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Soviet Cold War Perceptions of Turkey and

Greece, 1945-58
A.A. Ulunian
Published online: 06 Sep 2010.

To cite this article: A.A. Ulunian (2003) Soviet Cold War Perceptions of Turkey and Greece, 1945-58, Cold War
History, 3:2, 35-52

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 32cwh02.qxd 12/12/2002 16:05 Page 35

Soviet Cold War Perceptions of

Turkey and Greece, 1945–58
A RT I O M A . U LU N I A N
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No problem of Cold War history has attracted such serious attention as the decision-
making process of the highest state bodies. The more traditional approaches in history
are applied to this delicate sphere the more puzzles a student of the subject meets. Even
though the USSR party and state apparatus were interlocked and the party nomenclature
was predominant over the state bodies, the role and place of particular party
organizations in Soviet foreign policy activity have been unjustifiably ignored. Until now,
there have been no special studies on the perceptions of the world international system
which existed inside the Central Committee of the CPSU. But they had very great
significance and served in some ways as the basic preferences of the party apparatus in
its analysis of the international situation, geostrategic system, political and ethnic events
in the world.

Although few issues in Cold War history have attracted more

attention than the decision-making processes of political leaders,
Russian historians have so far largely ignored the role of Soviet Party
organizations in the foreign policy process. The perceptions of the
world that existed inside the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) have rarely been seriously studied.
This is an unjustifiable error. In the USSR the party and state
apparatus were interlocked and the party nomenklatura in most cases
controlled the state bodies. Party views were thus of great
significance in the analysis of the international situation. The
formation of spatial-political images and foreign policy perceptions
inside the secretariats of the CPSU hence deserve special study by
those engaged in Cold War research.1 This article, which will analyze
Soviet policy in South-East Europe, and as such builds upon the
author’s earlier studies of the USSR’s Balkan policies, is intended to
generate more general interest in this often overlooked aspect of
Soviet foreign policy.

Artiom A. Ulunian, Russian Academy of Sciences

Cold War History, Vol.3, No.2 (January 2003), pp.35–52

PU B L I S H E D BY F RA N K C A S S , LO N D O N
 32cwh02.qxd 12/12/2002 16:05 Page 36

36 C O L D WA R H I S T O RY

Soviet Views of Turkey

Party influence over Soviet policy towards the Balkans was to reach
new heights in the immediate postwar era. Not only did victory over
Germany mean that the USSR was in a position to exercise
unprecedented influence over the area, but the party had also
acquired new means of shaping foreign policy during this period. A
systematic study therefore needs to analyze not only the spatial-
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political perceptions of world realities in the party but also the aims
and tasks of the party structures, the composition of its cadres, the
means by which the party was involved in the policy process, and the
sources and channels through which it received information.
In the mid-1940s, the Central Committee of the CPSU apparatus,
or, to be precise, its Foreign Policy Department (henceforth FPD),
openly demanded a greater share in the foreign policy activity of the
USSR and tried to go beyond its traditional role of fostering contacts
with foreign Communist parties and their leadership. By summer
1946 the FPD had expanded its activity and had demanded, albeit in
a timid manner, the right to receive information on foreign affairs
equal to that received by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mikhail
Suslov, who chaired the FPD, called on the Secretary of the CC
Andrei Zhdanov and complained that ‘currently the Foreign Policy
Department has a limited range of information about the political
situation in foreign countries. And what is more, members of the
Department do not have access to materials of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs’. This claim was accompanied by the demand that the
leadership of the Department be informed of the ‘decisions of the CC
of the CPSU on the USSR foreign policy concerning distinct countries
and distinct international problems’.2
The confrontation in the Balkan region was followed with great
attention by the Soviets in the immediate postwar years. South-East
Europe had traditionally been seen as an unstable region, often
characterized as ‘an unstable powder keg’, ‘a scene of fratricidal
skirmishes’, or ‘an area prone to disintegration’. In the postwar
period, the Balkans were furthermore seen as being divided into two
rival camps, with Greece and Turkey belonging the camp opposing
the USSR.
The image of Turkey emerging in the FPD was strongly shaped by
Soviet national interests. In the secret material of the American
Bureau for Military Information in Turkey, which had been obtained
by Soviet Ambassador in Ankara S. Vinogradov through secret
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S OV I E T C O L D WA R P E R C E P T I O N S 37

channels and sent immediately to the CPSU headquarters, it was

pointed out that ‘The tasks of German propaganda were eased
significantly after the Nazis invaded Russia. … The journal
“Çinaralti”3 was created soon after Germany attacked the USSR and
carried out propaganda in the name of the Turkic population of
Southern Russia, which in its opinion should unite “under chinara”’.4
The pro-German stance taken by Ankara and its rather dubious
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neutrality during World War II gave the Soviet leaders an opportunity

to act forcefully towards Turkey once the war had ended. Molotov’s
warnings and Soviet demands for a revision of the regulations
covering the Straits were among the steps undertaken by the USSR.
But such actions sprang from more than simply resentment at
Turkey’s wartime activities: as important were the ethno-territorial
threat to the USSR posed by the activities of the Pan-Turkist
movement5 and the geo-strategic concern about Soviet security in the
Black Sea – Mediterranean region. In these circumstances, the Soviet
image of Turkey became more and more centred on the potential
danger of conflict between the two countries. The information
obtained by FPD had an alarming tone and strengthened negative
views in the Central Committee apparatus like those contained in
secret notes addressed to the CC headquarters.
One of these reports stresses the urgency of the situation.
Propaganda is being spread among Turkish soldiers and officers
about war preparations against the USSR ... There are rumours
among soldiers and officers of impending war against Russia.
Officers insisted that Russia would have to try to capture the
Straits but that Turkey would defend them. Meanwhile they
realize that Turkey will not be able to defend the Straits on her
own and she will inevitably require assistance from other states.
Turkish circles regard Bulgaria as the principal enemy with
whom there will have to be conflict sooner or later ... The
majority of the Turkish soldiers are afraid of the future war and
want to avoid it ... Among the Turkish soldiers and population
rumours are spreading about the inevitability of war with the
USSR. Some officers point out that this war will be a holy one
for Turkey intend to regain territories captured earlier by
Bulgaria in Thrace and by the USSR in the Batumi region. There
are strong feelings that Britain will lend her support to Turkey.
While waiting for the impending Soviet attack, Turkey is
building defensive strongholds.6
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38 C O L D WA R H I S T O RY

Some Soviet observers of the Middle East did, however, believe

that the situation might soon improve. The analysis of the situation
by the Ministry of Defence, which was sent in the form of a note to
the CC of the CPSU, was one example of such optimism. It argued
that ‘there is much evidence that, as happened in Iran, the
strengthening and democratisation of the National Kurdish
movement both in Iran and the South-eastern regions of Turkey
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proceeds apace’.7 The reports received by the FPD drew special

attention to the domestic political situation in Turkey and to strained
relations between different political, social, and ethnic groups. The
latter also had a practical significance to the USSR as a multiethnic
state in which part of the population belonged to the Turkic linguistic
group. It was particularly the ethnic relations that were analyzed in
detail in some of the material received from Soviet military and
civilian officials.
One report, for instance, noted:
Turks living near Amarat do not like the Azeris, and suspect that
in case of difficulties the Azeris will betray them. The Azeris in
their turn do not like Turks and many of them dream of Russia,
except those rich ones who do business with the Turkish
authorities.
During the summer of 1945 Turkish troop concentrations
built up in the region of Igdir. … As a result, the wealthy
inhabitants of Amarat were saying that the Russians want to
seize those lands from Turkey and a number of prosperous
inhabitants of the region fled into interior regions of the
country, but the poor people stayed in their place and expressed
positive feelings about the possible arrival of the Russians
because ... the Turks are on better terms with the Kurds than
with the Azeris.8
Soviet views of developments in Turkey, as revealed by Central
Committee materials, also incorporated geostrategic assessments
alongside analysis based on social and class characteristics.
‘Juxtaposed as it is to the USSR and Balkan countries on the one hand
and Arab states and the Middle East on the other, Turkey occupies a
very important international place in the struggle of the imperialist
powers for domination and is important as a bridge-head for attacks
on the Soviet Union.’9
Nor did Soviet analysts ignore the territorial disputes between
Turkey and the USSR.
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S OV I E T C O L D WA R P E R C E P T I O N S 39

Another important question touching upon the interests of the

Turkish reactionaries was the return to Soviet Armenia of
Armenian lands forcibly captured by Turkey ... On November 1,
1945 at the opening session of Mejlis [the Turkish parliament]
President Ismet Inönü vehemently rejected the justifiable
demand of the Armenian people to return the Armenian vilayets
to Soviet Armenia ... The Turkish reactionary press has reacted
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nervously when discussing the Macedonian problem. They are

angry at the draft plan to establish an independent Macedonia
blames Bulgaria and the mutual rapprochement between the
Slavic peoples. … The Turkish press has tried to whip up
animosity between the Greeks and the Yugoslavs.10
The elements of a hostile image of Turkey present in these
analyses nonetheless coexisted with a distinct pragmatism about
possible future actions. One report from the assistant head of the CC
Information Department, for instance, advocated an extremely
cautious line: ‘in the current political circumstances in Turkey, I
consider it inexpedient to criticize the Democratic Party’s activity and
[suggest that we should] confine our broadcasts to unveiling the
reactionary politics of the People’s Republican Party, laying particular
emphasis on its ban on the participation of opposition parties in the
elections.’11
The ideological, strategic, and historical tension between the
Soviet Union and Turkey thus combined to produce in the Central
Committee an image of the USSR’s southern neighbour as a very
dangerous and unfriendly power. In its turn, the Soviet leadership
considered it necessary to use this image in the USSR and abroad. In
most areas of foreign policy, ‘ideological enlightening’ was a focus of
its special concern. This often took the form of lectures on socio-
political topics delivered at the Central Lecture Halls in Moscow.
These would often involve advisers to the Soviet foreign policy
organizations, normally representatives of the intelligentsia trusted
by the CC, or, more rarely, Central Committee employees. In
February 1946 the CPSU Politburo adopted a special secret
resolution called ‘About publishing the minutes of the public lectures
of the All-Soviet Lectures’ Bureau to the Committee on Advanced
Training of the Council of Ministers’. This called upon ‘the
Administration of propaganda and agitation of the CC of the CPSU
to organize the publication of the best lectures delivered in the
republics, regional and district centres and other big cities either in
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40 C O L D WA R H I S T O RY

the form of distinct publications or as articles in the central, republic

and regional press’.12 Although the decree did not specify any theme
or subject for the lectures, they were to be an instrument to shape ‘the
correct understanding of the situation’, including Soviet foreign
policy towards particular countries or regions.
By the second half of 1946 major elements of the Soviet image
of Turkey were the fruits of perceptions, which existed in the
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highest party body and corresponded to its guidelines. Their

dissemination was carried out by the party propaganda system in
the form of scholarly ‘enlightening’ lectures and reports and their
texts had been used in different forms in so-called inter-party
information materials, particularly in the secret bulletins of the
Information Bureau of the CPSU. On the top of the agenda at this
time were the problems of the Black Sea and the Dardenelles. This
reflected Soviet determination to secure equality with Turkey in
administering the Straits regime. Thus the image of Turkey was
determined by such characteristics as its advantageous geostrategic
position since it was a part both of the Balkans and the East
juxtaposed to Middle East. For all that, the main characteristic
feature in the perceptions of Turkey was the fact that it was both a
Black Sea and a Mediterranean power, which was very important
from the Soviet point of view. One public lecture noted:
The justifiable nature of proposals submitted by the Soviet
Government is proved by centuries-long historical experience
which had shown clearly how important it was for Black Sea
powers to guard access to the Straits. Joint defence of the Straits
by Russia and Turkey as had happened during the Napoleonic
wars fully corresponds to the interests of both states and would
provide real security for their Black Sea possessions.13
The Mediterranean aspect of this problem was viewed in the same
manner
The meaning of “the Mediterranean basin” goes far beyond the
Mediterranean Sea and includes as a indissoluble unity all seas
washing the shores of North Africa, South and South-East
Europe and western Asia (Middle East); in other words, not
only the Tyrrhenian Sea, the Black Sea (“a distant corner of the
Mediterranean sea” according to a precise characteristic given
by Marx and Engels) and the Sea of Azov. It therefore follows
that the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria and
Rumania are typical Mediterranean regions.14
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S OV I E T C O L D WA R P E R C E P T I O N S 41

The analysis of the disposition of forces in the Black

Sea–Mediterranean region was carried out according to an
ideological formula, which attached some importance to Turkey and
Greece. This noted that
the complexity of the current situation in the Mediterranean
basin is also determined by the presence of almost all the types
of political regimes and state systems that exist in the world: the
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Soviet Union (a great socialist power), the Peoples’ Democratic

Republics of South-East Europe, the bourgeois-democratic
republics of Italy and France, the reactionary regimes of Turkey
and Greece, the clearly fascist regime in Franco’s Spain.15
By early 1947 the image of Turkey in the CC apparatus of the
CPSU had taken on a distinctive combination of features. The
country was viewed as a predominately unfriendly power which
sought to weaken its northern neighbour; which still occupied part of
the territory of the Soviet republics; which used its advantageous
geographical position for purposes hostile to the USSR, and which
deliberately opposed the USSR in the Black Sea–Mediterranean
region, thereby fulfilling its mission as a geostrategic bridgehead for
the Western powers against the USSR in the case of a possible military
political conflict. Politically, it was seen as a state with a reactionary
regime, which tried to adapt itself to the new postwar reality by
allowing a multiparty system but preserving control over the
situation, while allying itself with the main imperialist countries. In
the field of interethnic relations, Turkey was viewed as a state in
which the pan-Turkist ideology was supported and where national
minorities faced a choice between assimilation and annihilation. The
principal aspects of this assessment remained fairly constant up until
1955, although they were intensified by the promulgation of the
Truman doctrine, the start of the Marshall Plan (and therefore
provision of sizeable US aid to Turkey), and Turkey’s entry into
NATO in 1952. The analytical assessments of the situation were
produced both in secret interparty documents of the Central
Committee and in publicly available materials rather in the same
style. Information received from different Soviet institutions focused
the attention of its ‘consumers’ on the clearly negative aspects of the
Turkish regime, such as ‘anti-Soviet propaganda in Turkey’; ‘plans to
create an anti-Soviet Eastern bloc’, which Turkey was believed to
foster; tension on the shared USSR/Turkish border and more
generally an ‘unfriendly policy toward the Soviet Union’.16 The
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42 C O L D WA R H I S T O RY

internal situation was said to be characterized by high-level conflict,

which in turn reflected Turkey’s political and economic crisis and its
high level of dependence on American political and military
backing.17 And Soviet analysis was further shaped by the evolving
international and regional context. By the spring of 1947, even
public CC materials, aimed primarily at a global audience and
designed to be reproduced in the Soviet Press under the symbolic by-
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lines of ‘Anatoliyev’ (the Anatolian) and ‘Anatoliyskiy’ (of Anatolia),

were brutally frank about the regional implications of the emerging
US Cold War policy:
Several weeks before Truman offered “help” to Greece and
Turkey the Turkish official mouthpiece, the newspaper “Ulus”,
had come up with an offer to establish a so-called “security
zone” which would have stretched from Iran through Turkey
and the Balkans to Central Europe. The meaning of this offer is
absolutely clear. It was intended to revive the idea of an anti-
Soviet “cordon sanitaire”.18
In the analytical reports from the leading cadres of the CC apparatus
to the members of the Political Bureau responsible for ‘foreign affairs
direction’, these statements were not only reiterated but also
intensified.19
The Soviet image of Turkey was also strongly influenced by ethnic
and religious factors, and in particular by the existence of a sizeable
Turkic–Islamic population within the USSR – a group that was
considered by the party apparatus to be a permanent threat to
national unity. A note addressed to the party and state leadership of
the USSR made this abundantly clear, explaining that the Altay
nationalist ‘term “oyrot” or “oyrat” became a synonym of national
oppression to the peoples of Altay. Meanwhile this term was a slogan
of the feudal Turkic nobility looking for superiority over the Altay
peoples’.20 Soviet sensitivity about the ‘Turkic theme’ can be further
seen from a question addressed to the CC of the CPSU by Tajikistan
First Secretary B. Gafurov, who wrote to A. Zhdanov, a member of
the Politburo. Gafurov noted:
Certainly, you know better then I do, that Pan-Turkist
propaganda now claims that all the peoples in Central Asia are
Turks. In addition, the Pan-Turkists regard even the Tajiks as
Turks despite the fact that they don’t speak a Turkic language.
Therefore I consider the theory which [head of the Academy of
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S OV I E T C O L D WA R P E R C E P T I O N S 43

Sciences’ Institute of Anthropology and Ethnography Prof. S.P]

Tolstov preaches to be extremely harmful to us and all Prof.
Tolstov’s guidelines to be of assistance to the Pan-Turkists. At
the same time I think that every statement concerning the pure
Turkish origin of peoples in Central Asia only helps our enemies
and this is awaited by the Pan-Turkists who are currently the
most dangerous enemies of the USSR in the East.21
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By 1955, Soviet views of Turkey had solidified. They became part

of the ideological approach of the CPSU CC apparatus – with a
content roughly as follows: the military-strategic situation of Turkey
determined its foreign policy; the socio-political system determined its
alliances; the ethno-territorial approach determined the inter-ethnic
kinship of the Turkic people and its role in the propaganda both of the
Turkish state of Turkic peoples within the USSR. A special role was
attached to historical analogies and to observations about past
Russian–Turkish or Soviet–Turkish relations. The meaning of these
‘constructions’ was clearly demonstrated in the ‘socio-enlightening’
materials prepared by the Soviet historians on Turkey and approved in
the apparatus of the CPSU for large-scale publication. The
propaganda activity of the party organs during the Cold War period
also included this sort of ‘work with the masses’.22 Different
explanations of the elements of the image did not affect the whole
picture. As far as the pan-Turkist element was concerned, it played the
role of general background.23 At the same time, the definition of pan-
Turkism has been defied by party ideologists and propagandists on the
basis of historical analogies.24 Despite the negative official Soviet
attitude toward Turkey’s role, the Soviet Party and state leadership did
not want to lose all opportunity for Soviet influence in that country.
In connection with this, in September 1950 the Political Bureau of the
CC of the CPSU adopted a special secret decision, which stated, ‘it is
purposeless to revoke the Soviet–Turkish trade and payments
agreement’.25
A major transformation of the perceptions of Turkey held by the
CPSU apparatus started from the mid-1950s, determined to a great
extent by the end of the Stalinist era and the beginning of the so-
called Khrushchev thaw. The new Soviet leadership was increasingly
interested in the colonized peoples of Africa and Asia, considering
them vital potential allies in the bipolar confrontation.
Soviet–Turkish relations were no exception to the general departure
from the Stalinist heritage in foreign relations. The new approach
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44 C O L D WA R H I S T O RY

became apparent from Khrushchev’s comments about Turkey at the

sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in December 1955: ‘It is
known when Kemal Atatürk and Ísmet Ínönü were at the top of the
Turkish leadership we had very good relations but later on they
deteriorated. We cannot say that this happened only because of
Turkey; there were inappropriate statements made on our side which
weakened these relations.’
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In the late 1950s, the Soviet struggle to establish its influence in

the Third World periphery that surrounded the Soviet Union became
more acute. The fact that the Soviet Union was not only a European
but also an Asian country gave Moscow an opportunity to counteract
former European colonial powers in their overseas domains and to
represent them, particularly in dialogue with the newly established
states, as ‘outsiders’.26 Meanwhile, the image of non-European
countries held by the Soviets became heavily influenced by the degree
to which each country was dependent on the Great Powers – the
United States above all, but also Britain and France. Soviet specialists
who were close to the apparatus of the CPSU and who occupied posts
in both scientific and party institutions formulated the image of Asia
and behaviour of the powers opposing the USSR powers as follows:
In US political publications, according to the demands of the
monopolist bourgeoisie, there are reflected conceptions
formally opposite to each other but naturally the same, which
give assessments of the perspectives in the development of Asia.
One of them consists of the statement that the process of
liberation and development of the national sovereign states is
supposedly possible only on the bourgeois-nationalist basis ...
The bourgeois-nationalist ideology of new sovereign states
provides their unconditionally negative attitude toward old
colonial powers, the USA’s rivals, such as Britain, France, The
Netherlands etc. In the meantime their bourgeois-nationalist
nature provides immunity against socialism and “pro-
Communist influence”. By this the United States gets a chance
to establish closer relations with the new sovereign states of Asia
and Africa since the latter will be looking for support from
outside which corresponds to their ideological tendencies.27
In the new international situation, and especially after the
suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956, the Soviet party and
state leadership was inclined to look for new ideological and
theoretical theses which could provide the USSR and its foreign
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S OV I E T C O L D WA R P E R C E P T I O N S 45

activity and domestic politics with guidelines applicable to the new

conditions but, of course, without breaking from Marxist-Leninist
dogmas in general.28

The Soviet View of Greece

The image of Greece in the CPSU apparatus also passed through a
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long process of development. Like that of Turkey, it centred on the

geostrategic position of the country, its domestic sociopolitical
developments, and its possible place and role in Soviet foreign policy.
All of this varied significantly on the basis of the situation in Greece
itself. The civil war (1946–49), in which the local Communist Party
stubbornly resisted surrender to a central government supported by
the major Western powers, was a key military-political conflict for
the Soviet Union. The struggle of the Greek Communist Party was
supported by regional Balkan forces, including its Yugoslav and
Bulgarian neighbours – where the Communists were ever more
powerful – and the USSR. The causes and the origin of the civil war
were crucial contributions to the CC world-view, in the way they
were understood in Moscow. The CPSU attempted to disseminate
this Soviet reading of events amongst a wider public, both in the
USSR and abroad. It consisted of a distinct set of the theses
interlinked with each other by an ideologically defined line of
premises and consequences. It was stated that:
Trying to save themselves from the persecutions of the police
and armed gangs of the monarcho-fascists, thousands of Greeks
left their native towns and countries and fled to the mountains.
The government called them bandits and started to send
punitive expeditions against them. Thus in summer 1946 the
guerrilla movement was re-established. Nearly the whole Greek
police and gendarme forces were ordered to fight these
detachments in Northern Greece and even in Athens. The
Greek people are fighting for a democratic and independent
Greece.29
Through interparty information channels and first of all by the use of
a special secret Bulletin of the Bureau of the Information, this version
was ‘strengthened’ and enlarged. In the Bulletin, it was pointed out
that
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46 C O L D WA R H I S T O RY

Greek monarcho-fascist reaction supported by the British

Government started in the early June 1946 an armed offensive
against the democratic forces in the country ... The main
activity of the guerrillas is carried out in the regions, which
formed the territory of “Free Greece” during the two-years of
Italian and German occupation, where peoples’ power had
existed. This is why the population of these regions opposes the
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monarcho-fascists and their regime of terror and violence so

strongly.30
In the autumn of 1947, while the guerrilla fighting under the
guidance of the local Communist Party was in progress, the CC of the
CPSU came to a decision to picture the struggle as a people’s war
without stressing the Greek Communist Party’s plans to capture
political power. The interparty Bulletin stated that the command of
the insurgents had defined ‘the primary task of the Democratic Army
... to [be to] establish main compact regions of liberated territory’,31
which could then serve as the territorial and legal basis for a guerrilla
administration on the spot and could later be transformed into the
insurgents’ government.32
The civil war in Greece determined CPSU CC images of the
country and its assessments of the role and place of Greece in Soviet
policy. The main elements of the image of Greece included its
domestic situation, its geographical position in the Balkan-
Mediterranean region, its relationships with neighbouring countries
where Communist regimes had been established, and the character of
its relations with Great Powers (primarily the USA and Britain).
These ‘codes’ evolved in a similar direction to those relating to
Turkey. Thus, in 1946 the tone of narration was rather moderate and
the main focus of attention was the geographical, ethnic, and political
character of Greece, albeit with a subtext of criticism of relations
between the Greek authorities and national minorities (the Albanians
and the Macedonians were of principal concern to the Soviets).33 But
as the domestic conflict was enlarged, the perception of the country
in the CPSU apparatus changed. The role and content of the
territorial problems between Greece and its neighbours came to be
seen as part and parcel of the wider dispute about borders of those
states where Communist regimes had been established. Thus the
following became Soviet priorities, with the last assuming particular
importance: (1) Trieste and Giulian Kraina, which were seen as
constituting the heart of the Yugoslav–Italian territorial dispute; (2)
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S OV I E T C O L D WA R P E R C E P T I O N S 47

the CC began referring to the ‘justifiable demand of Bulgaria to be

given an outlet to the Aegean Sea’ (from Greek territory); (3) and the
need for the Montreaux agreement on the Straits to be adapted to
‘post-war realities’.34
The negative perception of Greece was greatly strengthened in
1948–49, when Soviet propagandists openly began referring to the
Provisional Peoples’ Democratic Government of Free Greece on
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the territory controlled by the Democratic Army of Greece ...

The establishment of a true national government by the Greek
patriotic citizens who fight for the independence of their
Motherland convincingly demonstrates the new upsurge of
national liberation struggle of the peoples of Greece. This event
manifests also the failure of further attempts made by the British
and American invaders to strangle the peoples’ liberation
struggle and to convert Greece into a military strategic
bridgehead of Anglo-American imperialism in the Balkans.35
The sociopolitical component of such analyses was closely related
to a geostrategic assessment of the place and role of Greece in the
region. In this connection it was stated that ‘the imperialists of the
USA planned to convert Greece into a base for American imperialism
in the Balkans. Alongside its seizure of power in Greece, the
Americans were also getting their hands on Turkey. A distinct role has
been attached to these countries because of their proximity to the
borders of the Soviet Union ... the conversion of [Greece] into an
American military bridgehead and base of political intrigues against
Peoples’ democratic regimes’.36 Soviet analysts drew special attention
to the Greek role in the whole system of international connections
and mutual relations created by the United States. This system was
seen as alarming by the USSR, and increasingly shaped the so-called
permanent military and political threat which Greece represented to
the Soviet Union and to the nascent Eastern Bloc. The importance of
Greece sprang from its position ‘on the crossroads’; its predominant
place ‘in the Eastern part of the Mediterranean’; its role as a
‘stronghold of the imperialist pressure’ on Turkey, Egypt, and Middle
East countries; its potential as ‘the door into the Balkans and,
together with Turkey, the gates into the Black Sea’.37
The domestic situation in Greece was described as a ‘regime of
monarcho-fascist dictatorship’ or a ‘threat to peace and security in the
Balkans and in whole Europe’.38 The ongoing discussions about the
‘Greek cause’ in the Security Council of the UN revealed the Soviet
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48 C O L D WA R H I S T O RY

emphasis on the regional geopolitical component. The Soviet Union

claimed that ‘the Balkan question is a question of the domestic
situation in Greece and its relations with the northern neighbours’. At
the same time, there were attempts to prove that a strong connection
existed between the evolution of the situation inside Greece and the
stability of the whole Balkan region, including Turkey.39 The
explanation of the events in Greece was thus part of a more general
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pattern of Soviet analytical forecasts and was formulated as follows:

‘The American imperialists establish military bases in the Middle East
and strongholds in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, converting these countries into
their satellites and trying to ensure that the Turks, Persians, Arabs
would fight for the incomes of the US monopolists. [The American
plan] is to convert the countries of South-East and Central Europe
into bridgeheads for aggression.’40
The defeat of the Communist insurgents in autumn 1949 forced
the Soviets to retune their official propaganda, although from time to
time Moscow used rather harsh language when it was necessary to
show its discontent. In the early 1950s new features developed. This
time great emphasis was placed on the Greek regime’s total
dependence on foreign (and primarily American) support; on its
domestic instability stemming from rivalry between groups linked to
the USA and Britain; and on the significance of the peace movement.
Interestingly, these views were entirely shaped by the CPSU’s own
reading of the Greek situation. No scope was allowed for input from
allies such as the Communist Party of Greece (CPG) or the new legal
party called the United Democratic Left (EDA), which had been
established with the direct participation of the Greek Communists.
The new features in the approach to the ‘Greek problem’ after
Stalin’s death are apparent in one CPSU party document which
included a review of the broadcasts carried out by the illegal CPG
radio station ‘Free Greece’, which operated out of Romania and
which received extensive Soviet technical and financial support.
‘Commenting on the aggressive military pact between
Athens–Belgrade–Ankara [the Balkan pact) the radio station stated on
February 26 that “the feverish hurry of the American and local
bandits produces concern among mass population who are acutely
aware of the threat of war.” We consider this statement incorrect.
Such statements disseminate military psychosis and military
hysteria.’41 This time direct CPG propaganda aroused the concern of
the representative of the CPSU apparatus since it did not correspond
to new winds in the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR. These
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S OV I E T C O L D WA R P E R C E P T I O N S 49

were linked to changes in the Soviet leadership. The whole of Soviet

foreign policy came under serious study by the new rulers. This
reassessment had a direct effect on the assessment of Greece. First of
all, this was demonstrated in geostrategic pragmatism and the
obvious desire to lure some countries belonging to the opposing
military and political bloc away from the influence of the United
States. Greece was identified by the Soviet Party leadership as a
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particularly promising target for such an attempt. As a result, an

approach towards Greece was developed which combined appeals to
Greek nationalism and to Greek instincts of self-preservation. This
behaviour was demonstrated in the official letter of the formal leader
of the Soviet government, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of
the USSR N. Bulganin to the Greek Prime Minister K. Karamanlis on
14 December 1957, when he wrote:
Several states of Western Europe are involved in an exclusive
military group and a country which is thousands of miles away
from Europe establishes in the European and other countries a
network of bases designed to carry out nuclear war. In all these
measures, as is known, a significant place is attached to your
country ... The NATO leadership’s intentions to convert Greece
into an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” may lead to the situation
when under the conditions of war the success of such plans in
relation to Greece would make it a military bridgehead for this
groups of states and convert it into a battlefield.42
This message was reinforced in January 1958 when Bulganin
delivered to Karamanlis a second letter very much along the same
lines.43
The changes on the broader international scene did not solve the
problems of the bipolar world in the post-Stalinist era and even if the
Cold War perceptions of Turkey and Greece inside the CPSU
apparatus attained new features in the late 1950s and early 1960s
they never changed their general meaning.
The postwar decade was a period of intensified military and
political conflicts with direct or indirect participation of former
Allies. Their interests had diverged, leading to the creation of new
zones of influence and hastening the solification of new military and
political blocs. The Soviet party-state leadership understood this
situation both in geopolitical terms and with constant references to
their ideological vision. A study of how the perceptions of Greece
and Turkey developed during these years show how the Central
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50 C O L D WA R H I S T O RY

Committee apparatus methodically and deliberately interlinked these

two approaches. The USSR’s political purposes were determined by
the ideological essence of the Soviet regime, but at the same time a
key part of the vocabulary needed to be heard within the Soviet
leadership was connected to state interests. Nowhere is this shown
better than in the documents of the Central Committee Foreign
Policy Department and its successors. The CPSU apparatus tried to
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view the international situation in terms of state interests and on the

basis of an ideological approach that was firmly held to be the only
scientific view of foreign affairs available. Both the Greek and
Turkish examples, however, ultimately demonstrate the serious
contradictions that could occur between geo-political and ideological
interpretations in forming a functional view of diplomatic practice.

NOTES

1. About institutional significances of spatial images see R. Colledge, Decision Making

and Spatial Behavior: A Geographic Perspective (New York, 1996).
2. See A. Ulunian, The Communist Party of Greece (Moscow, 1994), p.178.
3. Literally read as ‘Under Chinara’, meaning coming together under the typical plant
popular among Turkic peoples. The publication was organized by the pan-Turkists.
4. German propaganda in Turkey. Russian State Archive of Social and Political History
(henceforth: RGASPI). Fond (f.) 17, Inventory (i.) 128, File (f.)9, List (l.) 23.
5. About this aspect of Soviet–Turkish relations see J.M. Landau, Pan-Turkism in Turkey.
A Study in Irredentism (Hamden, 1981); L. Bezanis, ‘Soviet Muslim Emigrés in the
Republic of Turkey’, Central Asian Survey, 13/1 (1994).
6. Report by Acting Chief of the 7th Department of the Main Political Administration of
the Red Army I. Braginsky to the CC of the CPSU, 1 Aug. 1945. RGASPI. f.17. i.128.
f.44. l.93, 94.
7. Report by the Political Administration of the Transcaucasian Front to the CC of the
CPSU, 12 Oct. 1945. RGASPI. f.17, i.128, f.44, l.79.
8. Minutes of the political interrogation of the refugee from Turkey Sevendik Rustam
Temir-ogli, 12 March 1946. RGASPI. f.17, i.128, f.390, l.23, 25.
9. On the domestic situation in Turkey. Bulletin of the Bureau of the Information of the
CC of the CPSU. Questions of Foreign Policy. N 8(32). 15 April 1946, p.14.
10. Ibid., pp.14, 15, 16, 17.
11. Note by Shamsutdinov to the assistant head of the Information Department of the CC
of the CPSU A. Panyushkin on 23 May 1946 on the letter by Comrade Marat.
RGASPI. f.17, i.128, f.178, l.40, 41. The alias ‘Comrade Marat’ (or, in full, it sounds
as Bostanci Marat) pertained to one of the leading cadres of the CC of the Communist
party of Turkey Ismail Bilen, who worked a broadcaster and editor of Soviet
broadcasts. He had proposed active propaganda against both the main Turkish parties.
12. Record of the Politburo meeting of the CC of the CPSU N49, 2 Feb. 1946. RGASPI.
f.17, i.3, f.1056, l.13.
13. K.V. Bazilevich, ‘On the Black Sea Straits (From History of the Question)’, minutes of
a public lecture, 18 Oct. 1946, Moscow, p.28 (in Russian).
14. I.I. Yermashev, ‘The Mediterranean Problem’, minutes of a public lecture, 16 Aug.
1946, Moscow, p.3 (in Russian).
15. Ibid., p.4.
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S OV I E T C O L D WA R P E R C E P T I O N S 51

16. Report on activity of All-Soviet Society for Cultural Relations with Turkey (1946).
RGASPI. f.17, i.128, f.91, l.43.
17. ‘Review of the situation in Turkey. On the influence of decisions of the Warsaw
meeting of the representatives of nine Communist parties ... (Information and
analytical material of the CC of the CPSU’. RGASPI. f.575, i.1, f.6, l.53.
18. A. Anatoliyev, ‘Letter from Ankara’, Izvestiya, 6 May 1947.
19. Turkey (note), L. Baranov to A. Zhdanov, 19 Sept. 1947. RGASPI. f.575, i.1, f.36, l.2,
9.
20. G. Alexandrov to A. Zhdanov, 12 Feb. 1947. RGASPI. f.17, i.125, f.552, l.1. Oyrat
was the term the Altay nationalist movement had used for their ideal state since the
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late 19th century; the term was banned by Stalin in 1947.

21. B. Gafurov to A. Zhdanov, 14 April 1947. RGASPI. f.17, i.125, f.552, l.57.
22. B. Dantsig, Turkey. Political Geography (Military Publishing House of the Ministry of
Armed Forces of the USSR, 1949), pp.295, 296, 299, 304 (in Russian).
23. See for example L.N. Ryn’kov, ‘Revealing of the Pan-Turkist Essence of Current
Turkish Linguistics (Ph.D. thesis, 1951); F.K. Kamalov, ‘History of Evolution and
Development of the Uzbek National Language’, Questions of Studies in the Languages
of the Peoples of Central Asia and Khazakhstan in Light of the Stalin’ Teachings on
Language (Tashkent, 1952); A.H. Babakhodzhaev, ‘Pan-Turkism is a Tool of
Ideological Subversion’, in Works of the Institute of Oriental Studies. Series II
(Tashkent, 1954) (All in Russian).
24. N.M. Lavrov, ‘Turkey in 1939–1951’, Lectures delivered at the Higher Party School
to the CC of the CPSU (1952), pp.6, 20 (in Russian)
25. Record of the Politburo meeting on 29 Sept. 1950. RGASPI. f.17, i.3, f.1085, l.24.
26. Note by Academician M.P. Gerasimov and Candidate of Sciences (Geography) M.E.
Liyakhov to the CC of the CPSU on 22 Feb. 1956. Centre for Storage of
Contemporary Documents (henceforth TsKhSD). f.5, i.35, f.22, l.32, 33. A copy of
the document was sent by the CC of the CPSU to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
27. E. Zhukov, ‘The Colonialist Policy of the USA in Asia’, in Questions of the Foreign
Policy of the USSR and Current International Relations (1958), p.195.
28. This was particularly visible in the preparatory work on the new party programme
and reform plans of the Otto Kuusinen team.
29. Report on VOKS activity in Greece in 1946. RGASPI. f.17, i.128, f.88, l.83.
30. ‘On the Events in Greece’, Bulletin of the Information Bureau of the CC of the CPSU.
Questions of Foreign Policy, 3/50 (1 Feb. 1947), pp.15, 17 (in Russian).
31. ‘On the Third Plenum of the Communist Party of Greece’, in Bulletin of the
Information Bureau of the CC of the CPSU. Questions of Foreign Policy, 22/69 (15
Nov. 1947), p.17.
32. The establishment of their own government was a long-time plan of the CPG
leadership, dating back to the period of National resistance during the Nazi
occupation. The civil war only made this plan more obvious and legitimized it.
33. R. Razumova, Greece. Political Map of the World. A Manual to Help Tutors in the
School of Party Activists in the Division (Military Publishing House of the Armed
Forces of the USSR, 1946) (in Russian).
34. I.I. Yermashev, ‘The Mediterranean Problem’, minutes of a public lecture, 16 Aug.
1946, Moscow, 1946, p.24.
35. N.I. Bragin, ‘The Fight of the Greek People for Freedom and Independence’, minutes
of a public lecture, 15 May 1948, p.24 (in Russian).
36. Ibid., p.9.
37. N.S. Shmelyov, ‘What Is the Obstacle to Solve the Greek Problem?’ minutes of a
public lecture, Moscow, 1949, p.7 (in Russian).
38. Ibid., pp.3, 4.
39. Speech made by the Soviet representative A. Vyshinsky in the UN Political Committee,
27 Oct. 1949 on the ‘Greek case’, in A.Y. Vyshinsky, Questions of International Law
and Foreign Policy (Moscow, 1951), p.588 (in Russian).
40. M. Suslov, ‘Defense of Peace and Struggle against War-Mongers’, report at the Session
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52 C O L D WA R H I S T O RY

of the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties in Hungary, 1949, pp.9, 11 (in
Russian).
41. Review of the broadcasts of ‘Radio Free Greece’ (14–28 Feb. 1953). RGASPI. f.575,
i.1, f.266. g.17. l.123.
42. Pravda, 15 Dec. 1957.
43. Pravda, 12 Jan. 1958.
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