100% found this document useful (2 votes)
1K views90 pagesAerofax - Grumman F-14 Tomcat PDF
Uploaded by
BDSMasterPTCopyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF or read online on Scribd
100% found this document useful (2 votes)
1K views90 pagesAerofax - Grumman F-14 Tomcat PDF
Uploaded by
BDSMasterPTCopyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF or read online on Scribd
/ 90
Grumman
F-14 Tomcat
Leading US Navy Fleet Fighter
Dennis R Jenkins -
POOR, Grumman
F-14 Tomcat
Leading US Navy Fleet Fighter
Dennis R Jenkins
PORK Grumman F-14 Tome:
Pubished by Niland Pubtsning Limited
24 The Hollow, Ea Shiton
Letester, LES 7NA, England
Tok 07455 047 815 Fax: O1455 841 805
United States race disrbuton by
Specialty Press Publahere & Wholesalers Ine
11481 Kost Dam Road, Nerh Branch, MN 55056
Tel ee telophone: 800.895.4585
Aight reserved. No pat of thie pubeation may
‘mechanical o phot-coped, recorded ot charwise
without he wren parmision of the pubihers
Photographs fom the Jay Miler Colton appear
courasy ofthe Aerospace Education Center in
Lite Rock, Arkansas
Tie page: Two Tomeats (BuNo 161138/161161)
{rom VF-24 return tothe USS Nimitz (CVN-6)
‘om th March 4981. Robert Lavon wa Jay Miler
Below: A VE-S1 Tomeat on the catapult of tho
USS Aity Hawk (CV-83). Jy Miler
Dennis Rdenkine
Mat Pst Lid nd Contents
Printed in England by
Clearpoint Coloupint Limes Introduction 3
eyes Manche, NaS 60: ‘Acronyms and Abbreviations 4
Aero i an imprint of hagiors
Mialana Pubishing Utes
. 1 Genesis 5
‘The publishers wish to hank the folowing for eit 2 Grumman enters the ray 7
contibaions to the book: Mick Reth; Jan Jacobs: 3. Progtam serutiny as
Bryan M Nylander: Mark Naol; Darr! A Shaw presiiclon bog .
il Kiser; Loe Lovo, Grumman History Ofice Lsaae a a
Wiliam Barto ana Lyle Heldenbrand, Grumman Jn Golo #
(Chis Stir Malcolm Hayes; Marty Lachow; Ens 4 Operational service
Wiliam P Koppar, V-2: (tJ Toda Lapin VF with the US Navy a
Lt lan © Anderson, V-2; Lt Kt ‘Sparky’ Nii, 8 Technical dsccription
VE-A54: Ens Pichard € Meade, V2" 1 Todd iieiitantaeiie i
‘Grinch’ Brophy, VF-49; Ens W L White, Vk coated 7
Vance Vasque? at Pt Mugu: Lt Kev M Clty, Vk 6 Armament 6
sim Stump at GE Acrat Engines; Broacils 7 Powerplants at
imaging Corporation: Chor! Agin Heathoock, NASA
(Dryden: Robert Lawson, Tommy Thomason:
Michael Grove; Douglas MaCurach, Locknoes
Marin; Ok Holbert and Kenneth Quimby atte
‘Aerospace Eduoaton Canter: and Jay lle,
Opposite page: Both afterburners it an F144,
from VF-51 launches from the USS Kitty Hawk
{€¥.83). The need for attrburners on mast
launches was eliminated when the F110 engine
was introduced, increasing engine lite, but
Secriiing spectacular visual eects. ay We In 1994, the US Navy's Grumman F-14 Tomeat
appeared to be out ofa job. Although widely
respected by the pilotsthat flow, the basic ai-
frame was over 20 years old and the Navy
‘announced its intentions to phase it out of ser
vice. The upgraded F-14D program was cut
shot, and the F/A-18E/F received the lion's
share of an ever decreasing budget. Even the
TTomecat’s original manufacturer had complete
ly changed its identity, becoming part of a
‘merged Northrop Grumman Corp, and closing
its long-time assembly plants in New York
But an amazing thing happened. Instead of
‘quietly fading away, the Tomcat was bom
‘again through a series of relatively inexpensive
upgrades, Some ofthese upgrades were made
possible by the modular architecture adopted
Curing the F-14D program, allowing the inte
gration of offthe-shelf hardware such as the
Lockheed Martin LANTIRN pod. Other small
but innovative upgrades, such as a $3,398
‘modification to allow the fing of Zuni rockets,
were accomplished in-house by the Navy.
The Tomcat is not new to controversy sur
rounding I. It was born from the F-111 fiasco
where the Defense Department tried to take a
reasonable idea (commonality) to an extreme
that was not supported by thetechnology ofthe
day. McNamara wanted a common airrame
with different avionics to be used by both the
Navy and Air Force. The end result satisfied the
requitementsof nether service.
Introduction
Interestingly, 30 yoars later, the F-14D and
F-ASE have remarkably similar avionics and
engines, but completely diferent airtames,
Maybe McNamara had the rghtidea
Controversy followed the F-14 during its
early life, The crash of the first prototype on its
second fight dealt a public relations setback to
the program, although it actualy had litle real
elect on the fight test series. Being the recipi
tent of the last DoD large-scale fixed price
evelopment contract guaranteed that cost
‘overruns would haunt the Tomcat during the
inflation plagued 1970s, almost forcing Grum-
rman into bankruptcy. A government backed
Joan was seen as ‘balling out big business’ and
ended up being cancelled. A deal between
cash-strapped Grumman and an iranian bank
exploded in the press, causing embarrassment
for everybody.
‘And the crashes, The TF-30 turbofan had
pushed the available technology too far, andit
managed 10 fail at the most inopportune
‘moments, This had caused the F-111 tohave a
high fare rate, and the mote extreme carrier
environment did not help the F-14. Twenty
years later, Tomcat crashes ae stllallto0 com-
mon, mainly with the early F-14A that the Navy
‘could never atfordto upgrade or retire.
But always, the Tomcat was impressive to
watch fly. A generation grew up with “Topgun’
‘asa theme, and its star was the F-14, not Tom
‘Cruise. Tomeat was large and loud, a combina
tion guaranteed to excite the young and young
atheart everywhere,
‘When the F-14 was designed, t was envi
sioned to have a secondary air-to-ground role,
Fortwanty years this rola was dormant, regard
less that the wing-sweep control handle has
‘always had a position marked ‘BOMB.’ Wahi
the last couple of years the Navy has rediscov:
fered this capabilty, giving birth to the Bom
Cat. This need was dictated by the retirement of
the Grumman A-6 belore a worthy replacement
was in place, the F/A-18 being unable to carry
sufficient bombs to truly supplant the Intruder
‘All that practice lugging 1,000 pound Phoenix
‘missiles around has given the Tomcat sufficient
muscle to carry more than its share of iron
‘bom, even if its configuration does not lend
‘tsoltto being particularly versatile ait
‘The Navy currently says that the Tomcat wil
‘be gone by 2008, replaced by a combination of
F/A-I8E/Fs and the Joint Strike Fighter, yet
‘another attempt to implement McNamara’s
‘commonalty’ concept. Time wil tl,
This books the sacond Aerofax tile to detail
the F-14, the fist being Jay Miler’s MiniGraph
#3. | owe Jay a debt of gratitude for his assis
tance in preparing this work, and in treaty allow
ing me to plagiarize his earlier work where
appropriate. But thsi not the last book on the
Tomcat, since | suspect there are more tricks
{oft up its sleeve botore it fades, notsily and in
full’bumer, from thescene, ARAM
ACLs
ADL
AFCS.
AGM
al
‘AINAM
Ama
ama
AM
‘AIM-120
AMPAAM
ASP
AWACS
ais
BUNo
BvR
cag
cor
conus
cat
op
ppp
oD
Acronyms and Abbreviations
Advanced Airto-ir Missile
(unbult replacement for AIM-54)
‘Automatic Carrer Landing System
Attitude Direction Indicator
Automatic Fight Control System
‘Airto-Ground Missile
Air Intercept
‘Advanced Intercept Aicto-Air
Missile (unbuit replacement for
AIM-54)
Sparrow Ill Acto-Aie Missile
Sidewinder Air-to-Ai Missile
Phoenix Aito-Air Missile
AMRAAM Aito-Air Missilo
AIN-120 Advanced Medium:
Range Alrto-Air Missile
Airborne Sell Protection Jammer
Airborne Waning and Contro!
System
Board of Inspections and Surveys
‘Bureau Number
Boyond Visual Range
Commander, Air Group
Citical Design Review
Continental United States,
Cathode Ray Tube
Digital Display
Deiail Data Display
Department of Defense
ECM
ECM
ECP
Fx
FADE
FUR
rv
GE
GFE
ops
Gs
HuD
Har
mu
oc
R
IRSTS
IRIAF
smibs
KIAS.
LANTIRN
Meo
Nas
NASA
Electronic Countermeasures
Electronic Counter
Countermeasures
Engineering Change Proposal
Fightor-Experimental(F-15)
Fleet Air Defense
Forward-Looking Infrared
Fiscal Year
General Electric
‘Government Fumished
Equipment
Global Positioning System
Ground Support Equipment
Heads-Up Display
Imperial Iranian Air Force
Inertial Measurement Unit
Initial Operational Capability
Infrarea
Infrared Search and Track Set
Islamic Republic of Ian Ai Force
Joint Tactical Information
Distribution System
Knots indicated Air Speed
Low Altitude Navigation and
Targeting for Night
Mui Function Display
Naval Air Station
‘National Aeronautics and Space
‘Administration
Nate
NATE
NFO
NwTC.
osp
Paw
POR
Pom
PSP
FIO
EP
WR
SAM
TACAN
TARPS
Tes
1x
To
TISEO
uHF
vor
vFK
vree
VHF
Naval Air Test Center
Naval Advanced Tactical Fighter
Naval Fight Officer (oack-seater)
Navy Missile Test Center
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Pratt & Witney
Preliminary Design Review
Precision Guided Munitions
Programmable Signal Processor
Radar intercept Oficer
Request for Proposals
Radar Waring Receiver
Surface-o-Ai Missile
Tactical Air Navigation sytem
Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pot
System
Television Control Systom
Tactical Fighter, Experimental
(ea)
Tactical Information Display
Target Identification System,
Electro-Optical
Uta. High Frequency
Vertical Display Indicator
Navy Fighter, Experimental
14)
"Navy Fighter Squadron designs:
tion (## replaced by numbers)
Very High Frequency
: joo
ee Chapter One
Genesis
‘Above: The Douglas FD Missilocr was never
ult, but gave the Navy a vision ofthe Fleet Air
Defense Fighter it really wanted. Slow and cum-
bersome, the FED was nothing more than a fy.
Ing missile platiorm, and as such could nat
‘make the cut when put under the budget micro.
Scope. Dousias Areal Company
CCpposie page, et: An F-148 from VE in 1973.
shows the colerul original Wolfpack markings
Carried by the squadron. Robert Lawson wa he
Jay Miler Calcio
During the 1950s, the US Navy was working
with the McDonnell Aircraft Company on the
evelopment of the new FaH-1 (F-4A) Phantom
IM fighter. Although firly behind the F4H-t as
its future fighter, the Navy was becoming
increasingly worried by the threat posed by
projected long-range Soviet bombers and air-
craft'ship/submarine-launched cruise missiles.
The Soviets were demonstrating surprising
‘advances in pcopulsion and guidance systems,
‘and had also begun testing thermonuclear
weapons. What the Navy decided they needed
was an aircraft capable of engaging multiple
targets simultaneously at ranges wel in excess
of then-current or projected air-to-air (AAM) or
surface-to-air (SAM) missles,
‘The concept that showed the most promise
was putting a great deal of required intercep-
tion performance in the missile, rather than in
the aircraR which cartied it. In 1957 the Navy
{issued a request for proposals (RFP) fora Fleet
‘Ar Detense Fighter (FADF) and its associated
missile and fir-control system. In 1959, the
Navy announced Douglas Aircraft Company
(hich had not yet merged with McDonnell) as
the winner with the F6D-1 Missiler, with Ben:
‘cix/Grurmman to develop the XAANLN-10 Eagle
long-ange air-to-air missile, and Hughes the
advanced fire-control system. The division of
‘work between Bendix and Grumman was inter-
esting: although Bendixwas ised as the prime
‘contractor, Grumman was responsible forthe
‘missiles airframe, ground handling equipment
‘and propulsion system, with Bendix primarily
developing the guidance systom.
‘The Douglas model 0-768 emerged looking
tke a slightly overgrown version of the F3D
‘Skyknight. twas alarge arraftcaryinga crew
‘of two side-by-side with a shoulder mounted
wing and two Pratt & Whitney TF30-P-2 non-
‘afterburning turbotan engines mounted in the
fuselage. The aircraft had a rather limited top
speed of Mach 0.8 and was optimized for
extended stand-off loiter capabilties. Six Eagle
rmissiles were carried under the wing three per
side, wth some illustrations showing two adai-
tional missiles under the fuselage. The Hughes
pulse-Doppler radar had extensive ant-clutter
‘and look-down capabilities and the fre-control
system could guide multiple missiles to inde
Pendent targets simultaneously. The radar was
based on the AN/ASG-1 set originally designed
{or the cancelled Air Force North American Avi:
ation XF-108 Rapier fighter interceptor. Amodi-
fied AWASG-1B later found its way into the
Lockheed YF-12A, which never entered pro:
‘duction, but provided some excelent data on
the capabilities ofthe radar.
The Bendix XAAMN-10 Eagle was 16 feet
Jong and weighed 1,288 pounds. A solid-pro-
ppellant rocket motor boosted the weapon to
‘Mach 40 and a sustainer motor provided a
range of 110 nm. The missile incorporated an
‘active pulse-Doppler seeker based on the unit
developed for the Air Force's Boeing M29
Bomarc SAM. The warhead could be nuclear
(or conventional. The nuclear warhead design
Was initiated in January 1960 when the Atomic
5 Energy Commission (AEC) started studying
the feasibilty of modifying the Mk 42 Mod 0
warhead for he Eagle. The military characteris-
‘ics were approved on 7th February 1961, but
shot, the entire Missileer project would be
cancelleg, and the warhead development effort
was officially terminated on 22nd June 1961
The one kloton W42 warhead was projected to
weigh 75 pounds and was approximately 14
inches in diameter.
The economic climate in 1960 saw a new
‘cost consciousness arise within the confines of
Congress and the Department of Defense.
Accordingly, greater versatity in terms of
capabilty began to etfect contract decisions,
and one of the frst major contracts to come
Uunder close scrutiny was the Douglas Mis-
silee. In December 1960, folowing months of
analysis, the Douglas contact was cancelled
by Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, maifly
bbecause the system's overall combat capabil-
ties were too limited. This was highlighted by
the fact the Missleer was considered unac
ceptable as a fighter escort for strike aircraft
(too slow) and was unable to detenditself once
Its missiles were expended (no gun, andlimited
‘maneuverabiliy). On 25th Apri 1961, the Eagle
missile and Hughes fre-control system were
also cancelled, effectively ending the FADF
development efor.
‘Atnough the original Bendicdeveloped
missile was canceled, the basic philosophy
behind the concept was sill considered sound,
In a strange and complicated maneuver to dis-
{guise what was happening, much of the engi-
neering and breadboard hardware was turned
‘over to Hughes Aircraft Company's Missile
Systems Group in a move to keep the program
alive under the auspices of acifferent contrac-
tor, Thus, during August 1962, Bencix stepped
out of the picture, and Hughes stepped in.
Hughes also continued to develop the fre-con-
trol system under the new designation
6
ANVAWG:9, with the Eagle missile rising from
the ashes as the AIN-54A Phoenix. Flight trals
‘of the XAIM-54A started in 1965, with the frst
fully uided fights occurring in 1968, Two Dou:
las A-3 Skywarriors and one F-1118 (BuNo
151973) were used from 1966 to 1971 for
Phoenixtesting.
‘But the Navy still wanted a Fleet Air Defense:
Fighter. Inthe spring of 1960, the Air Force had
issued Specific Operational Requirement
(SOR) 188 for a tactical ighter to replace the
Republic F-105 Thunderchief. The specifica
tion calad for an aircraft capable of Mach 1.2 at
sea level (1,000 mph), Mach 2.6 at alitude
(1.700 mph), and unrefueled fight from the US
to Europe, The new Secretary of Detense,
Robert McNamara, dected that he Air Force's
SOR-183 and Navy's FADF requrements be
merged into a single aircraft under the Tactical
Fighter, Experimental (TFX) nomenclature.
This was intended to savethe taxpayers several
hundred milion dollars in development costs,
with minimal operational impact of either ver:
sion of the aircraft. The savings were to come
‘rom a concept known as ‘commonality’ where
the two versions shaved a common airame
and powerplants, but had diferent avionics 10
perform ther diverse tasks, As is the case with
‘many innovative ideas, commonality was an
‘outstanding theory that was to prove impossi-
ble to implement with the then-current state-of:
the-art technology and methodologies.
By August 1961, the Secretary of the Navy
reporied that the compromise TFX conceptual
design could not meet the Navy's require:
iments. The Ait Force wanted a 75,000 pound
(ss weight aircrat, while cartier considera-
tions mandated a Navy version weighing less
that 50,000 pounds. An additional Navy
requirement, imposed because of cartier eleva
tor size constraints, was that overall length not
‘exceed 58 feet. The Navy aso wanted to retain,
the 48 inch diameter radar antenna developed
for the F6D-1, while the Air Force wanted a 38
Inch diameter nose. Sweeping aside several
very real technical considerations, MeNamara
solved the problem by decree: the Navy would
accept the 36 inch diameter antenna, and a
‘compromise 55,000 pound gross weight
(On 1st October 1961 an RP was released,
‘and six contractors; Boeing, General Dynam
ies, Lockheed, MeDonnell, North America,
‘and Republic responded. Alter a thorough
analysis, he Boeing and General Dynamics
proposals were selected for futher considera
tion, but three addtional rounds of competitive
studies stil dic not produce a design accept-
‘able to both the Air Force and Navy. A fourth
round was ordered, with McNamara unilaterally
deciding in favor of General Dynamics. This
decision is one of the most controversial ever
issued from the Pentagon. McNamara based
his decision not on cost ar performance (Boe-
ing won on both counts), but on ‘éommonality’
‘The Boeing proposal had airkames that shared
less than 50 percent oftheir wing, fuselage and
tall structures, and McNamara later comment-
ed". Boving isin effect proposing two differ.
entairplanes..”.
‘Above: Three of the General Dynamics /
Grumman F-1118 prototypes fine up. The short
nose ofthis version Is clearly evident. The cen
{or aircrafts loser tothe configuration that
was expected to enter production, with around:
ed on the tip ofthe vertical stabilizer
‘unetional IR sensor under the nose (the other
‘wo alreaft have dummy pods). The side-by-
side seating is evident by the open canopies on
the contr aireratt. Two Phoenix missiles were
tarred in the fuselage missile bay, and up
four more could be eared on pylons under the
‘wings. Although an amazingly eapable sireraft,
the F-111 was too heavy to suit the needs oft
Navy, and its development problems provided 3
Convenient excuse to cancel it in favor ofthe
soon-to-be F-14. Genera! Dynamics ‘Because ofthe size ofthe TFX program, aheav:
ily weighted preliminary evaluation recommen
dation had led tothe decision of both biddersto
team with another company. In the case of
General Dynamics, this partner was Grumman
Aerospace, alogieal choice since twas among
only @ handful of companies with variable
geometry expertise,
(On 7th Apri 1948 the Navy had ordered two
variable-geometry XF1OF-1 Jaguar prototypes,
wit the fist fying on 19th May 1952. A total ot
112 F10F-1s wereto be procured for use in the
Korean war, bt difficulties experienced during
the Jaguar’ fight test program resulted in the
termination of the production contract cn tt
Apr 1953, and in fact, the second prototype
was never completed. The 54.3 foot long ait
craf’s wings had a ful-lorward sweep of 19.5
and a fulkatt sweep of 52.5". Unike the Air
Force's Bell X5 experimental aircraft, the
Jaguar had been intended to be a production
fighter, and was fuly configured for an
ANJAPQ-41 airto-airradar, four 20mm cannon,
and two uncer-wing hard-points. Power forthe
Prototype was provided by a single Westing-
house J40-WE-6 turbojet developing 10,900
ounds-thrust in afterburner. The experience
gained by Grumman during this $30 milion
program was no doubt useful during the design
oftheF-111 and ater F-14
Grumman was to build the at fuselage and
landing gear oral F-111 variants, and as might
be expected, had been assigned to assemble
the Navy version. This latter aspect was to the
Navy's qeeat rele since they had litte exper:
fence working with General Dynamics. Grum:
‘man onthe other hand, had filed the market for
US Navy carter-based fighters ever since the
early 1930s. The FF, F2F, and FaF biplane
The abortive Grumman XFIOF-1 Jaguar fighter
of 1952. Only a single prototype was completed,
supplid much-needed experience about
ble-geometry wings, Gruniman Aerospace va
the day Miler Colston
What twas roaly all about. The Navy wanted
the Hughes AIM.54 Phoenix missile, Here an
{AIMS I mounted to tho wing pylon of 2
F-111B prototype. Testing during the F111
program validated the basic AN/AWG-9 and
[AM58 weapon system. Hughes Arca via the
wanes wesees at
Chapter Two
Grumman
Enters the Fray
fighters, the FAF Wilicat and FF Hellcat
‘monoplane fighters ofthe Second World War,
the postwar FBF Bearcat, and the jet-powered
FOF Panther and Cougar fighters had dominat-
fd the decks of Navy aircraft carriers for nearly
three decades,
However, by the mid-1950s, Grumman
seemed to be running dry and was beginning
to lose its edge over its competitors. In 1953,
the company’s Design 87, a single-seat fighter
powered by a single Pratt & Whitney J57 turbo-
Jat lostoutto the Vought FBU Crusader, Design
118, atwo-seat misglearmed interceptor pow.
red by a pai of General Electric 79 turbojet,
had initially boon ordered by the Navy as the
126-1, but was cancelled in 1955 in favor of
the McDonnell XFaH-1 Phantom Il, Even the
‘successful Design 98 (F11F Tiger) had its pro
duction career cut short in favor of more Cru:
saders. The F-111, even as an associate
Contractor, would ensure Grumman's contin
‘ued compettveness.
The extraordinary F-111 was, among many
cther things: the first operational aircraft to
Incorporate a variable-geometry wing: the fist
‘operational fighter to incorporate afterburning
turbotan engines: the frst operational aireratt to
Incorporate an encapsulated ejection system
the fist aircratt to incorporate a dedicated ter
rain following radar system: and the frst pera:
tional aircraft intentionally designed to fly at
‘supersonic speedsa sea level altitudes.
Because itwas.a technologieally precedent.
Setting program of unparalleled proportions,
the F-111 entered its fight test program with a
‘number of serious falings. Among the most
‘noteworthy were intake flow anomalies, higner
than estimated aerodynamic drag throughout
the performance envelope, premature wing
hinge fatigue problems, ficulties with the
encapsulated ejection system, and a very se
(us weight problem. The latter would, in fact,
prove to be the F-111's achiles' hee. It was
perhaps the single most important factor lead
ingto the Navy version's premature demise
The intial USAF version was the F-111A, with the Navy version designated F-1118. By
this time, the compromise $5,000 pound air
craft had grown to 63,500 pounds, and at the
time ofits first fight on 18th May 1985, the F-
1118 had @ staggering 70,000 pound gross
weight. There was considerable concer ifthe
‘decks of even the newer carriers could endure
the repeated lancings and the potential weight,
‘growin of the new aircrat. The F-1118 also
shared the engine and inlet problems encoun:
tered on the Air Force version, and trials soon
showed that the angle-ofattack and steeply:
sloping windshield gave unacceptable rolec:
tions during carr style landings.
In an attempt to solve the weight problem,
Grumman instituted a Weight Improvement
Program (WIP), whose effectiveness can be
Judged by the need for a subsequent Super
‘Weight improvement Program (SWIP) and then
{a Colossal Weight Improvement Program
(CWP). The SWIP managed to remove 3,000
8
pounds wit internal changas alone, but CWIP.
Fesorted to major surgery on the airrame in an
effort to recover an adcitional 5,000 pounds.
This let the aircraft ‘only’ 12,000 pounds over
the Navy's cxiginal 50,009 pound weight limit
Sensing that the problem-plagued F-111B
would never reach production, Grumman stat-
dan in-house study of possible replacements
under design leader Mike Pelehach. In October
1967, Grumman submited an unsolicited pro-
posal to the Navy for a totaly new airframe
‘wrapped around the F-1118's engines, avion-
ies, and weapons. The now airframe was opti
mized for the FADF role, but was capable of
Performing as an air-superiorty and fighter
escort as well. The design (203-60) was a twin
engined, singletall aircraft with a high-mount
edvatiabie-geometry wing
In order to evaluate Grumman's proposal,
Navy Fighter Study Group I was convened
between February and May 1968 to compare it
LTV also constructed a very detalled mockup of
thelr VEX proposal. A varoty of missile conigu-
rations wore possible as tlustrated by the pho-
{ogrephs at lot. This mockup had hinged
Canopies, and was frequently towed around the
field at NAS Dallas. LTV va ay Naber
‘against the F-111B. twas deemed superior in
many ways: the Grumman design had ten
times the rato of cimb at 40,000 fect; t acceler.
ated from Mach 0.8 to Mach 1.8 n one-third ot
the time (2 minutes versus 6); and it had over
{wioe the inital rate of turn. The study group
‘also agreed that the new design could perform
the ‘Other Fighter Role’ (.e.at-superionty and
fightor-escor) in a ar superior manner.
‘As aresponse tothe problems encountered
by the Navy on the F-111B, Congress can:
celled ell future funding for the development
‘and production ofthe Navy variant in May 1968,
‘On 18th June 1968, the Office ofthe Secretary
‘of Defense (OSD) approved Development Con:
tract Paper (OCP) 60, authorizing the release of
an RFP for a new Navy fighter under the VFX
designation, Five contractors, General Dynam
ies, Grumman, Ling Temeo Vought (LTV),
McDonnell, and North American received the
RFP on 2st June, followed by small study con-
tractson 17h July 1968.
‘The RFP spectfiac the new aircraft would
have: a two-man crew in tandem (as opposed
to the side-by-side seating ofthe F-111B); two
‘engines (for safety during landing); an
advanced weapons system consisting of a
Powerful radar (oy intent and default, the Hugh
‘98 AN/AWG-9); the ability to carry a varity of
high-performance, airto-air missiles (consist
ing of the AIM-7 Sparrow Il, AIM. Sidewinder,
and AIMS4 Phoenix); an internally mounted
General Electric M61A1 20mm rotary cannon
and the ability to land on a Hancock-class cari
cer with a full armament load and 4,000 pounds
of fuel. The new fighter was to be capable of
patroling 100-200 miles fromits carier ant
remain on station for up to two hours. A sec:
ondary close support role was aiso envisioned
for the aircratt, which was to be capable of ca
‘yng upto 14,500 pounds of bombs. Maximum
speed wastobe Mach 22 at alttude
‘The Navy established the source selection
‘evaluation criteria on 25th September 1968,
detaling how they would evaluate the contrac:
to's proposals. Al ve contractors submitted
their proposals on ist October 1963, and
received additional funding to sustain their
design teams unt 3rd February 1989, Four of
the fe contractors had elected to submit
design concepts based arcund variable-geom-
etry wings. The Source Evaluation Board fi
ished their evaluation ofthe proposals on 13th
December, and made their presentation o the
Source Selection Authority on 15th December.
‘The SSA concurred with the recommendation
toretain Grumman and McDonnell in competi
tion, and subsequently the other three con
tracts were cancelled on 17th December 1968, Grumman had studied something over
6,000 possible F-14 configurations trom the
Issuance of the RFP in June 1968 to the design
configuration freeze of January 1869, A wide
range of planforms were evaluated, some with
fxed wings, most with variable-geometry
wings. These possibilities resuited in eight spe-
cle designs being investigated in deta
Design 303-60: Finalized in January 1968,
this design had podded engines and a high
‘mounted variable-geometry wing. Since it was
developed early in the design cycle, it was
more an *... assemblage of reasonable goals.
"than a mature design. The design featured a
Single vertical tail, and chines on the nose form-
Ing into the tops of the engine air inlets, ala
F/Ac18. The wing, wing glove and horizontal
stablizers were, however, aiready showing a
remarkable resemblance to the eventual F-14
Design 303A: A minor nacelle change to
the 303-60, with few other significant changes,
Design 3038: This was a more refined ver-
sion of 303A, and was beginning to closely
Above: A ground attack rolo was envisioned for
the Tomeat as early as the VEX competition.
Here an artist's rendering shows the Design
{303 carrying twelve 500-pound bombs under
the fuselage. Gumman Aerospace
Fight Of intorost i this artist concept isthe
placoment of stores ~fual tanks are caried on
‘the wing pylons and Phoenix missiles are under
‘duction configuration Grumman heroapace
+ Tere seems to be some contusion ovr which
esign was realy 308C ana whch was 308.
{Grumman has released photos of modes that add to
‘he contuson, 28 oo pubiened nterdows wth Chuck
Sowol (Grumman che tet pt) and Miko Plehach
In ary event, the descriptions hare are accra, even
¥iney deserbe the dasige in an incorrect ode
resemble the eventual F-14, although stil witha
single vertical stabilizer.
Design 303C: This low-mounted variable
‘geomatry aircraft ciscarded the podded engine
‘configuration in favor of submerged engines,
‘more like the F-111. In an effort to avoid the
F-111's inlet problems, this design maintained
the highly swept intakes reminiscent of the
North American A-S (and later tho F-14, F15,
[MiG-25 and others). This was the fist study to
use twin vertical stabilizers, each canted out
board about 10 degrees. This design was
dropped for a variety of reasons, including
[poor subsonic longitudinal stability, poor sub-
sonic lit ue to drag, excessive cruise fuel con-
sumption, and reduced maximum afterburner
supersonicthrust.."
Design 3030: This design took most ofthe
fuselage, intakes and twintalls of the 303C, anc
incorporated them onto a high-wing variable
‘geomet planform.The 3080 proved inferiorio
the 3038 in supersonic combat cling and
installed fuel flow. Itwas also fl thet the 3038
‘Would allow for more growth potential, particu:
larly in the area of advanced engines because
ofits podded configuration
Design 3036: The winning design. This was
{direct evolution ofthe original 208-80 concept
bby way of the 3088. At this point the dosign stil
tutiized a single vertical tail and folding ventral
fins, along wit varable-geometty wings.
Design 203F: This was essentially the same
‘as the 203E, but incorporating a fixed wing and
‘win vertical tals. When compared tothe 903E,
this design was 4.295 pounds heavier, primar
ly because of the size (745 square feet) of the
fixed wing and double-sloted flaps necessary
to.produce the desired lit during carrer opera:
tions. The large wing area also degraded the
aicratt’slow-alttude performance,
Design 3036: Essentially a slightly scaled
down version of 3036, but substituting the
F-4J's AN/AWG-10 weapons control system for
the AN/AWG., Since i lacked Phoenix capa
billy was not pursued seriously, being used
for comparative analysis only The final revisions to the proposals were
submitted on Sth January 1969, with the award
‘going to Grumman Corporation of Long Istand,
New York, on 14tn January 1969. Grumman
actually submitted two proposals, the basic
\VPX-1 using the F-111's TF30 engines, and
VPX2 using the Advanced Technology Eng
ines (ATE) being developed jointly by the Navy
‘and Air Free forthe USAF F-X (F-18) fighter. A
Contract between the Navy and Grumman for
the design, construction, and fight testing of 12
F-14A development aircraft was signed on oro
February 1969, The contract also included the
first 26 production arcratt
‘One feature ofthe desiga thatthe Navy was
ot overly enthusiastic about was the single
vtical stabilize and folding vental fin empen-
rage. Aer contract award Grumman started
investigating the possibilty of substituting the
twin vertical stabiizers developed for the fixed
wing 303F as these effectively eliminated the
need for the large folding ventral fins and
‘allowed the use of smaller, fixe fins onthe bot
tom ofthe engine nacelles. This was sil some.
what of a compromise since the single vertical
stabilizer arrangement was slightly lighter and
offered better performance at high angles ot
attack, However, the single tail did present
deck handling problems and there were on
‘Cems over its ability to maintain crectional sta
billy in the event of an engine failure at
supersonic speeds.
Grumman constructed an extremely
detailed mock-up ofthe aireraft under the dec:
10
tion of Tony Stanziale. Called EMMA (Engineer
ing Mock-up and Manufacturing Al), it was
constructed out of sand-cast aluminum and
sheet metal as opposed to the moce normal
wood and plastic. Originally bul wih the single
tall and folding ventral fins, EMMA was later
rebuilt with twin tals and fixed vertrals, EMMA
‘was accurate enough to allow engineers to
‘check the mating and alignment of modular
sections and sub-assemblies. Bulkheads,
beams, hatches, and engine mountings ware
all faithfully reproduced, and EMMA was even
strong enough to witnstand TF30 fit-checks.
Wiring harnesses were installed, then removed
and used as master pattems for production
items. Another test article was built out of true:
tural steelfor ft checking the fight controls and
hydraulic systems, and a third was constructed
fortuel system teste
The F-111 had pioneered the concept of
vatiable-geometry wings, but several aircraft
had been lost early inthe program to faire of
the main load-carrying wing pivot. A product of
‘ariy-1960 technology, the F-111 used a bot
assembled wing pivot manufactured from
BAC stosl In order to ensure this did not hap.
pen on the F-14, Grumman designed a 22-eet
ong wing pivot box structure thal was vacuum
Welded togethor out of 33 separate pieces of
‘machined 6A1-4V titanium. The five 60,000-vat
electron beam welding machines that were
sed fo construct the wing box cost Grumman
‘more than $1 million each. The welds were
done in a vacuum to prevent atmospheric
{gases from contaminating the joint, which
Could possibly lead to cracking, When an F-14
structural test article was subjected to fatigue
testing it finaly failed at 2,760 hours in March
1971, almost four times its design life. In fa
the wing box rom the fist prototype was recov
ted intact ater its crash and used for several
years asates fidureat Cavern,
Wing sweep was designed to: be handled
‘automatically based on tight conditions, a sig
riticant improvement over the F-111's manual
system. Up to Mach 0.4 the maximum permis:
ble angle is 22 degrees, only two degrees more
than fully forward, while in the Mach 0.6-0.9 air
‘combat maneuvering range the wing is norma
ly postioned between 20° and 50. Fr air com:
bat maneuvering the slats are deployed to
‘approximately 7” and the flaps o 10° to give the
maximum turn rate. As with wing poston
deployment of the flaps and slats is accom
plished automatically by the fight control sys
tom, although there isalso.a manual capabilty
{An integrated trim system automaticaly offsats
pitch-tim changes caused by the deploy
‘mentietraction ofthe faps and sats,
‘A manual wing sweep-angle contol is also
fited, allowing the pilot to override the automat
ed program. The cockpit control maves for:
ward to sweep the wings forward, rearward to
sweep the wings back. The airratt computer
wil not allow the pilot to select a postion that
might exceed the aircraft's structural mits. The
original F-14 plans called forthe areraft to nave
{secondary ground attack role, and the wing poste page: The orignal Design 303E mockup
atfered trom the final configuration in sev
‘Amongst these were the placement of
the cannon on the forward fuselage (t project:
Into the radorve slighty); the canopy was 2
Single pleco (instead of two-pleeos with a
frame); there were no strakes on the upper
fuselage; and the verial stabilizers were
ped with pods for ECM equipment. Also
noteworthy s thatthe vontal fins were canted
Outboard, whereas production alreraft had tuly
vertical vortral fins. Although barely visible, he
ait fuselage on this mockup festured a single
ECM pod. Grumman Aerospace via the Jay Miler
‘Tis page, 199: EMMA #008 the light of day. Tis
mockup was extremely detalleg, and was mod!
fied continually as engineering changed, The
‘major eiferences between the contiguration
Shown and tho fest flyablo prototype was the
pds on the vertical stabilizer are sil not co
fect, and the wing glove vanes are obviously
‘terthoughts. Grimms Aaroepace via he ay
ler Coecton
‘Cee, oh Alleompartments were fully stutted
With avionics boxes, and the refueling probe
formed by a clear sheet of plexiglass, but had
the correct range of motion to allow fit checks.
‘Grumman Aerospace via the Jay Miler Colection
[ottom The area around the ME eannon Is sti
‘ot final, an Infact, this area changed soveral
times during the preduction run in an effort to
find the Bost cooling and venting for the com:
partment. Other differences from real F-145 are
that the IST pod is faired back a ile too
‘much, and the main landing gear are nt thick
fenough. Gruman Aerospace va te Jay Mer
Cateeion ‘sweep control selector has alwayshad a BOMB.
Position. When this mode is used, a fixed 55
{degree wing sweep posiionis selected so that
‘one variable (wing position) can be eliminates
‘rom the weapon release calculations. Intarest-
ingly, the F-14 had been in service fr almost 20
years betore anyone seriously considered
Using theaieratin analrto-groundrole,
During the last part of 1969, the F-14 ejec-
tion system underwent testing by the Navy and
Martin-Baker. Twerty-two fights tests of the
GRU-7A rocket-powered ejection seats were
cartied out using a Convair F-1068 Detta Dart
and Douglas A-3 Skywarrior over the Naval Air
Recovery Facility at E! Centro, California. In
early December 1969, an F-14 cockpit section
Containing all systems and components was
mounted on a rocket sled at the Naval
‘Weapons Center at China Lake for further ejec-
tiontests. Soveral wollintrumented seats wore
fired at speeds between 100 and 600 knots to
verity separation characteristics, clearing the
way forthe fist F-14 fight
Somewhat indicative of Grumman's cont
dence init ability to win the VFX contract was
the fact that it hed quietly begun to hand-buil
hardware for the first aircraft as early as lato
1968, Because ofthe resulting head:star, less
than a year transpired between contract aware
and the patilly completed first prototype
(BuNo 187980) being trucked from the Grum:
‘man factory at Bethpage tothe final assembly
area at Calverton. Al F-14's were ‘built at Beth
page, including most sub-system installation,
but were actually assembled and tested at
Calverton, Now York
‘Once at Galverton's Pant 7, the airoaft was
assembled and underwent ground vibration
12
tests, afuel function test, and final adjustments.
Taxi tests commenced on 14th December
1970, and were completed on the 2tst wen
Grumman chief test plot Robert Smythe and
projecttestpilot Wiliam Miler tookashort hop’
In the prototype just a half hour prior to sun-
down, afte waiting all aternoon forthe weather
to clea. With the wings locked forward and the
landing gear down, Smythe completed two cir
cuits ofthe pattern at 3,000 feet, then landed.
l, short as it was, had gone
The second fight, on 30th December, did
not areas well. Early in the fight a chase plane
observed smoke or fluid taling the aircraft. As
the chase piane came infor closer look, Miller
reported that the primary hydraulic system had
failed. The aircraft turned to head home, and
‘our miles from the Calverton runway the emer-
gency nitrogen bottle was used to blow down
the landing gear. At the same time the sec-
‘ondary hydraulic system failed, and the aircraft
automatically switched to the emergency sys-
tem, This isa minimal hydraulic system driven
by an electric pump and designed to power the
rudders and stabilators only. A mile ortwo later
this system also failed, an the aircratt pitched
into dive, crashing a mile from the end of the
runway. Both Smythe and Miler ejected suc-
cesstuly, and sustained only minor injures,
although the arcraftwas totaly destroyed,
‘The accident investigation showed that
pipes in both hydraulic systems had falled due
to harmonic fatigue. The cause of the failure
‘was rooted in some exotic technology that
Grumman had developed eave for NASA's
lunar lander. In order to save weight, ttanium.
hydraulic lines had been used inthe prototype,
land these were connected using innovative
bimetalic sleeves which were chiled in quid
helium before installation. As the sleeves
retuned to room temperature, they shrunk,
sealing the lines with a leakproot connection
What was not fully aporeciated was thatthe pip
Ing and connectors wore extremely sensitive to
how they were mounted on the airframe, both
Intorms of how they were attached to the fuse
lage structure, and in terms of the distance
‘between attachments. At eartain harmonic te
uencies the pipes simply fractured. As it
tumed out, one of those frequencies was
‘matched when an engine was idled in fight
and the second fight had tested single engine
performance with one engine icling. A switch
was made to more conventional aluminum tub
Ing and threaded connectors in the second
prototype and subsequent aircraft, along witha
reouting of some hydraulic lines to eliminate a
mirror image’ syndrome uncovered duting the
accidentinvestigation.
‘The loss of the prototype did not greatly
affect the fight test program, though the sec:
ond aircratt (BuNo 157981) did not become
Avaliable for fight test work unt is fist fight on
24th May 197. The prototypes and intial pro
duction units were powered by Pratt & Whitney
TF30-P-401 turbotans instead of the planned
‘TF90-P-412s, although the newer engines were
retrofttedinto most aicrat
“Two siatic test articles were also construct.
ed, and carried the Grumman shop numbers
+1 and .2. The frst ofthese was delivered for
testing in the fal of 1870, anc both test articles
were used to verily the expected design ie of
the airrame. Grumman designed and con:
structed a static test rig dubbed ‘colluseum’ to
simulate fight loads on the irrame. The loads
‘wore created by hycrauic jacks, and could test
the variable-geometry wing in all possible posi-
tions. The test program itself consisted of a
satis of loading tests on critical areas of the
aircraft structure, covering arange of load con
ditions under insight and caitier operations
equivalent to those that were expected to be
accumulated during the operational servic ite
Of the aircraft. total of 6,000 simulated fignt
hours were accumulated by June 1972 wih no
unexpected failures. Testing continued and
fone of the test articles accumulated several
‘itosmes' betoreitailed,
Let Two rare photos ofthe original F148
prototype (BuNo 157980) during its fst tost
fight nthe top phot, pil
‘dumping tuol (a vapor tral is visible at th rear
fof the alreat). Grumman Aerospace a he
Jay Mier Catecton
Cpposte page: Phoenix missile Writs were
carried out by he #11 prototype (top) and the
{#4 alrraft (pttom) at NAS Pt Mugu.
Hughes Aca via the Jay Miler Cotacton Flight Test
A total of 19 aircraft were assigned to the
F-148 fight test program, with each assigned a
Unique set of fght trials. The fst aircraft had
been intended for envelope expansion fights
{and high-speed testing, Since twas necessary
to conduct these tests early in the program, the
uncompleted twelfth airframe (BuNo 157991)
was completed in record time, renumbered
‘4X’ and assigned the tasks originally sched.
Uled for hei fated frst airraft
‘The second prototype was assigned to low:
speed, hight and stal/spintesting. As such, it
was modified to cay a 22oot stallpin para-
chute in a canister on top of the rear fuselage
which could be deployedtoaidin spin recovery
between 120-170 knots. ll tests were iitally
accomplished with the wings fly forward and
the air inlets locked fulLopen. Preliminary spin
investigations had used models at NASA's Lan-
lay Research Center wind tunnels, and had
shown a tendency forthe aircraft to enter tast,
flat spin. Engineers made some minor modi:
cations and follow-on tests were performed
Using 1/10th scale radio-contrlled models
{dropped from helicopters. These tests showed
thatthe aireraft was extremely spin resistant,
‘and easily recovered from an inadvertent spin
The fourth prototype (BuNo 157983) was
‘he fist to loave Grumman, being delivered to
Hughes at Pt Mugu in October 1971 for
weapons system integration. The ith and sith
aircraft also wont to Pt Mugu for various missile
and fre control system testing. The fith proto-
|ype (BuNo 157984), assigned to Pt Mugu for
‘armament tials, had the rather dubious honot
of shooting itself dawn on 20th June 1973. An
AIM-7E-2 Sparrow missile pitched up moments
ator boing launched, striking the aircraft,
although the crew managed to eject safely
The seventh aircrat (BuNo 157986) was
designated as an engine testbed.’ The original
plans called for the 68th and subsequent at-
craft to be completed as F-148s with the
acvanced F401 engine, but the Navy withdrew
rom this engine program in June 1971. The
aircraft initally flew wth two TF30s, but on
12th September 1973 made its frst fight with
one TF30 and one F401. After the F401 trials
the aircraft was put into storage, and was later
reactivated for use asthe F101 Derivative Fight
lerEngine (OFE) testbed, then as one ofthe ful:
scale development aircraft forthe F-14A(Plus)
and F-14D programs using F110 engines. The
aircraft has also been used to test various aero.
«dynamic modifications to the Toma, the most
recent being a dummy dual-chin pod intended
for use on the F-14D. This was theone and only
original’ F-148 alrcrat, although in 1992 the
Navy redesignated all F-14A(Plus)’ derivatives
88 F-148's, forever confusing historians.
The tenth prototype (BuNo 157989) was
used by Grumman for structural validation test
ing, then taken aboard USS Independence
(CVA-62) for catapult and arresting trials. On
30th June 1972 test pilot Bill Mile, who had
narrowly escaped death inthe crash ofthe fist
Prototype, was kiled when #10 struck the
water near Patuxent River. He had been prac:
ticing fora charity airshow scheduled for later
that week at Pax River. Iwas replaced on cart
er-compatiilty tests by the 17th prototype.
The 13th prototype (BuNo 153612) was
used for the electromagnetic testing in the
Grumman Calverton anechoic chamber. This
$3,500,000 facility allowed complex electro
‘magnetic compatbilty testing tobe performed
without worrying about interfering with public
communications, and without being spied
tupon by Soviet ravers operating ofthe coast.
The 75 x75 x0 foot chamber, atthe tie the
only one of its kind in the tree world, was lage
enough for an aircraft to be hung trom asing in
‘awheels-up configuration. The anechoic mate
fial was designed to handle extremely high
power, permitting operation ofall aircraft sys
tems simultaneously — including a full comple
ment of ECM jammers and high-powered
radars. While used primaniy as an electromag
‘etic compatibilty test facity, the chamber
also housed a bank of threat simulators which
were used torun functional system checks.
Early fight tests revealed a minor butfeting
when the flaps were lowered. Investigations
showed that turbulent aitfow through a gap
between the spollers and the wing flaps was
impinging on the horizontal stabilzers and
ccausing the problem. The correction was to
move the spoilers slightly further af, elimina
ing the gap. The only tly serious anomaly
encountered during fight test was an engine
intake buzz and a tendency for the TF30
engines to stall at high angles of attack. The
intake buzz was corrected by a partial
redesign, but the TF20 problems would contin
Ue to haunt the Tomcat, as they had the F-111
The Naval Preliminary Evaluation (NPE) was
split into three phases, with the frst completed
in late-1971, and the last in late-1972. By June
1972 carrer trials had been successtully com
pleted aboard the USS Forrestal (CVA-S9)
Board of Inspections and Survey (BIS) trials
took place during 1973, finaly being complet-
ed in October. The BIS trials were flown at Point
Mugu and Patuxent River using early produc
tion aircraft #13 through #20,
Forte purposes of tis work the F-14A() wl
be refered to a the F148 ence tas current
desenaton
13 Flight testing of the F-14 (as with the AS
before it) used Grumman's automated teleme:
try system (ATS). The aircraft lew in a corridor
(ofthe Alantic coastal ar-defense identification
zone (ADIZ) located off Long isang and around
100 miles in length. The ATS allowed aircrat
under test to send data directly to ground sta
tions which could analyze the data in real-time
Using the ATS, engineers were able to sit at
ground-based consoles and monitor the
progress of each test fight. If something of
interest happened, the engineers could ask the
pilot to deviate from the planned test profie to
‘get more data. Airborne telemetry was received
by aground station located at Terry Hil, about
three mile from the Calverton Plant 7. The use
fof ATS, along with extensive intght relueling
during test fights, is estimated to have saved
‘18months during the fight test program,
Ina, the following results were realized dur.
ing he F-14A's early fight test program:
* atop speed in excess of Mach 2.40,
+ flown to 90" angle-otattack without a
departure trom contrlles tight
+ capable ofsinkratesin excess of 24
ips without structural damage:
+ capable of +8.5gand-5.5 through
‘amajor portion ofthe fight envelope:
+ theabiity tofly 00m, operate in
‘maximum afterburner fortwo minutes,
then returto the pointoftekeot
+ the abiity tofly full at stick while inc
cating OKIAS, at 41° ADA: and,
+ theaircrattcould be safely landed with
the wings at 88° sweep (ullback).
(One problem which quickly became obvi
‘ous on the prototypes was a reflection off the
inside of the windscreen, An electrically con.
‘ductive coating on the inner layer ofthe wind
screen was used o heat and detost the glass
I the surface to which this conductive coating
‘was applied had been parallel to both outer
windscreen surfaces, the reflection problem
‘would probably have been insignificant. How.
ever, the inner coated surface was not parallel
to either ofthe outer surfaces, and the rays that
itrolected were not parallel othe rays from the
outer surfaces, thus resulting in the generation
of spurious images. The inner conductive coat-
ing was removed, and the spurious images
went away. A forced air defrosting system was
installec to keep the inner surtace frost ree.
Top: Theee carly (#2, #4, and #1X) prototypes
pose fora family pertralt. The darker painted
reas are bright re visibility markings
Gruman Aerospace via the Jy Miler Callecton
Center The #2 prototype ts Mustrative of the
bottom configuration of early are
Noteworthy ls the shapo ofthe roar contor use:
tage. rat & Wie via te Jay Miter Colecton
Botlom: The #14 alreratt (BuNo 158613) during
Carrier compatibilty testing Is representative of
‘the upper contiguration. Raber Lwson (Chapter Three
Program Scrutiny
as Production Begins
‘Congress began to take several long looks at
both the F-14 and F-15 programs duting 1971
with the goal of eliminating one of them to
save money. The airrat were compared
‘against each other and also against the Soviet
[MiG-25, Admiral Thomas Moore, Chef of Naval
Operations and General John P. McConnell,
Air Force Chiet of Staff, agroad to present a
Unified view to Congress that the two airratt
were designed for different missions (leet
defense versis airsuperioity). Nevertheless,
several alternatives to the F-14 and F-15 were
proposed, Including acceptance of one type
by both services, or limited procurement of
each, augmented by purchases of cheaper,
less capable, lightweight fighters. This eventu-
aly led to the dosign and fight testing of the
YF-161YF-17 prototypes, and the ultimate pro-
ccurement of the F-18 by the Air Force and the
F/A-18 (dorived trom the YF-17) by the Navy.
Grumman would have the distinction ot
receiving the ast large:
Defense. Fixed-price development contracts
were a legacy of the McNamara era, and were
the subject of great and heated debates with-
in Congress, the DoD, and the GAO. The
Grumman contract had been negotiated with
{an inflation factor of three percent per year,
but unfortunately the actual inflation rate great
ly exceeded this during the early 1970s. The
original contract had a fixed-price for the
F148 (BuNo op: Tepgun F-14A (BuNo 159607) In IRIAF
markings during 1992. The post-revolution
raring othe oar ule, th se
markings adorn this F-14A,
Noteworthy is
love vane area.
Lot This F148 earred an unusual palnt scheme
arrived at Pt Mug In lto 1998, tick Rot
Bonomi The same F-14 (BuNo 161432) as
arrived at Pt Mugu. Wes Rt
cht: An F-14A displays its
US Bicentennial with this F-14A (BuNo 159427),
Fetaas in 199. This one was painted In $u-27
markings. The Jay Wiles Caleeton ‘i cures of Dennis Rdenkns unless
‘therm noted
beekground
Len: Classe “Anytime, Baby.
Fight Logo for the Tomest dur
Ihr Fore Ftow'On morceptor FO)
competition.
vow: Even the machanies and
‘round crew had a loge,
Fight: The baste Temeat igo.
elo lt Dressed in Marine Blues,
this Is as close as a dedicated
USMC Tomeat would come.
Blow: Patch popular during
‘Desert Storm in 1991.
0 (Chapter Four
Operational Service
with the US Navy
In June 1972 the wost coast Fleet Readiness
Squadron, VF-124, at NAS Miramar received
their frst F-14A. The first two operational
squadrons, VF-1 Wolfpack and VF-2 Bounty
Hunters stood up on 14th October 1872. VF-1
became te first operational squadron to qual
ily the F-14A for daytime carrier operations in
March 1974. Almost two years after fist receiv-
ing their aircra, the two squadrons deployed
fon the F-14's first cruise aboard the USS
Enterprise (CVN-65). All carriers had to have
new jet blast deflectors installed before
deploying with the F-14, and this was accom
plished during routine overhaul periods.
The first operational east coast squadron
was VF-14 Tophatters, who together with
\VF-32 Swordsmen made their frst deployment
In June 1975 aboard USS John F. Kennedy
(CV87). Another Fleet Readiness Squadron,
VF-101, was established at NAS Oceana,
Viginia, in July 1977 to handle east coast
‘operations, effectively complementing VE-124
inthe west.
‘As compared with the best existing USN
fightors, the Tomcat offered a 21 percent
Increase in acceleration and sustained
force, 20 percent increase in rate of climb,
27 percent increase in maneuvering capability,
{and a 40 percent improvement in turing
radius. At @ high throtle setting, the F-14 can
hold a steady angle of attack of about 77
degrees. Maximum design speed of the
‘Tomcat is Mach 2.4, but the Navy sots a limit
‘of about Mach 2.25 for service aircrew. The air-
craft can execute an 180-degree 6.5.g turn of
1,800 feet radius in 10 seconds without loss of
‘speed. The F-14 can hold 65 g at Mach 2.2,
‘and can accelerate trom loiter to Mach 1.8 in
75 seconds. Armed with four Phoenix, two
Sparrows, two Sidewinders, and two external
‘uel tanks, the Tomcat can loter on combat air
patrol for 90 minutes 17 miles from the carri-
er, or for an hour at a range of 280 miles.
Tactical radius with the same load on a deck-
launched interception mission is 200 miles
with a Mach 1.3 flyout
‘In mid-1986, the Navy's plans called for 12
F-14 squadrons ~ 11 active and one reserve
through 2001, As the F/A-BE/F becomes
operational beginning in FYOt, the F-i4
squadrons will be retired. All 12 should be
gone by 2010. The first F-14 squadron wil be
replaced by single-seat F/A-18Es; all remain-
ing squadrons will be replaced by two-seat
F/A‘BFs. From 1877 to the present, 31
‘squadrons have operated the F-14, including
\VF-1 Wolfpack: The current VF-1 was com-
missioned at NAS Miramar on 14th October
1972, being one of two units organized on that
dato.to operate the soon-to-be F-18. The frst
Fd was accepted on 1st July 1973 and the
squadron was assigned to Cartier Air Wing 14
(CVW-14) on the same day. The squadron was
‘upto fll strength by March 1974 and made its
first deployment from September 1874 to May
1975 aboard USS Enterprise. F's from VF-1
‘and VF-2 supported the evacuation of Saigon
‘during operation Frequent Wind, although the
aircrah did not engage in combat. By the end
(of 1982, VF-1 had accumulated 17,000 acci-
entree fight hours, despite the F-14'srecur-
fing engine problems. With the docommis-
sioning of USS Rangar in 1983 the squadron
‘was left without a carrer assignment and oper-
ated out of NAS Miramar. At one point the
squadron was due to convert to the F140,
however, the lack of airframes and the Navy's,
decision to reduce the number of F-14
‘squadrons per carrer from two to one, caused
\VF-1 to be disestablished in October 1993
\VF-2 Bounty Hunters: The frst VF-2 exis
‘ed from 1st July 1922 until 1st January 1927
fying the Vought VE-7SF, Boeing FB-1, and
Curtiss F8C-+ aircraft, and had the distinction
of being the first carrier squadron deployed
aboard the first US carrier, the USS Langley
(CV). The squadron was disbanded and
recommissioned on the same day, and was
quite successful during WWI, finally being
disestablished on th November 1945. The
third VE-2 was organized at the same time as
VF-1, and received its fist Tomeat in July
‘op: F-14A (BuNo 160390) trom VF-41 In sub-
‘dued markings at Offutt AFB. George Cocke vie
‘he Jay Mor Calecton
Bottom: A VF-32 -14A (BuNo 160827).
[Noteworthy ls the Tomeatinsigna onthe tal.
‘The Jay Mile Colection|
“ 1979, VF-2 accompanied the Wolfpack aboard
the USS Entorpriso. The squadron became the
‘second operational squadron to deploy with
the TARPS reconnaissance pod in April 1962.
In February 1987 the squadron surpassed
20,400 hours and 5 years of mishap-tree oper.
ations. Like VF-1, when the USS Ranger was
