellant requesting his
swimming coach (Coach 4) to excuse E temporarily from training. The
appellant told him that he was going to conduct a minor “sports check” and
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led him to a changing/store room where water polo equipment was stored.
In the room, E testified that the appellant closed the door and again
informed him that he intended to conduct a “sports check” on his back. E
agreed as he understood this to mean that the appellant was going to check
for injuries. He noticed that the appellant was carrying a clipboard, a pen
and a plastic ruler.
39 During the check, E testified that the appellant stood behind him and
massaged the back of his shoulders with his thumbs for 10–20 seconds to
ascertain whether he felt any pain. Then the appellant instructed him to
bend forward so he could check to see if his back was straight. E felt a ruler
being placed on the middle of his back as he bent forward. The appellant
then removed the ruler and wrote something on the clipboard. E testified
that he was then told to stand up straight and the appellant squatted in front
of him to massage his legs from his calves to the top of his thighs. When he
reached the groin area, he allegedly asked E to pull down his trunks, which
E did, “a little bit”. The appellant remarked that he need not to be shy and
requested that he pull them down a little bit more. E did so but without
“revealing anything to him yet”. The appellant then told him to “just pull
down [his] trunks” and E obeyed, pulling them down to his knees. E
testified that the appellant then proceeded to massage the right side of his
groin area, touching his penis and pushing it aside with his left hand in the
process. He then massaged the left side of his groin. After that, the appellant
told E to pull up his trunks. E sought permission to use the toilet so that he
could leave. He testified that the appellant followed him out of the room
back to the training pool where he summoned another boy to follow him.
40 E testified that he felt deeply traumatised when he had to pull down
his trunks, and was so frightened and “rooted to that spot” during the
incident that he did not dare ask the appellant to stop. Only after he had
pulled up his trunks again did he summon “enough courage” to ask to be
excused. After training that day E remembered discussing the incident with
some of his teammates, comparing the differences in the nature of the
checks that they had received, including whether they had had to pull down
their trunks. After this discussion he claimed he was reassured and did not
mention this incident again while he was in Secondary 1.
41 Strangely, at no point did or could E in his testimony identify any of
the boys who had gone through a sports check that day despite sustained
probing by the appellant’s counsel. Considering that it was undisputed that
the appellant conducted sports checks only on one occasion in early 2001,
E’s fellow complainant, B, must have been present since he too alleged that
the appellant had molested him during a sports check. However, though E
testified that he had discussed the check with his teammates afterward, he
was unable to name a single one, explaining that they were unfamiliar to
him at that time and all looked the same in their swimming trunks. This
rather implausible explanation aside, E also testified that he was rooted to
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[2008] 4 SLR(R) XP v PP 703

the spot in fear when the appellant allegedly touched his penis, but he was
reassured that there was nothing out of the ordinary about his experience
when he later compared notes with his friends. Yet he did not recollect who
or how many boys he discussed the sports check with, nor was he able to
recall what was discussed and why his mind was put at ease following what
had allegedly been a traumatic experience. Considering that it is not the
Prosecution’s case that all the boys were touched inappropriately, it is
difficult to fathom how E’s account can be at all credible, much less
unusually convincing.

42 It was undisputed that there was no corroboration of E’s evidence.

Pertinently, K and Coach 2, both prosecution witnesses, testified that the
door to the changing/store room remained open throughout and that there
were boys waiting or participating in ball-handling exercises outside the
room. This contradicted E’s testimony that the appellant closed the door
behind him and then proceeded to check his back before molesting him.

43 Coach 4 also testified that he had only spoken to the appellant on

three occasions, and the appellant had never once asked to excuse a boy
from swimming training. The Judge “did not give much weight to this …
because [Coach 4’s] recollection did not quite gel with the [appellant]’s own
evidence” (GD at [114]). Yet the appellant never admitted to pulling E out
of swimming training, nor did anyone but E allege that he had done so.
There was simply no plausible basis given for preferring E’s testimony to
Coach 4’s unequivocal and precisely consistent evidence.

44 Indeed, it cannot be disputed that E’s complaints to Ms BB and

Mrs AA, which might be construed as referring to the sports check incident
(he told Ms BB he had been touched and Mrs AA testified that E said his
trunks had been lowered slightly, with no mention of the appellant
touching his penis), could not constitute corroboration even under s 159 of
the Evidence Act. Here too, however, the Judge, rather puzzlingly, resolved
the discrepancies in favour of the Prosecution, interpreting or explaining
away the other independent adult witnesses’ testimonies so that they
awkwardly hewed to E’s account. The Judge concluded (GD at [130]):
No doubt that there were discrepancies between E’s evidence and the
evidence of other witnesses on the back check incident. I, however,
found that these discrepancies were not of the nature that they could be
taken as an indication that … E was deliberately concocting his
evidence. After all, there was a two-year time gap between the
complaint in 2004 and the court proceedings and this may have caused
E and the other witnesses to have inaccurate recall.

45 Another important issue was when E informed Ms BB that the

appellant had touched him inappropriately. It was a critical part of the
Judge’s conclusion that there had been no collusion among the
complainants and that E had told Ms BB about the alleged 2001 sports
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704 SINGAPORE LAW REPORTS (REISSUE) [2008] 4 SLR(R)

check incident in 2003, before his relationship with the appellant

irreversibly soured in 2004. As the judge stated (at [31]):
… E would have had no cause to fabricate allegations against the
[appellant] prior to 2004 and … if he did indeed report a wrongdoing
against the [appellant] before 2004, it could not have been the result of
any collusion amongst the complainants. This was a critical point
because E testified that when he realised in 2003 that the [appellant]
[might] have behaved inappropriately towards him when he was in
secondary one, he had told his teacher, Ms BB … that the [appellant]
had “touched” him. … I was of the view that this was clear and
untainted evidence of improper conduct on the part of the [appellant]
in 2001 that attacked the theory of collusion at its roots. [emphasis in
original]

46 While corroboration in the sense of a previous complaint, according

to s 159 of the Evidence Act and Public Prosecutor v Mardai ([28] supra), is
not corroboration by independent evidence and should not be given such
weight (see Khoo Kwoon Hain ([21] supra) at [48]–[50]), I would
nevertheless agree that the implication in the present case of when E
mentioned the alleged touching to Ms BB is important because the
appellant does not argue that prior to 2004, E or any of the boys would have
had reason to resent him. However, it could not with any degree of
plausible certitude be determined that the conversation took place in 2003.

47 First, the Judge erred in finding that E told Ms BB about having been
touched in 2003. Ms BB herself, who, on any criterion, was an independent
and truthful prosecution witness, clarified on the stand that the
conversation took place in 2004 after the appellant had returned from his
studies, and that E had revealed this to her in a half-serious manner. She
clarified that her initial recollection that the conversation happened in 2003
was wrong because she only remembered that E was then in upper
secondary and assumed that he was in Secondary 3. She later remembered
that the rumours about the appellant being gay had already started
circulating, thus it had to be in 2004 (see [84] below). Despite Ms BB’s very
cogent reasons and her own unequivocal confirmation that the
conversation took place in 2004, the Judge preferred the initial date of 2003,
and took this to “substantiate the Prosecution’s case that E’s complaints
against the [appellant] were untainted with hate” (GD at [174]).

48 Second, the Judge erred in extrapolating further from this finding, ie,
that the conversation took place in 2003, that the appellant therefore did in
fact molest E in 2001 at a store room at Toa Payoh Swimming Complex
during a sports check by telling him to pull down his trunks and touching
his penis. It was common ground that the most E conveyed to Ms BB was a
half-serious one-liner that he had been “touched” by the appellant (GD at
[121]). The Judge also noted (at [122]) that “it was odd that [Ms BB] did not
even deem it fit to query E further with the view either to take some action
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[2008] 4 SLR(R) XP v PP 705

or to discourage or scold E if he indeed was joking” [emphasis added].

Ironically, it is also odd that despite this legitimate concern, the Judge then
went on to airily brush it aside. Even assuming that Ms BB’s explanation
can be rejected and the conversation did take place in 2003, this fact can
only be of minimal weight in proving consistency as well as in bolstering E’s
credibility. It should not have been viewed as corroboration even under
s 159 of the Evidence Act because it was a vague passing remark made half
in jest that solicited no reaction from Ms BB.

The 2001 portakabin charge

49 E testified that a few months after the alleged sports check incident,
while he was still in Secondary 1, he attended his first water polo team camp
during one of the school holidays at the former premises of X Secondary
School. According to him, during a “rest and relax” period one afternoon,
between 2.30pm and 3.00pm, the appellant approached him and led him to
the portakabin that was being used as the prefects’ room. He attested that
the appellant unlocked the portakabin, closed the door behind them and
then switched on the air-conditioning and the music-player in the
portakabin (GD at [66]). Inside the portakabin the appellant asked E to sit
on the sofa, sat next to him and requested that he remove his T-shirt. The
appellant then started massaging his back and after a while asked E to lie on
the sofa facing up. The appellant later proceeded to massage E’s temples,
slowly moving down to massage his shoulders. After that, he massaged E’s
chest area until E felt uncomfortable and said he did not actually need a
massage. The appellant asked E if he was certain, E said yes, and the
appellant told him he could leave. E put on his T-shirt and immediately left
the room. According to him the incident lasted about five minutes (GD at
[67]). The Judge noted at [68]:
E explained that he felt uncomfortable and stopped the massage as he
felt that the massage may proceed further down – “So after massaging
my shoulders I was feeling uncomfortable when he was going massaging
[sic] further down my shoulders.” He was not able to tell the Court
which part of his chest the [appellant] was massaging when he began to
feel uncomfortable but he stated that the [appellant] was rubbing his
chest when he decided to stop him – “I cannot really remember which
part of the chest. He was like moving downwards towards the chest and
when he was rubbing my chest I said that I was ok. I do not think I need
a massage.” [emphasis in original]

50 This account was conspicuous for the glaring and deeply troubling
absence of a crucial particular in the original charge: the allegation that the
appellant had rubbed E’s nipples. As the Judge noted at [99], the Defence
mounted no less than four challenges to the validity of the original charge
during the course of the trial: first, when E was testifying; second, after he
had finished testifying; third, when the Prosecution closed its case; and
fourth, during closing submissions. At the close of the Prosecution’s case
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the charge was amended pursuant to an application by the Prosecution and

only then was the reference to the rubbing of E’s nipples removed. The
Judge found (at [100]) that:
[T]here was some evidence in support of the said charge under
section 354 [of the Penal Code] albeit the description of the actual
nature of the criminal force applied on E needed to be amended. In any
event, I held that this was not the appropriate time to consider such an
application.
She thought (at [104]) that:
[C]onsidering where the massage was conducted, the manner in which
it was conducted and the reaction of E, it was extremely difficult to
infer that the [appellant] only intended a regular massage ...
Surprisingly, the Judge did not subsequently consider the significance of E’s
failure to state specifically that his nipples had been rubbed; she seemed to
have ignored this preliminary issue in reasoning that E’s allegations were
“not inherently incredible” (GD at [110]), notwithstanding that there was
no single clear account of the incident to be discerned from the evidence.
This was plainly wrong. The original charge could only have been
formulated on precisely what the complainant had originally disclosed to
the investigating officer (“IO”). The complainant’s failure to repeat such a
fundamental allegation that formed the essence of the original charge, on
the stand, despite some rather pointed and lengthy questioning by the
Judge herself was, and should have been recognised as, a very disturbing
development that severely compromised E’s credibility and the overall
strength of the charge.
51 Given the complainant’s about-turn on this particular allegation, the
charge in any form simply could not stand, and it is therefore unnecessary
for me to decide whether massaging the complainant on his shoulders
towards his chest would be an outrage of modesty under s 354 of the Penal
Code because the precise facts and circumstances of the allegation remain
so fundamentally dubious. For good measure, I should state that I do not,
however, find that the Judge “descended into the arena” as the appellant’s
counsel strenuously contended. Though she probed the complainant quite
extensively, both parties always had opportunities to respond and question
the witness further. Given the outcome of these proceedings, it is not
necessary to address this issue further, though I must add that I was
somewhat surprised by the extensive questioning undertaken by the Judge.
A more appropriate procedure would have been for the Judge to indicate to
counsel the areas that required further probing and to suggest that this be
delved into. While it is always legitimate for judges to query witnesses, this
should be for the purpose of clarification and not to establish any intuitive
preconception about the matter. Care should be taken to ensure that the
questioning is not objectively perceived as being directed towards achieving
a particular outcome.
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[2008] 4 SLR(R) XP v PP 707

The 2004 June camp charge

52 The second complainant, D, accused the appellant of having groped
his buttocks in the middle of the night during a four-day camp at the School
from 6 June to 9 June 2004. D could not remember which night the alleged
incident occurred, but in cross-examination he agreed that it must have
been the first night because he did not anticipate that the room would be
cold. There was independent evidence on this charge, but both the
prosecution and defence witnesses’ recollections were somewhat conflicting
and did not quite match D’s version of events.
53 D testified that during the camp he slept in the aerobics room in the
Movement Centre with about 30 other boys and the appellant. The boys
had placed exercise mats to cover the floor and slept on them with their
sleeping bags. D testified that on one night before bedtime, while D was
laying out his mat, the appellant approached him and asked whether he
could borrow D’s sleeping bag. D agreed and handed it to the appellant
before completing his toilet routine. When he returned to go to sleep, all the
mats were occupied except for two mats next to C, one of the four
unsuccessful complainants at trial. D slept between C and the appellant,
with the appellant sleeping on D’s right. However, the appellant and D did
not in fact share the sleeping bag as a blanket that night; D did not know
where his sleeping bag was and as it was cold, he tried to share C’s.
54 In the middle of the night around 3.00am, while D was sleeping on his
side facing C he felt a hand stroking or groping his right buttock cheek, then
moving to the middle of his backside to his left buttock cheek. D testified
that he was a light sleeper and knew it must be the appellant groping him
because the appellant was the only person there on his right. When he felt
the appellant touching him, he tried to indicate that he was waking up by
moving slightly, and the appellant withdrew his hand. However, a few
minutes later D felt the appellant tugging or trying to pull down his surfer
shorts. He made some noise, turned around and looked at the appellant
angrily. D testified that the appellant, lying on his side facing him, then
immediately withdrew his hand and went back to sleep. Shocked, D took
C’s mobile phone and went outside to call his girlfriend. They talked for
about an hour but he did not tell her what had just happened. After that, he
went back to sleep and nothing else happened for the rest of the night.
55 D emphatically testified under cross-examination that he did not
report this incident to anyone during the camp, and denied knowing about
or having been present at a meeting with Coach 1 in August 2004, during
which Coach 1 asked about ten boys whether any of them had been touched
inappropriately by the appellant. D stated that if he had attended the
meeting, he would certainly have disclosed to Coach 1 what had happened
during the June 2004 camp. As the Judge noted, his fellow complainants, G
and W, on the other hand, testified that he had mentioned the incident to
them the next morning (GD at [244], fn 174). Yet the Judge, despite
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considering D to be unusually convincing vis-à-vis the other unsuccessful

complainants, mystifyingly appeared to prefer the latter’s evidence to that
of D on this point. The Defence contended that reasonable doubts were
engendered by several aspects of this charge: to begin with, it was far from
certain whether the appellant had even slept next to D on any of the three
nights of the camp. The Judge appeared to base her conviction on this
finding, as if it followed naturally that the allegation must then be true.
Putting aside the logical deficiencies of such reasoning, it was wildly
improbable that D would have returned to sleep next to the appellant if he
had really been molested. It was far from clear that there was no other place
for him to sleep that night. Curiously, the Judge did not inquire into or
establish this. In any case, there was real doubt as to whether the appellant
had even slept next to D, in the first place.

Did the appellant sleep next to D?

56 The Judge inexplicably accepted in the face of contradiction by six
witnesses that the appellant had slept next to D. This included three
prosecution witnesses who testified that the appellant slept on a pile of mats
in the corner of the room on all three nights of the camp. Objectively
speaking, this alone would have been sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt
that the appellant would have molested D, since it is not the Prosecution’s
case that the appellant stealthily crept up to D during the night to molest
him.
57 Furthermore, the evidence that D slept next to the appellant was itself
dubious in so far as it was principally corroborated by another boy, W, who
had coincidentally accused the appellant of massaging his buttocks in
April–May 2004, a charge that was abruptly withdrawn prior to the trial
below. W was adamant that he had been sleeping beside D that night, with
the appellant sleeping on the other side of D. When confronted with D’s
own persistent account that C had been sleeping next to him, W said, “That
is not true. He must be mistaken or something.” Indeed! This worrying
response speaks volumes.

Did the appellant and D share D’s sleeping bag?

58 D’s credibility was further, significantly and unmistakably, corroded
by his evidence on the sharing of his sleeping bag. His testimony during
cross-examination was rather different from the initial account he had
recited in his written statement and during examination-in-chief. In his
statement to the School, D alleged that the appellant had approached him to
share D’s sleeping bag as a blanket because it was cold and he (the
appellant) did not have one. D had unequivocally declared that he and the
appellant shared the sleeping bag, and that in the middle of the night the
appellant had groped his buttocks. However, in the course of cross-
examination he later strenuously dissociated himself with this statement,
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[2008] 4 SLR(R) XP v PP 709

concluding with a disconcerting volte-face, “[t]he truth is I didn’t share my

sleeping bag with him at all” [emphasis added]. While it was not necessary
for the Prosecution to prove that the appellant and D shared a sleeping bag
as a blanket, D’s subsequent equivocation on a fact so inextricably
intertwined to his account of the alleged groping was fundamentally
detrimental to his credibility and the overall cogency of the Prosecution’s
case. I could not agree with the Prosecution’s proffered explanation that by
“share”, what D initially meant was that he lent his sleeping bag to the
appellant entirely that night. That was not what D meant or said. It is clear
from the appellant’s police statement, Exh P89 (“P89”), which the Judge
took as corroboration for D’s evidence, that the sharing of the sleeping bag
there referred to the appellant and D jointly using it as a blanket. D’s
inexplicable about-turn on the stand in relation to this material particular
should surely have raised doubts as to whether he was similarly mistaken
about the sleeping positions, and indeed whether the alleged molest
occurred at all.
59 The Judge appeared to have ignored all these flaws in accepting D’s
account, relying also on P89. This was despite the presence of cogent
evidence compromising its probative value. Having “accepted the contents
of the answers in A37 to A39 in Exhibit P89 as being an accurate record of
what the [appellant] had informed the IO during the recording of the
statement”, the Judge “found that the answers materially contradicted the
[appellant]’s evidence in Court and confirmed D’s testimony that the
[appellant] had slept beside him and shared his sleeping bag on one night
during the June 2004 camp” [emphasis added] (GD at [437]). This
perplexing conclusion will be addressed below at [63].

Weight of the appellant’s statement P89

60 The material portion of P89 in issue reads as follows:
Q37) Sometime in 1st week of June 2004 during the bonding camp at
Gymnasium Aerobic room, [D] informed that around 9 pm, you
approached him and asked whether he could share the sleeping
bag with him. Is that correct?
A37) Yes, I remembered that I had asked him to share the sleeping bag
as a blanket.
Q38) On that night, did you slept [sic] beside [D]?
A38) Yes, we had shared the sleeping bag as a blanket.
Q39) At about 3 am, [D] alleged that you grabbed his right buttock
followed by stroking the middle are [sic] and to the left buttock.
What do you have to say about this?
A39) I would not do such a thing intentionally. There is a possibility
that I could have accidentally knock [sic] his buttock while I was
sleeping.
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61 The appellant suffers from ventricular tachycardia, a chronic heart

ailment he has had since 1998 or 1999. An attack of this ailment results in a
rapid racing of the heart and affects blood pressure, judgment and mental
cognition. It is undisputed that the appellant suffered a severe attack on
9 June 2005, the day his first police statement, Exh P84 (“P84”), was
recorded. The appellant was admitted to the Accident & Emergency
Department of the Singapore General Hospital in the early hours of 10 June
2005 and was immediately warded in the intensive care unit. The appellant
testified that when he was brought to the hospital he had intense
palpitations, low blood pressure resulting in dizziness, disorientation and
nausea, and his heart rate was over 200 beats per minute. He was placed on
a drip and did not manage to snatch any sleep at all during the entire night.
Sometime after 6.00am on 10 June 2005 the appellant asked to be
discharged and subsequently returned to the police station to continue
giving his statement. This statement, P89, was recorded from 3.25pm that
day, with the appellant having had no sleep in the interim after his
discharge from hospital. The Judge “accepted that the [appellant] became
unwell during the early hours of the morning of 10 June 2005 and that he
had been treated and kept under observation at the SGH’s Emergency
Medicine Department until about 6 am” (GD at [393]). However, she
“found that he was not suffering from severe fatigue or trauma … nor was
he unwell when he gave his statements on 9 June and 10 June 2005” (at
[404]). On my part, I am not at all sure that this was an appropriate
assessment to be made, given the plainly traumatic and enervating events of
the previous night.

62 While P89 was not the subject of a voir dire, counsel for the appellant
contended that little weight should be accorded to the appellant’s apparent
admissions in it. In any case, it was an exculpatory statement and not a
confession. The Prosecution submitted that its exculpatory nature and the
appellant’s denials to other allegations in P89 showed that he was in full
possession of his mental faculties and had not really been affected by the
episode the night before. The Judge appeared to agree, finding at
[397]–[404]:
As for his health condition on 10 June 2005, I noted that the
[appellant] was not admitted for treatment in the hospital and was just
kept under observation after he was treated. …

The undisputed facts were that the [appellant] chose to return to the
police station the next day to continue with the interview and he did
this on his own volition. He had insisted on proceeding with the
interview even though he had been given 3 days of medical leave by the
hospital and he had been given the option by the IO to postpone the
interview. If he had decided to do this, it must have been because he
believed that he was fit and able to continue with the interview. In any
event, the interview time was changed from 10 am to 3.00 pm and this
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[2008] 4 SLR(R) XP v PP 711

would have allowed the [appellant] sufficient time to get some rest
after his discharge from the hospital.
…
Having considered the evidence, I could not infer any improper
conduct or improper exercise of power on the part of the IO when the
[appellant] was placed under arrest. The IO confirmed that the arrest
of the [appellant] was effected in accordance with the usual practice of
the specialised team in Tanglin Police Divisional HQ that investigates
sexual crimes. The IO also denied handcuffing the [appellant] or doing
so to intimidate the [appellant]. He stated that he only handcuffed the
[appellant] when he was taken to his house for investigations. As the
arrest per se was proper and in accordance with the provisions of the
law, I found no reason to infer that the IO had effected the arrest to
intimidate or create oppressive conditions. As such, whatever the
[appellant] may have felt, it was mostly self-imposed.
Based on the above, I found that he was not suffering from severe
fatigue or trauma … nor was he unwell when he gave his statements on
9 June and 10 June 2005.

63 I agree that the conduct of IO was on the face of it “procedurally”

proper. In recording P89 on 10 June 2005 he had first sought the appellant’s
confirmation that he was well and advised him that since he had three days’
medical leave he did not have to give further statements until after his
medical leave was over. The IO also asked whether the appellant had
consulted his lawyer and whether he still wanted to give his statement. The
appellant replied affirmatively. In the course of the appeal hearing, Ms Teh,
however, informed me that this consent had in fact never been sought. This
lends some support to the appellant’s contention that he was anxious not to
upset the IO and had mistakenly hoped to bring the investigations to a
speedy closure. His almost desperate attempts to appear co-operative were
solely directed towards this objective. Still, P89 was voluntarily given and its
admissibility is not in issue. However, in the light of the undisputed medical
events between the recording of P84 (see [61] above) and P89, full weight
surely cannot be accorded to P89. Furthermore, the ostensible admissions
made by the appellant in P89, viz, that he shared D’s sleeping bag with D as
a blanket, were completely and paradoxically denied by the complainant, D,
himself! Yet the Judge ignored D’s about-turn on the stand and found as a
fact that he had shared the sleeping bag as a blanket with the appellant,
relying on the appellant’s statement in P89 to discredit his defence and
convict him. Indeed, while the Judge gave much leeway to salvage the
complainants’ credibility in the face of materially contradictory evidence
from Prosecution and defence witnesses alike, she showed considerably less
sympathy towards the appellant. Considering the medical difficulties the
appellant experienced immediately prior to the recording of P89, as well as
the fact that what he admitted to in P89 was in any case refuted by none
other than the complainant D, I would not, unlike the Judge, accord any
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712 SINGAPORE LAW REPORTS (REISSUE) [2008] 4 SLR(R)

significant weight to P89. There is one further observation I ought to make.

The IO testified that the statement accurately recorded every exchange
between him and the appellant and that P89 faithfully recorded all that
transpired between them at that point of time. The appellant, on the other
hand, maintained that several matters discussed were not recorded. Having
examined the entire statement, I am hard put to accept that it is indeed a
faithful record of everything that transpired between them. There were
several abrupt changes of topic. It would be strange for there not to have
been a preliminary discussion between them before each new area was
plunged into.

Significance of acquittals on the other six similar charges

64 The Judge was satisfied that the Prosecution had proved beyond
reasonable doubt the Charges for which the appellant was convicted, but
“was not satisfied that the Prosecution had proved the charges beyond
reasonable doubt for the remaining charges” (GD at [14]), and accordingly
acquitted the appellant of those six charges. She continued (at [16]):
As the Appeal only concerns the three charges for which I convicted
the [appellant], I will only set down the reasons for my decision for
these three charges and deal with the evidence put forth in relation to
them. Reference to the evidence pertaining to the other charges will
only be made where necessary.

65 Procedurally, this approach cannot be technically faulted, especially

considering the length of the trial and the sheer volume of evidence
produced. However, in the context of this case, where all the charges were
similar in nature and the Defence was strenuously arguing that all four
complainants had colluded to make the accusations falsely, it was, in my
view, imperative for the Judge to explain why she reached different
decisions on six of the nine similar charges. Without going so far as to say
that the acquittals on the six charges would themselves constitute a
reasonable doubt as to the three convictions, they certainly would affect the
complainants’ collective credibility and the Prosecution’s overall case.
66 Of the nine charges preferred against the appellant, the other six
charges involved two other complainants, with B alleging one count
substantively similar to the 2001 “sports check” charge concerning E, and C
alleging five counts ranging from touching the groin area to the most
serious of the nine charges, that the appellant put his hand on his penis and
stimulated it. B was also the complainant whose father organised the
parents and other complainants prior to the lodgement of the police report.
In particular, C’s evidence was taken as corroboration for D’s on the 15th
charge (the third of the Charges set out at [2] above). This is significant
because the other two complainants’ credibility must be assessed in the light
of the fact that the appellant was acquitted of the charges originating from
their accusations. Where several similar charges emanate from a few
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[2008] 4 SLR(R) XP v PP 713

complainants who also give evidence to corroborate each other, and the
accused is convicted of some charges but acquitted of the rest, the judge
ought to give reasons for deciding differently vis-à-vis the different
complainants, especially if he or she also relies on their evidence in making
a finding of guilt on some charges.

67 The inference to be drawn from the acquittals is that the other two
complainants were in all likelihood not unusually convincing, but the
troubling question that remains cryptically unanswered is whether they
were nevertheless credible enough to refute the existence of any reasonable
possibility of collusion among the boys, as well as acceptable as
corroboration for the three convictions. It is not in dispute that “even if a
witness is found to have lied on a matter, it does not necessarily affect his
credibility as a whole” (Ng Kwee Leong v PP [1998] 3 SLR(R) 281 at [15]).
The Prosecution rightly argued that the assessment of a witness’s credibility
was not a science and could not be precisely calibrated on a scale of
truthfulness. I accept that the complainants could be believed on some
issues and not others without necessitating the conclusion that their
testimonies were entirely incredible. However, in the present case, aside
from the Charges not having been made out, it was also difficult to dismiss
outright the allegations of collusion. This is why it was important for the
Judge to give reasons for the acquittals, so that her assessment of the
credibility of the other complainants could assist in the determination of
whether there existed a reasonable doubt pointing to collusion. The
implications of her silence may be briefly illustrated here.

68 First, the accusations levelled by the others against the appellant were
substantially similar in fact. Two other sports check complaints were made,
but the Judge gave no inkling as to why the appellant was acquitted of those
but convicted of the charge relating to E. In the absence of any assessment
relating to the other witnesses’ testimonies, the foremost inference is that
the other two complainants were disbelieved, while E was believed because
he was “unusually convincing”. If this is the case, one is left wondering why
E was more convincing than the other witnesses. Was it simply a matter of
demeanour? Did the other complainants fabricate their complaints?

69 Second, assuming the Judge did not find these complainants credible,
she could have erred in holding that there was no collusion amongst the
complainants. Their lack of credibility in relation to the accusations against
the appellant urgently needed to be addressed in assessing their credibility
apropos the Defence’s allegations of collusion. While it may well be that a
witness who does not tell the truth with respect to one issue may
nevertheless be believed on another issue, a critical assessment of the
witness and his testimony is necessary to determine on what issues he is to
be believed, and, of paramount importance, why he is nevertheless to be
believed on those issues.
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70 In the circumstances of the present case, having upheld only three out
of an initial fusillade of 19 charges, many of which were substantively
similar (and it may be noted that the three convictions related to the least
serious accusations), it was imperative for the Judge to give reasons for the
acquittals, to dispel any plausible impression of arbitrariness. The
questionable import of the Judge’s choice of language in holding that she
“was also not convinced that there was a conspiracy to fabricate false
allegations against the [appellant]” (GD at [39]) aside, it is mildly alarming,
to say the least, that she explained this conclusion only by reasoning that
the conduct of B and C (two boys whose complaints did not justify
convictions), in reporting the matters, “was hardly the behaviour of boys
who were allegedly scheming to lay false complaints against the [appellant]”
(GD at [42]). In reasoning that the difficulty in making the complaints to
their parents and the counsellor was perfectly plausible and understandable
because of embarrassment and discomfort, the Judge left a legal void in not
offering her reasons for acquitting the appellant on these charges, since she
had disregarded B’s and C’s delays in making the complaints as a factor
adversely affecting their credibility. This was also a rather curious
assessment of those complainants’ credibility, since a finding that the
complaints were genuine must have supported both the conclusion of no
conspiracy as well as the appellant’s guilt as inseparable, logical conclusions,
and not one without the other. Despite the lengthy GD, the Judge gave no
clue as to the solution for the fundamental conundrum implicit in her
verdict: If all the complainants were to be believed, why did she only convict
the appellant of the three charges relating to E and D? Further, if indeed all
the complainants were to be believed and there had been no collusion, how
and why did she bifurcate this aspect of the evidence from the other
complainants’ credibility on the alleged incidents contained in the charges
of which she acquitted the appellant?

The complainants’ credibility

71 I freely and readily acknowledge that a trial judge is usually much
better placed than an appellate judge to assess a witness’s credibility, having
observed the witness testifying and being cross-examined on the stand.
However, demeanour is not invariably determinative; contrary evidence by
other witnesses must be given due weight, and if the witness fails to recall or
satisfactorily explain material facts and assertions, his credible demeanour
cannot overcome such deficiencies. As I explained in PP v Wang Ziyi Able
[2008] 2 SLR(R) 61 at [92]–[96], an appellate judge is as competent as any
trial judge to draw necessary inferences of fact not supported by the
primary or objective evidence on record from the circumstances of the case.
72 While an appellate court should be more restrained when dealing
with the trial judge’s assessment of a witness’s credibility, there is a
difference between an assessment of a witness’s credibility based on his
demeanour, and one based on inferences drawn from the internal
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[2008] 4 SLR(R) XP v PP 715

consistency in the content of the witness’s testimony or the external

consistency between the content of the witness’s evidence and the extrinsic
evidence. In the latter two situations, the trial judge’s advantage in having
studied the witness is not critical because the appellate court has access to
the same material and is accordingly in an equal position to assess the
veracity of the witness’s evidence (see Jagatheesan s/o Krishnasamy v PP
[2006] 4 SLR(R) 45 (“Jagatheesan”) at [40], citing PP v Choo Thiam Hock
[1994] 2 SLR(R) 702 at [11]).
73 Particularly applicable to this case are the following observations I
made in Jagatheesan at [40]–[43]:
… An apparent lack of appreciation of inconsistencies, contradictions
and improbabilities can undermine the basis for any proper finding of
credibility: see Kuek Ah Lek v PP [1995] 2 SLR(R) 766 at [59]. The real
tests are how consistent the story is within itself, how it stands the test
of cross-examination and how it fits in with the rest of the evidence
and the circumstances of the case; per Lord Roche in Bhojraj v Sita
Ram AIR (1936) PC 60 at 62.
I must caution, however, that even when the trial judge’s evaluation of
a witness’s credibility is based on his demeanour, this will not
invariably immunise the decision from appellate scrutiny. In PP v
Victor Rajoo [1995] 3 SLR(R) 189, the Court of Appeal disagreed with
the trial judge’s findings of fact which were, in that case, primarily
based on his impression of both the accused and another witness as
well as the manner in which they gave their evidence. Writing for the
court, L P Thean JA held as follows at [47]–[48]:
The learned trial judge’s acceptance of the accused’s evidence
was based mainly on his impression of AB and the accused and
the manner in which AB and the accused gave evidence. These
factors are of course important and play a vital role in the
determination of the veracity and credibility of their evidence.
However, it is equally important to test their evidence against
some objective facts and independent evidence. In PP v Yeo Choon
Poh [1993] 3 SLR(R) 302 at [45] Yong Pung How CJ delivering
the judgment of this court said:
As was held by Spenser-Wilkinson J in Tara Singh v PP
[1949] MLJ 88 at 89, the principle is that an impression as
to the demeanour of the witness ought not to be adopted
by a trial judge without testing it against the whole of his
evidence. …
It is also helpful to remind ourselves of what Ong Hock Thye FJ
said in Ah Mee v PP [1967] 1 MLJ 220, at 223:
To avoid undue emphasis on demeanour, it may be well to
remember what was said by Lord Wright, and often
quoted, from his judgment in Powell & Anor v Streatham
Manor Nursing Home [1935] AC 243, at p 267 of the
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possibility of judges being deceived by adroit or plausible

knaves or by apparent innocence.
…
I should also add that, in my view, reliance on the demeanour of
witnesses alone will often be insufficient to establish an accused’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. In this respect, the astute observation of
Lord Bridge of Harwich in the Privy Council decision of Attorney-
General of Hong Kong v Wong Muk Ping [1987] AC 501 at 510 is
apposite:
It is a commonplace judicial experience that a witness who
makes a poor impression in the witness box may be found at the
end of the day, when his evidence is considered in the light of all
the other evidence bearing upon the issue, to have been both
truthful and accurate. Conversely, the evidence of a witness who
at first seemed impressive and reliable may at the end of the day
have to be rejected. Such experience suggests that it is dangerous
to assess the credibility of the evidence given by any witness in
isolation from other evidence in the case which is capable of
throwing light on its reliability[.]
The appropriate balance to be struck between the advantages
admittedly available to the trial court and the concomitant need for an
appellate court to discharge its constitutional duty in ensuring that a
conviction is warranted is perhaps best captured by the Canadian
Supreme Court in Her Majesty The Queen v RW [1992] 2 SCR 122 at
131–132:
The trial judge has the advantage, denied to the appellate court,
of seeing and hearing the evidence of witnesses. However, as a
matter of law it remains open to an appellate court to overturn a
verdict based on findings of credibility where, after considering
all the evidence and having due regard to the advantages
afforded to the trial judge, it concludes that the verdict is
unreasonable.
A verdict is unreasonable if, in the words of s 261 of the CPC, the trial
judge’s decision is against the weight of the evidence or wrong in law. If
the Prosecution has not proved its case beyond any reasonable doubt a
conviction would be wrong in law.
[emphasis in original, emphasis added in bold italics]

74 In the present case, despite examining and apparently dissecting the

witnesses’ testimonies with admirable diligence, the Judge did not
appreciate their serious inconsistencies, glossing over them as immaterial
and regrettably appearing to resolve almost every ambiguity in favour of the
Prosecution. The Judge found E (at [107]) to be “a consistent and clear
witness. When he was forgetful, it was about details which were peripheral
in nature or which he did not consider as important at that point in time.”
However, her forgiving dismissal of the contradictory evidence provided by
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[2008] 4 SLR(R) XP v PP 717

other witnesses, including prosecution witnesses, was quite unsatisfactory.

She stated baldly at [112]:
The fact that water polo boys were subjected to a back check in 2001
was not in dispute. The issue was whether the back check on E was
conducted in the manner described by him. I found that E gave a clear
and credible description of what transpired during his back check.
Firstly, in relation to the evidence of the other water polo boys who
testified that there was only one back check session and that the door
to the storeroom was kept opened throughout this session, I felt that
these inconsistencies were not fatal to the Prosecution’s case. Just
because the door was not locked when the other boys were checked, it did
not mean that the door was not locked when the check on E was
conducted. Further, just because the other witnesses were only able to
recall going through one back check, it did not mean the [appellant] only
conducted one back check session or that all the boys were checked on the
same day. [emphasis added]
75 This simply cannot be the basis for any conviction. The standard of
proof is of course proof beyond reasonable doubt, not beyond every
conceivable or hypothetical possibility. Certainly the fact that the door was
not locked when the other boys were checked did not absolutely preclude
the door from having been locked when E was being checked. However,
given that the Prosecution could not produce a single independent witness
from any of the boys or coaches present at that training session to testify
that the door was ever shut, there must exist at least a reasonable doubt, if
not a compelling inference, that the door was indeed left open as the boys
took turns to be checked while doing exercises outside the room.
76 Similarly, the Judge was somewhat too enthusiastic in preferring E’s
account of the alleged portakabin incident, dismissing as immaterial the
Defence’s arguments that the portakabin was the most unlikely location for
the appellant to have molested E, and that E’s complaint to the Principal
about the alleged incident was inconsistent with his evidence in court. The
Judge quite categorically decided (at [137]) that:
[O]nce the Principal’s statement to the police dated 21 February 2006
… wherein it was stated that the [appellant] had taken E to the
portakabin and had given him a massage after asking him to take off
his T-shirt was admitted as part of evidence under section 147(3) of the
Evidence Act, the issue about it being an unlikely place to carry out the
massage or that the cabin could not be locked from the inside became
an immaterial issue. … [T]he Principal’s statement to the police in this
regard had the effect of the Principal telling the police that the
[appellant] had admitted to him that he (the [appellant]) had brought E
to the portakabin and had given him a massage without his T-shirt ...
With this evidence, the contradictory evidence on the location of the
portakabin, the visibility of the interior of the container/portakabin
and the state of the locking mechanism had no effect on the credibility
of E’s evidence. [emphasis in original]
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77 Given that the Principal himself testified that he might have been
mistaken in his police statement and the very cogent arguments raised in
relation to the implausibility of E’s account, the Judge should not have been
so ready to find E’s evidence “indirectly corroborated” (GD at [154]) and to
accept it. Nor could this so-called admission by the appellant to the
Principal constitute a sound enough basis to support a finding that the
appellant was not a credible witness.

78 In the present appeal, neither complainant was unusually convincing,

often responding in cross-examination with “I don’t know” or “I cannot
remember”. Their close friendship and obvious intense dislike for the
appellant also gave some credence to the Defence’s allegations of collusion.

The friendship between E and D

79 The Judge found (GD at [35]–[36]) that:

[T]here was no evidence that [E] kept close contact with the other
complainants. This fact was clearly shown by the fact that it was B’s
father and not one of the other complainants who had approached him
and asked him whether he would be willing to “testify” against the
[appellant]. …

What was most telling was the fact that during the meeting with the
Principal on 30 April 2005, E was not asked by any other complainant
or parent about what allegedly happened to him in 2001. If indeed E
was a central figure in the conspiracy to fabricate the allegations
against the [appellant], one would have expected him to work in
unison with the other complainants in 2005 to raise the complaints to
the Principal or at the very least, one would expect him to be in contact
with the other complainants. In any event, E was no longer in [the
School] in 2005 and was no longer “suffering” under the control of the
[appellant]. It was difficult to see why he would be motivated to subject
himself to the ordeal of police investigations and court proceedings
just to join his ex-team mates in a plan to “destroy” the [appellant].

80 However, she also acknowledged (at [51]) that:

The complainants were close friends who were studying in the same
school in 2004 and 2005 and were water polo team mates. Further, the
complainants admitted that they did discuss this matter although it
was not done with any intent to collude. This, to me, was to be
expected especially since it was quite natural for boys who are close
friends and going through the same ordeal to talk with each other. It
would be rather artificial to expect them to suddenly moderate or alter
their behaviour just because of pending police investigations. In a way,
their conduct was similar to the [appellant’s] discussions with the
coaches and former students at the Coffee Bean at Holland Village and
at Anchor Point to discuss certain events that were relevant to his
defence.
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[2008] 4 SLR(R) XP v PP 719

Nevertheless, the Judge firmly concluded that the risk of contamination was
negligible with regard to the evidence of E and D (at [53]).
81 The appellant argued that the Judge erred in dismissing the possibility
of collusion between E and D because the two complainants remained
particularly close friends even though E had graduated from the School in
2004. Counsel for the appellant pointed out that the two complainants had
admitted to holding hands and resting their heads on each others’
shoulders, and their “testimonials” on the social networking website,
Friendster, from 2004 to 2006 also demonstrated a close friendship. D also
testified at trial that his sister knew E. While E testified that he was generally
not particularly close to the other complainants during the three months
preceding the release of the General Certificate of Education Ordinary
Level examination results in 2005, he trained with the affiliated junior
college water polo team, where C and B also trained, and sparred with the
school team before the March 2005 competition. Pointing to the fact that
the two complainants E and D were photographed together at a party in
September 2006 after the trial was underway, counsel for the appellant
asserted that they had clearly not lost touch or drifted away after E left the
School. This concern is not without substance.
82 In the light of this evidence that the complainants’ close friendship
clearly endured, the Judge should at least have assessed this concern in
greater depth in determining whether they might have colluded to falsely
make the accusations against the appellant.

Whether the complainants were unusually convincing witnesses

83 In finding E and D to be unusually convincing witnesses, the Judge
resolved almost every ambiguity in the evidence in their favour, and
unevenly glided over several glaring inconsistencies raised by the other
evidence. Even if the Judge found the complainants to be entirely credible,
even unusually convincing witnesses, the contradictions raised by other
evidence, such as Coach 4’s testimony, and that of at least two prosecution
witnesses as to the sleeping positions during the June 2004 camp, would
have sufficed to create a reasonable doubt that disenabled the Prosecution
from discharging its burden of proof in so far as D was concerned.
84 It is common ground that sometime in 2004 during or after the 2004
Hostel Stay (see [16] above) but before the June camp (when D was
allegedly groped), E mischievously planted an unsubstantiated rumour
amongst his teammates that the appellant was gay. While neither E nor D
could remember when exactly E was confronted about the rumours and
was asked to stop them, Coach 1 testified that in late July or early August
2004, about two weeks before the meeting during which he asked the boys if
any of them had been touched inappropriately by the appellant, he and the
appellant had lunch with some of the boys including E and D. At that lunch,
E admitted to having spread the rumour. E later sent an SMS to his
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teammates apologising for the rumour and clarifying that it was not true.
This corresponded roughly with E’s evidence that the appellant approached
him to “clear things up” and asked him to inform his teammates that the
rumour was untrue (see GD at [90]–[92]), as well as the appellant’s
evidence on the lunch and on approaching E (see GD at [289]–[295]).
While I would not attribute undue significance to this incident, or take it as
conclusive proof that E’s and D’s complaints were as baseless as the
rumour, it is curious that D, having been warned by his friend E that the
appellant was allegedly gay, did not later mention the alleged groping
incident to E, not even to affirm E’s suspicion. For that matter, it might also
be considered curious that E did not tell his juniors or even D about what
had allegedly happened to him in 2001, as that would certainly have put
them on guard. The complainants’ behaviour, on reflection, did not quite
comport with their testimonies.
85 As discussed above, in the light of the serious inconsistencies in the
two complainants’ evidence, with E failing to reprise the most essential
particulars in the original charge relating to the alleged portakabin incident,
and D recanting inexplicably on the similarly crucial matter of whether he
and the appellant shared a sleeping bag, it could not be said with certitude
that the complainants were unusually convincing witnesses. Their
credibility was eroded by their own contradictory statements and further
shaken by inconsistent testimonies from other credible witnesses,
prosecution and defence alike.

The appellant’s credibility

86 The Judge did not specifically address the appellant’s credibility, but
noted that it was “a critical part of his defence that all the complainants had
fabricated the allegations as he did not commit any of the acts alleged” (GD
at [22]). In finding that there was no collusion (despite the contradiction of
acquitting the appellant of charges stemming from complaints which she
considered legitimate) and that E and D were “unusually convincing”
witnesses (GD at [109] and [224] respectively), the Judge necessarily found
that the appellant was not a credible witness. This finding was presumably
founded on the unsatisfactory explanations of his guarded admissions in his
police statements, which apparently contradicted his defence of complete
denial at trial. In addition, the Judge also appeared to conclude adversely on
the appellant’s credibility based on his evidence in the voir dire for his first
statement to the police recorded on 9 June 2005, ie, P84 (see [61] above).
87 The Judge addressed at some length the Defence’s challenge to the
admissibility of P84. I agree with the Judge’s finding in the voir dire that P84
was made voluntarily and was correctly admitted, but full weight should
not have been accorded to either P84 or P89, the second statement given on
10 June 2005 (discussed at [61]–[63] above). As the Judge acknowledged at
[356], the appellant had been suffering from recurrent idiopathic left
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[2008] 4 SLR(R) XP v PP 721

ventricular tachycardia since 1998 or 1999, and would be short of breath,

dizzy and disoriented when he got an attack. During a serious attack his
body would get stiff and he would feel numb. The Judge also accepted a
letter dated 16 August 2006 from Singapore General Hospital confirming
that he was seen at the Department of Emergency Medicine in the early
hours of 10 June 2005 for this problem. The recording of P84 had
concluded on 9 June 2005 at 3.50pm. However, the Judge seemed sceptical
that the appellant would have already felt ill about 12 hours before he was
admitted to hospital. She “was compelled to find that even if the [appellant]
was ill during the recording of [P84], his condition was not as severe as he
suggested” (at [359]). Further, she found (at [363]) that:
[The appellant] was capable of comprehending the questions and
providing answers to the questions on his own even during the last
hour of the recording of the statement. Once I rejected his claim that
he was ill, I also rejected his claim that he merely scanned the contents
of the statement and he did so within two minutes because of his health
condition.

88 Having concluded that both the appellant’s statements P84 and P89
had been made voluntarily and that his comprehension had not been
impaired by his medical condition, the Judge then listed several
discrepancies between the appellant’s testimony and his police statements
(at [374]–[385]), ranging from whether he had massaged boys’ thighs on
other occasions to whether he had admitted to sleeping next to D. Several of
these discrepancies related to facts irrelevant to the Charges, and were in
reality no more material than the numerous inconsistencies perforating the
complainants’ evidence. The Judge appeared to base her finding of the
appellant’s credibility largely on the issue of whether the statements had
been made voluntarily. While I agree that the statements were voluntarily
made, from a technical standpoint, and therefore admissible, the Judge was,
with respect, too quick to conclude, and not quite justified in extrapolating
from the voir dire for P84, that the appellant “showed that he had no qualms
in embellishing his evidence and he was on occasion prone to exaggeration”
(at [344]). Most importantly, the Judge’s finding was premised almost
entirely on the appellant’s admission in P89 that he had shared D’s sleeping
bag with him as a blanket. As discussed above at [58]–[63], in the light of
D’s most inexplicable but unequivocal denial of his earlier allegation that
they had shared the sleeping bag as a blanket, the appellant’s credibility
should have been acknowledged to be on par with D, at the very least, on
this particular issue.

89 Given my finding that the Prosecution did not prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt, I need make no finding on the appellant’s credibility.
However, in fairness to the appellant, I should mention that some of the
Judge’s criticisms about his testimony were unwarranted: there was simply
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not enough sturdy evidence to conclude that the appellant had no “qualms
in embellishing his evidence”.

Burden of proof – “beyond reasonable doubt”

90 The presumption of innocence is the cornerstone of the criminal
justice system and the bedrock of the law of evidence. As trite a principle as
this is, it is sometimes necessary to restate that every accused person is
innocent until proved guilty. As Viscount Sankey LC authoritatively
declared in Woolmington v The Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC
462 at 481-482 (most recently approved in Took Leng How v PP [2006]
2 SLR(R) 70 at [27]):
Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is
always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the
prisoner’s guilt subject to what I have already said as to the defence of
insanity and subject also to any statutory exception. If, at the end of
and on the whole of the case, there is a reasonable doubt, created by the
evidence given by either the prosecution or the prisoner, … the
prosecution has not made out the case and the prisoner is entitled to an
acquittal. No matter what the charge or where the trial, the principle
that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of the
common law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can be
entertained.

91 In other words, as the English Court of Criminal Appeal put it in R v

Dennis Patrick Murtagh and Kenneth Kennedy (1955) 39 Cr App R 72 at 83,
it is “not for the accused to establish their innocence”, save of course in
certain special circumstances expressly mandated by Parliament. There are
sound policy reasons for this stance. In Jagatheesan ([72] supra) at [46],
[48] and [59], I pointed out:
The requirement that the Prosecution has to prove its case against an
accused beyond reasonable doubt is firmly embedded and entrenched
in the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) (‘EA’) as well as in the
conscience of the common law. In fact, this hallowed principle is so
honoured as a principle of fundamental justice that it has been
accorded constitutional status in the United States (In re Winship,
397 US 358 (1970) (‘Winship’) and in Canada (R v Vaillancourt [1987]
2 SCR 636). It is a doctrine that the courts in Singapore have
consistently emphasised and upheld as a necessary and desirable
prerequisite for any legitimate and sustainable conviction: see, for
example, [Teo Keng Pong v PP [1996] 2 SLR(R) 890] at [68]; most
recently applied by the Court of Appeal in Took Leng How v PP [2006]
2 SLR(R) 70 …
…
… Every conviction must hew to an identical touchstone. Such a
standard is not so stringent as to mean that every item of evidence
adduced should be isolated, considered separately and rejected unless
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[2008] 4 SLR(R) XP v PP 723

the Prosecution satisfies the trial judge that it is credible beyond

reasonable doubt: See Nadasan Chandra Secharan v PP [1997] 1
SLR(R) 118 at [85]. All the principle requires is that upon a
consideration of all the evidence presented by the Prosecution and/or
the Defence, the evidence must be sufficient to establish each and every
element of the offence for which the accused is charged beyond
reasonable doubt.
…
… [The] threshold below which society will not condone a conviction
or allow for the presumption of innocence to be displaced is the line
between reasonable doubt and mere doubt. Adherence to this
presumption also means that the trial judge should not supplement
gaps in the Prosecution’s case. If indeed gaps in the evidence should
prevail so that the trial judge feels it is necessary to fill them to satisfy
himself that the Prosecution’s burden of proof has been met, then the
accused simply cannot be found legally guilty. In short, the
presumption of innocence has not been displaced.
92 The Court of Appeal in Took Leng How also adopted Denning J’s
dicta in Miller v Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372 at 373 explaining
what constitutes a reasonable doubt:
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the
shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it
admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the
evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility
in his favour which can be dismissed with the sentence “of course it is
possible, but not in the least probable,” the case is proved beyond
reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice.
93 It can also be distilled from the established jurisprudence that a
reasonable doubt is a reasoned doubt, “a doubt for which one can give a
reason, so long as the reason given is logically connected to the evidence”
(per Wood JA in R v Brydon (1995) 2 BCLR (3d) 243 at [44], cited in
Jagatheesan at [53]). A reasonable doubt must be capable of distinct
articulation and be founded in the evidence submitted which is essential to
support a conviction; it must react to a weakness in the case offered by the
Prosecution. The trial judge must thus be careful to objectively reason
through the evidence, and state precisely why and how it supports the
Prosecution’s theory of the accused’s guilt, rather than simply state that he
or she has been subjectively satisfied beyond reasonable doubt (see
Jagatheesan at [55]–[56]).
94 If the evidence is insufficient to support the Prosecution’s theory of
guilt, and if the weaknesses in the Prosecution’s case reveal a deficiency in
what is necessary for a conviction, the judge must acquit the accused, and
with good reason: it simply has not been proved to the satisfaction of the
law that the accused is guilty, and the presumption of innocence stands
unrebutted. It is not helpful, therefore, for suggestions to be subsequently
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724 SINGAPORE LAW REPORTS (REISSUE) [2008] 4 SLR(R)

raised about the accused’s “factual guilt” once he has been acquitted. To do
so would be to undermine the court’s finding of not guilty and would also
stand the presumption of innocence on its head, replacing it with an
insidious and open-ended suspicion of guilt that an accused person would
be hard-pressed to ever shed, even upon vindication in a court of law. I have
no doubt that prosecutions are only commenced after careful investigation
and prosecutorial discretion is never lightly exercised, but the decision of
guilt or innocence is constitutionally for the court and the court alone to
make. The court cannot convict if a reasonable doubt remains to prevent
the presumption of innocence from being rebutted. In that result, there is
no room for second guessing or nice distinctions; there is only one meaning
to “not proved” and that is that it has not been established in the eyes of the
law that the accused has committed the offence with which he has been
charged.

Conclusion
95 In convicting the appellant on three charges but acquitting him of six
others, the Judge was duty-bound in the context of these proceedings to
provide reasons for differing conclusions on the appellant’s guilt apropos
the various complainants. This is especially since the facts alleged in most of
the charges were substantially similar, and even more so given that the
Judge “found” that there was no prevailing reasonable possibility of
collusion amongst the four complainants. She also erred in resolving almost
every doubt or inconsistency in favour of the Prosecution, while being
decidedly unforgiving of the appellant’s inconsistent police statements,
even though it was undisputed that he had been hospitalised the night
before due to a severe recurrence of his chronic heart ailment. Had there
really only been immaterial creases in the complainants’ testimonies, there
would have been no basis to draw an adverse inference as to their
credibility. However, this was not the case. The discrepancies within each
complainant’s testimony, as well as the contradictions thrown up by both
prosecution and defence witnesses alike, raised several serious doubts as to
the veracity of the allegations that, in the final analysis, could not be
dismissed. The Prosecution’s evidential platform on each charge was simply
not sturdy enough to discharge the burden of proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
96 While the appellant’s general behaviour with his students is not in
issue here, I notice that he acknowledged exchanging massages with the
boys, while sometimes bonding with them through other activities that
brought them into close physical proximity. Such conduct alone cannot and
does not constitute the criminal offence of outraging modesty.
Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the fact that all teachers are indeed in a
position of considerable authority vis-à-vis their young charges, and must
be cautious never to find themselves in situations where there is a potential
to harmfully exploit that relationship. It is almost impossible to exaggerate
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[2008] 4 SLR(R) XP v PP 725

the importance not merely of propriety, but the appearance of propriety, in

the teacher-student relationship. In seeking to play an active role so as to
make a meaningful difference to the lives of their students, teachers must
always be mindful never to cross the boundaries of personal and cultural
proprieties and should be ever conscious of respecting their students’
privacy and personal space. Potentially compromising situations should be
avoided at all costs. Should there be a need for student-teacher bonding
involving any form or degree of physical contact, this should invariably take
place in the open, and, in any event, only in the presence of others, without
occasioning even the slightest hint of impropriety.

97 The present appeal has shown conclusively and irrefutably that the
legal burden of proof has not been discharged and that the presumption of
innocence remains unrebutted as a result. First, both complainants were far
from unusually convincing: both their testimonies were internally
inconsistent in material particulars and the Judge erred in resolving
practically every contradiction in the Prosecution’s favour. Second, the
Prosecution’s case was inherently untenable, having been contradicted on
important points by both prosecution and defence witnesses alike. Finally,
and most crucially, the Defence had most definitely raised several
reasonable doubts as to the appellant’s guilt when assessed against the
objective evidence. In the circumstances, while I may entertain some
misgivings about the propriety of certain aspects of the appellant’s conduct,
the convictions were plainly unsafe and had to be overturned. It follows
inexorably from this that the appellant is not guilty of the Charges and the
appeal must accordingly be allowed.

98 The Prosecution’s case is only one side of the story; our adversarial
system requires and ensures that the defence be fully ventilated should one
exist. In each and every case, it is the constitutional role of the judges to
carefully and dispassionately evaluate the deficiencies of the Prosecution’s
and/or the Defence’s case theory on the sole basis of legal proof and not
mere suspicion or intuition. “The search for truth is a search for epistemic
justification for belief in the disputed propositions of fact.” (Ho Hock Lai, A
Philosophy of Evidence Law: Justice in the Search for Truth (Oxford
University Press, 2008) at p 84.) The question for the court in every case is
not whether it suspects the accused has committed the crime but whether
the Prosecution has proved beyond any reasonable doubt that he has
indeed committed it. It is trite that courts can never convict on the basis of
suspicion and/or intuition. Such is the conclusion demanded by and
enshrined in that cardinal principle, the presumption of innocence, upon
which is founded the most elemental rule of the criminal justice system:
that the Prosecution must establish guilt beyond any reasonable doubt.
Objective and not subjective belief is the essential touchstone of guilt, and
there is simply no place for subsequent speculation or implication that an
acquitted accused may be “factually guilty”. Who makes that
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determination? The adversarial system that we have adopted requires the

Prosecution to conscientiously and irrefutably ensure that an unbreakable
and credible chain of evidence secures the guilt of the accused. It is not
flawless in that perfectly proper prosecutions may sometimes fail because of
unexpected frailties in the evidential links. Our system is, however, an
eminently credible, pragmatic and effective one that tempers idealism with
a healthy dose of realism. The rules are clear and precise, and neither the
Prosecution nor the Defence can or should complain if they fail by them. By
rigorously demanding and upholding exacting standards from both the
Prosecution and the Defence alike, the courts are able to ensure that public
confidence in our legal system does not falter.
99 Let me conclude by reiterating certain observations that I made in
Jagatheesan ([72] supra at [61]):
… An accused is presumed innocent and this presumption is not
displaced until the Prosecution has discharged its burden of proof.
Therefore, if the evidence throws up a reasonable doubt, it is not so
much that the accused should be given the benefit of the doubt [but] as
… [that of] the Prosecution’s case simply not being proved. In the final
analysis, the doctrine of reasonable doubt is neither abstract nor
theoretical. It has real, practical and profound implications in sifting
the innocent from the guilty; in deciding who should suffer
punishment and who should not. The doctrine is a bedrock principle of
the criminal justice system in Singapore because while it protects and
preserves the interests and rights of the accused, it also serves public
interest by engendering confidence that our criminal justice system
punishes only those who are guilty. [emphasis added]
100 It remains for me to place on record my appreciation to counsel for
the commendable industry they have so ably demonstrated in the
preparation and presentation of their respective cases. While I have not
accepted a number of points made by counsel, I have nevertheless found
most of them helpful in arriving at my final determination.

Reported by Tan Liang Ying.