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Case Digest 3

Petitioner Ofelia Arceta did not move to have the charge against her dismissed or the Information quashed. She reasoned out that with the Lozano doctrine still in place, such a move would be futile. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
549 views4 pages

Case Digest 3

Petitioner Ofelia Arceta did not move to have the charge against her dismissed or the Information quashed. She reasoned out that with the Lozano doctrine still in place, such a move would be futile. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.

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LOTA ALBAY TUMAMBING

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

CASE DIGEST

ARCETA V. MANGROBANG

Facts:

Information was filed to herein petitioner Ofelia Arceta for issuing a bouncing
check to Oscar Castro. Arceta did not move to have the charge against her
dismissed or the Information quashed on the ground that B.P. Blg. 22 was
unconstitutional. She reasoned out that with the Lozano doctrine still in place, such
a move would be an exercise in futility for it was highly unlikely that the trial court
would grant her motion and thus go against prevailing jurisprudence.

Issue:

The constitutionality of B.P. Blg. 22- The Bouncing Check Law.

Ruling:

The constitutional question herein raised is not the very lis mota presented in the
controversy below. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality,
and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.1[13] We
have examined the contentions of the petitioners carefully; but they still have to
persuade us that B.P. Blg. 22 by itself or in its implementation transgressed a
provision of the Constitution.

1
Javier vs. Commission on Elections

Facts:

The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the
Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to
enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the
nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the
eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head
when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly
by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are
now facing trial for these murders. The incident naturally heightened tension
in the province and sharpened the climate of fear among the electorate.
Conceivably, it intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition
candidate or into supporting the candidate of the ruling party.

It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election
developments were to run true to form. Owing to what he claimed were
attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner
went to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election
returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was
proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner
thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void
because made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en
banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his
proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member of the
Batasang Pambansa.

The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986,
the petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight. The
nation, already indignant over the obvious manipulation of the presidential
elections in favor of Marcos, was revolted by the killing, which flaunted a
scornful disregard for the law by the assailants who apparently believed they
were above the law. This ruthless murder was possibly one of the factors
that strengthened the cause of the Opposition in the February revolution that
toppled the Marcos regime and installed the present government under
President Corazon C. Aquino.

The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office
in dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent-both of whom
have gone their separate ways-could be a convenient justification for
dismissing this case. But there are larger issues involved that must be
resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here
raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible
terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the
simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and
academic.

Issue:

Whether or not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections has


jurisdiction over the above-mentioned case.
Ruling:

Section 3 provides:

The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All


election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests
involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard
and decided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election
cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their
submission for decision.

In providing that the Commission on Elections could act in division when


deciding election cases, according to this theory, the Constitution was laying
down the general rule. The exception was the election contest involving the
members of the Batasang Pambansa, which had to be heard and decided en
banc. The en banc requirement would apply only from the time a candidate
for the Batasang Pambansa was proclaimed as winner, for it was only then
that a contest could be permitted under the law. All matters arising before
such time were, necessarily, subject to decision only by division of the
Commission as these would come under the general heading of "election
cases."

In making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests


involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the
Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases
from beginning to end and on all matters related thereto, including those
arising before the proclamation of the winners.

Besides, the term "contest" as it was understood at the time Article XII-C.
Section 2(2) was incorporated in the 1973 Constitution did not follow the
strict definition of a contention between the parties for the same office.
Under the Election Code of 1971, which presumably was taken into
consideration when the 1973 Constitution was being drafted, election
contests included the quo warranto petition that could be filed by any voter
on the ground of disloyalty or ineligibility of the contestee although such
voter was himself not claiming the office involved. 12

The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive meaning; on the


contrary, it should receive the widest possible scope conformably to the rule
that the words used in the Constitution should be interpreted liberally. As
employed in the 1973 Constitution, the term should be understood as
referring to any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective
office, made before or after proclamation of the winner, whether or not the
contestant is claiming the office in dispute. Needless to stress, the term
should be given a consistent meaning and understood in the same sense
under both Section 2(2) and Section 3 of Article XII-C of the Constitution.

The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its


totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's
title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that "election" referred to
the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the
electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" to
the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including
questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the
authenticity of the election returns and "qualifications" to matters that could
be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such
as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of
candidacy
WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for
the supervening events that have legally rendered it moot and academic,
this petition would have been granted and the decision of the Commission on
Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution.

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