G.R. No.

87332 August 13, 1990 In defiance of the Minister's return-to-work order, the Union declared a strike on January 3,
EDUARDO CRUZ, MOISES MACASO, ROY GALLINERA, PERCIVAL CRUZ, BUBBY VALERIO, 1985 and established picketlines at the Bank's Head Office and Binondo Branch.
ROY PAMITTAN, MANOLO ORBETA & MARIANO VILLA, petitioners, vs. THE HON. PURA
FERRER-CALLEJA, in her capacity as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, & ROLANDO On January 31, 1985, Minister Ople issued an Order resolving the deadlock issues in the
G. OCAMPO, ET AL., * respondents. collective bargaining and in effect drew up a new CBA for the parties. The 3-year term of the new
CBA would expire on January 31, 1988. The union asked for reconsideration, and on February 11,
Douglas G. Baarde for petitioners. 1985, continued its strike. Two hundred seventy (270) striking officers and employees of ABEU
Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Taquio, Sy and Associates for private respondents. (among them were the private respondents) were dismissed by the Bank for abandonment of
work and commission of illegal acts.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
On March 4, 1985, the Bank filed in the Arbitration Branch, NCR, NLRC, a petition to declare the
SUMMARY: The term of the Allied Bank Employees Union’s (ABEU) officers was to expire on strike illegal.
February 10, 1987.
Upon receipt of the Resolution dated March 7, 1985 modifying Minister Ople's order dated January
The Allied Bank and the Union reached a bargaining deadlock in their negotiation for a new CBA. 31, 1985, the ABEU on March 8, 1985 lifted its picketlines and announced its intention to return
Hence, a notice of strike was filed by the ABEU. The Minister of Labor issued a return-to-work order to work. However, the Bank refused to admit the strikers.
to the ABEU, which the latter defied. The ABEU then continued with its strike and established a picket
line outside the Allied Bank’s Binondo branch. On March 19, 1985, a referendum was conducted by the ABEU to ratify the 1985-1988 CBA
incorporating the additional benefits awarded in the March 7, 1985 resolution. A majority voted for
Hence, over 270 employees and union officers were dismissed for abandonment of work and ratification.
commission of illegal acts.
On July 15, 1985, the Bank filed a motion praying for the issuance of an order directing the Union to
The National Union of Bank Employees, a union to which the ABEU was a chapter, issued a special hold a general membership meeting for the purpose of designating union representatives who would
resolution creating an Interim Board for the ABEU. The Interim Board was tasked to continue sign the CBA inasmuch as the Union's officers had already been dismissed by the Bank.
negotiations with the Allied Bank and to sign the new CBA.
On November 11, 1985, the NUBE issued a special resolution creating an ABEU Interim Board
Negotiations continued between the Allied Bank and the ABEU Interim Board. Meanwhile, the ABEU tasked to sign the new CBA with the Bank in lieu of the union officers who had been dismissed
Interim Board submitted to the referendum the matter of extending their term of office for one year. by the Bank. **
They sought to postpone the election of the new regular officers of the ABEU. A majority of the
employees agreed. In January, 1987, the Interim Board commenced negotiations with the Bank for a one-year extension
of the CBA which was expiring on January 31, 1988. A drive for the extension of the CBA began in
The old officers protested this referendum. Hence, they filed a suit before the DOLE. Meanwhile, the March 1987 for the referendum would take place on June 23, 1987. However, the Interim Board
Interim Board appointed a Comelec which issued a resolution setting the election of officers on also submitted to the referendum the matter of extending for one year the term of office of the
February 10, 1988. The Bureau of Labor Relations ordered the Interim Board from proceeding with Interim Board, in effect, postponing for one year the election of the regular officers of the Union.
such election, but the latter went ahead with the election. They won. The overwhelming majority of the union members voted yes in the referendum. The
postponement of the election did not sit well with the ousted officers led by private respondent
The Med-Arbiter ordered the conduct of a new election of the regular officers of the union. She also Rolando Ocampo. On June 23, 1987, they filed in the Office of Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon a
declared void the extension of the term of the Interim Board. She also declared void the election letter-petition against the postponement of the election of the officers of the Union and to nullify
conducted by the Inter Board on February 10. the one year extension of the CBA.

Issue: Whether the med-arbiter erred in declaring the extension of the term void After the referendum result was announced on July 3, 1987, the Bank granted a P600 "signing
bonus" to all the employees. Private respondents and other employees stationed in the Strata
Held: No. The ABEU Interim Board "overstepped its bounds" for it was constituted and authorized Building in Pasig, Metro Manila, collected the signing bonus but, in protest, they deposited it in the
only "to sign for and in behalf of the union the Collective Bargaining Agreement with the Bank and Equitable Banking Corporation, payable to Allied Bank through Secretary Drilon.
administer the CBA and the operation of the union
The Office of the Secretary of Labor forwarded the letter-petition of respondent Rolando Ocampo to
It may be true, that the task of administering the operation of the union was given to the ABEU-Interim the National Capital Region, DOLE, Manila, which subsequently treated it as a formal petition,
Board at the time it was constituted, to fill in the vacuum in the local union's leadership during that docketed as Case No. NCR-OP-M-8-611-87.
time. Nonetheless said task could not be exercised beyond the regular term of the regular officers.
After the hearing of the petition and the submission of the parties' position papers, the Med-Arbiter,
FACTS: In 1984, the Allied Bank Employees Union (ABEU), which was then a mere chapter of on January 4, 1988, issued an order directing the Union to call a general membership meeting
the National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE), elected its officers, whose term of office would where the manner of conducting the election could be discussed before fixing the date of the
expire on February 10, 1987. election. The order declared null and void the one-year extension of the CBA from February 1,
1988 to January 31, 1989.
Before the expiration of the old CBA between the ABEU and Allied Bank on June 30, 1984, the
ABEU negotiated for a new CBA. However, because the Union and the Bank could not agree on Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration (which was treated as an appeal) of the order of the
major economic proposals, a bargaining deadlock ensued. Med-Arbiter. In a resolution dated January 6, 1988, the Interim Board appointed a Comelec which, on
January 8, 1988, issued a resolution setting the election of officers on February 10, 1988.
ABEU filed a Notice of Strike on November 26, 1984. Labor Minister Blas Ople assumed jurisdiction
over the labor dispute on December 19, 1984. On motion of Ocampo, et al, the Bureau of Labor Relations issued on February 9, 1988, a temporary
restraining order enjoining petitioners, including the Union's Comelec, from proceeding with the
election on February 10, 1988. However, despite the restraining order, the Union held the
election on February 10, 1988 as scheduled. Petitioners were declared the winners in the election.

On March 2, 1989, the public respondent, Director Pura Calleja of the BLR, issued a resolution
whose dispositive portion reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the election conducted in Allied Bank Employees Union on February 10, 1988 is
hereby declared null and void.
Another election is hereby ordered conducted in accordance with the express tenor of the Med-Arbiter's Order dated 4
January 1988, that a general membership meeting shall first be held where the mechanics of the election shall be fully
threshed out.
In the meantime, the officers who were elected on 10 February 1988 and whose election to office we now declare null and
void are hereby temporarily charged with the safekeeping of the union funds subject to accounting before the new set of
officers which shall be elected in accordance with this Order.
The respondent Bank is likewise enjoined to observe absolute neutrality during these activities, they being purely an
internal affair of the union. (p. 7, Rollo.)

The issues raised in this petition for certiorari are as follows:

a) Whether or not the public respondent erred in declaring null and void the election held on February 10, 1988; and
b) Whether or not the extension of the CBA was valid.
ISSUE: WON the Med-Arbiter gravely abused her discretion in nullifying the resolution of the Board of
Administrators of the Employees Union which extended the term of office of the union officers (NO)

RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of merit. No costs. SO ORDERED.

RATIO: There is no merit in the petitioners' contention that the public respondent gravely abused her
discretion in annulling the February 10, 1988 election of officers. The public respondent correctly
noted that in ordering the postponement of the election for one year (in effect extending their
term of office for one year), the ABEU Interim Board "overstepped its bounds" for it was
constituted and authorized only "to sign for and in behalf of the union the Collective
Bargaining Agreement with the Bank and administer the CBA and the operation of the union." (p.
27, Rollo.)

Instead of calling a regular election of officers of ABEU on 11 February 1987, as

mandated by the Union's Constitution and by-laws, respondents submitted in a
"referendum" the extension of their term of office for yet another year , from 11
February 1987 to 10 February 1988.

From the very inception the referendum process initiated by the Interim Board was
improper. The results therefrom are therefore, invalid. It may be true, that the task of
administering the operation of the union was given to the ABEU-Interim Board at the
time it was constituted, to fill in the vacuum in the local union's leadership during that time.
Nonetheless said task could not be exercised beyond the regular term of the regular
officers. Stated simply, the exercise of said task is only coterminous with the term of
the regular officers, in whose shoes, the members of the ABEU-Interim Board merely
stepped into.

When the term of the union's regular officers expired on February 11, 1987 the
election of officers should have been held, in accordance with the provision of the union
constitution and bylaws. With the expiration of the term of the regular officers, the term of
the ABEU-Interim Board, expired too. In calling the referendum therefore, the ABEU-
Interim Board clearly overstepped its bounds. (pp. 27-28, Rollo.)

The second issue regarding the validity of the one-year extension of the CBA, as observed by the BLR, has become
moot and academic. The public respondent's view that the one-year extension was also null and void is not quite
correct for the extension was approved by the Union in a referendum which was properly supervised by the
Department of Labor. It was accepted by the Bank which gave a "signing bonus" to the employees who voted for it.
Since the holding of the referendum was within the authority of the Interim Board "to administer the CBA and
operate the union," and the extension was acceptable to both of the parties to the agreement, and did not violate
any law, it is valid and binding on them.
G.R. No. 99395 June 29, 1993 Only the collective bargaining agent, the local union SLMCEA in this case, possesses legal standing
ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN O. TORRES and ST. LUKE'S to negotiate with petitioner. A duly registered local union affiliated with a national union or federation
MEDICAL CENTER ASSOCIATION-ALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS ("SLMCEA- does not lose its legal personality or independence
AFW"), respondents.
Sofronio A. Ona for petitioner.
Edgar R. Martir for respondent union.
FACTS: In response to the mandate under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code and amidst the labor
MELO, J.: controversy between petitioner St. Luke's Medical Center and private respondent St. Luke's
Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers (SLMCEA-AFW), then
EDITOR’S NOTE: Maraming facts ‘yung case regarding the economic issues between the company Secretary of Labor Ruben D. Torres, issued the Order of January 28, 1991 requiring the parties
and the union, the prematurity of the order of the med-arbiter, and the retroactive effect of the CBA. to execute and finalize their 1990-1993 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) to retroact to the
The primary focus here is ‘yung fact na may dispute sa Federation regarding leadership. Ginamit ito expiration of the anterior CBA. The parties were also instructed to incorporate in the new CBA the
ng St. Lukes as a basis na hindi binding ‘yung mga negotiations nila with the local union. disposition on economic and non-economic issues spelled out in said Order (p. 48, Rollo).
Separate motions for re-evaluation from the parties were to no avail; hence, the petition at bar
SUMMARY: The St. Luke’s Medical Center Employees-Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers (or premised on the following ascriptions of error, to wit:
SLMCEA-AFW) was affiliated with the Alliance of Filipino Workers.
I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND/OR COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE VIOLATED PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS, PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMPLETELY
There was squabbling within the Alliance of Filipino Workers regarding the leadership of the IGNORED THE LATTER'S EVIDENCE AND ISSUED THE QUESTIONED AWARDS ON THE BASIS OF ARBITRARY GUESSWORKS,
CONJECTURES AND INFERENCES.
federation. On one side was the faction of Gregorio del Prado. On the other end was the wing of
Purita Ramirez. Both of them claimed to be the rightful leaders of the AFW. A petition was docketed II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE CURTAILED THE PARTIES' RIGHT TO FREE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, AND WHEN HE GRANTED MONETARY AWARDS AND ADDITIONAL BENEFITS TO THE EMPLOYEES
in the DOLE for the declaration on who were the legitimate officers of the AFW. GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE OPERATING INCOME OF PETITIONER.

III. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE ADOPTED/CONSIDERED THE ALLEGATIONS OF
Meanwhile, while all this was going on, the SLMCEA-AFW began negotiation with St. Luke’s THE UNION THAT THE HOSPITAL OFFERED SALARY AND MEAL ALLOWANCE INCREASES IN THE AMOUNT OF P1,140,00 FOR
THE FIRST YEAR AND P700.00 ACROSS THE BOARD MONTHLY SALARY INCREASES FOR THE SECOND AND THIRD YEARS OF
regarding the renewal of their CBA. Informal Negotiations then began between the company and the THE NEW CBA.
local union, where St. Luke’s proposed maximum across-the-board monthly salary increase of
IV. FINALLY, PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE GAVE HIS AWARD RETROACTIVE
P375.00 per employee, to which proposal private respondent demanded a P1,500.00 hike or 50% EFFECT.
increase based on the latest salary rate of each employee, whichever is higher.
When the collective bargaining agreement for the period August 1, 1987 to July 30, 1990 was
Later, Del Prado was declared to be the rightful leader of the AFW. Thereafter, negotiations continued forged between petitioner and private respondent, the incumbent national president of AFW,
between St. Lukes and the local union, but such negotiations reached a deadlock. The Secretary of the federation to which the local union SLMCEA is affiliated, was Gregorio del Prado.
Labor assumed jurisdiction and, after the parties submitted their pleadings, issued a resolution
resolving the economic issues between St. Luke’s and the local union: Before the expiration of the 1987-90 CBA, the AFW was plagued by internal squabble splitting its
leadership between Del Prado and Purita Ramirez, resulting in the filing by AFW and Del Prado of
First year — P1,140.00 broken down as follows: P510.00 in compliance with the government mandated a petition later docketed before the Department of Labor as NCR-00-M-90-05-077, where a
daily salary increase of P17.00; and P630.00 CBA across the board monthly salary increase. declaration was sought on the legitimacy of Del Prado's faction as bona fide officers of the
Second year — P700.00 across the board monthly salary increase. federation.
Third year — P700.00 across the board monthly salary increase.
Pending resolution of said case, herein private respondent SLMCEA-AFW brought to the
The above-mentioned order is based off of the last proposal of St. Luke’s from the negotiations with
attention of petitioner via a letter dated July 4, 1990 that the 1987-1990 CBA was about to expire,
the local union.
and manifested in the process that private respondent wanted to renew the CBA. This development
triggered round-table talks on which occasions petitioner proposed, among other items, a
Now, St. Lukes comes before the Court on Certiorari alleging (as far as our topic is concerned) that it
maximum across-the-board monthly salary increase of P375.00 per employee, to which
never entered into proper negotiations with the local union. St. Luke’s contends that since there was a
proposal private respondent demanded a P1,500.00 hike or 50% increase based on the latest
dispute within the AFW, the negotiations between it and the local union were mere informal ones; that
salary rate of each employee, whichever is higher.
nothing conclusive on the terms and conditions of the proposed CBA could be arrived at when the
other party, private respondent SLMCEA-AFW is confronted with an unresolved representation issue. In the meantime, relative to the interpleader case (NCR-00-M-90-05-070) initiated by petitioner to settle the question
as to who between Del Prado and Diwa was authorized to collect federation dues assessed from hospital
St. Luke’s argues that since no formal negotiations were conducted, it could not have possibly made employees, the Med-Arbiter recognized Del Prado's right (p. 423, Rollo). This resolution of July 31,
an offer of P1,140.00 as salary and meal allowance increases for the first year and an increase of 1990 was elevated to the Labor Secretary.
P700.00 across-the-board monthly salary for the second and third years of the new CBA.
That talks that then ensued between petitioner and private respondent were disturbed anew
Issue: Were the negotiations between the Union and St. Luke’s not binding, considering there was a when the other wing in the AFW headed by Purita Ramirez, expressed its objections to the on-
dispute within AFW’s ranks? going negotiations, and when a petition for certification election was filed by the Association of
Democratic Labor Organization of petitioner. However, private respondent emerged victorious after
Held: No. The Court sustained the union. It held that the local union and the federation had separate the elections and was thus certified as the exclusive bargaining entity of petitioner's rank and file
and distinct personalities. employees.

The SC held that it is immaterial whether the representation issue within AFW has been resolved with Following the decision dated September 14, 1990 in NCR-00-M-90-05-077 (pp. 444-445, Rollo) which
finality or not. Said squabble could not possibly serve as a bar to any collective bargaining since AFW upheld the legitimacy of Del Prado's status including the other officers, Bayani Diwa of the Ramirez
is not the real party-in-interest to the talks; rather, the negotiations were confined to petitioner and the Wing appealed; the two cases — NCR-00-M-90-05-070 for interpleader and NCR-00-90-05-077 —
local union SLMCEA which is affiliated to AFW. were consolidated.
 YR I
On September 17, 1990, private respondent wrote petitioner for the resumption of their
negotiations concerning the union's proposed CBA. Petitioner reacted by writing a letter on A. P1,40 added to basic pay

September 20, 1990 expressing willingness to negotiate a new CBA for the rank and file employees a) P1,140 x 1,500 (no. of employees) x 12 (months) — P 20,520,000
b) 13th month pay: P1,140 x 1,500 — 1,710,000

who are not occupying confidential positions. Negotiations thus resumed. However, a deadlock on c) Overtime pay, 20% of payroll — 4,104,000
d) Holiday pay, PM/Night pay — 1,026,000
issues, especially that bearing on across-the-board monthly and meal allowances followed and to e) Sick leave — 855,000
f) Funeral, Paternity, Maternity leaves, retirement
pre-empt the impending strike as voted upon by a majority of private respondent's membership, pay — 820,000

petitioner lodged the petition below. The Secretary of Labor immediately assumed jurisdiction B. P230 added to meal allowance

and the parties submitted their respective pleadings. a) P230 x 1,500 x 12 — 4,140,000

C. One day added to sick leave

On January 22, 1991, a resolution was issued in the consolidated cases which eventually a) (Ave. pay P3,000 = P1,140) divided by 30 x 1,500 — 222,000

declared Gregorio del Prado and his group as the legitimate officials of the AFW and the D. Sick leave cash conversion base reduced from 60 to 45 days

acknowledged group to represent AFW (pp. 320-321, Rollo). a) (P3,300 = P1,140)/30 x 1,200 — 2,664,000

E. Retirement benefits adjustment — 500,000

On January 28, 1991, public respondent Secretary of Labor issued the Order now under —————

challenge. Said Order contained a disposition on both the economic and non-economic issues FIRST YEAR ADDITIONAL COST P 36,561,000

raised in the petition. On the economic issues, he thus ruled: YR II

A. Yr I increase except sick leave cash conversion

First year — P1,140.00 broken down as follows: P510.00 in compliance with the government mandated from 60 to 45 — P33,897,000

daily salary increase of P17.00; and P630.00 CBA across the board monthly salary increase. B. P700 added to monthly basic pay
Second year — P700.00 across the board monthly salary increase. a) P700 x 1,500 x 12 — 2,600,000
Third year — P700.00 across the board monthly salary increase. b) 13th month pay: P700 x 1,500 — 1,050,000
c) Overtime, pay, 20% of P12.6 M — 2,520,000
d) Holiday pay, PM/Night pay — 630,000
e) Sick leave: 15 days x 700/30 x 1,500 — 525,000
It is understood that the second and third year salary increases shall not be chargeable to future f) Funeral, paternity, maternity leaves, retirement pay — 504,000
————
government mandated wage increases. (p. 47, Rollo.)
SECOND YEAR ADDITIONAL COST P51,726,000

As earlier stated, both parties moved for reconsideration of the above order, but both motions YR III

were denied. Consequently, petitioner St. Luke's filed the instant petition, a special civil action A. Yr I and Yr II increases — 88,287,000

on certiorari. B. P700 added to basic pay

a) P700 x 1,500 x 12 — 12,600,000

b) 13th month pay: P700 x 1,500 — 1,050,000
In assailing the Order of January 28, 1991, petitioner St. Luke's focuses on public respondent's c) Overtime pay, 20% of P12.6 M — 2,520,000
d) Holiday pay, PM/Night pay — 630,000
disposition of the economic issues. e) Sick leave — 525,000
f) Funeral, paternity, maternity, leaves,
retirement pay — 504,000
————
COMPANY’S CONTENTION:
THIRD YEAR ADDITIONAL COST — 106,116,000

TOTAL THREE-YEAR ADDITIONAL

First, petitioner finds highly questionable the very basis of public respondent's decision to award
BENEFIT/WAGES — 194,403,000
P1,140.00 as salary and meal allowance increases for the first year and P700.00 across-the-
(pp. 14-16, Rollo).
board monthly salary increases for the succeeding second and third years of the new CBA.
According to petitioner, private respondent SLMCEA-AFW misled public respondent into On the basis of the foregoing, petitioner St. Luke's concludes that it would be in a very poor position
believing that said amounts were the last offer of petitioner St. Luke's immediately prior to the to even produce the resources necessary to pay the wage increases of its rank and file employees.
deadlock. Petitioner vehemently denies having made such offer, claiming that its only offer consists of
the following: ******ST. LUKE’S CONTENTION ON THE AFW LEADERSHIP DISPUTE (IMPORTANT)
Non-Economic Issues:
Petitioner also impugns public respondent's awards on grounds of prematurity, emphasizing that the
St. Luke's submits that it is adopting the non-economic issues proposed and agreed upon in its Collective Bargaining Agreement with SLMCEA-
AFW for the period covering 1987, 1990. Copy of the CBA is attached as Annex "F" hereof.
awards in question even preceded collective bargaining negotiations which have to take place first
between both litigants. It denies entering into a round of negotiations with private respondent
Economic Issue
SLMCEA-AFW on the theory that the meetings referred to by the latter were merely informal
St. Luke's respectfully offers to give an increase to all its rank and file employees computed as follows: ones, without any binding effect on the parties because AFW is torn between two factions vying
First Year — P900 (P700.00 basic + P200.00 food allowance) for an over all total food allowance of P320.00. for the right to represent it. Thus, petitioner maintains that nothing conclusive on the terms and
Second Year — P400
conditions of the proposed CBA could be arrived at when the other party, private respondent
SLMCEA-AFW is confronted with an unresolved representation issue.
Third Year — P400

plus the union will be allowed to operate and manage one (1) canteen for free to augment their funds. Although the profit shall be divided equally Petitioner argues further that since no formal negotiations were conducted, it could not have
between union and SLMC, the operation of the canteen will generate for them a monthly income of no less than P15,000.00, and likewise provide
cheap and subsidized food to Union members. possibly made an offer of P1,140.00 as salary and meal allowance increases for the first year
The wage increase as proposed shall be credited to whatever increases in the minimum wage or to any across the board increases that may be
and an increase of P700.00 across-the-board monthly salary for the second and third years of
mandated by the government or the DOLE. (pp. 20-21, Rollo.) the new CBA. It raises doubts on the veracity of the minutes presented by private respondent
SLMCEA-AFW to prove that negotiations were held, particularly on October 26, 1990, when petitioner
Petitioner charges that public respondent, in making such award, erroneously relied on the allegedly made said offer as its last ditch effort for a compromise prior to the deadlock. According to
extrapolated figures provided by respondent SLMCEA-AFW, which grossly inflated petitioner St. petitioner, these minutes, unsigned by petitioner, were merely concocted by private respondent
Luke's net income. Petitioner contends that if the disputed award are sustained, the wage SLMCEA-AFW.
increases and benefits shall total approximately P194,403,000.00 which it claims is excessive and
unreasonable, considering that said aggregate amount is more than its projected income for the next Finally, petitioner attacks the Order of January 28, 1991 for being violative of Article 253-A of the
three years. To illustrate its point, petitioner submits the following computation: Labor Code, particularly its provisions on retroactivity. Said Article pertinently provides:
 xxx xxx xxx awards such as those involved in the instant case. According to private respondent, Article 253-A of the Labor Code
is clear and plain on its face as referring only to collective bargaining agreements entered into by management and
Any agreement on such other provisions of the collective bargaining agreement entered into within six (6) months from the
the certified exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees therein within six (6) months from the expiry of
date of expiry of the term of such other provisions as fixed in the collective bargaining agreement, shall retroact to the day
immediately following such date. If any such agreement is entered into beyond six months, the parties shall agree on the the old CBA.
duration of retroactivity thereof. In case of a deadlock in the renegotiation of the collective bargaining agreement, the
parties may exercise their rights under this Code. These foregoing contentions and arguments of private respondent have been similarly put forward by the Office of
the Solicitor General in its Consolidated Comment filed on November 23, 1991. The Solicitor General share a the
Petitioner argues that in granting retroactive effect to the enforceability of the CBA, public respondent committed an views of private respondent SLMCEA-AFW.
act contrary to the above provision of law, pointing out that the old CBA expired on July 30, 1990 and the questioned
order was issued on January 28, 1991. Petitioner theorizes that following Article 13 of the Civil Code which provides We are now tasked to rule on the petition. Do petitioner's evidence and arguments provide adequate basis for the
that there are 30 days in one month, the questioned Order of January 28, 1991 was issued beyond the six-month charge of alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by public respondent in his Order of January 28, 1991 as to
period, graphically shown thus: warrant its annulment by this Court? This is the sole issue in the case at bar. Consequently, this Court would apply
the following yardstick in resolving the aforestated issue: that public respondent, in the exercise of his power to
July 30, 1990 Expiration assume over subject labor dispute, acted whimsically, capriciously, or in an arbitrary, despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility which was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
July 31 = 1 day
August 1-31, 1990 = 31 days virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law (San Sebastian College vs. Court of
September 1-30, 1990 = 30 days Appeals, 197 SCRA 138 [1991]).
October 1-31, 1990 = 31 days
November 1-30, 1990 = 30 days
December 1-31, 1990 = 31 days Subjected to and measure by this test, the challenged Order, we believe, can withstand even the
January 1-28, 1991 = 28 days
————————— most rigorous scrutiny.
TOTAL = 182 days

(6 months and 2 days) Petitioner assails the Order of January 28, 1991 on three grounds:
UNION’S CONTENTION:
(a) unreasonable and baselessness; (b) prematurity; and (c) violation of Article 253-A of the Labor
Traversing petitioner's arguments, private respondent SLMCEA-AFW contends that the formulation of the terms and
Code.
conditions of the CBA awards is well supported by the factual findings of public respondent which established that
petitioner failed to refute private respondent's allegation that during their last meeting on October 26, 1990,
petitioner stood pat on its offer of P1,140.00 as salary and meal allowance increases for the first year of the ISSUE: WON the “Informal Negotiations” conducted between St. Lukes and the Employees union
new CBA and P700.00 across-the-board salary increases for the second and third years thereof . Said were binding on the company, considering that there was a representation dispute within the
awards, it said, are well within the means of petitioner because its reported net income of P15 million, P11 million, Federation to which the Union belonged?
and 13 million for 1987, 1988, and 1989, respectively, have been actually understated. Moreover, private
respondent claims that petitioner, in actual terms, does not have to pay the alleged amount of P194,403,000.00 for
wages and benefits in favor of its employees. Such amount, according to private respondent, is bloated and
RULING: YES. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO
excessive. Private respondent in substantiating such claim made the following analysis: ORDERED.

First P1,140.00 total salary increase for the first year (1990-1991) of the new CBA is divided into: P510.00 in compliance with the RATIO:
government mandated daily salary increase of P17.00 and P630.00 CBA across the board monthly salary increase, thus, the
whole P1,140.00 salary increase is payable only beginning August 1, 1990 (reckoned from the CBA July 30, 1990 expiry date) up
to October 31, 1990 only following the November 1, 1990 effectivity of WAGE ORDER NO. NCR-01 which granted the said
P17.00 daily wage increase or P510.00 monthly of which herein petitioner promptly complied with and paid to its employees and
ON THE ECONOMIC ISSUES
therefore deductible from P1,140.00 total monthly salary increase (Annex "A" — Petitioner and Annex "13" hereof);

Second, the remaining P630.00 CBA across the board monthly salary increase takes effect on November 1, 1990 up to January We rule that the Order, particularly in its disposition on the economic issues, was not arbitrarily
7, 1991 only following the January 8, 1991 effectivity of WAGE ORDER NO. NCR-02 which mandated P12.00 daily wage increase imposed by public respondent. A perusal of the Order shows that public respondent took into
or P630.00 monthly, hence, reducing the P630.00 CBA monthly salary increase to P270.00 CBA monthly salary increase effective
January 8, 1991 and onwards till July 31, 1991 (Annexes "22" and "23" hereof); consideration the parties' respective contentions, a clear indication that he was keenly aware of their
Third, that out of an estimated workforce of 1,264 regular employees  inclusive of about 209 supervisors, unit, junior area, division
contrary positions. Both sides having been heard, they were allowed to present their respective
department managers and top level executives, all occupying permanent positions, and approximately 55 regular but highly evidence. The due process requirement was thus clearly observed. Considering public respondent's
confidential employees, only 1,000 rank-and-file regular/permanent employees (casuals, contractuals, probies and security guards
excluded) are entitled to the CBA benefits for three (3) years (1990-1993) (as private respondent SLMCEA-AFW gathered and expertise on the subject and his observance of the cardinal principles of due process, the assailed
analyzed from the petitioner's Personnel Strength Report hereto attached as Annex "28" hereof)  vis-a-vis the generalized and Order deserves to be accorded great respect by this Court.
inflated 1,500 employees as total workforce purportedly entitled to CBA benefits per its self-serving and incredible computation;

Fourth, the petitioner's computed 20% overtime pay of the basic salary is unrealistic and overstated in view of its extreme cost-
cutting/ savings measures on all expenditures, most specially, on overtime work adopted since last year and a continuing
Equally worth mentioning is the fact that in resolving the economic issues, public respondent
management priority project up to the present; and merely adopted in toto petitioner's proposals. Consequently, petitioner cannot now claim that
Fifth, due to the above consideration, the total real award of wages and fringe benefits is far less than the true annual hefty the awards are unreasonable and baseless. Neither can it deny having made such proposals,
operating net income of the petitioner. as it attempted to do in its Motion for Reconsideration of the challenged Order before public
The net result is that the first year award of P1,140.00 monthly salary increase of which P510.00 monthly salary increase is made respondent and which it continues to pursue in the instant petition. It is too late in the day for such
in compliance with the P510.00 monthly wage increase at P17.00 daily wage increase effective November 1, 1990 under Wage
Order No. NCR-01 (Annex "13" hereof) or with the intended P630.00 CBA monthly salary increase is further reduced by P360.00
pretense, especially so because petitioner failed to controvert private respondent's allegation
monthly wage increase at P12.00 daily wage increase effective January 8, 1991 under Wage Order No. contained in its Comment to the petition before the Labor Secretary that petitioner had offered as its
NCR-02 (Annex "22" hereof), thereby leaving a downgraded or watered down CBA monthly increase of P270.00 only.
last proposal said salary and meal allowance increases. As correctly pointed out by public
Comparatively speaking, the 13% monthly salary increase of each employee average basic monthly salary of P2,500.00 in 1987 respondent, petitioner failed, when it had the chance, to rebut the same in its Reply to said
or P325.00 monthly salary increase granted by the petitioner under the first old CBA (1987-1990) is better than the much diluted
P270.00 CBA monthly salary increase (in lieu of the awarded P630.00 CBA monthly salary increase for the first year of the new Comment, considering that the resolution of the labor dispute at that was still pending. Any
CBA under Order, dated January 28, 1991, of public respondent). (Annexes "A" and "G" — Petition). (pp. 390-391, Rollo.)
objection on this point is thus deemed waived.
Private respondent concludes that petitioner's version that it will have to pay P194,403,000.00 is not true because
this will be drastically reduced by 40% to 60% in real terms due to a smaller number of employees covered. It is ON THE REPRESENTATION ISSUE (TOPIC)
further explained that the government-decreed wage increases abovementioned already form part of the P1,140.00
wage and meal allowance increases, not to mention the strict cost-cutting measures and practices on overtime and We do not see merit in petitioner's theory that the awards were granted prematurely. In its effort
expense items adopted by petitioner since 1990. to persuade this Court along this point, petitioner denies having negotiated with private
respondent SLMCEA-AFW. Petitioner collectively refers to all the talks conducted with private
With respect to public respondent's ruling that the CBA awards should be given retroactive effect, private respondent as mere informal negotiations due to the representation issue involving AFW.
respondent agrees with the Labor Secretary's view that Article 253-A of the Labor Code does not apply to arbitral
Petitioner thus argues that in the absence of any formal negotiations, no collective bargaining
could have taken place. Public respondent, petitioner avers, should have required the parties
instead to negotiate rather than prematurely issuing his order.

We cannot agree with this line of reasoning. It is immaterial whether the representation issue
within AFW has been resolved with finality or not. Said squabble could not possibly serve as a
bar to any collective bargaining since AFW is not the real party-in-interest to the talks ; rather,
the negotiations were confined to petitioner and the local union SLMCEA which is affiliated to
AFW.

Only the collective bargaining agent, the local union SLMCEA in this case, possesses legal
standing to negotiate with petitioner. A duly registered local union affiliated with a national
union or federation does not lose its legal personality or independence (Adamson and
Adamson, Inc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relations and Adamson and Adamson Supervising Union
(FFW), 127 SCRA 268 [1984]). In Elisco-Elirol Labor Union (NAFLU) vs. Noriel (180 SCRA 681
[1977]), then Justice Teehankee re-echoed the words of Justice Esguerra in Liberty Cotton Mills
Workers Union vs. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc. (66 SCRA 512 [1975]), thus:

(T)he locals are separate and distinct units primarily designed to secure and maintain an
equality of bargaining power between the employer and their employee-members in the
economic struggle for the fruits of the joint productive effort of labor and capital; and the
association of the locals into the national union (as PAFLU) was in furtherance of the same
end. These associations are consensual entities capable of entering into such legal
relations with their members. The essential purpose was the affiliation of the local unions
into a common enterprise to increase by collective action the common bargaining power in
respect of the terms and conditions of labor. Yet the locals remained the basic units of
association, free to serve their own and the common interest of all, subject to the
restraints imposed by the Constitution and By-Laws of the Association, and free
also to renounce the affiliation for mutual welfare upon the terms laid down in the
agreement which brought it into existence. (at p. 688; emphasis in the original.)

Appending "AFW" to the local union's name does not mean that the federation absorbed the
latter. No such merger can be construed. Rather, what is conveyed is the idea of affiliation, with
the local union and the larger national federation retaining their separate personalities.

Petitioner cannot pretend to be unaware of these legal principles since they enjoy the benefit of legal
advice from their distinguished counsel. Thus, we are constrained to agree with the position of the
Solicitor General that petitioner conveniently used the representation issue within AFW to skirt
entering into bargaining negotiations with the private respondent.

ON PREMATURITY OF THE ORDER (IRRELEVANT)

Too, petitioner is in error in contending that the order was prematurely issued. It must be recalled that immediately after the deadlock in
the talks, it was petitioner which filed a petition with the Secretary of Labor for the latter to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute. In
effect, petitioner submitted itself to the public respondent's authority and recognized the latter's power to settle the labor dispute
pursuant to article 263(g) of the Labor Code granting him the power and authority to decide the dispute. It cannot, therefore, be said
that public respondent's decision to grant the awards is premature and pre-emptive of the parties' right to collectively bargain, simply
because the Order of January 28, 1991 was unfavorable to one or the other party, for as we held in  Saulog Transit, Inc. vs. Lazaro,
(128 SCRA 591 [1984]):

It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. A party cannot
invoke jurisdiction at one time and reject it at another time in the same controversy to suit its interests and
convenience. The Court frowns upon and does not tolerate the undesirable practice of same litigants who
submit voluntarily a cause and then accepting the judgment when favorable to them and attacking it for lack
of jurisdiction when adverse. (Tajonera v. Lamaroxa, 110 SCRA 447, citing Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA
35). (at p. 601.)

Finally, the effectivity of the Order of January 28, 1991, must retroact to the date of the expiration of the previous CBA, contrary to the
position of petitioner. Under the circumstances of the case, Article 253-A cannot be property applied to herein case. As correctly stated
by public respondent in his assailed Order of April 12, 1991 dismissing petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration —

Anent the alleged lack of basis for the retroactivity provisions awarded, we would stress that the provision of
law invoked by the Hospital, Article 253-A of the Labor Code, speak of agreements by and between the
parties, and not arbitral awards . . . (p. 818, Rollo.)

Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting retroactivity of the effectivity of arbitral awards issued by the
Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, such as herein involved, public respondent is deemed vested with
plenary and discretionary powers to determine the effectivity thereof.
G.R. No. L-41288 January 31, 1977 Then came the assertion that on May 27, 1974, with due notice to all the members of the PLAC, and
PHILIPPINES LABOR ALLIANCE COUNCIL (PLAC), petitioner, with more than 1,500 of them present, such collective bargaining agreement was ratified by a
vs. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS-ORION CHAPTER, unanimous vote.  It was then so certified by the former National Labor Relations Commission
GERARDO ROSANA and ORION MANILA, INC. respondents. on June 4, 1974.   It was further alleged that at the time of such certification, there was no pending
Fortunato Gupit, Jr. for petitioner. request for union recognition by any other labor organization with management.  
Solicitor General Estelito P Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor
Romeo C. de la Cruz for respondent Bureau of Labor Relations. Thereafter, on June 20, 1974, respondent Federation of Free Workers, setting forth that its
F. F. Bonifacio, Jr. for respondent Union and Gerardo Rosana. members represent more than 60% out of 1,500 members, more or less, rank-and-file employees
Cesar C. Cruz & Associates for respondent Orion Manila, of Orion, sought a certification election.   PLAC, as could be expected, opposed such a move as in
its view the collective bargaining agreement entered into with the Orion had been certified.   
FERNANDO, J:
It was sustained, the Secretary of Labor to whom an appeal was taken concurring with the former
JUSTICE FERNANDO’S FLEX: It would be to frustrate the hopes that inspired the present Labor Code   to minimize judicial participation in the National Labor Relations Commission affirming the dismissal of such petition for certification, on the
solution of employer- employee disputes resort to the courts would remain unabated. Nevertheless, in view of the certiorari jurisdiction of this Tribunal,    a grave
abuse of discretion may be alleged as a grievance thus calling for remedial action. So petitioner Philippine Labor Alliance Council did hope to achieve in this
ground of the existence of a certified collective bargaining agreement.  That did not end the
certiorari and prohibition proceeding against respondent Bureau of Labor Relations.    It would indict an order   for a certification election by respondent Bureau as dispute.
tainted by a jurisdictional infirmity in view of what is contended to be an existing duly certified collective bargaining contract between it and private respondent
Orion Manila, Inc., the employer. It would thus ignore the withdrawal in the same order of such certification based on a finding that there was a failure on the part
of the majority of the employees in the bargaining unit to ratify the collective contract, renewed nine months before the termination of the previous agreement. Respondent Federation on January 15, 1975, filed a complaint with the respondent Bureau of
Apparently, the difficulty confronting it was due to the disaffiliation of many of its members. The order complained of recognized that there was such a sentiment on
the part of sizable number of employees in the collective bargaining unit, thus making patent the desirability of conducting a certification election. That was the Labor Relations, the present Labor Code having become effective, alleging that some employees,
method to determine the exclusive bargaining representative followed even under the previous labor legislation .  It would thus appear rather obvious that the
attempt to impute arbitrariness to respondent Bureau cannot be attended with success. (Spoiler Alert) The petition must be dismissed.
numbering 848 in all, in a resolution attached to the complaint disaffiliated from PLAC and
affiliated with it, characterizing the certified agreement as having been entered into allegedly to
SUMMARY: The petitioner union PLAC had entered and concluded a collective bargaining thwart such disaffiliation and seeking a declaration of the nullity thereof.   After both PLAC and
agreement with respondent company Orion, Inc. The CBA was ratified by a unanimous vote by 1,500 respondent Federation of Free Workers had filed their pleadings,   the Med-Arbiter, on March 20,
members of the PLAC. The CBA was further certified by the NLRC. 1975, dismissed the complaint.  There was a motion for reconsideration, then an opposition.  

However, an issue regarding the defective nature of the CBA emerged when the Federation of Free On April 8, 1975, respondent Bureau of Labor Relations issued an order setting aside the
Workers claimed that it represented more than 60% of the members of the rank and file employees of certification of the collective bargaining agreement and ordering a certification election within
Orion. It then filed for a certification election, which was opposed by the PLAC. The PLAC was 20 days from receipt of the order, upon the following declaration:
sustained in view of the fact that the CBA was certified.
"In the instant case, it is not disputed that the collective bargaining agreement certified by the National
The FFW then filed a complaint with the Bureau of Labor Relations, arguing that 848 employees of Labor Relations Commission was not ratified by the majority of the employees within the bargaining unit.
Orion had disaffiliated from PLAC and affiliated with FFW. The complaint was dismissed. This is defective. It is blatant non- observance of the basic requirement necessary to certification. ... With
respect to the complaint of the confirmation of disaffiliation of the members of respondent Philippine
Labor Alliance Council, the same should be resolved in the most expedient and simple method of
However, the BLR issued an order setting aside the certification of the CBA and ordered for a determining the exclusive bargaining representative—the holding of a certification election"  
certification election. The reason for the decertification was the finding that there was a non-
ratification by the majority of the employees of the CBA. There was a motion for reconsideration as well as a verified urgent petition filed with the Secretary of
Labor by Orion, but the order was affirmed on July 31, 1975, the motion to consider being denied. 
Issue: Whether the BLR erred in issuing the order calling for the certification election
From the very petition with its annexes, it is undisputed that there was a finding in the challenged
Held: No. Disaffiliation from a union is a phenomenon which is nothing new in the Philippine labor order by respondent Bureau of Labor Relations of the non-ratification by the majority of the
movement. It is not open to any legal objection and disaffiliation is implicit in the freedom of employees of the certified collective bargaining agreement, thus calling for its decertification. It is
association explicitly ordained in the Constitution. also noteworthy that in the comment of respondent FFW, considered as its answer, the allegation
that there was such a ratification was specifically denied. It cannot be taken as having proven.
The individual employee has an incontrovertible right to join an organization of his choice and such There is nothing in the exhaustive memorandum of petitioner either that would justify the imputation
choice belongs to him; he is not to be denied such liberty. Once the fact of disaffiliation has been that respondent Bureau, in ordering decertification of the collective bargaining agreement with
demonstrated beyond doubt, as in this case, a certification election is the most expeditious way of petitioner to be followed by a certification election, committed a transgression of the present Labor
determining which labor organization is to be the exclusive bargaining representative. Code, much less one of such grievous character as to taint its actuation with a jurisdictional infirmity.
It is quite apparent therefore that with due recognition of the ability and scholarship evident in the
Collective bargaining implies that instead of a unilateral imposition by management, the terms and pleadings of Attorney Fortunate Gupit, Jr. for the petitioner, the attempt to invoke our certiorari
conditions of employment should be the subject of negotiation between it and labor. Thus the two jurisdiction cannot succeed..  So it was noted at the outset.
parties indispensable to the economy are supposed to take care of their respective interests.
Moreover, the very notion of industrial self-rule negates the assumption that what is good for either ISSUE: WON the BLR erred in ordering a certification election among the employees of Orion, inc.
party should be left to the will of the other. On the contrary, there is an awareness that labor can be (NO)
trusted to promote its welfare through the bargaining process. To it then must be left the choice of its
agent for such purpose RULING: WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed. The restraining order issued by
this Court in its resolution of September 8, 1975 is hereby lifted. No costs.
FACTS: It was a detailed narration of facts set forth in the petition, starting with the allegation that
there was a renewal of the collective bargaining agreement with a union shop clause on March RATIO:
9, 1974 between Petitioner Union (Philippines Labor Alliance Council) and respondent
company (Orion Manila, Inc.) to last for another period of three (3) years incorporating therein new 1. It is indisputable that the present controversy would not have arisen if there were no mass
economic benefits to expire on December 31, 1977.   The claim was that at that time it was the only disaffiliation from petitioning Union. Such a phenomenon is nothing new in the Philippine labor
bargaining agent of the Orion unchallenged by any labor organization.    movement.  Nor is it open to any legal objection. It is implicit in the freedom of association
explicitly ordained by the Constitution.  There is then the incontrovertible right of any
individual to join an organization of his choice. That option belongs to him. A workingman is the members of respondent Philippine Labor Alliance counsel the same should be resolved in the most
not to be denied that liberty.   He may be, as a matter of fact, more in need of it if the institution of expedient and simple method of determining the exclusive bargaining representative — the holding of a
collective bargaining as an aspect of industrial democracy is to succeed. No obstacle that may certification election."   
possibly thwart the desirable objective of militancy in labor's struggle for better terms and conditions is
then to be placed on his way. Once the fact of disaffiliation has been demonstrated beyond In the order denying the motion for reconsideration dated July 31, 1975, it was first noted: "On
doubt, as in this case, a certification election is the most expeditious way of determining January 20, 1975, FFW and 848 Orion employees filed with the Bureau a petition for the
which labor organization is to be the exclusive bargaining representative. It is as simple as that. annulment of the 1974 collective bargaining agreement and for the confirmation of the
disaffiliation of the 848 employees from PLAC and their affiliation with FFW. The petition
There is relevance to this excerpt from a recent decision, Philippine Association of Free Labor alleged among others, that the new agreement was concluded about ten months before the expiry
Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations:    date of the old purposely to defeat the right of the covered employees to choose their bargaining
representative at the proper time appointed by law. It appears, indeed, that there was no urgency for
"Petitioner thus appears to be woefully lacking in awareness of the significance of a certification election for the premature renegotiations considering that the new agreement provides for a 50-centavo salary
the collective bargaining process. It is the fairest and most effective way of determining which labor increase effective yet on January 1, 1976."   Then, there was further clarification of the decision
organization can truly represent the working force. It is a fundamental postulate that the will of the majority, if reached as to the holding of a certification election being the appropriate mode of solving the dispute:
given expression in an honest election with freedom on the part of the voters to make their choice, is controlling.
No better device can assure the institution of industrial democracy with the two parties to a business enterprise,
"With the decertification of the collective agreement, the representation issue comes back to the fore.
management and labor, establishing a regime of self-rule.” Petitioner wants this resolved by ruling on the affiliation and disaffiliation of the union, The Bureau
holds, however, that certification election can better resolve the issue. Parenthetically, it should be
As was pointed out by Chief Justice Castro in Rivera v. San Miguel Brewery Corporation, Inc., "a stated that a certification election can still be held even if the collective agreement were certified,
collective bargaining agreement is the law of the plant." To the same effect is this explicit considering the peculiar facts of the case. Good policy and equity demand that when an agreement is
pronouncement in Mactan Workers Union v. Aboitiz: 'The terms and conditions of a collective renegotiated before the appointed 60-day period, its certification must still give way to any
bargaining contract constitute the law between the parties.' What could be aptly stressed then, as representation issue that may be raised within 60-day period so that the right of employees to choose
was done in Compania Maritima v. Compania Maritima Labor Union, is "the primacy to which the a bargaining unit agent and the right, of unions to be chosen shall be preserved." 
decision reached by the employees themselves is entitled." Further, it was therein stated: 'That is in
the soundest tradition of industrial democracy. For collective bargaining implies that instead of a ON CONCLUSIVENESS OF ADMIN FINDINGS
unilateral imposition by management, the terms and conditions of employment should be the
subject of negotiation between it and labor. Thus the two parties indispensable to the economy 3. There is, finally, another insuperable obstacle success of this petition. There is no need for a citation of authorities to show how well-
settled and firmly-rooted is the doctrine of the well- nigh conclusive respect for the findings of facts of administrative tribunals, leaving to
are supposed to take care of their respective interests. Moreover, the very notion of industrial self-rule the judiciary, in the ultimate analysis, this Tribunal, to set forth the correct legal norm applicable to the controversy. With specific
negates the assumption that what is good for either party should be left to the will of the other. On the reference to the agencies at present dealing with labor relations, there is this excerpt from Justice Aquino's opinion in  Antipolo Highway
contrary, there is an awareness that labor can be trusted to promote its welfare through the Lines, Inc. v. Inciong:   "A dispassionate scrutiny of the proceedings in the NLRC does not sustain petitioners' view that they were
denied due process and that the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion. (See Maglasang v. Ople, L-38813, April 29, 1975 per
bargaining process. To it then must be left the choice of its agent for such purpose.' To Justice Fernando). We found no justification for setting aside the factual findings of the NLRC, which like those of any other
paraphrase an observation of the recently retired Chief Justice Makalintal in Seno v. Mendoza, it is administrative agency, are generally binding on the courts (Timbancaya v. Vicente. 62 O.G. 9424, 9 SCRA 852). " 
essential that there be an agreement to govern the relations between labor marked by confusion, with
resulting breaches of the law by either party. There is, it would appear, a decidedly unsympathetic Separate Opinions
approach to the institution of collective bargaining at war with what has so often and so consistently
decided by this Tribunal."  BARREDO, J., concurring:
With the observation that nothing herein modifies the general rule that while a bargaining wish may be changed, the
effectivity and enforceability with a valid collective bargaining contract cannot be affected thereby.
ON THE DECERTIFICATION OF THE CBA

2. A different conclusion could have been reached had there been no decertification. The
contract-bar rule could then be invoked by petitioner. It is, as pointed out by Justice Fernandez in
Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions v. National Labor Relations Commission,   "a principle
in labor law that a collective bargaining agreement of reasonable duration is, in the interest of the
stability of industrial relations, a bar to certification elections." 
Even then, as was pointed out in the just-cited Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions decision,
it "is not to be applied with rigidity. ... The element of flexibility in its operation cannot be ignored."    In
this controversy, however, such a principle is not applicable. The collective bargaining agreement
entered into by petitioner with management on March 9, 1974 was decertified in the challenged
order of April 8, 1975.  The power to decertify by respondent Bureau is not disputed. It was the exercise thereof
that is now assailed. If done arbitrarily, there is valid ground for complaint. The due process clause is a guarantee
against any actuation of that sort. It stands for fairness and justice, that standard was not ignored. It suffices to read
the petition to disprove any allegation of such failing, whether in its procedural or substantive aspect. Petitioner was
heard by respondent Bureau before the order of decertification was issued on April 8, 1975. The denial of its motion
for reconsideration came also after it had an opportunity to present its side. Procedural due process was thus
observed. Nor was there any denial of substantive due process in the sense of such decertification being an act of
arbitrariness and caprice.

In the order of April 8, 1975, it was specifically pointed out:

"In the instant case, it is not disputed that the collective bargaining agreement certified by the
National Labor Relations Commission was not ratified by the majority of the employees within
the bargaining unit. This is defective. It is blatant non-observance of the basic requirement necessary
to certification. To allow it to remain uncorrected would allow circumvention of what the law
specifically ordained. We cannot countenance irregularities of the highest order to exist in our
very own eyes to be perpetuated. With respect to the complaint of the confirmation of disaffiliation of