M A R I N E A C C I D E N T I N V E S T I G AT I O N B R A N C H

ACCIDENT REPORT

SERIOUS MARINE CASUALTY REPORT NO 12/2014 MAY 2014

Extract from The This investigation has been Anchor dragging and subsequent grounding of
United Kingdom conducted with the
Merchant Shipping
(Accident Reporting and
co-operation and assistance
of the Swedish Accident
STENA ALEGRA
Investigation) Regulations Investigation Authority. Karlskrona
2012 – Regulation 5:
28 October 2013
“The sole objective of the
investigation of an accident SUMMARY
under the Merchant Shipping
(Accident Reporting and At 1851 (UTC1+1) on 28 October 2013, the RoPax 2 ferry Stena Alegra (Figure 1)
Investigation) Regulations grounded after dragging its anchor in 76 knot winds off Karlskrona, Sweden.
2012 shall be the prevention
of future accidents through
the ascertainment of its The vessel’s bottom plating and frames were damaged, and one ballast tank and
causes and circumstances. one void space were flooded. Two tugs towed the vessel off the rocks after the
It shall not be the purpose
of such an investigation weather had moderated the next day. Following an underwater inspection the
to determine liability nor, vessel proceeded to Gdynia, Poland, for repair.
except so far as is necessary
to achieve its objective, to
apportion blame.” The MAIB investigation identified that the master had decided to anchor the vessel
NOTE in winds that were forecast to increase to the assumed maximum design limit of its
This report is not written anchoring equipment without completing a full assessment of the consequent risks.
with litigation in mind and,
pursuant to Regulation 14(14)
of the Merchant Shipping
(Accident Reporting and
Investigation) Regulations
2012, shall be inadmissible
in any judicial proceedings
whose purpose, or one of
whose purposes is to attribute
or apportion liability or blame.
© Crown copyright, 2014
You may re-use this
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All reports can be found on
our website:
www.maib.gov.uk
For all enquiries: Figure 1: Stena Alegra
Email: [email protected]
Tel: 023 8039 5500
Fax: 023 8023 2459 1
Universal Co-ordinated Time
2
Roll on roll off passenger ferry

1
The wind speed rose to above that forecast, causing the vessel to drag its anchor. Measures aimed at
arresting the vessel’s drift failed to prevent Stena Alegra from running aground.

Recommendations have been made to the vessel’s manager, Northern Marine Management Ltd, to
enhance its safety management system requirements for anchoring, including contingency planning, and
the enhancement of masters’ handover procedures.

FACTUAL INFORMATION

Vessel

On 27 May 2013, while laid up in Falmouth, UK, Stena Alegra was purchased by Stena North Sea Ltd.
The vessel was then towed to Gdansk, Poland, for a major refit under the management of Northern
Marine Management Ltd (NMM).

On 8 July 2013 the vessel was chartered to Stena Line and entered service between Gdynia and
Karlskrona. An ‘Operational Limits’ certificate, issued by the UK’s Maritime and Coastguard Agency on
19 September 2013, included a ‘Sea State Restriction’ of 4 metres significant wave height. In accordance
with Merchant Shipping Notice (MSN) 1790 (M), this allowed Stena Alegra to operate the route between
Gdynia and Karlskrona for which a significant wave height of 2.9 metres had been determined.

Stena Alegra was one of three vessels on the service and was scheduled to sail from Gdynia on
Wednesday, Friday and Sunday, and from Karlskrona on Tuesday, Thursday and Friday. The schedule
included overnight layovers in Gdynia on Saturday night, and Karlskrona on Monday night.

Environment

When Stena Alegra dragged its anchor the weather conditions in the area were south-westerly winds
gusting 76 knots (Beaufort Force 12), a moderate sea state, and good visibility.

NARRATIVE

At 1800 on Sunday 27 October 2013, Stena Alegra sailed from Gdynia for its overnight crossing to
Karlskrona. Once clear of the port the master handed over the watch to the third officer and left the
bridge. He went to sleep in his cabin at about 2200. At 0400 he was called by the OOW3 because a
passenger had suffered a stroke, and went to the bridge. In an effort to expedite the vessel’s arrival at
Karlskrona the master agreed with the pilot, by VHF4 radio, that the pilot could board the vessel once it
was north of the submarine nets between Aspo and Tjurkö (Figure 2) rather than at the usual boarding
position. The master then took the con, with the second officer remaining on the bridge to support
the master until relieved by the chief officer. At 0550, the pilot boarded, followed shortly afterwards by
paramedics to assist the sick passenger.

Stena Alegra was berthed by the master using one of the two bow thrusters, owing to a fault with one
of its two diesel generators. Wind conditions at the time were approximately south-west 28 knots. After
making fast, three of the four main engines were stopped while the cargo was discharged. No 3 main
engine was left running to power a shaft alternator while the faulty diesel generator was under repair.

During the short time alongside, the master discussed with the pilot his intention to proceed to anchor in
anchorage B (Figure 2) for the vessel’s scheduled layover period. The master proposed anchoring as
close to the main channel as possible to gain maximum sea room from Aspeskarsklapparna, owing to
the forecast south-westerly winds. During these discussions, the pilot produced a local weather forecast

3
Officer of the watch
4
Very High Frequency

2
Reproduced from Chart SE 7411 by permission of the Swedish Maritime Administration, Norrköping 2012

Ro-Ro berth

Anchorage A

nel
han
in C
Aspeskarsklapparna

Ma
Lassa Grund
North Cardinal Mark

Anchorage B
Godnatt

Aspo
Tjurkö

Submarine Nets

Figure 2: Chartlet showing anchorage and main features of Karlskrona and approach

3
that indicated winds would increase in excess of 40 knots and peak at about 2100 that evening. The pilot
also commented that anchoring Stena Alegra south-west of its normal anchoring position should provide
better holding ground because the seabed would be less disturbed. The local weather forecast predicted
wind speeds similar to the vessel’s NAVTEX5 forecast of 18-24 metres/second (35-47 knots).

At 0800, after completing cargo discharge, Stena Alegra departed its berth for the anchorage. The wind
had increased to 30 knots. The master had the con with the pilot providing advice. At 0827, the master
ordered the starboard anchor to be let go. By 0845, Stena Alegra was ‘brought up’6 with 8 shackles7
of anchor cable having been deployed. The vessel’s bridge was positioned with Godnatt bearing
approximately 267°(T) 8 at 0.82 mile.

The master then discussed the availability of the main engines with the chief engineer, and requested
that they remain on 5 minutes’ notice throughout the vessel’s time at anchor. The chief engineer wanted
to keep a shaft alternator running while the faulty diesel generator was under repair. He therefore
suggested that No 3 main engine be kept running and available to be clutched in immediately should
it be required, with the other engines to be started as quickly as possible afterwards. Following this
conversation, No 1, 2 and 4 main engines were shut down and No 3 main engine remained running with
the shaft alternator engaged to supply electrical power.

The master then handed over the anchor watch to the third officer, and left written instructions for the
OOW to instruct the engine room to clutch in the main engine that was running and to call both him and
the bosun should he suspect that the vessel was dragging its anchor. These instructions also advised the
OOW that the wind was due to increase to over 40 knots.

At 1200, the third officer handed over the watch to the second officer on the bridge and the fourth
engineer handed over the watch to the third engineer in the engine room. Both outgoing officers verbally
passed on to their reliefs the master’s requirement for the main engines to remain at 5 minutes’ notice. At
that time the wind remained blowing from the south-west at about 30 knots.

By 1300, the wind had increased and the master had started visiting the bridge about every 15 minutes
to check on the wind speed; he was also monitoring the forecast conditions via the internet.

By about 1600, the wind speed had increased to 40 knots. Stena Alegra was maintaining its anchored
position, but had started to yaw9 by up to 60º either side of the wind direction. At 1646, a NAVTEX
forecast was received predicting south-westerly winds at 18-25 metres/second (36 to 50 knots).

By 1700, the wind speed had increased to 50 knots and the repair to the faulty diesel generator had been
completed. The chief engineer informed the master, who decided that No 3 main engine should remain
running and ready to be clutched in immediately should it be required.

At 1800, the watches changed; the third officer took over on the bridge, and the fourth engineer took over
in the engine room. At the time of the handover, the wind speed was around 53 knots. The master was
also on the bridge and had observed the wind speed on the anemometer. Hoping that the wind strength
had reached its peak, he went to have dinner with the chief officer.

5
NAVTEX (Navigational Telex) is an international automated medium frequency direct-printing service for delivery of
navigational and meteorological warnings and forecasts, as well as urgent marine safety information to ships.
6
A vessel is said to be ‘brought up’ when all way has stopped, it is riding to its anchor, and the anchor is holding.
7
A shackle of anchor cable measures 27.5 metres.
8
True
9
The sideways movement and rotation around the vertical axis of a vessel at anchor.

4
At 1830, the master and chief officer returned to the bridge, noting a wind speed of about 51 knots on
their arrival. The chief officer went to the chart room at the back of the bridge and began preparing a
loading programme for the next day, while the master returned to his cabin. Approximately 10 minutes
later, the chief officer became concerned by ‘strange noises’ coming from the focsle10. Fearing that the
starboard anchor windlass brake might not be holding, the chief officer returned to the front of the bridge
and visually monitored the focsle. He then told the third officer that he would take one of the duty ABs11
with him to inspect the anchor cable.

Before the chief officer left the bridge, the master returned and noted that the anemometer was
registering a wind speed of 66 knots. At approximately 1847, the master looked at the ECS12 display
and saw the vessel’s history trail, which had been scribing a consistent arc over the last few hours, start
to move astern. He immediately instructed the third officer to call the engine control room to “start the
second engine quickly and clutch in the first”. The third officer used the internal telephone system to
call the engine control room and pass on the master’s orders, which were acknowledged by the fourth
engineer. The fourth engineer slowed down No 3 main engine in preparation to engage the clutch, and
then began to start the other main engines.

At 1848, the master sent the third officer to the chief engineer’s cabin to ask for No 3 main engine to be
clutched in. On receiving the master’s request, the chief engineer told the third officer to call the engine
control room and pass the message to the duty engineer. He then proceeded to the engine control room
himself.

The third officer returned to the bridge and, at 1849, a second call was made to the engine control room
stating “we need to start right now”. This call was again answered by the fourth engineer. Stena Alegra
continued to drag its anchor and drift north-eastwards at about 3 knots.

At 1851, Stena Alegra’s forepart grounded on rocks adjacent to Aspeskarsklapparna. Approximately 20

seconds later, the control of all four main engines and two bow thrusters were handed over to the bridge.
The master attempted to manoeuvre the vessel clear of the rocks by splitting the engines13 and using the
bow thrusters and rudders. During this time he instructed the duty AB to call the crew, alerted the pilot
station and coastguard by VHF radio, informed NMM by mobile telephone, and gave instructions for the
tanks and void spaces to be sounded.

At 1905, the master stopped his attempts to free the vessel and left the engines running with zero
propeller pitch applied. No 17 void space was found to be flooded.

At 2135, the tug Dutch Power, which had been moored in Karlskrona, arrived on scene to assist, and was
made fast to Stena Alegra’s stern. Stena Alegra remained aground overnight.

During the morning of 29 October 2013, officials from the Swedish coastguard arrived with a
classification society surveyor and divers to carry out a damage inspection. At 1000, No 6 ballast tank
was found to be flooded. At approximately 1655, with moderating weather conditions and a second tug
assisting, Stena Alegra was pulled off the rocks and re-anchored in anchorage B.

10
Forecastle – forward mooring station, where the anchor windlass and mooring winches are located
11
Able seaman – a deck rating
12
Electronic Chart System
13
To place port and starboard propeller pitch controls in opposite directions, ie one side ahead and one side astern to generate
a turning moment at the vessel’s stern.

5
Manning and watchkeeping

The master was Romanian and 51 years old. He was on his first contract with NMM and had joined
Stena Alegra on 16 October 2013 for a familiarisation and handover period with the offgoing master. He
formally took command of Stena Alegra on 27 October 2013 in Gdynia. Prior to joining NMM he had
served as master predominantly on Ro-Ro14 vessels and had gained some RoPax experience since
2002. He had obtained a Romanian STCW15 II/2 Master Unlimited Certificate of Competency in 1996.

The third officer was Polish and 39 years old. He had worked for NMM for about 2 years and had joined
Stena Alegra on 25 September 2013 for his second contract on board. He had held a Polish STCW II/1
OOW Unlimited Certificate since 2001, and had gained about 6 years’ experience as second officer on a
variety of vessel types prior to joining NMM.

The fourth engineer was Polish and 29 years old. He had joined NMM 3 months before the accident
and was on his second 2-month contract on board Stena Alegra. Prior to joining NMM he had worked
as a commissioning engineer in a Polish shipyard for about 4 years. He held a Polish STCW III/1 OOW
Engineering Unlimited Certificate.

All Officers on board Stena Alegra held appropriate UK Certificates of Equivalent Competency enabling
them to serve on UK registered vessels.

Stena Alegra was conventionally manned with a master, chief, second and third officer in the deck
department, and a chief, second, third and fourth engineer officer in the engine department.

The master, chief officer, chief engineer and second engineer worked daywork and were not part of the
regular watchkeeping routine. The second officer and third engineer kept the 0000-0600 and 1200-1800
watches. The third officer and fourth engineer kept the 0600-1200 and 1800-2400 watches.

Two ABs were assigned to each bridge watch.

Safety management system

NMM’s safety management system (SMS) provided instructions and guidance on anchoring, which
included a statement recognising that Ro-Ro and RoPax vessels did not routinely anchor. It also advised
masters to carefully consider the following when anchoring: ‘depth of water; nature of the bottom; ship
type and condition; weather and tidal conditions; proximity of dangers; length of stay.’ The advice also
included a warning that, should two anchors be used in strong weather conditions, then the second one
should be recovered as soon as possible when the conditions moderate to prevent the anchor cables
fouling.

In addition to the written instructions and guidance, a checklist was provided. The checklist required an
anchor plan to be prepared, which considered: ‘speed reduction in ample time; direction/strength of wind
and current; tidal stream when manoeuvring at low speed; need for adequate sea room particularly to
seaward; depth of water; type of seabed; and the scope of the anchor cable required.’

Industry guidance on anchoring

The Nautical Institute publication entitled ‘Mooring and Anchoring Ships – Principles and Practice’
provides detailed information regarding anchoring operations and associated equipment. It references
assumed worst conditions for vessels at anchor, discusses methods of anchoring, and suggests

14
Roll on, Roll off
15
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978, as amended

6
considerations for deciding the amount of anchor cable to deploy. A commonly used formula for
calculating the minimum number of shackles of anchor cable to deploy is 1.5 x square root of the water
depth (measured in metres).

The Nautical Institute publication ‘Bridge Watchkeeping’ provides practical guidance on anchoring
operations and the keeping of an anchor watch. The guidance includes the recognised best practice of
fixing the vessel’s position at the time of letting go the anchor, allowing a measured distance from the
anchor to the bridge when the vessel is brought up, and constructing a swinging circle. This practice was
not followed on Stena Alegra.

Design limitations of anchoring equipment

The IACS16 ‘Requirements concerning mooring, anchoring and towing’ includes the following in respect
of the design of anchoring equipment:

‘The anchoring equipment required herewith is intended for temporary mooring of a vessel within a
harbour or sheltered area when the vessel is awaiting berth, tide, etc;

The equipment is therefore not designed to hold a ship off fully exposed coasts in rough weather…;

The anchoring equipment presently required herewith is designed to hold a ship in good holding
ground in conditions such as to avoid dragging of the anchor...;

The Equipment Numeral (EN) formula for anchoring equipment required here under is based on an
assumed current speed of 2.5 m/sec, wind speed of 25 m/sec and a scope of chain cable between 6
and 10, the scope being the ratio between length of chain out and water depth.’ [sic]

Similar accidents

On 26 November 2011, the port windlass of the UK registered Ro-Ro vessel Norcape suffered
catastrophic damage during an attempt to weigh anchor after experiencing a wind speed of up to 50
knots17. Rather than keep the vessel underway or seek a less exposed location, the master had opted to
anchor the vessel with 8 shackles of anchor cable deployed in a water depth of 35 metres. Even though
a second anchor had been lowered onto the seabed to reduce anticipated yaw, the vessel’s heading
was noted to swing through 150º. A safety flyer that accompanied the MAIB’s safety investigation report
strongly advised an owner or operator to ensure that its SMS provides masters with clear guidance on
the capability of its vessel’s anchoring system, including:

• Any limitations of the anchor system components, including those of the windlass.

• Effects of windage in various load conditions.

• Risks associated with excessive yaw.

On 1 January 2002, the Cyprus registered product tanker Willy grounded after dragging its anchor in a
wind speed of up to 24 knots18. The vessel had been anchored 0.4 mile off a leeshore with 4 shackles of
anchor cable deployed in a water depth of 10 metres. The MAIB safety investigation report concluded
that insufficient anchor cable had been deployed, and that the vessel’s close proximity to the shore,
together with the speed at which it dragged its anchor, provided insufficient time for the engine to be
started and for the crew to take effective corrective action.

16
International Association of Classification Societies
17
MAIB Report No 28/2012
18
MAIB Report No 31/2002

7
ANALYSIS

The master decided to anchor Stena Alegra with forecast winds of up to 47 knots. Insufficient
contingency planning meant that the possibility of winds in excess of those forecast, and measures to
reduce the consequent increased risk of the vessel dragging its anchor and grounding when anchored in
such close proximity to land, had not been considered. The vessel dragged its anchor while encountering
wind speeds that were well in excess of its anchoring equipment design parameters, and grounded due
to insufficient corrective action being taken in the limited time available.

The decision to anchor

Stena Alegra was required to layover from Monday morning until its scheduled loading time on Tuesday
afternoon. Three vessels routinely used the same Ro-Ro berth in Karlskrona. Consequently, Stena
Alegra was required to leave the berth after discharge, which left the master with a choice of either
leaving the port and proceeding to sea, or anchoring in one of the designated anchorage areas within the
port approaches until the berth became available the following day.

The weather forecast available to the master at the time of his decision to anchor was for winds to
increase up to 47 knots from the south-west. The master considered there would be little protection
from the wind and sea immediately outside the port because of the port’s southerly location. He also
assessed that the small islands surrounding the designated anchorages within the port approaches
would provide an adequate lee for Stena Alegra.

In dismissing the option of proceeding to sea, the master did not consider steaming east or west along
the coast from Karlskrona, and then heaving to in areas where the sea conditions were likely to have
been more favourable due to the shelter provided by the Swedish coast. Such an option was feasible
considering the length of the layover period (Figure 3).

The master’s decision to anchor was influenced by his previous successful, albeit limited, experience
of anchoring other Ro-Ro and RoPax vessels in wind speeds of about 40 knots. His lack of experience
of anchoring Stena Alegra was due mainly to the short time that he had been on board, and the limited
opportunities he had had to observe how the vessel performed at anchor. His lack of familiarity with
Stena Alegra’s anchoring capabilities were further exacerbated by the limited experience of both the
outgoing master and the officers and crew in general, none of whom had witnessed the vessel anchored
in strong winds.

Stena Alegra was a recent acquisition for NMM. Therefore, in familiarising themselves with its
capabilities and performance, the crew were reliant on information exchanged during handover periods,
and instructions and guidance held on board, some of which is likely to have been lost during the vessel’s
change of management.

Although the forecast wind speed was at the assumed maximum design limit of Stena Alegra’s anchoring
equipment, the yawing effect of the vessel would have increased the loading to beyond that limit. NMM’s
SMS did not refer to this information. Had such guidance been available on board, it might have deterred
the master from his decision to proceed to anchor.

Lack of crew familiarity with a vessel’s capabilities and performance, and the need for clear guidance to
be provided in a company’s SMS, featured in the MAIB’s safety investigation report and accompanying
flyer following the accident on board Norcape.

Having decided that anchoring the vessel in the forecast wind was feasible, Stena Alegra’s master
then needed to carefully appraise his intended anchorage, fully assess the consequent risks, plan the
anchoring operation and implement appropriate safeguards to prevent the vessel dragging anchor and/or
running aground.

8
 Sweden

a
on
r
rlsk
Ka

Possible areas of shelter

Baltic Sea
Bornholm

South-westerly wind

Figure 3: Swedish coast and possible areas of shelter

9
Appraisal of anchorage

There were two designated anchorages within the approaches to Karlskrona. The master selected
anchorage B because in anchorage A Stena Alegra would have potentially impeded the passage of other
vessels using the Ro-Ro berth. He decided to anchor the vessel south-west of its normal anchoring
position so as to maximise its distance from Aspeskarsklapparna, without unduly encroaching into the
main entrance channel. He also increased the amount of anchor cable normally used, to 8 shackles
which, in a water depth of 15 metres, provided a scope of 14.7 (ie greater than the assumed maximum
scope in the IACS design requirements for anchoring equipment). The pilot’s comments regarding the
suitability of the holding ground at the master’s intended anchoring position provided tacit validation of
the appropriateness of his decision to proceed to anchor in anchorage B despite the forecast weather
conditions.

In modifying Stena Alegra’s normal anchoring position and increasing the amount of cable normally
used, the master broadly took into consideration the factors listed in the NMM’s SMS.

However, the master did not construct a swinging circle for the vessel either at the planning stage or after
anchoring. Had he done so, he might have identified the potential for Stena Alegra to pass over Lassa
Grund north cardinal mark, and the vessel’s close proximity to Aspeskarsklapparna (Figure 4). Taking
into account Stena Alegra’s windage area, this graphical illustration might have alerted the master to
the limited time that he would have available in which to arrest the vessel’s drift should it start to drag its
anchor, and might have encouraged him to reconsider his decision to anchor.

Finally, the master did not consider the possibility of the vessel experiencing stronger winds than those
forecast. A higher wind speed increased the potential for the anchoring equipment to fail or the vessel to
drag its anchor, and for an increased rate of drift reducing the time available before the vessel grounded.
With no contingency plan developed in the event of stronger winds than forecast being experienced, the
trigger point at which a response was executed became the point at which the vessel eventually started
to drag its anchor.

Monitoring of vessel at anchor

As the wind increased during the afternoon of 28 October, Stena Alegra maintained its position, which
reaffirmed to the master that the amount of cable deployed was probably sufficient to prevent the vessel
dragging its anchor in the forecast conditions. Additionally, if the vessel did start to drag its anchor,
he remained confident that, by clutching in No 3 main engine, the vessel’s drift could be satisfactorily
arrested to prevent it from grounding.

However, once the wind had increased to over 40 knots, the master became concerned by the erratic
and severe yawing of the vessel. This behaviour can be explained by the position of the vessel’s hawse
pipe which, owing to the bow door, was situated further aft on the shoulder than that on a conventional
vessel, and to the effect of the wind on the forward accommodation block. The combined effect of these
factors was a tendency for the vessel to present itself beam onto the wind, particularly during gusts.

The erratic yawing of the vessel prompted the master to consider what options might be available to him.
There is conflicting evidence suggesting that he might have been influenced by a misinterpretation of the
‘Sea State Restriction’ of 4 metres listed on the vessel’s ‘Operational Limits’ certificate in not deciding to
proceed to sea. However, once the wind had increased to 50 knots, he considered it to be too dangerous
for the vessel to safely pass through the narrow gap between Aspo and Tjurko.

Having decided to remain at anchor, the master could have taken proactive measures to reduce the risk
of the vessel dragging its anchor and grounding. No 3 main engine could have been clutched in, and all
other main engines, steering motors and thrusters could have been started and placed on bridge control.

10
 Reproduced from Chart SE 7413 by permission of the Swedish Maritime Administration, Norrköping 2012

Stern Swinging
Circlee Grounding position at
Position of Stena
Aspeskarsklapparna
Alegra’s bridge at 0900

Bridge Swinging ile

8m
0.1
Circle

Godnatt 220m
267°(T) x 0.82 mile

180m

Approximate
position of
anchor
Lassa Grund
North Cardinal
Mark

Figure 4: Anchor swinging circle for Stena Alegra

11
The master could then have manoeuvred the vessel ahead to reduce the loading on the anchoring
equipment. He could also have lowered the port anchor to the seabed to reduce the vessel’s yawing.
Although NMM’s SMS referred to the possibility of using two anchors in strong weather conditions, it
made no reference to using the second anchor for this purpose. He might also have considered paying
out more anchor cable, although this would have reduced the vessel’s distance from the leeshore and so
decreased the time available in which to prevent it from grounding.

Had the master prepared a contingency plan to respond to changes in observed wind conditions rather
than to simply react to the vessel dragging its anchor, he might have included the above measures
in that plan. Such action required a greater level of proficiency and precautionary thought than that
demonstrated. Instead, the master remained hopeful that the wind would peak before the vessel started
to drag its anchor, and was confident that the main engines would be available for use in sufficient time
to prevent it from grounding.

Dragging of anchor and grounding

When Stena Alegra started to drag its anchor the wind speed had increased to 66 knots observed on
the anemometer by the master (a maximum of 76 knots was recorded on the vessel’s VDR19). Such
wind speeds were about 50% higher than those for which the vessel’s anchoring equipment had been
designed, and it is therefore unsurprising that the vessel dragged its anchor at this stage.

The early identification that Stena Alegra was dragging its anchor failed to prevent it grounding because
of the vessel’s close proximity to the leeshore, and the crew having insufficient time in which to
respond. The main engines were at 5 minutes’ notice and were made ready within this time. However,
Stena Alegra quickly reached a speed of 3 knots when dragging, and covered the short distance to
Aspeskarsklapparna in 4 minutes. Having the main engines at 5 minutes’ notice, with the trigger point for
their use being when the vessel started to drag its anchor, was inappropriate and is indicative that the
master did not appreciate the vessel’s likely rate of drift in such circumstances.

The MAIB safety investigation report of the accident involving Willy highlighted the rate at which the
vessel dragged its anchor, allowing insufficient time for the crew to prevent it from grounding.

The master expected No 3 main engine to be immediately clutched in when requested, and he had
left written instructions on the bridge to this effect. However, his verbal instructions were for the main
engines to remain on 5 minutes’ notice. The fourth engineer’s understanding was that No 3 main engine
was running, and ready to be clutched in, to reduce the time needed to have all main engines ready for
use to satisfy the master’s 5 minutes’ notice requirement.

The differing interpretations of the master’s requirement for the main engines’ readiness remained
unresolved throughout the vessel’s time at anchor. Therefore, when the third officer called the fourth
engineer to “start the second engine quickly and clutch in the first”, the instruction failed to transmit
the master’s expectation for No 3 main engine to be clutched in and its control passed to the bridge
immediately.

No 3 main engine could, in fact, have been clutched in from the bridge, a function that none of the bridge
team were aware of. However, it is uncertain whether the immediate use of a single main engine would
have prevented the vessel from grounding in the prevailing conditions.

19
Voyage Data Recorder

12
CONCLUSIONS

• The master decided to anchor Stena Alegra with wind conditions forecast to increase to the assumed
design limitation of its anchoring equipment. In doing so, he did not take into account the additional
loading that would be caused by the vessel yawing, and did not consider contingency options should
the wind speed increase to beyond that forecast.

• In dismissing an option of proceeding to sea, the master did not consider steaming a short distance
along the coast and to then heave to in areas where the sea conditions were likely to have been more
favourable. He might also have misinterpreted the ‘Sea State Restriction’ of 4 metres listed on the
vessel’s ‘Operational Limits’ certificate.

• The master’s decision to anchor was influenced by his previous successful, albeit limited, experience
of anchoring other Ro-Ro and RoPax vessels in winds of about 40 knots. He lacked familiarity with
Stena Alegra’s capabilities and performance when anchored due to his limited time on the vessel and
a lack of available guidance on board.

• The master did not construct a swinging circle for the vessel. Had he done so, he might have been
alerted to the vessel’s close proximity to danger and the limited time that he would have available to
arrest its drift should it start to drag its anchor.

• Had the master prepared a contingency plan to respond to changes in observed wind conditions rather
than waiting for the vessel to drag its anchor, he could have taken proactive measures to prevent the
grounding.

• The master lacked an appreciation of the vessel’s likely rate of drift should it start to drag anchor in
the prevailing wind conditions. His expectation for No 3 main engine to be clutched in immediately if
the vessel dragged its anchor was not effectively communicated to the engine control room. However,
if No 3 main engine had been clutched in immediately, it is uncertain that its sole use would have
prevented the vessel from grounding.

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ACTION TAKEN

Actions taken by other organisations

The Maritime and Coastguard Agency has:

Undertaken to revise the wording of its ‘Operational Limits’ certificate pro forma to remove any potential
for confusion regarding the meaning of ‘Sea State Restrictions’.

Northern Marine Management Ltd has:

Carried out its own internal investigation into the accident, and:

• Conducted additional audits of its Ro-Ro and RoPax vessels, focusing on the standard of
management and navigation practices on board.

• Held 2-day seminars for senior officers at its head office to encourage communication and,
specifically, to discuss this accident.

• Conducted a review of its SMS anchoring and heavy weather procedures with the intention of
ensuring lessons learned from this accident are incorporated.

• Issued a fleet circular with amendments to be incorporated in the next revision of its SMS Manual.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

Northern Marine Management Ltd is recommended to:

2014/118 Improve its safety management system by:

• Providing specific guidance on the operational limitations of vessels’ anchoring

equipment.

• Providing further guidance to masters on its expectations for anchor planning, including
the importance of contingency planning and the need for early action to prevent a
vessel dragging its anchor.

• Enhancing its masters’ handover procedures to ensure that key information regarding
a vessel’s capabilities and performance while at anchor are discussed during handover
periods.

Safety recommendations shall in no case create a presumption of blame or liability

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SHIP PARTICULARS
Vessel’s name Stena Alegra
Flag United Kingdom
Classification society RINA
IMO number/fishing numbers 9147291
Type RoPax

Registered owner Stena North Sea Ltd

Manager(s) Northern Marine Management Ltd
Year of build 1997
Construction Steel
Length overall 180.0 metres
Registered length Not applicable
Gross tonnage 22,152
Minimum safe manning 20
Authorised cargo Vehicles and passengers

VOYAGE PARTICULARS
Port of departure Karlskrona (anchorage B)
Port of arrival Karlskrona (anchorage B)
Type of voyage International
Cargo information In ballast
Manning 33

MARINE CASUALTY INFORMATION

Date and time 28 October 13, 1851 (UTC+1)
Type of marine casualty or incident Serious Marine Casualty
Location of incident Karlskrona, Sweden
Place on board Not applicable
Injuries/fatalities None
Damage/environmental impact Plate and frame damage to hull plating with one ballast
and one void tank opened to sea, no pollution

Ship operation Anchored

Voyage segment Anchored
External & internal environment Wind south-west force 12; moderate sea state; good
visibility

Persons on board 33

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