RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY
ENTITLED RESTORING INTEGRITY: A
STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE
ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME
COURT
A.M. NO. 10-10-4-SC. JUNE 7, 2011
Lyka Dennese C. Salazar
PALE
FACTS:
Respondent University of the Philippines (UP) law professors Tristan A. Catindig and
Carina C. Laforteza filed MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION praying that:
a. The Court's Decision dated March 8, 2011 be reconsidered and set aside and the
respondents' Compliance dated November 18, 2010 be deemed satisfactory,
b. The Court expunge the reference in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC to the respondents (i.e.,
"joined by some faculty members of the University of the Philippines school of law")
effectively finding them guilty of making false charges against Associate Justice
Mariano C. del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo).
In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, Professors Catindig and Laforteza
relied on one of the following grounds:
a. This proceeding, while ostensibly docketed as an administrative matter, is premised
on a finding of indirect contempt. Accordingly, with all due respect, the honorable
court erred in finding that the respondents breached their ethical obligations
without observance of the due process safeguards guaranteed in an indirect
contempt proceeding
Anent the said ground, Professors Catindig and Laforteza insist that, notwithstanding
the docketing of this matter as an administrative case, there was purportedly a
finding that respondents were guilty of indirect contempt in view of:
a. the mention made in the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 of In re
Kelly, 5 a case involving a contempt charge; and
b. the references to respondents' "contumacious language" or "contumacious speech
and conduct" and to several authorities which dealt with contempt proceedings in
the Decision dated March 8, 2011.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contumacious speech and/or behavior directed against the
Court on the part of a lawyer may be punishable either as contempt or an ethical
violation, or both in the discretion of the Court.
HELD:YES
It is true that contumacious speech and conduct directed against the courts done by
any person, whether or not a member of the Bar, may be considered as indirect
contempt under Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a charge in
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by
himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for
indirect contempt:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice.
The very same contumacious speech or conduct directed against a court or judicial
officer, if committed by a member of the Bar, may likewise subject the offender to
disciplinary proceedings under the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
prescribes that lawyers observe and promote due respect for the courts
In such disciplinary cases, the sanctions are not penal but administrative such as,
disbarment, suspension, reprimand or admonition.
In Salcedo v. Hernandez, for the same act of filing in court a pleading with intemperate
and offensive statements, the concerned lawyer was found guilty of contempt and
liable administratively. For this reason, two separate penalties were imposed upon
him, a fine (for the contempt charge) and reprimand (for his failure to observe his
lawyerly duty to give due respect to the Court).
in the case of In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, the Court explicitly stated that whether
or not respondent lawyer could be held liable for contempt for his utterances and
actuations was immaterial as the sole issue in his disciplinary case concerns his
professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of the
Court.
When the Court initiates contempt proceedings and/or disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers for intemperate and discourteous language and behavior directed at the courts, the
evil sought to be prevented is the same — the degradation of the courts and the loss of
trust in the administration of justice. For this reason, it is not unusual for the Court to cite
authorities on bar discipline (involving the duty to give due respect to the courts) in
contempt cases against lawyers and vice versa.
Thus, when the Court chooses to institute an administrative case against a respondent
lawyer, the mere citation or discussion in the orders or decision in the administrative case of
jurisprudence involving contempt proceedings does not transform the action from a
disciplinary proceeding to one for contempt. Respondents' contrary position in their motion
for reconsideration is bereft of any rational merit. Had this Court opted to cite respondents
for contempt of court, which is punishable by imprisonment or fine, this Court would have
initiated contempt proceedings in accordance with the Rules of Court. Clearly, the Court did
not opt to do so.
