Decline and Depletion Rates of Oil Production
Decline and Depletion Rates of Oil Production
of oil production: a
comprehensive investigation
Mikael Höök1 , Simon Davidsson1 , Sheshti Johansson1
rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org and Xu Tang2
1 Global Energy Systems, Department of Earth Sciences, Uppsala
Keywords:
depletion rate, decline rate, peak oil,
field-by-field analysis, depletion level
1. Introduction
Non-renewable fossil fuels provide around 81% of the
global primary energy supply and oil remains the single
Author for correspondence:
largest primary fuel, satisfying 33% of the world’s
Mikael Höök energy needs in 2009 [1]. Given the high reliance on oil,
e-mail: [email protected] particularly within the transportation sector, it is evident
that policymakers and the public need reliable forecasts
of future oil supply.
Two of the most fundamental concepts in the current
debate about future oil supply are oilfield decline rates
Electronic supplementary material is available and depletion rates. These concepts are related, but not
at http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2012.0448 or identical. However, analysts and laymen alike tend to get
these concepts mixed up, leading to misunderstandings
via http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org.
and flawed conclusions. In addition, the definition of
depletion rates can vary. The term decline rate refers
2013 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.
to the annual reduction in the rate of production from an individual field or a group of fields, after
2
a peak in production. Detailed empirical analyses of decline rates have been produced for well
over 50 years and most studies tend to agree on the typical decline rates for different categories
plateau
discovery
well build-
decline
up
appraisal abandonment
well
economic limit
time
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Figure 2. Production of oil and water for the giant Jay field in Florida, USA. The water cut reached over 90% of total produced
fluids in the mid-1980s and is now at 97%. In 2010, the field produced 2500 barrels of oil and 94 000 barrels of water per day.
Data source: Florida Department of Environmental Protection [19]. (Online version in colour.)
Darcy’s law states that a fluid with high viscosity will have a low flow rate; that if the rock
permeability is high there will be a high flow rate; and that there must be a pressure gradient in
order to have any fluid flow. The negative sign in the expression also indicates that the flow goes
in the opposite direction of the pressure gradient.1
Rr = URRt − Qt , (3.1)
where Rr is the remaining recoverable resource (RRR) at time t, URRt is the ultimately recoverable
resources estimated at time t and Qt is the cumulative production at time t. The term reserve
growth refers to the increase in the estimated URR of known fields over time and has been
discussed in more detail by the UK Energy Research Centre [28]. Revisions to URR estimates
may occur at any time as a consequence of changing market conditions, increased geological
knowledge and improved technology and so on. This makes URR a time-varying quantity,
although it is not as fluctuating as other reserve estimates.
URR may also be expressed as the RRR plus cumulative production at an arbitrary point in
time. The depletion level, here denoted Dt , can then be defined as the fraction of the URR that has
been extracted at time t
Qt Qt
Dt = = . (3.2)
Qt + Rr URRt
Depletion levels can vary from 0 to 1 (i.e. 0–100%) and indicate what proportion of the estimated
URR remains. Returning to the beer bottle analogy, we note that a half-full bottle would have a
depletion level of 50%.
q̇ dq/dt
λt = − = − = Cqβ . (3.7)
q q
Originally introduced by Arps [31,32], decline curve analysis is a simple tool to model and
predict future production under the assumption that depletion is the driving decline mechanism.
Decline can be constant (β = 0), directly proportional to production rate (β = 1) or proportional to
a fractional power of the production rate (0 < β < 1).
In decline curve models, it is assumed that production begins to decline at time t0 , with
an initial production rate of q0 and an initial cumulative production of Q0 . The production
rate at time t ≥ t0 is denoted by q(t) and the cumulative production between t and t0 is
t
given by the integral Q(t) = t0 q(t)dt. The simplest decline curves are characterized by three
parameters: the initial production rate q0 > 0, the initial decline rate λ0 > 0 and the exponent
t
β ∈ [0, 1]. If the production is allowed to continue perpetually and the integral Q(t) = t0 q(t)dt
converges to a single value as t → ∞, it is possible to calculate the cumulative production over
the decline phase. This can then be added to q0 to give an estimate of the field’s URR.
A more general presentation of decline curves can be found in Chang & Lin [33], Höök et al. [34]
and Khanamiri [35]. The general case is a hyperbolic decline curve (0 < β < 1), while exponential
decline (β = 0) is an important special case owing to its simplicity and ease of use. Their key
properties can be seen in table 1. Harmonic decline (β = 1) is another important special case of the
hyperbolic decline curve, not described in detail here.
Decline curves should be seen as more than mathematical curve-fitting exercises as they have
a sound physical basis. For example, exponential decline curves represent the solution to the
physical flow equation of a homogeneous field with a given initial drive pressure that reduces
as the oil is extracted [36,37]. This connects decline curve models with the depletion-driven
production declines caused by the exhaustion of recoverable resources. Although decline curve
analysis was originally developed for single wells, it can also be applied to entire fields [11].
However, the time distribution of active wells as well as temporary shutdowns and similar events
will also influence the production profile and hence complicate the connection between observed
decline and underlying driving forces.
Initial production decline is often exponential, although behaviour tends to flatten out towards
hyperbolic or harmonic decline further out in the tail region. Hyperbolic decline gives longer well
life and leads to larger URR values. An example of fitted decline curves can be found in figure 3.
Incorrect choice of decline curve can lead to flawed estimates if the curve is used to estimate URR.
Decline curve extrapolations require no detailed reservoir data, such as oil saturation or
local permeability, and can easily be done from only production data, which is comparatively
easy to acquire. They can also be used to estimate ultimate recovery of fields via curve-
fitting. Consequently, decline curve projections are often used when analysing single fields or
in bottom-up studies of oil depletion that sum up the production from individual fields.
Skjöld
50 000 daily production 9
45 000 decline phase
exponential fit
Figure 3. The Danish oilfield Skjöld with both exponential and hyperbolic decline curve fits. (Adapted from Höök et al. [34].)
(Online version in colour.)
q0 exp(−λ(t − t0 ))
dRRR,t = . (3.8)
q0 q
Q0 + λ − Q0 + λ0 (1 − exp(−λ(t − t0 ))
Consequently, having an estimate of dRRR,t prior to the onset of decline makes it possible to
estimate the subsequent decline rate, provided the field can be assumed to follow exponential
decline. In practice, fields tend to divert from exponential decline and move towards a more
hyperbolic or harmonic decline curve as production heads further out into the tail region.
The second definition of the depletion rate of URR (equation (3.3)) yields a more complicated
expression that cannot be additionally simplified
q0 exp(−λ(t − t0 ))
dURR,t = . (3.10)
q
Q0 + λ0
As q0 , Q0 and λ all are constants and the exponential expression is strictly decreasing, it follows
that the depletion rate of URR will be decreasing as the oilfield enters the decline phase. It also
holds that the maximum value of dURR,t must occur before the field reaches the onset of decline.
It should also be mentioned that exponential behaviour is a simplified form of decline and that
the general situation tends to be hyperbolic in nature. This makes it interesting to study how the
two depletion rates behave in a hyperbolic decline situation. Once again, combining the definition
of dRRR,t (equation (3.4)) and the functions for production, URR and cumulative production in the
hyperbolic case (table 1) yields
q0 [1 + λβ(t − t0 )]−1/β
dRRR,t = . (3.11)
q0 q0 [1−(1+λβ(t−t0 ))1−1/β ]
Q0 + λ(1−β) − Q0 + λ(1−β)
21 210 000 RRR dep. rate – official URR
RRR dep. rate – estimated URR 10
18 180 000 URR dep. rate – official URR
9 90 000
6 60 000
3 30 000
0 0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Figure 4. Production and depletion rate behaviour in the Norne giant oilfield in Norway. The official URR estimate (0.60 Gb)
was taken from the NPD fact pages (http://factpages.npd.no/factpages/), but includes economic considerations lowering the
recoverable volume compared with an estimated URR (0.67 Gb) obtained using an exponential decline curve. Nevertheless, the
RRR depletion rate remains stable or decreases. (Online version in colour.)
One should note that β ∈ [0, 1], making the power generally negative. All together, the
expression for dURR,t will also be strictly decreasing with time as t → ∞.
The expressions for depletion rates of both remaining recoverable resources (dRRR,t ) and
ultimate resources (dURR,t ) in the hyperbolic case imply that a maximum depletion rate must be
reached before the onset of decline. This holds for single wells, described by a single decline
curve, as well as for entire fields consisting of many declining wells distributed in time. But some
caution should be exercised regarding fields, as obfuscating factors of a non-physical nature such
as temporary shutdowns or redevelopments may influence production.
The maximum depletion rate occurs just before the onset of decline, which can be shown
analytically for wells or fields perfectly described by decline curves. In practice, the maximum
depletion rate typically occurs around the peak production with some dependence on the
definition of recoverable resources.
A real-world illustration can be made from the Norwegian giant field Norne (figure 4). The
exponential decline curve provides a good fit to observed production and can also be used
to estimate the URR, giving reasonable agreement with the official figure provided by the
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD). The value of dURR,t reaches a maximum at the peak
production, while dRRR,t based on the estimated URR does the same. When using the official URR,
dRRR,t remains stable after the peak production with some oscillations around its maximum in
reasonable agreement with theory. Investigating these parameters empirically in a larger dataset
is the next step.
Qreg,t
n
Qn,t
DURR,t = = . (3.14)
URRreg,t URRreg,t
1
The depletion rate of URR in a region is the next thing to delineate. If qn,t denotes annual
production of field n one can now define it as
qreg,t
n
qn,t
dURR,t = = . (3.15)
URRreg,t URRreg,t
1
qreg,t
n
qn,t
dRRR,t = = . (3.16)
URRreg,t − Qreg,t URRreg,t − Qreg,t
1
A maximum depletion rate for individual fields also indicates the existence of a maximum
depletion rate on both regional and global scales, as the regional depletion rate is just a weighted
average of the individual subparts. From this it follows that the regional depletion rates must lie
somewhere between the smallest (0% if undiscovered fields are considered) and largest depletion
rates for its individual fields, regardless of whether one uses depletion rates of URR or RRRs.
Thus, depletion rates of individual fields and the temporal distribution of field production profiles
become the principal factors that determine the regional depletion rate.
The extreme situation would be if all fields reached their maximum depletion rates
simultaneously, in which case the regional value would also be at a maximum, although not
the same numerical value. However, this is not likely to happen in reality as fields are usually
at different stages of development at any given point in time. Larger regions, for example the
world, will never develop uniformly and some subparts will be developed in the beginning,
whereas others will remain undeveloped for a long time. Such patterns will give more temporally
dispersed fields, yielding lower regional depletion rates.
The timing of production from a particular field is determined by the year of discovery,
available extraction technology, administrative barriers and macroeconomic circumstances, to
name a few factors. Therefore no analytical expression for the temporal distribution of fields can
be found. Consequently, the estimation of regional depletion rates must chiefly rely on empirical
experience of how regions generally develop.
4. Empirical study
This study relies on the Uppsala giant oilfield database. The database was initiated by Robelius [9]
and later updated by Höök et al. [2]. It contains approximately 350 giant oilfields worldwide,
accounting for a URR of over 1100 Gb. For the purpose of this study, complementary data on
hundreds of smaller oilfields all over the world have been combined with the giant oilfield
data. From this combined database, some 880 individual oilfields were selected (see electronic
supplementary material). They were chosen to reflect the wide array of field sizes, production
strategies and socioeconomic conditions seen over the globe. The size distribution is given in
table 2, and in general an equal number of fields in each size category have been chosen.
However, owing to the limited number of post-peak fields larger than 1 billion barrels (Gb), this
size category contains fewer fields (N = 130) than the other categories (N = 150). However, this
difference is assumed to be negligible when identifying the general patterns of behaviour.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the sample of fields studied. The distribution is highly skewed with most resources concentrated
12
in relatively few giant fields.
.........................................................
105
104
103
102
10 y = 139 220x0.8993
R2 = 0.9765
1
10–6 10–5 10–4 10–3 10–2 10–1 1 10 102
ultimately recoverable resources (Gb)
Figure 5. The relation between field size and maximum production level. (Online version in colour.)
–10
–20
–30
–40
–50
–60
–70
10–6 10–5 10–4 10–3 10–2 10–1 1 10 102
ultimately recoverable resources (Gb)
Figure 6. Scatter plot of observed decline rates seen in the dataset. Significant differences occur, but generally decrease with
increasing field size. (Online version in colour.)
to increase reserves over time, making it probable that URR estimates based upon current 2P
reserves will underestimate the actual field size, and the fact of reserves growth must also be
acknowledged even in 2P data. For the remainder where no 2P data or official URR estimates
were available, more traditional curve-fitting methods were used to estimate the URR.
In our aggregated dataset, the URRs of some fields are surely overestimated, while others may
be underestimated. We assume here that these effects cancel each other out when combined. For
the sake of simplicity, we assume here that a field’s URR remains fixed over time. Changed URR
values will not affect decline rates of any of the fields used in this study, and neither will they
affect the peak production points. However, increases in the estimated URR reduce the estimated
depletion level and depletion rate.
Giant fields of over 1 Gb have by far the lowest decline rates and there is a clear trend towards
more rapid decline with decreasing field size (table 3). Production-weighted (PW) average values
also show that fields with high production levels tend to decline somewhat faster than the
arithmetic average for small fields (less than 0.1 Gb), while the opposite was true for semi-giant
and giant oilfields. Partly this can be explained by a large share of OPEC control among the larger
fields and the fact that OPEC producers tend to aim for long and stable production profiles rather
than rapid return on investment. Second, these patterns can arise from the economically rational
behaviour of a price-taking producer who maximizes profit subject to technical and physical
constraints [40].
Earlier studies have also shown that technological development, for instance EOR, can
result in more rapid declines. Gowdy & Juliá [41] initially highlighted this problem for two
North Sea giant fields. Later, Höök et al. [2] elaborated on this and found a general tendency
towards higher decline rates for giant fields as new technology and modern production
strategies allowed the extension of plateau production at the expense of higher subsequent
decline rates.
Table 4 compares the results of three studies that provide estimates of average decline rates
from a globally representative sample of post-peak giant fields. Despite differences in datasets,
definitions and weighting methods, the results are in broad agreement that the decline in the
existing production is between 4% and 8% annually [3]. Expressed in production capacity, this
means that roughly a new North Sea (approx. 5 Mb d−1 ) has to come on stream every year just to
keep the present output constant [42]. This implies that nearly five new Saudi Arabias would be
needed by 2030 just to offset the decline in existing production [43].
Höök et al. [3] provide additional data on the time evolution of giant oilfield decline rates
and find the average decline rate has increased by around 0.15% per year since the mid-1960s—a
trend that is expected to continue. From table 3, it can be also seen that decline rates are higher for
smaller fields and as future production becomes more reliant on non-giant fields it is reasonable
that average decline in existing production will increase. The increasing decline rate is seldom
discussed—even though it can lead to additional capacity requirements of as much as 7 Mb d−1
by 2030 [43].
.........................................................
recoverable resources (%)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
10–3 10–2 10–1 1 10 102 103 104 105
ultimately recoverable resources (Mb)
Figure 7. Scatter plot of estimated depletion levels at peak production (onset of decline). (Online version in colour.)
Table 4. Average decline rates for post-peak giant fields found by recent studies. CERA, Cambridge Energy Research Associates.
PW decline (%)
..........................................................................................................................................................................................................
100
80
frequency
60
40
20
0
0–5 10–15 20–25 30–35 40–45 50–55 60–65 70–75 80–85 90–95 >100
depletion level of URR (%)
Figure 8. Frequency distribution of estimated depletion levels at peak (onset of decline). (Online version in colour.)
Table 5. Estimated depletion levels at peak production sorted by field size.
16
depletion level at peak production
field size (table 5). Some of the fields with the highest depletion levels at peak, especially in
the more than 100 Mb size category, are old American fields that were extensively redeveloped
around the 1980s when new technology/investments allowed larger fractions of the oil in place
to be recovered. PW figures indicate that fields with high annual production rates are usually
developed in such a way that the depletion level is relatively high at the onset of decline.
Interestingly, there is virtually no correlation (linear correlation coefficient = −0.07) between
the estimated depletion levels at peak and the subsequent decline rates in oilfields. This indicates
that depletion levels have restricted relevance for analysing production flows.
It should also be noted that any future reserve growth in the studied fields will reduce the
estimated depletion levels. If a significant portion of the URR figures used in this study are
underestimates, the depletion levels derived here will be overestimates. If so, this would reinforce
the conclusion that most fields begin to decline well before half of their URR is produced.
Figure 9. Scatter plot of estimated depletion rates of URRs at the onset of decline. (Online version in colour.)
160
140
120
100
frequency
80
60
40
20
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
depletion rate of URR (%)
Figure 10. Frequency distribution of URR depletion rates at peak production/decline onset. (Online version in colour.)
Table 6. Estimated depletion rates of URRs at onset of decline, sorted by field size.
field size (Mb) median % mean (%) PW mean (%) s.d. (%)
x < 0.1 15.0 16.1 18.4 6.9
..........................................................................................................................................................................................................
field data, regional depletion rates are likely to be constrained to less than 20% if they are
assumed to follow patterns seen in history. Given the dominance of larger fields in total regional
production, the regional depletion rates are even lower in reality. Aleklett et al. [43] estimate that
the typical regional depletion rates of RRRs are of the order of 2–5%, and argue that projections
of future global oil production by the IEA [10] are based upon unrealistic assumptions about
RRR depletion rate at peak vs field size
40 18
Figure 11. Scatter plot of estimated depletion rates of RRRs at onset of decline. (Online version in colour.)
120
100
80
frequency
60
40
20
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
depletion rate of remaining recoverable resources (%)
Figure 12. Frequency distribution of RRR depletion rates at peak production/decline onset. (Online version in colour.)
field size (Mb) median % mean (%) PW mean (%) s.d. (%)
..........................................................................................................................................................................................................
depletion rates that are not explicitly discussed. Miller [44] agrees with the findings of Aleklett
et al. [43] and notes the persistent optimism of the IEA projections.
Depletion rates at peak, calculated using both URRs and RRRs, correlate strongly with the
subsequent decline rate. The linear correlation coefficient with mean decline rate was determined
to be 0.83 for depletion rates of RRRs and 0.81 for depletion rates of URR at peak. This observation
provides empirical support for the theoretical arguments in §3c (table 7).
Depletion rates can be directly calculated from production data and URR estimates during
19
both the build-up and plateau stages in an oilfield’s life, even before the field has peaked. By
contrast, decline rates can only be estimated after the onset of decline. However, the strong
5. Concluding discussion
Decline and depletion rates are important to understand and give significant depth to the peak
oil debate. However, it is essential to understand that these two concepts are fundamentally
different. Decline rates can be measured directly from production data, while depletion rates
depend upon estimates of recoverable resources. Changes in recoverability will affect depletion
levels and depletion rates, while decline rates are unaffected. Different data sources and resource
estimates done at different times are likely to give diverging results.
Comprehensive analysis can be used to identify typical trends and patterns for depletion
levels, depletion rates and production decline rates for different categories of fields. Oilfield size is
a key variable, with generally high values for most parameters in small fields and comparatively
low values for larger fields. The data show clearly that most fields tend to peak with much less
than half of their URRs produced, typically around 30% (table 5). Peak production generally
appears well before the glass is half empty.
Depletion levels of giant oilfields are a noteworthy detail, because giant fields tend to reach
the onset of decline with higher depletion levels than small fields. This could be explained by
the way most giant fields are developed, as they usually start production at far lower depletion
rates than smaller fields owing to requirements related to production equipment, pipelines, etc.
As a result, giant fields can maintain a production plateau by continually drilling into new parts
of the reservoir to supplement declining production from older sections and this can probably
lead to comparatively higher depletion levels at peak. However, this could also be an effect of
underestimated URR and might possibly change if significant future reserve growth occurs.
The theoretical framework summarized here is well supported by the empirical evidence. The
existence of maximum depletion rates prior to the onset of production decline is of particular
importance. Furthermore, the strong correlation between depletion rates at peak and subsequent
decline rates can be used in supply forecasting and for estimating future decline rates before the
plateau phase ends.
Depletion rate analysis has been around for some time, but the underlying methodology has
never been clearly presented. Much confusion surrounds the concept of depletion rates, even
though it is a relatively simple idea once properly understood. Maugeri [46] is a recent example
of how terminology is mixed up and how exceptionally low decline rates are used without any
solid justification. Another example is how the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) used
a depletion rate model in a flawed way to reach misleading conclusions [30]. Similarly, the IEA’s
influential projections of global oil supply are based upon highly unrealistic assumptions about
the depletion rates of various categories of resources [26,43,44]. Once more realistic assumptions
are made, the future supply outlook looks much bleaker.
Owing to the large number of geological, technological and economic factors influencing
depletion rates, there is no universal maximum depletion rate that is applicable to all fields or
all regions. However, the data presented here display the range of decline and depletion rates
that are found in practice and provide a good guide to the depletion rates that may be expected
in the future.
Acknowledgements. The authors thank Dr Herbert West for providing valuable inspiration.
Funding statement. This study has been supported by the STandUP for Energy collaboration initiative.
References 20
1. International Energy Agency. 2011 Key energy statistics 2011. See http://www.iea.org.