Report of an Investigation into

the Grounding of

the Dry Bulk Carrier

Pentlan d
7 December 1998
 Extract from

The Merchant Shipping

(Accident Reporting and Investigation)

Regulations 1994

The fundamental purpose of investigating an accident under these Regulations is to

determine its circumstances and the causes with the aim of improving the safety of life
at sea and the avoidance of accidents in the future It is not the purpose to apportion
liability, nor, except so far as is necessary to achieve the fundamental purpose, to
apportion blame
CONTENTS

Page

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

SYN0PSIS 1

SECTION 1 FACTUAL ACCOUNT 2

11 Details of Vessel and Incident 2

1.2 Description of Vessel 4
1.3 Background to the Voyage 4
1.4 The Crew 4
1.5 Watchkeeping 5
1.6 Environmental Conditions 5
1.7 Events Leading to the Grounding 5
1.8 STCW 95 7
1.9 Torbulk Ltd 8
1 10 UK Paper to IMO 9

SECT ION 2 ANALYSIS 11

2.1 Interpretation of Available Evidence 11

2.2 Alternative Events Leading to the Grounding 11
2.3 Work and Rest Periods 11
2.4 Manning 12
2.5 One Man Bridge Operation at Night (OMBON) 12

SECTION 3 CONCLUSIONS 14

3.1 Cause 14
3.2 Contributory Causes 14
3.3 Other Findings

SECTION 4 RECOMMENDATIONS 15

4.1 Maritime and Coastguard Agency 15

4.2 Torbulk Ltd IS

Figures 1 & 2 Pentland

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

AB Able Seaman

BP Between Perpendiculars

GPS Global Positioning System

gt gross tonnage

IMO International Maritime Organization

kW kilowatt

m metre

MCA Maritime and Coastguard Agency

MF Medium Frequency

MRCC Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre

STCW 95 International Convention on Standards of Training,

Certification and Watchkeeping incorporating the 1995
Amendments

UK United Kingdom

UTC Universal Co-ordinated Time

VHF Very High Frequency

SYNOPSIS

The accident was notified to the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) on 7
December 1998 and an investigation commenced the same day.

The 909 gt Barbados registered dry bulk carrier Pentland ran aground 1.5 miles north
of Arbroath while on passage from Amsterdam to Inverness.

The vessel was refloated on the following tide. Damage was sustained to the forepeak
hull plating. There was no pollution.

The cause of the grounding was the track made good by the vessel in the prevailing
circumstances and conditions.

Contributory causes were the master falling asleep on watch and his consequent failure
to make a course alteration at the due time, the master suffering from the effects of
cumulative fatigue, the absence of an additional person on watch during the hours of
darkness, contrary to UK regulations, and the absence of a bridge watch alarm.

MCA is recommended to reaffirm its position on the requirement to post a lookout in

addition to the officer of the watch during the hours of darkness, to continue to
promote the concept of an international standard and carriage requirement for watch
alarms and to seek international agreement on the specific number of qualified
watchkeeping officers to be carried when determining minimum safe levels of manning.

Recommendations have also been made to the manager of the vessel to consider
employing an additional watchkeeping officer on those vessels where the master and
mate are currently the only qualified watchkeeping officers on board, ensure that a
lookout is posted in addition to the officer of the watch, during the hours of darkness,
and to consider fitting a watch alarm.
SECTION 1 FACTUAL ACCOUNT

1.1 Details of Vessel and Incident

Name Pent land

Type Dry Bulk Carrier

Port of Registry Bridgetown Barbados

Official Number 7827273

Built 1980 Cochranes Ship Builders

Selby

Construction Steel

Owner Onesimus Dorey Guernsey

Channel Islands

Manager Torbulk Ltd Grimsby

North East Lincolnshire

Gross Tonnage 909

Length Overall 59.98 metres

Length BP 56.00 metres

Breadth 1 1.28 metres

Depth 4.60 metres

Propulsion Mirlees Blackstone 750 kW

Single Screw Shaft

Crew Six

Position of Accident : 34' N 32' W

Date and Time 7 December 1998 0357

(UTC)

Damage Forepeak Hull Plating (Holed)

Injuries None

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1.2 DESCRIPTION OF VESSEL

Pentlandwas designed as a dry bulk carrier and was currently engaged on the
UK/near continental trade, carrying general bulk cargoes. The vessel had a
single hold, with folding steel hatch covers.

She was equipped with standard navigational equipment which included GPS,
radar, gyro compass with autopilot, MF radio, VHF radio and echo sounder

The helm position was situated centrally at the forward end of the bridge with
the navigational equipment and main engine controls strategically placed in an
operating console either side

There was a chart table at the aft end of the bridge and a two-man seat/locker
on the port side.

No watch alarm was fitted

1.3 BACKGROUND TO THE VOYAGE (All times are UTC)

On 30 November 1998 Pentland arrived in the Belgian port of Fosdyke At

0300 she was secured alongside and at 0700 commenced discharging her
cargo After a break overnight, discharging was completed at 1410

Pentland, in ballast, sailed from Fosdyke at 1630 bound for the port of
Amsterdam

At 1940, on 2 December, the vessel arrived in the port of Amsterdam. The

following day, she was shifted to a loading berth and started loading a cargo of
coal

Loading was completed at 1 1 15 on 4 December

1.4 T H E CREW

Pentland carried a crew of six, the master, mate, chief engineer. two ABS and
an AB/cook, in accordance with her safe manning certificate issued by the
Barbados authorities

The master, a Polish national, held an unrestricted Polish master’s certificate of

competency An application for an equivalent Barbados certificate was being
processed at the time of the accident He was an experienced seafarer having
served on fishing vessels from 1969 and on merchant vessels from 1985

He joined Pentland in October 1998 in the employment of Torbulk Ltd, the

manager of the vessel He was employed on a four months on/two months off
contract

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 The mate, a Russian national, was the holder of a Russian master's certificate
and a Barbados chief mate's certificate.

He was an experienced seafarer having served for over ten years on general
cargo vessels. He also joined Pentland in October 1998 and was employed on
a six-month contract.

The remainder of the crew were non-UK nationals employed on contracts

ranging from six to nine months.

1.5 WATCHKEEPING

When at sea, the navigation watch was shared between the master and the
mate, alternating six hours on, followed by six hours off. The master was
normally on watch from 0600 until 1200, and 1800 until 2400.

When in port, the mate supervised the loading and discharging of the cargo and
the master was normally stationed on the bridge to take care of paperwork and
visits by harbour officials, and to answer any telephone calls.

In port the ABs worked on deck around cargo operations. At sea, they
normally worked on deck from 0800 until 1700. An AB was only posted as a
lookout on the bridge during bad weather.

It was not normal practice to have an AB posted on the bridge as a lookout

during the hours of darkness.

1.6 ENVIRONMENTAL, CONDITIONS

The weather at the time of the accident was a north-north-westerly wind of

force 2/3 with a slight to moderate swell. The visibility was good. The
predicted times of HW and LW at Leith on 7 December were 0452 and 1049
respectively.

1.7 EVENTS LEADING TO THE GROUNDING (All courses are true)

Pentland sailed from Amsterdam at 1330 on 4 December 1999 bound for the
port of Inverness with a cargo of 1165 tonne of coal. The master remained on
watch until the vessel had cleared port.

A passage plan to Inverness was constructed. On leaving Amsterdam courses

were set towards the Dowsing buoy off the UK coast. The weather during the
passage across the North Sea was a north-north-westerly wind of force 7/8
with a 5m swell. The vessel made good a speed of approximately 5 knots,
pitching and rolling heavily in the prevailing weather conditions. None of the
crew managed to get much sleep during this period.

At 1600 on 5 December Pentland reached the Dowsing buoy. Courses were

then set t o take the vessel northwards towards Rattray Head, maintaining a
distance of 5 miles from the UK coastline. There was very little improvement
in the weather conditions.

At 2400 that evening the master was relieved on the bridge by the mate
Before returning to the bridge at 0600 the following morning, he managed to
sleep for approximately five hours.

The master took the navigation watch until 1200, when again he was relieved
by the mate. There was still no significant change in the weather conditions.

The mate called the master at 1900, having decided to allow him an additional
hour's rest. During the period the master was off-duty he slept for only three
hours. This was due mainly to tasks which had to be completed during off-
watch periods, and the pitching and rolling of the vessel in the heavy weather.

When the master took over the watch the course steered was 344' on
autopilot. At 2000 a GPS position of 55" 41.0' N 3 1.7' W was recorded
in the deck log book. 'The master then altered course to 337" to maintain the
laid-down courseline. This courseline would have taken the vessel to a
position 5 miles east of Bell Rock, where, in accordance with the passage plan,
an alteration of course to would then have had to have been made to
maintain a distance of 5 miles from the coastline. At 2400 a GPS position of
56" 15.0’N 002'03.2' W was recorded in the deck log book.

The weather had begun to moderate sometime earlier in the evening and by
2 100 the north-north-westerly wind had decreased to force 2/3 with a slight to
moderate swell and good visibility. The GPS indicated the speed of the vessel
had increased to an average of 8 knots.

The master did not call the mate at 2400, but remained on watch, subsequently
sitting down on the seat/locker located on the port side of the bridge and falling
asleep. He interpreted detecting both visually and by radar Bell Rock at a
distance of 7 miles on the port beam at 0200 on 7 December.

Without the required course alteration the vessel continued on her current
heading past Bell Rock

At approximately 0340 the master woke. The first thing he noticed was the
coastline in close proximity ahead and to port of the vessel. He immediately
put the main engine controls from ahead t o full astern. However the
manoeuvre was insufficient to prevent Pentland from running aground at
Carlingheugh Bay, north of The Diel's Heid.
 After grounding, the master immediately instructed the crew to sound all
internal compartments for water ingress, and to sound round the vessel
externally. At 0357 the master contacted Forth Coastguard on VHF channel
16 and reported the vessel aground and taking water. There was no pollution.

It was found that the forepeak compartment had flooded with 30 tonne of
water to a depth of approximately 2m. The remainder of the vessel was sound.
Pentland had grounded on her starboard side forward. External soundings
showed that the port side and the after part of the vessel was in a depth of 6-
7m. The draught of the vessel was 3. 1m.

After establishing the position of the vessel, co-ordination of the incident was
passed to Aberdeen MRCC. Due to a falling tide and, with it, the imminent
danger of the vessel sustaining further damage, Arbroath and Montrose
lifeboats were launched and tasked to the scene.

At 043 1 Arbroath lifeboat arrived on scene and an attempt was made to pull
Pentland clear. This attempt failed. When the Montrose lifeboat arrived on
scene, a further attempt using both lifeboats and the vessel's astern propulsion
was made, but this too failed.

At 0525 Pentland began listing to port. By 0605 the list had increased to
approximately A decision was then made by the master to abandon the
vessel. All the crew were transferred to the Arbroath lifeboat and taken ashore
to the lifeboat station.

At 0752 with Pentland hard aground but in no immediate danger, the master
and the crew proceeded back to the vessel on the Arbroath lifeboat, with a
portable salvage pump and materials to construct a temporary repair.

After being transferred back on board the vessel, the crew reduced the water
level in the forepeak and effected a temporary repair to the damage

At 1253, now on a rising tide, with the aid o ft h e Arbroath lifeboat Pentland
was refloated successfully, and made her way under her own power to
Montrose for further examination of the damage. An escort tug was provided
during the passage and Pentland was secured alongside at 1610.

1.8 STCW 95

International standards for watchkeeping are laid down in STCW 95 which

came into force on 1 February 1997.

The provisions of STCW 95 include a mandatory code pertaining to manning

and operational matters. The code addresses watchkeeping at sea and sets out
certain principles to be observed in keeping a navigational watch. Relevant
parts of the text read a s follows:

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 ...All persons who are assigned duty as officer in charge of a watch...
shall be provided a minimum of 10 hours rest in any 24 hour period. ..

... The hours ofrest may he divided into no more than two periods, one
ofwhich shall be at least 6 hours in length.

... The minimumperiod of 10 hours may be reduced to not less than 6

consecutive hours provided that any such reduction shall not exceed
beyond two days...

... The officer in charge of the navigational watch may be the sole
lookout in daylight provided that on each occasion... (this is followed
by conditions which should be taken into account such as weather,
visibility and traffic density).

Merchant Shipping Notice 1682(M) makes it clear that in order to comply

with The Merchant Shipping (Safe Manning, Hours of Work and
Watchkeeping)Regulations 1997 the principles applying to the keeping a safe
navigational watch under STCW 95 must be followed. The Regulations apply
to seagoing UK registered merchant ships and to other ships when they are in
UK national waters.

STCW 95 permits the officer of the watch to be the sole watchkeeper by day
but not by night, although the wording of the text makes this only implicit

Merchant Shipping Notice 1682(M) also provides guidance on appropriate

manning levels. For vessels of the size and type of Pentland it recommends
that at least three officers should be carried, unless the master keeps watch, or
where the length of voyage is short enough to ensure adequate rest periods for
watchkeepers.

1.9 TORBULK LTD

Torbulk Ltd is the manager of six foreign-flagged general bulk carriers ranging
from 900 to 2000 gt.

The vessels normally trade within the near continental and extended European
trading areas.

A memorandum, issued by Torbulk Ltd on 7 February 1997 to all masters,

contained amendments to the company's standing instructions These
amendments embraced the provisions of STCW 95.

On 24 October 1997, Sea Humber, managed by Torbulk Ltd, ran aground in

Belfast Lough. The resultant MAIB investigation concluded that the primary
cause of the grounding was that the master fell asleep on watch. Contributory
causes were the master's cumulative fatigue caused by working an excessive
 number of hours prior to the grounding. Further contributory factors were the
lack of a second person on watch and the absence of a bridge watch alarm.

On 6 February 1998, Oakland, also managed by Torbulk Ltd, ran aground

while leaving Buckie harbour. A contributory factor to the grounding was the
inability of the master to pilot the vessel successfully without the assistance of a
dedicated helmsman, contrary to the provisions of STCW 95.

In September 1998, Torbulk Ltd, being aware of a growing opinion that, to

fully comply with STCW legislation, current minimum safe manning scales are,
in many cases, inadequate, employed an additional officer on one of its vessels
as an exercise to alleviate the workload on other officers and crew.

This exercise was to be evaluated over a period of six months. The result of
this exercise was not made available to the MAIB.

1.10 UK PAPER TO IMO)

On 24 April 1998, the UK government, in light of a number of accidents

investigated by the MAIB where the primary cause was the officer of the watch
falling asleep, submitted a paper to the IMO Sub-committee on Safety of
Navigation highlighting these accidents and concluding:

1. These accidents would not have occurred had an effective watch alarm
been correctly set for the prevailing circumstances. The incidents
demonstrate the needfor shipowners to considerfitting effective watch
alarms irrespective of the watch structure on board their vessels.

2. Whilst vessels are required to be manned so that the officer of the

watch i s properly rested it is clear that an element of fatigue was
present in the incidents investigated by the MAIB. It i s also a
requirement that a lookout is provided on the bridge at night. In these
cases there is no doubt that the absence of a lookout contributed to the
watchkeepers falling asleep. The UK does not condone non-
compliance with IMO requirements.

3. Although most of these incidents occurred at night when sole

watchkeeping is not permitted, there i s clear evidence that fatigue can
be a problem for sole watchkeepers during daylight hours. The UK
believes that watch alarms significantly enhance navigational safety.
Encouragingly. an increasing number of ships are being fitted with
such watch alarm systems providing them with a valuable safeguard
against watchkeepers,falling asleep. The effectiveness of this
important safety feature w would he improved through the development
of a performance standard.

'9
The sub-committee was invited to note the information provided and to
consider inviting the committee to add the development of a performance
standard for watch alarm systems to the sub-committee's work programme

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SECTION 2 ANALYSIS

2.1 INTERPRETATION OF AVAILABLE EVIDENCE

2.1.1

a) The last two recorded GPS positions in the deck log book showed that
Pentland had made good a course of 333" and covered a distance of 38 miles
at an average speed of9.5 knots during the period from 2000 until 2400. The
increase in speed was probably due to the predicted tide flowing predominately
in a north-westerly direction during this period.

b) At 2400, in the given GPS position the predicted tide commenced flowing in a
direction of at a rate of 0.4 knots. By 0200 the direction was at a
rate of 1 .0 knot, and by 0300 the rate had increased to 1.2 knots.

2.1.2 At 0200, having made no alteration to the course or speed of the vessel and
allowing for the tidal current, Pentland would probably have been making good
a course of about 323"' at an approximate speed of 7 knots. It is therefore
unlikely the master detected Bell Rock on the port beam at a distance of 7
miles. Pentland would have probably passed abeam of Bell Rock at 0150 at a
distance of about 3 miles, eventually running aground in the position given.

2.2 ALTERNATIVE EVENTS LEADING TO THE GROUNDING

2.2.1 The master recorded the GPS position in the deck log book at 2400. It was
probably his intention to call the mate at 0100 having then been on watch for
the allotted six-hour period. The mate, a qualified officer, was capable of
making the required course change. There was no need for the master to
remain on the bridge after his period of duty.

2.2.2 Sometime shortly after 2400, 6 December, the master sat down on the
seat/locker on the port side of the bridge and fell asleep. Without the required
course alteration coupled with the effect of the tidal current, the vessel
continued on her passage past Bell Rock towards The Diel's Heid. At 0340 the
master awoke and then used the main engines in an unsuccessful attempt to
avoid a grounding.

2.3 WORK AND REST PERIODS

2.3.1 From 0600 on 4 December 1998 until the vessel ran aground, a period of 70
hours, the master was on watch for a total of 42 hours and off watch for 28
hours. Had the mate relieved him on the bridge at 0100, he would have just
managed to achieve an average period of 10 hours off watch in every 24 hours
These could be deemed to be periods of rest and therefore would be in
accordance with STCW95. However, although off watch for 28 hours the
 master only managed to sleep for approximately 10-12 hours during the total
period of 70 hours.

2.3.2 During the watch leading up to the grounding the weather subsided causing the
master t o inadvertently relax, no longer having to brace himself against the
movement of the ship. This, coupled with the effects of cumulative fatigue
caused by long hours of duty, interrupted sleep, and the lack of sleep during the
passage from Amsterdam, was a major cause of his inability to remain awake

2.4 MANNING

2.4.1 Like many small bulk carriers Pentland ran to a tight schedule. Again, like
many vessels of her type, manning was no more than the minimum required and
the watchkeeping was shared between the master and the mate. For officers
working an equivalent number of hours on and off watch, the theory that the
off-watch hours can be entirely spent resting is impossible to achieve due to the
schedule of the vessel and other tasks which must be completed while off
watch, both at sea and in port. Heavy weather, fog, and pilotage duties are a
few instances where the master must either take over the conduct of the vessel
himself, or at least be present on the bridge. While off watch, apart from meal
times and undertaking domestic chores, the master has to deal with various
items of paperwork, inspections and drills etc. All these activities must be
carried out during off-watch periods.

2.4.2 Although the master recognised that it was virtually impossible to achieve
adequate rest he made no formal complaint to the manager of the vessel.

2.4.3 The number of officer:; carried on board Pentland was in accordance with her
safe manning certificate and with the guidance provided in Merchant Shipping
Notice 1682(M). However there is no international agreement on the specific
number of qualified officers to be carried when determining safe manning
levels.

2.4.4 The employment of an additional watchkeeping officer would have overcome

the problem of existing officers and, in particular, the master being unable to
achieve adequate rest.

2.5 ONE MAN BRIDGE OPERATION AT NIGHT (OMBON)

2.5.1 During the hours of darkness no additional lookout was posted on the bridge,
contrary to The Merchant Shipping (Safe Manning, Hours of Work and
Watchkeeping)Regulations 199 7.

2.5.2 Lone watchkeeping at night was a regular practice on board Pentland and was
also in contravention of standing instructions issued by the manager of the
vessel

12
2.5.3 A second man present on the bridge acting as a lookout could have ensured
that the master remained awake and, in any event, could have realised that
something was amiss in time t o prevent the grounding.

2.5.4 The fitting of a fully operational bridge watch alarm also could have ensured
that the master remained awake.

13
SECTION 3 CONCLUSIONS

3.1 CAUSE

The cause of the Pentland grounding was the track made good by the vessel in
the prevailing circumstances and conditions.

3.2 CONTRIBUTORY CAUSES

1. The master falling asleep on watch. (2.2)

2. The master's failure to make a course alteration at the due time. (2.2)

3. The master suffering from the effects of cumulative fatigue caused by long
hours of duty, interrupted sleep, and the lack of sleep. (2.3)

4. The master's lack of sleep caused by the heavy weather conditions experienced,
and off-duty tasks which had to be completed during passage. (2.3)

5. The absence of an additional person on watch during the hours of darkness

(2.5)

6. The absence of a bridge watch alarm. (2.5)

7. The master inadvertently relaxing due to the weather subsiding. (2.3)

3.3 OTHER FINDINGS

1. The available evidence indicates that the master fell asleep sometime shortly
after 2400, 6 December, and did not detect Bell Rock at 0200, 7 December, at
a distance of 7 miles on the port beam. (2.1) (2.2)

2. The employment of an additional watchkeeping officer would have overcome

the problem of existing officers being unable t o achieve adequate rest. (2.4)

3. The master and mate were in contravention of UK regulations, and standing

instructions issued by the manager of the vessel, by keeping bridge watches on
their own during the hours of darkness. (2.5)

14
SECTION 4 RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 MARITIME AND COASTGUARD AGENCY is recommended to:

1. Reaffirm its position on the requirement to post a lookout in addition to

the officer of the watch during the hours of darkness.

2. Continue to promote the concept of an international standard and

carriage requirement for watch alarms.

3. Seek international agreement on the specific number of qualified

watchkeeping officers to be carried when determining minimum safe
manning levels.

4.2 TORBULK LTD is recommended to:

1. Consider employing an additional watchkeeping officer on those

vessels where the master and mate are currently the only qualified
watchkeeping officers on board.

2. Ensure that a lookout is posted in addition to the officer of the watch

during the hours of darkness.

3. Consider fitting a watch alarm

Marine Accident Investigation Branch

July 1999

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